

Democratic Practices in Transnational Civil Society Networks

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Abbreviations

| | |
|--------|--|
| CCC | Clean Clothes Campaign |
| CCS | Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage |
| CEE | Central-and Eastern Europe |
| C&A | Clemens and August Brenninkmeijer |
| CS | Civil society |
| CSR | Corporate Social Responsibility |
| ECOSOC | United Nations Economic and Social Council |
| EU | European Union |
| GMO | Genetically modified organism |
| FoE | Friends of the Earth |
| FoEE | Friends of the Earth Europe |
| FoEI | Friends of the Earth International |
| G8 | Group of Eight |
| H&M | Hennes & Mauritz |
| ILO | International Labour Organisation |
| IR | International Relations |
| NGO | Non-governmental organization |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| SMO | Social movement organization |
| TCSN | Transnational civil society network |
| UN | United Nations |
| WWF | World Wide Fund for Nature |
| WTO | World Trade Organization |

Abstract

During recent decades, the arenas of political decision-making have increasingly shifted from national governments to intergovernmental and transnational political forums. At the same time, the number and relevance of non-state actors in international politics is steadily growing. These trends have led political scientists to study and theorize about new forms of democracy beyond the national political arenas (Archibugi 2004, Bexell et al. 2010, Näsström 2010). However, democracy beyond the nation state is difficult to conceptualize with the idea of an institutionalized democracy within the borders of nation-states. Instead, many political scientists emphasize the role of civil society actors as a cure for the democratic deficit in international politics (Steffek & Nanz 2008). Yet, normative and empirical problems arise over the extent of access, selection and role of civil society actors in international organizations (Tallberg et al. 2013). Furthermore, the normative relevance of transnational civil society actors makes it necessary to study their own democratic legitimacy.

While international organizations are mostly institutionalized and hierarchical governing bodies, the ever growing diffuse conglomerate of non-state actors is characterized by fluid structures, blurry boundaries and a multi-level setting of interaction (Keck & Sikkink 1998). Thus, in studying democratic practice in transnational civil society networks, we must ask: How institutionalized do political practices have to be and how flexible can they be, to still be considered democratic? Normative theorists reconceptualized democracy in the light of this changing context (Bohman 2007). Recent concepts of participatory, deliberative and representative democracy attempt to reconfigure existing democratic institutions through procedural elements (Fung & Wright 2003, Dryzek 2006) or innovative forms of representation (Phillips 1998, Mansbridge 2003, Castiglione & Warren 2006). This emerging theoretical framework is well suited to analyze the extent, to which democratic practices exist within transnational civil society networks.

By applying the concept of practice (Giddens 1984, Schatzki et al. 2005) as a bridging tool between the empirical reality of fluid, temporary and open transnational civil society networks on the one hand and the institution-oriented democratic theory on the other hand, this study explores the extent to which democratic practice develops in a field that lacks traditional institutions to guarantee citizen participation. As innovative transnational actors, civil society networks can bring up new forms of democratic practice (see Polletta 2006) that can potentially inspire the debate about transnational democracy as such. This study, with its innovative ap-

proach, hopes to invigorate the debate about transnational democracy and transnational civil society, which has stalled to some degree in recent years.

The study is divided into three parts; first, a conceptual part that clarifies the question of how democracy as practice can be theoretically conceptualized in transnational civil society networks, which is followed by an empirical exploration of political practices in the transnational civil society networks. In this second part, the main question is how participation, representation and deliberation practice develops in transnational civil society networks. Two cases of transnational civil society networks, the Clean Clothes Campaign and Friends of the Earth, are analyzed to provide insights into the democratic practice within transnational civil society. In the final part, the empirical findings are evaluated in the light of the outlined concepts of democratic theory in order to explore how democratic these political practices actually are.

The study identifies implicit and in-process practices of democratic norms in transnational civil society networks. Political practice in transnational civil society networks can become democratic through empowerment measures and trustful relationships. However, deliberate democratic practice can be impeded by disembodied digital communication and complex decision-making. The study explores how new forms of democratic practice emerge in the interaction between political actors and the structural environments of actors and networks.

Introduction

Two major transformations have taken place in global politics over the last two decades. First, political decision-making power has gradually shifted from representative institutions and democratically elected parliaments in nation states to intergovernmental forums and transnational¹, partly informal networks that consist of members of national executive organs and mainly unelected private actors and (Chilton 1995; Dingwerth 2006; Tallberg et al. 2008). This development led to a disempowerment of national parliaments and an empowerment of (national) executive authorities, who are sitting together as ministers, prime ministers or presidents at the negotiation table of G8, World Economic Forum and other meetings (see e.g. Zürn 2002). Second, the number, power and range of global civil society actors, such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth or Amnesty International has increased as one consequence of this development (see e.g. Steffek et al. 2008). These two transformations have led International Relations (IR) scholars as well as democratic theorists to rethink democracy in the context of international and transna-

¹ The term „transnational“ refers to „interactions that cross national boundaries at levels other than sovereign-to-sovereign“, whereas the term “international” is used to describe interactions between sovereign nation states. As a more general term “global” refers to any “transborder interactions that include (approximately) the entire world system” (Hale and Held 2011: 4-5).

tional affairs. Focusing on the first shift of political decision-making power, many concepts of transnational democracy conceptualize an institutional transfer of democratic institutions from the nation state to the international system (Held 1995; Archibugi et al. 1998; Bohman 2007). However, global governance scholars have also claimed that the different institutional preconditions of the global order demand a distinct institutional architecture of global democracy (MacDonald & Macdonald 2010).

Democratic institutions of nation states are not that easily adaptable to a global system that consists of less formalized relationships between organizations and actors. Nation state democratic institutions cannot democratically control the multiple forms of public power that are exerted by different state and nonstate actors (ibid.). While democratic institutions were conceptualized for centralized and hierarchically organized nation state contexts, transnational relations are characterized by complex and overlapping spheres of influence and power. *Practices and processes* that are conducted between the multiple actors dominate the sphere of transnational relations rather than institutions. An institution-oriented democratic theory is thus hardly applicable in the context of transnational relations. This study contributes to the debate about the second major transformation that focusses on the democratic legitimation of transnational civil society in global governance. The aim of this study is to examine the democratic quality of political practices inside transnational civil society networks (TCSNs) and to explore the potential of a transnational democracy in one of the main areas of transnational relations, namely civil society networks.

Consequently, civil society coalitions and networks as one group of main actors in the transnational sphere, act in an unclear and fluid sphere with many “formally-constituted political bodies such as the United Nations” (Dryzek 1999: 45) that are either opponents or collaboration partners of civil society organizations. At the same time, transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and social movement organizations (SMOs) are seen as the cure for the democratic deficit in international organizations (Steffek et al. 2008).

Civil society shall be defined in empirical terms and divided into social movement groups and non-governmental organizations. Social movements are investigated as a phenomenon since the 1970's, whereas non-governmental organizations and research about them has emerged only in the 1990's, with the growing internationalization and institutionalization of social movements. Both types of organizations still exist and play a part in the two TCSNs that will be examined in this study. While social movement groups are seen as more grass-roots oriented and less institutionalized, non-governmental organizations are also called the “tamed” social movement groups (Kaldor 2003) because they are much more professionalized and institutionalized and often focus on lobby activities rather than on public protest (Della Porta & Caiani 2009). Different typologies of social movements were developed based on the assumptions that social movements

are historical phenomena, and as such, they cannot be generalized in abstract terms without considering their historical contexts and historical developments. Furthermore, social movements are structured phenomena, which can be situated between an “amorphous ad-hoc collective” (Raschke 1985: 17) and a highly formalized organization. In criticizing the rationalist explanation of social movement mobilization recent studies show that cultural aspects and explanations from social psychology are also relevant for the mobilizing potential of “newest social movements” (Day 2005; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001; Jasper 2007).

Transnational civil society organizations are seen as the crucial mediators for transnational mobilization; they connect different public spheres and combine different local interests (Smith 2001:99). TCSNs are “bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services” (Keck & Sikkink 1998: 2). Since the 1980’s NGOs have been interacting with each other in ever more networked and dense settings. Networks gave a more structured context in transnational relations. These networks are also understood as communicative structures and political spaces, where actors negotiate about the meanings of their “joint enterprise” (Keck & Sikkink 1998: 3). During the past two decades, transnational civil society actors have started to receive much more attention, contacts and influence in decision-making processes. The traditional role of civil society as a third sector between market and state, which organizes citizens’ interests and provides a space for public engagement, is no longer the only role of civil society. Members of transnational NGOs or SMOs have partly inherited the responsibilities of elected representatives in traditional democratic settings: they represent a certain constituency, campaign for their norms and interests, try to formulate and condense interests of their constituency, and finally sit at the decision-making table in order to decide public matters within a certain range. Many democratic theorists reacted to this development in conceptualizing new forms of democratic governance and political representation (Held 1995; Archibugi et al. 1998; Bohman 2007).

While transnational NGOs and SMOs themselves are often seen as *per se* democratic, there are recent studies which show that civil society organizations do not always represent their constituency adequately (Hahn & Holzscheiter 2013) or do not even claim to be accountable to the beneficiaries of their political engagement (Steffek et al. 2010). Furthermore, it is criticized that transnational NGO campaigners “have drawn disproportionately from middle-aged adults, professional and propertied classes, men, Northern countries, whites, Christian heritages and urban dwellers.” (Scholte 2002: 296)

Now, with illiteracy rates in some parts of the world exceeding 80 percent, with Internet access virtually nonexistent in others, and with language skills, economic knowledge, and political education distributed extremely unevenly across the globe, realizing transparency and democracy in a meaningful normative sense is indeed a far-fetched dream. And

what is more, hardly any global democracy activists are working to turn this particular dream into reality. (Dingwerth & Hanrieder 2010: 94)

Although transnational civil society seems to have a significant impact in the setting of rules and the promotion of norms, they often lack democratic legitimacy, e.g. the approval of beneficiaries. The normative claims made in this literature are that civil society actors from *different* backgrounds should participate equally in international institutions and transnational forums (Bendell 2006; Scholte 2007). Scholte similarly argues that “If civil society is to make its full contribution to enabling public participation in global governance, then full recognition – and effective negotiation- of the world’s cultural diversity is required.” (Scholte 2002: 297). Equal participation is especially crucial in relation to inclusion of underrepresented groups and the accessibility of formation of opinion and decision-making for the general membership as well, and not only the active elite (Anheier & Themudo 2002). In a study on the participation patterns of *Friends of the Earth (FoE)* and *Amnesty International* in Great Britain, Jordan and Maloney (1997) state that the *de facto* decision-making in those campaign organizations can be at best termed ‘anticipatory oligarchy’²– the few members decide on behalf of the rest of the members anticipating their wishes and what is popular enough to gain support. Those democratic shortcomings in civil society networks become particularly apparent in the unequal participation of the different members and activists. Social inequalities for example are often rather reproduced than countered in civil society networks (Roth 2001; Tallberg et al. 2008; Beauzamy 2010). This leads among other things to the fact that global civil society engagement rests on a very narrow cultural base (Scholte 2002).

This observed asymmetry in the transnational civil society is particularly virulent in the context of the global North-South divide and most often explained by the lack of capacities, such as financial resources, as well as language barriers and the campaigning focus on an affluent (Western) audience which is rather inclined to donate (Roth 2001). Particularly NGOs which are concerned with development and social change in the developing world are criticized for being disproportionately based in Western Europe and the US. Although the number of Transnational Civil Society’s secretariats in Western Europe, Canada and the US decreased from 92% in 1953 to 72% in 1993 there is still a great asymmetry between the OECD world and the rest of the world including Eastern Europe (Smith and Sikkink 2002: 34-37). This affects also the framing of topics and problems which differs between north and south NGOs, especially in issue areas such as human rights, gender politics or biodiversity issues. If there is no mobilizing potential in the Western world there will be no campaign about a certain topic (Roth 2001: 43). Furthermore, it is criticized that Northern NGOs pick Southern NGOs as coalition partners according to a suitable topic for donors and public attention and often it is not realistic that Southern NGOs are able to

² This term refers to the “iron law of oligarchization” conceptualized by Robert Michels (1989).

avail themselves of transnational networks and get prominent according to the urgency or relevance of the issue. Due to its heterogeneity transnational civil society is easy to get co-opted in particular by donors who fund selected projects or organizations (Fisher 1997).

The study identifies a theoretical and an empirical research gap. First, the theoretical conceptualization of democratic legitimation inside TCSNs has been neglected in the literature on democracy beyond the nation state as well as in the broad NGO-literature. While an overall institutional framework for transnational democracy remains inapplicable due to the instable structural contexts of transnational relations, the examination of practices on a meso-level between individual action and overall structure can give better insights on how democracy can develop in temporary, fluid and complex transnational networks. Substantive and routinized practices are not only empirically better observable in transnational civil society than institutionalized settings, they are at the same time an interesting and innovative conceptual perspective for normative democratic theory and the question of how to think of democracy in transnational relations. Therefore, such transnational networks will be examined in the light of process- and practice oriented approaches to democratic theory, which has not been done so far to a great extent. These approaches can be found in concepts of participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, and more recently even in representative theory. Thus, this study translates the theoretical framework of the three strands of democratic theory (participatory, representative, and deliberative democracy) into practices that can be empirically observed in two selected cases of TCSNs. The peculiarity and thus necessity for conceptualization of democracy in TCSNs stems from the specific characteristics of TCSNs. They neither function like nation states nor like a multilateral international system. Therefore, concepts of democracy should be adapted to this specific context. The conceptual question of transnational democracy in network contexts is relevant, but under-theorized and will therefore be a major element in this study. The conceptual contribution of this study is the theoretical discussion and combination of concepts of democracy and practice. Concepts of participatory, representative and deliberative democracy are adapted to the network context with the help of practice theory. The theoretical interest in transnational network democracy is inspired by the debate on how transnational democracy, with its specific characteristics, could be envisioned (Held 1995, 2003; Keohane 2003; Dryzek 2006) and how already existing transnational relationships between different types of actors can be evaluated in terms of their democratic quality (Friedrich 2008; Tallberg et al. 2008; Näsström 2010; Steffek et al. 2010; Dingwerth et al. 2011). In order to analytically grasp transnational network democracy, the concept of practice is introduced and used as an analytical frame to detect democracy that is practiced rather than institutionalized in TCSNs. In this context, *democracy* is broadly defined as “empowered inclusion of those affected in collective decisions and actions” (Warren

2006: 386). *Networks* are defined as heterarchical³ fora of communication, interaction and decision-making between “interdependent but operationally autonomous actors (Sørensen & Torfing 2007: 9). *Practices* are generally defined as shared courses of action that are co-constituted by actors and structure and can be modified by the agency of the actors (Giddens 1984).

