

# **Cross-National Evaluation of the Sources of Anti-Trafficking Enforcement**

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## List of Abbreviations:

3P Index	3P Anti-Trafficking Policy Index
ARMA	Autoregressive Moving Average
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
COCI	Composite Organized Crime Index
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
CRI	Citizen Rights Index
EDI	Effective Democracy Index
EVI	Emancipative Values Index
GDI	Gender Development Index
GEI	Gender Equity Index
GEM	Gender Empowerment Measure
GGI	Gender Gap Index
GII	Gender Inequality Index
HDI	Human Development Index
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
MLM	Multilevel Modeling
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
PEI	Perception of Electoral Integrity
PIRI	Physical Integrity Rights Index
PTS	Political Terror Scale
RIM	Random Intercept Model
RIRS	Random Intercept Random Slope Model
SMA	Social Movement Activity
TIP	Trafficking in Persons Report
TVPA	Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act
UN Protocol	United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VAW	Violence Against Women Index
VIF	Variance Inflation Factor
WANGO	World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations
WGI	World Bank Governance Indicators
WVS	World Values Survey



## **CHAPTER OUTLINE**

### Introduction

Introduction defines both human trafficking and anti-trafficking enforcement. Difficulties of accurately measuring victims of that crime and gaps in quantitative research in this field are discussed. Responding to these difficulties in global comparative analysis the thesis offers to work with quantifiable data on enforcement of the legislation against human trafficking or as the literature refers to it – anti-trafficking enforcement data.

### Chapter 1: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

Chapter one reviews the literature and previous studies on anti-trafficking enforcement by addressing the root causes of human trafficking. These theoretical root causes are reviewed from global perspective as factors preventing enforcement of an effective legislation against human trafficking. They consist of gender inequality, international factors, state capacity, political institutions and demand drivers. Due to existing gaps in the literature Chapter one offers a broader theoretical framework by identifying what are the most significant factors influencing global anti-trafficking enforcement.

### Chapter 2: Theoretical Nexus of Anti-Trafficking Enforcement

Chapter two critically reviews the data sources currently available for the global measurement and analysis of anti-trafficking enforcement with the aim of empirically evaluating the reliability and validity of existing data sources. Three major global data sources on anti-trafficking enforcement are analyzed: the Trafficking in Persons Report (the US Department of State), the 3P Anti-trafficking Policy Index (the German Institute for Economic Research) and the Trafficking Scale (Woman Stats Database). This Chapter evaluates and tests the most reliable existing global measure of anti-trafficking enforcement overlapping with the concepts of human trafficking and thus hindering the process of better enforcement.

### Chapter 3: Data and Methods

Chapter three introduces the data sources, indicators, country and time coverage as well as the methods in the two studies that follow. First study focuses on analyzing the evidence at the country level, while the second delves deeper into micro-foundations of human trafficking.

## Chapter 4: Results: Anti-Trafficking Enforcement Models

Chapter four analyzes the evidence at the country level, using various statistical methods. To analyze anti-trafficking enforcement models and determine which drivers have the highest importance, both cross-sectional and longitudinal methods of analysis are applied. The chapter separately reviews comparative cross-sectional analyses run via ordinal regressions and pooled time-series analyses run via panel regressions.

## Chapter 5: Results: Micro-Foundations of Human Trafficking Models

Due to the limitations found in the country-level evidence, Chapter five moves from country-level evidence to a more complex multilevel framework, to shed light on the micro-foundations of human trafficking by looking at the link between violence acceptance, on the one hand, and prostitution tolerance and emancipative values, on the other hand, as well as moderations of this link.

## Discussion and Conclusion

Concluding chapter discusses the main findings and their implications for future research in the field of cross-national research on anti-trafficking enforcement.

*“Whether it comes in the form of a young girl trapped in a brothel, a woman enslaved as a domestic worker, a boy forced to sell himself on the street, or a man abused on a fishing boat, the victims of this crime have been robbed of the right to lead the lives they choose for themselves.”*

Secretary of State John F. Kerry, 2014

## **INTRODUCTION**

Studies repeatedly label human trafficking “modern slavery” or “the slavery of our times” (Holmes 2010; Shelley 2010; Roth 2010). Indeed global awareness of this problem is growing. It is becoming more difficult for international and domestic actors alike to turn a blind eye to the injustice of human trafficking.

The history of human trafficking is complex and dated over hundreds of years. The first mention of trafficking related behavior dates back to ancient civilizations (Masci 2004; Davis 2006; Cullen-DuPont 2009). Human trafficking is deeply rooted in slavery which can be traced back to the earliest written records of humankind, such as the Judeo-Christian Old and New Testaments, the Muslim Koran, classical texts of ancient Greece and Rome, and even the Code of Hammurabi (c. 1780 BC), where slavery was defined as an established institution (Cullen-DuPont 2009). From the ancient Greek and Romans to the medieval times, and up until today, humans have been subject to various forms of physical and sexual slavery (Thomas 1996; Masci 2004; Davis 2006; Cullen-DuPont 2009). It is therefore a perennial story, and one for which every region of the world has its own history. However, throughout history and across the globe, the common feature of human trafficking is the brutal violation of human rights. Despite the long history of abuses of humans, this crime is still thriving in a contemporary context. These days, the definition of trafficking differs from the days of white slavery when people were publicly bought and sold for forced labor. The first definition of the modern day trafficking of humans is given in the 2000 United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (hereafter the “UN Protocol”). It defines human trafficking as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability, or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation” (Assembly UN General 2000: 42). This definition expresses

the “political will to answer a global challenge with a global response” (Assembly UN General 2000: foreword). According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime website “the intention behind this definition is to facilitate convergence in national approaches with regard to the establishment of domestic criminal offences that would support efficient international cooperation in investigating and prosecuting trafficking in persons cases”.<sup>1</sup> Before this definition has been proposed it seems that the scholars did not properly address this problem. Starting in the early 2000s, the problem of human trafficking begins to raise awareness for the problem. When the scholars realized the scope of the problem, human trafficking started to be referred as the modern form of human slavery (Kristof and WuDunn 2009). Slavery was not eliminated in the nineteenth century, but still thrives in parts of the world today. Indeed, in their stunning book “Half the Sky” Kristof and WuDunn (2009) observe that “whatever the exact number is it seems almost certain that the modern global slave trade is larger in absolute terms than the Atlantic slave trade in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was” (Kristof and WuDunn 2009: 11). Thus, the concern is rising and many more countries are addressing the human trafficking problems that have befallen them.

However, countries are dealing differently with elimination of human trafficking via imposing various legislative measures. There are several global indices that evaluate countries’ legislative efforts to combat human trafficking. It is accepted in the literature to refer to the laws against human trafficking as anti-trafficking enforcement since they include a wide range of governmental measures to address human trafficking. Such measures include enactment of laws prohibiting trafficking in persons, criminal penalties prescribed for human trafficking, prosecution of the prevalent forms of trafficking, preventive measures to identify factors contributing to human trafficking, identification of victims and protection efforts. The information provided by these indices helps to evaluate how well countries address the problem of human trafficking.<sup>2</sup>

To this day, due to the criminal aspect of human trafficking and perhaps other intervening factors, the reliable data on human trafficking per se is absent, that is why the researchers tend to use data on anti-trafficking enforcement – a set of measures governments can develop and incorporate into their legislative agendas to combat human trafficking. These days, the number of studies using the data on enforcement is growing, but there is still little research

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/index.html>

<sup>2</sup> There is indeed a conceptual difference between anti-trafficking legislation and anti-trafficking enforcement: the first reflects the desired outcome and the latter – an actual outcome. This difference is omitted here and the two concepts are combined due to the purpose of this work in the mere outcome – the evaluation of countries efforts to enforce anti-trafficking legislation.

that focuses on the quantitative or comparative aspect of anti-trafficking enforcement. It seems that scholars already know how the legislation works in general, but lack interest in why some countries are more successful in enforcing anti-trafficking laws while others are far behind. No study comes up with an explanation of why the enforcement of legislative measures works differently in different countries and what might be the possible global determinants of an effective anti-trafficking enforcement. Despite the rising concern and the study of human trafficking over the last 20 years, few studies systematically analyze the phenomenon and evaluate efforts that countries are applying to deal with the problem, and just few take a global, cross-national approach. Quantitative research is rare in this field: most studies cover just one or a few countries (Clawson et. al. 2006; Danailova-Trainor and Belser 2006; Akee et al. 2007; Mahmoud and Trebesch 2009; Karakus and Mcgarrell 2011; Jac-Kucharski 2012). Many will not even approach the quantitative side of human trafficking research. For instance, Tyldum (2010:1) points out that “attempts to describe worldwide trafficking across regions and arenas are less likely to be successful”. Possibly due to the paucity of systematic, global comparison, the existing literature comes to mixed conclusions over the determinants of anti-trafficking enforcement.

For instance, Cho’s (2012) examination of 78 push and 67 pull factors produces contradictory results. There are several factors including measures of democracy and poverty that produce both negative and positive effects in her models (Cho 2012: 35-39). This mixed terrain begs for more cross-national, systematic research, which allows tracing country-level characteristics affecting enforcement of anti-trafficking legislation.

The difficulties of quantitative research in this field are very reasonable and start with the fact that some countries ignore the problem of human trafficking as such. Such countries rarely collect human trafficking statistics or even try to hide real scope of the problem by misusing the definition of a trafficked person. For instance, trafficking is often confused with human smuggling or illegal migration (Huda 2006). However, the UN Protocol defines smuggling of migrants as “intentional procurement for profit of the illegal entry of a person into and/or illegal residence of a person in a State of which the person is not a national or permanent resident” (Assembly UN General 2000: 2). Although it is sometimes hard to distinguish between people who are smuggled and people who are trafficked, the general comparison lies in the notion of cooperation: people who have been smuggled are aware of the smuggling crime and coercion is not applied in this case, while trafficked persons are victims involved into forced labor or sexual exploitation under coercion. Thus, it is important to distinguish between people who are smuggled and people who are trafficked, and

trafficking needs to be addressed differently, starting with identifying victims and stretching to other methods like the legal possibilities to stay in a country for trafficked victims. There are countries which recognize these crimes separately and participate in various regional and global agreements while some clearly confuse the severe crime of trafficking with smuggling and offer no means to identify and protect the victims. Due to the lack of agreement on the definition of human trafficking in some countries, it is possible that a trafficker must only pay a fine if he/she is caught by a law enforcement agent.

For instance, in Tanzania in 2013 convicted traffickers received fines without jail time for the crime of international labor trafficking (TIP 2013: 356-358). In Uruguay, sex trafficking has been prosecuted with community services or fines (TIP 2013: 387-389). Another example of authorities not distinguishing between smuggling and trafficking can be observed in Zimbabwe, where authorities “fined a man on migration charges for his transport of 19 potential trafficking victims into South Africa” (TIP 2013: 399-400). In some cases, *victims* are being punished since they are considered to be complicit in illegal migration or smuggling crime. For example, in the case of Turkmenistan authorities, who punished trafficked victims and fined them for violating the visa regime (TIP 2013: 370-371). In Uzbekistan, trafficked victims faced not only fines but imprisonment as well for crossing the border illegally (TIP 2013: 389-390). From a legislative standpoint, it is clear that countries shall adopt different strategies to fight both human trafficking and human smuggling crimes as they have been separated by the two related UN protocols. As we see in countries like Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan, mixing the crimes might even affect people who became victims of crime instead of those who actually committed the crime of trafficking. In some instances, policies against trafficking indeed overlap with illegal migration policies, affecting countries’ decisions to actually put trafficking on their agendas. Countries, then, should stop punishing trafficked victims under immigration laws so that these people are not immediately deported and forbidden to re-enter, but offer appropriate support when needed. Although the literature agrees that migrants are especially vulnerable to being trafficked, an enactment of laws against smuggling of migrants evidently will not be able to solve the human trafficking issues.

Another side-effect of the low number of quantitative research in the field of human trafficking is the unavailability of data on real numbers of trafficked victims worldwide. That is why researchers who want to apply quantitative analysis are every now and then using the estimates of trafficked victims (Salt 2000; Kangaspunta 2003; Danailova-Trainor and Belser 2006), which are not the most reliable measures and are even referred to as sketchy data (Goodey 2008). As the urge for better trafficking data remains, some researchers, rather than



working with rough estimates, work with the data on enforcement of legislation against human trafficking. To date, several studies quite successfully implement these data resources for global comparisons (Cho 2012; Cho and Vadlamannati 2012; Studnicka 2010; Wooditch 2010; Cho, Dreher and Neumayer 2014). However, another problem arises here – the variety of sources of anti-trafficking enforcement data. There are several global secondary sources of this data available nowadays, produced by organizations, institutions or individual researchers<sup>3</sup>, and scholars use these data sources to explore national, regional and international differences. But, it is indeed hard to draw global patterns based on such results since the data sources vary dramatically, and the researchers use different reasons for selecting one index over another. For instance, some researchers rely on the number of countries that the measure covers, some - on previous research and only a few delve deeper into advantages of chosen measures. These are some serious gaps which scholars must have overlooked due to either the data scarcity or novelty of the topic. Responding to the gaps in the literature, this study *offers, firstly, a cross-national evaluation of the sources of anti-trafficking enforcement*. Since these sources vary, in order to carefully evaluate their performance accordingly I will examine the relation of existing global secondary sources to the main concepts of human trafficking in order to choose the best conceptually-driven measurement of global anti-trafficking enforcement.

Since the topic of human trafficking and its legislation has been brought to the scholars' attention rather recently, there is a lack of consensus amongst researchers with regard to the theoretical explanation behind global anti-trafficking enforcement. Some hypothesized influences are under-theorized and lack an unambiguous operationalization, not to speak of a sound analyzed. So far, global cross-national analyses present thin theoretical models, with a heavy multitude of theoretically weakly justified variables. I argue that a more systematic and theory-grounded approach to the worldwide determinants of anti-trafficking enforcement is necessary. Thus, secondly, the thesis *aims to offer a more rigorous examination of drivers that explain anti-trafficking enforcement across the globe*. I will offer a broad theoretical framework according to which I will test the most significant factors influencing global anti-trafficking enforcement. In order to theoretically address the determinants of anti-trafficking enforcement, the root causes of trafficking need to be further examined. Such conditions as severe inequalities and poor political, economic and social realities are recognized as the main reasons of modern human trafficking. These factors must be undertaken from an international legislative standpoint since the current reality offers a wide range of opportunities for only a

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<sup>3</sup> The detailed comparison of three most comprehensive measures is presented in Chapter 2.

minority of the world's population, leaving the majority with nothing besides ending up in miserable conditions.<sup>4</sup> Thus, I offer five global realities affecting human trafficking nowadays, which are further tested as main drivers of anti-trafficking enforcement worldwide. These are: gender inequality, international factors, capacity of state, political institutions and behavior and demand drivers. Each of them is expected to be an important aspect and all together will offer a more comprehensive theoretical explanation of global variation in anti-trafficking enforcement.

Apart from country-level features in the aggregate, this study also aims to explore the micro-level foundations of the countries' varying efforts, or non-efforts, at anti-trafficking enforcement. I assume that a reason for governments to not enforce anti-trafficking measures is when there is no strong public support for such measures because people's deeply encultured habits de-sensitize them from seeing violence against human beings as much of a problem. Thus, proposition needs to be seen against the background that human trafficking is, first and foremost, sex trafficking. Sex trafficking in turn inevitably involves violence against women's physical integrity. Hence, I posit that if violence against women and violence in the household (including children) are widely accepted, and when prostitution is tolerated and even appreciated as a normal practice of life, then we face a cultural environment that radiates no pressure in favor of anti-trafficking enforcement. Accordingly, understanding the personal and contextual circumstances that acculturate individuals into accepting violence in the household sheds additional light on (a) where anti-trafficking enforcement is more likely to occur and (b) where it is more effective.

I will examine this issue in a multilevel framework that looks at the people's acceptance of violence against women and in the household as the dependent variable and how individual- and country-level characteristics simultaneously, and in mutual interaction, shape this violence acceptance. We will see that individuals who tolerate prostitution are more affirmative of violence in the household and that there is a pronounced negative interaction between the individuals' prostitution tolerance and their country's anti-trafficking enforcement. This negative interaction suggests, on the one hand, that anti-trafficking enforcement weakens the link between prostitution tolerance and violence acceptance and, on the other hand, that anti-trafficking enforcement is less likely where prostitution tolerance is (a) widespread and (b) strongly linked to violence acceptance.

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<sup>4</sup> The Canadian Council for Refugees NGO (<http://ccrweb.ca>)

Finally, with this thesis *I expect to offer some recommendations to the policymakers responsible for the construction of global measure of anti-trafficking enforcement.* While the horrifying stories of trafficked survivors are gruesome and unimaginable, the ratio of prosecuted traffickers remains unexpectedly low. The cases in which traffickers were able to leave only paying a fine, and thereafter likely going back to the same lucrative business, are even harder to believe. Why do some countries still prioritize some people over the others? Is it someone's skin color, or gender or social class that affects the decisions on trafficking cases? Or are the bribes that traffickers are paying to the authorities simply helping them to avoid punishment? Why are global international agreements neglected, despite being adopted by a country when they are brought to the government's attention? These questions are not only relevant for addressing the problem of human trafficking and creating effective legislative mechanisms, but also for establishing preventive measures only if we take into account existing realities of the world. I argue that only by addressing as many root causes of human trafficking as possible, this work can contribute to strengthening the governmental measures taken to combat trafficking. Identifying the most influential factors will help to improve the existing global measures, which at this point rely only on legislative information and lack socio-cultural aspects as well as political ones.

The relevance of this topic cannot be overestimated. Over the last decade, media and society became more aware that the human trafficking problem persists and actually develops exponentially. Although it is important to document the victims' suffering, it is equally important to examine how certain legislative measures address this problem in order to avoid the situations which lead to trafficking and prevent the act from happening again. At the moment, the problem of legislation rarely gets the same amount of attention. Mostly specialists in the field, policy makers, lawyers and NGOs discuss it. Thus, this and every other comparative research on anti-trafficking legislation should aim in the future not only to further examine this topic but also to bring it to the overall attention of the public and authorities.

Addressing the gaps discussed in the introduction, the first chapter of this thesis reviews the previous studies and offers different theoretical categories of alleged drivers behind the countries' anti-trafficking enforcement efforts, including gender inequality, international factors, capacity of state, political institutions and behavior, and demand drivers. Each driver is discussed separately in a sub-chapter. Chapter two identifies the best global measurement of anti-trafficking enforcement via addressing theoretical categories that overlap with human trafficking. Chapter three introduces the data sources, indicators, country and time coverage

as well as the methods in the two studies that follow. Chapter four (so to speak study 1) analyzes the evidence at the country level, using various statistical methods. Since the country-level evidence has inherent limitations, Chapter five (i.e., study 2) moves from country-level evidence only to a more complex multilevel framework, to shed light on the micro-foundations of human trafficking by looking at the link between violence acceptance, on the one hand, and prostitution tolerance and emancipative values, on the other hand, as well as moderations of this link. As we will see, anti-trafficking generally associates with reduced violence tolerance among individuals, which means that, on the one hand, anti-trafficking enforcement reduces violence tolerance but, on the other hand, is likely to occur in contexts with high violence tolerance. Moreover, emancipative values in the domain of sexual self-determination further strengthen the depressing effect of better anti-trafficking enforcement on violence acceptance. Furthermore, prostitution tolerance turns from a factor that increases violence acceptance into one that diminishes it, in interaction with better anti-trafficking enforcement. Finally, the Concluding chapter discusses the main findings and their implications for future research in the field of cross-national research on anti-trafficking enforcement. Supplementary findings and a detailed documentation of coding procedures, model specifications and other details of a more technical nature are provided by the Appendix at the end of this thesis.

# **CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

## **1.1 Explorative factors of anti-trafficking enforcement**

For the past 20 years hundreds studies on human trafficking have appeared in the literature. Although quantitative research is rare in this field, scholars are trying to fill this gap by looking at national (Arnold and Bertone 2002; Ekberg 2004; Schauer and Wheaton 2006; Kara 2006; Kreston 2007) and regional (Fitzgibbon 2003; Adepoju 2005; Huda 2006; Askola 2007; Surtees 2008) studies shedding more light on this problem. Since the data on real cases of human trafficking is hardly accessible or unreliable, these national and regional studies have limitations in order to grow into cross-national studies. Moreover, what is common for these studies is that they do not focus on establishing a confounding theory explaining both human trafficking and governmental enforcement of anti-trafficking legislation. Scholars analyze human trafficking by accounting for one explanation mostly, which is not enough for such a large-scale phenomenon. Hereby, I aim to combine both the theoretical assumptions explaining human trafficking and thus hindering anti-trafficking enforcement, from one side, and the empirical analysis explaining which country-level characteristics lead to better anti-trafficking enforcement, from the other side. Thus, the Chapter begins with a review of previous studies, both regional and national, helping to identify what global, country-level drivers play the crucial role in sustaining effective anti-trafficking legislation. Since this thesis aims at analyzing country-level compliance to international anti-trafficking enforcement, I account for all facets of a society that are able to explain how laws against human trafficking are enforced and why they are more successful in some countries and failing in others. In this thesis the reader will be presented with the following causes of failed anti-trafficking enforcement: the lack of equality in a society, unwillingness to follow the standards of international law, the lack of states' capacities to enforce proper legislation, non-democratic political institutions, lack of civic engagement and high demand for vulnerable people used for forced labor, prostitution or both. I argue that these country-level characteristics are the main groups of global drivers affecting the level of anti-trafficking enforcement nowadays. Since there is no confounding theory explaining anti-trafficking enforcement, I pull the outlined factors into one more general framework in order to showcase which of them have the highest impact on shaping global anti-trafficking enforcement.

### *1.1.1 GENDER INEQUALITY*

According to the TIP report, trafficking mostly has the following purposes: sex trafficking, child sex trafficking, forced labor, bonded labor or debt bondage, involuntary domestic servitude, forced child labor, unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers (TIP 2013: 29-38). Researchers indicate that women's position in the family and society makes them especially vulnerable to being trafficked (Surtees 2008; Blokhuis 2008; Sorensen et al. 2012). Hankivsky argues, "trafficking is often described as one of the most serious contemporary forms of gender discrimination" (Hankivsky 2005: 995). Gender inequality and gender-related issues are considered one of the extremely important focuses in the trafficking literature (Takamatsu 2004; Balos 2004; Ekberg 2004; Hankivsky 2005; Langberg 2005; Lee 2005; Chuang 2006). In broader terms the concept of gender inequality can be defined when injustice and discrimination occurs if women are excluded from the process of human development (United Nations Development Programme 1995). Gender inequality is captured in various dimensions: education, the labor market, well-being outcomes, policy distribution and many more. They all showcase disadvantages women accumulated over the years of unfair treatment. However, several aspects of gender inequality are more relevant in the field of human trafficking research. First, the resources women have access to, the lack of which in some instances make them excluded from male-dominated networks. Second, domestic laws specific to gender-related problems help to capture how inequality in the society is treated in the everyday reality. Another highly important and theoretically distinct aspect both related to gender inequality and facilitating human trafficking is regulation of prostitution. Thus, due to the focus of this thesis on enforcement of anti-trafficking legislation, the link between anti-trafficking policies and policies on prostitution shall not be omitted from discussion here. These policies are addressed under domestic laws specific to gender. Addressing gender inequalities from different theoretical angles is helpful in understanding how these inequalities hinder the enforcement of anti-trafficking legislation.

#### *Resources, Motivations and Achievements*

Gender inequality prevents many developments in society such as economic growth and well-being, especially in developing countries (Klasen 2000; Nussbaum 2001). When gender inequality is widespread it leads to the development of discriminating policies, emphasizing the differences between men and women and thus disempowering women. The problem of gender inequality gets more attention often in relation to sex trafficking (Brown 2000; Dargan

2003; Balos 2004; Ekberg 2004; Huda 2006; Kyle and Koslowski 2011). For example, Balos (2004:149, 165) blames gender inequality in fueling sex trafficking, and Ekberg (2004: 1188-1189) notes that gender inequalities, and male violence against women and children, help traffickers to exploit the vulnerability of the victims.

In 2008, the US Department of State evaluated that approximately 80 percent of transnational victims are women and girls (TIP 2008: 8). It is logical to assume that trafficking should be treated as gender-based problem since it mostly affects women. However, gender inequalities are implicated in more than just sex trafficking research, these inequalities apply to all forms of trafficking (Kelly and Regan 2000; Heyzer 2002; Sanghera 2005; Bastia 2006; Goodey 2008; Cho 2012). Kelly and Regan (Kelly and Regan 2000: 4) view trafficking in relation to gender inequality, while Sanghera notes that gender discrimination among other reasons facilitates the growth of trafficking in persons (Sanghera 2005: 7), and Cho considers human trafficking as “a form of gender based violence” (Cho 2012: 18). Indeed, case research in Asia proves that “the continued existence of caste systems in some parts of Asia and other expressions of discrimination based on race, ethnicity, social origin or gender, exacerbates trafficking, as some people are assumed to be more exploitable and less worthy of protection than others” (Huda 2006: 376). As mentioned earlier, trafficking is related to the position of women not only in the family but also in the community or country. This position, especially in poor countries, leads to an abuse of women and an increase in their vulnerability to being trafficked (Sorensen et al. 2012). Treating women as something that can be bought and sold facilitates trafficking in many poor countries. As we know, gender inequality is rooted in income differences between men and women. This is one of the reasons women often take work in informal sectors where they become easy targets for trafficking. On labor trafficking, Bastia finds that “gender-based discrimination in local labor markets, gender-based violence, household division of labor or macro-level policies that are supposed to be gender-neutral have different effects on women and men” (Bastia 2006: 27).

The problem of trafficking in women has been widely explored on both national and regional levels (Hughes 2000; Mizus et al. 2003; Ekberg 2004; Trujillo and Blouin 2004; Gozdziaik and Collett 2005; Ali 2005; Surtees 2008; Kotrla 2010). Research on trafficking in South Asia indicates gender disparity as one of the problems behind sex trafficking in the entire region (Huda 2006). Another study in South Asia proves that mainstream literature on trafficking in that region is concentrated on women and children who are typically seen as “victims of trafficking” (Ali 2005). Although research on trafficking in the Middle East region is scarce, it has shown that this region has one of the highest increases in female migrant laborers, who are often lured by promises of well-paid jobs in the domestic sector,

but end up abused or sexually exploited (Calandrucchio 2005). Research in East Africa also shows vulnerability of women who become sex slaves to rebel commanders or affluent men in Sudan and the Gulf States (Adepoju 2005). Finally, one of the few cross-national studies on human trafficking analyzes the UN database on trafficking and confirms that it is a “gender-specific phenomenon, sad manifestation of the rampant violence against women and girls” (Kangaspunta 2003: 100).

Thus, operationalizing resources, motivations and achievements acquired by women via various gender inequality measures helps to allocate the related gaps between women and men. As the direction of the literature suggests, countries with larger gender gaps will likely lack stronger anti-trafficking enforcement.

### *Domestic Laws*

As researchers agree, it is indeed harder to establish any fair policy in countries still denying women equal treatment (True 2010). Some countries have acknowledged that treating the problem of inequality will help to strengthen the laws against human trafficking and prevent the incidents of trafficking.

There are various crimes, on which the legislation is needed and that might positively affect anti-trafficking enforcement such as the implementation of laws prohibiting domestic violence, marital rape and sexual harassment. Laws criminalizing each of these activities are likely to strengthen anti-trafficking legislation, and thus, need to be examined.

Countries protecting citizens from all types of violence are countries that most likely enforce anti-trafficking legislation, the core of which is to protect vulnerable populations from being abused. Let’s consider these laws in detail. For instance, in Sweden, where domestic violence legislation is enforced, a woman (or a man as well, although empirically, less frequently) can report to the police about the case of this violence and expect a fair treatment while in Iran, where the legislation on domestic violence is absent, hundreds of victims have to suffer silently. In countries like Chad, Swaziland, Burkina Faso, Cameroun, Morocco, Iraq, Iran, Qatar and many others, court systems do not have protective laws against domestic violence. There it’s easier for traffickers to find a loop and transfer more vulnerable people since even if discovered these cases cannot be properly addressed by authorities. Obviously, people become vulnerable in places where courts refuse to prosecute cases of marital rape or sexual harassment. Taking these measures then will be helpful to examine how far these types of legislation affect the enforcement of anti-trafficking legislation.



Addressing gender inequality from a legislative standpoint helps to capture how women are treated in that society, whether they receive the same treatment in court and to what extent the issues of gender violence are accepted as norms. Different policies extend our understanding of vulnerabilities of women and the rights granted to them. This entire domain can be represented by a set of various domestic laws addressing the spread of gender-related violence and to what extent women can be guaranteed legal protection and equal treatment.

As it was mentioned before, prostitution and specifically prostitution policies shall be included into discussion of domestic laws representing gender-related problems. The history of men paying for sexual services started centuries ago. The first mention of prostitution indeed dates back to ancient Babylonian times (Ringdal 2007). Over time, prostitution became widespread due to the high and constant demand from men. Places where prostitution is officially regulated or accepted as a social norm are extremely dangerous for women making them easy targets for profiteering.

One of the examples that showcases this change is indeed possible is Sweden, where the research demonstrates how implementation of the law prohibiting purchase of sexual services affects human trafficking in Sweden. In her paper, Ekberg analyzes how the law was initiated by the Swedish women's movement with the assistance of female politicians and was signed into law in 1999 (Ekberg 2004). Back at the time, 43 percent of the parliamentarians were women, so female legislators played a crucial role in lobbying the law. The law proved to be an effective tool in limiting the amount of trafficked victims (Ekberg 2004). Following Sweden, a coalition of women's organizations in Iceland proposed the parliament to enforce laws that prohibit the purchase of a sexual service. Later, the government of Norway followed and passed the same legislation. Hopefully, more countries will join the initiative and prohibit the male demand for sexual services in order to "create a contemporary and democratic society where full gender equality is the norm" (Ekberg 2004: 1188). Due to the connection between human trafficking and prostitution, many countries enforce additional laws prohibiting prostitution. However, this process is not easy. Since the police force is a predominantly male and homosocial working environment, they can simply resist enforcing laws against sex trafficking because it threatens traditional male values (Ekberg 2004).

The most developed countries acknowledge the importance of gender equality. They respect women's rights equally with men's rights, and reject the idea that women are commodities that can be bought, sold or exploited. On the other side of the coin, developing countries are still not ready to give women the equality of rights and most likely are involved in trading women for huge illegal profits. That is why successful anti-trafficking enforcement requires taking into account realities that women face, particularly in developing countries. In

accordance with Coontz and Griebel it should be noted, “women must be recognized as subjects of rights, especially those relating to freedom of movement, employment and the right to legal counsel, private claim of action and restitution in criminal proceedings” (Coontz and Griebel 2004: 57). Therefore, addressing one of the root problems of human trafficking – the problem of gender inequality – should be helpful in eliminating vulnerabilities and weak spots while establishing better enforcement of laws against trafficking.

### *1.1.2 INTERNATIONAL FACTORS*

The fact that national policy is being influenced by a social issue like human trafficking adds support to the constructivist theory of international relations which posits that states’ actions are based on socially constructed norms, ideas and beliefs rather than on the neorealist concepts of anarchy, sovereignty and security (Finnemore 1996). Specifically, acceptance of an anti-trafficking norm indicates that despite the fact that it may not be in the state’s interest to commit to the obligations of international anti-trafficking laws, which require prevention of trafficking, punishment of traffickers and protection of victims, states are doing so or they are at least trying to appear to be doing so through the ratification of international anti-trafficking agreements (Crookham 2004). Thus, inclusion of internationally-driven theoretical factors seems essential for the understanding of successful anti-trafficking enforcement.

### *International Law*

Despite the fact that over recent years more countries have included human trafficking as a criminal offense in their penal codes and demonstrated commitment to follow international anti-trafficking laws, more efforts are needed. Friesendorf notes “the fact that, in 2005, only about half of all European countries have instituted interagency cooperation mechanisms against human trafficking (UNHCR 2005: 8) indicates the bureaucratic and political obstacles to effective networking” (Friesendorf 2007: 399).

One way to see how a country’s international agenda affects anti-trafficking legislation is via examining how many human rights treaties a country ratifies and follows. Supporting human rights by signing related treaties indicates countries efforts to eradicate cases of violence, harassment, violations of human rights and basic freedoms. Policy makers consider this step an important one since it helps to track which countries are improving the situation by adding additional international polices to their legislative systems. Although it is out of

scope of this work to access the quality of legal work in every country, however, it is possible to trace the efforts countries make by signing international agreements to combat human trafficking. One of these agreements is the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (hereafter “UN Protocol”) considered the main document on addressing human trafficking from a legislative standpoint.

The UN Protocol helps to track how countries follow the regulations approved by the international community. It is also possible to track the change in Protocol ratification over time and across different countries. Back in 2000, when the UN Protocol came into force, only 80 countries ratified it almost immediately. 14 years later, in 2014, already 147 countries signed or ratified it<sup>5</sup>. The Protocol first introduced the official definition of human trafficking, and countries that ratified it committed to this definition while prosecuting cases of human trafficking. Up until now there are countries that are not fully committed to the official definition provided by the UN Protocol and try to mask cases of trafficking as prostitution or labor violation cases. Thus, signing the Protocol indicates countries’ commitments to acknowledging the problem of human trafficking.

Although the UN Protocol is considered the main international instrument against human trafficking, there are various international human rights treaties that are serving anti-trafficking purposes as well. The research agrees that “international human rights documents set the normative standards for the international community with respect to the establishment and enforcement of human rights” (Balos 2004: 142). Ratifying international human rights treaties even goes beyond constructivist approach since it is directed into broadening and strengthening existing legislation. Due to the fact that human rights treaties are designed to protect from violations of human rights, by acquiring this data, one could assess whether countries prioritize protection of their citizens. Combining these treaties with enforcement of policies against human trafficking would indicate how countries could strengthen their international legislation. Only through cooperative efforts it is possible to develop working policies and to make countries accountable through introducing new techniques of evaluating the work of these joint policies serves the goal of strengthening anti-trafficking enforcement mechanisms. One of the steps governments can consider is repealing treaties violating human rights or contributing to all sorts of discrimination. Every treaty that shifts the focus from the trafficker to a victim undermines efforts to establish anti-trafficking legislation.

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<sup>5</sup> <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/countrylist-traffickingprotocol.html>

## *Transnational Actors*

Working hand in hand with international non-governmental organizations (hereafter “INGOs”) is favorable not only for locating traffickers but also preventing trafficking and helping the victims of this crime. An INGO is a private organization that pursues activities to promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertaking community development on a global scope (Willett 2006). The main purpose of INGOs is to deal with specific issues worldwide. As follows from the definition, the very nature of INGOs is to establish the principles of protection and support. Moreover, the discourses and activities of INGOs are a key element of an emergent global culture, and they play an important role in the spread of that culture. Boli and Thomas (1997: 187) conclude that although “power remains in the hands of states, but the impact of the world-cultural authority of INGOs is substantial”, and INGOs can both “influence state policies and bypass states altogether in seeking solutions to world-culturally defined problems”. INGOs serve to institutionalize world society and cultural models, and this action has to be taken into account when one explains a positive relationship between INGO memberships and policy diffusion (Schofer et. al. 2012). Based on the evidence, country memberships in INGOs can be accepted as a measure of national embeddedness in world society.

INGOs are well grounded for spreading global culture, and are fastest to adopt policy innovations, such as new environmental laws, human rights commitments, penalizing criminal activities including human trafficking and so on. Past research concludes that INGOs have a positive effect on human rights practices (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Powell and Staton 2009) assuming that their presence affects anti-trafficking policies. Although the work conducted by Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) and Hathaway (2002) do not support the influence of a treaty’s ratification on state’s human rights performance, no one yet tested the impact of human rights treaties on a country’s anti-trafficking enforcement, which might be considered as an overlooked relationship. The country’s membership in INGOs has not been used before in quantitative research on human trafficking. However, INGOs are one of the central topics in qualitative literature on trafficking (Aronowitz 2001; Raymond 2002; Arnold and Bertone 2002; Tzvetkova 2002; Kara 2006) that agree about involvement of INGOs being extremely important in the fight against human trafficking. To begin with, a coalition of 140 INGOs from all parts of the world played a crucial role in advocating for a definition of trafficking in the UN Protocol (Raymond 2002). Some INGOs work closely with government agencies to protect victims (Aronowitz 2001). For example, the German police often work closely with NGOs. In the investigative phase police forces allow NGOs to cooperate with

trafficking units and even to be present during raids (Kangaspunta 2000). According to Tzvetkova's detailed study on NGO responses to trafficking in women "NGOs are often viewed as being the 'conscience of government', and representatives of civil society, and have traditionally stepped in where governments have failed to take the initiative" (Tzvetkova 2002: 61). INGOs are very successful in working with trafficked victims, especially women. Since many victims fear deportation or traffickers, or pressure to testify against traffickers, they do not trust officials or police officers and ask INGOs for support more often (Tzvetkova 2002). Moreover, INGOs stay active in combating trafficking via writing recommendations for legislation and policy developments, and participating in political forums. Indeed, their role has been emphasized in the literature. Due to these reasons I expect a country's membership in INGOs and anti-trafficking enforcement will be related to each other.

Overall changes brought by international laws and transnational actors discussed in this chapter should be integrated into a broader framework of anti-trafficking legal responses.

### *1.1.3 STATE CAPACITY*

The lack of supportive institutions and a weak rule of law may present the ideal circumstances for trafficking syndicates to get organized in source countries. Moreover, based on the assumptions of institutional theory, institutional structures that respond to the treatment of trafficked victims in hosting countries can strengthen the trafficking flow to those countries. Clarke and Cornish (2000) propose that it is essential to provide the police, other criminal justice officials, legislators, and policy makers with conceptual tools that enable them to anticipate and respond to complexity, change, and innovation in organized crime (Clarke and Cornish 2000). Therefore, an effective, well organized, and institutionalized response is crucial at the international level in order to fight this global threat. To ensure that countries are delivering such a response, a capacity of state to provide appropriate services needs to be taken into account. Though the state capacity is a multi-dimensional concept, there is a minimalistic definition referring to state capacity as "the ability of state institutions to effectively implement official goals" (Sigman and Hanson 2013: 2). This definition allows me to focus on the implementation of policies process. With regard to anti-trafficking enforcement, state capacity means how well a political system is able to enforce anti-trafficking policies and deliver related services. Though it is hard to say whether the establishing of anti-trafficking legislation entirely depends on a state's resources, implementation of this legislation is definitely provided only by the state's support and ability

to deliver these services. It is necessary to include states' ability to meet their obligations to address the core issues of international anti-trafficking enforcement in order to run a global comparison. Determining which states are failing to meet these obligations is helpful to understanding which role state capacity plays in anti-trafficking enforcement.

