Journal ArticleParallel publicationPublished version DOI: 10.48548/pubdata-1693

Organized Labor, Labor Market Imperfections, and Employer Wage Premia

Chronological data

Date of first publication2024-03-13
Date of publication in PubData 2025-02-26

Language of the resource

English

Related external resources

Variant form of DOI: 10.1177/00197939241237757
Dobbelaere, S., Hirsch, B., Müller, S., Neuschäffer, G. (2024). Organized labor, labor market imperfections, and employer wage premia. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 77(3), 396-427.
Published in ISSN: 0019-7939
ILR Review

Abstract

This article examines how collective bargaining through unions and workplace codetermination through works councils relate to labor market imperfections and how labor market imperfections relate to employer wage premia. Based on representative German plant data for the years 1999–2016, the authors document that 70% of employers pay wages below the marginal revenue product of labor and 30% pay wages above that level. Findings further show that the prevalence of wage markdowns is significantly smaller when organized labor is present, and that the ratio of wages to the marginal revenue product of labor is significantly larger. Finally, the authors document a close link between labor market imperfections and mean employer wage premia, that is, wage differences between employers corrected for worker sorting.

Keywords

Employer Monopsony; Worker Monopoly; Wage Markdowns; Wage Markups; Labor Market Power; Collective Wage Agreements

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More information

DDC

Creation Context

Research