Second, this study wants to fill an empirical research gap and open the black box of the most growing type of actors in global politics, namely transnational civil society networks. Although there are single studies of social movements observing the specific democratic practices of activists (Polletta 2002, 2006), the coalition building and participation within transnational movement networks in view of democratic norms is underresearched. The empirical research interest of this study targets TCSNs’ capabilities and potentials of democratic coordination in order to function as democratically legitimate actors in global politics, which can serve as an external control layer for international institutions and nation states by representing the underrepresented in the global system. Transnational activism and protest has been organized in network-like structures since it came into being (Tarrow 2006). Specifically the TCSNs examined in this case study, are very concerned with democratic procedures and principles. Thus, the practices of democracy that have emerged in these non-state network settings present an interesting and needed area to be examined. Empirical research thus far has focused on the democratic legitimation of transnational civil society with standards that conceptualize legitimation as external control that runs vertically either between civil society actors and international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) or the World Trade Organization (WTO) (upwards), or between civil society actors and their constituency, namely the affected groups of individuals (downwards) (Steffek et al. 2010; Tallberg & Uhlin 2011). However, this research perspective neglects the internal and horizontal democratic legitimation that is at least equally important for transnational democracy. If TCSNs function as external democratic control layers for international organizations or states, they should be themselves democratically legitimized. Otherwise, opaque and possibly corrupted interests could be the basis for a supposedly democratic legitimation of global politics.

Starting from these research gaps in a theoretical and empirical context, this study is structured in a threefold division: At first, the theoretical conceptualization of democracy as practice is done by combining practice theory with democratic concepts of participatory, representative and deliberative democracy. In a second step, the empirical analysis focusses on political practices in TCSNs, thus opening the black box “civil society network” and explore the participation,

³ Neyer (2003) defines heterarchies as follows: “In a heterarchical structure, political authority is neither centralized (as under conditions of hierarchy) nor decentralized (as under conditions of anarchy) but shared, which means that the units of a system pool their sovereignties ” (Neyer 2003: 689).

representation and deliberation practices that are conducted inside such networks. In a last step, these political practices that are conducted in the TCSNs are evaluated with regard to their democratic quality. Thus, this study's research questions are:

- (1) How can democracy as practice be theoretically conceptualized in TCSNs?
- (2) How do participation, representation and deliberation practices form in TCSNs?
- (3) How democratic are these political practices?

In order to evaluate the democratic quality of political practice inside TCSNs, one needs to critically investigate the normative foundations of criteria for democratic quality. These criteria that are used in research on democracy at the global level often follow an institutionalist logic and adopt the criteria that are used to assess democracy within nation states. In this regard, transnational democracy is often evaluated with standards that do only marginally take into account the different preconditions in transnational relations. This study does not want to completely remodel the normative standards of democratic quality, but wants to shift the focus of analysis away from formal institutions to substantive practices. Institutional accounts emphasize "the role of institutions and institutionalization in the understanding of human actions within an organization, social order, or society." (March & Olsen 1998b: 948). Institutions are defined as "a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations." (ibid.). The practice account now shifts the perspective. According to practice theorists, the social world can only be understood through studying practices, which are collectively shared courses of action that are steered by structural contexts as well as by individual action (Giddens 1984) and thus are placed between the macro-level of structure and the micro-level of individual action.

The two cases of TCSNs, namely Friends of the Earth (FoE) and the Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC), examined in this research study were chosen because they share the most common characteristics of TCSNs and their relative power in global politics: Both are organized as networks of semi-autonomous member groups in different countries and have communicate power⁴ through global campaigns as well as influence on international institutions or multinational companies⁵. Most of the member organizations are situated in Europe. The member groups are independent organizations that also campaign in other contexts. Both networks claim to be grass-roots democratic. Therefore, the cases are most-likely cases, since it is very likely that

⁴ Following Habermas' (1996) conceptualization of communicative power, many constructivist IR-scholars claim that NGOs can exert communicative power in convincing more powerful actors (most often states) to "change their minds" (Risse 2000: 19).

⁵ FoE has consultative status in different UN bodies; CCC successfully pressures many different companies to implement a code of conduct in bilateral negotiations. Besides this, both networks lead public campaigns that are widely taken up by the media. A detailed description of the influence and action repertoire of both networks is to be found in the case chapters (7.1 & 7.2).

democratic practices are found in those networks. Despite their shared characteristics of TCSNs, the two cases differ in their goals, internal relationships, targets, strategy and collective identity and thus provide a certain range of TCSNs. An interview analysis of qualitative interviews with activists in the respective networks was used to examine these two cases. The qualitative semi-structured interviews with activists of the two TCSNs in Europe were analyzed and interpreted with a reconstructive method of text interpretation. The interview analysis was guided by a heuristics of political practices, divided into participation practices, representation practices and deliberation practices. These three kinds of political practices together with inductively reconstructed findings about political practices in the two networks were first described and then evaluated and discussed in terms of their democratic quality.

Structure of the Dissertation

The following part I of this dissertation delineates the conceptual foundations of this study. First, the three subsequent chapters (chap. 1-3) review the relevant literature on participatory, representative and deliberative democracy respectively. These three chapters are all organized in two parts: (1) a general overview and discussion of relevant concepts and (2) a discussion on the applicability of these approaches to the context of TCSNs. While all three variants of democracy are presented and discussed in the light of the research questions, the concrete translation of the theoretical accounts into an evaluation framework is done in chapter 4. In order to bridge the gap between normative democratic theory and empirical reality of TCSNs, the practice theory functions as a connecting link. Relevant approaches of practice theory are outlined in order to conceptualize democracy as practice. This conceptualization leads into the formulation of democratic criteria for participation, representation and deliberation practice.

Part II of this dissertation is divided into four chapters. Chapter 5 outlines the research design of the empirical study. Chapter 6 is devoted to the exploration of the political practice in the two cases of Clean Clothes Campaign and Friends of the Earth. After the analytical heuristics for exploring the political practice of participation, representation and deliberation are presented, the cases are generally introduced (chapters 6.1 & 6.2). The results of the reconstructive qualitative analysis are then presented in chapter 6.3, which is further subdivided into general perceptions in the networks, participation practices, deliberation practice and representation practices. After this descriptive part of the analysis, the evaluation and discussion of the political practices discovered is done in chapter 7. This chapter links back to the theoretical considerations of the first part of this study and attempts to combine normative democratic theory and the empirical results in a fruitful discussion of the democratic quality of political practices in TCSNs. This study ends with general conclusions about the usefulness of the practice approach for transnational democracy and the implications of the findings for research on TCSNs.

Part I Conceptual Foundations of Democratic Practice in Transnational Civil Society Networks

In the field of global governance, many scholars applied normative democratic theory originally conceptualized for nation state contexts. Bexell et al. (2010) speak in this regard of the “trichotomy of representative democracy, participatory democracy, and deliberative democracy” (Bexell et al. 2010: 83), which defines the three main strands of democratic theory. Taking these three main models of democratic theory into account, the selection of authors and approaches for this study was guided by the need for an adaptation of normative democratic theory to the empirical research object, namely TCSNs. Since these networks are more loosely bound together, less hierarchically structured and not limited by clearly defined boundaries compared to nation states, normative democratic theory that is conceptualized for the context of hierarchically structured, sovereign nation states is not suitable. As a result, normative democratic theory such as participatory democratic theory that is concerned with democracy in spheres beside the state, for example in civil society associations (Hirst 1994), in the work place (Pateman 1970; Bachrach & Botwinick 1992) or even in private spheres such as the family (Phillips 1991) is of specific value for this study. Similarly, more recent theories in the field of representation that aim at conceptualizing representation without the formal institution of elections and focus more on horizontal control of representatives (Castiglione & Warren 2006) or on the performative variants of representation (Saward 2010) are suitable for this study due to their broader horizon of possible forms of representation. Deliberative democracy as a third strand within normative democratic theories was selected because of its procedural conceptualization of democracy that furthers an understanding of democracy that is not aggregative and is thus not that tightly bound to clearly defined electorates. Deliberative democracy was by some theorists specifically conceptualized for the context of transnational relations as well as network governance (Dryzek 1999, 2006, 2007; Esmark 2007) and can therefore be clearly linked to this study’s research subject of TCSNs. However, difficulties remain in overcoming the boundaries between normative democracy and practical, empirically observable democracy in these networks. Therefore, the practice lens serves as a conceptual bridge between normative democratic theory and empirical observability. Before turning to the three strands of democratic theory that will be further outlined in the following chapters, I will first briefly review the debate about democracy in international theory and afterwards discuss the specific relationship between civil society and democracy in IR.

For a long time IR scholars were not concerned about any kind of global democracy. In the international system, norms, such as democratic norms, seemed not to matter in the eyes of realist and rational-institutionalist IR-scholars (Steffek 2006: 10-13). The international system mainly

consisted of nation states, which acted under conditions of anarchy through power threats (realist) or negotiations (rational-institutionalist). This empirical reality has changed in the last 20 years and so has the IR-research expanded scholarly interest into fields such as the role of norms (Jepperson et al. 1996; Checkel 1998; Risse 1999) and democracy (Held 1995; Bienen et al. 1998; Archibugi 2004).

Legitimacy defined as the “stable belief in the rightfulness of social order and the mechanisms of authoritative decision-making that this order entails” (Weber cited by Steffek 2006: 2), is crucial especially in global politics, where rules are “ultimately unenforceable” (ibid.). Furthermore, the emphasis on a procedural dimension of legitimacy in global governance shifts the focus of legitimacy as an attribute to legitimation as a process (Hurrelmann et al. 2007) because only the acts of legitimation are what we can observe (Barker cited by Hurrelmann et al. 2007: 9) coming into being through “political processes through which consent [by subordinates, H.K.] is either expressed or withdrawn” (Hurrelmann et al. 2007: 9). How this legitimation can be democratic in global governance is what was debated for more than two decades in IR and political science. Drawing on different schools of democratic theory, scholars conceptualized various approaches of a transnational democracy. McGrew identifies four different conceptual strands: (1) liberal internationalism, (2) radical pluralist democracy, (3) cosmopolitan democracy and (4) deliberative democracy (McGrew 2004). As the designation of liberal institutionalism and radical pluralist democracy already suggest, the concepts draw from different theoretical strands, namely liberal democratic theory and radical democracy. Cosmopolitan democracy is a rather eclectic and ambitious approach, which makes use of different elements of democratic theory, whereas deliberative democracy is a rather recent theoretical strand that is concerned with the discursive forms of democratic legitimation (ibid.). Transnational civil society plays an important role in each of the concepts of transnational democracy.

Liberal internationalism, advocated above all by Robert Keohane, envisions transnational democracy as a pluralized and transparent international system with multilateral institutions held accountable by states and NGOs (Keohane 2003). In general, liberal theorists see transnational democracy as a reconstruction of liberal democracy in nation states, without elections. Thus, instead of parties, civil society actors are engaging in democratizing the international system: “In place of parties competing for votes, a vibrant transnational civil society channels its demands to the decision makers whilst in turn, also making them accountable for their actions. Accordingly, ‘accountability will be enhanced not only by chains of official responsibility but by the requirement of transparency.’” (McGrew 2004: 4). However, liberal internationalism is limited to the Western world and a state-centric perspective insofar as it is concerned mainly with “institutional tinkering” in order to enhance transparency and accountability of international institutions vis-à-vis national governments (ibid.).

Radical pluralist democracy as a bottom-up theory of democratization mainly works through the critical social movements, “which challenge the authority of states and international structures as well as the hegemony of particular (liberal) conceptions of the ‘political’” (McGrew 2004: 5). Stemming from theories of participatory democracy, particularly radical democracy, the rejection of concepts such as sovereignty and the rule of law, which are seen as basic conditions of the functioning of democracy, is a main critique of this approach (ibid.). Radical pluralist democracy doesn’t envision real democracy in nation states’ governance of international politics, but rather in the self-governance of communities (ibid.). The ideas of radical democracy are also a relevant part of participatory democracy and will thus be outlined more extensively in the respective chapter.