When it comes to the rule of law, human rights-sensitive initiatives help institutions to better implement that legislation (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2007). These initiatives may include reform of institutions and raising awareness to the international standards of anti-trafficking legislation. Only effective political systems are able to enshrine human rights in policy and establish a legislative system that is accountable. Studies on human trafficking acknowledge that rule of law helps to strengthen anti-trafficking programs (Jones et al. 2007; Shelley 2010). The crime of human trafficking itself undermines the principles of rule of law in any country. Traffickers know their "markets" well, so they exploit the lack of rule of law and weak or non-implemented anti-trafficking laws in order to lure their victims in. Not surprisingly, the research shows that "weaker governance structures in poorer countries are likely to lead to these countries becoming origins for trafficked victims" (Akee et al. 2010). That is the reason why scholars in the human trafficking field sometimes include rule of law as a control variable when they model trafficking flows. For instance, Cho proves that incidents of trafficking decline with better rule of law (Cho et al. 2013). One of the explanations might be that effective and strong political institutions do not only establish policy response against human trafficking, but also contribute to establishing a more trustful environment where victims are more likely to cooperate with authorities in order to prosecute against traffickers. Also, Cho and Vadlamannati demonstrate that an increase in rule of law is associated with an improvement in anti-trafficking policies measured by the 3P Index (Cho and Vadlamannati 2012). Another empirical research shows that weaker rule of law in the source country significantly increases trafficking (Akee et al. 2010). Thus, it is easy to assume that in a country where rule of law is stronger, anti-trafficking enforcement is stronger as well. Conceptually, rule of law captures "perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence" (Kaufman et al. 2008:7).

### *1.1.4 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND BEHAVIOR*

The capacity of a state to establish effective legislation in any field is intrinsically linked with political institutions. Institutions are designed to provide better governance outcomes. Institutions can be perceived “as determining the opportunity structures and the limits within which individuals formulate preferences” (Caramani et al. 2013: 7). These preferences define individuals’ behavior, which in turn affects the type of the outcome governments provide to its citizens. Thus, both concepts of political institutions and behavior deserve a special attention due to their mutual impact on governmental performance, affecting the enforcement of anti-trafficking policies produced by governments and carried forward by institutions.

#### *Institutions*

In order to take a closer look on institutions and explore the role they play in governance outcomes, including policy-making outcomes, I focus on a specific type of institutions – democratic ones. As research demonstrates higher levels of democracy both bring positive changes in administrative capacity of states (Bäck and Hadenius 2008) and are essential to state capacity (Hendrix 2010). Democratic governments are more likely to comply with international law (Helfer and Slaughter 1997; Simmons 2000; Cho et al. 2014). The researchers argued long before about the link between liberal governments and compliance with international legal judgments (Helfer and Slaughter 1997), which brings additional justification on focusing specifically on democratic political institutions. Simmons also proves that democracies are more likely to support human rights treaties (Simmons 2000). Democratic countries with more developed civil societies have more evident anti-trafficking activity (Shelley 2010: 171). Cho also argues that in democratic countries, NGOs, citizens and the media can easier monitor a government’s level of compliance with international treaties (Cho et al. 2014).

European, especially Western, democracies have a long history of commitment to human rights starting with the slave emancipation movements in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In most Asian societies, on the other hand, “human beings are subordinated to the state, the community and the family” (Shelley 2010: 171). Since researchers emphasize the importance of liberal democracies, this concept shall be taken account in establishing the theoretical framework of the global anti-trafficking enforcement. When it comes to defining the liberal democracy, scholars have contributed to the research of liberal democracy by proposing various definitions (Dahl 1971; Huntington 1984; Vanhanen 1990; Parekh 1992; Bollen 1993). I

prefer to use the interpretation provided by Bollen, where he defined liberal democracy “as the extent to which a political system allows political liberties and democratic rule” (Bollen 1993: 1208). According to Bollen, in liberal democracies “each individual has a freedom to express her or his political opinions and participate in the government directly or through representation” (Bollen 1993: 1209). In liberal democracies, rights of individuals are respected and a “balance between the individual and the community aims at a more fair distribution of the opportunities required for full citizenship” (Parekh 1992: 169). Liberal democratic institutions also provide better opportunities for establishing liberty, justice, equality and the protecting of basic human rights. Since liberal democracy is a great achievement, it might be plausible that establishing and enforcing anti-trafficking legislation is easier within those countries. Such countries are more politically and culturally resource-provided, being able to establish a transparent legal system which is required for human rights protection, including the laws against human trafficking. On the contrary, countries dependent on illegal profits from human trafficking simply do not want to make any changes to stop both trafficking and the influx of money. Authoritarian states can make it difficult for politicians supporting human rights to impose laws favoring equality and human rights principles and greater freedoms. Another study proves that democracies have stronger anti-trafficking policies than dictatorships (Potrafke 2016). In well-established democracies, the police fight organized crime, while in many Asian and African countries, the police are organized crime (Bales 2000). As such, Castle states that if there is a long-term threat to security which flows from transnational criminality, it is from the destruction of faith in democratic institutions in societies where criminality of the organized, governmental, and individual varieties is facilitated by international financial regulatory discrepancies and opportunities (Castle 1997).

Though liberal democracies are ruled by the principles of freedom and equality, the democratic regime is not an entire solution to the problem of establishing effective anti-trafficking enforcement. According to Shelley, many democratic societies allowed mass violations of human rights and lack proper protections for trafficking victims (Shelley 2010). Victims have been often categorized as “prostitutes” or “illegal migrants” and they are often deported from the countries where they have been rescued. It happens also in democratic countries which prioritize national security over human security (Shelley 2010). For example, former victims of human trafficking only have a six-month permit to stay in a particular country before they have to go back to their home countries. Certainly, they may become victims again because they have been simply sent back to the conditions from which they were first trafficked. In Germany, trafficking victims only have four weeks to decide if they want to testify against traffickers. In the Netherlands, victims have three months if they agree



to press charges and if they do not, they are deported. On the other hand, countries in South Eastern Europe do not grant residency permits or other immigration protections to victims of trafficking (Haynes 2004). Those examples reveal that handling the human trafficking problem is indeed an ordeal even for democratic states, whose main principles are equal rights and guarantees of human freedoms. Although this research proves that not all democratic countries comply with international anti-trafficking legislation, government compliance level is dependent on the political regime, since political environments usually determine which decisions will emerge on the government agenda, including decisions on compliance with international law (Avdeyeva 2012).

### *Behavior*

Assessing political behavior from an institutional standpoint allows tracing if behavioral patterns are able to influence governmental outcomes within specific institutional structures. In order to find out which role behavior of individual plays in establishing better anti-trafficking enforcement, the concept of behavior shall be defined. Due to uncertainty of its effect on anti-trafficking legislation, a broad conceptualization of political behavior is employed. Broadly defined, political behavior is communicated via “citizens’ activities affecting politics” (van Deth 2016: 2). These activities are shaped by both institutions and individual preferences, forming the chain of interrelated processes. There are two forms of behavior outlined in the literature: individual and collective. Individual behavior is driven by self-interest, as Peters argues, while collective behavior includes “aggregation of the individual behaviors” (Caramani et al. 2013: 39). Being able to determine what drives behavior is not possible without assessing micro-level data, besides unnecessary step within the framework of this thesis. However, the impact of aggregated behavior on governmental policy-making outcomes is indeed very relevant for the purpose of this work. One can also assume that various forms of political behavior do not only give people freedom of choice via engagement and participation but also unite them in fighting against human rights violations and the oppression of the innocent population, which in turn is one of the important elements of international anti-trafficking legislation. As Dalton notes “engaged citizenship may also encourage volunteerism and greater civil society activity” (Dalton 2008: 86). These various forms of citizens’ engagements have the capacity of political leverage and that is why are referred as “elite-challenging” political behavior (Inglehart 1990; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). The distinct feature of this type of political behavior is its spontaneous character usually concerned about specific event with a clear message to the authorities. As soon as citizens

start voicing their claims, societies got infused with civic agency, which leads to practicing freedoms in all spheres of life (Welzel 2013). This type of behavior forces elites to react, at least in well functioning democracies. Moreover, civic agency has an active role in shaping societies agendas, being a “major manifestation of human empowerment” (Welzel 2013: 216). Elite-challenging political behavior includes participation in protests and demonstrations and in the context of social engagement seems to be more relevant in explaining how successful the anti-trafficking enforcement is in a country.

#### *1.1.5 DEMAND*

The human trafficking market, as any other market, prospers when the services it provides are demanded. Demand does not only fuel trafficking but is considered one of the root causes of it (Raymond et al. 2001; Yen 2008). Since the business of trafficking itself is so lucrative, without addressing the demand chain, it would be not possible to abolish human trafficking and enforce effective anti-trafficking legislation. The economic incentive is too high and the possibility of getting caught in a country, which does not apply any anti-trafficking policies, is too low, so it is no wonder that trafficking continues to thrive. According to the testimony of one trafficker, a criminal can buy a woman for 10,000 dollars, then force the victim to earn back the money in a week, and everything else from that point on amounts to a profit, which can reach up to 250,000 dollars in a year (Yen 2008). The financial returns in human trafficking are very tempting, considering the fact that a pimp can sell one woman many times in contrast to guns and drugs. Thus, addressing demand for sexual services by scholars of human trafficking who argue that policies should be directed on reducing demand has increased over the last years (Shifman 2003; Balos 2004; Ekberg 2004; Yen 2008; Chuang 2010). Accounting for demand would allow this cycle to be closed in the legislation which is often overlooked by the policymakers since even the human trafficking protocol does not cover the aspect of demand in general.

The driving forces behind demand might vary but the literature pays most attention to the following reasons:

- Demand driven by men who serve in the military
- Demand driven by men looking for wives through illegal means
- Demand driven by the increasing proportion of young adults

- Demand driven by the vulnerable position of migrant population

First, the demand driven by men who serve in the military is associated with military demands for prostitution which occur often near the military bases and in places where conflicts or war take place. Research on sex trafficking in the US indicates that military personnel sometimes even help the sex businesses to thrive around the bases and some of them get involved in the direct trafficking of women from Korea, Vietnam and Japan (Raymond et al. 2001). Also, such countries as Bosnia-Herzegovina, East Timor, Slovenia, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Kosovo witnessed members of peacekeeping forces involved themselves with the prostituting and trafficking of women and girls from the local population (Ekberg 2004). The location of brothels, massage parlors and strip bars near the military's presence also presents the evidence that male demand is what drives sex trafficking in these places (Ekberg 2004; Yen 2008). The involvement of U.S. military officers in the trafficking of women in South Korea in 2002 has been revealed to the public by the hidden-camera broadcast on Fox News (Cheng 2008). The program reported how military officers admitted on camera that they were aware of trafficked women in the military bases (Hughes et al. 2007). Moreover, in some cases, the officers worked with Asian organized crime networks and were involved in trafficking themselves (Hughes et al. 2007). This means that the link between military personnel and traffickers is bidirectional. The relationship between the military and traffickers is evident, with soldiers using the services of prostitutes being aware that some of these girls were trafficked and commit prostitution involuntarily. The relationship also works the other way around – when traffickers use military officers to export women to the US via marriages where those women later could be found in brothels. According to Hughes et al., traffickers use military personnel as couriers in order to get women into the United States (Hughes et al. 2007). The war against Iraq, which brought US forces to Romania contributed to growing prostitution in the region as another study reports (Kligman and Limoncelli 2005). Nowadays, the awareness that military personnel have been involved in fostering demand for trafficked women is rising (Allred 2006). However, some governments do not rush to implement specific laws prohibiting prostitution and trafficking around military bases. This is a foreign policy issue, so it is more difficult to regulate, and first of all, both sides should be interested in this regulation. Oftentimes, destination countries' corrupt officials are highly interested in maintaining these illegal practices while they earn huge amounts of money, so they might prevent attempts of establishing proper legislation. Even when the anti-trafficking legislation exists it does not account for the demand side of trafficking and traffickers continue to supply more and more innocent victims. While the ratio of net profit to the risk of being caught remains low, the “market” is

expanding. The connection between demands by military personnel and trafficking episodes and, hence, the absence of a proper legislation should be put into international governmental agenda as quickly as possible to stop this dangerous and disgraceful crime.

The second driving force of demand is associated with men looking for wives through illegal means, which is supposedly caused by imbalanced sex ratios with a prevalence of males to females. Researchers paying attention to the demand sources of trafficking agree that sex ratio imbalance directly affects demand for sex trafficking to China and other Southeast Asian countries (U.S. Department of State 2007; Hall 2010; Jiang and Jesus 2011). China has, by far, the longest history of imbalanced sex ratios (Hesketh 2009). China's "one child policy" has led to severe demographic disbalance, which according to Hall may leave up to 40 million men of marriageable age in China by the year 2020 unable to find a wife (Hall 2010). According to the literature, a disproportional amount of men live in rural areas in China where it is hard for them to find wives, so they often are involved in buying women for marriage purposes (Zhao 2003; Hughes 2005). One study exploring the problem of sex trafficking in China suggests that the country already has severe trafficking problems "but an even more drastic firestorm is coming in the next decades because of the sex ratio imbalance" (Hall 2010: 69). Studies connect the emergence of the Chinese marriage market with the Vietnam War, which initially caused a sex ratio imbalance in Vietnam in favor of women (Heyzer 2002). Due to the patriarchal culture, women were supposed to marry Vietnamese men sometimes as second or third wives (Heyzer 2002). That was supposedly one of the reasons why the trafficking and trade of Vietnamese women to China had begun. These women have been literally sold to the men who can afford to buy them. This phenomenon is also well known as "mail-order brides" (Long 2004; Constable 2006). Some NGOs, including the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women, define "mail-order brides" as trafficked women (Constable 2006). The problem of trafficking has been always poorly addressed in China. From a historical point of view, the practice of buying women as servants or concubines was widespread and legally justified in China back in those days (Jiang and Jesus 2011). Being deeply rooted in people's minds, those traditional patriarchal practices are still considered normal behavior (Zhao 2003; Jiang and Jesus 2011). In US Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report, both the "one child policy" and cultural traditions are named as the reasons for the imbalanced sex ratio, which in turn "may serve to increase the demand for prostitution and for foreign women as brides for Chinese men" (TIP 2014: 132).

The third driving force of demand behind human trafficking is associated with the increasing proportion of young adults, a phenomenon labelled the youth bulge in the

literature. The youth bulge is a “demographic trend where the proportion of persons aged 15-24 in the population increases significantly compared to other age groups” (Ortiz and Cummins 2012: iv). According to the Easterlin's relative cohort size theory, there is a linkage between increasing proportions of young cohorts and adverse economic and social conditions forcing young adults to often move into the illegal and illicit economy (Easterlin 1987; Macunovich 2000). Researchers actively associate young men with violent behavior and unrest in societies (Njeru 2010; Kunkeler and Peters 2011; Adhego and Eke 2013; Williams 2013). Due to the problem of growing populations, it is getting harder to generate a sufficient number of jobs, especially in the developing world (Williams 2013) and that significantly increases the chances that unemployed youths will join organized crime groups and will end up selling drugs, guns or even humans. Societies characterized by a youth bulge are mostly the ones in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and the Pacific Islands (Adhego and Eke 2013). They all have more than 30 percent of the population as youth cohort. Case studies, like the one in Sudan, shows that youths in African countries do not have regular access to schooling and they also lack job opportunities, which makes them ready to “bear arms for spurious ideological or ethnic reasons” (Njeru 2010: 32). Middle Eastern countries also experience high unemployment rates and a growing male youth population, two factors which influence political activism and terrorist uprisings (Hoffman and Jamal 2012). However, Adhego and Eke warn that the youth bulge and violence are not connected automatically, meaning that there are other intervening factors mediating the relationship between demographic structure of the society and security issues (Adhego and Eke 2013). This explains the existence of contradictory empirical evidence of a link between youth bulges and criminal violence in the cross-country research. Some studies find no empirical relationship (Fajnzylber et al. 2002; Cole and Gramajo 2009) and others find a positive and statistically significant one (Conklin and Simpson 1985; Fox and Hoelscher 2010). Though the youth bulge theory has not been tested in human trafficking research, I expect to find a negative relationship between countries level of anti-trafficking enforcement and youth bulge. In other words, according to the theory, countries with a larger number of youth cohorts should experience higher rates of violence, which in turn should weaken the enforcement of any human rights law including anti-trafficking legislation. This hypothetical relationship is based on the assumption that countries which are vulnerable to social unrests and violent behavior are not interested in maintaining the proper level of legislation and generally have weaker political institutions as well. Although not all researchers agree whether there is a direct link between violence and growing youth population, they acknowledge negative consequences of the youth bulge phenomenon (Ortiz and Cummins 2012; Williams 2013).

The problem of large youth cohorts engaging themselves in antisocial and violent behavior is more pronounced in developing societies where it is coupled with corruption, poor governance, ineffective public institutions and high rates of unemployment and poverty (Adhego and Eke 2013). That is why this topic should get high priority for both policy makers and for the governments; in order to avoid more dangerous consequences for societies.

Finally, the fourth driver of demand is the vulnerable position of the migrant, population which puts them at higher risk of being trafficked. The migrant vulnerability driver clearly emerges as one of the central topics, at least in the qualitative literature on human trafficking. Thus, studies show that there is a strong link between migration and human trafficking (Gozdziak and Collett 2005; Clawson et al. 2006; Mahmoud and Trebesch 2010). Researchers agree that human trafficking is “the exploitation of people who want to migrate” (Bhattacharyya 2005:154), and traffickers might even follow the direction of legal migration so later they can lure people seeking legitimate work in these countries (Surtees 2008). However, these examples cover only a handful of countries, and there is only one global study that shows evidence proving that international migration is linked with trafficking (Potrafke 2012). As a call for strengthening the analysis of this link, Chung (2009: 93) notes, “it is important to go beyond one’s own country and community and attempt to impact a broader spectrum that includes both sending and recipient countries”. The chapter aims to prove that migration is a larger process happening through human trafficking and migrants constitute large proportion of trafficked victims, thus encouraging the demand for trafficking. It is likely that the same factors contribute to the growth of both migration and human trafficking. Moreover, the concepts seem so closely related, so much so that they are often confused with one-another (Huda 2006). That is why the problem of trafficking can be solved without addressing the drivers of international migration (Rao and Presenti 2012). Some governments acknowledge the existence of a connection between migration and trafficking and yet create obstacles for migrants in order to follow their national security policies. Countries that experience larger inflows of migrants tend to impose stricter migration regulations, often forgetting to protect the rights of those who were involuntarily brought into the country. Thus, trying to regulate migration, governments exclude the trafficking side in every way from this regulation. On the other hand, to my knowledge, trafficking legislation does not account for the migration factor either. That means both regulation of migration and anti-trafficking policies should reinforce each other’s efforts to establish the better protection of human rights.

It is also important to emphasize that although researchers outlined the trend in migrant vulnerability to being trafficked, they have not yet considered how countries’ policies against

trafficking account for this problem. Though not only migrants and especially female migrants are vulnerable to being trafficked, the rights of these groups especially shall be added to the policymakers' agenda. All over the world we are witnessing how international migration is becoming more feminized (Calandruccio 2005), however, the laws protecting the rights of migrants remain unchanged and when it comes to women, some regions of the world become extremely dangerous for women wanting to join the international labor market. For instance, in the Middle East, legal systems are based on Sharia law, which does not treat women as equals to men, thus, creating problems in courts when prosecuting trafficking cases. According to Mattar, most legal systems of Middle Eastern countries "have not yet specifically criminalized all forms of trafficking, nor do they provide for any protection or assistance to victims of trafficking" (Mattar 2002). However, most migrants arrive in the countries on a legal basis since they want to work voluntarily. Many trafficked victims entered countries legally with work visas, but that does not mean they agreed to what usually happens after arriving to countries. Not only might these people be victims of violence, abuse or harassment from their employers but they oftentimes do not have the work they have been promised and they are forced to either stay and work on conditions of their employers or go to authorities which will usually end in them getting sent to their home-country. Working visas clearly state a person should get a job she or he was invited to do in a country. If the position does not exist anymore or was fake initially, the bureaucratic system can do nothing else than send these people home to the miserable conditions and poverty they were trying to escape in the first place. Thus, governments need to address structural causes of why people were displaced or had to leave their countries and ended up being trafficked. Although realistically, governments cannot control when the situation of trafficking occurs due to the highly criminal aspect of all these occurrences but at least joining efforts with NGO's, researchers and workers' unions would allow to examine and prevent trafficking situations before they take place.

## **1.2 Explorative factors of micro-foundations of human trafficking**

Apart from country-level characteristics, the aim of this study is also to explore the micro-level foundations of the countries' varying efforts at anti-trafficking enforcement. Anti-trafficking enforcement represents a public policy pursued by governments and there is an influential literature arguing that a country's public policies are a reflection of its people's public preferences (Stimson 2002; Erikson, McKuen and Stimson 2002; Soroka and Wlezien 2012). And even though policy-preference links have been established first and foremost for well functioning democracies, it is an open empirical question whether such links also exist in less or non-democratic regimes, especially those which the majority of the population supports (Welzel and Kirsch 2017). Theoretically, there are reasons to assume that policy-preference links exist even in less and non-democracies because popularity is a source of stability for any kind of regime. Thus, every regime has an incentive to avoid implementing widely opposed policies, even more so when their implementation requires costly enforcement measures. The absence of public support for such measures also suggests people's high level of violence tolerance which prevents them from seeing violence as a problem at first place. Meanwhile, addressing micro-level foundations of human trafficking is rooted in inevitability of violence associated with the crime of human trafficking. The official definition of human trafficking in the UN Protocol equates this crime with an act of violence. Specifically, the male violence against women and children, as research notes, allows traffickers to exploit the vulnerability of the victims (Kangaspunta 2003; Ekberg 2004).

As literature shows, one of the main purposes of human trafficking is sex trafficking fueled by severe gender inequalities (Brown, 2001; Dargan, 2003; Balos 2004; Ekberg 2004; Huda 2006; Kyle and Koslowski 2011). Gender-based violence is another term introduced by the researchers of human trafficking (Cho 2012). According to the theoretical assumptions proposed in the sub chapter on gender inequality, women constituting 80% of victims of human trafficking have higher risks of ending up being trafficked in countries where prostitution is accepted as social norm. In places where prostitution is tolerated, cultural climate is friendly for prostitution and unfriendly for anti-trafficking. The question arises, what can create such climate. One possible reason behind is that people's acceptance of prostitution serve as societal indicator of progressive mindsets. These mindsets oriented strongly towards acquiring more freedoms, including freedom of making choices, control over own's body and sexual orientation and living in countries, where one is capable to claim these freedoms. It is plausible to suggest that such progressive attitudes will have positive impact on prostitution acceptance and highly negative one on people's tolerance of violence.



Summing up the directions of these hypothetical relationships, a conceptual graph is drawn (Figure 1).

*Figure 1: Theoretical Justification of the Tolerance of Violence in the Household*




Figure 1 accounts for proposed micro-foundations of tolerance of violence that shape the success of anti-trafficking enforcement at the country-level. The attention in this chapter shifts towards tolerance of violence, since as we have seen sex trafficking always involves readiness to commit violence against women and girls. Thus, psychological micro-foundations for sex trafficking are flourish in societies where tolerance of violence is widespread. Consequently, it seems worthwhile to analyze what are individual and contextual factors that either enhance or diminish violence tolerance in societies.

Anti-trafficking enforcement aims at providing guaranteed protections to all victims of human trafficking but it succeeds if, and only if, a society dismisses violence as socially-accepted norm. Hence, I assume that when both violence and prostitution are widely accepted, people are lacking interest in supporting anti-trafficking enforcement. Understanding the personal and contextual circumstances explaining tolerance of violence sheds additional light on (a) where anti-trafficking enforcement is more likely to occur and (b) where it is more effective.

Concluding the review of theoretical factors, both at micro- and macro-level, affecting anti-trafficking enforcement is the Table 1 where related theoretical approaches and hypotheses are revisited.

Country-level theoretical assumptions are presented by five large groups of factors and individual-level assumptions include one hypothetical relationship. Due to the explorative logic of the study hypotheses are formulated in a general way. Thus, at the country-level it is assumed that countries demonstrating higher gender equality, namely where women have more resources and their rights are equally addressed in domestic laws, will likely have better anti-trafficking enforcement. Next, the better embeddedness into international activities via legislation and the work of transnational actors helps to achieve better anti-trafficking enforcement. The stronger state capacity will contribute to a better anti-trafficking enforcement. The combination of well-functioning political institutions and active political behavior in countries will likely lead to better anti-trafficking enforcement. Finally, in countries where demand for the services provided by human trafficking market is low, in other words, countries with more balanced demographic structures will likely have better anti-trafficking enforcement.

Micro-foundations of human trafficking are addressed in hypothesis that assumes complex relationship between tolerance of prostitution, tolerance of violence and anti-trafficking enforcement. Specifically, when both violence and prostitution are widely accepted, anti-trafficking enforcement turn out to be less successful.

**Table 1: Overview of Theoretical Approaches and Related Hypotheses**

		<b>Theoretical Approaches</b>	<b>Related Hypotheses</b>
<b>COUNTRY-LEVEL</b>	<i>Gender Inequality:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Resources, Motivations and Achievements</i></li> <li>• <i>Domestic Laws</i></li> </ul>	Women’s position in the family and society makes them especially vulnerable to being trafficked (Surtees 2005; Blokhuis 2008; Sorensen et al. 2012). Implementation of the law prohibiting purchase of sexual services (Ekberg 2004).	Countries demonstrating higher gender equality, namely where women have more resources and their rights are equally addressed in domestic laws, will likely have better anti-trafficking enforcement.
	<i>International Factors</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>International Law</i></li> <li>• <i>Transnational Actors</i></li> </ul>	Constructivist Theory of International Relations (Finnemore 1996). The impact of the world-cultural authority of INGOs (Boli and Thomas 1997).	Countries with better embeddedness into international activities via legislation and the work of transnational actors will likely have better anti-trafficking enforcement.
	<i>State Capacity</i>	Institutional theory (Clarke and Cornish 2000).	Countries with stronger capacity of state will likely have better anti-trafficking enforcement.
	<i>Political Institutions &amp; Behavior</i>	Democratic governments are more likely to comply with international law (Helfer and Slaughter 1997; Simmons 2000; Cho et al. 2014). Elite-challenging political behavior (Inglehart 1990; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel 2013)	Countries with well-functioning political institutions and active political behavior will likely have better anti-trafficking enforcement.
	<i>Demand</i>	The theory of youth bulge (Macunovich 2000). Imbalanced sex ratios (Hesketh 2009).	Countries with more balanced demographic structure will likely have stronger anti-trafficking enforcement.
<b>INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL</b>	<i>Micro-foundations of human trafficking</i>	Country’s public policies are a reflection of its people’s public preferences (Stimson 2000; Stimson and McKuen 2007; Soroka and Wlezien 2011). Human trafficking as gender-based violence (Cho 2012).	In countries where both violence and prostitution are widely accepted, people are lacking interest in supporting anti-trafficking enforcement.

Each of these theoretical propositions is refined in the follow up chapters, where operationalizations of theoretical concepts are introduced. Thus, in addition to the direction of hypothesized relationships presented in this review, empirical measures are taken into account, and testifiable hypotheses are produced.

## **CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL NEXUS OF ANTI-TRAFFICKING ENFORCEMENT**

This part of the thesis reviews existing data sources measuring anti-trafficking enforcement in the world, with the aim of empirically evaluating the reliability and validity of these sources. As has been mentioned before, anti-trafficking enforcement is based on a set of legislative measures adopted and followed by governments to address human trafficking. Dealing with such a criminal and sensible issue as human trafficking, scholars, practitioners, lawyers and others who are interested in the matter, are facing the lack of reliable data on real victims of human trafficking. The process of being recognized as a victim of human trafficking often goes along with a mark of shame in some cultures. In such cultures, it is not common, in fact, forbidden to marry a non-virgin, thus, women who escaped the bondage of slavery and returned home are now being shamed for not meeting “marriage material”. Many women prefer not to make their victim statuses official or even disclose their past experiences, which makes the data collection a hard exercise. In some instances, not claiming herself/himself a victim is a question of safety. When reporting on their abusers, victims put themselves or their families at risk of a trafficker’s revenge. Another complication is that clearly many people remain hostage to traffickers, and this number is absolutely impossible to calculate with precision. The rough estimates range from 20.9 million people calculated by International Labour Organization (ILO 2016) to 45.8 million people calculated by the Global Slavery index (Free the Slaves 2016). Though, the quality of these estimates remains uncertain. The research on human trafficking is growing and it is hoped that in the near future, the data collection process becomes easier, thus making quantitative research of real victims possible. However, in addition to filling the gap on human trafficking, data researchers working with country-level data contribute by analyzing anti-trafficking enforcement patterns and specific indices developed to evaluate countries progress in addressing human trafficking. Being a topic of broad and current interest, anti-trafficking enforcement, luckily for the researchers, draws attention of policy makers. Back in the early 2000s, by applying purposeful efforts supported by the policy makers, the first official definition of human trafficking had been proposed for the first time together with a set of policies regulating how governments should address the problem of human trafficking in order to combat it successfully. It turned out that like in every international policy area, countries enforce anti-trafficking policies differently and that called for the development of specific indices, which would help to trace how well countries comply and follow international regulations to combat

human trafficking. Some of these indices are global in scope and thus can be used for evaluation of cross-national anti-trafficking enforcement data.

At the moment, three global data sources with the largest country and time coverage are available and are carefully examined in this chapter. These measures, in no particular order, are the Tier Rankings from Trafficking in Persons Report (hereafter “TIP”) developed by the US Department of State; the 3P Anti-Trafficking Policy Index developed by the German Institute for Economic Research, DIW-Berlin; and the Trafficking Scale developed by the Woman Stats Database. The goal of this chapter is to empirically evaluate the reliability and validity of existing data sources. However, these indices are constructed differently and independently from each other. It is impossible to directly compare them with each other and decide which one performs better since they use different methodologies. But it is possible to test which index is closer related to the theoretical concepts of human trafficking and as a result reflects the better connection with the reality that defines human trafficking as such. To run this test, a few steps are applied. First, theoretical concepts of human trafficking are defined in order to focus on specific aspects that shall be addressed to properly enforce anti-trafficking legislation. Then, these theoretical concepts are operationalized via empirical indicators that can be directly compared. Scientifically, operationalization refers to the process of developing indicators or items for measuring the concepts (Bhattacharjee 2012: 46). It allows bridging theoretical concepts with empirical indicators, which have been either used in previous research or considered relevant from practitioner’s point of view. Next, three global indices are correlated with each of the operationalized theoretical concepts to determine which index has the highest reliability and validity with all concepts. This index would be proven as the most useful in evaluating the governmental measures to combat human trafficking. Thus, the following chapter starts with defining the concepts that are most associated with human trafficking by international organizations, scholars and practitioners, and then critically reviews the global anti-trafficking enforcement data sources.

The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights compiled the list of United Nations Agencies, programmes, NGOs and foundations, which contains 90 organizations fighting against all forms of contemporary slavery<sup>6</sup>. These organizations are a great source of information on how the problem of human trafficking is perceived by the global community. I studied their websites and agendas in order to identify how these organizations define human trafficking beyond the official definition presented in the UN Protocol. Dealing with human trafficking from a practitioner standpoint and on a regular basis, these organizations must have their own perception of what is synonymous to human trafficking. Some definitions are

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<sup>6</sup> The list is available at <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Slavery/UNVTFCFS/Pages/SlaveryList.aspx>

overly broad, including the official UN Protocol definition according to which human trafficking can be placed into framework of crime and violence. However, through analyzing websites of different international organizations, the trafficking framework could be defined more thoroughly. The website of the United Nations, for example, places trafficking in the section of drugs and crime, and the U.S. Department of State – under civilian security and democracy along with conflicts, narcotics and global criminal justice, associating these crimes together. Other international organizations, which have been created with only the purpose to fight trafficking, agree that human trafficking is most prosperous in highly criminal, corrupt and violent environments. These organizations include Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Polaris Project, Free the Slaves and many others. Thus, taking into account the definition of human trafficking and related to trafficking aspects provided by international organizations and practitioners dealing with this issue I could assume for the purposes of this chapter that trafficking is thriving in countries with high level of crime, corruption and physical rights violations. Analysis of missions, purposes and reports by international foundations provides the key concepts of human trafficking from practitioners' point of view prove that identified concepts deserve careful examination. These factors indeed not only facilitate trafficking but also become major obstacles in enforcement of an effective international legislation to combat human trafficking. Researchers continue to pay close attention to these factors, although, most often separating them from each other. By combining them under one umbrella, I argue that it would be easier to explain how well existing global indices of anti-trafficking enforcement actually reflect what is defined as human trafficking today. Addressing the relationship between these theoretical concepts and indices of anti-trafficking enforcement will help to explain how anti-trafficking enforcement works in essence and define which index is the best existing source related to trafficking both empirically and theoretically. In this chapter, I shall showcase that the following outlined theoretical concepts prevent the adoption and enforcement of laws against trafficking and explore the relationship between crime, corruption and physical rights violations from the one side and measures of global anti-trafficking enforcement from another side.

First, I shall begin with a description of three concepts emphasized from practitioners' point of view as most related to human trafficking by the global international community: organized crime, corruption and human rights violations. Thus, in order to combat human trafficking and establish strong anti-trafficking enforcement countries should focus on problems of organized crime, corruption and human rights violations. These concepts are combined into Triangulated Concept of Human Trafficking that represents the theoretical nexus essential for addressing anti-trafficking enforcement (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Theoretical Nexus of Anti-Trafficking Enforcement<sup>7</sup>




Figure 2 shows that the concepts of organized crime, corruption and human rights violations are connected to each other (bold and blue arrows) meanwhile each of them has an individual impact on human trafficking (dotted and red arrows). I argue that reliable measure of global anti-trafficking enforcement shall be empirically related to these proposed concepts. Addressing not only enforcement of existing anti-trafficking policies but also current international realities is useful to strengthen global measures of anti-trafficking legislation. The limitation one could already voice at this stage of research is that there might be even more concepts theoretically linked to human trafficking, which can be included to the nexus on Figure 2. Indeed the nexus can be enlarged to infinity if we account for all individual cases of human trafficking happening through various forms, reasons and scenarios. However, to be able to successfully address individual cases, global patterns and trends affecting human trafficking shall be formed and examined. Governments shall become united in their fight against human trafficking by proposing policies that would work not just in one single country but all over the world, by ensuring these policies are implemented equally all over the world, and by focusing attention on most crucial issues that create obstacles for better enforcement all over the world. That is why, since the purpose is to examine the global patterns, I shall outline only the major pillars of human trafficking, which as will be shown are hindering an effective anti-trafficking enforcement. Here, as Figure 2 depicts, I propose to focus on three concepts most related to human trafficking, improving which also would lead to better enforcement of anti-trafficking legislation. These concepts are proposed as a template for practically every country that has ever dealt with the problem of human

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<sup>7</sup> It is assumed that anti-trafficking enforcement is an outcome of the anti-trafficking legislation that supposedly is based on the grass roots of human trafficking from a practitioner's point of view, presented on this graph.



trafficking. If more global concepts appear to be relevant after further examination, the proposed nexus might be improved but at the moment it is yet the first attempt to develop a theoretical justification of anti-trafficking enforcement in that way.

Now I shall turn to the evidence on how outlined concepts are both theoretically and empirically related to human trafficking and start with the first pillar of the nexus – crime aspect of trafficking. So far scholars have not developed a commonly accepted definition of crime. Although, Gottfredson (1990: 21) states that classical interpretation of crime includes “an event involving force or fraud that satisfies self-interest”. This already overlaps with the definition of human trafficking and allows scholars to assume that these two have a lot in common. Since human trafficking is a crime itself and an act of abuse with the purpose of exploitation and profits earning, the research associates or equates it often with organized crime (Adamoli et al. 1998; Skeldon 2000; Stoecker 2000; Väyrynen 2003).

Both definitions include force or fraud, so these concepts seem to overlap, while the research also shows one is impossible without the other: trafficking is thriving where other crimes are thriving, and laws against trafficking are unenforced where laws against other crimes are either poorly or not enforced. For instance, in Algeria, Russia, Ukraine or Zimbabwe organized crime is widespread and enforcement of anti-trafficking legislation is lacking. Despite the fact that some scholars argue that there is not enough evidence to prove that trafficking is a part of organized crime (Salt 2000; Schloenhardt 2001), most of the other researchers agree that there is an association between these two types of crime (Adamoli et al. 1998; Skeldon 2000; Stoecker 2000; Väyrynen 2003). The scope of this study does not aim to develop the proof that organized crime is synonymous to trafficking but rather aims to prove that this type of crime hinders a country’s ability to enforce a strong legislative framework. As an example, Väyrynen (2003: 7) states that trafficking exists due to the resources and networks controlled by the organized criminal groups and the latter receive profits from human trafficking. Stoecker (2000: 130) agrees that “human trafficking is a highly attractive business for criminal groups because it is low in risk and high in payoffs”. Schloenhardt (2001: 340) argues that “especially Asian organized crime groups use routes, means and methods of transportation simultaneously for the trafficking of people and narcotics”. The Global Report on Human Settlements concludes that “like the trade in drugs and arms, human trafficking is a global problem that involves organized criminal groups” (United Nations Human Settlements Programme 2007: 63). These examples demonstrate how strongly scholars and practitioners associate human trafficking with organized crime, which only supports the analysis of missions of various NGOs and foundations in which they put human

trafficking under the umbrella term of organised crime. It is thus plausible that organized crime serves as a first theoretical pillar of proposed anti-trafficking enforcement nexus.

The operationalization of organized crime concept is complex and does not appear in the literature often. However, Van Dijk created the measure of the Composite Organized Crime Index (hereafter “COCI”). The COCI combines data on the perceived prevalence of organized crime, unsolved homicides, grand corruption, money-laundering and the extent of the black economy (Van Dijk 2007). The index ranges from 0 indicating lowest value of organized crime to 100 indicating highest value of organized crime. Though the index does not cover many countries, there are still 52 countries evaluated by it, and it is enough number for the correlation analysis. The COCI has already been used in the research as an empirical measure of organized crime (Van Dijk 2007; Smith et al. 2011; Holmes 2013), providing evidence that organized crime is related to human trafficking. Thus, this indicator is an operationalization of the first theoretical component of the triangulated concept of human trafficking.

