Journal ArticleParallel publicationPublished versionDOI: 10.48548/pubdata-3857

One-third Co-determination in German Supervisory Boards and its Economic Consequences. New Evidence for Employment

Chronological data

Date of first publication2011-06
Date of publication in PubData 2026-06-19

Language of the resource

English

Related external resources

Variant form of DOI: 10.3790/schm.131.1.107
Boneberg, F. (2011). One-third Co-determination in German Supervisory Boards and its Economic Consequences. New Evidence for Employment. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, 131(1), 107-131.
Published in ISSN: 2568-762X
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch

Editor

Case provider

Other contributors

Abstract

The economic consequences of workers’ participation rights in Germany are still uncertain. Because employee representation at the board level is mandatory based on the legal form and size of the company, a direct comparison of firms that apply co-determination and those that do not does not appear to be possible. However, a new kind of data set used in this paper allows such a direct comparison. The present study analyzes the potential impact of co-determined supervisory boards on employment. Whereas several studies have looked at the possible effects of works councils on employment growth, the effects of co-determination at the enterprise level have been the object of investigation only once. The present paper contributes to this lack of empirical evidence in showing that there is no significant correlation between supervisory board existence and employment growth.

Keywords

Workers Participation Right; Employee Representation; Co-determination; Employment Growth; Germany

More information

DDC

Creation Context

Research