Cosmopolitan democracy centers on the “effective democratic governance within, between and across states” (McGrew 2004: 6). On the basis of the constitutionalist argument that the political order should be based on a rule of law, Held argues that such constitutional rights guarantee the appropriate participation of affected individuals in decision-making (Dingwerth et al. 2011: 51). Following this argumentation, the principle of autonomy is a corner stone of cosmopolitan democracy. Held states that individual autonomy is characterized as “the capacity of human beings to reason self-consciously, to be self-reflective and to be self-determining. It involves the ability to deliberate, judge, choose and act upon different possible courses of action in private as well as in public life.” (Held 2006: 263). Held’s concept of democracy is thus based on the notion that democracy’s function is to further the aim of individual and collective autonomy (Dingwerth & Blauberger 2011: 51). The principle of autonomy can also be transferred to the state level, where autonomy erodes due to globalization processes (Archibugi 2004: 439). Held distinguishes state autonomy from state sovereignty. Sovereignty is defined by him as “the political authority within a community which has the right to determine the framework of rules, regulations and policies within a given territory and to govern directly” (Held 2006: 295). Autonomy in contrast is defined as “the actual power a nation state possesses to articulate and achieve policy goals independently” (ibid.). While sovereignty defines the entitlement to rule over a territory, autonomy defines the freedom of the state to democratic decision-making without international and transnational constraints (ibid.). In this regard, autonomy, thought of as individual, collective and state autonomy is the major principle of justification for democracy. If governance modes guarantee or enable the conduct of collective autonomy in the form of collective participation, they can be seen as democratically legitimate (Friedrich 2013: 41). As Held states: “In a world of intensifying regional and global relations, with marked overlapping ‘communities of fate’, the principle of autonomy requires entrenchment in regional and global networks as well as in national and local polities” (Held 2002: 308).

Although cosmopolitan democracy focusses on the international state system, advocates of this approach argue that the system of international democracy among states should be embedded in transnational associations and communities (McGrew 2004: 6). This is necessary because the principle of autonomy causes a congruency problem in global politics: the ones who take decisions are not necessarily the same that are affected by the decisions. Affected communities can be communities that span across state borders, so-called “overlapping communities of fate” (Held, 1995: 136) or they can be entirely global. Thus, stakeholder’s communities do not necessarily fit in state borders (Archibugi 2004: 443). While many environmental causes affect all individuals globally, communities of fate can be identified for example as the workers of different countries affected by human rights abuses in the global garment industry. As a result of this effect of transnational affected communities, advocates of cosmopolitan democracy assume that “[g]lobalization engenders new social movements engaged with issues that affect other individuals and communities, even when these are geographically and culturally very distant from their own political community.”(Archibugi 2004: 439)

Proponents of deliberative democracy go one step further and do not aim at reforming the global polity, but at democratizing existing “governance”. Therefore, deliberative democracy goes beyond the liberal vision of institutional reform of global governance and also the cosmopolitan idea of a democratic institution (McGrew 2004: 8). Deliberative democracy is defined as “an association whose affairs are governed by the public deliberation of its members” (Cohen 1997: 67). This is completely different to the other concepts. Hence the procedural conception of democracy will be outlined in more detail in chapter 3 on deliberative democracy and will thus be not that extensively treated here.

All democratic theorists concerned with transnational affairs and global governance must take a stand on the question of the demos in transnational democracy: “Who is the people?”. Who belongs to this group is difficult to define even in nation states where individuals are categorized in citizens, residents, migrants or refugees. This resonates with the congruency problem (Zürn 2004). Political decisions are not always legitimized by the people who are affected by them. People in nation states are more and more “other-determined”, they are subject to rules made by institutions, governance bodies and agencies that they cannot control anymore (Näsström 2011). The concurrence of the people as source and subject of democratic legitimacy is not prevalent in transnational relations. Transnational democracy is not divided in geographic terms, but in issue areas. All affected individuals and groups of a specific political decision constitute the people that should have a say in this particular policy issue. The all-affected principle suggests a solution for the boundary problems in transnational democracy. Not every individual on this planet needs to be represented in a certain political decision, but only those that are directly affected by a decision. But how can we define who will be affected? If there is a decision to be

made about the operating times of nuclear power plants worldwide, who knows who will be to what degree affected by the next nuclear catastrophe? Besides the difficulty of drawing lines between affected and not affected people, there is another problem with the all-affected principle: "It runs the risk of making future political boundaries into enclaves of sheer self-interest in so far as they would be based in separate stakes rather than equal rights." (Näsström 2011: 124). Thus, the direct representation of concrete groups of individuals is hardly practicable in transnational relations. Therefore either a discursive, subjectless mode of representation (Dryzek & Niemeyer 2008) or the implementation of indirect accountability through proxies (Koenig-Archibugi & Macdonald 2013) is suggested.

Proxies are one part of the roles civil society actors assume in transnational relations. However, in much of the research on civil society, the difficulty of defining the relationship between civil society and democracy arises. Civil society is often defined according to its boundaries⁶: it is a sphere apart from the state and, by some theorists also distinguished from the market economy (Arato & Cohen 1999). Civil society is a term that is strongly connected to Western liberal democracies and in this context understood as associational life that is voluntary and pluralistic: "Civil society organizations [...] are neither mandated nor run by state institutions, but spring from the everyday lives and activities of communities of interest." (Young 2000: 158). While the state (as well as the economy) functions systematically; it follows certain system imperatives and brings together disparate people, places and goals mediated through authorized power or money, civil society's focus rather lies on free organization and discursive reasoning (ibid.). The classic role of civil society associations is that of "schools of democracy" (Tocqueville & Mayer 1835 [1985]) based on the reasoning that a democracy without democrats is difficult to maintain (Chambers 2006: 369-70). The expectation in this regard is that civil society associations are places of learning democratic citizenship. Another role of civil society that refers back to the discursive mode of communication in the sphere of civil society (Young 2000) is that of civil society as creator of a public sphere. Through its associational character, civil society can institutionalize societal problems that spring from the private lives of citizens and can make them heard in a public sphere:

Civil society is composed of those more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organizations, and movements that, attuned to how societal problems resonate in the private life spheres, distill and transmit such reactions in amplified form to the public sphere. The core of civil society comprises a network of associations that institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public spheres. These "discursive designs" have an egalitarian, open form of organization that mirrors essential features of the kind of communication around which they crystallize and to which they lend continuity and permanence. [...]All the same, they

⁶ Liberals emphasize the negative definition of civil society's boundaries to the state as rights-based. The rule of law should limit the state's influence on civil society and thus guarantee the freedom of association (Chambers & Kopstein 2006: 364-66).

do form the organizational substratum of the general public of citizens. More or less emerging from the private sphere, this public is made of citizens who seek acceptable interpretations for their social interests and experiences and who want to have an influence on institutionalized opinion- and will-formation. (Habermas 1996: 367)

This definition also points to a problematic aspect of the term civil society, namely its hidden normativity. Civil society is regarded as good. The main argument is that “a robust, strong and vibrant civil society strengthens and enhances liberal democracy” (Chambers & Kopstein 2001: 837). This ideal of civil society is often criticized as overlooking the “bad” civil society, which fulfils all criteria of voluntary and pluralistic associations that further the civic virtues of their members, but promote hate, bigotry or violence (Chambers 2006: 373). Tightly connected to this question whether civil society associations are always promoting just causes, act in a public interest or at least do not threaten other groups in society, is the question that is raised more often in the debate about transnational civil society: Is civil society contributing to a strong democracy, and more specifically: Can civil society remedy the democratic deficit in global governance?

Since the late 1990's transnational NGOs and SMOs as actors in a global civil society have become an ambivalent research object in political sociology and IR. Main perspectives focus on the development and dynamics of transnational activism (McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow 2006), the roles and structures of transnational activism (Smith & Sikkink 2002; Smith & Wiest 2005), the participation of transnational NGOs in international institutions' policy making and their influence on international institutions (Steffek & Nanz 2007; Friedrich 2008; Jönsson & Tallberg 2010) and the transnationalization of national and local protests (Della Porta et al. 1999; Rucht 1999; Della Porta & Caiani 2009). Transnational NGOs and SMOs are “governing” their networks independently from the classic arenas of IR-democracy, the international organizations, and at the same time they are extensively interacting with traditional loci of democracy such as state agencies and international organizations. Furthermore, NGOs and SMOs have gotten much more influence and capacity. They are partly taking over state functions and /or international organizations' services. Those developments make civil society networks crucial actors in international relations. Most of the transnational civil society organizations advocate rights, ideas and norms that often concern minorities and unprivileged groups in society, but the targets of their claims, protests and lobby politics are international organizations and national governments (Risse-Kappen 1994; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 2002). For this reason transnational civil society actors are often seen as mediators or the “transmission belt” (Steffek et al. 2008) between citizens and international organizations. With this normative conceptualization of civil society actors it can be asked how inclusive, transparent and participatory international organizations are (Beisheim 2001; Friedrich 2008; Tallberg & Uhlin 2011).

While European democratic theory is very much concerned with the design of democratic institutions, some sociologists and ethnographers in the United States have started to investigate

democracy as a practice in social movements. These scholars want to show that democracy cannot only be analyzed in terms of institutions and structures, but also in the ways that activists create democracy while participating in some kind of civic action (Polletta 2002; Blee 2012). This empirical perspective on democracy as a practice, which evolves, develops and changes through collective actions of participating actors, is very valuable for the context of the barely institutionalized, fluid contexts of TCSNs. Therefore, the practice lens on democracy is used in this study.

Democratic practice will be defined alongside the concept of social practice. Practices are shared courses of action that are co-constituted by actors as well as structures and can be modified by the agency of the actors (Giddens 1984). On a macro-level, people produce and reproduce society through social practice (Bourdieu 1977). This lens on democracy provides the opportunity to see democracy as a procedural category that is not solely bound by democratic institutions. Neither the institutional structure nor the actors alone create democracy in networks. Both, structures and actions co-constitute each other in the practices of TCSNs. Therefore, the translation of democracy from nation states to networks is done through the conceptualization of democracy as practice. In TCSNs, democracy is more likely to be practiced in informal routines between actors. Since these practices can further stabilize internal relationships in the networks, practices have the potential to create democracy without a priori established institutions.

In order to identify democracy in TCSNs, the abstract ideas of democracy should be disentangled from the institutionalist idea of the democratic state. Two sets of ideas are the baseline for the normative logic of democracy: first, the moral equality of each individual in collective rule "...because each individual life is an end in itself, collective decisions ought to recognize, respect, and benefit individual's interests and values equally, insofar as possible." (Warren 2006: 385). The second set of ideas relates to the boundaries of democratic rule and the definition of "the people". The normative claim for democracy is the "empowered inclusion of those affected in collective decisions and actions" (Warren 2006: 386).

The traditional account of democracy is that of an institutional architecture that guarantees certain democratic norms, such as checks and balances, minority protection or equal voting rights. The institutional account of democracy has a long tradition. The social contract as an institutionalization of the relationship between rulers and ruled is a corner stone of the justification of legitimacy of the democratic government, according to Rousseau (1762). This kind of institutionalized relationship was further developed in the federalist papers by Madison, Hamilton and Jay (1787/88) in the drafting of a constitution for the United States of America. In contrast to Rousseau, the federalist papers' authors conceptualized a democratic theory that is based on pluralism and not on the identity of ruler and ruled. Due to the necessity to draft a constitution for a

large mass society, they emphasized representation as a main element. J.S. Mill argued for a representative government with an institutionalized system of pluralist voting (1861).

These foundations of modern democratic theory show the traditional rootedness of democracy in institutions. However, some accounts of democracy that were drafted since the mid-20th century, try to overcome the drawbacks of traditional representative democracy by conceptualizing a more process- and practice-oriented approach to democracy. These approaches are the salient theoretical anchors for the present study and will therefore be outlined in the following three sections of the theoretical part of this dissertation. Process- and practice-oriented democratic theory can be divided into three main strands of literature: (1) the literature on participatory democracy, dating back to Athenian direct democracy, and being revived in the 1960's by Pateman, Hirst and others; (2) the more recent literature of representative claims-making (Saward 2010) and discursive and deliberative representation (Dryzek & Niemeyer 2008, Urbinati 2000) and (3) the large strand of literature dealing with deliberative democracy (Habermas 1994, Cohen 1996, Goodin 2008).

| Democracy as institution | Democracy as practice |
|---|---|
| Democratic contractualism (J.-J. Rousseau 1762) | Participatory democracy (eg. Pateman 1970, Barber 1994) |
| Representative democracy in the federal constitutional state (Madison, Hamilton, Jay 1787/88) | Representative Claims-making (M. Saward 2010) Discursive/deliberative representation (Dryzek & Niemeyer 2008, Urbinati 2000) |
| Democratic representative government (J.S. Mill 1861) | Deliberative Democracy/Proceduralization of popular sovereignty (Habermas 1994, Cohen 1996, Goodin 2008) |

Table 1: Democracy as Institution and Practice

While there are more institution or state-focused approaches within these three strands of literature, such as some participatory democratic approaches that conceptualize an integration of participatory institutions in the institutional setting of states or representative democracy in its more traditional form, many concepts that are part of these three strands of theory assume a practice, process or performance perspective.

As Saward stated, "One of the defining features of democracy may well be its restlessness, dynamism and comparative openness to new ideas" (Saward 2000: 3). The re-discussion and re-framing of traditional democratic theoretical concepts in the light of changed contexts is of theoretical interest of this study. While transnational networks are not always seen as a favorable

place for democracy because of the lack of institutionalization, the conceptualization of democracy as practice can help to evaluate democracy under different conditions than those of the liberal nation state. Consequently, the three subsequent chapters of part I will discuss process-oriented democratic concepts that are not that tightly bound to nation state institutions. Concepts of participatory democracy, current approaches of representative democracy and concepts of deliberative democracy are first outlined and then discussed in terms of their use for the empirical context of TCSNs respectively.