The second component of the triangulated concept of human trafficking is corruption, which according to scholars fuels human trafficking (Lyday 2001; Adams 2003; Agbu 2003; Bales 2005; Malarek 2003; Tanagho 2006; Studnicka 2010). The effect of corruption has been acknowledged even in legislative documents, such as the US Anti-Trafficking Act. The Act states that “trafficking in persons is often aided by official corruption in countries of origin, transit and destination, thereby threatening the rule of law” (Victims of trafficking and violence protection act of 2000: 1467). Both qualitative and quantitative studies illustrate that corruption is closely tied to human trafficking. Few qualitative examples show that not only “corruption by government agencies, law enforcement, immigration officials, and private individuals enhances the ease with which criminal networks traffic human beings” (Tanagho 2006: 928), but corruption is also considered the main factor behind the trafficking trade success (Malarek 2003: 141). In his book, Malarek also gives examples of countries where corruption adjoins trafficking and prostitution such as Moldova, Serbia, Israel, former Soviet states and East Block nations, proving evidence on how corruption among governmental authorities results in trafficking. The reason why officials and police turn a blind eye towards trafficking might be their direct involvement in local sex industry and local trafficking (Dottridge 2007). It seems that in places where corruption is pervasive, the challenges to enforce anti-trafficking legislation are immensely higher. Some quantitative studies exploring this problem showcase, for instance, that “in Nigeria the volume of human trafficking correlates with the level of corruption in the agencies that directly deal with immigration and organized crime” (Agbu 2003: 8). The results of another study prove using quantitative data that corruption in Brazil is a causal factor for human trafficking (Studnicka 2010). Other

examples of quantitative studies include Lyday (2001) and Bales (2005). Lyday demonstrates the relationship between perceptions of corruption and anti-trafficking enforcement while Bales using multivariate analysis proves that government corruption significantly predicts trafficking from a source country. With these examples, corruption seems to be empirically closely tied to human trafficking and might help to explain the lack of anti-trafficking enforcement. Thus, corruption is considered another piece of the puzzle, namely, the triangulated concept of human trafficking.

Corruption is operationalized via Corruption Perceptions Index (hereafter “CPI”) produced by Transparency International. The CPI is a composite index, a combination of surveys and assessments of corruption, collected by a variety of highly reputable institutions. The CPI scores and ranks countries based on how corrupt a country’s public sector is perceived to be. The CPI rates a country’s perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 signifies that country perceived to be highly corrupt and 100 represents a very clean system (Transparency International 2013). Full source descriptions including lists of the data sources, questions about corruption respondents were asked, scores, and country coverage is available in yearly reports by Transparency International on their website. The latest available CPI data collected for this thesis includes 177 countries in 2013. According to the Transparency International official reports, the CPI is limited in scope but captures different aspects of corruption in a country, making this measure widely popular for research. Proving its usefulness, scholars use the index in their research and also apply it within a human trafficking context. For example, Lyday (2000), Agbu (2003), Bales (2005) and Studnicka (2010) in their research on human trafficking use the CPI as an empirical measure of corruption. Agbu argues that “TIP and CPI studies conducted by the US government suggest strongly that corruption and trafficking are strongly related” (Agbu 2003: 8). Empirical evidence of this relationship includes Lyday’s (2000) analysis, where highly significant correlations show a strong relationship between the CPI and TIP measures at the cross-country level. Bales (2005) using multivariate analysis demonstrates that CPI predicts trafficking from a source country at the cross-country level, and Potrafke (2012) using OLS regression finds that absence of corruption (with highest CPI values) has a positive impact on having stricter anti-trafficking policies. Thus, I use CPI to operationalize the second theoretical component of the triangulated concept of human trafficking.

By definition, trafficking is a brutal violation of basic human rights, both physical and psychological: “traffickers employed forms of violence ranging from sexual violation to severe beatings, physical assault to psychological terror” (Surtees 2008: 59). Thus, human

rights violations shall be examined and added as the third part of the triangulated concept of human trafficking. There is likely no single researcher or practitioner who would not agree that trafficking is mostly accompanied by physical and psychological suffering, abuses and torture (Hughes 2000; Gallagher 2002; Aradau 2004; Gajic-Veljanoski and Stewart 2007; Surtees 2008; Zimmerman et al. 2008; Di Tommaso et al. 2009; Hendrix 2010). The Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP 2013) mentions physical violence towards victims in almost half of the countries in the world<sup>8</sup>. For example, “trafficking victims returning from Lebanon, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia reported rape, psychological abuse, physical torture and violence, sexual harassment and assault, harsh working conditions, confinement to the home, confiscation of travel documents, and withholding of salaries” (TIP 2013: 245). Researchers of trafficking in the Middle East also report widespread physical abuses in Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Nepal (Schubert 2001; Mattar 2002; Surtees 2008). Reports from such African countries as Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda show the incidences of physical violence towards victims as well (Fleisher, Johnston and Alon 2008: 63). All these examples of countries where human rights are disrespected and physical abuses are widespread suggest that in these countries in particular, it will be more difficult to enforce an effective anti-trafficking legislation. Therefore, I consider human rights violations highly related to trafficking, which also serves as third element of the triangulated human trafficking concept.

The concept of human rights violations is rather broad, however, and with regard to human trafficking, it can be narrowed down to physical violence since it is directly related to victims’ experiences and is measureable, unlike psychological violence. Physical violence is operationalized via Political Terror Scale (hereafter “PTS”), which measures “actual violations of physical integrity rights and captures the relative severity of abuse across countries” (Wood and Gibney 2010: 370). Amnesty International and the US State Department construct this index on the yearly country reports. The PTS is measured on a 5-item scale, where 1 means strong protection of people by the rule of law and respect for their rights, while 5 means the most abusive category when terror has expanded to the whole population. The PTS dataset includes 187 countries in 2010. However, since it has been mentioned that the concept of physical violence is complex, I would like to include another global measure of physical violence that captures another governmental respect for human

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<sup>8</sup> Such countries are Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, Cape Verde, China, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Hungary, India, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Oman, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Rwanda, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, UAE, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe.

rights. This measure is the Physical Integrity Rights Index (hereafter “PIRI”) produced by the CIRI Human Rights Data Project. The index evaluates the level of governmental respect for a variety of internationally recognized human rights, and is constructed by adding the rights not to be tortured, summarily executed, disappeared, or imprisoned for political beliefs. The scores are summed to form one cumulative index (Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Richards et al. 2001). The PIRI ranges from 0 when there is no governmental respect for the four-abovementioned rights to 8 when there is full governmental respect for these four rights. Although, both PTS and PIRI have not been used in empirical research on human trafficking, both measures have been successfully used in the research on human rights (Weiler 2004; Walsh and Piazza 2010; Cingranelli and Filippov 2010; Schmaljohann 2013; Hill 2013). Since these indices each represents a part of the human rights violations concept they both are used for the operationalization of the concept.

All operationalized concepts represent the aspects theoretically most related to human trafficking and thus reversely related the anti-trafficking enforcement. Together they help to better capture the triangulated concept of human trafficking visualized on Figure 2. Next, the external validity test will be performed in order to identify which one of the global sources of anti-trafficking enforcement is empirically related stronger to human trafficking. The external validity test includes correlation analysis of the three global data sources on anti-trafficking enforcement with operationalized concepts related to human trafficking.

First, existing data sources are reviewed. The first global measure of anti-trafficking enforcement is called *Tier Rankings* and annually reported in the Trafficking in Persons Report (hereafter “TIP”) by the US Department of State. There are different acts which provide the tools to combat trafficking in persons both worldwide and domestically. One of the first acts that appeared, the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (hereafter “TVPA”), proposes the minimum international standards for countries in order to eliminate human trafficking. Taking into account these standards, the TIP Report places each country onto one of three tiers based on the extent of their governments’ efforts to comply with the TVPA’s standards. Countries are divided in the following manner: Tier 1 is for countries which fully comply with the required TVPA’s standards, Tier 2 is for those countries making consistent efforts although not yet being fully compliant and Tier 3 - for those countries with deficit in both aspects. There is also an intermediate category called Tier 2 Watch List for those countries which do not comply with the minimum standards but are making significant efforts to do so. However, being in the highest Tier category does not imply that a country already solved the human trafficking problem. According to the TIP report “Tier 1 ranking indicates that a government has acknowledged the existence of human trafficking, made

efforts to address the problem, and complies with the TVPA's minimum standards" (TIP 2013: 41). Though Tier placement acknowledges the size of human trafficking problem in a country, the evaluation itself depends more on the extent of governmental action to combat trafficking. The Tier Rankings cover up to 182 countries and are available for each year since 2001. Although the range of available countries varies from 78 countries in 2001 to 182 in 2013, it still can be used in the empirical analyses, both in a cross-country analysis and a time-series analysis. Overall, the Tier measure provides a global look at the scope of human trafficking problem and how governments are dealing with it. However, some scholars are quite skeptical about using this measure in quantitative research (Hughes 2002; Chuang 2006; Qian and Yanagizawa 2009, Wooditch 2011; Cho and Vadlamannati 2012). The main criticism is the non-transparent methodology of the Tier rankings, as is often the case when one is dealing with indices based on expert assessments. According to the official documents, the Tier measure is compiled of an enactment of laws prohibiting severe forms of trafficking in persons, as defined by the TVPA, criminal penalties prescribed for human trafficking offenses, implementation of human trafficking laws, proactive victim identification measures, government funding and partnerships with NGOs, victim protection efforts and governmental measures to prevent human trafficking (TIP 2013: 42-44).<sup>9</sup> Researchers not only argue that it is unclear how the abovementioned measures are evaluated and combined into one scale but also that rankings are biased due to certain political interests. For instance, Kelley and Simmons find that such a form of monitoring has strong effects and those rankings are used as a form of social pressure (Kelley and Simmons 2015). Despite these criticisms, the TIP measurement is used successfully in quantitative research (Lee 2005; Calandruccio 2005; Wooditch 2011; Van Dijk and Klerx-Van Mierlo 2014; Hernandez Rudolph 2015), and it has been helpful in evaluating the governments' actions to combat human trafficking and tracking countries' progress over the last fifteen years. Moreover, the TIP reports generally "have become part of the global human rights architecture, accepted by the human rights establishment as an effective tool for holding governments accountable" (Gallagher 2011: 383). These contradictions among the scholars reflect the need of exploring the Tier Rankings and establishing how relevant this measure is to the concept of human trafficking as such.

The next global measure of anti-trafficking enforcement is the 3P Anti-Trafficking Policy Index (hereafter "3P Index") - which was developed by Seo-Young Cho and published by *the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW-Berlin)*. The 3P Index evaluates governmental anti-trafficking efforts in the three main policy dimensions: prosecution of perpetrators of

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<sup>9</sup> Detailed information on what Tier rankings reflect can be found in the Appendix.

human trafficking, prevention of the crime of human trafficking and protection of victims of human trafficking or the so called three Ps. Since this measure aims directly at policy assessment, it is widely applied among quantitative researchers of anti-trafficking policies (Cho 2012; Cho, Dreher and Neumayer 2014; Van Dijk and Klerx-Van Mierlo 2014; Amahazion 2014). Scholars test both the validity and reliability of the index, demonstrating that the 3P Index “is fine-grained and based on the consistent coding of a wide range of informational sources” (Cho, Dreher and Neumayer 2014: 23). The index captures “three different fundamental dimensions of anti-trafficking policies, namely prevention, protection and prosecution” (Cho, Dreher and Neumayer 2014: 23). It is easy and straightforward to follow the method of the aggregation of countries scores. Each of the 3P areas is evaluated on a 5-point scale and each sub-index is aggregated to the overall 3P Index as the unweighted sum, so the overall index ranges from scores 3 to 15. The minimum values of the index correspond to the absence of compliance for any of three areas, and the maximum values stand for full compliance for all of three areas. The 3P Index is available for each country yearly and covers up to 185 countries. Besides the wide country and time coverage of the index, the largest advantage is a clear transparency of the aggregation method. Being first introduced in year 2010, the 3P Index was estimated backwards for the period from 2000 to 2010 yearly, which is documented in coding guideline materials.<sup>10</sup> At least two coders define ranks of countries’ performances and principal investigators interfere when coders do not agree on their decision (Cho, Dreher and Neumayer 2014). Criticizing non-transparent methodology of Tier rankings, authors of the 3P Index made all empirical examinations to ensure the reliability of their index. Though, this measure demonstrates various advantages, it has not been checked on the extent of the relation to main human trafficking concepts. Applying mathematical logic, authors create fully viable index not emphasizing the theoretical aspect as much. Thus, using an external validity test helps to determine how close the 3P Index is related to human trafficking theoretically, first, and empirically, second.

The third global measure of anti-trafficking enforcement is the trafficking scale developed by Hudson et al. (2012). This measure is available in *The WomanStats Database* and is based on anti-trafficking practices and laws (Caprioli et al. 2009; Hudson et al. 2012). The variable has an ordinal scale and ranges from 0 to 4. The lowest scale point is 0 and stands for full compliance with the anti-trafficking policies, while the larger the scale point is, the less laws regarding an enforcement of trafficking are spotted. The intermediate points stand for some limitations in the existing anti-trafficking policies. When a country is assigned a scale point 1, this country enforces the laws against trafficking and complies with the TVPA’s standards,

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<sup>10</sup> Available online at <http://www.economics-human-trafficking.org/data-and-reports.html>

but either enforcement is becoming more lax over time or reports of significant trafficking undetected by authorities are increasing (Hudson et al. 2012). The scale point 2 demonstrates major limitations in the existing anti-trafficking policies. There are laws against trafficking in these countries, but these laws are not always enforced. The country is in non-compliance with the TVPA's international standards but making efforts to comply (Hudson et al. 2012). The scale point 3 demonstrates severe problems with enforcing anti-trafficking legislation. There are limited laws against trafficking in a country that is in non-compliance with the TVPA's requirements and only limited efforts are being made to comply (Hudson et al. 2012). Finally, the scale point 4 shows no laws against trafficking in the country, or from or into the country. The country is not in compliance with the TVPA's standards and victims are not supported (Hudson et al. 2012). The trafficking scale was extracted for the largest number of countries in 2011 and covers 160 countries in my dataset. Being relatively new, this measure has not often used. So far, trafficking scale has been only applied quantitatively in two studies: for mapping anti-trafficking laws globally (Hudson et al. 2011) and examining how these laws are spread in the Islamic world (Stearmer and Emmett 2007). This measure is not as widespread as the other two global indices, although, it has great potential due to countries and time coverage. The measure includes expert evaluations of countries' compliance to international anti-trafficking legislation. The main advantage of trafficking scale is that it is based on unique and original dataset designed to capture the status of women in the world. Authors of the WomanStats database expand data sources for their measure by including reports produced by NGOs, State Department's human rights reports, UN reports, CEDAW and overall over 500 sources representing status of women (Caprioli et al. 2009). Being such a vast resource of information on the culturally formed position of women, trafficking scale measure shall soon become more familiar to quantitative researchers of anti-trafficking policies. Among shortcomings of the measure, one could notice the same absence of transparent methodology of expert evaluations as in Tier Rankings. The WomanStats Database has an extensive codebook on their website, but it lacks the detailed description of how particular scale points were assigned by experts. This might be a potential shortcoming since authors are not disclosing the methods used in producing country ratings, so one can make sure that reliability and validity issues are properly addressed. Another shortcoming is that the measure was only introduced in 2007 and the authors do not use backwards estimations to evaluate countries positions in missing years. This might possibly affect any time-series analysis that researchers aim to conduct using this measure. Next, for the year 2007, 156 countries were evaluated and evaluations repeated in 2009, 2011 and 2015, again making it impossible to run time-series analysis without filling missing gaps in the data. The



last disadvantage is common to all three global measures: the lack of connection between theoretically defined anti-trafficking enforcement and its empirical representation. Again this issue overlaps with the lack of transparency in expert evaluations, which happens quite often with indices in all fields and spheres. By outlining shortcomings of each index I want to show that at least conceptual problems can be addressed with specific technique discussed next.

All three aforementioned evaluation measures of anti-trafficking policies are the major global data sources of anti-trafficking enforcement with the largest time and country coverage. These three indices are compared by their aggregated scores yearly so one can examine how different they are, not only in countries and time coverage, but also in average scores. The indices' scores were harmonized to 0-1 scales for an easier comparison, where 0 indicates absence of anti-trafficking enforcement and 1 – the strongest enforcement (Table 2).

**Table 2: Comparison of Global Anti-Trafficking Enforcement Indices**

Year	Tier Rankings		Indices of anti-trafficking enforcement on 0-1 scale			
			N countries	3P Anti-trafficking Policy Index	N countries	Trafficking scale
2000			0.51	81		
2001	0.29	78	0.55	90		
2002	0.33	86	0.61	119		
2003	0.37	112	0.60	136		
2004	0.32	130	0.62	154		
2005	0.33	139	0.64	159		
2006	0.33	146	0.64	164		
2007	0.33	145	0.63	171	0.42	156
2008	0.33	147	0.65	176		
2009	0.31	163	0.66	177	0.43	174
2010	0.32	164	0.66	184		
2011	0.32	164	0.65	185	0.39	168
2012	0.33	164	0.66	188		

*Note. Original scores of the indices have been transformed to a 0-1 scale for an easier comparison. Scores reflect average anti-trafficking efforts all estimated countries take in a given year, where 0 indicates no efforts and 1 indicates maximum efforts. Original averaged 3P scores are taken from 3P Index Report (Cho 2012).*

After a closer look at available statistics, I turn to the main question – which measure closer captures the full scope of governmental actions against the trafficking problem? Researchers tend to use these measures separately, and no one to date compares all of the measures simultaneously. This chapter aims not only to compare these sources, but also evaluate them according to their level of external validity in relation to the concepts of human trafficking. A test on external validity helps to interpret how well data and theories from anti-trafficking setting apply to other settings. In other words, this test helps to determine the true measure which overlaps the most with the concepts of human trafficking. The measure of external validity is the extent to which the results can be generalized and thus applied to other

populations (Winter 2000). According to Cook and Campbell (1979: 70–80) external validity involves “the generalizability of causal inferences to a broader set of cases”.

In order to give a broader specification of the meaning and entailments of the systematized concept, Shepard (1993: 417) summarizes that “an external model depicting its relationship to other [concepts]” is required. According to the principle of external modelling I use the concepts which are most related to human trafficking since addressing them should shed a light on the best global anti-trafficking enforcement measure. Eventually, my external model of anti-trafficking enforcement will illustrate the relationship between indices of anti-trafficking efforts and concepts most related to human trafficking that together form the triangulated concept of human trafficking.

The next step in the process is to include the latest available indicators that represent the theoretical concepts of human trafficking and existing global sources of anti-trafficking enforcement and run correlation analysis. The implication here is that measures of anti-trafficking enforcement should reflect the theoretical meaning of human trafficking, which is in turn compiled of organized crime, corruption and human rights violations concepts. How far will these measures overlap with the theoretical concepts? The key to answering this question is to test which of these three measures relates the most to all of the proposed concepts of human trafficking. Correlation helps to discern to what extent the measures and thus concepts overlap, and what degree of variance they share. Correlation implies that data is analyzed in a way to “look at relationships between naturally-occurring variables rather than making statements about cause and effect” (Field 2009: 783). For the purposes of external validity test, there is no need to account for cause and effect, however, causality does not seem to be a problem in this case since all concepts of trafficking appeared long before the governments started to apply anti-trafficking policies. Thus, the variables representing theoretical concepts are used for the correlation analysis with indices of anti-trafficking enforcement. The correlation coefficient usually measures the strength of the relationship between variables. The Pearson correlation coefficient is accurate when linear relationship between variables is measured and thus the data shall be interval or ratio (Field 2009). While Spearman’s correlation coefficient is a non-parametric statistic, it is used when data violates parametric assumptions such as categorical or abnormally distributed data (Field 2009). Since the Tier Rankings and trafficking scale both are ordinal variables, I calculate Spearman’s correlation coefficients for them and Person’s coefficients for the 3P Index, which has an interval scale. After accounting for different data types, Table 3 provides the results of the correlation analysis.

**Table 3: Correlations of Anti-Trafficking Enforcement Indices with Concepts of Crime, Corruption and Human Rights Violations**

	Measures of anti-trafficking enforcement		
	Tier Rankings	3P Anti-trafficking Policy Index	Trafficking scale
The Composite Organized Crime Index (COCI)	-0.56 *** (52)	-0.39*** (52)	-0.49*** (52)
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)	-0.56*** (159)	-0.42*** (159)	-0.53*** (159)
The Political Terror Scale (PTS)	-0.49*** (159)	-0.34*** (159)	-0.45*** (159)
The Physical Integrity Rights Index (PIRI)	-0.46*** (160)	-0.34*** (160)	-0.44*** (160)

*Note.* Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients are reported. Number of countries in parentheses.


\*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*  $p \leq .01$ , \*  $p \leq .05$ .

In Table 3, all correlation coefficients are significant at the .001-level. The Tier has been reversed so the highest values represent the highest level of anti-trafficking enforcement. The largest correlations are observed between Tier rankings and almost all variables from each theoretical concept. Correlation coefficients between Tier and operationalized concepts are rather large, all around 0.5, which is considered in the literature as large effect size (Cohen 1992). Using these coefficients for interpretation allows to conclude that COCI is negatively related to Tier with a Spearman correlation coefficient of  $r = -.56$  and a significance value of less than .001. This gives confidence that the observed relationship between organized crime and anti-trafficking enforcement is genuine. Next, the CPI is negatively related to Tier also with a coefficient of  $r = -.56$  and significant at  $p < .001$ , which proves the existing relationship between the concept of corruption and the Tier Rankings. Table 3 also shows that both measures of physical violence are negatively related to Tier with coefficients of  $r = -.49$  ( $p < .001$ ) and  $r = -.46$  ( $p < .001$ ) accordingly. That means the relationship between the concept of human rights violations and anti-trafficking enforcement is genuine as well. These correlations prove that as the level of organized crime, corruption or physical abuses in a country increases, the level of anti-trafficking enforcement decreases. Moreover, these coefficients are considered important for the purposes of this chapter, since they are placed

within the context of the research domain of triangulated concept of human trafficking used here. Thus, Tier measure has the highest level of external validity with a set of key contextual indicators. The results can be generalized to the sample of countries used in this research ranging from 52 to 160 countries and is a sufficient number for drawing conclusions. Hence, at the country-level, the Tier Rankings variable has proven to be the most reliable measurement of anti-trafficking enforcement and will be used in further analysis to help define which characteristics of countries strengthen anti-trafficking policies worldwide.

Giving the fact that TIP measure has received a lot of criticism due to its tier ranking determination, the analysis presented in this chapter has proven that Tier is linked conceptually to human trafficking and should be considered a valid measurement of anti-trafficking enforcement. Tier Rankings measurement will be further used to determine country-level characteristics affecting the enforcement of global policies against human trafficking. To glance on a comparison of countries by Tier Rankings, TIP provides a global map visualizing levels of anti-trafficking enforcement.

Figure 3: Legislative Framework to Combat Human Trafficking Globally (TIP 2013)



Note. Original scale of Tier Rankings are presented, reversed ones are used in empirical analyses

Figure 3 shows that countries are ranked according to their level of legislative efforts to combat human trafficking. Green areas represent Tier 1 countries with the highest anti-trafficking enforcement such as Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, etc.<sup>11</sup>, and countries with the lowest enforcement or Tier 3 are represented with red color on the map, for example, Algeria, China, Cuba, Iran and others. The quick look on the map suggests that rich democracies are overwhelmingly filling the niche of strongest anti-trafficking efforts. Being a rich democracy clearly gives an advantage in terms of resources to establish the laws and proper institutions to support enactment of these laws. However, I assume that these are necessary but not sufficient conditions for a country to fully comply with international standards of anti-trafficking legislation. There are several exceptions that prove this point. Indeed, many rich and democratic countries fall into the first Tier group, with such exceptions as the Republic of Korea, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Macedonia and Nicaragua, which are all very high on the scale of the democratic institutions but rather middle or low income countries, while Colombia and Armenia both have rather low GDP and mediocre democratic performance. When we look at the second Tier group, we can find Switzerland and Japan as the outliers with exceptional democratic performances and rather high GDP per capita, and still Japan and Switzerland are countries with flaws in the existing anti-trafficking legislation. Another example is Qatar, which is a very wealthy but non-democratic that adheres to the international laws and precedents set but the international community on trafficking. The next group – watch listed countries – contains a couple of exceptions as well. For instance, Trinidad and Tobago with very strong democratic institutions and mediocre GDP and less wealthy but still democratic Uruguay are good examples. The last and most dangerous group does not stand out since it includes mostly non-democratic countries. Since the Tier methodology in no way identifies that presumably rich and democratic countries are allocated to the highest category, I shall test whether it is indeed a valid assumption. If this assumption holds true, it might affect the theoretical framework I am trying to propose in order to explain how the anti-trafficking enforcement works. On the other hand, if the assumption does not hold, I must assume that other factors may interfere with the theoretical explanation. I have already mentioned an absence of the global anti-trafficking enforcement theory and even expressed criticism towards existing measures of anti-trafficking policies. Thus, despite the difficulties which might affect the study of the global determinants of anti-trafficking enforcement, I want to examine the country-level drivers, possibly explaining the similarities and differences in the nowadays enforcement patterns. These may well be the factors affecting the decision of the US State Department to use funds in order to strengthen

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<sup>11</sup> The full list of countries split by their level of anti-trafficking enforcement is available in the Appendix.

and improve anti-trafficking legislation. While it is not yet clear how the governmental funds to combat human trafficking are allocated, I assume that recipients of the funds are more likely willing to comply with international laws. These and other country-level drivers are studied in detail in the next chapter. Accounting for country-level drivers will help to explain the varying levels of anti-trafficking enforcement, respond to the criticism of the existing enforcement measures and propose policy recommendations based on global comparative analyses. In this Chapter the conceptual framework of theoretical nexus of anti-trafficking enforcement has been proposed on a country level. However, addressing the issue of enforcement is hardly full without addressing the grass roots of human trafficking at the individual level. These grass roots are referred as micro-foundations of human trafficking and are discussed along with factors affecting anti-trafficking enforcement in the following chapters.



## **CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODS**

### **3.1 Measuring anti-trafficking enforcement**

This chapter aims to explain what drives global anti-trafficking enforcement from an empirical perspective. A comprehensive literature review of theoretical principles and approaches within this thesis helps to broaden factors influencing measures of anti-trafficking enforcement worldwide. Such drivers were divided into gender inequality, international factors, state capacity, political institutions and demand. To propose a broader model explaining anti-trafficking enforcement and to determine which factors have the highest importance, both cross-sectional and longitudinal methods of analysis are applied. In the light of the explorative purpose of this research I include a wide range of existing country-level indicators representing each theoretical driver in order to determine the measure overlapping the most with the best source for measuring anti-trafficking enforcement. First, these global indicators are reviewed accordingly to the related theoretical concepts discussed earlier. Next, correlation analysis, ordinal and panel regressions are applied in order to determine which indicators play the most important role in forming global anti-trafficking enforcement mechanisms. While the theoretical links between these factors and global anti-trafficking enforcement are reviewed in Chapter one, selection of the most reliable enforcement measure is presented in Chapter two, empirical links are discussed further in Chapter three. Possible limitations and further implications of the data are also reviewed in Chapter three. The sources of the data can be found in the Appendix at the end of this thesis.

## **DATA**

### *DEPENDENT VARIABLE*


As it was established in Chapter two, Tier Rankings is by far the most reliable measure of global anti-trafficking enforcement, since it overlaps most with all theoretical predictors of anti-trafficking nexus. The data on Tier Rankings is collected from TIP reports compiled by the US Department of State. Each country is placed onto one of three tiers plus an intermediate category based on a country's efforts to comply with the TVPA's standards to combat human trafficking. The original scale of Tier Rankings is described in detail in Chapter two. However, for the purposes of easier interpretation, the scale has been reversed where 0 stands for countries that do not comply with the minimum standards of combating

human trafficking and 1 means that countries are in full compliance with those standards. Intermediate categories 0.3 and 0.6 stands for, accordingly, watch listed countries and countries making consistent efforts. These reversed Tier Rankings are treated as dependent variable.

In order to eyeball the distribution of countries on their anti-trafficking ratings, one can explore Figure 4, which illustrates how countries and world regions differ in their level of anti-trafficking efforts.

As Figure 4 shows, Western Europe and Northern America are regions with the best efforts to enforce anti-trafficking legislation. Here, one will not find a single country that is not fully or partly following the standards of international anti-trafficking legislation. In contrast, there is no country in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is fully complies with that legislation. Countries in this region have, by far, the weakest legislation against human trafficking, and also happen to be the region on Earth with the largest number of countries that are either watch-listed or do not follow the international precedent set against human trafficking.

Figure 4: Distribution of Tier Rankings by Country Region



Note. Original scale of Tier Rankings are presented, reversed ones are used in empirical analyses

## *INDEPENDENT VARIABLES*

All independent variables are grouped accordingly to the related theoretical concept discussed in the Chapter one. These theoretical concepts are grouped by the measures of gender inequality, international factors, state capacity, political institutions and behavior and demand. Each of them is operationalized via various country-level indicators, which amount to 41 measures in total. Due to the explorative purpose of this research and its global scope, I argue that all these measures are discussed as relevant representations of the proposed theoretical factors.

### *GENDER INEQUALITY*

Reviewing gender inequality as fuel for human trafficking and hence the great obstacle in achieving better enforcement, it was assumed theoretically that countries demonstrating higher gender equality will likely have better anti-trafficking enforcement. Given the fact that there are many facets of gender inequality, this chapter seeks to explore which part of gender inequality contributes the most in effective anti-trafficking enforcement. In order to operationalize the concept of gender inequality I address separately the dimensions of this concept, such as female resources, motivations and achievements and domestic laws specific to gender-related problems.

#### *Resources, motivations and achievements*

Various gender inequality indices help to measure the spread of resources and allocate the related gaps between women and men. Although these indices have been constructed independently from each other, they reflect one multidimensional concept of gender inequality, and thus are highly collinear with each other. Since one is not yet sure which facets of gender inequality are more crucial for establishing better anti-trafficking enforcement, several global indices of gender inequality with the largest country coverage are included into correlation analysis.

One of the global measures of gender inequality has a synonymous name – the Gender Inequality Index (hereafter “GII”). The GII was introduced by the United Nations Development Programme (hereafter “UNDP”) in 2010. According to the UNDP, this index is a composite measure that captures the loss of achievement within a country due to gender

inequality in three dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment, and labor market participation. The index shows the loss in potential human development due to inequality between female and male achievements in these dimensions. Although the GII is not a widespread measure in the literature, scholars have started to pay more attention to this new index (Arora 2012; Permanyer 2013; van Staveren 2013; Bilbao-Ubillos 2013). The GII also has constraints as any other global composite index. A criticism of the index concerns its complicated computations and mixing women-specific indicators with indicators computed for both women and men, which leads to “conceptual and methodological problems” (Permanyer 2013: 940). Some scholars characterize the GII as a gender-neutral criterion of inequality, which measures the capabilities of human development (van Staveren 2013). Being relatively new, the GII still needs to be further explored. This chapter gives a great opportunity to employ the GII in the analysis of anti-trafficking enforcement, since it has not been used in human trafficking research yet. The GII ranges between 0 and 1 and higher values indicate larger disparities between females and males in all measured dimensions. In the year 2013, the GII covers 139 countries, which is a sufficient amount for both correlation and comparative cross-national analyses.

Next measure in the list of global indicators list is the Gender Gap Index (hereafter “GGI”). The GGI was introduced by the World Economic Forum in 2006. According to the Global Gender Gap Report, the GGI examines national gender gaps in four fundamental categories: economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival and political empowerment. The sub-indices include 14 indicators: labor force participation, wage equality, estimated earned income, female legislators, senior officials, and managers, literacy ratio, higher education enrolment, female professional and technical workers, life expectancy ratio, sex ratio at birth, women in parliament, at ministerial level and heads of state (Hausmann et al. 2012). Although scholars applied the GGI in such research fields as social science (Gerson 2010; Mills 2010; Yeganeh and May 2011), political science (Lister 2009), mathematics (Hyde and Mertz 2009) and psychology (Zentner and Mitura 2012), no one has yet used the measure in connection with research on anti-trafficking legislation. According to Hausmann et al. many global indices are tied to income levels, while “the Global Gender Gap Index is disassociated from the income and resource level of an economy and instead seeks to measure how equitably the available income, resources and opportunities are distributed between women and men” (Hausmann et al. 2012: 19). Also since the GGI reflects multiple dimensions, it tends to capture more nuances in developed nations (Mills 2010). The GGI’s coverage reaches 131 countries. Its highest possible score is 1 indicating parity and the lowest possible score is 0 standing for imparity.

The next measure, the Gender Equity Index (hereafter “GEI”), was introduced by the Social Watch network in 2007. The index measures the gap between women and men in education, the economy and political empowerment. In education, the GEI looks at the gender gap in enrolment at all levels and in literacy; economic participation computes the gaps in income and employment and political empowerment measures the gaps in highly qualified jobs, parliament and senior executive positions. The scale runs from 0 representing perfect inequality to 100 representing perfect equality and covers 146 countries in 2013. Despite the GEI being a relatively new measurement index, scholars started to employ and compare it with other related indices (Geske Dijkstra 2006; Schüler 2006; Tambunan 2009; Mills 2010; Bericat 2012). While some authors note that dropping the health indicator (i.e. life expectancy) helps the GEI in “avoiding the problem of adjusting for biological differences between men and women” (Geske Dijkstra 2006: 277), others consider omission of the health indicator problematic (Mills 2010). Despite this omission, Mills admits that the index includes “comprehensive indicators of empowerment and has a broad coverage of 154 countries” (Mills 2010: 454). One of the recent studies on comparison of cross-national indices with gender-differentiated data agrees that both the GEI and GGI “only count inequalities that disadvantage women” measuring inequality from the women perspective (Hawken and Munck 2013: 820). Thus, addressing gender inequality from another angle might play a significant role in strengthening anti-trafficking policies that shall specifically account for the root causes of a woman’s vulnerability to being trafficked.

The next global index, the Gender Development Index (hereafter “GDI”), measures gender inequalities in achievement in three basic dimensions of human development: health, measured by female and male life expectancy at birth; education, measured by female and male expected years of schooling for children and female and male mean years of schooling for adults ages 25 and older; and command over economic resources, measured by female and male estimated earned income (UNDP Human Development Report). The GDI is simply the ratio of female HDI to male HDI. The index ranges from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating higher equality in HDI achievements between women and men and covers all 164 countries of my sample. The index is not a measure of inequality per se but it measures the gap between HDI and GDI, which is interpreted as the loss of human development due to gender inequality (Klasen and Schüler 2009). So far the index has not been particularly popular among researchers and has not been used with regard to human trafficking research. There is practically no quantitative study employing this measure, which also indicates existing flaws in it. For instance, the reliance on the HDI in calculation of the GDI apparently favors countries with higher incomes providing them with higher GDI scores (Bardhan and Klasen

1999; Dijkstra 2006). Another shortcoming of the index is that the GDI does not include direct measures indicating the position of women in the society (Morrisson and Jutting 2005). Addressing the criticism, the GDI estimation procedure has been revised in recent years, providing more credit to the measure and the possibility to start using it in quantitative research. Though it has been argued that this measure shall be further improved, it is already providing insights on gender equality across countries and over time (Weldon 2002; Beneria 2003).

Simultaneously with the GDI, another highly relevant global index was introduced by the UNDP – the Gender Empowerment Measure (hereafter “GEM”). The GEM considers gender gaps in political representation, in professional and management positions in the economy, as well as gender gaps in incomes (Klasen 2006). The GEM consists of proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments, percentage of women in economic decision making positions and female share of income (UNDP Human Development Report). The index runs from 0 to 1 where 1 stands for top performance. Both GEM and GDI are considered as broad measures of gender inequality in the literature (Charmes and Wieringa 2003; Giovannini et al. 2007). Criticism of the GEM index consists of several valid points. As Klasen argues poor countries are excluded from scoring high on the GEM scale, since the measure doesn’t account for gaps in incomes per se but earned incomes, which are low in these countries (Klasen and Schüller 2009). Another major omission is that GEM only accounts for gaps in higher rank positions for females both politically and economically (Betata 2007). However, GEM measures both economic and political empowerment of women, which represent the extent of female achievements as an important aspect of gender inequality with regard to strengthening anti-trafficking policies. The GEM index helps to capture “the opportunities through which women are actually able to achieve equality with men” (Chant 2006: 208). Moreover, the index includes internationally comparable indicators, is built on important theoretical assumptions, covers large amount of countries on a yearly basis and brings more clarity to the aspects of gender inequality omitted by other measures. This proves that it is a valid global index, worth considering among various indicators of gender inequality.

The above-mentioned indices have all been used in various fields of quantitative research but not yet in relation to human trafficking. Nevertheless, they all represent the facets of gender inequality supposedly leading to gaps in anti-trafficking legislation in some country-level instances. However, there are few other measures of gender inequality, which address how resources acquired by women impact their role in society. More specifically, the women’s rights index measures the rights to legal protection and equal treatment: politically,

economically, and socially (Cingranelli and Richards 2007). This index originally is divided into women's political (the right to vote, to run for political office, to hold government positions, to join political parties), economic (equal pay, free choice of profession, equality in hiring, job security) and social rights (the right to equal inheritance, to enter into marriage on a basis of equality with men, to travel abroad, to obtain a passport)<sup>12</sup>. Each part of the overall index can be used as separate indices. Using the women's rights index, Cho confirms that the findings are controversial but reflect "a complex relationship between human trafficking and women's rights and overall development" (Cho 2012: 13). Because Cho, who, in her study, works with estimated human trafficking inflows and this thesis analyzes anti-trafficking law enforcement data, I assume that the relationship between women's rights and anti-trafficking legislation will be more straightforward: the more power women have been granted, the more effectively legislation will function. This assumption should be tested by including these three indices as measures of female resources, motivations and achievements, and checking whether different aspects of women's rights affect anti-trafficking legislation.

