PubData Leuphana Repository: Associations Agreement and the Interest of the Network Suppliers

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.48548/pubdata-1186

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Field	Value
Resource type	Working Paper
Title(s)	Associations Agreement and the Interest of the Network Suppliers - The Strategic Use of Structural Features
DOI	10.48548/pubdata-1186
Handle	20.500.14123/1249
Creator	Wein, Thomas 0000-0001-7443-3253 170739767
Abstract	The EU electricity directive (96/92/EC) established the right of the member states to choose between Regulated and Negotiated Third Party Access (RTPA and NTPA). The interest group theory is able to explain whether the introduction of NTPA in Germany had been an interest group equilibrium under the restriction of EU-directive. Using the NTPA associations of electricity power suppliers, network monopolists and industrial consumers negotiated three agreements. The last one (AA VVII+) in December 2001 introduced a market comparison scheme with three structural features: “East-/West-Germany”, “consumption/population density”, and “cable rate”. These features are variables which are supposed to reflect cost differences between network suppliers. The theoretical analysis will derive the hypothesis that this conception allows to introduce a cost irrelevant factor and therefore to increase prices without harming firms which do not hold this factor. This hypothesis could be tested by analyzing the German low and medium voltage network suppliers in 2002 and 2003. Our estimations show that the use of structural feature “East-/West Germany” and “consumption/population density” could be explained by this hypothesis. But because we have no firm specific information about cost differences other explanations could not be excluded: Monopoly prices differ with marginal costs, and regulation could reflect real cost differences. The third structural feature “cable rate” has no influence in low voltage networks, but has an impact on access charges levied in medium voltage networks. This relationship is only given if we use the borderlines given by AA VVII+. Hence, we are not able to reject the interest group theory: The feature “cable rate” was introduced successfully to increase access charges for medium network suppliers which have high cable rates without having higher costs.
Language	English
Keywords	Deregulation; Monopoly; Interest Group; Regulierung; Monopol; Interessenverband; Netzbetreiber
DDC	330 :: Wirtschaft
Year of publication in PubData	2005
Publishing type	First publication
Publication version	Published version
Date issued	2005-07-06
Creation context	Research
Faculty / department	Frühere Fachbereiche
Series title and number	Working paper series in economics 7
Alternative Idenfier(s)	urn:nbn:de:gbv:luen4-opus-3115
Date of Availability	2024-08-23T07:46:13Z
Archiving Facility	Medien- und Informationszentrum (Leuphana Universität Lüneburg 02w2y2t16)
Published by	Medien- und Informationszentrum, Leuphana Universität Lüneburg