1 Participatory Democracy

Participatory democracy comprises many very different concepts, ranging from the direct democracy in the Athenian Polis to recent concepts of “democracy in the making” in social movement groups. All these concepts, however, share the strong emphasis on equality and the tight connection between equality and freedom. As already argued, I will focus in this chapter, as well as in the subsequent chapters on representative and deliberative democracy, on normative democratic theory and the more abstract ideas within these strands of democratic theory. Only this selection of normative theory makes it possible to translate the identified democratic norms into criteria for democratic practice. The plethora of empirical models in participatory democracy, as well as in the other two strands of democratic theory, is not outlined in full detail, especially because many of these models are conceptualized under the assumption that the state or state actors play an important role (for example in models of participatory governance). Thus, these models assume different preconditions than those that exist in the TCSNs studied here.

Many participatory democrats argue for an equal society which should be an end in itself. This should be reached through equalized participation in politics, which gives citizens the freedom to discuss and decide upon their matters freely. This line of argumentation is as old as the city states in ancient Greece. Later, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762) outlined this idea in his work in popular sovereignty and critics of the liberal representative “thin” democracy revived this line of argumentation again in the 1960’s/70’s. The demand for more citizen participation arose from the insight in the deficiencies of modern democracy (Dahl 1971), the normative claims for more equality in state democracy as well as in other parts of social life (Phillips 1991, 1996, 1998), and the recognition of civic virtues, as well as the assumption that democratic institutions can foster and broaden the moral and cognitive capacities of reasoning in citizens (Goodin 2003). Ideas of participatory democracy were developed in social movement contexts and are often seen as the normative foundation of social movement work when taking a critical stance toward the “thin” democracy of representative governments. These inventions of participatory practice can be observed in the so-called new social movements in the 1960’s and 1970’s as well as for

example in the current Occupy movement, where new practices of equalized discussion and decision-making are invented and tested. Therefore, the consideration of participatory democracy is inevitable in the context of this study on transnational civil society. However, many participatory democrats started with the critical examination of democracy in the state. The first modern theorists of participatory democracy, for example Carole Pateman, argued that citizens can learn from participating in democratic processes to think and act more democratically and less egoistically. Based on this assumption, all kinds of other societal spheres where people interact with each other should be democratized, for example the work place and the economy (Hirst 1994; Pateman 1970). The expansion of participatory democracy to areas of the workplace, family and schools is also demanded by radical democrats. There are, however, gradual differences in the scope of expansion. A rather integrative account of participatory democracy is that of Peter Bachrach (1967) who sees increasing participation as complementary to a representative democracy. This is rejected by more radical participatory democrats such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) or Benjamin Barber (1994). Thus, it can be said that there is a continual range of differing views within participatory democracy from a more integrative approach to a radical account of participatory democracy.

This chapter first outlines the theoretical foundations of participatory democracy rooted in the Athenian Polis and the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. After that, the tight connection of participation, equality and freedom will be outlined in more detail. This assumed interdependency between these three norms is the normative basis of participatory democracy. After this theoretical approximation, the third and fourth section will deal with the practical implementation of participatory democracy. First, the attempts to relate participatory democracy to existing democracies, either in opposition to it or in an integrative approach will be outlined and second, the prospects of participatory democracy in transnational relations as well as inside civil society organizations, will be examined.

1.1 The Theoretical Foundations of Participatory Democracy

The classical democracy of Athens is seen as the origin of democracy, a direct and participatory democracy in a city-republic. The political ideals were “equality among citizens, liberty, respect for the law and justice” (Held 2006:13); all these ideals inspired modern democratic theory. In the Athenian Polis, citizens could engage directly in state affairs; the demos had supreme authority in legislative and judicial functions. Citizens were supposed to subordinate their private lives under public affairs and the common good (Held 2006: 14). Private and public life were intertwined, and every citizen should live “in their own way” (ibid.). Not only the citizens ‘duty’ to participate in political life is expressed in the following quote of Pericles’ Funeral Oration, but

also a reference to the increased quality of decisions after thorough debate, which is a core argument of deliberation theory:

Here each individual is interested not only in his own affairs but in the affairs of the state as well: even those who are mostly occupied with their own business are extremely well-informed on general politics – this is a peculiarity of ours: we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all. We Athenians, in our own persons, take our decisions on policy or submit them to proper discussions: for we do not think that there is an incompatibility between words and deeds; the worst thing is to rush into action before the consequences have been properly debated. (Pericles' Funeral Oration, in Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, pp. 147, as cited by Held 2006: 14)

Equalizing political participation was a main objective of the selection of representatives. The selection of officials by lot in order to avoid a selection according to wealth, education or birth was seen as very democratic. It gave the less wealthy, who are strongest in numbers, the main weight in the political system. Elections were seen as a rather unequal instrument since they favor the well-known and usually richer citizens (Cartledge 2006). Thus, freedom and equality are linked since the freedom to rule and being ruled in turn can only be established if there is an equal share in the capacity to rule, meaning that participation is financially compensated and there are equal chances to hold offices (ibid.):

Thus understood, equality is the practical basis of liberty. It is also the moral basis of liberty, for the belief that people should have an equal share of ruling justifies the first criterion of liberty ('ruling and being ruled in turn'). While this strong commitment to equality might conflict (as many, including Aristotle, have argued) with liberty as measured in the second criterion ('living as one chooses'), democrats hold that there must be some limits to choice if one citizen's freedom is not to interfere unjustly with another's. (Held 2006: 16-17).

This emphasis on liberty understood as ruling and being ruled in turn marks a core understanding of participatory democracy, while the liberal understanding of liberty as "living as one chooses" is often said to conflict with participatory democracy and broad participation. Although the ancient Greek city state democracy was very exclusive in terms of formal citizen rights, it is seen as *the* model of democracy, which lays the foundation for the ideal of an inclusive and participatory democracy. However, the Athenian democracy had only around 30,000-45,000 citizens (Held 2006:12). Because of the exclusion of women, slaves and immigrants, only a small number of inhabitants counted as full citizens. The adaptation of the classical democracy of Athens to modern democracy thus faces problems of scale, complexity and degrees of political heterogeneity (ibid.).

After the Athenian city state democracy, Jean-Jacques Rousseau is often cited as a theorist who laid the groundwork for participatory democracy with his concept of popular sovereignty. He conceptualized popular sovereignty as inalienable, indivisible, infallible, absolute and not to be

delegated (Schmidt 2008: 83). In his theory of republicanism, Rousseau argued against representative government as an unjust governmental theory that alienates people and justifies constant and irrevocable representation (ibid.). On the contrary, he saw the executive government as a servant to the people who are active citizens directly involved in the legislation: "In Rousseau's account, the idea of self-rule is posited as an end in itself; a political order offering opportunities for participation in the arrangement of public affairs should not just be a state, but rather the formation of *a type of society*: a society in which the affairs of the state are integrated into the affairs of ordinary citizens (...)" (Held 2006: 45). These ideas of democracy as well as the justification of democracy as an end in itself were taken up by current participatory democrats as Benjamin Barber, who alleges that representative democracy and participatory democracy cannot go together (Schmidt 2008: 84).

1.2 The Triad of Participation, Equality and Freedom

Participatory democratic theorists argue that individuals and institutions should not be divided in a society. Therefore, the representative democracy is not a sufficient democratic system because institutions seem often to be remote from citizens. However, the continuous and broad participation of individuals in society is necessary to develop democratic competencies and skills. Thus, public discourse is an essential part of democratic decision-making, but citizens should not only participate in collective will-formation. They should also have access to political power (Walk 2008: 79).

Should All Citizens Equally Participate? A Fundamental Debate

Participatory democracy is praised for its developmental effects: "Participatory deliberation yields citizens who are more knowledgeable, public spirited, better able to see the connections between their own interests and those of others, and more willing to reevaluate their own interests." (Polletta 2002: 11). The main arguments for the strengthening of participatory democracy are (1) that the authority structures of institutions are interrelated with the psychological qualities and attitudes of individuals, and (2) that the major function of participatory democracy is to educate (Pateman 1970: 27, citing Rousseau (1762) [1968], *The Social Contract*). Participatory democrats thus see a potential in citizens who can develop skills, capacities and virtue under the conditions of a strengthened participatory inclusion of citizens into decision-making processes. In turn, this means that very authoritative state structures prohibit citizens from making use of their "psychological qualities and attitudes". Consequently, citizens are forced to remain passive in such a minimal democratic polity.

In her book about participation and democracy, Carole Pateman (1970) investigates the relationships between work place contexts and the sense of a political efficacy. At first, she demon-

strates through many studies, above all the one by Almond and Verba (1963) that there is a clear relationship between the sense of political efficacy and actual political participation. People who are involved on the local level in non-governmental activities and people who have a high socio-economic status have a sense of political efficacy. Taking the finding that people, who are locally engaged feel more interested and capable to participate in national politics seriously lets Pateman, as many other participatory democratic theorists, conclude that a “democratic character” can be learned (Pateman 1970: 53). Secondly, while studying the impact of work place situations, she finds that workers who have more room for individual problem-solving and exercise their skills have much higher self-esteem and feel more capable to be involved in political matters. In contrast, workers who are treated as subordinates in a strictly hierarchical authority structure do not have this sense of political efficacy and feel like powerless subordinates in the political system as well as in their workplace (Pateman 1970: 50-52). Those two lines of reasoning argue that the political apathy of the majority of people is not an unchangeable fact, but that the “psychological qualities (the sense of political efficacy) required for participation at the national level” (Pateman 1970: 50) can be developed and fostered by the participation in non-governmental authority structures and the democratization of the work place (ibid.).

In critically examining elitist democratic theory, Bachrach (1967) comes to a similar diagnosis. The elitist concept of democracy, which Pateman calls contemporary democratic theory, is founded on the assumption that a majority of people in society are not interested in engaging in politics and are furthermore not capable of making reasonable decisions. The potential participation of those masses poses a threat to democracy. Bachrach describes how democratic theorists shifted their focus from corrupt elites and authoritarian despots in the 18th and 19th century as hindering the development of democracy, to the people or the “ordinary man” who in the western industrial societies was suspected to threaten political freedom (Bachrach 1967: 46). Studies observed that the working class is more authoritarian in its habits and social behavior, because members of the working class are socially isolated and do not participate in public life. Advocates of elitist democratic theory see this evidence as an unchangeable fact and therefore propose to avoid broad participation. In contrast, participatory democrats see the apathy of wide parts of the population as something that can be changed on an individual basis. Being a democratic citizen can be learned by participation. This is called the self-transformation thesis (Warren 1993), a central element of participatory democracy. Furthermore, Bachrach criticizes that democracy is seen by elitist democrats as a mere end in itself, a “political method” without any normative claims. This deprives democracy from any goal it could have. According to Bachrach and other participatory democrats, a democracy’s goal should be the self-development of its citizens (Bachrach 1967: 118-119). In this context, advocates of a “thin democracy” would pose the question, if a democracy needs all people to participate in political decision-making or if

it is not enough that a few are active. Pateman would answer that this form of contemporary liberal democracy that we find in western liberal states is not a real democracy in the original sense of democracy as a government for and *by* the people (Pateman 1970: 104).

However, the claim for broader citizen participation, understood as a democratization of democracy, is far from being an uncontested issue. A more descriptive and “value free” contemporary democratic theory strongly opposes the idea of a wide participation of entire populations in nation states. Democratic theorists such as Dahl (1971) or Sartori (1997) feared the danger of destabilization and potentially totalitarian rule when all people are actively participating in a political system (Pateman 2000: 15). Other political scientists in the 1970’s were concerned about the “involvement of an increasing proportion of the population in political activity [...] the development of new groups and of new consciousness on the part of old groups, including youth, regional and ethnic minorities” and their expansion of tactics and goals (Crozier et al. 1975: 163). This would, as they argued, lead to an overload and consequential weakening of the democratic state. Besides the overloading of state agencies, critics argue that there are other downsides of participation: (1) an inclusive participation cannot be realized, because different social groups participate to different degrees (this unequal participation will be discussed later on); (2) citizens lack skills and competencies to make informed decisions; (3) citizen participation has in general little impact on political decisions; (4) enhancing citizen participation is not an efficient mode of governance; and (5) effectiveness of citizen participation is limited by scale, and thus transferability from smaller to bigger units is limited (see Smith 2009: 14-20). Furthermore, political sociologists claim that wider spheres of the population, especially the lower classes, are not interested in participating in politics (Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995). Verba calls that a participatory distortion: Only the well-off, well-educated and well informed become active in politics (Verba et al. 1995): “(...) the voices that speak loudly articulate a different set of messages about the state of the public, its needs and its preferences from those that would be sent by those who are inactive. Were everyone equally active, or were activists drawn at random from across the population, an unbiased set of communications would emerge” (ibid: 11). In sum, criticism of participatory democracy raises two main points: the effectiveness problem and the equality problem. First, broader participation does not only weaken the effectiveness of government (overload of input); it is also in itself not supposed to be politically effective. There is not much political impact when citizens become active, as critics of participatory instruments argue. Secondly, in terms of the equality problem, more participation, assuming that citizens’ attitudes towards politics are unchangeable, would only lead to more participation from the well-off who are the ones with time and capacities. The latter point will be subsequently elaborated.