Another measure often used with regard to defining the state of gender inequality is the share of women in the labor force. Female labor force participation rate is the percentage of female population ages 15 and older that are economically active. The International Labour Organization provides the most recent data. This measure is another reflection of gender equality in society and also reflects female's achievements. However, it is not as widely used quantitatively as standard inequality indices. Few studies mention that using this indicator leads to different outcomes. Some prove that feminization of the labor force leads to countries' economic growth (Seguino 2000), but nevertheless unrelated to gender inequality in political representation (Kenworthy and Malami 1999). The research on human trafficking employs this measure as well, indicating that higher shares of unemployed women make them easier targets for recruiters (Shelley 2003). Using female youth unemployment as the share of the female labor force Danailova-Trainor and Belser statistically prove that with higher unemployment rates trafficking is unlikely to be reduced (Danailova-Trainor and Belser 2006). Based on these few examples, I assume that including the share of females in the labor force as an indicator of gender inequality helps to observe another aspect of inequality, namely, the achievements side.

How women are perceived in societies, how actively they can exercise their rights and whether they have any decision-making power are important questions to ask if one wants to

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<sup>12</sup> The full list of indicators is available in the Cingranelli, D. L., & Richards, D. L. (2010). The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) human rights data project. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 32(2), 401-424.



address to what extent gender equality can affect policy-making processes. Thus, gender inequality concerns shall be taken into account in order to enforce well-functioning anti-trafficking legislation.

### *Domestic Laws*

There are several global indices capturing the laws specific to gender-related issues that cover large amount of countries. They include legislation on violence against women, how equitable is a family law, how domestic violence, marital rape and sexual harassment are addressed by various laws. They all seem extremely relevant from a theoretical standpoint, and according to the literature if these laws are enforced properly, the anti-trafficking enforcement will be likely stronger as well.

One of the operationalization of domestic laws capturing gender inequality is the Violence Against Women index (hereafter “VAW”). This measure was developed by Htun and Weldon in order to explore governments’ responses to violence against women in the world. The responsiveness of governments includes both helping current victims and preventing future violence. The VAW index “assigns higher values to those policy regimes that address more types of violence and whose actions span the categories of services, legal reform, policy coordination and prevention of violence” (Htun and Weldon 2012: 550). The final scale consists of 10 points where higher values mean more governmental response while lower values mean governments are doing less and less to address the violence against women. With this measure, researchers capture how widespread is the violence against women and how it affects the policy changes (Htun and Piscopo 2014). I expect this index being highly related to measuring anti-trafficking enforcement indicating vulnerability statuses of women from governmental standpoint. Unfortunately, the country coverage of the VAW index is rather low – 68 countries. In the case of using it further in cross-national analysis, I would lose more than half of a sample, which significantly distort the results. For the purposes of correlation analysis the index still fits well and shall be taken into account due to its uniqueness of capturing violence against women on the global scale.

Another global measure capturing the concept of domestic laws is directly linked to how equally women are treated within families. A variable such as inequity in family law, developed in 2007, seeks to capture how inequitably family law is conceptualized according to gender (Caprioli et al. 2007). The following variables are included in this scale: marital rape, age at first marriage, polygyny, abortion, attitude towards divorce and inheritance as a

wife. The variable has an ordinal scale with 4 points. The lowest 0 point represents the case of perfect equality between men and women in all indicated areas, while the highest point 4 represents perfect inequality. Inequity in the family law variable combines data, law and practice and measures women's relation to the state (Caprioli 2009). According to Caprioli, "if the age of marriage is younger than the legal age, then we know that the courts and society are not in synch with the law and that the state is choosing to ignore the issue" (Caprioli 2009: 430). In other words, this variable measures how vulnerable women's positions are in society, directly linking this vulnerability to the possibility of being easier targets for trafficking in their own countries. Scholars have also proved that inequity in family law is strongly related to violence against women (Hudson et al. 2011), which in turn is likely lead to weaker governmental anti-trafficking enforcement.

Next, using the dataset of United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, measures of whether a country enforces legislation on domestic violence, marital rape and sexual harassment are selected. The legislation on domestic violence includes information about general criminalization of domestic violence and other domestic violence-related criminal offenses, issuing protection orders, prohibition of perpetrators from possessing a firearm and others. The variable has a nominal scale where 1 means that the elements of domestic violence legislation are established in any domestic violence law and 0 means they are not established. Another crime defined and measured in the same UN dataset is marital rape. Marital rape is a specifically sexual assault within a relationship. The legislation against marital rape includes the following elements: a definition of sexual assault that does not require penetration or force, burden on the accused to prove consent, enhanced penalties for the threat or use of force, or the age or disability of survivor, provision for a broad range of coercive circumstances around consent such as intimidation or fraud and others. The variable is coded nominally where 1 means these elements are established in any marital rape law and 0 means they are not established. Lastly, the legislation against sexual harassment includes information about harassment in employment, education, sports, housing, and provision of goods and services. In any context, however, laws prohibiting sexual harassment should include the following general components: judicial and/or administrative procedures to enforce the prohibition on harassment, provision for compensation and/or reparation related to damages and losses suffered as a result of the harassment, dissuasive penalties for perpetrators and others. The variable has a nominal scale with 1 indicating these elements are established in any domestic violence law and 0 means they are not established. Researchers use this dataset to "better understand men's use of different forms of violence against women" (Fulu et al. 2013: 110). The activists of human

trafficking often connect the lack of legislation on domestic violence, for instance, and human trafficking of women but doing so mostly analyzing single cases. However, quantitatively the lack of legislation on these issues has not been properly addressed, and I intend to close this gap by adding the operationalized measures of gender-related laws to the empirical analysis.

The situation with regulation of prostitution is more complex and deserves a special attention. As one sees in the Swedish example, when trafficking-related crimes, such as prostitution, are penalized, it reduces the number of trafficking incidents. From one side, quite a large body of research proves that “slacker prostitution laws lead to more trafficking for sexual exploitation” (Jakobsson and Kotsadam 2013: 8). This strain of research connects regulation of prostitution with decreasing stigmatization of prostitution market, which would in turn increase supply side and thus the net profits of traffickers. According to this logic countries where prostitution is legally regulated are more lucrative for supplying trafficked victims for sexual exploitation (Della Giusta 2010). Cho, Dreher and Neumayer (2013) test this assumption on large sample of countries showing that where prostitution is regulated there are higher inflows of human trafficking, so thus it is most likely related to anti-trafficking enforcement mechanisms, which are yet to be tested quantitatively. Most of the debates agree that regulation of prostitution would not necessarily end up in informed choice of women in the prostitution market (Raymond 2004; Farley 2006) while some disagree and think that only regulating prostitution provides women with better employment conditions and individual choice (Kempadoo and Doezema 1998; Askola 2007). Women are considered more protected and it should be easier to report about being abused or deprived of consent when the prostitution is regulated in a country. However, physical violence and physical threats – main components of human trafficking – might occur independently from regulation of prostitution. Human trafficking is a type of criminal behavior and prostitution, regulated or not, is only a one part of this market. Thus, it is not yet clear whether regulating the prostitution or the opposite – making it illegal – would be beneficial for such a short-term goal as enforcing effective anti-trafficking legislation and a long-term goal as combating human trafficking. To examine the relationship between anti-trafficking enforcement on the one hand and regulation of prostitution policies on the other, I collect the data on regulation of prostitution policies by the US Department of State indicating the legal status of prostitution for 94 countries. The variable has an ordinal scale where 0 means that prostitution is illegal, 0,5 – that prostitution is limitedly legal and 1 for countries where prostitution is regulated legally.

Thus, all these indicators will represent the concept of gender inequality in order to test theoretical assumption that *countries demonstrating higher gender equality will likely have better anti-trafficking enforcement.*

## *INTERNATIONAL FACTORS*

In the process of operationalizing international factors, I proposed to split this bigger concept into laws and transnational actors, which according to the literature should be accounted in anti-trafficking enforcement. Both types of these factors reflect theoretical assumption that countries with better embeddedness into international activities via legislation and the work of transnational actors will likely have better anti-trafficking enforcement.

### *International Law*

International law seems as an inherent part of anti-trafficking legislative agreements. Since the measure of anti-trafficking enforcement does not rely on any laws per se, I assumed in the theoretical argument that influence of international laws can explain the spread of anti-trafficking policies.

Thus, I turn to the body of international law that also includes the most important tool in addressing the human trafficking problem – the UN Protocol. When it first appeared, it was acknowledged as a huge step forward in protecting human rights (Hyland 2001; Raymond 2002; Gallagher 2002). Researchers agree that although the UN Protocol has its pros and cons, it is “the first comprehensive international anti-trafficking agreement with tough law enforcement and victim protections” (Hyland 2001: 30). The UN Protocol is the first instrument which enables member states to use it as a basis for international cooperation in fighting transnational organized crime more effectively (Assembly UN General 2000). Its influence should not be underestimated, therefore the ratification of the Protocol should be considered as a related part of global anti-trafficking enforcement. The data for countries ratification of the UN protocol has been collected from the UN website and this variable has a nominal scale where 0 stands for no ratification and 1 stands for ratification.

The next important measure, which has been discussed in the theoretical part of this work, is countries’ ratifications of international human rights treaties. This measure is intended to explain the influence of the spread of global culture on establishing anti-trafficking legislation. Scholars agree that human rights laws are extremely important in order to ensure

both national and international responses to human trafficking (Gallagher 2002, 2008; Doezema 2002; Petersmann 2002; Todres 2009). Moreover, human rights legislation is intrinsically connected with anti-trafficking laws because effective enforcement of laws against human trafficking is not possible without creating a respectful human rights environment. Although countries have different legislations, the task of the international treaties is to equally protect human rights all over the world. Today more than 100 multilateral and bilateral international treaties on the protection of human rights exist (Petersmann 2002). However, it has not been proven yet at the global cross-national level that there is an effect of ratification of international human rights treaties on actual law enforcement, such as anti-trafficking enforcement. Not all human rights documents are enforceable and that is why it might be hard to use them in quantitative research. For example, the UN's Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking is not an enforceable document, while it has been described as one of the most significant outputs of the UN's anti-trafficking program. The purpose of the document is to "promote and facilitate the integration of a human rights perspective into national, regional and international anti-trafficking laws, policies and interventions" (Principles 2002). However, there are other treaties that can be quantifiable and their effect on anti-trafficking enforcement is interesting to explore. The UN Crime Commission has developed several international treaties to deal with the growing problem of transnational organized crime including protocols on the smuggling of migrants and on the trafficking of persons, and the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Gallagher 2008). Launching these initiatives helps to bring trafficking to the attention of the international community. Although international human rights legislation does not necessarily always address human trafficking, these treaties demonstrate countries' commitment to establish proper legislation respecting, first of all, human rights. As an adviser on trafficking of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Gallagher, writes "there can be no doubt that the spirit of the entire corpus of human rights law rejects, absolutely, the practices and results that are integral to the human trafficking process" (Gallagher 2008: 847). That is why I consider a country's ratification of international human rights treaties as sufficient measure of the spread of global culture and an important predictor for anti-trafficking enforcement. The data on countries' ratifications of international human rights treaties are extracted from the University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, one of the largest collections of human rights documents in the world. This variable is based on the number of international human rights treaties ratified by every country. The data collection has been made manually by counting every treaty for all 164 countries in the sample. The original measure is converted to a 0-1 scale where 1 indicates

maximum of 64 international human right treaties in a country and is treated as an interval variable in the analysis.

### *Transnational Actors*

The role of transnational actors in seeking solutions to developing stronger anti-trafficking enforcement can be captured by country memberships in INGOs. As it has been argued theoretically, INGOs not only influence policy diffusion and adopt policy innovations but also positively affect human rights practices. Based on these proposed theoretical assumptions, I consider country's memberships in INGOs as a measure of transnational actors embedded in world society. The data for country's membership in INGOs are extracted manually from the World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (hereafter "WANGO") – an international organization uniting INGOs worldwide in the cause of advancing peace and global well-being.<sup>13</sup> WANGO's dataset is designed to choose International Organizations and Human Rights INGO by every country in the world. Counting manually how many of these organizations exist in every country, I covered all 164 countries in my sample. So far, this is the best free available source of INGOs membership.<sup>14</sup>

Abovementioned operationalizations of international factors are used to test whether *countries with better embeddedness into international activities will likely have better anti-trafficking enforcement.*

### *STATE CAPACITY*

According to the institutional theory discussed earlier it was assumed that countries with stronger capacity of state will likely have better anti-trafficking enforcement. Since many definitions of state capacity exist in political science literature, there are various empirical measures capturing the concept. Due to the broad definition of state capacity, sufficient for the purpose of this work, I employ one of the most common datasets with the focus on state's capacity and that is World Bank Governance Indicators (hereafter "WGI") dataset. The group of measures developed by the WGI dataset has the purpose to evaluate the quality of government. These measures include rule of law, government effectiveness, control of

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<sup>13</sup> More information about WANGO is available at <http://www.wango.org>

<sup>14</sup> The largest source, the Yearbook of International Organizations Online, provides a comprehensive database of over 66,000 organizations worldwide, but demands an annual fee of €2,220 and it is because of this that this resource cannot be used in this work.

corruption, regulatory quality and political stability, so the inclusion of these five measures provides the better representation of state capacity as such.

In order to construct the rule of law index, the WGI employs such indicators as violent crime, organized crime, fairness of judicial process, enforceability of contracts, speediness of judicial process, confiscation/expropriation, intellectual property rights protection and others.<sup>15</sup> Rule of law index is measured in units ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better outcomes.

Next, the measurement of political stability and absence of violence captures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism. The index's estimates are range from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better outcomes.

The next WGI measure is government effectiveness, and captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. As other WGI measures, the index ranges from -2.5 to 2.5.

Another important measure that captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies promoting private sector development is the regulatory quality index. The index's estimates range from -2.5 to 2.5.

The last WGI measure of state capacity is the control of corruption index. The index captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. Like other WGI measure, the control of corruption index has the scale from -2.5 to 2.5. The efforts to establish anti-trafficking legislation should rely on fighting corruption if governments are willing to implement these policies and monitor their execution.

There is some amount of criticism in the literature regarding the application of the WGI indicators including the absence of theoretical justification, expert bias, differences in indicators that were pulled together and overlap of the data sources (Knack 2004; Oman and Arndt 2010; Thomas 2010). However, this criticism can be applied to most global aggregated indices. Despite the critiques the WGI measures have been used in the research as explanatory variables (Neumayer 2002; Skaaning 2008; Rohwer 2009). These measures are a combination of expert evaluations and data sources based on specific countries (Rohwer 2009). Besides, as Thomas notes these indicators are used by policymakers in order to allocate the foreign aid, as

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<sup>15</sup> The full list of included indicators can be found at <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/rl.pdf>

the Millennium Challenge Account in the US, for instance (Thomas 2010). Researchers address both pros and cons of the WGI indicators.

It is indeed rather hard endeavor to develop a measure both conceptually and empirically well-defined to the extent when it covers the global scope and is not limited to one dimension of the concept. In addition, “aggregated indicators are more informative about unobserved governance” (Rohwer 2009: 47). Thus, the search for the better global measures should not stop.

A broader dimension of state capacity includes not only the ability to develop and deliver anti-trafficking policies, but also the resources states allocate to deliver these policies. These resources consist of health, education and military expenditures in a particular country’s budget.

Health expenditures represent the sum of public and private health expenditures and can be expressed as a percentage of GDP. They cover the provision of health services, family planning activities, nutrition activities, and emergency aid designated for health (The World Bank Open Data 2013). The measure of health expenditures is most often used as an explanatory variable to explore the problems of social inequalities (Navarro and Shi 2001) or influence on political performance (Huber 1998).

Next, total education expenditures are the sum of public current operating expenditures in education and can also be expressed as a percentage of GDP. The variable does not include private investment in education and has been used for international comparative research (The World Bank Open Data 2013). Researchers usually link the type of the regime with distributional policies, including education expenditures (Avelino et al. 2005; Stasavage 2005).

Lastly, military expenditures include military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel, operation and maintenance, procurement, military infrastructure spending and military aid, and the variable can once again be expressed as a percentage of GDP (The World Bank Open Data 2013). In comparative research, military expenditures are sometimes linked with the amount of international conflicts, especially during the Cold War period (Hill 2013) or economic growth by enhancing the last in the Middle Eastern countries, which considered “the most militarized region in the world” (Yildirim et al. 2005: 284). Overall, not so many researchers use these measures in cross-national research. I argue that expenditures measures are useful for policymakers since they help to evaluate the efficiency of governments spending. This helps



to check if there is a relationship between countries level of resources and anti-trafficking policy outcomes measured via Tier ratings.

All these indicators of capacity of state are used to test theoretical assumption that *countries with stronger capacity of state will likely have better anti-trafficking enforcement.*

### *POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS & BEHAVIOR*

Both concepts of political institutions and behavior are supposedly linked to better governance outcomes, including stronger anti-trafficking enforcement. In formulating theoretical relationship between them it was assumed that countries with well-functioning political institutions and active political behavior will likely have better anti-trafficking enforcement. In operationalizing the concept of political institutions, the focus has been made to the democratic institutions, which are more prone to providing better policy outcomes. The operationalization of behavior concept was connected to the expression of individual preferences, which leads to a better governmental performance as well.

#### *Institutions*

Since scholars have pointed out the relationship between democratic governments and compliance with international legal obligations including anti-trafficking legislation, it is necessary to consider different operationalizations of political regimes, focusing on democratic ones. Measuring political institutions is a highly arguable topic in the literature where one can find various indicators of democracy, for instance. Here I employ measures that cover most countries in the world. Among them are nine different measures of political institutions and two of political behavior, which now will be reviewed in order to find out how they interplay with the global measure of anti-trafficking enforcement.

The first measure is a combined index of three elements developed by the Polity IV Project – institutional democracy indicator. The first element of this index is the competitiveness of political participation, which guarantees civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. The second is the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, which assures institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. The third guarantees the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2012: 13). The institutional democracy indicator is measured on an additive eleven-

point scale where higher values indicate more democratic countries. Nowadays, Polity IV indicators are widely used in quantitative research as measures of democratic regimes by large numbers of scholars from different research fields (Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Mulligan et al. 2003; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Knack 2004; Treier and Jackman 2008). The measure of institutional democracy was recently employed in the research on human trafficking as well (Cho and Vadlamannati 2012; Avdeyeva 2012; White 2013; Cho et al. 2014). Although there are not so many quantitative studies linking together anti-trafficking legislation and democratic performance of a country, the relationship between these concepts appears controversial. For instance, some studies prove that an increase in the level of democracy is significantly related to the quality of a country's anti-trafficking policies (Cho and Vadlamannati 2012; Cho et al. 2014). Another study finds that states' level of democracy is not associated with government's level of compliance with anti-trafficking legislation (Avdeyeva 2012). The reason behind this controversy is probably in the dependent variable, which is different in these studies. Cho and her colleagues use the 3P Index, discussed in Chapter 1, and Avdeyeva uses data on government compliance with the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol by the US Department of State. Although I propose another measure of anti-trafficking enforcement, I will still be able to assess how strongly the level of democracy and anti-trafficking enforcement are related to each other by including the measure of institutional democracy into the analysis.

Other widely recognized measures of democracy are Freedom House's ratings of political rights and civil liberties (Vanhanen 2000; Bollen and Paxton 2000; Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Inglehart 2003; Busse 2004). Political rights and civil liberties index combines two variables – political rights and civil liberties – measured both on the scale from 1 to 7, with higher values indicating absence of political rights and less freedom. Both indices are based on different criteria of democracy. According to Knack “the political freedoms index better approximates standard definitions of democracy than the civil liberties index, but the latter better captures many of the civil society dimensions of democracy building” (Knack 2004: 254). Thus, a combination of those indices is used in the analysis and scales are reversed for an easier interpretation. The combined index ranks from 0 to 1 where higher value indicates that a country is more democratic. So far, only few studies use Freedom House empirical indicators in relation to human trafficking research and provide some contradictory findings. For instance, Avdan argues that, using Freedom House data, he finds that political freedoms are negatively associated with restrictive policies, and trafficking therefore is more likely to be visible in democratic countries (Avdan 2012). On the other hand, Wooditch proves that the level of governmental anti-trafficking enforcement is weaker in countries, which less likely

grant civil liberties (Wooditch 2011). Although Freedom House measures are not widespread for quantitative research on human trafficking, testing this indicator and comparing it with other alternative measures of democracy is a worthwhile venture.

Both the Freedom House and Polity IV measures of democracy have been criticized for having non-transparent coding schemes, the middle range being difficult to interpret and low reliability in general (Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Cheibub et al. 2010). That is why Cheibub et al. have suggested a more straightforward and minimalistic measure of democracy – the measure of democracy and dictatorship. The measure serves a minimalist dichotomous measure of political regime. According to Cheibub, “for a regime to be democratic, both the chief executive office and the legislative body must be filled by elections” (Cheibub et al. 2010: 69). The measure of democracy and dictatorship is based on three criteria: the holding of elections, the existence of more than one political party and change in the leadership of the government. All these conditions must be met in order to satisfy the definition of a democratic regime. Although the measure of democracy and dictatorship is dichotomous and minimalistic, the authors argue that it is “compatible with most of the theoretical issues that animate empirical research on political regimes” (Cheibub et al. 2010: 72). The data covers 199 countries for a large number of years. The variable is coded 1 if the regime qualifies as democratic and 0 – if not. The measure of democracy and dictatorship has been often employed for the last decade in different research (Brown and Hunter 1999; Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Hollyer et al. 2011; Boix et al. 2013; Bormann and Golder 2013). The debate on the best measure of democracy is outside of the scope of this thesis, so I shall skip the detailed discussions on this topic between scholars. My goal is to test various measures of democratic institutions in order to choose the one which overlaps the most with anti-trafficking governmental legislation. The researchers of human trafficking indeed employ the measure of democracy and dictatorship (Cho et al. 2013; Peerapeng and Chaitip 2014; Potrafke 2016). Both studies by Cho et al. and Peerapeng and Chaitip look at the relationship between the incidences of trafficking inflows and the measure of democracy and dictatorship. They find that democratic regimes are associated with larger trafficking inflows (Cho et al. 2013; Peerapeng and Chaitip 2014). Thus, this measure will be tested among other alternative measures of democracy in this chapter to determine its role in the Tier rankings.

The next measure of democracy from the WGI dataset – the voice and accountability index – captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as their freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media (World Bank 2013). The index ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 where higher values

indicate more democracy. The set of world governance indicators are developed to assess the quality of institutions, and thus they are widely used in quantitative research. Being accountable to the public has various implications, including decrease in corruption (Aidt, Dutta and Sena 2008), gender mainstreaming (Corner 2005), economic development (Aidt 2009) and most likely capable to bring positive effects on strengthening anti-trafficking legislation.

The next measure is another combined index of empowerment rights available through the CIRI human rights dataset. This is an additive index constructed from the indicators of foreign and domestic movement, freedom of speech, religion and assembly and association, workers' rights, and electoral self-determination. The index ranges from 0 to 14 where higher values indicate greater respect of the government for these seven rights. Due to the wide range of indicators included into the empowerment rights index, the measurement was employed by researchers even to prove that it corresponds to its theoretical concept (Cingranelli and Richards 2010; Schnakenberg and Fariss 2014). Since the index is tapping the extent of various rights, it is also used as proxy for democracy here.

Another measure that helps to capture the presence of citizens' rights in law and practice is the Citizen Rights Index (hereafter "CRI"). The CRI measures the prevalence of citizen rights as the presence of respect of political participation rights on the condition of the presence of respect of personal autonomy rights (Welzel 2013: 254-263). The index ranges from 0, which marks the complete absence of citizens' rights in law and practice, to 1, which marks their full presence. Since the CRI has been introduced only in 2013, scholars have run only few cross-country analyses using this index for measuring democracy levels (Inglehart, Puranen and Welzel 2015). However, it is worth considering along with other global indices of democratic institutions.

Yet another measure, which has been quite often employed by quantitative researchers and linked to the concept of democracy, is the perception of electoral integrity (hereafter "PEI"). This measure includes the list of 49 indicators drawn from expert surveys to compare elections around the globe. The overall PEI is measured on 100-point scale, in which a score of 100 means that a particular country fully meets international standards of electoral integrity. This measure provides another operationalization of democratic institutions and due to the wide country and time coverage is used often by quantitative researchers. Starting the year 2012, when PEI was first introduced, scholars proved that the index is strongly related to "contemporary levels of liberal democracy" (Norris, Frank and i Coma 2014: 792).

Closing the list of various democracy indicators is the Effective Democracy Index (hereafter “EDI”). The EDI is a multi-point index measuring the extent of effective democracy, understood as the presence of democratic rights on the condition that honest governance puts them into real practice (Alexander and Welzel 2011). Democratic rights represent combined ratings of civil liberties and political rights from Freedom House. The Honest Governance Index measures the extent to which institutions are oriented towards law enforcement and the avoidance of grand corruption (Alexander and Welzel 2011). The index ranges from 0 to 100, where higher values indicate more effective democracies. The EDI has been as well used in comparative cross-country research to explain what effects on promoting democracy (Welzel, Inglehart and Kligemann 2003; Welzel and Inglehart 2009; Alexander and Welzel 2011). Being a “meaningful operationalization of democracy defined substantively” (Knutsen 2010: 110), the EDI is selected as the last proxy of democracy.

### *Behavior*

As the literature shows political behavior is defined as preferences individuals express to communicate with authorities. Various sources of data allow operationalization of political behavior nowadays. Quite often operationalizations of political behavior include such activities as participation in demonstrations and protests, membership in voluntary organizations and voting behavior. Out of those activities voting represent electoral preferences which are less likely impact legislative policies. On the other hand, political behavior in the context of social engagement seems to be more relevant in explaining how successful the anti-trafficking enforcement is in a country. Thus, leaving electoral behavior aside I will only focus on such forms of political behavior as participation in demonstrations and protests and membership in organizations, since these two indicators would naturally fit the description of “elite-challenging” political behavior (Inglehart 1990; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel 2013) which is essential when legislative change is needed.

Thus, political behavior can be first operationalized via the measure of Social Movement Activity (hereafter “SMA”). The SMA index measures the variety of social movement activities respondents have been in or consider themselves to be involved in, including petitions, peaceful demonstrations, and consumer boycotts (Welzel 2013). The variable represents a three-point scale with higher values indicating higher levels of social movement activity. The SMA index has been calculated using the sixth wave of the WVS dataset, with country-level data from 2010 to 2014. The variable has been averaged by country and the final scale ranges from 0 to 1 where 1 indicates that the entire population supports indicated

varieties of social movement activities. Trends of social movements have been studied for quite some time in the literature but SMA index is a relatively new measure and thus has not been used by many quantitative researchers. My intention is to bring this measure, which reflects how citizens are engaged into civil society, to study how freer countries are more open to all types of changes – from social ones to ones including legislative mechanisms and even political agendas.

The next indicator captures another aspect of behavioral pattern, associational membership. This measure has been constructed based on the sixth wave of the WVS dataset as well. The respondents are asked about their level of activity in such voluntary organizations as sport or recreational organization, art, music or educational organizations, environmental organizations, humanitarian or charitable organizations. Non-membership is coded as 0, inactive membership as 0.5, and active membership as 1. The scores are averaged by the type of organization and by country and form a 9-point index ranging from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more active involvement (Welzel 2013). These two indicators seem valid operationalizations of the broad political behavior concept in a way that helps to assess if they are related to the anti-trafficking enforcement.

Both measures of political institutions and political behavior are pooled together to test if *countries with better political institutions and active political behavior will likely have better anti-trafficking enforcement.*

## *DEMAND*

Finally, in countries where demand for the services provided by human trafficking market is low, in other words, countries with more balanced demographic structures will likely have better anti-trafficking enforcement. There are various indicators helpful to operationalize the demand that as was argued attracts men to the human trafficking market. Theoretically, I assumed that this demand is driven by men who serve in the military, by men looking for wives through illegal means, by the increasing proportion of young adults and by the vulnerable position of migrant population.

The first possible operationalization here is a surplus of males to females, which captures ratio imbalance in a country. To measure ratio imbalance, literature suggests using either the ratio of males to females' births (Mathews and Hamilton 2005) or the ratio of males to

females split by the age group (Fossett and Kiecolt 1991). Here I choose to use surplus of men in the age 15 to 64 when they are most active.

Since the previous literature already highlighted a youth bulge as a critical national security indicator (LaGraffe 2012), the empirical evidence is still lacking consensus that there is a need to further explore the youth bulge phenomenon and its relation to anti-trafficking legislation. In order to operationalize youth bulge phenomenon, the proportion of youth cohorts in a total population must be used.

To address the demand driven by the vulnerable position of migrant population, it would be better to account for the migration regulation data since I am analyzing anti-trafficking enforcement patterns. However, since countries vary too much when it comes to migration policies, I will rely on the data on proportion of international migration. This data seeks to capture how widespread migration is in a country, testing the earlier assumptions that migrants would be easier lured to traffickers. To analyze migration from a cross-national standpoint, the international migrant stock is used as an empirical measure of migration. International migrant stock is the number of people born in a country other than that in which they live. The data are obtained from the United Nations Population Division dataset. International migrant stock is measured as a percentage of a total population.

The only dimension of the demand concept which is not possible to measure is the share of men who serve in the military. The statistical data on that issue is sketchy and not comparable across the world. However, the three other dimensions will be reflected via abovementioned measures.

The operationalized measures of demand are used to explore whether *countries with more balanced demographic structure will likely have better anti-trafficking enforcement*.

## *CONTROL VARIABLES*

After accounting for the most important explanatory factors, one needs to include other possible interfering factors affecting both the dependent and independent variables which are usually called control variables. Thus, it is possible to provide the interpretation of results independent of influence of control variables. Few controls are identified for country-level regressions here.

Controlling for population size helps to account for a particular country's size and eliminate possible biases due to the fact that some countries simply outweigh others with the amount of people living in them. The literature agrees that population size is an important control when dealing with country-level data (Babbie 2013), and even suggests that larger countries might be more difficult to govern (Salehyan 2009).

Next, I choose to control for the GDP level since I expect that a particular country's initial level of resources might have an independent positive effect on the Tier Rankings, simply due to ability of countries direct the resources they have to strengthening law enforcement practices. However, in instances regarding oil resources, countries with extremely large GDP levels do a very poor job with providing services to its people. Thus this control variable is included in the analysis to examine which effect it has on the dependent variable and how other variables affect the Tier Rankings while holding the GDP constant.

When I proceed with data analysis, all models include both a country's population size and GDP per capita, both logarithmically transformed. Thus, these controls help to isolate the target relationship I intend to examine.

## **METHODS**

The methods applied in this sub chapter include correlation analysis, ordinal and panel regressions. First, due to the variety of empirical operationalizations used for theoretical concepts described earlier, correlation analysis is conducted. This statistical technique helps to select the measures which overlap the most with the dependent variable – anti-trafficking enforcement. Second, using selected most related indicators, I run comparative cross-sectional analysis via ordinal regressions. This method is applied to explore what constitutes a stronger anti-trafficking enforcement on a country level at a single point in time. Next, in order to complete the analysis, panel regressions are run to find if on a larger time-span some indicators bring more explanation than the others. These methods are described below.

### *CORRELATION ANALYSIS*

Correlations are used to prove whether variables are related. Generally, correlation analysis is used to examine an empirical relationship between two variables in order to understand if the relationship is positive or negative and the strength of this relationship (Babbie 2013). The aim of correlation analysis in this chapter is to determine which global measures are most




related to global anti-trafficking enforcement. Each theoretical concept is operationalized via various country-level indicators, which amount to 41 measures in total. Since it is not yet established which empirical measures are better representations of theoretical concepts to explain anti-trafficking enforcement, I include into analysis as many global operationalizations as possible. Then these measures are correlated with the dependent variable – Tier Rankings. Next, I select the best-performing empirical indicator from each proposed theoretical category. The indicator with largest correlation coefficient is selected for each driver discussed in theoretical sub chapters and included in further model testing. It is known that correlation is always accompanied with the causation problem, however in this case the correlation test has only been applied in order to select best statistical indicator based on theoretical evidence preceding the analysis. That is why it is not possible to provide extensive conclusions on causes and effects of tested relationships at this stage apart from acknowledging their mutual influence in relation to one-another. However, in order to narrow down the pool of existing global indicators to the few most important ones, the method of correlation analysis fits well.

#### *ORDINAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS*

Due to the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, ordered logistic regressions are applied to analyze the data. Before proceeding to the analysis, it is worth mentioning that when the dependent variable is ordinal, there are other estimation techniques one may consider such as OLS regressions, due to the fact that Tier Rankings have naturally ordered four categories or probit regressions if the dependent variable is highly skewed. After analyzing basic descriptive statistics and plotting the distribution of the dependent variable, the decision in favor of ordinal models has been made.

Figure 5: Frequency Distribution of reversed Tier Rankings



First, Tier Rankings are distributed symmetrically along the normal curve line (Figure 5) and second, OLS models do not provide robust estimates, unlike ordinal models, in which assumptions have not been violated. The results of the OLS regressions are reported in the Appendix and discussed in the robustness section.

#### PANEL REGRESSION ANALYSIS

To determine how the drivers affect anti-trafficking policies over time, I have compiled a comprehensive dataset of global anti-trafficking enforcement for the period 2001-2014. To construct the dataset for this thesis, I first pool data on anti-trafficking enforcement from 2001 through 2014 and then merge this data with operationalized measures of gender inequality, international factors, state capacity, political institutions, behavior and demand. Panel data is characterized by having repeated observations (most frequently years) on fixed units (most frequently states and nations). The data I pool combines 164 countries and 13 time periods which lead to a data set of  $164 \times 13$  observations. The final panel dataset includes only variables which proved their significance in ordinal regression analysis. However, all global

indicators discussed earlier have sufficient country and time coverage to produce such panel dataset.

The general method of panel regressions combines time-series analyses for several cross-sections. The clear advantage of this technique is the ability to be able to account for more data and predict the outcome in the present by using the data in the past. It has already been mentioned that previous quantitative studies give us controversial conclusions on the determinants of human trafficking as such and anti-trafficking legislation especially. That is why a larger, more systematic cross-national analysis will be of great importance in this field. These results should be expected to offer a broad theoretical framework on global human trafficking and anti-trafficking enforcement.

These panel regressions models expand ordinal cross-sectional models and are used to test whether they explain more in global variation of anti-trafficking enforcement. By including theoretical drivers stepwise, I am able to find the best combination of factors affecting the dependent variable. All stepwise regressions can be found in the Appendix while main results are reported in Chapter four. The models have been estimated using R statistical software and PLM package, which provides robust inferences for estimation of linear panel models (Croissant and Millo 2007). Both fixed effects and random effects have been added to the models. Fixed effects are added to adjust for unobserved heterogeneity and reduce the potential omitted variable bias (Beck 2001). Random effects are added to adjust for cross-country variations, which are assumed to be random and uncorrelated with independent variables included in the models. The literature suggests applying random effects if there is a reason to believe that differences across countries might have an impact on the dependent variable (Green 2008).

However, the advantage of fixed effects is the ability to explore the relationship between the dependent and independent variables varying over time within countries. To use fixed effects, one assumes that something within a country impacts the dependent variable, such as democratic performance of a country might influence the enforcement of anti-trafficking legislation and, hence, one needs to control for this. The fixed effects model helps to control for time-invariant differences within countries since time-invariant variables are constant for each country, so the estimated coefficients of the fixed-effects models cannot be biased due to the omission of time-invariant characteristics (Kohler and Kreuter 2005: 245). Since there are reasons to assume that there are both differences between and within countries, both random and fixed effects are applied.

To decide between fixed or random effects, one can run a Hausman test, which explores whether the unique errors ( $u_i$ ) are correlated with the independent variables (Green 2008). The Hausman test shows that fixed effects' model specification provides better estimation than random effects. Fixed effects are reported and discussed further in this chapter while random effects specifications can be found in the Appendix.

Panel corrected standard errors are used since they produce robust and unbiased error estimates, which is a widely accepted practice in cross-sectional time-series analysis and also helps to account for independent heteroskedastic errors (Beck and Katz 1995).

### *MULTIPLE IMPUTATION*

One of the challenges my pooled time-series dataset faces that it does not contain observations for all countries nor for all years. This problem is almost unavoidable when researchers work with time-series data, and could lead to a bias in results if not treated accordingly (Beck 2001). Following the method specifically developed to address this issue, I shall use the multiple imputation technique to fill the gaps when information is missing. The method of multiple imputation is used to fill in the gaps in incomplete datasets by three steps: imputation, analysis and pooling (Van Buuren 2012). Multiple imputation is considered a superior solution for dealing with missing data. It does not substitute missing values simply with mean values thus significantly reducing the variance but relies on existing values from other variables and creates multiple predicted values for any variable producing multiple imputed datasets (Wayman 2003). Since this is a repeated process, it is called multiple imputation. After the imputation is done, statistical analysis shall be run on each of the imputed datasets, and then these analyses are pooled together to produce one result. It is considered sufficient to produce the imputation 3 to 5 times to achieve more consistent results (Allison 2011). The resulting dataset is set in the way that it “maintains the overall variability in the population while preserving relationships with other variables” (Wayman 2003: 4).

To perform multiple imputation, I shall employ Amelia II statistical program in R. Amelia II is a widely recognized software with improved attributes resulting in better and “much more accurate imputations for cross-sectional, time-series, and time-series-cross-section data” (Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2011: 3). One can also run diagnostic checks to ensure the validity of acquired results. Thus, the program fits perfectly, taking into account the features of the data and the vast opportunities it presents. The pooled time-series data I am working

with includes 10 variables for 164 countries and 13 years from 2001 to 2014. One can see the proportion of missing data split by each variable in Table 4.

Out of 10 variables in the dataset 8 need to be imputed as Table 4 shows. I omit only regulation of prostitution variable since it is a constant parameter. It is a nominal variable and it shows whether prostitution is legally regulated or not in a country. However, I still include this variable into imputation model as well as dependent variable Tier Rankings to increase predictive power of the model. As authors of the program argue “any variables that would increase predictive power should be included in the model, even if including them in the analysis model would produce bias in estimating a causal effect or collinearity” (Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2011: 10). Amelia II employs the multivariate normal model since the dataset has a multivariate normal distribution. This imputation model also works well even when categorical or non-normal variables are included. Imputation has been run five times ( $m=5$ ), which resulted in five completed datasets. All variables are treated as continuous including the Tier Rankings, thus no additional settings in the program are required. Missing values are assumed to be missing at random which is an important assumption while performing multiple imputation. This assumption requires that missing data depends on variables observed in the dataset. Less democratic, resource-poor countries with weaker governance structures may less likely comply with international anti-trafficking legislation in comparison with more resourceful, democratic countries. However, provided that the likelihood of better compliance is unrelated to the existence of anti-trafficking legislation within these countries, the data I am working with shall be considered missing at random. Thus, the imputation model should allow for clustering of countries according to their global characteristics. In order to demonstrate that characteristics of the resulting dataset such as mean, variances, etc. are preserved at maximum it is recommended to compare the distribution of imputed and observed data. This information will be provided in the Appendix. After creating the imputes, the analysis is run on both imputed and non-imputed datasets. The results are compared and discussed below.

