Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.48548/pubdata-1188
Resource typeWorking Paper
Title(s)Strongly rational expectations equilibria with endogenous acquisition of information
DOI10.48548/pubdata-1188
Handle20.500.14123/1251
CreatorDesgranges, Gabriel
Heinemann, Maik
AbstractThis paper analyzes conditions for existence of a strongly rational expectations equilibrium (SREE) in models with private information, where the amount of private information is endogenously determined. It is shown that the conditions for existence of a SREE known from models with exogenously given private information do not change as long as it is impossible to use the information transmitted through market prices. In contrast, these conditions are too weak, when there is such learning from prices. It turns out that the properties of the function which describes the costs that are associated with the individual acquisition of information are important in this respect. In case of constant marginal costs, prices must be half as informative than private signals in order for a SREE to exist. An interpretation of this result that falls back on the famous Grossman–Stiglitz–Paradox is also given.
LanguageEnglish
KeywordsEductive Learning; Private Information; Rational Expectations; Strongly Rational Expectations Equilibrium; Erwartung; Rationale Erwartung
Year of publication in PubData2005
Publishing typeFirst publication
Publication versionPublished version
Date issued2005-07-07
Creation contextResearch
Published byMedien- und Informationszentrum, Leuphana Universität Lüneburg
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