The relationship between participation and equality is a crucial point of debate between liberal theorists favoring representative democracy and participatory democratic theorists. While liberal democrats argue that more participation reinforces inequalities in society, participatory democrats argue that equality and participation are mutually reinforcing. Participatory democrats agree that more participation initially generates inequality among participants - only the eloquent ones with more spare time etc. will participate. However, at the macro-level and in the long run the democratization of e.g. the work place will contribute to more equality in society as a whole. This will in turn motivate more subordinate members of the participant group (e.g. the workers' movement) to demand their rights within the group (Bachrach & Botwinick 1992). From a normative standpoint, Macpherson (1977) argues in favor of participatory democracy because it is normatively desirable that societies should be more equal. He also admits that a sheer increase of participation does not cure inequality, but that "It is only that low participation and social inequity are so bound up with each other that a more equitable and humane society requires a more participatory political system" (Macpherson 1977: 94). However, he identifies a major dilemma in making political systems more participatory. Two prerequisites have to be met before participatory democracy can work: (1) the image of the citizen as a consumer must be replaced, and (2) social and economic inequality must be reduced in society (Macpherson 1977: 100). Thus, participatory democracy is obviously stuck in a vicious cycle: it could make societies more equal, but before this can happen, societies must have transformed into more equal societies in order to enable all citizens to participate. Macpherson identifies three loopholes in this vicious cycle. At first, he notices that more and more people doubt or rethink the cost-benefit-ratio and the virtues of expansion and more and more identify the costs of expansion such as air, water and earth pollution. This could be a first step away from a thin market-embedded democracy. Secondly, there is an increasing awareness of the costs of political apathy and in turn the awareness of participation's political efficacy. Neighborhood activity is increasing as well as movements for more democracy at the workplace. Finally, there is growing doubt about corporate capitalism to meet consumer expectations in the long run (Macpherson 1977: 103-04). These developments are, according to Macpherson, gateways to more participatory and consequently equal societies from the bottom-up. Now, more than 35 years later, Macpherson's normative hopes in participatory democracy have not materialized. Since the loopholes for participatory democracy still exist, and neither the consumption logic of citizens nor the social and economic inequality in society has been significantly reduced, it might need to be rethought if participatory democracy grows only from a bottom-up initiative or if participatory democracy needs structural change.

The debate about inequality in society and if participation can engender or lessen inequality is continued by Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth (2003), who both argue, with the concept of

recognition, for and against the positive effects of more participation, respectively. Both assume that inequality of status in a society is produced by the lack of recognition⁷ between social actors. Recognition should not be seen as something personal, subjective or even psychological, but as an institutional structure, a *norm of participatory equal opportunities* (Fraser 2003: 46-48). Whereas Nancy Fraser identifies the different types of new social movements as the ones that fight the battle for recognition and symbolize the “others” in society, namely those who do not fit in the norm of the white, heterosexual, middle class man⁸, Honneth counters that those new social movement groups are already recognized and visible in society. They have already won recognition, left the shadows of the public sphere, and produced exclusion and inequality themselves (Honneth 2003).

Although Pateman, Bachrach, Macpherson, Fraser and Honneth are conceptualizing the relationship between participation and equality in the framework of broader societies, they argue that equality can also be gained through participatory democracy within social movement groups or civil society organizations. Whereas Bachrach states that participatory democracy can also maintain equality within specific social movements, Macpherson alleges that the development within civil society can lead to more opportunities for practicing participatory democracy and therefore increasing equality in broader society. Fraser and Honneth argue about the norm of equal participatory opportunities (Fraser 2003: 46-48) and disagree about the potential of social movements in civil society to provide equal opportunities for subordinated social groups.

The Tight Connection between Freedom and Equality

Anne Phillips argues for participatory democracy as a solution for inequalities in society by using Rousseau’s argument that no citizen can be free if society is unequal. In this view, inequality undermines freedom and consent. As long as one man is rich enough to make another one his servant, and as long as another is so poor that he has to submit, they cannot be considered equally independent (Phillips 1991: 15-16). Thus, if inequality persists, democracy in its normative connotation is not possible. The critical perspective on structural inequalities in modern democracies is a very valuable contribution of feminist political theory to participatory democracy. Feminist political theorists stress the systematic and historical subordination of groups in democracies. Although feminist democratic theory is quite a new strand of literature, which exists since the mid-1990’s, renowned feminist political theorists such as Carole Pateman, Anne Phillips and Iris Marion Young brought concepts of equal representation and groups rights in democracy into the debate on equality and freedom in democracies (Phillips 1993; Young 2000;

⁷ The recognition of difference in a cultural scheme or the mutual recognition of social actors means that people can participate in social life equally and are not pushed outside of social interaction or are stigmatized as inferior or “the other” Fraser (2003: 45).

⁸ Fraser calls that the „postsocialist conflict scenario” (Fraser 2003).

Holland-Cunz 2008). The reason for inequality in democracies from a feminist perspective is clearly rooted in the male concept of citizenship, which is (falsely) perceived as a universal citizenship concept. Feminist political theorists argue that the concept of the individual citizen in liberal democracy is not gender-neutral. There is a specific and not gender-neutral understanding of the individual in liberal democratic theory based on market relations. Individuals in a democracy are proprietors of their own persons, as Macpherson has argued, and thus the freedom of citizens merely depends on their freedom from any contractual relationship with others. The wage workers can freely enter a contract to allow others to use their capacity as workers (Phillips 1991: 31). However, women historically have not formed consented contracts with others. The one contract they primarily agreed to was a marriage contract in which they were to “hand over their body to another” (Phillips 1991: 35). This kind of contract could not be compared to work contracts, which are entered freely. The individual who is able to consent as such is a male category because the male and female perspectives on freedom and possession differ. Therefore, the concept of citizenship is not universal. The image of a free individual possessing his own person and handing it over to someone else in a contractual relationship cannot be compared to marriage contracts⁹. Therefore, Phillips states that “[t]he notions of consent and freedom that underlie liberal philosophy are grounded in the experience of the male.” (ibid.). Participatory democrats and feminist political theorists share a similar critique of liberal democracy. The strict division of public and private sphere and its implication on political equality are criticized by participatory democrats as well as feminists. Both argue for more participation because it does not make sense to have universal suffrage when main decisions about supposedly private matters such as employment, housing and education are left to an un-elected administration (Phillips 1991: 38-39). Similar to feminist critiques, the developmental argument of participatory democracy also targets the division of private and public spheres. Democratic practices are learned in the private sphere of family, work or schools and thus it is not a logical step for many women to engage in democracy on the national level where those matters are not negotiated and decided (ibid.).

More theoretically, the feminist focus on division between public and private has made the question of *where* democracy should be practiced a central, inescapable concern.[...] Diversity, difference, differences, seem to be emerging as central preoccupations in a feminist perspective on democracy. If this is so, they point to active discussion and participation as the key. (italics in the original, Phillips 1991: 41).

While the representative state democracy is criticized for being exclusive and for marginalizing women e.g. in parliamentary representation, participatory forms of democracy are much better received in feminist discourse. First, such forms were concretely practiced in the old and new

⁹ Phillips also points to rape trials and the negotiation of what counts as consent of women. Here, she argues, it becomes clear that a woman’s consent (and disagreement respectively) is not valued or even taken seriously under the contract of marriage (Phillips 1991: 35).

women's movements. Second, they leave room for diverse participation forms, a diversity of voices and the democratization of all spheres of life, including the private sphere¹⁰ (Holland-Cunz 2008: 533): "Those who have been previously subordinated, marginalized or silenced need the security of a guaranteed voice and in the transitional period to a full and equal citizenship, democracies must act to redress the imbalance that centuries of oppression have wrought." (Phillips 1991: 7). This normative claim of democracy, as formulated by Anne Phillips in her feminist account of participatory democracy, conceptualizes and identifies inequality as a structural, complex and historical phenomenon that cannot just be solved by giving all citizens the same political rights as in liberal democracy. Opening up institutions to citizen participation does not cure the problem of inequality. Difference theorists, such as Anne Phillips, emphasize the logic of presence: the interests of those who are not present in specific meetings will most likely not be considered (Phillips 1995). Consequently, difference theorists argue that it is particularly necessary to test if institutions motivate people from marginalized groups to participate. In sum, the feminist perspective on democracy highlights the necessity of participatory forms and elements of democracy in order to contribute to a more equalized democratic system, not only in terms of gender equality, but also with respect to equality for any groups that are subordinated in society. Feminist authors in particular raise the question *where* democracy should be practiced and learned. Furthermore, feminist democratic theory critically investigates the understanding of allegedly universal rules and principles of democracy. In how far these rules can produce inequalities is outlined by feminist theorists such as Phillips and Young. Men and women must be treated differently in order to be equal. Broadening this thesis to other groups in society, the normative claim of participatory democracy for a wider inclusion is a demand for pro-active and group context sensitive participation practices. The question that feminist political theorists pose in relation to gender categories, namely what structures and ideas inherent in democratic institutions favor a specific circle of people over another (men over women), is relevant in relation to other social categories as well. The structural differences in TCSNs for example are much more blatant than within a nation state. Therefore, the question of equal representation and group rights must be thought through more thoroughly because the conditions of groups in transnational networks are very different. Thus, equality is difficult to reach, especially in a context of fluid network coordination. . It is one important element of this empirical study to investigate in how far participants and coordinators in TCSNs are sensitive towards difference and how this is mirrored in their practices

¹⁰ The liberal dualism of public and private sphere is a main field of contestation in feminist theory. Whereas the private sphere as the sphere of difference is mostly attributed to women, the public domain is in those classical accounts a male sphere. This was and is extensively criticized and reformulated by feminists.

In sum, the idea of participatory democracy, which expands participation in society and democracy as the guiding principle in different domains of society, is guided by normative assumptions of the effects of participatory democracy. Those normative assumptions of participatory democracy imply that (1) society should be equal and (2) society can change, and citizens can learn. Those assumptions and the positive outlook on the potentials of democracy are much more comprehensive than the minimalist concepts of democracy, which define democracy as the protection from tyrannical rule. Also, the liberal dualism of private and public sphere is partly dissolved when democracy enters spheres that are not the classic arenas of politics. Overall, it can be concluded that the demands of participatory democracy are much more ambitious and extensive than those of representative liberal democrats, which corresponds with the democratic ideas of many social movements. Due to its shifting focus away from state institutions, participatory democracy is better adaptable to the transnational network context of the present study than other forms of democracy.

1.3 From System Change to Integration: Participatory Democracy vis-à-vis State and Society

Radical democrats conceptualized theories of participatory democracy that go beyond basic liberal assumptions of democratic theory and thus most often imply a more systematic change of the political system than many reformists among participatory democrats suggest. Whereas a criticism of liberal theory by the more “moderate” participatory democrats targets the concrete arrangements of liberal representative democracy, radical democrats question fundamental assumptions of liberal theory such as the concept of the individual citizen as the central point of reference for any democratic legitimization. The concept of radical democracy by Laclau and Mouffe (Laclau & Mouffe [1985] 2001) studies hegemony and antagonism as essential parts of politics. Many scholars referred to this theory as “Postmarxism”, but besides the reinterpretation of Gramsci, it is also contribution to discourse theory and democratic theory. The contribution to democratic theory was further developed by Chantal Mouffe (Mouffe 1997) and will be outlined below. Some current democratic theorists who investigate network democracy refer to Laclau and Mouffe’s theory as the basis for a new post-liberal democratic theory (Torfing 2003; Marcussen & Torfing 2007).

For the present study, it is relevant to consider the notion of citizen identity and the assumptions of the functioning of politics in radical democracy. A pluralist concept of citizen identity such as in radical democracy is applicable to the transnational network context. Sørensen and Torfing (2005) have already pointed out that Mouffe refers to Wittgenstein’s “grammar of conduct” as the constituting principles of democracy that guide democratic practice (Mouffe 1997: 85). The common good coincides with this grammar of conduct, according to Mouffe (ibid.).

However, since these principles can be interpreted differently, there must be some sort of exclusion; a radical inclusive democracy is impossible (ibid.). Nevertheless, Laclau and Mouffe's concept of radical democracy considers the plurality and diversity of citizens' concepts as relevant without trying to find essentialist categories of groups that merely reflect diversity such as in a liberal concept of citizens. Thus, citizen identities are diverse and overlapping, which is especially true in transnational network settings: "Citizenship is not just one identity among others, as it is in liberalism, nor is it the dominant identity that overrides all others, as it is in civic republicanism. Instead, it is an articulating principle that affects the different subject positions of the social agent, while allowing for a plurality of specific allegiances and for the respect of the individual liberty" (Mouffe 1997: 84). Similar to liberals, Laclau and Mouffe value pluralism, but the self-determination of social groups is only legitimate insofar as it does not stop disempowered groups from achieving equality (ibid.):

"What we wish to point out is that politics as a practice of creation, reproduction and transformation of social relations cannot be located at a determinate level of the social, as the problem of the political is the problem of the institution of the social, that is, of the definition and articulation of social relations in a field criss-crossed with antagonisms." (Laclau & Mouffe [1985] 2001: 153).

Thus, radical democracy suggests a systematic change in conceptualizing democracy. Besides the emphasis on pluralism, which is shared by liberal concepts of democracy, radical democracy takes a critical stance towards the belief in the "nature" of politics. Laclau and Mouffe argue that there is always an alternative way to practice politics; there is no determination in "how things are done". Hegemonies and antagonisms for example are created and reproduced, but they are not necessarily fixed (Laclau and Mouffe [1985] 2001). This perspective gives room to think about citizenship and participation outside the common demarcation lines of modern liberal democratic theory. This does not only support the practice or practical aspect of democracy, which is pursued in this study; Torfing and Sørensen (2005) used the same perspective to conceptualize democratic quality in governance networks, which is conducive to the understanding of TCSNs, too. Thus, the debate about radical democracy and its recipients will be important for the translation of democratic theory into analytic categories of democratic quality in transnational civil societies.

Although it seems that participatory democracy often stands in opposition to liberal representative democracy, there are approaches that attempt to integrate participatory elements into existing democratic systems. At first associative democracy puts an emphasis on secondary associations in civil society to complement the common participation repertoire in representative democracy. The more recent concept of "Empowered Participatory Governance" argues similarly for an institutionalization of civil society participation in politics.