**Table 4: Missing Data Report (2001 - 2014)**

Variable	N valid observations	N missing observations	% of missing data
Tier Rankings	1985	311	13,5
Gender Inequality Index	1255	1041	45,3
Regulation of prostitution	1316	980	42,7
Social Movement Activity	145	2151	93,7
Regulatory Quality	1963	333	14,5
Effective Democracy Index	1784	512	22,3
Youth bulge	656	1640	71,4
International Human Rights Treaties	2240	56	2,4
Population size	2279	17	0,7
GDP PPP	2232	64	2,8
Total N		2296	

### *DEPENDENT VARIABLE LIMITATION*

Due to the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, I acknowledge that ordinal panel regressions shall be applied, however, to date there is no commonly accepted technique of estimating time-series ordinal dependent variable. Researchers discuss existing problems in modelling time-series categorical data (Jackman 1998; Fokianos and Kedem 2003). Among different methods, such as Markov chain models, integer autoregressive processes or discrete ARMA, the easiest solution to this problem is to apply generalized linear models theory which allows for the treating of the dependent variable as interval and hence applying pooled panel regressions (Fokianos and Kedem 2003). It is considered legitimate to treat the variable as an interval if it has at least four categories (Hildebrandt 2015: 64). Since the Tier Rankings variable has four categorical values being naturally ordered, I will assume it is an interval for the purposes of panel modelling. However, acknowledging this limitation, I shall later run additional robustness checks to make sure that the results are valid.

## **3.2 Measuring micro-foundations of human trafficking**

As literature review has shown country-level factors, affecting global anti-trafficking enforcement, overlap with factors leading to human trafficking, which are harder to grasp at the macro-level. Instead, these factors referred as the micro-foundations of human trafficking are better explored at the individual-level. Their inclusion will provide more coherent outlook on both complex human trafficking phenomenon and patterns of anti-trafficking enforcement.

In Chapter one, it was argued that implementation of policies is a direct result of public preferences. In line with this argument, anti-trafficking enforcement can be considered as reflection of what people think. That is when the public opinion data can be used. So far public surveys do not address specifically people's opinion on anti-trafficking policies or enforcement of these policies. However, questions assessing the acceptance of physical violence or prostitution in a country help to explain how tolerating violence turns a blind eye on such crime as human trafficking leading to less support of anti-trafficking enforcement. Moreover, since one of the main purposes of human trafficking is sex trafficking addressing the acceptance of prostitution will also help to explain what makes people open their minds to tolerate prostitution and whether this leads further to tolerating violence or not. Since both regulation of prostitution and anti-trafficking enforcement are country-level components of policy implications against practices involving violence towards women, I assume they both would affect some of the individual-level preferences of tolerating such violent practices. Bridging both county-level evidence and individual-level preferences will increase the soundness of results. Hence, in this sub chapter the data and methods used for analyzing micro-level foundations of trafficking are described. The results of the analysis are presented in the following Chapter five.

### **DATA**

In order to analyze public preferences one of the largest cross-national survey databases in the world, the World Values Survey (hereafter "WVS") is employed. The WVS data consists of cross-national representative samples with minimum sample size of 1,000 respondents per country. The total of 60 countries and 86272 respondents have been selected using the latest wave sixth of the WVS, conducted between 2010 and 2014. Figure 6 demonstrates variability in countries covered by the data (Figure 6).




## *DEPENDENT VARIABLE*

In this study, the dependent variable is the Violence in the Household index. This measure has been accumulated by combining survey questions from the latest wave 6 of whether it is justifiable to beat one's wife (v208), one's children (v209) and generally violence against others (v210). Each question in the original form is measured on a 1 to 10 scale, where 1 means never justifiable and 10 means always justifiable. These variables have been converted into 0-1 scales and added together by simple averaging. These three WVS items make up a reliable subscale with the 0.8 associated Cronbach's alpha. ( $\alpha = .80$ ) and thus reliable proxy for measuring violence in the household. Particular wording and response formats of these questions are reported in the Appendix.

As can be seen on Figure 6 countries' mean scores vary greatly with mostly African and Asian countries tolerating violence more than European societies, which is not surprising but still leaves room for the analysis.

Figure 6: Tolerance of Violence in the Household by Country



The question of what contributes the most to the climate of tolerating violence opens the door to study the psychological foundations of human trafficking which assumingly able to explain different country-levels of anti-trafficking enforcement. One possibility is that factors leading to accepting violence, such as tolerance of prostitution, can explain why people don't see violence as a problem which in turn translates into less support for anti-trafficking enforcement in those countries. Yet another possibility of people's tolerating violence is associated with less progressive mindsets constrained to make their free choice by living under the pressure of long-lasting traditions or authoritarian rulers. One shall not forget the question of social desirability of this topic where non-tolerance - being more appropriate social concept - would be reported more often. Thus, if strong relationships are detected, they should be treated as true patterns of social climate.

Hence, in line with theoretical assumptions, it was proposed that individuals accepting violence-related practices such as prostitution tolerate violence more. However, individuals with more progressive mindsets are less tolerating violence. Another assumption states that individuals tolerate violence more in countries where both prostitution and anti-trafficking policies are not regulated. Finally, when both violence in the household and prostitution are highly tolerated, then we face a society that will not act in favor of better anti-trafficking enforcement. These propositions are tested using both individual- and country-level independent variables.

### *INDEPENDENT VARIABLES*

The WVS measure tolerance of prostitution (v203a) asks respondents how do they justify prostitution on a 10-point scale, where 1 stands for never justify and 10 corresponds to always justify. The variable is transformed to 0-1 scale with 1 meaning prostitution is always justifiable. At the country-level, population means of prostitution tolerance are calculated.

Another WVS measure, the choice sub-component of the Emancipative Values Index (hereafter "EVI"), measures an emphasis on choice and serves as a proxy for progressive mindsets. This index combines three questions on whether respondents justify homosexuality (v202), abortion (v204) and divorce (v205). The resulting 10-point scale index is transformed to a 0-1 scale with 1 corresponding to justification of all three life-choices. The scores of the

choice index are used at the individual-level and averaged by population means to be used at the country-level.

The overlapping relationship between tolerance of violence and prostitution from the one side and tolerance of prostitution and choice values from another side needs to be further examined. In the first, scenario peoples' understanding of violence and prostitution match, and when it happens this should negatively affect tolerance of violence in general. In the second scenario, when peoples' understanding of prostitution matches progressive choice values, it affects as well negatively tolerance of violence. The question is what motivates prostitution tolerance at the individual-level, and if it can line up with high or low levels of violence acceptance. Thus, two correlational variables are added to the analysis. First variable, correlation between tolerance of violence and tolerance of prostitution, is an individual-level link between tolerance of prostitution and violence. Second variable, correlation between choice values and tolerance of prostitution, is an individual-level link between tolerance of prostitution and choice. Both variables have been calculated at the individual-level and aggregated by countries.

The anti-trafficking enforcement measure is the Tier Rankings compiled by the US Department of State. Ordinal in nature Tier Rankings are transformed into 0-1 scale where 1 means that countries are in full compliance with TVPA's standards to combat human trafficking.

The data on regulation of prostitution are also compiled by the US Department of State indicating the legal status of prostitution for 94 countries. The variable has an ordinal scale where 1 means that prostitution is illegal, 2 – that prostitution is limitedly legal and 3 for countries where prostitution is regulated legally.

Few more variables were included at the individual level to control for the spuriousity of findings. These are gender, age, education and religiosity. Gender and age help to control for the demographic differences. As for the two other controls education, it is highly plausible that more educated and less religious people tolerate violence less and that needs to be taken into account.

## **METHODS**

Since the aim of this sub chapter is to explain tolerance of violence by accounting for both individual- and country-level characteristics, the method of multilevel liner regressions is

applied. The hierarchical structure of the data allows multilevel regressions to be applied, which extend simple linear regressions by accounting for both between and within groups' variation (Field et al. 2012). In addition, data is analyzed via OLS regression models to test macro-level assumptions before presenting more complex multilevel framework. The findings are further presented in Chapter five.

## **CHAPTER 4: RESULTS: ANTI-TRAFFICKING ENFORCEMENT MODELS**

### *CORRELATION ANALYSIS*

Results of the correlation analysis help to outline which indicators from each theoretical concept are most related to the global anti-trafficking enforcement. But first various global measures have been used to operationalize each theoretical concept. I use pairwise correlation analyses to demonstrate how far these measures overlap within each category.

#### *Gender inequality*

Since gender inequality has been split into resources, motivation and achievements and domestic laws, related global measures have been used to represent these concepts. As pairwise correlations in Table 5 show indices of gender inequality correlate quite high with each other.

It is especially evident for the GII, GEM, GGI and GEI measures, which correlate with each other significantly and above 0.5 (Table 5). Next table with pairwise correlations demonstrates that violence against women index correlates above 0.3 with legislative efforts against various forms of gender-related violence (Table 6). Both tables prove that selected measures indeed overlap and thus only most related to the anti-trafficking enforcement shall be selected: each measure respectively for every theoretical concept.

**Table 5: Correlations among Measures of Resources, Motivations and Achievements**

		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	Gender Inequality Index (GII)	.74***	.52***	.63***	.72***	.21**	.31***	-.04	-.03
2	Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)	-	.77***	.62***	.76***	.56***	.17	.29**	.04
3	Gender Gap Index (GGI)		-	.57***	.85***	.55***	.18*	.40***	.02
4	Women's Economic Rights CIRI			-	.60***	.37***	.19*	.06	-.11
5	Gender Equity Index (GEI)				-	.33**	.30**	.21*	-.04
6	Women's Political Rights CIRI					-	.01	.25**	-.08
7	Gender Development Index						-	-.01	.07
8	Female labor participation rate							-	.04
9	Women's Social Rights CIRI								-

Note. Pearson correlation coefficients are reported. \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*  $p \leq .01$ , \*  $p \leq .05$ .

**Table 6: Correlations among Measures of Domestic Laws**

		2	3	4	5	6
1	Violence against women index (Weldon and Htun)	.38**	-	.43***	.50**	.25*
2	Regulation of prostitution	-	.33**	.13	.11	.16*
3	Inequity in family law		-	-.47***	-.35***	-.28***
4	Domestic violence legislation			-	.47***	.27**
5	Marital rape legislation				-	.35***
6	Sexual harassment legislation					-

Note. Pearson correlation coefficients are reported. \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*  $p \leq .01$ , \*  $p \leq .05$ .

All related correlation coefficients with anti-trafficking enforcement are presented in Table 7 for the measures of resources, motivations and achievements and Table 8 for domestic laws accordingly.

**Table 7: Correlations of Tier Rankings with Measures of Resources, Motivations and Achievements** <sup>16</sup>

	<i>Tier</i>
Gender Inequality Index (GII)	0.56*** (139)
Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)	0.54*** (106)
Gender Gap Index (GGI)	0.51*** (131)
Women’s Economic Rights CIRI	0.50*** (162)
Gender Equity Index (GEI)	0.50*** (146)
Women’s Political Rights CIRI	0.32*** (160)
Gender Development Index	0.24** (164)
Female labor participation rate	0.07 (164)
Women’s Social Rights CIRI	0.06 (162)

*Note. Correlations with Tier Rankings are Spearman rank-order coefficients. Number of countries in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*  $p \leq .01$ , \*  $p \leq .05$*

As table 7 shows most measures of resources, motivations and achievements are indeed significantly related to countries’ levels of anti-trafficking enforcement. Out of various indices of gender inequality, the GII demonstrates the highest level of Spearman correlation –  $r = .56$ . This correlation is positive and significant for 139 countries covered by the index. The GII is a highly relevant measure of various inequalities in societies emerging in health, empowerment and labor market participation. Apart from measuring gaps in these areas, the GII was proven to reflect the grass roots of gender role socialization in a society. In Alexander et al., the GII is shown to be high correlated with fertility rates in 1800 as a measure of historical gender equality in the household (Alexander et al. forthcoming). Thus, this measure reflects several aspects of gender inequality, which are quantitatively most

<sup>16</sup> All measures have been reversed so higher values indicate higher levels of equality.



related to the success of anti-trafficking legislation. Out of all presented global indices, the GII is further taken in the analysis and model testing.

**Table 8: Correlations of Tier Rankings with Measures of Domestic Laws**

	<i>Tier</i>
Violence against women index (Weldon and Htun)	0.53*** (68)
Regulation of prostitution	0.47*** (94)
Inequity in family law	-0.45*** (158)
Domestic violence legislation	0.43*** (161)
Marital rape legislation	0.29*** (151)
Sexual harassment legislation	0.28*** (153)

*Note. Correlations with Tier Rankings are Spearman rank-order coefficients. Number of countries in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*  $p \leq .01$ , \*  $p \leq .05$*

Table 8 presents correlation results between measures of domestic laws and anti-trafficking enforcement, all of which turn out to be significant. Here the best performing indicator is the VAW index with Spearman correlation coefficient  $r = .53$ . The index explores governments' responses to violence against women in the world and captures the part of gender inequality depicted via laws. However, due to the small country coverage, only 68 countries, of this index I will not include it into cross-national analysis, since the risk is to lose more than half of the sample. Thus, I will take the next indicator most related to the anti-trafficking enforcement – regulation of prostitution policies. As discussed earlier a measure of whether a country regulates prostitution represents certain laws specific to gender and it is also a qualitatively distinct indicator closely connected with human trafficking problem on a theoretical level. This measure has the better country coverage and based on important theoretical assumptions, thus, will be further taken into cross-national analysis.

### *International factors*

To determine which international factors are most related to the global anti-trafficking enforcement, correlation analysis is applied to all operationalized measures of theoretically

proposed international law and transnational actors. Here three indicators have been proposed, and before correlate them to the anti-trafficking enforcement the pairwise correlations among them are presented in Table 9.

**Table 9: Correlations among Measures of International Factors**

		2	3
1	International Human Rights Treaties	.32***	.19*
2	Human Trafficking Protocol	-	-.03
3	Country membership in INGOs		-

*Note. Pearson correlation coefficients are reported. \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*  $p \leq .01$ , \*  $p \leq .05$ .*

In Table 9 all three measures of international factors are correlated significantly with each other. Number of human rights treaties and ratification of human trafficking protocol are correlated slightly higher with each other and represent one domain of international law. While membership in INGOs and ratification of human trafficking protocol are not related and this proves why theoretically they have been split (Table 9). Next these measures are correlated with Tier rankings.

**Table 10: Correlations of Tier Rankings with Measures of International Law**

	<i>Tier</i>
International Human Rights Treaties	0.47*** (160)
Human Trafficking Protocol	0.16* (162)

*Note. Correlations with Tier Rankings are Spearman rank-order coefficients. Number of countries in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*  $p \leq .01$ , \*  $p \leq .05$ .*

Table 10 presents measures of international human rights treaties and human trafficking protocol, which both are significantly related to the level of anti-trafficking enforcement. Judging on the size of correlation coefficient, the number of international human rights treaties is more strongly correlated with Tier rankings with Spearman  $r = .47$ . Data on number of human rights treaties covers 160 countries, which is a sufficient sample size for including this measure in cross-national models.

**Table 11: Correlations of Tier Rankings with Measures of Transnational Actors**

	<i>Tier</i>
Country membership in INGOs	0.10 (162)

*Note. Correlations with Tier Rankings are Spearman rank-order coefficients. Number of countries in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*  $p \leq .01$ , \*  $p \leq .05$ .*

While country membership in INGOs presented in Table 11 shows no significant correlation with anti-trafficking enforcement. This measure of transnational actors will not be further taken into analysis. I assume there might be other indicators of actors to test and this limitation will be addressed later.

Even with only one out of two measures of international factors I am still able to check if countries with stronger ties to the global community will have stronger anti-trafficking enforcement.

### *State capacity*

The capacity of state to enforce proper legislation has been operationalized via several World Bank measures. Table 12 shows that all WGI indicators correlate above 0.6 with each other. The indices of regulatory quality and government effectiveness are especially closely related with correlation coefficients above 0.9 (Table 12).

**Table 12: Correlations among Measures of State Capacity**

	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1 Regulatory Quality	.93***	.92***	.86***	.66***	.44***	.30***	-.07
2 Government Effectiveness	-	.96***	.93***	.70***	.43***	.36***	-.03
3 Rule of law		-	.95***	.75***	.44***	.34***	-.03
4 Control of Corruption			-	.75***	.47***	.38***	-.08
5 Political Stability and Absence of Violence				-	.34***	.38***	-.07
6 Health expenditure (% of GDP)					-	.44***	-.29**
7 Education expenditure (% of GDP)						-	.01
8 Military expenditure (% of GDP)							-

Note. Pearson correlation coefficients are reported. \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*  $p \leq .01$ , \*  $p \leq .05$ .

However, when these measures are correlated with anti-trafficking enforcement, regulatory quality outperforms the others (Table 13).

**Table 13: Correlations of Tier Rankings with State Capacity Measures**

	<i>Tier</i>
Regulatory Quality	0.70*** (164)
Government Effectiveness	0.64*** (164)
Rule of law	0.63*** (162)
Control of Corruption	0.60*** (164)
Political Stability and Absence of Violence	0.46*** (164)
Health expenditure (% of GDP)	0.44*** (161)
Education expenditure (% of GDP)	0.26** (154)
Military expenditure (% of GDP)	-0.23* (124)

*Note. Correlations with Tier Rankings are Spearman rank-order coefficients. Number of countries in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*  $p \leq .01$ , \*  $p \leq .05$ .*

In Table 13 regulatory quality demonstrates the largest correlation coefficient with Tier rankings ( $r = .70$ ) proving that the ability of a state to develop a policy is linked with countries anti-trafficking enforcement level. Using this index further in cross-national analysis helps to account for the concept of state capacity in the global anti-trafficking enforcement.

#### *Political institutions and behavior*

The pairwise correlations presented in Table 14 show how selected measures of political institutions are highly correlated with each other, starting from 0.6 to 0.9 (Table 14). Only institutional democracy indicator is the least but still significantly related to other measures. Thus, they all represent the concept of institutions rather well.

Meanwhile, there were only two measures of political behavior discussed earlier: SMA index and membership in voluntary associations. They correlate with each other at 0.6, which proves that they belong to the one concept (Table 15).

**Table 14: Correlations among Measures of Political Institutions**

		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	Effective Democracy Index	.94***	-.91***	.94***	-.87***	.82***	.77***	.60***	.26**
2	Voice and Accountability	-	-.96***	.94***	-.92***	.81***	.86***	.71***	.32***
3	Civil liberties		-	-.94***	.95***	-.79***	-.85***	-.70***	-.29***
4	Citizen Rights Index			-	-.91***	.79***	.89***	.66***	.29***
5	Political rights				-	-.79***	-.82***	-.73***	-.28***
6	Perception of Electoral Integrity					-	.66***	.66***	.23*
7	CIRI Empowerment Rights Index						-	.68***	.31***
8	Democracy-Dictatorship							-	.32***
9	Institutional democracy indicator								-

Note. Pearson correlation coefficients are reported. \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*  $p \leq .01$ , \*  $p \leq .05$ .

**Table 15: Correlations among Measures of Political Behavior**

		2
1	Social Movement Activity (SMA)	.55***
2	Membership in Organizations	-

Note. Pearson correlation coefficients are reported. \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*  $p \leq .01$ , \*  $p \leq .05$ .

Next in order to figure out which of these measures are most related to anti-trafficking enforcement, all aforementioned measures of political institutions are included in correlation analysis with Tier rankings. The results are presented in Table 16.

**Table 16: Correlations of Tier Rankings with Measures of Political Institutions**

	<i>Tier</i>
Effective Democracy Index	0.70*** (164)
Voice and Accountability	0.70*** (164)
Civil liberties	-0.67*** (160)
Citizen Rights Index	0.63*** (160)
Political rights	-0.62*** (160)
Perception of Electoral Integrity	0.60*** (97)
CIRI Empowerment Rights Index	0.54*** (164)
Democracy-Dictatorship	0.52*** (160)
Institutional democracy indicator	0.24** (162)

*Note. Correlations with Tier Rankings are Spearman rank-order coefficients. Number of countries in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*  $p \leq .01$ , \*  $p \leq .05$ .*

Out of all political institutions measures used in the correlation analysis, the EDI demonstrates the largest correlation with Tier rankings,  $r = .70$ , meaning that anti-trafficking legislation is related positively to a country's democratic performance. Thus, EDI will be used further to represent the concept of political institutions in modeling global variance of anti-trafficking enforcement. As for the measures of political behavior, the SMA index demonstrates the highest level of correlation with Tier rankings –  $r = .65$  (Table 17).

**Table 17: Correlations of Tier Rankings with Measures of Political Behavior**

	<i>Tier</i>
Social Movement Activity (SMA)	0.65*** (97)
Membership in Organizations	0.24 (51)

*Note. Correlations with Tier Rankings are Spearman rank-order coefficients. Number of countries in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*  $p \leq .01$ , \*  $p \leq .05$ .*

The SMA index measures the variety of social movement activities a respondent has been or considers to be involved in including petitions, peaceful demonstrations, and consumer boycotts, and covers 97 countries. Since the level of civic activity in the country is highly related to an anti-trafficking enforcement, it is considered further in the analysis and model testing.

#### *Demand*

The next step is the pairwise correlation analysis of the operationalized indicators of demand. In Table 18 these correlations show that youth bulge correlate moderately with other measures and correlations among most indicators are rather weak.

**Table 18: Correlations among Measures of Demand**

		2	3	4
1	Youth bulge rates	-.25**	-.28***	-.09
2	% migrants	-	.00	.57***
3	Sex ratio at birth		-	-.29
4	Surplus of men (15-64)			-

*Note. Pearson correlation coefficients are reported. \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*  $p \leq .01$ , \*  $p \leq .05$ .*

Then, these measures are correlated with anti-trafficking enforcement and results are reported in Table 19.



**Table 19: Correlations of Tier Rankings with Demand Measures**

	<i>Tier</i>
Youth bulge rates	-0.49*** (162)
% migrants	0.20* (160)
Sex ratio at birth	0.17* (164)
Surplus of men (15-64)	-0.01 (162)

*Note. Correlations with Tier Rankings are Spearman rank-order coefficients. Number of countries in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*  $p \leq .01$ , \*  $p \leq .05$*

Table 19 indicates that the youth bulge rates are most strongly and negatively connected with anti-trafficking enforcement with  $r = -.49$  for 162 countries. Thus, this indicator will be included in the further analysis with an assumption that countries with higher proportions of youth cohorts have weaker anti-trafficking enforcement.

#### *ORDINAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS*

In this part of the thesis, I explain the variation across 164 countries in anti-trafficking enforcement in 2013 by including the proposed theoretical drivers discussed in Chapter one. After conducting correlation analyses among all global indicators, one measure has been selected to represent each theoretical concept. These following measures are the best empirical operationalizations of the proposed concepts: GII and regulation of prostitution policies for gender inequality, number of international human rights treaties for international factors, regulatory quality index for state capacity, EDI and SMA for political institutions and behavior and youth bulge rates for demand factors. These indicators are then pooled into a new dataset along with the Tier Rankings. Tier Rankings reflect anti-trafficking enforcement of the country and serve as the dependent variable. Table 20 provides a more detailed look at countries' Tier profiles.

Table 20 shows that there is up to a three times difference between fully complied countries and countries that made no efforts to combat trafficking. The table indicates that further analysis exploring different Tier Rankings separately should be conducted via further models testing.

**Table 20: Socio-Cultural Profiles of Countries Based on Tier Rankings**

		Fully comply	Consistent efforts	Watch listed	No efforts
		Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean
Gender Inequality	Gender Inequality Index	0,6	0,34	0,30	0,27
	Regulation of Prostitution	0,83	0,63	0,22	0,1
International Factors	International Human Rights Treaties	0,77	0,50	0,40	0,31
Political Institutions & Behavior	Effective Democracy Index	0,76	0,34	0,21	0,05
	Social Movement Activity	0,40	0,22	0,18	0,17
State Capacity	Regulatory Quality	0,84	0,58	0,46	0,29
Demand	% of youth cohorts in a total population	0,23	0,52	0,59	0,61

To explain the variation that occurs in global anti-trafficking enforcement all theoretical assumptions shall be taken into account. These assumptions can be further broken down according to the empirical measures selected via correlation analyses. Thus, following hypotheses are formulated:

*H1: Countries where the GII index is higher and prostitution is not regulated will likely have higher Tier Rankings.<sup>17</sup>*

*H2: Countries where the number of international human rights treaties is higher will likely have higher Tier Rankings.*

*H3: Countries where regulatory quality of state is higher will likely have higher Tier Rankings.*

*H4: Countries where the EDI and SMA indices are higher will likely have higher Tier Rankings.*

*H5: Countries where the youth bulge rates are lower will likely have higher Tier Rankings.*

To test the proposed hypotheses ordinal regressions have been run using the measures with highest correlation coefficients from each theoretical category.

Before presenting results of the analysis, one can take a look at final independent variables included into model testing. These variables are graphed according to the countries Tier Rankings and reported in the Appendix. These visualizations along with correlation analysis provide an idea of direction of the tested relationships.

Out of seven selected indicators, only regulation of prostitution has been treated as an ordinal variable while the others – as interval ones. All measures have been rescaled to a 0-1 scale for an easier results interpretation. All data sources of these variables representing operationalized theoretical drivers are reported in detail in the Appendix.

To establish a broader anti-trafficking enforcement model, the variation in anti-trafficking ratings is analyzed across countries by operationalized measures of theoretical drivers using proportional-odds ordinal logistic regression models. Table 21 provides the results of ordinal logistic regression analyses.

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<sup>17</sup> Higher Tier Rankings reflect better anti-trafficking enforcement as the scales were reversed

**Table 21: Ordinal Regression Models**

Dependent variable: Tier 2013																
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)		(7)		(8)	
Independent variables:																
Gender Inequality Index	3.04** (0.90)	21.0 2													-	
Regulation of Prostitution (prost is illegal)			-1.12*** (0.29)	0.32											-0.89* (0.38)	0.41
International Human Rights Treaties					1.91*** (0.39)	6.78									-	
Social Movement Activity							5.68*** (1.28)	293. 48							4.82** (1.61)	123.69
Regulatory Quality									5.56*** (0.75)	259. 68					2.89** (1.04)	17.99
Effective Democracy Index											3.58*** (0.51)	36.07			-	
Youth bulge													-0.24* (0.53)	0.29	-	
Controls:																
Population size	0.19 (0.13)	1.21	0.11 (0.16)	1.11	0.15 (0.12)	1.16	0.25 (0.19)	1.29	0.26* (0.12)	1.29	0.32* (0.13)	1.37	0.14 (0.12)	1.15	-	
GDP PPP	0.27 (0.22)	1.31	1.06*** (0.22)	2.88	0.75*** (0.15)	2.11	0.66** (0.23)	1.94	-0.17 (0.19)	0.84	0.14 (0.17)	1.15	0.61** (0.18)	1.84	-	
<i>Countries</i>	139		94		160		95		162		162		162		68	
<i>McFadden R<sup>2</sup></i>	0.14		0.23		0.18		0.22		0.27		0.26		0.13		0.33	
<i>Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup></i>	0.32		0.46		0.39		0.45		0.53		0.51		0.29		0.56	
-2LL	293.35***		167.02***		322.98***		174.76***		292.59***		297.55***		350.17***		91.71***	
AIC	305.35		181.02		334.98		186.76		304.59		309.55		362.16		105.71	

Note. Odds ratios are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*  $p \leq .01$ , \*  $p \leq .05$

In Table 21 coefficients of ordinal logistic regressions can be interpreted as odds ratios (ORs), representing the ratio of odds of having higher anti-trafficking ratings. The odds of an event occurring are defined as the probability of an event occurring divided by the probability of an event not occurring. Thus, the odds ratio is the ratio of the odds of an event occurring in one group compared to another. We can interpret it in terms of the change in odds: if the value is greater than 1, it indicates that as the predictor increases, the odds of the outcome occurring increase. Conversely, a value less than 1 indicates that as the predictor increases, the odds of the outcome occurring decrease (Field et al. 2012: 319-320). In the resulting table one can see that in the construction of bivariate models, all operationalized drivers have a significant impact on the Tier rankings.

The model 1 shows that the GII is associated with an increase in the odds of a higher anti-trafficking rating, with an exponentiated  $\beta$  statistic or odds ratio of 21.02,  $p < .01$ . It means that the odds of having stronger anti-trafficking ratings are 21.02 times greater for each increment increase on the scale of the GII (Table 21, Model 1).

The model 2 shows if prostitution is not regulated in a country, it is associated with a decrease in the odds of lower anti-trafficking ratings, with an exponentiated  $\beta$  statistic or odds ratio of 0.32,  $p < .00$ . Thus, the odds of having lower anti-trafficking ratings are 0.32 times greater for countries that do not regulate prostitution (Table 21, Model 2).

Next, the model 3 shows that the international human rights treaties are associated with an increase in the odds of a higher anti-trafficking rating, with an exponentiated  $\beta$  statistic or odds ratio of 6.78,  $p < .00$ . The odds of having stronger anti-trafficking ratings are 6.78 times greater for each increment increase in number of international human rights treaties (Table 21, Model 3).

The model 4 proves that an increase in the SMA index is positively associated with an increase in the odds of a higher anti-trafficking rating, with an exponentiated  $\beta$  statistic or odds ratio of 293.48,  $p < .00$ . The odds of having stronger anti-trafficking ratings are 293.48 times greater for each increment increase in SMA index (Table 21, Model 4).

The results of the model 5 show that the regulatory quality index is associated with an increase in the odds of a higher anti-trafficking rating, with an exponentiated  $\beta$  statistic or odds ratio of 259.68,  $p < .00$ . The odds of having stronger anti-trafficking ratings are 259.68 times greater for each increment increase on the scale of the regulatory quality index (Table 21, Model 5).

The model 6 shows that the EDI is positively associated with an increase in the odds of a higher anti-trafficking rating, with an exponentiated  $\beta$  statistic or odds ratio of 36.07,  $p < .00$ .

The odds of having stronger anti-trafficking ratings are 36.07 times greater for each increment increase on the scale of the EDI (Table 21, Model 6).

Finally, the model 7 demonstrates that an increase in the youth bulge rates is negatively associated with an increase in the odds of a higher anti-trafficking rating, with an exponentiated  $\beta$  statistic or odds ratio of 0.29,  $p < .05$ . The odds of having lower anti-trafficking ratings are 0.29 times greater for each increment increase in the youth bulge rates (Table 21, Model 7).

The significance of these indicators remains even when controlled by the population size and country's GDP. However, with the increasing complexity of the models, the number of significant variables decreases. When all independent variables pooled into one model, only few of them remain significant and together constitute the best-fitted additive model. This model number 8 proves that countries with a higher social movement activity, higher regulatory quality and regulated prostitution are more likely to have stronger anti-trafficking ratings (Table 21, Model 8). These results can also be written in a form of the following equation:

$$\text{logit}[P(\text{Anti} - \text{trafficking} \leq i^{18} | \text{IllegalProst}, \text{SMA}, \text{RegulQual})] = \alpha_i - 0.89 * \text{Illegal Prostitution} + 4.82 * \text{SMA} + 2.89 * \text{Regulatory Quality}^{19} \quad (1)$$

where the probability under the proportional odds model equals:

$$P(\text{Anti} - \text{trafficking} \leq i | \text{IllegalProst}, \text{SMA}, \text{RegulQual}) = \frac{e^{\alpha_i - 0.89 * \text{Illegal Prostitution} + 4.82 * \text{SMA} + 2.89 * \text{Regulatory Quality}}}{1 + e^{\alpha_i - 0.89 * \text{Illegal Prostitution} + 4.82 * \text{SMA} + 2.89 * \text{Regulatory Quality}}}$$

More precisely, this model shows if prostitution is not regulated in a country, it is associated with a decrease in the odds of lower anti-trafficking ratings, with an exponentiated  $\beta$  statistic or odds ratio of 0.41 (95% CI: 0.19 to 0.87), Wald  $\chi^2(1) = 5.31$ ,  $p < .05$ . Thus, the odds of having lower anti-trafficking ratings are 0.41 times greater for countries that do not regulate prostitution.

Next, an increase in the SMA index is associated with an increase in the odds of a higher anti-trafficking rating, with an exponentiated  $\beta$  statistic or odds ratio of 123.69 (95% CI: 5.31

<sup>18</sup> for  $i$  = countries without anti-trafficking legislation, watch listed and consistent efforts

<sup>19</sup> Formula notation: *Anti-trafficking* is the response outcome variable, *Illegal Prostitution* shows that prostitution is illegal in that country, *SMA* is Social Movement Activity index, *Regulatory Quality* is an index that shows country's ability to implement policies

to 2879.56), Wald  $\chi^2(1) = 9.0$ ,  $p < .01$ . The odds of having stronger anti-trafficking ratings are 123.69 times greater for each increment increase in SMA index.

State capacity measured via the regulatory quality index also shows a statistically significant result. The result indicates that an increase in regulatory quality index is associated with an increase in the odds of a higher level of anti-trafficking ratings, with an odds ratio of 17.99 (95% CI: 2.34 to 138.21), Wald  $\chi^2(1) = 7.72$ ,  $p < .0$ . The odds of having higher anti-trafficking ratings are 17.99 times greater for each increment increase in regulatory quality index.

This model proves that the operationalized measures gender inequality, as well as political behavior and state capacity have the strongest impact on countries' anti-trafficking rankings. The model also has the best-explained power, which rises to 33% with McFadden  $R^2$  and to 56% with Nagelkerke  $R^2$ .

As one can see on the macro-level, anti-trafficking mechanisms are driven by a multitude of factors, which explain the enforcement of anti-trafficking legislation. Though the proposed models do a good job in explaining global variation in the Tier Rankings, it is worth testing whether the same patterns are found not only across countries but over time as well. In addition to static models described above I will explore dynamic models taking into account the variance across all countries and all years. Hence, the ordinal models are re-run at a second stage using panel regression analysis in order to test the robustness of the most significant theoretical drivers.

## PANEL REGRESSION ANALYSIS

### *Models specification*

In accordance with hypotheses reviewed in Table 1, I shall form a broad model by pooling all significant indicators together. The general form of final estimation equation for this broad model is the following:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_1 X(GII)_{it} + \beta_2 X(IllegalProst)_{it} + \beta_3 X(Treaties)_{it} + \beta_4 X(SMA)_{it} + \beta_5 X(RegulQual)_{it} + \beta_6 X(EDI)_{it} + \beta_7 X(YBulge)_{it} + \beta_N X(Controls)_{it} + f_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}^{20} \quad (2)$$

---

<sup>20</sup> Formula notation:

$Y_{it}$  represents the Tier Ranking of a country  $i$  at year  $t$ ,  $X_{it}$  represents the vector with explanatory variables:

$X(GII)_{it}$  stands for Gender Inequality Index in country  $i$  at year  $t$ ,

$X(IllegalProst)_{it}$  stands for cases when prostitution is not regulated in country  $i$  at year  $t$ ,

$X(Treaties)_{it}$  stands for the number of international human rights treaties ratified in country  $i$  at year  $t$ ,

All predictor variables have been lagged by one year in order to use past values to predict the present outcome. The general model estimated by equation 2 has been run, first, by adding one predictor at a time, then all predictors were pooled together and the weakest ones eliminated. In total, nine models are reported in Table 22.

In Table 22, all models include theoretical predictors, control variables and fixed effects. All variables are standardized in order to have equal measurement scales, so regression coefficients can be directly compared (Tenenhaus et al. 2005).

The results of this analysis reveal the positive, significant relationship between the number of international human rights treaties, indices of SMA and regulatory quality on anti-trafficking enforcement, when bivariate models are run. Specifically, first two models where the GII and regulation of prostitution are tested do not demonstrate any significant estimates. The model 3 shows that for one increase in the number of international human rights treaties, Tier Rankings are expected to increase by 0.08 on the 0-1 index scale on average per country (Model 3, Table 22). Next, it has been found that countries with higher level of SMA and regulatory quality indices are more likely to have stronger Tier Rankings: for one increase in SMA index and regulatory quality index, Tier Rankings are expected to increase by 0.05 and by 0.13 respectively on the 0-1 index scale on average per country (Models 4 and 5 in Table 22). Both EDI and youth bulge rates do not indicate statistical relationship with Tier Rankings, when models run separately using country fixed effects (Models 6 and 7 in Table 22).

---

$X(SMA)_{it}$  stands for Social Movement Activity index in country  $i$  at year  $t$ ,  
 $X(RegulQual)_{it}$  stands for Regulatory Quality index in country  $i$  at year  $t$ ,  
 $X(EDI)_{it}$  stands for Effective Democracy index in country  $i$  at year  $t$ ,  
 $X(YBulge)_{it}$  stands for percentage of youth population in country  $i$  at year  $t$ ,  
 $X(Controls)_{it}$  represents the vector with control variables,  $f_{it}$  stands for the country and year fixed effects, and  $\varepsilon_{it}$  represents panel corrected error terms.




**Table 22: Panel Regression Models (Pooled Imputed Dataset)**

Dependent variable: Tier 2001 - 2014									
	Country FE (1)	Country FE (2)	Country FE (3)	Country FE (4)	Country FE (5)	Country FE (6)	Country FE (7)	Country FE (8)	LDV (9)
Independent variables:									
Gender Inequality Index	-0.02 (0.02)							-	-
Regulation of Prostitution (prost is illegal)		0.003 (0.004)						-	-
International Human Rights Treaties			0.08* (0.04)					-	-
Social Movement Activity				0.05*** (0.01)				0.05*** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)
Regulatory Quality					0.13*** (0.03)			0.12** (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)
Effective Democracy Index						0.05 (0.03)		0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Youth bulge							-0.01 (0.02)	-	-
Controls:									
Population size	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
GDP PPP	0.01 (0.01)	-0.0004 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.006)
Regulatory Quality*Effective Democracy Index								-0.65*** (0.10)	-0.61*** (0.10)
LDV									0.15*** (0.03)
Observations	11405	11405	11405	11405	11405	11405	11405	11405	11405
Countries	164	164	164	164	164	164	164	164	164
R <sup>2</sup>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.002	0.002	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.03
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.002	0.002	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.03
F Statistic	1.2	1.1	2.4	6.9**	9.7***	2.2	1.1	15.2***	54.0***

Note. All models include country fixed effects. Cluster corrected errors in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*  $p \leq .01$ , \*  $p \leq .05$

The next model is a combination of SMA and regulatory quality indices and an interaction term where an increase in SMA index and regulatory quality index by one unit is associated with 0.05 increases and 0.12 respectively in the Tier Rankings on average per country, while the interaction effect shows that the positive effect of regulatory quality in the Tier Rankings changes to negative once controlled for democracy, namely EDI measure (Model 8, Table 22). Graphical representation of this interaction effect suggests that with higher values of both effective democracy and regulatory quality indices we observe better Tier Rankings. On contrary, when the EDI values are very small even one increase in regulatory quality index leads to a significant decrease of -.65 on average in Tier Rankings (Figure 7).