Two main conceptualizations of associative democracy share the idea of a self-governance of secondary associations as a form to widen participation in representative democracies. While Cohen and Rogers (1992) rather favor a governance model of associative democracy that implies state regulation of group representation (Cohen & Rogers 1992: 425), the associationalism put forward by Hirst (1994) criticizes the “centralized and sovereign state with radical federalist and pluralist ideas advanced as a substitute” (Hirst 1994: 15). While Cohen and Rogers’ approach clearly underlines the dangers of free group representation for democratic norms such as egalitarian participation, Hirst’s emphasis is on voluntarism and self-government of secondary associations. Thus, according to Hirst, political organization should be restructured so that voluntary self-governing associations “gradually and progressively become the primary means of democratic governance of economic and social affairs” (Hirst 1994: 20). The state gives up some functions to private agencies, not in the liberal understanding of privatization and *laissez-faire* politics, but as a means to pluralize society. These private agencies are accountable to “those for whom the service or activity is provided” (Hirst 1994: 22). Contrary to the conceptualization of the state in liberal democratic theory, the state here is the secondary institution, whereas civil society takes over social and public functions and thus becomes the primary institution in society: “Self-governing civil society thus becomes the primary feature of society.” (Hirst 1994: 26). Overall, government shifts from being a service provider to a means of protecting citizens’ rights and of ensuring that social services are provided adequately (*ibid.*). Another principle of political organization according to associationalism is that deliberation and reflection complement elections and majority decision. There should be a constant information flow between governors and the governed. In representative governments, governors seek consent and cooperation of the governed (Hirst 1994: 20) and therefore influence the quality and scale of decision-making, which Hirst identifies as the main problem of representative government (*ibid.*). His concept of democracy as communication is very close to neo-corporatist concepts of social governance, which define the quality of decision-making by the interaction between governing agencies and the agencies organizing the activities being governed (Hirst 1994: 35). This can also be critical when the state is creating voluntary organizations that are highly dependent on the state and quite weak in their potential of critical reflection. According to Hirst, this problem can be solved by creating more organizations from below and having more regional organizations (Hirst 1994: 39). This would pluralize civil society even more. In addition, regional organizations further the devolution of state functions.

A more recent approach to participatory democracy, which is similarly envisioned as a reform of state and society, is conceptualized by Fung and Wright (2003) who have systematized the observations of participatory projects ranging from participatory budgeting to deliberation forums and mini-publics or citizen juries (Fung & Wright 2003; Smith 2009). These concepts aim at a

more concrete application of participatory or deliberative norms. Fung and Wright's reformist concept "Empowered Participatory Governance" seeks to broaden the practical orientation of deliberation and wants to do justice to the importance of bottom-up civic engagement and secondary associations for a vivid democracy. Furthermore, they argue for a broader discovering and imagining of (participatory) institutions (Fung and Wright 2003b: 16-17). The design of Empowered Participatory Governance is built on three fundamental ideas: (1) devolution: The power to conceptualize tasks should be delegated to local units; (2) centralized supervision and coordination: Local units should not be purely autonomous; accountability should be linked to superordinate bodies (Fung and Wright 2003: 20-21); and (3) state-centered, not voluntaristic participatory governance: The participatory model does not see social movement actors influencing state institutions from the outside, but remaking official institutions themselves along participatory norms. Therefore, Fung and Wright (2003) argue that this approach is even more radical than other concepts of participatory democracy because it institutionalizes a permanent participation instead of temporary activities of typical social movement mobilization. (ibid.: 22).

Both, associative democracy and Empowered Participatory Governance clearly highlight the role of civil society organizations within democratic structure. Both approaches conceptualize a shift towards associational self-governance, pluralism and federalism as the major step towards a democratization of states and societies in the face of a decreasing role of the state for democratic governance due to globalization, differentiation, complexity and pluralization (Warren 2001: 4). In addition, associationalists advocate for a democratization of the economy through principles of cooperation and mutuality (Hirst 1994: 15), which resembles the concept of expansive concept of participatory democracy. Both concepts argue that the dialogical manner of decision-preparation, the decentralization and the transformationalist function of associations for engaged citizens speak for the democratizing effects of associations such as civil society organizations.

1.4 The Prospects of Participatory Democracy for Transnational Civil Society Networks

The general normative impetus of all varieties of participatory democracy to expand democracy into different social spheres is relevant for this study because of three reasons.

First, democracy in TCSNs spans across state borders. Therefore, the foundations of liberal representative democracy, such as the guaranty of citizens' rights for a well-defined citizenry, are challenged. It becomes more and more difficult to grant "citizens' rights" to a diverse and temporary number of "citizens" who are members of organizations in a fluid transnational network. In addition, there is no state-like institution that has the power to control this guarantee. Thus,

democracy in TCSNs must be conceptualized first and foremost as a process-oriented rather than as institution-oriented democracy. This process dimension is inherent in the participatory approaches of democratic theory.

Second, the main assumption that every citizen is capable of learning and practicing participatory democracy and that participatory democracy leads to better and more long-lasting decisions is reflected and adapted in the participation practices within transnational grass-roots NGO coalition networks. These participation practices are different from domestic state democracy's representative governments and are therefore rather related to normative participatory democratic theory. Civil society as a sphere outside the state is a suggested place to practice democracy by many, if not all participatory democrats. Theorists of associative democracy (Cohen & Rogers 1992; Hirst 1994) in particular refer to the importance of civil society for democratizing democracy. Thus, the discussion about participatory democracy that focuses on empirical studies of participatory democracy inside states will be excluded from this overview. For example, concepts of direct democracy via plebiscites are not adoptable to the present empirical context

Third, in the civil society networks included in this study, it can be empirically observed how far democracy expands. For example, those networks are not only civil society coalitions; they also serve as work places for the people employed in different NGOs. It is worthwhile to explore in how far democratic procedures diffuse from the network into working routines at the local level or if there is a sharp dividing line between the transnational network collaboration and the workplace settings "at home".

1.4.1 A Model for Participatory Transnational Democracy: Global Stakeholder Democracy

A participatory approach to transnational democracy was put forward by Terry MacDonald (2008). In applying the stakeholder concept to transnational relations, she suggested a concept that is built on public power as the main instrument of democratic control. "Multiple agents of public power" should be "held to account by their multiple overlapping 'stakeholder' communities" (Macdonald 2008: 13). The stakeholder concept was originally introduced in business studies in order to identify stakeholders, next to shareholders, as a group that should be included in decision-making on companies' developments (Walk 2008). Within the literature on participatory democracy, the stakeholder concepts functions as a basis to identify relevant affected groups, that should participate in political planning and decision-making processes (Walk 2008: 52-53). The stakeholder approach assumes that interest groups are sufficiently institutionalized in order to be identified by political authorities and that they contribute effectively to the problem solution. Thus, the output criterion is in some of these approaches higher valued than the

educational aspects that were highlighted by Pateman and others (ibid.). Moreover, in contrast to other participatory democratic approaches, the inclusion of stakeholders is limited to a manageable size of possible stakeholders. Stakeholder concepts are applied in public-private partnerships or in multi-stakeholder initiatives (ibid.). Beisheim & Kaan (Beisheim & Kaan 2010) for example find in their evaluation of transnational standard-setting public-private partnerships that the broad inclusion of stakeholders has a direct effect on the output of standard-setting in that a “customized institution” (2010: 138) could be developed. While Walk (2008) and Beisheim & Kaan (2010) identify the stakeholder concept as a rather pragmatic and empirical model of participatory governance, Bäckstrand (2006) and MacDonald (2008) envision a normative potential to broaden the range of participating actors in non-electoral contexts of global governance (Bäckstrand 2006) and to install direct democratic control in a “pluralist global order” (Macdonald & Macdonald 2010). MacDonald & MacDonald argue that the global order differs to the nation state order in that it is characterized by pluralist structures of power instead of sovereign structures of power. Sovereign structures of power are characterized by centralized and constitutionalized public power¹¹, whereas the public power across national borders is characterized by an “organizationally complex network of public political agencies” and a “radically decentralized” structure of state and nonstate actors (MacDonald & MacDonald 2010: 24). According to the authors, this poses two key challenges of democratic control in the global order: First, the multiple actors that exert public power need to be held directly accountable to their own stakeholder community. Indirect accountability, as in national governments to the delegatory chain of control is not possible. This makes any form of electoral control seem very improbable. Second, the so-called “nonsovereign forms of public power (such as corporate power)” (MacDonald & MacDonald: 26) are less institutionally stable and transparent than sovereign forms of public power, which makes it more difficult to democratically control them (ibid.). The normative agenda of the global stakeholder democracy would thus be to connect the pluralist forms of public power with their multiple stakeholder groups (MacDonald & MacDonald 2010: 32). The more institutionally stable and transparent these forms of power are, the better responsibilities can be identified. This approach is insofar interesting as it neither tries to adopt democratic institutions from nation state contexts to the transnational level, nor does this approach claim to define a completely new democratic architecture for the global order. However, there is a major practicability concern that needs to be raised. It remains vague how these highly complex and decentralized actors should be institutionally stabilized and bound back to their stakeholder communities in practice. While MacDonald and Macdonald’s study follows the diagnosis of a pluralist global order with multiple overlapping stakeholder communities vis-à-vis

¹¹ Public power is defined as the power that “prospectively affects in some problematic way the equal autonomous entitlements of individuals such that there is a normative imperative for its democratic control” (MacDonald & MacDonald 2010: 21).

pluralist forms of public power, the focus of this study is rather on the substantive practices that actually take place than on the institutional order that forms around them. MacDonald & MacDonald (2010) come to a very negative assertion of the democratic control mechanisms which they ascribe to the absence of a constitutional structure and a generally weak institutionalization of control mechanisms. However, this evaluation is based on the criteria of the control of sovereign power within nation states and thus this study argues to take the notion of different institutional preconditions in transnational relations more seriously and adopt, as argued before, a practice lens that can better identify the democratic quality of such pluralist and decentralized transnational networks. The concept of global stakeholder democracy is a very valuable framework for participatory democracy in the transnational sphere. For the purpose of this study, this framework needs more translation into observable categories of participatory practice. Therefore, it is necessary to examine in more detail the potentials of participatory democracy *inside* civil society groups, which will be done in the following chapter.

1.4.2 Internal Democracy in Civil Society Groups

Whereas associative democracy conceptualizes the outward role of civil society organizations in society and in relation to the state, the literature discussed in this section is concerned with internal participatory democracy in civil society organizations. Besides the developmental or transformative effects on individuals that are ascribed to participatory democracy, there are other factors, namely contexts and forms of civil society organizations, that either influence participatory democracy or that influence the strategies, goals and success of civil society organization according to different applications and interpretations of participatory democratic principles. Civil society organizations do not necessarily provide favorable circumstances for participatory democracy, as Warren (1993) reflects. In general, two characteristics of civil society organizations and their networks tend to counteract a participatory will formation: (1) the sense of solidarity within groups and (2) the action orientation of civil society organizations. (1) The voluntary character of civil society organizations “and the ease of exit will mean that they will be relatively homogenous, self-selecting for values and lifestyles. In these cases, non-reflexive ideological or religious identities may reinforce one another, and attempts to critique and discourse may be regarded as unwelcome challenges to the solidarity of the group” (Warren 1993: 227). (2) Many civil society organizations are action-oriented, and their communication will thus focus on strategic concerns rather than critique and discourse (ibid.). Overall, Warren argues that civil societies’ internal organization is not conducive for participatory democracy. In further differentiating between different types of civil society organizations, Warren (2001) identifies a negative relationship between these inner and the outer dimensions, namely the two democratic dimensions of civil society. He states that those organizations that emphasize internal deliberation and thus the furthering of individual autonomy inside the group or organization (internal dimen-

sion) can potentially be less successful in articulating a strong public voice, which would further the political autonomy of the organization and their constituency (outer dimension)(Warren 2001: 79). Vice versa, it is plausible that organizations, which are very successful in giving a public voice to subordinate interests, might not be that eager on deliberating inside the organization. Inside deliberation can make claims very intricate, complex or even diffuse, whereas giving a public voice means communicating efficiently and understandably to the public.

Whereas many grass-roots civil society organizations, especially the ones that are part of the two networks examined in this study, are deeply committed to participatory democracy, their interpretation and rules of those processes varies depending on the social relationships within the groups as well as with others (Polletta 2002: 4). For example, activists seeing each other as colleagues, business partners, family members or friends deliberately affect the interactions within groups and create rules on how to raise issues or find a consensus (ibid.). Overall, the role of friendship and trust seems to be ambivalent for participatory democracy in social movement groups. Friendship and more specifically trust among participants is the basis for participatory democracy, but friendship can also undermine participatory principles by its tendency towards exclusivity, deference, conflict avoidance and “antipathy to the rules that might have made for more accountability” (Polletta 2002: 222). Therefore, social movement groups have to invent new forms of cooperation that alleviate the negative consequences of close friendships among movement members (ibid.). “

In her study of different American social movements, Polletta argues against the conventional thesis that participatory democracy is valuable but not practical because it is inefficient, time-consuming and not goal-oriented. In contrast, she argues that many social movement groups adopt participatory democratic procedures out of strategic reasons and not ideological ones, as it is usually assumed:

It is in some ways a very different version of participatory democracy than that current in the 1960's. No one believes any longer that decisions can always be made by strict consensus. Activists are more comfortable with rules, less hostile to power, and more attuned to the inequalities concealed in informal relations. As a mode of deliberation, participatory democracy incorporates elements of representative democracy; as an organizational form, it incorporates elements of bureaucracy. (Polletta 2002: 202-203)

Groups that operate in uncertain conditions and do not have much access to power could benefit from participatory decision-making (Polletta 2002: 2), which “gives members a stake in the organization and responsibility for its fate.” Further, she argues, “[i]nformality encourages affectively rich relations, and the organization's egalitarian structure makes for mutual respect and, thence, solidarity.” (Polletta 2002: 210). Decision-makers learn to avoid pursuing one true answer, but try to explore several possibilities to find collective answers (ibid.). This leads to par-

ticipants who are more tolerant of differences and “better able to engage in moral discourse and judgment” (Warren 1993: 209), described as the self-transformation thesis by Warren (1993). In addition to these benefits, there is also a very motivational recruitment factor in participatory democracy in movement groups. Open discussions and the equally serious evaluations of all ideas and proposals can make participants sense that the whole process of decision-making is worthwhile because nobody will be left out, leading to decisions with which everyone could agree. Still, those kinds of benefits are “most obvious in conditions where people have had few prior opportunities for political leadership” (Polletta 2002: 212). In stable groups with constant funding, the benefits of participatory democracy might not be that evident (*ibid.*) and the shift toward goal-orientation might be even more popular.

The emphasis on participatory democracy also changes over time. As Blee (2012) found out, in her study on micro-dynamics in social movement groups in Pittsburgh, social movement groups gain coherence by forgetting that they disagreed in earlier discussion and subsequently just see their decisions as inevitable (Blee 2012). This goes along with a habitualization of once installed mechanisms: “early cultural dynamics can undermine the democratizing potential of activism as grass-roots groups fall into routines that erode their imagination and engagement” (Blee 2012: 138). Thus, the starting phase of a group formation is in so far very crucial as it can go two ways. First, it can either set the standards for participatory democracy, which can be recalled later, Second, cultural dynamics can lead to a tendency towards convention, such as always recruiting similar members, gaining information from familiar sources and limiting the possibilities of talking to each other (Blee 2012: 138). The latter of course diminishes the potential for participatory democracy within social movement groups. However, the first possibility of setting standards is not self-enforcing. As mentioned earlier, groups can simply forget the initial deliberation about their principles and instead emphasize loyalty and stability in the group instead of sustaining participatory democratic principles. Still, Blee states that some groups in her study “were able to escape paths of diminishing possibility through self-conscious efforts” (Blee 2012: 139). They brought ideas back on the table, reminded each other of earlier discussions and ideas they had not followed, remained explicit about why which decisions were made, designed strategies to stay open for input of new members, encouraged others to voice their concerns, and discussed about alternative actions and made ideas explicit (*ibid.*). Although this seems like an exhausting exercise, it allows groups to remain thriving and democratic. Overall, Blee concludes that “[g]rassroots activism can only strengthen democracy when it nurtures a broad sense of possibility.” (Blee 2012: 140). In addition, Polletta sees the causes for a decrease in participatory democracy in movement groups not only in the difficulties of staying with participatory principles, but also in the differing demands of social movements, the features of political discourse and broader cultural conceptions (Polletta 2002: 217).

In sum, participatory democracy in civil society organizations is very much dependent on contextual factors and on how activists can sustain principles over time and resist tendencies of habitualization and accommodation to close social relations. Finally, it can be questioned whether participatory democracy is effective in internally diverse, complex and resource-dependent groups (Polletta 2002: 221) or even networks. Also, the argument about the potential risks of too much resemblance, proximity and routine inside civil society organizations contributes to the analysis of the empirical case study insofar as it suggests an explanation why actors and organizations in networks choose to practice coordination and organization in a participatory way and why these practices develop over time.

Ideas about participatory democracy are very fruitful for the study of democratic practice in TCSNs. Overall, the different concepts of participatory democracy share the notion that liberal representative democracy is too thin. Democracy ought to be broadened by increasing the numbers of citizens participating and the ways and opportunities of participation. Maybe most importantly, the spheres of democracy must also be extended. Civil society organizations play a significant role in the normative claims to broaden democracy: they constitute the spaces of engagement and learning for citizens and function as a gate to political decision-makers in order to participate effectively. This chapter discussed the different aspects of participatory democracy that contribute to a better understanding of participation practices in TCSNs. Whereas the founding ideas of participatory or direct democracy of the ancient Greek city state and the development of popular sovereignty by Rousseau stand in stark opposition to any representative system, more recent conceptualizations of participatory democracy tend to more and more complement representative elements of democracy. Although participatory accounts of democracy sometimes demand a radical system change, they rather focus on the economy and the state architecture as such without explicitly excluding representational elements from democracy. As in the claim to deepen democracy by Fung and Wright (2003), the strengthening of participation in democratic systems is supposed to have positive effects on citizens' sense of democracy, their political efficacy and on equality in society at large. Equality through more and better participation could be achieved because participatory democrats normatively assume that citizens can learn to be democratic citizens. Interest and engagement in politics can thus rise through more opportunities for citizen participation. The role of civil society in this process of democratization is an enforcing and educating one mainly, but it is also seen ambiguously. Civil society can also reinforce existing inequalities in the way that it gives voice to the already heard.

2 Democratic Representation

During the long history of democracy, representation as a main principle of democracy emerged because of two reasons: to cope with the ever growing number of individuals belonging to the *demos* and, partly as a consequence of this, the growing mistrust of political philosophers towards the capacity and motivation of the majority of individuals to govern directly (Dahl & Tufte 1973: 10-11).

Representation is thought of as making someone or something present that is not literally present (Pitkin 1967: 8). Traditionally, representation is thought of as a dyadic relationship between the representative and the represented or constituency. This chapter will discuss the formal establishment of, as well as the actions taken within that relationship from different theoretical perspectives. The chapter begins with the roots of representation theory: Thomas Hobbes first described representation as a rational, not religious legitimation for authority, followed by John Stuart Mill, who can be seen as the founding father of democratic representative governments. While there were other democratic theorists beside Mill, he specifically saw representation as a central anchor of democracy. The second part of this chapter will outline the varieties of representation and their different normative implications. Some approaches of representation entail very high normative claims in respect to democratic equality, whereas other approaches are rather concerned with the functioning of a representative system as such. Hanna Pitkin (1967) provided a classic and comprehensive theoretical foundation of the concept of representation. Her definition and review of political representation theory is cited in many, if not most of the studies of political representation. Thus, Pitkin's work will be outlined during the course of the following chapter. The third part of the chapter is focused on the peculiarities of representation in civil society contexts that are not controlled by elections. Here, we find different forms of representation and different conditions and necessities for representation practices. These theoretical approaches will function as the baseline for an analytical heuristic of representation practices in TCSNs. However, first, it is necessary to understand the origin of representation and its different forms and normative claims in order to analytically grasp representation practices in new contexts. Since this study is not concerned about representative state institutions, this chapter will mainly focus on abstract representative relationships than on the implications for and conditions of representation in governments and parliaments.

2.1 The Roots of Democratic Representation

Thomas Hobbes thought democracy was a weak form of government; only a strong authority could establish peace and protect society from a "war of all against all" (Hobbes 1996, 1651). While Hobbes clearly dismissed the idea of *democratic* government, he is one of the first theo-

rists, who thought about representative authority as an alternative to the theological justification of authority. In his secular conception of political authority, his idea was constitutive for modern theorists of representative government (Runciman 2009: 15). In very abstract terms, Hobbes spoke about the constituency, making itself the “author” of representative’s actions and thus “owning” the actions of the representative (Pitkin 1967: 15). The authorization of the representative’s actions, in Hobbes’ case the sovereign, is not limited by specific requirements. Once authorized, the sovereign has unlimited and binding authority. Thus, the people, who authorize the sovereign must “own” whatever the sovereign is doing. That means that they take full responsibility for any action of the sovereign and must obey every decision he (or she¹²) is taking. The sovereign neither has to respond to any demands by his/her constituency, nor is there any control over the sovereign (Pitkin 1967). Representation as personation, as wearing a mask of the represented, is hardly conceivable as a representation of the “multitude” of individuals who live in a state. Therefore Hobbes conceptualizes the state or the commonwealth as something distinct from the individual persons that live in the state.. Although Hobbes based his rational account of political authority on individuals, he saw problems in conceptualizing the representative relationship as an individual relationship. In order to prevent the Hobbesian state from being fragmented and destabilized by the diversity of people who are represented, he conceptualized representation as representing the people as if they were one person. Although the individual persons authorized the sovereign and “own” his/her actions, the commonwealth becomes a unitary actor. Nevertheless, the obligations of this representative relationship rested upon the individuals (Runciman 2009: 15-22). This refers to a crucial point in democratic representation theory: the problem of representing diversity. While Hobbes is not concerned about the democratic quality of representation, classic and contemporary democratic theorists are. The question of how to be responsive to the multitude of individuals whom a representative represents becomes even more relevant in an ever more globalizing world. Thus, the transnational sphere which this dissertation studies, is specifically affected by the problem of representing diversity. What Hobbes thought of as authorship, is a central point in classic and contemporary democratic representation theory, namely the authorization of representatives. Authorization describes a formalistic aspect of representation. It means that “a representative is someone who has been authorized to act.” (Pitkin 1967: 38). This view largely favors the representative. Her/his rights have been enlarged and s/he has only a few responsibilities. In contrast, the represented have acquired new responsibilities and given up some rights (Pitkin 1967: 399). The contrary concept is accountability, which will be outlined later in this chapter.

¹² Hobbes only referred to the sovereign as a male person.

Authorization theories can be split into the theory of *Organschaft*¹³ and the theory of democratic representative government. Both theories oppose each other in the way they conceptualize authorization. *Organschaft* theorists argue that the way representatives are selected is irrelevant¹⁴; rather, they see representatives as organs or parts of the state apparatus. *Organschaft* theorists conceptualized an organic political theory, namely “the idea that (some) groups of people are (like) living organisms” (Pitkin 1967: 40). *Organschaft* theorists are interested in questions of sovereignty and legal status of government agents. They think that “all government officials, all organs of the state, are representatives, and representation is necessary in any complex society.” (Pitkin 1967: 40). Thus, *Organschaft* representation can be seen as the first conceptualization of unelected representatives. Since actors in civil society networks are also often unelected representatives, this is an interesting proposal in order to understand authorization of representatives as an ongoing process of fitting in like an organ in an organism. In contrast to *Organschaft* theorists, theorists of democratic representative government are very much interested in the way representatives are authorized through elections. In representative democracy, elections are the main mechanisms of authorization. Authorized representation in representative democracy is commonly defined as the “acting with the consent of someone else” (Pitkin 1967: 43). This means that the right to act in a certain way is conditional upon another who has “expressed the wish that he should act” in a certain way and that the “represented must at least share in responsibility for the actions taken” (ibid.). The problem that arises from this definition is that it does not include a timely limitation of representation. In other word, authority is not given for a limited period of time. Nothing in the meaning of representation in representative democracy could justify this, although no one would really accept a lifetime dictatorship as representative democracy. Authorization means to authorize a representative beforehand, but not to hold the representative accountable after the legislation period. As noted already above, representation through the authorization perspective derives from the need for action. Representatives must and should take actions for their constituency, and thus, they need to be authorized so that their actions are legitimized. This is different from other conceptions of descriptive representation, which argue that representation is linked to government control and not government action. Those concepts will be explored later in this chapter.

John Stuart Mill, one of the main advocates of democratic representative government, preferred a government that consists of the “instructed few”. He saw expert guidance as complementary to the “popular government” of the representative assembly. Mill wanted to constrain the danger of the “tyranny of the majority” by delegating government functions to skillful and wise experts.

¹³ One of the better known *Organschaft* theorists is Max Weber (*Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*) (see Weber (2005))

¹⁴ “The manner of their selection is irrelevant so long as they become organs of the group. Elected representatives are no different in status here than those chosen in some other way.” Pitkin (1967: 41)

The executive government should not be alone in possessing a certain degree of expertise; the electorate should also be knowledgeable in order to vote competently. Mill suggested “plural voting”: citizens with specific competences or intellect (“mental superiority”) should have more than one vote. This should improve the quality of political will formation as well as the political government. Although this is a very elitist argument, it uncovers a critical aspect of the functioning of democracy: Democracy needs competent, informed citizens (Mill 1971/ 1861; Pateman 1989). Mill saw this as a main function of democracy that needs to be improved: the education of the citizens in order to become politically mature individuals who can competently engage and participate in the process of will-formation and elections (Pateman 1989: 31-35). Mill’s “true democracy” is a political system with proportional representation and adequate minority protection (Mill 1971/ 1861; Schmidt 2008). In this way, Mill is a liberal proportionalist with the idea of an ideal conception of democracy as direct democracy. In this sense proportionalists see democracy only as a substitute for the ideal of direct democracy: “the modern form of democracy (...) [is] a machinery necessitated by modern civilization and requirements of life to make democratic government possible” (Pitkin 1967: 86).

In sum, the basic idea of representation as a mechanism of authorization rests on the assumption that either democratic control of the representative would weaken the government’s ability to rule effectively, as Hobbes saw it, or that authorization of expert representatives is a way to avoid a “tyranny of the majority” and to reflect the “ideal” form of democracy, direct democracy, in a way that proportional representation of citizens can be guaranteed (Pitkin 1967, Runciman 2009). These initial ideas of representation are influenced by the image of very powerful representatives who only need to be legitimized through an initial election. Procedural democratic control is neither a necessary condition for legitimation nor is it of any help to a good government. This kind of representation was further developed by modern representation theorists who saw more need for a more far-reaching democratic control of representatives.