*Figure 7: Conditional Plot of the Regulatory Quality Index on Tier Rankings by the Effective Democracy Index*



The model 8 in Table 22 is the one where two predictors hold their level of significance simultaneously. All other indicators do not reach marginal significance level. Although the predictors in model 8 are significant under control of GDP and population size, the amount of explained variance is just 1% which is rather poor and clearly this model will not be able to hold up in the real world. The results of this specific model remain under question until the robustness checks are performed. A word of caution shall be used since I run the models on imputed data and for some variables, such as SMA index, the missing values reach 90%, however, excluding these variables would mean violation of the theoretical puzzle. Thus, I proceed with substantive interpretation of the findings, while results using non-imputed data are reported in the Appendix.

Results obtained with panel regressions contradict not only with the results produced using cross-sectional dataset, but also with theoretical expectations. Hence, I acknowledge that an interpretation and further application of the results shall be done with great caution. A possible explanation of such contradictions might be that the dependent variable is treated as an interval and thus linear panel regression is applied while in the first part of the analysis ordinal regression models are applied for cross-sectional data. One solution to get the fully comparable results would be to re-run the ordinal regression models with OLS regressions treating the dependent variable as interval. This can be done as a part of a robustness check to establish consistency of the results in combination with other tests taking a closer look at data structure and specific assumptions one should take into account when dealing with time-series cross-sectional data.

#### *SENSITIVITY ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS*

Due to the inconsistency in results, I shall focus this section on tests that can help to prove the validity of the results, both in the ordinal and panel regression models.

To check the robustness of ordinal regression results one of the most straightforward estimation techniques includes running OLS regressions since the dependent variable is naturally ordered. The results of the OLS regressions suggest that in the proposed theoretical model SMA and regulatory quality indices positively affect Tier Rankings while regulation of prostitution does not reach statistical significance (Table 23).

**Table 23: Ordinal Regressions vs OLS regressions**

Dependent Variable: Tier 2013			
	Ordinal Regression		OLS
	(1)		(2)
Gender Inequality Index	-		-
Regulation of prostitution (prost is illegal)	-.89* (0.38)	0.41	.06 (.03)
International Human Rights Treaties	-		-
Social Movement Activity	4.82** (1.61)	123.69	.90*** (.24)
Regulatory Quality	2.89** (1.04)	17.99	.47** (.16)
Effective Democracy Index	-		-
Youth bulge	-		-
Population size	-		-
GDP PPP	-		-
<i>Constant</i>	-		-.07 (.11)
<i>Countries</i>	68		68
<i>McFadden R<sup>2</sup> / R<sup>2</sup></i>	0.33		0.51
<i>Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup> / Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></i>	0.56		0.49
<i>-2LL / F statistic</i>	91.71***		22.25***
<i>AIC</i>	105.71		-

*Note. Best-fitting ordinal and OLS regressions are reported. Standard errors in parentheses.*

This comparison demonstrates the closeness of the results, however, since running OLS regressions violates several assumptions, the decision has been made in favor of ordinal regressions, where all assumptions are met and reviewed in detail below. Thus, I only report OLS regressions for comparative purposes here.

In order to run ordinal regression models in the first place, one needs to meet certain assumptions, and if these are violated, offer a solution to get valid estimations. Assumption number one is that the dependent variable should be ordinal by nature, and it is met in the case of the dependent variable. The second assumption postulates that independent variables shall be treated as either continuous or categorical and not as ordinal, which is again met in all set of ordinal regressions. Third, it is assumed that there is no multicollinearity, meaning a

high level of correlation among independent variables, so these effects cannot be estimated separately. Here the multicollinearity is not a concern in either of the resulting models where various collinearity statistics do not exceed cut-off points ( $VIF < 5$  and  $Tolerance > 0.1$ ). Lastly, one must control for proportional odds assumption, which means that each independent variable should be the same for each value of the ordinal dependent variable (Williams 2006). This can be done via a test of parallel lines. The test takes the ordinal model including coefficients for all levels of dependent variable and compares this model to each model with coefficients for every level separately. If the overall model with all coefficients performs better than individual ones, one can reject the assumption of proportional odds. Both models fail to reject the assumptions of proportional odds ( $p > 0.05$ ), which speaks in favor of selected models. Since all the assumptions have been met, I conclude that results of ordinal regressions are reliable. Testing for these assumptions helps to validate the results obtained with ordinal regressions and continue using them in developing possible policy recommendations.

Another set of diagnostic tests focuses on panel regression models. To run diagnostics tests on cross-sectional time-series data, I shall start testing the models on presence of serially correlated errors. Serial correlation means that error terms from different time periods or countries are correlated. It is the case that an error occurring at one point in time would lead to errors in future years, resulting in overestimation of the model. To test for this, I shall use the widely accepted Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation in panel models (Croissant and Millo 2008). However, serial correlation has been spotted in all models performed on either imputed or non-imputed datasets. Since neither number of countries (N) nor time periods (T) are particularly large in my sample, I shall account for cluster corrected errors which considered completely robust to serial correlation. Next, the Lagrange Multiplier test helps to decide whether OLS regression performs better than random effects regression. This allows me to check if variance across entities is zero, which means no panel effect or variance is equal to zero and that there is significant difference across units. Here, the results show that random effects perform better than simple OLS, meaning that there are panel effects in the data and significant differences across countries. Another test, Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence, helps to check for cross-sectional dependence or contemporaneous correlation. The null hypothesis under examination is that residuals across entities are not correlated (De Hoyos and Sarafidis 2006). This test looks into whether the residuals are correlated across entities (De Hoyos and Sarafidis 2006). Cross-sectional dependence could potentially be a big problem, since it leads to bias in test results, namely contemporaneous correlation. All time-series models indicate the presence of cross-sectional dependence and, thus, specific

estimators shall be applied. The literature suggests different types of robust covariance matrix estimations, but since I am dealing with small time-series dataset HC1 heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance estimators are applied (Kleiber and Zeileis 2008). Lastly, I shall test for heteroskedasticity, or if the errors have non-constant variance using Breusch-Pagan test. The Breusch-Pagan test aims to detect any linear forms of heteroskedasticity (Breusch and Pagan 1979). Heteroskedasticity affects how errors in the models changes as  $X$  changes, and it can affect both the coefficients and their standard errors. The results do not detect any heteroskedasticity with small chi-square values in all panel regression models meaning that heteroskedasticity is not a problem.

Therefore, I need to account for cross-sectional dependence and serial correlation in cross-sectional time-series data. Applying a set of robust covariance estimators (namely allerano and HC1 types in the package “sandwich” in R) helps to get more consistent estimates. By adding individual effects to these models in the process and making the error covariance structure inside every country in the dataset fully unrestricted helps against serial correlation (Beck and Katz 1995). To deal with the problems of endogeneity and omitted variable bias, a lagged dependent variable has been added to each of the best models to see if the results hold. The results do hold and are reported in the Appendix. Even after applying all above-mentioned procedures and specifications the estimates from panel regression models are still inconsistent between imputed and non-imputed datasets. Due to the issues with cross-sectional time-series data these results cannot be taken further. Hopefully, with longer year and country coverage available in the future, the results will be more consistent and used for better predictions of anti-trafficking enforcement. As for now, ordinal regression models are proven to be most consistent and reliable. Overall, the robustness analysis section shows that this imputation has drastic impact while raw non-imputed data provides inconsistent results. The reason is simple: Tier Rankings have not been very different across countries over that rather small time period from 2001 until 2014. On the other hand, the results of robustness checks on ordinal cross-sectional models suggest that ordinal models are the most reliable and produce valid estimations. I intend to use these results in discussion and build inferences upon them while panel regression results shall be omitted from the discussion due to the indicated contradictions.

## **CHAPTER 5: RESULTS: MICRO-FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING MODELS**

Chapter 5 presents the results of the multilevel models analyzing the micro-foundations of human trafficking. Macro-level results, especially the time-series ones, have not been conclusive to provide sufficient explanation of variation of global anti-trafficking enforcement. Some pieces of the evidence produce counterintuitive results, which deserve further exploration. Such finding as regulated prostitution pronouncedly positively affecting anti-trafficking enforcement is quite interesting. The way to explore further the macro-level results we need to look at the individual-level data. First, descriptive results are reported, followed by the OLS regressions and MLM regressions: one can see how individual- and country-level characteristics shape tolerance of violence, on the one hand, and how anti-trafficking enforcement is less effective when tolerance of violence is widespread, on the other hand.

### *Descriptive results*

This section starts with eyeballing the country-level data. As boxplots figures show, at the country-level higher tolerance of violence is associated with less effective anti-trafficking enforcement and absence of prostitution regulation (Figures 8 and 9). On Figure 8, countries are grouped according to their level of anti-trafficking enforcement and tolerance of violence. In the group with strongest enforcement, Colombia proves to be an outlier with 0.3 score of tolerating violence when the mean of the group seems to be less than 0.1. The mean score of violence tolerance for the group with least enforcement is around 0.4, which constitutes a big difference not only among countries but also between groups. Algeria and Singapore turn out as outliers on Figure 9, both regulating prostitution and demonstrating rather high tolerance of violence. One can also note that mean level of violence tolerance in countries where prostitution is regulated is approximately 0.1 while it increases to roughly 0.35 for countries where prostitution is not regulated.

Figure 8: Tolerance of Violence in the Household by Tier Rankings





Figure 9: Tolerance of Violence in the Household by Regulation of Prostitution







Thus, it is worthwhile to test what is the strongest predictor of violence tolerance and what role anti-trafficking enforcement and regulation of prostitution play in explaining that type of tolerance. One can even assume that people who support legalization of prostitution would support anti-trafficking enforcement. However, while lacking the data on these specific questions, we could look at the individual-level preferences nevertheless.

Observing aggregated individual data, one can look at the simple scattergrams depicting bivariate relationships between tolerance of prostitution, choice values and tolerance of violence (Figure 10). Figure 10 demonstrates that choice values are associated negatively and more strongly with tolerance of violence (left graph), while tolerance of prostitution does not seem to be related with tolerance of violence (right graph).



Figure 10: Choice Values, Tolerance of Prostitution and Tolerance of Violence in the Household



Both graphs suggest that countries' tolerance of violence cannot be explained by either the level of prostitution tolerance or choice values, which affect countries division in accepting violence. However, one can further look if a) individuals' overlap between tolerance of prostitution and violence more or less strongly affects tolerance of violence, and b) individuals' overlap between tolerance of prostitution and choice values more or less strongly affects tolerance of violence. Graphically these relationships are presented on Figure 11.

When both pairs of variables are combined, one can see that their interplay affect tolerance of violence more strongly. Thus, neither the mere level of tolerance of prostitution or choice values explains the variation in tolerance of violence. What motivates tolerance of violence is hidden at the intersection of individual preferences. When prostitution tolerance is associated with tolerance of violence or choice values, it simply explains more. The graphs on Figure 11 allow the following assumptions to be made: first, high levels of violence tolerance associate with high levels of prostitution tolerance only in those countries where the individual-level link between these two variables is strong. Second, where individual-level prostitution tolerance links more strongly to choice values, high levels of prostitution tolerance at the country level do not associate with high levels violence acceptance.

Figure 11: Individual-Level Link between Tolerance of Prostitution, Choice Values and Tolerance of Violence on Aggregated Tolerance of Violence



Due to the observed patterns it seems plausible to check if these individual-level links between tolerance of violence and prostitution and tolerance of prostitution and choice differ when countries are split by low and high levels of prostitution tolerance, choice values and tolerance of violence. Using means of aggregated individual-level variables as cut-off points these differences are explored (Table 24).

**Table 24: Cut-Off Points for Prostitution Tolerance, Choice Values and Violence Tolerance**



	<i>Correlation between tolerance of prostitution and violence</i>	<i>Correlation between tolerance of prostitution and choice values</i>	<i>Correlation between tolerance of violence and choice values</i>
<i>Prostitution Tolerance = Low</i>	-0.11 (24)	0.78*** (24)	-0.42* (24)
<i>Prostitution Tolerance = High</i>	-0.15 (18)	0.47* (18)	-0.58* (18)
<i>Choice Values = Low</i>	0.10 (19)	0.74*** (19)	-0.04 (32)
<i>Choice Values = High</i>	0.08 (23)	0.54** (23)	-0.43* (27)
<i>Violence Tolerance = Low</i>	-0.16 (27)	0.84*** (27)	-0.33⌘ (34)
<i>Violence Tolerance = High</i>	0.45⌘ (15)	0.94*** (15)	0.35⌘ (25)

Note. Pearson correlation coefficients are reported. Number of respondents in parentheses.

\*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*  $p \leq .01$ , \*  $p \leq .05$ , ⌘  $p \leq .10$ .

Second column of Table 24 proves that people most likely link tolerance of prostitution and such liberal practices as homosexuality, abortion and divorce (i.e. choice values). While tolerance of violence and choice component does not mean the same for people, especially in countries where liberal values are higher. In societies where tolerance of violence is low, choice and tolerance of violence go in different directions. The opposite is seen in countries where violence is accepted higher, people link liberal values with tolerance of violence. Figure 12 graphs the most pronounced differences. The left graph shows that in countries where tolerance of violence is high choice values have a strong positive, yet not extremely large, effect on tolerance of violence. While in countries where tolerance of violence is low, choice has a strong negative effect on tolerance of violence (right graph). More graphs and descriptive statistics are reported in the Appendix.

Figure 12: Choice Values and Tolerance of Violence in the Household Split by High and Low Tolerance of Violence



Note. Left graph only contains countries demonstrating above mean-level tolerance of violence (i.e. high tolerance). Right graph only depicts countries with below mean-level tolerance of violence (i.e. low tolerance).

## *OLS Regression Analysis*

This section starts with observing country-level and individual-level correlations among proposed explanatory factors of the tolerance of violence.

As Table 25 shows out of aggregated measures violence in the household is most related to the anti-trafficking enforcement with a Spearman correlation coefficient of  $r = -.51$  (Table 25). It is yet another proof that tolerance of violence can serve as a proxy for the lack of support of the anti-trafficking enforcement. Another important note that both tolerance of prostitution and choice values associate with tolerance of violence in line with theoretical assumptions. However, at the individual-level choice values become positively associated with tolerance of violence ( $r = 0.18$ ) which is at least interesting to explore further (Table 26).



**Table 25: Country-Level Correlations among Measures Predicting Tolerance of Violence in the Household**

		2	3	4	5	6
1	Tier rankings	-.51*** (58)	.38* (41)	.42** (57)	-.40** (41)	-.29 (41)
2	Tolerance of violence in the household	-	-.06 (42)	-.35** (59)	.47** (42)	.49** (42)
3	Tolerance of prostitution		-	.85*** (42)	-.35* (42)	.14 (42)
4	Choice (EVI)			-	-.48** (42)	-.32* (42)
5	Individual-level link between tolerance of prostitution and violence				-	.40** (42)
6	Individual-level link between tolerance of prostitution and choice					-

*Note.* Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients are reported for Tier Rankings and Pearson correlation coefficients are reported for other variables.

Number of countries in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*  $p \leq .01$ , \*  $p \leq .05$ .

**Table 26: Individual-Level Correlations among Measures Predicting Tolerance of Violence in the Household**

		2	3
1	Tolerance of violence in the household	.32*** (59832)	.18*** (81579)
2	Tolerance of prostitution		.65*** (59887)
3	Choice (EVI)		-

*Note.* Pearson correlation coefficients are reported. Number of respondents in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*  $p \leq .01$ , \*  $p \leq .05$ .

Using simple OLS regressions, I look at countries' variance of violence tolerance by the identified predictors. All models in Table 27 prove the negative impact of choice values and positive one of tolerance of prostitution on tolerance of violence (Table 27). Moreover, one can see that initial negative effect of tolerance of prostitution on violence turns into positive and significant once controlled for choice values. Individual-level link between tolerance of prostitution and violence is positively associated with tolerance of violence and remains positive even at mean levels of tolerance of prostitution and choice values. Individual-level link between tolerance of prostitution and choice is also positively related to tolerance of violence but loses its significance when controlled for choice values and tolerance of prostitution. The inclusion of both of these correlational variables provides another piece of evidence: in places where violence and prostitution are linked, high tolerance of prostitution and low choice values correspond to more tolerance of violence (Model 5, Table 27). While in countries where prostitution is linked with choice, one cannot see any significant relationships between tolerating of prostitution, choice values and tolerance of violence (Model 7, Table 27). Finally, both regulation of prostitution and strong anti-trafficking enforcement have negative effect on tolerance of violence. Partial regression plots visualizing these findings are reported in the Appendix.

**Table 27: OLS Regressions Results**

Dependent Variable: Tolerance of Violence in the Household										
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Tolerance of Prostitution	-0.04 (0.13)	-	0.77** (0.20)	-	0.68** (0.19)	-	0.48 (0.32)	-	-	0.86** (0.19)
Choice (EVI)		-0.35** (0.06)	-0.96*** (0.13)	-	- (0.13)	-	-0.66 (0.22)	-	-	-0.85** (0.13)
Individual-level link between tolerance of prostitution and violence				0.48** (0.07)	0.37* (0.08)	-	-	-	-	-
Individual-level link between tolerance of prostitution and choice						0.49** (0.09)	0.21 (0.15)	-	-	-
Regulation of Prostitution								-0.34** (0.01)	-	-0.37* (0.02)
Tier Rankings									-0.42** (0.03)	-0.08 (0.05)
Constant	0.14*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.08 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.09 (0.10)	0.20*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.03)
Observations	42	59	42	42	42	42	42	60	58	41
R2	0.001	0.123	0.278	0.235	0.382	0.236	0.293	0.115	0.177	0.408
Adj.R2	-0.024	0.107	0.241	0.216	0.333	0.217	0.237	0.099	0.162	0.343

Note. Standardized coefficients are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*  $p \leq .01$ , \*  $p \leq .05$ .

### *Multilevel Regression Analysis*

Multilevel regression models were conducted to test whether tolerance of prostitution, choice values, regulation of prostitution and anti-trafficking enforcement were predictive of people's level of violence tolerance. In all models intercepts and slopes were allowed to vary across countries. Independent variables were group-mean centered due to the inclusion of the cross-level interactions and better interpretation of the main effects, as literature suggests (Bauer and Curran 2005). The analysis on multilevel models was run in R, using lme4 package (<http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=lme4>). Due to the hierarchical structure of the data and package specification models with random effects and random slope include one fixed parameter, choice values in this case. Adding a random slope for choice values allows different choice values slopes for each country and helps to investigate the puzzling positive correlations at the individual-level between choice and tolerance of violence.

As results in Table 28 show, less tolerance of violence is contingent on females, more educated, older and non-religious people. When people are ready to tolerate prostitution, they are more likely to tolerate violence in the household. More liberal-oriented people who justify abortion, divorce and homosexuality (i.e. choice values) are more likely to tolerate violence. At the country-level, when prostitution is regulated people are less likely to tolerate violence. Also choice values aggregated by countries affect negatively on tolerance of violence, while tolerance of prostitution remains its positive effect.

**Table 28: Multilevel Regressions Explaining Violence in the Household**


Dependent Variable: Tolerance of Violence in the Household						
	RIM	RIM	RIRS	RIRS	RIRS	RIRS
<b>INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL</b>						
			(Choice)	(Choice)	(Choice)	(Choice)
Female Sex	-0.018*** (0.001)	-0.018*** (0.001)	-0.019*** (0.001)	-0.017*** (0.001)	-0.017*** (0.001)	-0.017*** (0.001)
Age	-0.013*** (0.004)	-0.013** (0.004)	-0.013** (0.004)	-0.017*** (0.004)	-0.017*** (0.004)	-0.019*** (0.004)
Educational Achievement	-0.033*** (0.003)	-0.033*** (0.003)	-0.033*** (0.003)	-0.028*** (0.003)	-0.027*** (0.003)	-0.026*** (0.003)
Atheist	-0.022*** (0.003)	-0.023*** (0.003)	-0.023*** (0.003)	-0.009* (0.003)	-0.006 (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)
Tolerance of Prostitution	0.178*** (0.004)	0.180*** (0.004)	0.180*** (0.004)	0.158*** (0.004)	0.283*** (0.007)	0.253*** (0.006)
Choice (EVI)	0.183*** (0.004)	0.185*** (0.004)	0.185*** (0.004)	0.248*** (0.004)	0.237*** (0.008)	0.253*** (0.005)
<b>COUNTRY-LEVEL</b>						
Regulation of Prostitution		-0.069* (0.028)	-0.068*** (0.020)	-0.090*** (0.023)	-0.094*** (0.024)	-0.139*** (0.021)
Tier Rankings		-0.020 (0.046)	-0.003 (0.035)	0.039 (0.036)	-0.021 (0.039)	0.026 (0.035)
Tolerance of Prostitution (CL)		0.534** (0.179)	0.371** (0.121)	0.412** (0.154)	0.514** (0.161)	0.638*** (0.144)
Choice (CL)		-0.665*** (0.127)	-0.623*** (0.088)	-0.691*** (0.120)	-0.677*** (0.125)	-0.773*** (0.112)
<b>CROSS-LEVEL EFFECTS</b>						
Tolerance of Prostitution <sub>CL</sub> #				0.286*** (0.030)	0.617*** (0.034)	0.529*** (0.031)
Tolerance of Prostitution <sub>IL</sub>						
Choice <sub>CL</sub> # Choice <sub>IL</sub>				-0.990*** (0.022)	-0.935*** (0.027)	-0.926*** (0.023)
Tier Rankings <sub>CL</sub> # Tolerance of Prostitution <sub>IL</sub>					-0.253*** (0.013)	
Tier Rankings <sub>CL</sub> #Choice <sub>IL</sub>					0.001 (0.015)	
Prostitution is Regulated <sub>CL</sub> # Choice <sub>IL</sub>						-0.068*** (0.009)
Prostitution is Regulated <sub>CL</sub> # Tolerance of Prostitution <sub>IL</sub>						-0.188*** (0.008)
Constant	-0.269*** (0.017)	-0.218*** (0.024)	-0.233*** (0.022)	-0.227*** (0.023)	-0.198*** (0.023)	-0.196*** (0.021)
Observations	55,650	54,557	54,557	54,557	54,557	54,557
Countries	42	41	41	41	41	41
AIC	-41426	-40287	-40289	-42553	-43090	-44577
BIC	-41337	-40154	-40138	-42384	-42903	-44372
Log-Likelihood	20723	20158	20161	21295	21566	22311
Variance intercept	0.012	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.004
Variance slope (Choice)	-	-	0.022	0.027	0.026	0.026
Variance residual	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.070	0.070	0.058

Note: Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<.001, \*\* p<.01, \* p<.05. The estimated coefficients of random intercept and random slope models are reported, allowing for random intercept and random slope of choice values, and the variance of the slope, the intercept and the level-1 residuals.

The fact that choice values and tolerance of prostitution operate in different directions at the individual and country-level is puzzling. When one is conditional on the other does not solve the mystery either: in interactions one can see that country-level choice values negatively interacts with individual-level choice values and tolerance of prostitution at the country-level positively interacts with tolerance of prostitution at the individual-level. That means when the society overall becomes more liberally-oriented and tolerates prostitution, the initial violence acceptance-enhancing effect of individual-level choice values turns into an acceptance-lowering effect while individual-level prostitution tolerance hold the violence acceptance-enhancing effect. However, the significant and positive effect of individual-level prostitution tolerance on tolerance of violence reverts into negative as soon as I control for regulation of prostitution at the country level, which means that among countries already regulating prostitution stronger tolerance of prostitution make people less accepting of violence contrary to individual-level bivariate results suggesting that stronger tolerance of prostitution lead to more acceptance. The same holds for choice values in countries regulating prostitution: higher choice values correspond to less acceptance of violence. Lastly, the stronger anti-trafficking enforcement per se does not affect the tolerance of violence but when cross-level interacted with individual-level tolerance of prostitution corresponds negatively with violence tolerance. That means individual-level attitudes to tolerate prostitution are leading to less tolerance of violence in countries where anti-trafficking enforcement is stronger.

By plotting interactions one can see how tolerance of prostitution varies by countries with different levels of anti-trafficking enforcement (Figure 13).


Figure 13: Effect of Tolerance of Prostitution and Tier Rankings on Tolerance of Violence



Note. In countries with the strongest enforcement higher tolerance of prostitution corresponds to a lesser increase in tolerating violence. While in countries with the lowest enforcement levels, people’s higher tolerance of prostitution corresponds to a much higher tolerance of violence.

Substantively, it means that people in countries with the strongest enforcement have tolerance of violence scores that are 0.253 points lower for each unit increase in tolerance of violence, compared to people living in countries with the lowest enforcement levels. This is visible in less steeper slope for countries with stronger enforcement.

Figure 14: Effect of Tolerance of Prostitution and Regulation of Prostitution on Tolerance of Violence




Note. In countries where prostitution is regulated higher tolerance of prostitution corresponds to less steeper increase in tolerating violence. While in countries where prostitution is not- or partly-regulated, people's higher tolerance of prostitution corresponds to a much higher tolerance of violence.

Figure 14, which plots the interaction between individual-level tolerance of prostitution and regulation of prostitution, shows that in countries where prostitution is regulated higher tolerance of prostitution corresponds to 0.188 decrease in tolerating violence than in countries where prostitution is not- or partly-regulated. More interaction plots are visualized on Figures 15-17.




Figure 15: Interaction Effect of Individual- and Country-Level Tolerance of Prostitution on Tolerance of Violence




Note. In countries where majority of the population shows less tolerance of prostitution, individuals who tolerate prostitution higher will likely tolerate violence higher. On contrary, where majority supports prostitution more, individual who tolerate prostitution show less pronounced effect of tolerating violence.

Figure 16: Interaction Effect of Individual- and Country-Level Choice Values on Tolerance of Violence



Note. In countries where individual are more liberal-oriented, more pronounced choice values correspond to more steeper slope in tolerating less violence. While in countries where individual are less liberal-oriented, higher choice values correspond to less but almost non-visible difference in tolerance of violence.

Figure 17: Effect of Choice Values and Regulation of Prostitution on Tolerance of Violence



*Note. In countries where prostitution is regulated higher choice values correspond to higher tolerance of violence, however, with less steep slope than for countries where prostitution is not regulated. While in countries where prostitution is not regulated, people's higher choice values corresponds to a much higher tolerance of violence.*

Further graphs are documented in the Appendix.

## DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In summary, what follows is the review of all chapters, discussion of most important findings and conclusion with policy and research recommendations. This thesis aims to answer several research questions. Firstly, it proposes cross-national evaluation of the sources of anti-trafficking enforcement and a more rigorous examination of drivers explaining anti-trafficking enforcement worldwide. Secondly, exploring the personal and contextual circumstances contributing into tolerance of violence in the household in order to understand where anti-trafficking enforcement is more likely to occur and where it is more effective. The second question is linked to the first one by the clear evidence that (a) human trafficking is mostly sex trafficking involving prostitution, (b) disproportionately victimizes women and (c) inevitably involves violence against women, which arguably finds the strongest grassroots support where gendered and other forms of violence are considered a normal part of everyday life – hence, the focus on households.

The first set of results presented in this thesis suggests that to achieve better enforcement of legislation against human trafficking the existence of various factors affecting these laws globally has to be acknowledged. These results are mostly coherent with the argument developed in the literature focusing on gaps overlooked by previous scholarship. The absence of one unifying theory explaining anti-trafficking enforcement provides a fruitful soil for this research. Moreover, the lack of quantitative studies tackling the issue of global variation in anti-trafficking enforcement provides even more justification to delve into this topic from a cross-national standpoint. Due to these gaps in the literature, the aim of this thesis is of an exploratory nature. An exploratory approach is preferable to a confirmatory one when there is no ready-made set of established theories waiting to be tested (Babbie 2013).

In search for a better understanding of how anti-trafficking policies are enforced in different countries, Chapter one of this thesis examines global realities to theoretically define which of them have the most influence on international anti-trafficking ratings. In Chapter one, I combine pieces of different theories and other research to select which theoretical drivers could be used for the explanation of the phenomenon. Then, to approach the problem from a practitioner perspective, in Chapter two I fill those theoretical linkages with empirical indicators that represent a mixture of real-life data and expert evaluations.

As Chapter two where global indices are compared shows, all of them sparked a lot of criticism in the literature. Non-transparency of the methodology behind these indices forces scholars to find alternative explanations on how these ratings are related to the problem of

human trafficking in the first place and how they vary across countries. I examine these measures thoroughly in Chapter two in order to reply to the criticism addressing non-transparency of the global indices such as the one developed by the famous TIP report. Although the literature argues that the TIP measure simply reflects which countries have more money to implement the legislation, it does not mean resources are the only right answer to solve problems with enforcement of anti-trafficking legislation. Historically countries with more resources and democratic institutions were able to provide better public services for their citizens. Though the factors affecting a country's level of development are out of scope of this thesis they are still attributed to a country's major achievements in policy implementation, and are thus a part of a bigger picture. Moreover, I account for the level of countries' development in all statistical models in Chapter four and show that there is no causal relationship between resource-rich countries and Tier Rankings.

Another major concern of critics is related to the financial aid allocated by the US government to help other countries with the implementation of anti-trafficking legislation. The U.S. Congress proclaims that countries with the worst Tier Rankings are not eligible to receive non-humanitarian aid in the following year (Sun Wyler 2012). The intention of this policy is to force countries to better address the problem of human trafficking, which is why researchers have often called the U.S. "the global sheriff" (Chuang 2006). For better or worse, some countries were able to move from the very bottom and improve their Tier Rankings, such as Armenia. However, it is true that half of the countries with the lowest rankings are trapped in a vicious circle of lack of resources and pervasive corruption making them sustain human trafficking practices due to the lucrative profits authorities are getting from them. Thus, there should be a plan of actions developed specifically for these countries dealing with each case individually and not simply cutting off financial aid. However, the causal relationship between the U.S. aid and being in the bottom of Tier Rankings are harder to prove due to the lack of statistical and reliable data on that topic. Up until now, the problem of human trafficking continues to draw the global attention but only the U.S. government allocated 548 million dollars for international anti-trafficking projects from 2005 through 2011 (Sun Wyler 2012). Although it seems plausible to consider TIP to be too political in their assessments, there is no better measure of global anti-trafficking enforcement and the results in Chapter two prove that.

The criticism of the Tier Rankings simply shows that the global measure needs to be improved and its methodology has to be more transparent for future research. As I demonstrate in Chapter two, a reliable and valid cross-national measure should explain not

only the lack of policies as such but also the lack of implementation and enforcement. Hence, exploring the variation across countries is helpful when drawing comparisons between countries to outline the trends in enforcing and monitoring these policies. How these comparisons resonate with findings made by other researchers is discussed below. My thesis relies on theories that have already caught the attention of scholars in the human trafficking field. As Chapter one shows, none of these theories solely help to resolve the problem of implementation of anti-trafficking legislation. Thus, bringing these theories under one umbrella seems to at least partly resolve the problem with theoretical coverage of anti-trafficking enforcement. A strong argument for supporting this approach includes other fields of research such as sociology, psychology and cultural studies. Combining various theoretical approaches is rarely attempted in cross-national research on anti-trafficking as Chapter one demonstrates. Even when attempted it is done on rather small samples or lacks the explanations why a particular theory is important to be included. It is worth mentioning that these studies fail to include theoretical explanations of the implications of empirical results. Accounting for these previous omissions, this thesis argues that we need to account for various theoretical reasons, how well these reasons might be conceptualized and operationalized for the purposes of empirical analyses and how acquired results correspond back to the proposed theories.

This thesis presents a combination of methods and techniques, since, as researchers usually state, if one approach does not answer their research question, one should implement a combination of them in order to draw meaningful conclusions. The data used for the empirical analyses are discussed in detail in Chapter three. Next, the analyses in Chapter four show what quantitative characteristics of global realities are necessary for the countries' achievement of maximal anti-trafficking Tier ratings. As the results of ordinal regressions suggest, for countries to perform at the highest level of compliance to international anti-trafficking legislation, it is vital that they not only take into account expert evaluations but also include such country characteristics as gender inequality, state capacity and political behavior in their assessments. This is an important confirmation of a link between anti-trafficking efforts that countries are applying and those country-level factors that have been considered important to combating trafficking, and not only as an extra force to strengthen the legislation itself. The statistical results presented in Chapter four prove that differences across countries in anti-trafficking enforcement are statistically significant even after controlling for population size and a country's level of resources. This only means that global variation in enforcement should be researched more thoroughly and more cross-national comparative

studies should be done in the future. When various global drivers are taken into account, as Chapter four shows, gender inequality, state capacity and political behavior play the most important role in shaping expert ratings of anti-trafficking enforcement. These results might suggest looking closer at these measures and examining how governments could include them into tracking the success of enforcement of anti-trafficking legislation. The omission of these drivers from the overall picture might be harmful as statistics shows, while focusing on drivers of anti-trafficking enforcement allows bridging the weak spots in the implementation of anti-trafficking laws with global realities.

I believe that the interpretation of results presented in Chapter four should go beyond mere statistics. Thus, I suggest several policy recommendations countries might consider if they are willing to improve the current situation. Since previous research does not rely much on quantitative analysis, there are not many global patterns of anti-trafficking enforcement outlined in the literature. Thus, starting with establishing theoretical drivers of global anti-trafficking enforcement was the first step in this thesis. During this step, it became evident that great efforts are made to examine how well countries address the issue of human trafficking though not fully disclosing the methodology of countries ratings. Although the TIP report provides quite extensive country reports every year, providing examples on cases of prosecuted trafficking cases, rescued victims, survivors stories or funds allocated to each country, this report, first, causes heated debates every year and, second, does not attempt to present the global trends by analyzing countries efforts to combat human trafficking. Substantive effects of specific drivers cannot be underestimated and I argue that should be included in policymakers' agendas. It is reasonable to suggest that countries with larger resources make more efforts to comply with international legislation. However, if we break down the types of resources which drive anti-trafficking enforcement, it is quite evident that not all resources are used in full capacity and to some countries, it is not even important to achieve this goal. Thus, I suggest paying attention to the following factors: prostitution being regulated in a country, how well this country implements the policies – regulatory quality, and how active the civil society is in a country. Each of these factors requires closer observation and is discussed further.

One of the novelty features of this study is to provide the instruments for building a solid theoretical framework by combing pieces of related theories and previous research and filling the bigger theory with empirical measures, thus, offering a global outlook on variation in Tier Rankings. Though being criticized, the Tier Rankings have been proven by this research to be the most related to a set of contextual indicators of human trafficking. The number of policy

recommendations developed upon the results of this thesis hopefully sets a higher, but still attainable, bar for enforcing well-functioning global anti-trafficking legislation.

However, changes are not likely to happen easily, and it will take time to achieve these goals. In order to make this process a successful one, it is important to take into account not only one side of the story – the story of reaching higher levels of anti-trafficking enforcement. This one side means that even if governments realize how urgent the problem of human trafficking is, and ratify all required laws, it won't be enough to develop a mechanism allowing for timely evaluation of the work of these laws and most importantly prevention of trafficking. Thus, this thesis proposes an alternative option for creating such a mechanism in the future by examining what affects the legislation on a global level. As it turns out, the compliance to an international anti-trafficking legislation is contingent on all of the proposed global drivers. Only controlling whether a country ratifies the human trafficking protocol will not be sufficient if, for instance, other root causes of trafficking are not taken into account or no effort is put into policy implementation and implementation monitoring. Dealing with comparative analysis when there are flaws in the data can be tricky. That is why for the policy recommendations I emphasize not only those factors, which have proven to be statistically significant in all models, but also those considered important in the theoretical Chapter one. Due to the mentioned limitations and problems with existing anti-trafficking enforcement data, it would be an omission not to discuss the importance of these factors as well. The situation with data availability and ratings transparency will hopefully be improved and these global realities potentially harmful for establishing well-functioning anti-trafficking legislation might be prioritized when more cross-national comparative research in this field is done. In order to start discussing possible policy recommendations and implications of the proposed drivers of anti-trafficking enforcement, I suggest examining them in the same order as they appear in Chapter one.

Thus, the first factor I address is gender inequality. Due to the fact that human trafficking mostly concerns women and girls, the problem of gender inequality shall be added to the discourse of assessing countries' efforts to establish anti-trafficking legislation. As Heyzer suggests, women being extremely vulnerable to trafficking should be empowered via economic opportunities, and “promoting individual and collective empowerment that will allow the women to address the underlying causes of their marginalization and gender inequality” (Heyzer 2002: 14). The elimination of gender inequality is one of the primary goals in many spheres. One of the UN sustainable development goals is to achieve gender



equality by the year 2030.<sup>21</sup> Though this topic has increased global awareness and been added to the policymakers agenda, the anti-trafficking law enforcement still needs to improve its policies with regard to it. For instance, in many cases, a law enforcement officer, usually a man, is sent to talk to a victim of trafficking, usually a woman, forgetting that it is psychologically hard for a woman to open up to a man and trafficking survivors had been mentioning it.<sup>22</sup> Instead, special crisis centers have been created where women can be sent after the expertise has been made and it was established that trafficking had taken place. In these centers, women can request to talk to a woman. In fact, mostly female counselors are working with trafficking survivors as various centers indicate on their websites.<sup>23</sup> However, the first “barrier” for a victim is a contact with predominantly male police force or law enforcement officers. This must be changed in accordance to the degree of the case severity. All cases need to be treated carefully but some cases are more vulnerable and thus require introduction of more gender-specific policies. This is something, which can be improved from a legislative standpoint.

Another aspect of gender inequality – regulation of prostitution – needs to be addressed. Here, the discussion of whether regulation of prostitution policies help to combat human trafficking echoes with eliminating the demand side by punishing “the buyers”. It should be noted that even though the research shows that punishing “the buyers” has been proven to decrease the number of victims of trafficking (Eckberg 2004), the research question of this thesis aims at examining the change in anti-trafficking enforcement per se. Thus, the implication of the statistical results here is that in countries where prostitution is regulated it is easier to establish and control the implementation of anti-trafficking legislation. Due to the fact that male demand for sex services is still driving the supply of girls from poor countries, even the punishment of buyers or pimps will not eliminate the problem in most countries. In many places, the prostitution market will simply move to the shadow economy but continue to exist. Thus, it makes sense to assume that in countries where prostitution is regulated, it is also more transparent to distinguish the case of prostitution from the trafficking case or report of an abuse or threat from a “client” to the police. Regulation means that prostitutes enter this

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<sup>21</sup> More information on UN sustainable development goals can be found at <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment>

<sup>22</sup> Based on speaking to trafficking survivors at the conference on Human Trafficking in Nebraska, Lincoln (2014, 2017)

<sup>23</sup> These are just few examples of such crisis centers: the Nest-STOP Trafficking (<http://nordicbaltic-assistwomen.net>), Women's Center-YFS ([www.womenscenteryfs.org](http://www.womenscenteryfs.org)), Dream House ([www.runforfreedom.net](http://www.runforfreedom.net)), Out Of The Life, Inc. ([www.outofthelife.org](http://www.outofthelife.org)), Women's Center – Melbourne ([www.womenscenterinbrevard.org](http://www.womenscenterinbrevard.org))

market more or less by their own decision, are registered as workers, pay regular taxes, acquire entitlements to health and elderly care and benefits and, more generally, are protected by the legal system of a country. While in countries where prostitution is not regulated or illegal it still takes place but without any guarantees that if something happens consequences would follow immediately. Those involved in illegal prostitution are more likely to end up being trafficked. For instance, a policy analysis conducted in Nepal comes to the conclusion that “no specific laws should be enacted to criminalize prostitution” (Sanghera and Kapur 2000: iii). When women are granted constitutional rights of “sexually stigmatized communities” it would not only mean protection for these women but a possibility to exit this market (Sanghera and Kapur 2000: iii). Thus, from a legislative standpoint making the prostitution market transparent translates into better anti-trafficking enforcement mechanisms.

Although it might sound tautological that one shall account for international factors, including international law and transnational actors, while improving anti-trafficking enforcement mechanisms, I argue that broadening the scope related to human trafficking crimes might greatly improve the situation. As soon as countries start recognizing that the human trafficking problem overlaps with violations of human rights in general, they realize that addressing these issues is beneficial to improve the situation with anti-trafficking legislation. It also shows the international community is interested in providing protections to its citizens in various spheres. Since the importance of these factors has been demonstrated both from theoretical and empirical perspectives, I propose policymakers use such measure as ratification of international human rights treaties in the future assessments of anti-trafficking enforcement. Using this measure to track how countries are dealing with trafficking-related crimes shall be helpful in understanding the work and progress of global anti-trafficking legislation.

State capacity drivers are designed to control how different policies are implemented and run by the authorities. Tier Rankings include various legislative efforts and thus it is obvious that the capacity of a state to implement laws in general would impact anti-trafficking enforcement as well. These indicators seem very close but they measure different things in reality. As it was established, the Tier Rankings is a more narrowed measure capturing countries’ compliance to international anti-trafficking legislation, while the regulatory quality index, which has proven its significance, is a more general indicator, showing how countries formulate and implement policies that permit and promote private sector development. The fact that analyses prove that these two are related indicates the capacity of a state, in the way

it was formulated in this thesis, shall be examined thoroughly. Thus, including the information on formulation and implementation of policies, as well as the quality of public services responsible for these policies can expand the understanding of anti-trafficking enforcement. Lacking the environment capable to serve the needs of citizens is harmful to any international agreement. It might be hard to develop anti-trafficking policies accounting beforehand how well a certain type of government will implement them, but it seems worthwhile to develop a mechanism or a system of evaluation calculating the possible level of success of implementing a new policy in a country. Since this is not a policy recommendation directly, I will leave it out of scope of this thesis.

Next, democratic political institutions are vital to achieving high results in quality of government. This argument implied towards enforcing better anti-trafficking legislation. However, as results in Chapter four show measures of political institutions do not turn out to be significantly related to anti-trafficking enforcement. Both theoretically and in bivariate analysis, democratic institutions are important, indeed, but other factors outweigh them when other factors are taken into account. Basically, a democratic environment plays the same role as capacity of a state to implement policies. This means that democracy, as state capacity is a sufficient condition to establish stronger anti-trafficking legislation. Generally, the joint effects of state capacity and democracy in a country shall be considered before a policy is carried out. Adjusting the policies in this way must be very demanding but I'm confident that this process would result in better functioning policies and if more trends are outlined in the future the process might be simplified.

Also, as analyses in Chapter four show, some aspects of political behavior are more related to countries level of anti-trafficking enforcement. Here, the statistical proof shows something really interesting: more active civil societies tend to have stronger enforcement of policies against human trafficking. It is actually hard to account for civically active society. Societies, which prioritize freedoms and have the population ready to stand up for these freedoms are likely more progressive in general, so it comes as no surprise that these countries among other achievements would comply with the international anti-trafficking legislation. However, the question is how to account for this quest for freedoms in a country and make it work for improving the situation with policy implementation. Out of all proposed drivers this one in particular is the one impossible to add directly to anti-trafficking legislation. It seems possible, though, to track down the number and intensity of various freedom movements possibly affecting the topics brought to the attention of policymakers. It might be easier to

establish policies in more active civil societies and also check how they are implemented via the joint work of NGOs, various human rights groups, media and activists. Thus, it might be useful to account for the degree of social movement activity in the countries where the enforcement is taking place.

Finally, addressing the demand side of trafficking shall be included into developing measures of anti-trafficking enforcement. First, men throughout the centuries have supported the patriarchal world system where they are able to buy sexual services. Most often, these men are from rich and developed countries and women come from poor third world countries, trying to escape poor conditions there. One would argue that if a woman voluntarily decides to enter the prostitution, then she gives her consent. The difficulties begin when prostitution coincides with trafficking, which is often hard to distinguish even for involved parties. Though there are many scenarios of how women being trapped into prostitution end up being trafficked and deprived of their basic human rights, there is no doubt that no woman would make this choice in the first place had she had other options. In order to start providing women with these other opportunities, government should pursue the compulsory schooling of girls at an early age. In some African countries, girls have unequal access to education (N'DRI 2000; Lewin 2009) and many of them left with no other choice but joining the prostitution market or are even sold to traffickers to become prostitutes in their search for a better life. Thus, acknowledging the importance of education for women's wellbeing is important for eliminating them from the supply-demand equation. Researchers also argue that punishing "the buyers" would also help to strengthen the legislation against trafficking, since eliminating the demand side would eventually eliminate the supply side. However, the profits from the prostitution are so lucrative that not many countries are actually ready to take these radical steps. That is why I argue that introducing the free obligatory education for girls is necessary for strengthening anti-trafficking enforcement mechanisms. As the literature proposes, educating women and integrating them into the mainstream workforce can greatly increase a country's chances of economic, political, and social success (Bertone 1999; England 2010; Duflo 2012).

The results presented in Chapter five shed more light on the counterintuitive macro-level finding that in countries where prostitution is regulated anti-trafficking enforcement is stronger than in countries where prostitution is not regulated. Thus, an analysis of attitudes helps to explain what makes people tolerate prostitution and whether this leads further to tolerating violence or not. Being inherently connected with the act of human trafficking,

violence or tolerance of violence is considered an important aspect to look at. Thus, analyzing what affects tolerance of violence became the main focus of Chapter 5. According to the theoretical assumptions, in countries where violence is accepted as a norm, human trafficking would flourish and enforcement of anti-trafficking policies would be much harder to achieve. As the results indicate, socio-demographic characteristics coincide with different levels of violence tolerance. Thus, less tolerance of violence is documented for females, more educated, older and non-religious people. This finding echoes the literature: studies exploring violence indicate that gender, age and educational differences significantly affect tolerance of violence in the household (Markowitz 2001), especially in Arab countries (Almosaed 2004). Historically, these countries were the most violent places towards females and these practices seem to stick at the cultural level, since even nowadays one can see the highest scores for accepting violence in Arab countries. These findings reflect the development of gender roles in such societies where male dominance is considered as a norm (Nayak et al. 2003; Mostafa 2005). As Blokhuis argues “gender role stereotyping reflects the unequal power relationship between men and women and contributes to the treatment of women as commodities” (Blokhuis 2008: 54).

The analysis of attitudinal variables demonstrates that tolerating prostitution leads to more tolerance of violence both at individual- and country-levels. This goes in line with the literature that often equates these two concepts. Research demonstrates that “violence is a routine” in the sex industry (Coy et al. 2011: 443). The violent practices are explained by negative stigmas developed in societies towards sexual industry and commodification of women (O’Neill 2001; Jeffreys 2009). Societies where women are objectified and treated as commodities would be in favor of violence since it won’t be seen as a problem. One can connect this debate to the suggested link between violence and human trafficking. As research shows, trafficking practices continue to thrive in countries like Mauritania, Niger, Chad and India due to the patterns of social organization rooted in an ideology of human inferiority (Quirk 2011). In Cambodia “culture, traditions, and social norms help justify the practice of human trafficking, especially of women” (Monson 2009). A popular Cambodian saying, “Men are Gold: Women are cloth,” captures the patriarchal values of the Cambodians (Samarasinghe 2004: 89). In China, due to the long patriarchal and feudal system, a girl or a woman often becomes a pawn in her parents’ hands, trying to arrange a favorable marriage by selling their daughters to the person who simply offers the most money (Zhao 2003). Moreover, it is not considered a disgrace for men to buy a wife, while women are treated as commodities and have no power to change the situation. Zhao concludes that “both enduring

patriarchal attitudes that devalue women and the subordinate position women de facto occupy in society contribute to the moral tolerance to the trafficking of women in China” (Zhao 2003: 89). What this discourse is lacking is the analysis of public attitudes towards both tolerance of prostitution and tolerance of violence, where the outlined theoretical assumptions of what shapes these attitudes can be further tested. Hence, the results in Chapter five intend to fill this gap.

Another finding appears highly counterintuitive, showing that more liberal-oriented people are more likely to tolerate violence. This finding contradicts the common-sense understanding of progressive mindsets, which suppose to be less tolerant towards violence, as one indeed observes at the country-level. Choice values are a part of emancipative values and proved to be pro-democratic, critically-liberal and freedom- and peace-oriented (Welzel 2013; Dalton and Welzel 2014; Inglehart, Puranen and Welzel 2015). The choice component especially emphasizes priorities of lifestyle liberty (Welzel 2013). Hence, it seems paradoxical that these orientations predict higher tolerance of violence. However, the effect is small in absolute terms and smaller in relative terms than the mere bivariate relationship before controlling prostitution tolerance. Hence, part of the effect of choice values on violence acceptance is mediated by prostitution tolerance. Moreover, when aggregated to the country-level, more widespread choice values show the expectable negative effect on violence acceptance. And this negative aggregate-level effect over-powers the smaller positive effect at the individual level. So, overall the role of choice values with respect to violence acceptance is beneficial.

Still, the paradox of opposing individual- and aggregate-level effects of the same variable is intriguing. Thus, I added cross-level interactions to solve the issue. One can see that when the society overall becomes more liberally-oriented and tolerates prostitution, individual-level choice values turn into a lowering effect on violence tolerance. At the same time tolerance of prostitution remains associated with violence tolerance even in more liberally-oriented countries. This again echoes with explanations offered above, people who don't see prostitution, as an act of violence will be more susceptible of violence tolerance. There is a strand of research, which focuses on how prostitution is represented by the media culture. This literature states that portraying the life of prostitutes as funny and glamorous associates with a more positive image of their life (Coy et al. 2011). Perhaps, people who tend to look at prostitution in that way probably think that even if violence occurs, the sex industry remains its lucrative aspect and hence violence should not constitute a problem. However, it is hard to find more evidence since this research is purely qualitative. Relating attitudes towards

prostitution with progressive attitudes seems as a topic overlooked by empirical studies so far. Trying to add more plausible explanations and using the framework of this study, further evidence shows that the only scenario when tolerance of prostitution is leading to less tolerance of violence is when anti-trafficking enforcement is stronger. If one perceives tolerance of prostitution as an indicator of a progressive culture and hence an opposite of patriarchal culture, further evidence of the link between patriarchal societies and government's insufficient efforts to reduce human trafficking can be found in the literature (Gangoli and Westmarland 2006; Watson and Silkstone 2006; Fiorito 2012; Duong 2012). It is considered that in countries where social and institutional values are based on patriarchal traditions, governments do not well address the problems of social injustices, which may lead to fueling human trafficking including less effective anti-trafficking enforcement.

Next, using micro-level evidence one can see that the regulation of prostitution is indeed related to less tolerance of violence while at the macro-level regulating prostitution is associated with better anti-trafficking enforcement and thus is a desirable outcome. In countries where prostitution is regulated, women are provided with a sort of social insurance, where there is no shadow market perspective and less fear of being drugged into prostitution involuntarily and hence less violence tolerance. The literature connects the regulation of prostitution with sexual liberalism defined as "belief that sex is positive and that society should not restrict sexual expression" (Monto 2004: 177). This premise became a basis for regulating prostitution in different countries and even sparked the movement supporting rights of prostitutes (Jenness 1993; Monto 2004). Being under protection of the law gives women a chance to be protected by the police as well (Lowman 2000), meaning that there is less violence tolerance in these countries. As the results of the cross-level interactions also show, in countries that regulate prostitution people's tolerance of prostitution translates into less tolerance of violence. Although regulating prostitution does not mean solving the problems associated with violence, it seems to be an important policy.

It is worth noting that the reported models in Chapter five most likely underestimate the effects of the proposed factors because of the high social desirability of this issue, which makes people under-report their tolerance of violence. Some of the presented evidence remains puzzling and needs to be addressed carefully in future research. Both cross-national and multilevel studies on this topic would greatly improve the state of the art. Given the presented discussion one can see the clash between growing interest towards attitudes explaining violence against women and the lack of generalizable large-N studies that allow

policy implications to be drawn and applied at the country-level. An example is Flood and Pease (2009) where psychological aspects of violence against women are discussed and very insightful recommendations have been made. With the vast sources of public opinion data these results can be cross-validated using different countries or years. However, even with reported scores one can draw meaningful conclusions about main drivers of violence tolerance. Moreover, these results demonstrate the link between individual-level attitudes towards violence and important policy implications, such as anti-trafficking enforcement and regulation of prostitution. These findings certainly help to extend the literature by framing theoretical assumptions tested on both country- and multilevel data.

#### LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

There is still a gap in the literature examining the legal responses to the trafficking problem between countries of origin and countries of destination for the victims. As this thesis shows, international cooperation on this problem would lead to an improvement of policy implementation. The growing number of treaties prioritizing human rights proves that countries are becoming more aware of problems connected to violations of human rights, including the recognition of human trafficking problem. Studying the measures both at country- and individual levels is helpful in understanding how combined efforts of the international community affect a country's level of anti-trafficking enforcement. International cooperation should be considered successful only in the case when both origin and destination countries truly combine their efforts. It is well known that these countries have different interests due to the high profits they gain from trafficking. Most likely these profits are what stop some countries from strengthening the trafficking laws. Studying pairs of origin and destination countries might also be useful for producing network analysis, which has not yet been applied in this field of research. The main advantage of this technique is the ability to account for many different country-level characteristics from both sides and dealing with missing values – an inevitable problem in the data on human trafficking. Data gathered specifically for this thesis might be useful for conducting network analysis and drawing helpful inferences.



## POLICY AND RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS

Future research should employ the results and move them forward by taking into account the limitations of the study. Broader factors discussed in this thesis have been addressed separately and mostly by scholars and not yet policymakers. This results in development of partial legislative mechanisms targeting the problem of human trafficking. The effectiveness of anti-trafficking legislation indeed relies on combining these broader measures with empirical proof to devise a set of clear actions need for that legislation to work. Research already argues that cooperation in the affected regions and in the European Union is much needed (Askola 2007), so why not to take a bigger step and include country-level cooperation by developing specific measures assessing countries progress on that not so easy journey.

What countries have accomplished over the last years needs to be acknowledged and expanded. All these changes happened after careful research had been done. For instance, the famous Swedish example shows how making prostitution illegal helped to reduce the number of reported victims. The UK included into anti-trafficking legislation violations of working conditions and Australia included non-sexual bonded labor to its legislation (Brysk 2009). The examples show that scholars succeeded to bring attention to the weakest spots in legislation in some countries and the challenge is obviously how to broaden policy recommendations, which would be as suitable for as many countries as possible. Using results from global comparative research would be the first step. Although devising policy recommendations is not novel, I am also trying to take into account how global trends and realities would shape these policies.

In this work, I define policy recommendations as proposals to change current policy approach including developing practical measures that need to be implemented (OHCHR 2010). A set of recommendations is proposed based on the conducted global comparative research. However, I am not proposing general recommendations to combat human trafficking. Since the topic of my research is to examine sources of anti-trafficking enforcement, I suggest how legislative recommendations can be employed by policymakers or other researchers to improve existing measures. These recommendations are more practical ones. Before I start considering recommendations to improve anti-trafficking enforcement measures, I want to recall what empirical factors had the highest impact on anti-trafficking legislation.

Regulatory Quality Index: being associated with weak states' measures of anti-trafficking enforcement in the future should target capacity of a state to enforce such policies. It can be narrowed down to specific indices measuring state capacity but it is definitely an important issue that helps to address the accountability of states to bring policies to the benefit of its citizens. Clearly, the quality of services governments provide affects enforcement mechanisms, the best strategy would be to include these data whilst measuring anti-trafficking efforts. Here the indices reflect expert evaluations of governments' performance, however, they might be extended to survey data. People's satisfaction with government services does not necessarily match with the actual level of performance but is important for identifying services that can be improved. In a way, it is a more specific instrument and can be used directly to evaluate the work of anti-trafficking policies by citizens themselves.

Regulation of prostitution: another important issue is to broaden anti-trafficking enforcement measures with laws contributing to human trafficking. Despite what analysis in Chapter four has already shown, regulation of prostitution positively affects anti-trafficking enforcement, I argue that this finding requires closer examination. Although the literature is split on this topic by being pro- (Aghatise 2004) and against regulation (Ekberg 2004), possible recommendation here is to at least consider countries' status of prostitution regulation while developing anti-trafficking enforcement measures, which seems crucial and under-looked, at least as a quantitative indicator.

Social movement activity: integrating measures of social movement activity will be helpful in explaining better enforcement of anti-trafficking legislation. The current SMA measure includes and evaluates how often people sign petitions, join demonstrations and boycott. Perhaps identifying which civic groups are more active in a country would be beneficial for developing new anti-trafficking enforcement measure. It might happen that the socially active population as a whole is what leads to better implementation, thus, dividing it into smaller groups will not affect the overall results. If smaller civic groups might be more active in expressing opinions, they might be more active in formulating policies, which require specific measures. By asking people if they gave a public speech in any of the demonstrations can help to identify the top of the civically active population. There are few strategies to improve the already reliable and valid SMA index, but with regard to developing better anti-trafficking enforcement measure, proposed changes seem to be helpful. Systematic collection of these data would allow the development of a better understanding of how these types of activities encourage people to exercise their freedoms and stand up for human rights.

Based on the presented analyses and discussion, actions to improve existing measures should include the following:

1. Developing public opinion instruments to assess the perceived success of the implementation of anti-trafficking policies.
2. Developing more measures related to anti-trafficking enforcement to improve experts' evaluations.
3. Developing more forms for measuring social movement activity.
4. Developing and incorporating more gender-specific policies.
5. Providing more transparent methodology of the Tier Rankings as the core instrument of anti-trafficking enforcement.
6. Strengthening capacities of state to implement policies is absolutely vital.

These recommendations are directed to improve existing measures of enforcement mechanisms, but can be suggested to authorities so that in the long-run, anti-trafficking laws are applied in accordance with global realities and are not only backed by resources countries allocate to establish these laws. Both the theoretical and the empirical analyses presented in this thesis emphasize that although more quantitative research is needed, scholars can already use related quantitative indicators in order to evaluate the work of anti-trafficking enforcement mechanisms globally. Monitoring and modification of these mechanisms should be undertaken regularly and taken seriously. It is clearly not sufficient to outline the factors that are contributing to human trafficking, a clear plan of action based on statistical evidence shall be formulated and implemented to countries' legislative agendas.

More recommendations can be drawn from analysis of micro-level foundations of human trafficking has been incorporated into this study.

1. Tolerance of violence as individual and country-level preference shall be accounted in developing policies regulating violence in the household and against women specifically.
2. Attitudes towards violence are shaped by cultural imprints of societies related to liberal orientations and prostitution acceptance, thus, more factors overlapping with outlined concepts shall be further explored.
3. Addressing attitudes towards violence as well as towards prostitution shall be further accounted in developing anti-trafficking policies.

4. The contexts leading to the spread of violence tolerance shall be intersected with historical, geographical, institutional and other settings.
5. Adding other places where the violence can occur can further expand the concept of violence tolerance in the household.
6. Only addressing both micro- and macro-foundations of human trafficking would help in sustaining effective anti-trafficking enforcement.

In conclusion, the contribution of this thesis shall be noted. It should be reminded that the analysis of both sources evaluating existing global measures of anti-trafficking enforcement and micro-foundations of human trafficking has been conducted in this thesis. After the careful examination of three global indices, statistical proof has been presented to showcase that the Tier Rankings are the most valid and reliable existing measure. Due to the amount of criticism, the limitations of the TIP methodology have also been presented. To improve the understanding of global patterns and trends in variation of anti-trafficking enforcement, both cross-sectional and time-series analyses have been applied. Taking into account the results of these analyses, some recommendations to improve existing Tier measures have been made. Another contribution includes assembling the data on countries' ratings of anti-trafficking enforcement with theoretically chosen cross-national indicators. The data gathered in one place would be helpful to test other theoretically driven hypotheses and to address the limitations, this study re-evaluates existing mechanisms of monitoring countries' efforts to comply with international legislative standards. Finally, the links between attitudes towards violence and important policy implications, such as anti-trafficking enforcement and regulation of prostitution, have been established. Shortcomings and limitations possibly affecting the implication of results have been discussed. Although, more work still needs to be done, the importance of the topic shall not be underestimated. Based on my personal experience, depending on the country where people are coming from, a person may or may not be aware that the problem of human trafficking still exists. Thus, after one of the presentations in front of an audience not related to research, I asked people in the room if they heard about trafficking before. An interesting, however, unsurprising thing happened: a couple of people from France and the Netherlands said that they had never heard about it and thought slavery was abolished hundreds of years ago, while people from China and South Korea were very well aware of the problem and even shared some stories they recently heard in the news. Thus, it is clear that public opinion research on this topic is most needed and would help to shed the light not only on whether people support anti-trafficking policies and

how well they think these policies are implemented but also to measure people's awareness of this problem and hence encultured habits of indifferences towards violence in general.

However, before we will be able to get more data for future research on anti-trafficking enforcement we need to be able to tailor the acquired evidence towards global realities until a better solution is found.

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## Variables, Sources and Definitions

### *COUNTRY-LEVEL VARIABLES*

**Tier Rankings:** Tier Rankings measure the extent of each country governments' efforts to comply with the "minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking" found in Section 108 of the TVPA. Tier Ranking is an ordinal measure where Tier One stands for countries which fully comply with the required standards, Tier Two for those countries making consistent efforts but not yet fully compliant and Tier Three for those countries with deficit in both aspects. There is also an intermediate category called Tier Two Watch List for those countries which do not comply with the minimum standards but are making significant efforts to do so<sup>24</sup>.

*Source: The US Department of State (2013)*

**3P Anti-trafficking Policy Index (3P Index):** 3P Index evaluates governmental anti-trafficking efforts in the three main policy dimensions (3Ps):

- Prosecution of perpetrators of human trafficking
- Prevention of the crime of human trafficking
- Protection of victims of human trafficking

3P Index ranks from 3 (no compliance for any of 3 areas) to 15 (full compliance for all of 3 areas).

*Source: The German Institute for Economic Research, DIW-Berlin (2013)*

**Trafficking scale:** Trafficking scale variable based on trafficking practices and laws practiced in a country. The variable has the following codes:

0 = There are laws against trafficking in the country and into or from other countries. These laws are enforced. The country is in full compliance (ranking of 1) with the Trafficking Persons act of 2000. Trafficking appears to be rare. You cannot move from a Tier 2 ranking to a Tier 1 ranking over consecutive State Department reports and be scored as a 0 immediately after the assignment of the Tier 1 ranking. Sometime must elapse to see how the situation evolves, and so the country should be coded as a 1.

1 = There are laws against trafficking in the country and into or from other countries. These laws are enforced, but either enforcement is becoming more lax over time or reports of significant trafficking undetected by authorities is increasing. In other words, though a Tier 1

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<sup>24</sup> <http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/>

country, there appear to be growing problems. The country is in full compliance (ranking of 1) with the Trafficking Persons act of 2000. For countries in which prostitution is legal, the country can still be scored as a 1 if they have taken strong measures to insure that the prostitution is not entangled with trafficking.

2 = There are laws against trafficking in the country. (If the country only has laws about prostitution, slavery, etc., but no laws against trafficking per se, they cannot be coded as a 2.) These laws are not always enforced. The country is in non-compliance (ranking of 2) with the Trafficking Persons act of 2000 but efforts are being made to comply.

3 = There are limited laws against trafficking in the country. The country is in non-compliance (ranking of 2) with the Trafficking Persons act of 2000 and only limited/marginal efforts are not being made to comply.

4 = There are no laws against trafficking in the country, or from or into the country. The country is not in compliance (ranking of 3) with the Trafficking Persons act of 2000. Victims are not supported in any way. The government may even benefit from and therefore facilitate trafficking.

*Source: The Woman Stats Database (2011)*

**The Composite Organized Crime Index (COCI):** The COCI combines data on the perceived prevalence of organized crime, unsolved homicides, grand corruption, money-laundering and the extent of the black economy. The index ranks from 0 indicating lowest value of organized crime to 100 indicating highest value of organized crime.

*Source: Van Dijk (2007)*

**The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI):** The CPI rates a country's perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 signifies that country perceived to be highly corrupt and 100 represents a very clean system.

*Source: Transparency International (2012)*

**The Political Terror Scale (PTS):** The PTS is measured on a 5-item scale, where 1 means strong protection of people by rule of law and respect for their rights, while 5 means the most abusive category when terror has expanded to the whole population.

*Source: Amnesty International Report (2011)*

**The Physical Integrity Rights Index (PIRI):** The PIRI is an additive index constructed from the Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and Disappearance indicators. It

ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights).

*Source: The CIRI Human Rights Data Project (2010)*

**Gender Inequality Index (GII):** The GII measures gender inequalities in three important aspects of human development—reproductive health, measured by maternal mortality ratio and adolescent birth rates; empowerment, measured by proportion of parliamentary seats occupied by females and proportion of adult females and males aged 25 years and older with at least some secondary education; and economic status, expressed as labor market participation and measured by labor force participation rate of female and male populations aged 15 years and older. The GII ranges between 0, where women and men fare equally, and 1, where one gender fares as poorly as possible in all measured dimensions.

*Source: UN Human Development Report (2012)*

**Gender Equity Index (GEI):** The GEI measures the gap between women and men in education, the economy and political empowerment. In education, GEI looks at the gender gap in enrolment at all levels and in literacy; economic participation computes the gaps in income and employment and empowerment measures the gaps in highly qualified jobs, parliament and senior executive positions. Scale runs from 0 (perfect inequality) to 100 (perfect equality).

*Source: Social Watch (2012)*

**Gender Gap Index (GGI):** The GGI examines national gender gaps in four fundamental categories: economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival and political empowerment. The sub-indices include 14 indicators: labor force participation, wage equality, estimated earned income, female legislators, senior officials, and managers, literacy ratio, higher education enrolment, female professional and technical workers, life expectancy ratio, and sex ratio at birth, women in parliament, at ministerial level and heads of state (Hausmann et al. 2012). The GGI's highest possible score is 1 (parity) and the lowest possible score is 0 (imparity).

*Source: The Global Gender Gap Report, World Economic Forum (2012)*

**Women's Economic Rights:** Women's economic rights include equal pay for equal work; free choice of profession or employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's consent; the right to gainful employment without the need to obtain a husband or

male relative's consent; equality in hiring and promotion practices; job security (maternity leave, unemployment benefits, no arbitrary firing or layoffs); non-discrimination by employers; the right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace; the right to work at night; the right to work in occupations classified as dangerous; the right to work in the military and the police force.

Variable codes:

0 = indicates that there were no economic rights for women in law and that systematic discrimination based on sex may have been built into law

1 = indicates that women had some economic rights under law, but these rights were not effectively enforced

2 = indicates that women had some economic rights under law, and the government effectively enforced these rights in practice while still allowing a low level of discrimination against women in economic matters

3 = indicates that all or nearly all of women's economic rights were guaranteed by law and the government fully and vigorously enforces these laws in practice.

*Source: The CIRI human rights dataset (2011)*

**Women's Political Rights:** Women's political rights include the right to vote; the right to run for political office; the right to hold elected and appointed government positions; the right to join political parties; the right to petition government officials.

Variable codes:

0 = indicates that women's political rights were not guaranteed by law during a given year

1 = indicates that women's political rights were guaranteed in law, but severely prohibited in practice

2 = indicates that women's political rights were guaranteed in law, but were still moderately prohibited in practice

3 = indicates that women's political rights were guaranteed in both law and practice

*Source: The CIRI human rights dataset (2011)*

**Women's Social Rights:** Women's social rights include the right to equal inheritance; the right to enter into marriage on a basis of equality with men; the right to travel abroad; the right to obtain a passport; the right to confer citizenship to children or a husband; the right to initiate a divorce; the right to own, acquire, manage, and retain property brought into marriage; the right to participate in social, cultural, and community activities; the right to an education; the freedom to choose a residence/domicile; freedom from female genital mutilation of children and of adults without their consent; freedom from forced sterilization.

Variable codes:

0 = indicates that there were no social rights for women in law and that systematic discrimination based on sex may have been built into law

1 = indicates that women had some social rights under law, but these rights were not effectively enforced

2 = indicates that women had some social rights under law, and the government effectively enforced these rights in practice while still allowing a low level of discrimination against women in social matters

3 = indicates that all or nearly all of women's social rights were guaranteed by law and the government fully and vigorously enforced these laws in practice.

*Source: The CIRI human rights dataset (2007)*

**Gender Development Index (GDI):** The Gender Development Index (GDI) measures gender inequalities in achievement in three basic dimensions of human development: health, measured by female and male life expectancy at birth; education, measured by female and male expected years of schooling for children and female and male mean years of schooling for adults ages 25 and older; and command over economic resources, measured by female and male estimated earned income. The GDI is simply the ratio of female HDI to male HDI. The index ranges from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating higher equality in HDI achievements between women and men.

*Source: UN Human Development Report (2013)*

**Female labor force participation rate:** Labor force participation rate is the proportion of the population ages 15 and older that is economically active: all people who supply labor for the production of goods and services during a specified period. The data on female labor force

participation rate shows the percentage of female population ages 15 and older are modeled International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates.

*Source: International Labour Organization (2013)*

**Violence Against Women index (VAW):** Htun and Weldon developed the Violence Against Women index (VAW) in order to explore governments' responses to violence against women in the world. The VAW index assigns higher values to those policy regimes that address more types of violence and whose actions span the categories of services, legal reform, policy coordination and prevention of violence (Htun and Weldon 2012: 550). Assessing this range of policies produces a score out of a total of 10 points:

i) Three points for services to victims (1 for each of the following):

- Government funds domestic violence shelters.
- Government funds rape crisis centers.
- Government provides crisis services for other forms of violence (stalking, female genital mutilation [FGM], etc.).

ii) Three points for legal reform (1 for each of the following):

- Government has adopted specialized legislation pertaining to domestic violence.
- Government has adopted specialized legislation pertaining to sexual assault/rape.
- Government has adopted specialized legalization pertaining to other forms of violence (such as trafficking, sexual harassment, FGM, etc.).

iii) One point for policies or programs targeted to vulnerable populations of women (one point for any of the following programs/policies):

- Government provides specialized services to women of marginalized groups (defined by ethnicity, race, etc.). Examples include bilingual hotlines, specialized crisis centers, and specially trained police.
- Government recognizes violence against women as a basis for refugee status.
- Government protects immigrant women in abusive relations from deportation.

iv) One point for training professionals who respond to victims:



- Government provides training for police, social workers, nurses, etc.

v) One point for prevention programs:

- Government funds public education programs or takes other preventive measures.

vi) One point for administrative reforms:

- Government maintains specialized agency to provide leadership, coordination, and support for VAW policies across different sectors and levels.

These elements are simply summed so that more points imply more types of government response. The most responsive governments that adopt the most comprehensive policies score a 10 and those that do nothing score a zero.

The data have been gathered through an intensive review of primary documents (such as the laws themselves), interviews with legal experts, and consultation of secondary materials such as law review articles, articles in peer-reviewed journals and scholarly books, policy briefs, and materials from NGOs and international organizations.

This measure of policy scope encompasses a variety of different types of policies as way of getting at the many different dimensions of the problem. Responsiveness means addressing as many of these dimensions as possible—both responding to current victims and preventing future violence.

*Source: Htun and Weldon (2012)*

**Country membership in INGOs:** The World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (WANGO) provides data on global network of NGOs. WANGO is an international organization uniting NGOs worldwide in the cause of advancing peace and global well-being. The data of countries membership in INGOs has been acquired manually by choosing International Organizations and Human Rights NGO by every country in the world.

*Source: The World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (2014)*

**International Human Rights Treaties:** The University of Minnesota Human Rights Library provides one of the largest collections of human rights documents in the world. Thus the number of International Human Rights Treaties ratified by every country has been manually counted using this source.

*Source: The University of Minnesota Human Rights Library (2014)*

**Human Trafficking Protocol:** Country ratifications of “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime” refer to whether a country ratified the Protocol.

*Source: United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto (2014)*

Regulation of prostitution: The data on regulation of prostitution policies shows the legal status of prostitution. The variable has the following codes:

1 = if prostitution is illegal

2 = if prostitution is limitedly legal

3 = if prostitution is fully legally allowed

The data covers prostitution legislation in the world from 1995 to 2009 and includes government documents regarding prostitution such as laws, court decisions, employment information for each country.

*Source: The US Department of State (1995-2009)*

**Inequity in family law:** Inequity in Family Law/Practice between Men and Women, developed by Professor McDermott in 2007 seeks to capture how inequitably family law is conceptualized according to gender. The following variables are included in this scale: Marital Rape, Age at First Marriage, Marriage, Polygyny, Abortion, Attitude towards Divorce, and Inheritance as Wife.

Variable codes:

0 = Legal age of marriage is at least 18, and most (>50%) marry over that age. Marriages younger than 16 are virtually unheard of. Polygyny is illegal and extremely rare. Women are free to choose their spouse. Marital rape is illegal and actively prosecuted. Women and men have equal rights to divorce.

1 = Legal age of marriage is 16 or higher and most (over 50%) marry over age 16. Polygyny is illegal and uncommon. Women are free to choose their spouse. Marital rape is illegal.

Women and men have equal rights to divorce. Woman can inherit property, but laws tend to favor men in property rights, including asset division after divorce.

2 = Legal age of marriage is 16 or higher, but girls marrying younger are common (up to 25%). There is often an age difference between the legal age of marriage for men and women, such that girls are allowed to marry at younger ages than males. Polygyny is legal but unusual (<5% of women). Girls may not have full rights to choose their spouse. Marital rape may be illegal, but is not prosecuted and practice often allows it. Divorce laws systematically favor men, and women do not have equal rights in child custody matters.

3 = Legal age of marriage is 15 or lower, but girls marrying younger are common (between 25-50%). Polygyny is legal and not uncommon (>5% but less than 25% of women). Girls often cannot choose their spouse. Women in certain areas or in certain ethnic or religious groups may either be unaware of their rights to consent in marriage and to divorce, or may fear reprisals if they exercise those rights; such rights may be very limited. Marital rape is not acknowledged in law. Divorce laws systematically favor men, and women do not have equal rights in child custody matters, or in inheritance law.

4 = Legal age of marriage does not exist or allows girls younger than 12 to marry. Girls commonly (more than 25%) marry around the age of 12 or even before puberty. Women are rarely asked for consent before marriage, and women are often forced to marry much older men in this way. Polygyny is legal and common (>25%). Women must overcome tremendous legal obstacles to sue for divorce, while men can seek divorce for many reasons. Women are not awarded custody or inheritance. Marital rape is not illegal.

*Source: The Woman Stats Database (2011)*

**Domestic violence legislation:** The following elements should be established as the core elements of any domestic violence law:

- Criminalization of acts of domestic violence;
- A fully developed protection order civil remedy, including an emergency or ex parte protection order;
- Prohibition of perpetrators from possessing a firearm;
- Allowing courts, in protection orders, to at least temporarily order child custody and support to the nonviolent parent;

- Allowing courts to enter protection orders for children;
- Statements of rights of complainant/survivors and services available to them;
- Provisions on implementation of the law, including training of relevant professionals, monitoring and evaluation of the law, and funding of the implementation of the law;
- A criminal offense for violation of the protection order with a cross-reference to any relevant provisions of the criminal laws, such as punishment for various level of offenses;
- Enhanced penalties for multiple violations of the protection order;
- Enhanced penalties for other domestic violence-related criminal offenses; and
- Establishment of an inter-agency task force to ensure a coordinated community response to domestic violence.

Variable codes:

Yes = The elements are established in any domestic violence law.

No = The elements are not established in any domestic violence law.

*Source: United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (2011)*

**Sexual harassment legislation:** Sexual harassment can occur in multiple contexts and legislation should comprehensively address each of these in order to fully protect the rights of women and girls. This module includes specific information about harassment in employment, education, sports, housing, and provision of goods and services. In any context, however, laws prohibiting sexual harassment should include the following general components:

- A statement of purpose, also known as a preamble, that references international, regional, and existing national protections against discrimination and violence against women;
- A broad definition that includes examples of prohibited behavior;
- Judicial and/or administrative procedures to enforce the prohibition on harassment, including confidential complaint procedures;

- Provision for effective, proportionate compensation and/or reparation related to damages and losses suffered as a result of the harassment;
- Dissuasive penalties for perpetrators;
- Placing the burden of proof in civil proceedings on the alleged perpetrator, once a prima facie case is made;
- Protections against retaliation;
- Guidance for interpretation of the law;
- Measures for prevention such as policy development, including confidential complaint procedures, and training;
- Designated oversight body with the power to enforce the law, provide assistance to victims, collect data and publish appropriate reports.

Variable codes:

Yes = The elements are established in any domestic violence law.

No = The elements are not established in any domestic violence law.

*Source: United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (2011)*

**Marital rape legislation:** Marital rape is a specifically sexual assault within a relationship. The following elements should be established as the core elements of any sexual assault law. Each element is discussed in detail starting with defining sexual assault, below:

- A definition of sexual assault which is not framed as a crime of honor or morality;
- A definition of sexual assault that does not require penetration or force;
- Prohibition of mitigating factors such as intoxication of perpetrator;
- Provision for enhanced penalties for aggravating circumstances such as the threat or use of force, or the age or disability of survivor;
- Provision for enhanced penalties for aggravating circumstances involving natural disaster situations and civil or political unrest or conflict situations.
- Criminalization of sexual assault within an intimate relationship;

- Burden on accused to prove consent;
- Provision for a broad range of circumstances in which consent is immaterial, such as sexual assault by an individual in a position of authority such as in a correctional facility or in a school setting or by individuals in certain professional relationships to the survivor such as an ongoing psychotherapist-patient relationship;
- Provision for a broad range of coercive circumstances around consent such as intimidation or fraud;
- Provision for mandatory investigation of sexual assault;
- Prohibition of requirement of corroboration of survivor's evidence;
- Prohibition of introduction of survivor's sexual history as evidence at all phases of civil or criminal trial where it is unrelated to the case;
- Prohibition on use of mediation at all stage of the process;
- Provision for financial compensation during the criminal trial and following the criminal trial;
- Prohibition on accepting financial settlement or marriage as settlement of claim of sexual assault;
- Prohibition of perpetrators from possessing firearms;
- Fully developed emergency and long-term order for protection remedies and no contact order remedies;
- Criminalization of violation of orders for protection and no contact orders;
- Provision for support services such as counseling and medical treatment to survivors at all stages of process;
- Mandated training for law enforcement, judicial, medical, and social service professionals.
- Mandated data collection on prevalence of sexual assault, disaggregated by gender, race, age, location of assault, and type of assault;
- Mandatory prevention and public awareness programs on sexual assault; and

- Mandatory data collection and monitoring of cases of sexual assault.

Variable codes:

Yes = The elements are established in any sexual assault law.

No = The elements are not established in any sexual assault law.

*Source: United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (2011)*

**Social Movement Activity (SMA):** SMA measures the variety of social movement activities a respondent has been or considers to be involved in, on a seven-point scale in ascending order from no participation or intention of participation in any social movement activity, including petitions, peaceful demonstrations, and consumer boycotts. Despite only three types of activities asked for, the scale is that fine-grained because intention to participate is coded as a state in between rejection to participate and actual participation. SMA represents an average of each respondent's scores over the three social movement activities measured in the WVS: 1) "signing a petition" 2) joining in boycotts" and 3) "attending peaceful demonstrations". Respondents were asked whether they did do the activity, might do it or would never do it and for each of these activities, "would never do it" corresponded to 0, "might do it" – to .33 and "have done it" - to 1.0. Then the population average on this index was calculated with higher values indicating higher levels of social movement activity.

*Source: Welzel (2013)*

**Rule of Law:** Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5.

*Source: World Bank (2012)*

**Political Stability and Absence of Violence:** Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5.

*Source: World Bank (2012)*

**Government Effectiveness:** Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5.

*Source: World Bank (2012)*

**Regulatory Quality:** Regulatory Quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5.

*Source: World Bank (2012)*

**Control of Corruption:** Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5.

*Source: World Bank (2012)*

**Military expenditure (% of GDP):** Military expenditure includes military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel, operation and maintenance; procurement; military research and development; military infrastructure spending; and military aid (in the military expenditures of the donor country). Civil defence and current expenditures on previous military activities, such as veterans' benefits, demobilization, conversion and weapon destruction are excluded. Military expenditure is expressed as a percentage of GDP.

*Source: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2014)*

**Education expenditure (% of GDP):** Total education expenditure is the sum of public current operating expenditures in education, including wages and salaries and excluding capital investments in buildings and equipment. The variable does not include private



investment in education. It only includes public expenditures, for which internationally comparable data are available. Education expenditure is expressed as a percentage of GDP.

*Source: World Bank (2013)*

**Health expenditure (% of GDP):** Total health expenditure is the sum of public and private health expenditure. It covers the provision of health services (preventive and curative), family planning activities, nutrition activities, and emergency aid designated for health but does not include provision of water and sanitation. Health expenditure is expressed as a percentage of GDP.

*Source: World Bank (2013)*

**Institutional Democracy Indicator:** Institutional democracy indicator is a combined measure of three elements. The first one, the competitiveness of political participation, guarantees civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. The second, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, assures institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. And the third one, constraints on the chief executive, guarantees the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive (Polity IV Project: Dataset Users' Manual: 13). Institutional democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10) where higher values indicate more democratic countries.

*Source: Polity IV (2012)*

**Political Rights:** A country or territory is assigned two ratings (7 to 1)—one for political rights and one for civil liberties—based on its total scores for the political rights and civil liberties questions. Each rating of 1 through 7, with 1 representing the greatest degree of freedom and 7 the smallest degree of freedom, corresponds to a specific range of total scores (see Freedom House Report's methodology).<sup>25</sup>

*Source: Freedom House (2013)*

**Civil Liberties:** A country or territory is assigned two ratings (7 to 1)—one for political rights and one for civil liberties—based on its total scores for the political rights and civil liberties questions. Each rating of 1 through 7, with 1 representing the greatest degree of freedom and

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<sup>25</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2016/methodology>

7 the smallest degree of freedom, corresponds to a specific range of total scores (see Freedom House Report's methodology).<sup>26</sup>

*Source: Freedom House (2013)*

**Voice and Accountability:** Voice and Accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5.

*Source: World Bank (2012)*

**Democracy-Dictatorship:** Dummy variable coded 1 if the regime qualifies as democratic. The conditions for this variable are the following:

democracy=1 if

- country has direct election
- and multiple parties
- and legislators, or members of the lower house in a bicameral system, are selected by means of either direct or indirect popular election and legislature is elected
- and multiple parties legally allowed
- and multiple parties exist outside of regime front
- and legislature with multiple parties
- and the regime year qualifies as a democratic regime

and countries which satisfy the “alternation” rule: these are the cases that would be classified as democratic if the only criteria for democracy were multiparty (direct or indirect) executive and legislative elections.

*Source: Cheibub et al (2008)*

**Empowerment Rights Index:** This is an additive index constructed from the Foreign Movement, Domestic Movement, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Assembly & Association,

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<sup>26</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2016/methodology>

Workers' Rights, Electoral Self-Determination, and Freedom of Religion indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these seven rights) to 14 (full government respect for these seven rights).

*Source: The CIRI human rights dataset (2010)*

**Citizen Rights Index:** Citizen Rights Index measures the prevalence of citizen rights as the presence of respect of political participation rights on the condition of the presence of respect of personal autonomy rights, using multiplication to combine the two. Where political participation rights measure to what extent a country enacts political participation rights by law and respects them practice, and personal autonomy rights measure to what extent a country enacts personal autonomy rights by law and respects them practice.

Citizen rights index has been calculated by Welzel (2013: 254-263). The index scores range from 0 for the complete absence of citizen rights in law and practice to 1 for their full presence in law and practice, with proper fractions for intermediate positions.

*Source: Welzel (2013)*

**Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI):** The perception of Electoral Integrity (PEI) measure includes the list of 49 indicators drawn from expert surveys to compare elections around the globe. These indicators are clustered to evaluate eleven stages in the electoral cycle as well as generating an overall summary PEI 100-point index and comparative ranking, where 100 means that countries fully meet international standards of electoral integrity. The detailed information on survey items is available at Electoral Integrity Project website - [www.electoralintegrityproject.com](http://www.electoralintegrityproject.com).

*Source: Norris et al. (2014)*

**Effective Democracy Index:** Effective Democracy Index is a conditional multi-point index measuring the extent of effective democracy, understood as the presence of democratic rights on the condition that honest governance puts them into real practice. Where democratic rights index measures the prevalence of democratic rights based on Freedom House's "civil liberties" and "political rights" ratings, and honest governance index measures the extent to which a country has honest governance in the sense that its institutions are oriented towards law enforcement and the avoidance of grand corruption. Scores are weighted percentages ranging from a theoretical minimum of 0 for the least effective or absent democracy to 100 for the most effective democracy.

*Source: Alexander and Welzel (2011)*

**Youth bulge:** The youth bulge is a “demographic trend where the proportion of persons aged 15-24 in the population increases significantly compared to other age groups” (Ortiz and Cummins 2012: iv). Youth bulge is measured as percentage of youth cohorts in a total population.

*Source: U.S. Census Bureau | International Data Base (2012)*

**Surplus of men (15-64):** Surplus of men in the 15-64 age group is measured as the ratio of males to females in the 15-64 age group.

*Source: U.S. Census Bureau | International Data Base (2012)*

**Sex ratio at birth:** Sex ratio at birth is the ratio of male to female births.

*Source: The World Factbook (2012)*

**% migrants:** International migrant stock is the number of people born in a country other than that in which they live. It also includes refugees. The data used to estimate the international migrant stock at a particular time are obtained mainly from population censuses. The estimates are derived from the data on foreign-born population--people who have residence in one country but were born in another country. When data on the foreign-born population are not available, data on foreign population--that is, people who are citizens of a country other than the country in which they reside--are used as estimates. International migrant stock is measured as percentage of population.

*Source: United Nations Population Division (2010)*

## INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES

**Violence in the Household:** Violence in the household measure combines survey questions from the latest WVS-wave 6 of whether it is justifiable to beat one's wife (v208), one's children (v209) and generally violence against others (v210). In particular, respondents are asked:

Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between:

		Never justifiable								Always justifiable	
V208	For a man to beat his wife	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V209	Parents beating children	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V210	Violence against other people	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Each question in the original form is measured on a 1 to 10 scale, where 1 means never justifiable and 10 means always justifiable. These variables have been converted into 0-1 scales and added together by simple averaging. These three WVS items make up a reliable subscale with the 0.8 associated Cronbach's alpha. ( $\alpha = .80$ ) and thus reliable proxy for measuring violence in the household.

*Source: WVS (2010-2014)*

**Tolerance of Prostitution:** The WVS measure tolerance of prostitution (v203a) asks respondents how do they justify prostitution on a 10-point scale, where 1 stands for never justify and 10 corresponds to always justify. Respondents are asked:

Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between:

		Never justifiable								Always justifiable	
V203a	Prostitution	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

The variable is transformed to 0-1 scale with 1 meaning prostitution is always justifiable.

*Source: WVS (2010-2014)*

**Choice Values:** The choice sub-component of the EVI summarizes tolerance of homosexuality, abortion and divorce. This index combines three questions on whether respondents justify homosexuality (v202), abortion (v204) and divorce (v205). Respondents are asked:

Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between:

		Never justifiable								Always justifiable	
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V202	Homosexuality	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V204	Abortion	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V205	Divorce	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

The resulting 10-point scale index is transformed to a 0-1 scale with 1 corresponding to justification of all three life-choices.

*Source: Welzel (2013)*

**Educational Achievement:** This variable is based on WVS wave-six question v248:

V248. “What is the highest educational level that you have attained? [NOTE: if respondent indicates to be a student, code highest level s/he expects to complete].”

- 1 No formal education
- 2 Incomplete primary school
- 3 Complete primary school
- 4 Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type
- 5 Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type
- 6 Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type
- 7 Complete secondary: university-preparatory type
- 8 Some university-level education, without degree
- 9 University-level education, with degree

*Source: WVS (2010-2014)*

**Female Sex:** This variable is based on WVS wave-six question v240:

V240. [Interviewer: code respondent's sex by observation]:

- 0 Male
- 1 Female

*Source: WVS (2010-2014)*

**Age:** This variable is based on WVS wave-six questions v241 and v242 in which respondents are asked to indicate their year of birth, followed by their respective age:

V241. "Can you tell me your year of birth, please? 19\_\_\_\_ [Interviewer: write in last two digits]"

V242. "This means you are \_\_\_\_ years old [Interviewer: write in age in two digits]."

*Source: WVS (2010-2014)*

**Religion:** This variable is based on WVS wave-six question v147:

V147. Independently of whether you attend religious services or not, would you say you are (read out and code one answer):

- 1 A religious person
- 2 Not a religious person
- 3 An atheist

*Source: WVS (2010-2014)*

## **Methodology of Tier Rankings**

Tier rankings and narratives in the 2013 TIP Report reflect an assessment of the following (TIP 2013: 42-44):

1. enactment of laws prohibiting severe forms of trafficking in persons, as defined by the TVPA, and provision of criminal punishments for trafficking offenses;
2. criminal penalties prescribed for human trafficking offenses with a maximum of at least four years' deprivation of liberty, or a more severe penalty;
3. implementation of human trafficking laws through vigorous prosecution of the prevalent forms of trafficking in the country;
4. proactive victim identification measures with systematic procedures to guide law enforcement and other government-supported front-line responders in the process of victim identification;
5. government funding and partnerships with NGOs to provide victims with access to primary health care, counseling, and shelter, allowing them to recount their trafficking experiences to trained social counselors and law enforcement in an environment of minimal pressure;
6. victim protection efforts that include access to services and shelter without detention and with legal alternatives to removal to countries in which victims would face retribution or hardship;
7. the extent to which a government ensures victims are provided with legal and other assistance and that, consistent with domestic law, proceedings are not prejudicial to victims' rights, dignity, or psychological well-being;
8. the extent to which a government ensures the safe, humane, and to the extent possible, voluntary repatriation and reintegration of victims; and
9. governmental measures to prevent human trafficking, including efforts to curb practices identified as contributing factors to human trafficking, such as employers' confiscation of foreign workers' passports and allowing labor recruiters to charge prospective migrants recruitment or placement fees.



Tier rankings and narratives are not affected by the following:

1. efforts, however laudable, undertaken exclusively by non-governmental actors in the country;
2. general public awareness events—government-sponsored or otherwise—lacking concrete ties to the prosecution of traffickers, protection of victims, or prevention of trafficking, and broad-based law enforcement or developmental initiatives.

*Source: Trafficking in Persons Report 2013*

**Table A 1: Level of Anti-Trafficking Enforcement by Tier Rankings (Source: TIP 2013)**

<b>TIER 1 (Strong enforcement)</b>	<b>TIER 2 (Consistent efforts)</b>		<b>TIER 2,5 (Watch listed)</b>	<b>TIER 3 (No enforcement)</b>
Armenia	Antigua and Barbuda	India	Senegal	Afghanistan
Australia	Argentina	Indonesia	Serbia	Albania
Austria	Azerbaijan	Iraq	Sierra Leone	Angola
Belgium	Bahamas	Jamaica	Singapore	Bahrain
Canada	Bangladesh	Japan	South Africa	Barbados
Colombia	Belize	Jordan	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	Belarus
Czech Republic	Benin	Kazakhstan	Swaziland	Burundi
Denmark	Bolivia	Kyrgyzstan	Switzerland	Cambodia
Finland	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Lao People's Democratic Republi	Tajikistan	Chad
France	Botswana	Latvia	Timor-Leste	Djibouti
Germany	Brazil	Lithuania	Togo	Gambia
Iceland	Brunei Darussalam	Malawi	Turkey	Guinea
Ireland	Bulgaria	Malta	Uganda	Guyana
Israel	Burkina Faso	Mauritius	United Arab Emirates	Honduras
Italy	Cameroon	Mexico	Vietnam	Kenya
Korea (Republic of)	Chile	Moldova	Zambia	Lebanon
Luxembourg	Costa Rica	Mongolia		Lesotho
Macedonia	Cote d'Ivoire	Montenegro		Liberia
Netherlands	Croatia	Mozambique		Madagascar
New Zealand	Cyprus	Nepal		Malaysia
Nicaragua	Dominican Republic	Niger		Maldives
Norway	Ecuador	Nigeria		Mali
Poland	Egypt	Oman		Morocco
Slovakia	El Salvador	Pakistan		Namibia
Slovenia	Estonia	Panama		Rwanda
Spain	Ethiopia	Paraguay		Sri Lanka
Sweden	Gabon	Peru		Suriname
United Kingdom	Georgia	Philippines		Tanzania
United States	Ghana	Portugal		Thailand
	Greece	Qatar		Trinidad and Tobago
	Guatemala	Romania		Tunisia
	Hong Kong, China (SAR)	Senegal		Turkmenistan
	Hungary	Serbia		Ukraine
				Algeria
				Central African Republic
				China
				Congo (Democratic Republic of)
				Cuba
				Equatorial Guinea
				Eritrea
				Guinea-Bissau
				Iran (Islamic Republic)
				Korea (Democratic People's Rep.
				Kuwait
				Libya
				Mauritania
				Russian Federation
				Saudi Arabia
				Sudan
				Syria
				Uzbekistan
				Yemen
				Zimbabwe

**Table A 2: Country and Respondents Coverage of the Wave-Six in WVS (2010-2014)**

<b>Country</b>	<b>N Respondents</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>N Respondents</b>
Algeria	1,200	Mexico	2,000
Argentina	1,030	Morocco	1,200
Armenia	1,100	Netherlands	1,902
Australia	1,477	New Zealand	841
Azerbaijan	1,002	Nigeria	1,759
Bahrain	1,200	Pakistan	1,200
Belarus	1,535	Palestinian Auton..	1,000
Brazil	1,486	Peru	1,210
Chile	1,000	Philippines	1,200
China	2,300	Poland	966
Colombia	1,512	Qatar	1,060
Cyprus	1,000	Romania	1,503
Ecuador	1,202	Russia	2,500
Egypt	1,523	Rwanda	1,527
Estonia	1,533	Singapore	1,972
Georgia	1,202	Slovenia	1,069
Germany	2,046	South Africa	3,531
Ghana	1,552	Spain	1,189
HongKong	1,000	Sweden	1,206
Iraq	1,200	Taiwan	1,238
India	1,581	Thailand	1,200
Japan	2,443	Trinidad and Tob.	999
Jordan	1,200	Tunisia	1,205
Kazakhstan	1,500	Turkey	1,605
Korea, South	1,200	Ukraine	1,500
Kuwait	1,303	United States	2,232
Kyrgyzstan	1,500	Uruguay	1,000
Lebanon	1,200	Uzbekistan	1,500
Libya	2,131	Yemen	1,000
Malaysia	1,300	Zimbabwe	1,500

**Table A 3: Descriptive Statistics (Country-Level Data)**

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum	Skewness	Kurtosis
Tier Rankings	164	,47	,29	,00	1,00	,40	-,32
3P Anti-trafficking Policy Index	163	,57	,21	,00	1,00	-,18	-,35
Trafficking Scale	162	,61	,21	,00	1,00	-,43	-,13
The Composite Organized Crime Index (COCI)	52	,49	,27	,00	1,00	-,01	-1,01
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)	159	,42	,23	,00	1,00	,79	-,18
The Political Terror Scale (PTS)	159	,40	,28	,00	1,00	,17	-,86
The Physical Integrity Rights Index (PIRI)	160	,43	,27	,00	1,00	,41	-,72
GII	139	,38	,19	,00	,72	,11	-1,03
Regulation of Prostitution	94	,58	,46	,00	1,00	-,35	-1,75
International Human Rights Treaties	160	,50	,26	,00	1,00	,28	-,81
Social Movement Activity	97	,26	,13	,04	,52	,40	-,73
Regulatory Quality	164	,57	,22	,00	1,00	,05	-,53
Effective Democracy Index	164	,35	,30	,00	1,00	,78	-,63
Youth bulge	162	,50	,24	,00	1,00	-,40	-1,03
Population size (log)	162	6,93	,76	4,87	9,08	-,26	,13
GDP PPP (log)	162	3,58	,72	2,06	5,01	-,01	-,98
Violence in the Household Index	60	,14	,08	,04	,39	1,13	,82
Tolerance of Prostitution	42	,20	,11	,02	,44	,36	-,75
Choice Values	59	,30	,17	,09	,81	,96	,31

**Table A 4: Descriptive Statistics (Individual-Level Data)**

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum	Skewness	Kurtosis
Violence in the Household Index	84394	,14	,20	,00	1,00	1,74	2,97
Tolerance of Prostitution	60248	,20	,27	,00	1,00	1,30	,69
Choice Values	82217	,30	,27	,00	1,00	,76	-,33
Educational Achievements	80875	,57	,31	,00	1,00	-,16	-1,08
Religion	81762	,19	,29	,00	1,00	1,26	,56
Female Sex	86184	,52	,49	,00	1,00	-,09	-1,99
Age	86119	,31	,19	,00	1,00	,48	-,66

**Table A 5: Individual-level Link between Tolerance of Prostitution and Tolerance of Violence Aggregated by Countries**

Country	R	Country	R
Algeria	-	Mexico	,30
Argentina	,12	Morocco	-
Armenia	,30	Netherlands	,06
Australia	,14	New Zealand	,16
Azerbaijan	,33	Nigeria	,39
Bahrain	-	Pakistan	,51
Belarus	,30	Palestinian Auton..	,44
Brazil	,17	Peru	,32
Chile	,14	Philippines	,44
China	,41	Poland	,29
Colombia	,25	Qatar	-
Cyprus	,15	Romania	,27
Ecuador	,36	Russia	,38
Egypt	-	Rwanda	,04
Estonia	,19	Singapore	,55
Georgia	,27	Slovenia	,18
Germany	,06	South Africa	,78
Ghana	,36	Spain	-
HongKong	,43	Sweden	,34
Iraq	-	Taiwan	,24
India	,59	Thailand	,37
Japan	-	Trinidad and Tob.	-
Jordan	-	Tunisia	-
Kazakhstan	,50	Turkey	-
Korea, South	-	Ukraine	,42
Kuwait	-	United States	-
Kyrgyzstan	,54	Uruguay	,05
Lebanon	-	Uzbekistan	,45
Libya	,57	Yemen	-
Malaysia	,66	Zimbabwe	,48

*Note. R is Pearson's correlation coefficient for individual-level tolerance of prostitution and tolerance of violence.*

**Table A 6: Individual-level Link between Tolerance of Prostitution and Choice Values Aggregated by Countries**

Country	R	Country	R
Algeria	-	Mexico	,62
Argentina	,55	Morocco	-
Armenia	,31	Netherlands	,60
Australia	,65	New Zealand	,62
Azerbaijan	,35	Nigeria	,72
Bahrain	-	Pakistan	,67
Belarus	,62	Palestinian Auton..	,61
Brazil	,52	Peru	,67
Chile	,53	Philippines	,61
China	,60	Poland	,60
Colombia	,57	Qatar	-
Cyprus	,47	Romania	,62
Ecuador	,66	Russia	,54
Egypt	-	Rwanda	,67
Estonia	,50	Singapore	,77
Georgia	,35	Slovenia	,46
Germany	,59	South Africa	,85
Ghana	,68	Spain	-
HongKong	,71	Sweden	,08
Iraq	-	Taiwan	,51
India	,66	Thailand	,62
Japan	-	Trinidad and Tob.	-
Jordan	-	Tunisia	-
Kazakhstan	,61	Turkey	-
Korea, South	-	Ukraine	,58
Kuwait	-	United States	-
Kyrgyzstan	,61	Uruguay	,64
Lebanon	-	Uzbekistan	,55
Libya	,66	Yemen	-
Malaysia	,85	Zimbabwe	,78

*Note. R is Pearson's correlation coefficient for individual-level tolerance of prostitution and choice values.*

**Table A 7: Stepwise Ordinal Regressions**

Dependent variable: Tier Rankings 2013																
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)		(7)		(8)	
Independent variables:																
Gender Inequality Index	3.04** (0.90)	21.02													-	
Regulation of prostitution (prost is illegal)			- 1.12*** (0.29)	0.32											-0.89* (0.38)	0.41
International Human Rights Treaties					1.91*** (0.39)	6.78									-	
Social Movement Activity							5.68*** (1.28)	293.48							4.82** (1.61)	123.6 9
Regulatory Quality									5.56*** (0.75)	259.68					2.89** (1.04)	17.99
Effective Democracy Index											3.58*** (0.51)	36.07			-	
Youth bulge													- 0.24* (0.53)	0.29	-	
Controls:																
Population size	0.19 (0.13)	1.21	0.11 (0.16)	1.11	0.15 (0.12)	1.16	0.25 (0.19)	1.29	0.26* (0.12)	1.29	0.32* (0.13)	1.37	0.14 (0.12 )	1.15	-	
GDP PPP	0.27 (0.22)	1.31	1.06*** (0.22)	2.88	0.75*** (0.15)	2.11	0.66** (0.23)	1.94	-0.17 (0.19)	0.84	0.14 (0.17)	1.15	0.61 ** (0.18 )	1.84	-	
<i>Countries</i>	139		94		160		95		162		162		162		68	
<i>McFadden R<sup>2</sup></i>	0.14		0.23		0.18		0.22		0.27		0.26		0.13		0.33	
<i>Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup></i>	0.32		0.46		0.39		0.45		0.53		0.51		0.29		0.56	
<i>-2LL</i>	293.35***		167.02***		322.98***		174.76***		292.59***		297.55***		350.17***		91.71***	
<i>AIC</i>	305.35		181.02		334.98		186.76		304.59		309.55		362.16		105.71	



**Table A 8: Stepwise Panel Regressions (Country FE's & Pooled Imputed Data)**

Dependent variable: Tier 2001 – 2014									
	Country FE (1)	Country FE (2)	Country FE (3)	Country FE (4)	Country FE (5)	Country FE (6)	Country FE (7)	Country FE (8)	LDV (9)
Independent variables:									
Gender Inequality Index	-0.02 (0.02)							-	-
Regulation of prostitution (prost is illegal)		0.003 (0.004)						-	-
International Human Rights Treaties			0.08* (0.04)					-	-
Social Movement Activity				0.05*** (0.01)				0.05*** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)
Regulatory Quality					0.13*** (0.03)			0.12** (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)
Effective Democracy Index						0.05 (0.03)		0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Youth bulge							-0.01 (0.02)	-	-
Controls:									
Population size	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
GDP PPP	0.01 (0.01)	-0.0004 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.006)
Regulatory Quality*Effective Democracy Index								-0.65*** (0.10)	-0.61*** (0.10)
LDV									0.15*** (0.03)
Observations	11405	11405	11405	11405	11405	11405	11405	11405	11405
Countries	164	164	164	164	164	164	164	164	164
R <sup>2</sup>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.002	0.002	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.03
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.002	0.002	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.03
F Statistic	1.2	1.1	2.4	6.9**	9.7***	2.2	1.1	15.2***	54.0***

**Table A 9: Stepwise Panel Regressions (Random effects & Pooled Imputed Data)**

Dependent variable: Tier 2001 – 2014									
	Random Effects (1)	Random Effects (2)	Random Effects (3)	Random Effects (4)	Random Effects (5)	Random Effects (6)	Random Effects (7)	Random Effects (8)	LDV (9)
Independent variables:									
Gender Inequality Index	0.01 (0.02)							-	-
Regulation of prostitution (prost is illegal)		-0.00 (0.004)						-	-
International Human Rights Treaties			0.23*** (0.05)					-	-
Social Movement Activity				0.08*** (0.01)				0.06*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Regulatory Quality					0.002*** (0.003)			0.20*** (0.04)	0.04*** (0.01)
Effective Democracy Index						0.002** * (0.003)		0.13*** (0.04)	0.002 (0.005)
Youth bulge							-0.04* (0.02)	-	-
Controls:									
Population size	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.001* (0.005)	0.001* (0.005)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01** (0.01)	0.001** (0.0003)
GDP PPP	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01** (0.01)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	0.01** (0.01)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.002*** (0.001)
Regulatory Quality*Effective Democracy Index								-0.31** (0.10)	0.4** (0.01)
LDV									0.93*** (0.01)
Constant	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.006 (0.001)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.001)
Observations	11405	11405	11405	11405	11405	11405	11405	11405	11405
Countries	164	164	164	164	164	164	164	164	164
R <sup>2</sup>	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.002	0.02	0.95
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.002	0.02	0.95
F Statistic	3.6*	2.7*	22.9***	23.9***	45.7***	37.9***	9.5***	41.4***	30611.9***

**Table A 10: Stepwise Panel Regressions (Country FE's & Non-Imputed Data)**

Dependent variable: Tier 2001 - 2014									
	Country FE (1)	Country FE (2)	Country FE (3)	Country FE (4)	Country FE (5)	Country FE (6)	Country FE (7)	Country FE (8)	Country FE (9)
Independent variables:									
Gender Inequality Index	0.47*** (0.07)							-	-
Regulation of prostitution (prost is illegal)		-0.05*** (0.01)						-	-
International Human Rights Treaties			0.03 (0.04)					-	-
Social Movement Activity				-1.27** (0.47)				-1.35* (0.58)	-0.48 (0.39)
Regulatory Quality					0.01 (0.13)			-1.78*** (0.31)	-0.36** (0.10)
Effective Democracy Index						0.17** (0.06)		0.51*** (0.13)	0.05 (0.06)
Youth bulge							-0.03 (0.03)	-	-
Controls:									
Population size	-0.01 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	0.003 (0.004)	0.07** (0.02)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.001 (0.003)	1.20** (0.44)	0.32** (0.09)
GDP PPP	-0.06*** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.08 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.04)
Regulatory Quality*Effective Democracy Index								-3.37*** (0.50)	0.12 (0.32)
LDV									0.44 (0.23)
Observations	995	1119	1883	132	1770	1607	461	82	79
Countries	152	111	158	70	160	159	161	45	45
R <sup>2</sup>	0.02	0.01	0.001	0.10	0.003	0.01	0.001	0.34	0.34
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.02	0.01	0.001	0.05	0.002	0.01	0.001	0.13	0.12
F Statistic	6.3**	1.5	0.9	2.3	1.5	2.8*	0.1	2.7*	2.0

**Table A 11: Stepwise Panel Regressions (Random effects & Non-Imputed Data)**

Dependent variable: Tier 2001 - 2014									
	Random Effects (1)	Random Effects (2)	Random Effects (3)	Random Effects (4)	Random Effects (5)	Random Effects (6)	Random Effects (7)	Random Effects (8)	Random Effects (9)
Independent variables:									
Gender Inequality Index	0.52*** (0.10)							-	-
Regulation of prostitution (prost is illegal)		-0.07** (0.03)						-	-
International Human Rights Treaties			0.18** (0.06)					-	-
Social Movement Activity				0.67*** (0.09)				-	-
Regulatory Quality					0.52*** (0.07)			0.22* (0.11)	0.7* (0.03)
Effective Democracy Index						0.38*** (0.04)		0.30*** (0.06)	0.07* (0.03)
Youth bulge							-0.19 (0.12)	-	-
Controls:									
Population size	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.004)	-0.01 (0.004)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01* (0.003)	0.02 (0.01)	0.001 (0.001)
GDP PPP	-0.04** (0.02)	0.02* (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.005* (0.002)
Regulatory Quality*Effective Democracy Index								-	-
LDV									0.79*** (0.05)
Constant	-0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.004 (0.02)	-0.004 (0.02)	0.001 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.002 (0.003)
Observations	995	1119	1883	132	1770	1607	461	1601	1507
Countries	152	111	158	70	160	159	161	159	159
R <sup>2</sup>	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.19	0.09	0.10	0.06	0.12	0.83
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.19	0.09	0.10	0.06	0.12	0.83
F Statistic	13.5***	6.9***	23.3***	10.3***	57.8***	62.3***	9.4***	54.6***	1491.6***

**Table A 12: Stepwise Multilevel Regressions Explaining Violence in the Household**

Dependent Variable: Tolerance of Violence in the Household										
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL	RIM	RIM	RIM	RIM	RIRS(Choice)	RIRS(Choice)	RIRS(Choice)	RIRS(Choice)	RIRS(Choice)	RIRS(Choice)
Female Sex	-0.012*** (0.001)	-0.028*** (0.001)	-0.012*** (0.001)	-0.028*** (0.001)	-0.012*** (0.001)	-0.028*** (0.001)	-0.013*** (0.001)	-0.026*** (0.001)	-0.013*** (0.001)	-0.026*** (0.001)
Age	-0.022*** (0.004)	-0.017*** (0.003)	-0.022*** (0.004)	-0.018*** (0.003)	-0.022*** (0.004)	-0.018*** (0.003)	-0.020** (0.004)	-0.022*** (0.003)	-0.021*** (0.004)	-0.022*** (0.003)
Educational Achievement	-0.019*** (0.003)	-0.039*** (0.002)	-0.019*** (0.003)	-0.039*** (0.002)	-0.019*** (0.003)	-0.039*** (0.002)	-0.018*** (0.003)	-0.034*** (0.002)	-0.017*** (0.003)	-0.034*** (0.002)
Atheist	-0.009* (0.003)	-0.021*** (0.003)	-0.010** (0.004)	-0.023*** (0.003)	-0.010** (0.004)	-0.023*** (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)
Tolerance of Prostitution	0.277*** (0.003)	-	0.280*** (0.003)	-	0.280*** (0.003)	-	0.459*** (0.006)	-	0.486*** (0.006)	-
Choice (EVI)	-	0.294*** (0.003)	-	0.294*** (0.003)	-	0.294*** (0.003)	-	0.442*** (0.006)	-	0.472*** (0.006)
<b>COUNTRY-LEVEL</b>										
Regulation of Prostitution			-0.064* (0.033)	-0.027 (0.024)	-0.064* (0.031)	-0.033 (0.022)	-0.074* (0.031)	-0.044 (0.025)	-0.134*** (0.030)	-0.064** (0.025)
Tier Rankings			-0.082 (0.051)	-0.079* (0.039)	-0.092 (0.047)	-0.059 (0.038)	-0.178*** (0.048)	-0.094* (0.041)	-0.143** (0.046)	-0.089* (0.041)
Tolerance of Prostitution (CL)			-0.104 (0.129)	-	-0.122 (0.125)	-	-0.061 (0.126)	-	-0.041 (0.121)	-
Choice (CL)			-	-0.349*** (0.075)	-	-0.376*** (0.065)	-	-0.380*** (0.079)	-	-0.378*** (0.078)
<b>CROSS-LEVEL EFFECTS</b>										
Tolerance of Prostitution <sub>CL</sub> # Tolerance of Prostitution <sub>IL</sub>							0.068* (0.031)	-	0.135*** (0.031)	-
Choice <sub>CL</sub> # Choice <sub>IL</sub>							-	-0.686*** (0.021)	-	-0.659*** (0.022)
Tier Rankings <sub>SCL</sub> # Tolerance of Prostitution <sub>IL</sub>							-0.335*** (0.011)	-	-0.189*** (0.012)	-
Tier Rankings <sub>SCL</sub> #Choice <sub>IL</sub>							-	-0.206*** (0.011)	-	-0.162*** (0.011)
Prostitution is Regulated <sub>CL</sub> # Choice <sub>IL</sub>							-	-	-	-0.116*** (0.006)
Prostitution is Regulated <sub>CL</sub> # Tolerance of Prostitution <sub>IL</sub>							-	-	-0.223*** (0.007)	-
Constant	-0.276*** (0.015)	-0.296*** (0.014)	-0.206*** (0.028)	-0.151*** (0.023)	-0.206*** (0.028)	-0.256*** (0.023)	-0.150*** (0.028)	-0.208*** (0.024)	-0.139*** (0.027)	-0.200*** (0.024)
Observations	55,929	74,641	54,832	72,602	54,832	72,602	54,832	72,602	54,832	72,602
Countries	42	59	41	57	41	57	41	57	41	57
AIC	-39649	-54972	-38507	-53126	-38504	-53123	-39667	-56695	-41084	-57040
BIC	-39568	-54889	-38391	-53007	-38370	-52985	-39515	-56538	-40915	-56866
Log-Likelihood	19833	27495	19267	26576	19268	26576	19850	28364	20561	28539
Variance intercept	0.009	0.012	0.007	0.006	0.007	0.006	0.007	0.006	0.006	0.006
Variance slope (Choice Values)	-	-	-	-	0.004	0.010	0.008	0.000	0.012	0.000
Variance residual	0.029	0.028	0.029	0.028	0.029	0.028	0.028	0.027	0.027	0.027

Note: Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<.001, \*\* p<.01, \* p<.05. The estimated coefficients of random intercept and random slope models are reported, allowing for random intercept and random slope of choice values, and the variance of the slope, the intercept and the level-1 residuals.

Figure A 1: Gender Inequality Index and Regulation of Prostitution in Fully Complied Countries




Figure A 2: Effective Democracy Index and Social Movement Activity in Fully Complied Countries




Figure A 3: International Human Rights Treaties, Regulatory Quality Index and Youth Bulge Rates in Fully Complied Countries






Figure A 4: Gender Inequality Index and Regulation of Prostitution in Countries with Consistent Efforts on Anti-Trafficking Enforcement




Figure A 5: Effective Democracy Index and Social Movement Activity in Countries with Consistent Efforts on Anti-Trafficking Enforcement




Figure A 6: International Human Rights Treaties, Regulatory Quality Index and Youth Bulge Rates in Countries with Consistent Efforts on Anti-Trafficking Enforcement




Figure A 7: Gender Inequality Index and Regulation of Prostitution in Watch Listed Countries




Figure A 8: Effective Democracy Index and Social Movement Activity in Watch Listed Countries




Figure A 9: International Human Rights Treaties, Regulatory Quality Index and Youth Bulge Rates in Watch Listed Countries




Figure A 10: Gender Inequality Index and Regulation of Prostitution in Countries without Anti-Trafficking Enforcement





Figure A 11: Effective Democracy Index and Social Movement Activity in Countries without Anti-Trafficking Enforcement






Figure A 12: International Human Rights Treaties, Regulatory Quality Index and Youth Bulge Rates in Countries without Anti-Trafficking Enforcement




Figure A 13: Choice Values and Tolerance of Violence in the Household by Tier Rankings




Figure A 14: Tolerance of Prostitution and Tolerance of Violence in the Household by Tier Rankings




Figure A 15: Choice Values and Tolerance of Violence in the Household by Regulation of Prostitution




Figure A 16: Tolerance of Prostitution and Tolerance of Violence in the Household by Regulation of Prostitution




Figure A 17: Individual-Level Link between Tolerance of Prostitution and Tolerance of Violence in the Household by Tier Rankings




Figure A 18: Individual-Level Link between Tolerance of Prostitution and Choice Values by Tier Rankings




Figure A 19: Partial Effects of Tolerance of Prostitution and Choice Values on Tolerance of Violence







Figure A 20: Partial Effects of Choice Values, Tolerance of Prostitution and Individual-Level Link between Tolerance of Violence and Tolerance of Prostitution on Tolerance of Violence