2.2 Democratic Norms and Forms of Representation

In the following section, I will outline the variants of representation that were developed out of the normative claim of legitimacy of representatives. This legitimacy is either derived from a high equality of representation through the resemblance between representatives and represented (descriptive representation) or through “talented” and experienced representatives who further the discourse with their constituency and bring in new ideas. Besides this controversy over the tasks of a representative, there is a parallel controversy over the representative’s liberty. Democratic legitimation of the representative can be either reached by controlling the representative through a delegate model, i.e. the constituency gives the representative a mandate to act in a certain way, or the representative is democratically legitimized on the basis of trust. The

trusteeship model involves less control and more knowledge on the part of representatives about their constituency. This model of trusteeship is very common in civil society contexts where control mechanisms are often hardly feasible. In the following section, I will outline the four different forms of representation and their normative implications in order to argue which of these forms and which normative reasoning behind each form are applicable for TCSNs.

2.2.1 Representation as Description

Descriptive representation means standing for the represented by resemblance (Pitkin 1967: 61). Pitkin distinguishes descriptive “standing for” from substantive “acting for”, which overall means speaking for, acting for and looking after the interests of the groups one represents (Pitkin 1967: 116). According to descriptive representation as “standing for”, a democratic assembly of representatives should be a microcosm of society. It is therefore more important how a parliament is composed than what it actually does. According to descriptive representation theory, representative bodies have a different role than in substantive representation. Descriptive representatives do not act; they control the government that acts and takes decisions. Therefore, an accurate resemblance of the people is more important than the actions taken by the representatives (ibid.). Representation thus means sharing one group’s attributes¹⁵. The general reasoning behind descriptive representation is that there should be an equal representation of all groups in society and, from a critical perspective on liberal democratic theory, a distinct representation of underprivileged groups (Phillips 1996; Young 2000). According to Young’s critical approach of a politics of difference, underprivileged groups must be present in decision-making institutions for three main reasons. First, there might be a history of exclusion that affects members of those groups in that they refuse to participate actively; consequently, descriptive representation could be motivating for them. Second, some groups have dominated the discourse for a long time; this might affect how issues are prioritized, discussed and decided, and this “way of doing things” can be seen as something neutral or universal. Lastly, the special representation of marginalized groups brings in the “situated knowledge” of those groups, which is often unheard or not known. All those arguments for descriptive representation or a variation of it, group representation, aim at the drawback of political inequality and injustice (Young 2000: 144-45). In trying to reach a common identity between representative and represented, representative institutions first and foremost should function as suppliers of information about their constituencies. The more accurate the information about the constituency is, the better representatives can descriptively represent their constituencies. This is necessary in order to be representative in a descriptive sense. Pitkin distinguishes between descriptive representatives

¹⁵ When we think of political candidates who campaign for their own election, they often try to resemble their voters. However, this is an ideal typical presentation of a group (for example in displaying ideal family values) and not a representation understood as the “identity of characteristics” Pitkin (1967: 78).

as (1) a map, meaning an inanimate object that perfectly mirrors the interests of the people; (2) painter, describing this representation as providing accurate information; or (3) an accurate copy, meaning that elected representatives do “what the whole nation would have done” (Pitkin 1967: 84). This third definition of descriptive representatives is at the core of understanding democratic representative government. The logic behind this is radically democratic. It frames direct democracy as the ideal type of democracy or the desirable norm. Thus, representative democracy must strive to resemble direct democracy as much as possible in copying society as perfectly as possible (Pitkin 1967: 86).

Two main arguments against descriptive representation can be identified as follows: (1) There is no room for descriptive representatives to take initiatives, promote new ideas and discuss matters. Thus, descriptive representatives merely mirror the interests of their constituencies, but remain passive entities without agency (Pitkin 1967: 60-92). (2) Descriptive representatives may be less talented to take political action than representatives who were elected and already have experience in politics. It is also assumed that elected representatives are more willing and skilled to take over the position because they have already won the competition about votes. Taking these arguments into account, Mansbridge (1999) suggests a modified form of descriptive representation. The criticized descriptive representation, which she calls *microcosmic* representation, is the pure form of descriptive representation, where the parliament is supposed to be a microcosm of society. As a solution, Mansbridge suggests a selective form of descriptive representation. Here, representatives are selected by group characteristics and are not randomly selected (Mansbridge 1999: 629). Thus, there is a selection process that creates a group of descriptive representatives who are willing and skilled to take over the responsibility of a representative. Still, the general question remains: Is it necessary that groups must be represented by members of their groups in order to reach democratic representation? And how could we define which groups are relevant enough to be represented? The number of possible groups is infinite. Mansbridge concludes that only those groups should be included that are concerned with the decision to be taken, meaning all groups that contribute (new) relevant aspects to the decision (Mansbridge 1999: 635). However, who decides about the affectedness of a group? When thinking about group representation, there are further issues about the ambiguity of group belongings and group identities, which complicate descriptive representation in the sense that every individual naturally belongs to many groups and that groups themselves are not that unitary as they are assumed to be in, as some reasoning about descriptive representation might suggest (Phillips 1996).

Suzanne Dovi (2009) introduced a new argument about descriptive representation and states that it is not enough to always include as many groups as possible. In order to equally balance

representation, one has to track who is replaced by whom. It is necessary to exclude privileged groups in order to allow for a better representation of *all* affected groups. She states that if democrats are strategic about inclusion, they also have to be strategic about exclusion in order to represent historically disadvantaged groups equally: "After all, in a context where you have a white majority, a simple increase in the number of Latino representatives will not necessarily change the policy representation of Latinos since the number of Latinos could be increasing at the expense of black representatives." (Dovi 2009: 17).

The discussion about descriptive representation is concentrated very much on formalistic access of underprivileged groups into decision-making forums. In this way, descriptive representation is a very normative debate, which focusses on the ideal composition of representatives and their formal group membership rather than on the action of representation or the representative relationship as such. This formal "right to presence", which is articulated in descriptive representation, can hardly be guaranteed in TCSNs. It should be a worthwhile concern, given the diversity of network members, but the implementation of this right can only be thought of in an informal and mitigated way. It would also be important to guarantee this diversity in such networks because if new ideas and campaigns would not be picked up by representatives and represented alike, the networks would stand still. Thus, the criticism of descriptive representation must equally be taken into account when adapting representation to the context of TCSNs.

2.2.2 The Representative's Freedom

How free should representatives be in the practice of representing constituencies? This is a controversy between mandate and independency theorists, which is a discussion about the degree of independence of representatives. Whereas mandate theorists claim that the wishes of the represented should be the yardstick for any action of representatives, the independency theorists argue that a representative's judgment is the only relevant criterion for taking decisions (Pitkin 1967: 165). The metaphor that mandate theorists use to describe mandated representatives is the megaphone as a device to make the voice of the constituency a little louder and bring it into parliament. Delegate representatives only act on explicit instruction of their constituency. The reasoning behind this is that there is not one national interest that can be anticipated by the representative, but there are many local interests that overall build the national interest. In contrast, the independency theorists see the representative rather as a free agent or trustee. Once representatives are elected, they are completely independent in their actions (Pitkin 1967: 146-47). This trusteeship model is a relationship that involves trust and obligations on both sides (ibid.: 128). Here, the powers of government are seen as a property that representatives must administer for the benefit of others like fiduciaries do. In general, representatives are quite remote from the represented, and there is no consultancy at all. Because representatives are seen

as the experts, they “know[...] better” and do not need advice in finding the best solution of the represented. (ibid.: 136). Independency theorists say that a constituency is not a single unit with ready-made opinions and wills. The representative cannot just mirror already existing opinions. Even if that was possible, there would not be room for activities of the legislature such as “the formulating of issues, the deliberation, the compromise on which decisions should be based” (Pitkin 1967: 147). The representative would be merely a technical device of the constituency without the opportunity to bring in new ideas and discuss matters.

The question of the freedom of representatives is, as already indicated, also a matter of the definition of the represented. Whom or what is the representative supposed to represent? According to liberal theorists, the act of representation means representing people and their own individual interests, in contrast to representation of a national interest or the common good. Interests are defined as pluralistic, as opposed to the idea of the one national interest, connected or attached to people, subjective and “likely to conflict with the welfare of the nation”¹⁶ (Pitkin 1967: 191-92). This notion of representation is in line with the delegate or mandate model of representation. Burke’s trusteeship model, which he calls “virtual representation” (Burke 1774), justifies representation on different grounds. He sees interests, unlike Liberals, as unconnected to people. Those unconnected interests are seen as having an „objective, impersonal, unattached reality” (Pitkin 1967: 168). From this definition, Burke concludes that there are morally “right” answers for the government. There is the one national interest, which is why representatives do not need to be responsive to a constituency (Burke 1774). They do not even need to be elected because they know what is right in the end. Thus, he sees representation as an elite caring for others and the parliament as a deliberative assembly of the *one* nation and not an assembly of ambassadors of different and diverging interests: “[...] government and legislation are matters of reason and judgment and not of inclination” (Burke 1774) Burke suggests virtual representation as an alternative to actual representation i.e. elective representation.

Virtual representation is that in which there is a communion of interests, and a sympathy in feelings and desires between those who act in the name of any description of people, and the people in whose name they act, though the trustees are not actually chosen by them. This is virtual representation.[...] The people may err in their choice; but common interest and common sentiment are rarely mistaken. (Burke 1792)

Neither the trusteeship concept nor the mandate or delegate concepts are automatically and directly linked to *democratic* representation. Trusteeship, as conceptualized by Burke as “virtual” representation, depends on representatives who act with wisdom at best, but without the

¹⁶ Utilitarians argued even further, namely that it is impossible to represent someone else, because people are only able to follow their own interests. The task of representative government is to preserve the status quo, assure stability and wait until time gives way to reason over selfish interests among the people (Pitkin 1967: 196).

consent of their constituency (ibid.). In contrast, delegates as pure mirrors of the represented lack the ability to actively deliberate and moderate political processes and decisions. Thus, neither concept in its pure form is useful for thinking about democratic representation. Therefore, theorists started to combine elements of both approaches and thought about accountability as one mechanism to ensure democracy in representation. The assumption is here that representation is socially constructed and can develop very differently into diverse and rather loose forms of representational practices. The concept of representation is ambiguous insofar as that there are different understandings about the relational aspects of representation or the objects of representation (Castiglione & Warren 2006: 8). Therefore, many current concepts of representation argue that the distinction between the trusteeship and the delegate model does not capture the complexities of political representation (Mansbridge 2003; Rehfeld 2011). There is also a shift away from conceptualizing representation in terms a principal-agent relationship to conceptualizing representation in regard to questions of decision-making (Rehfeld 2011: 2).

Jane Mansbridge (2003) solves the problem of complexity in stating that there is not one good form of representation, but that there is a system of different representations. Mansbridge introduces different normative criteria in order to evaluate those forms of representation. She suggests that representation is systemic and not dyadic, that it is plural and not singular, and that representation should be based on deliberative rather than aggregative criteria. The forms of representation are categorized as anticipatory, gyroscopic and surrogate representation (Mansbridge 2003: 515-16). *Anticipatory representation* is understood as a relationship that is based on the anticipation, among representatives, of a future election outcome. Representatives assume that voters will vote retrospectively and thus will take their decision in line with what representatives have done during the past legislation period. Since a later event (the election after the legislation period) cannot cause an earlier event (a representative's action during the legislation period), the representation is "just" built on the representative's beliefs about voter preferences during the next election: "In anticipatory representation, what appears to the representative to be a "power relation" thus works not forward, but "backward," through anticipated reactions, from the voter at Time 3 to the representative at Time 2: RT2 -- VT3." (Mansbridge 2003: 517). Representatives have also an information problem. They need information about their constituency's preferences and will tend to address the general needs rather than the specific interests of certain people, thereby reacting to their lack of information. However, representatives can at the same time use the time of their legislation period in order to educate the constituency and deliberate about certain preferences of their constituency that can develop into interests (also referred as enlightened preferences). Thus, in anticipatory representation, the quality of deliberation is much more relevant for representatives' relationships with their constituencies than the mere aggregation of votes (Mansbridge 2003: 516-17). In *gyroscope rep-*

resentation, representatives refer to themselves and their own “gyroscopic compass” when acting as representatives. It seems similar to Burke’s concept of virtual representation. The crucial point in gyroscopic representation is the successful deliberation at the point of recruitment of the representative. The voter does not have power over the action of the representative as such, but over the system and the decision to put this or that representative in the system. (Mansbridge 2003: 522). Gyroscopic representation in itself may also create a more definite space of public deliberation because representation may “provide cognitive distancing between persons and arguments, between the “who” and the “what” [...]”(Castiglione & Warren 2006). Self-interested arguments may decrease, because the judge and the cause are separated (Madison et al. 1993) and representatives can bring this reflexivity even to the individuals they represent by raising other arguments and thus involving interest holders in a discussion about their interests within a broader public space (Castiglione & Warren 2006: 11). *Surrogate representation* means the representation of constituents who live outside the district of the representative. Although surrogate representation comes from the Burkean idea of a representative without an electoral basis, in Mansbridge’s concept, it is thought of in much more territorial terms. It is not about the national interest that is represented by a representative; it is rather about representatives in one district also speaking and acting for constituencies who are outside their own district (Mansbridge 2003: 523). Surrogate responsibility often arises out of a form of group belonging and descriptive representation. If representatives share group membership with a specific social group, they might feel responsible to represent group members in general and not only within the electorate. If this is judged in deliberative terms, the best argument should decide about specific issue-related questions. Thus, surrogate representation reflects both deliberative and aggregative logics of representation. This is different from Burke’s virtual representation, which just focusses on (elite) deliberation.

In sum, the controversy between delegate and trusteeship representation contains three levels of divergence: (1) the normative justification of representation; (2) the relational aspects of representation; and (3) the substantive arrangement of representation.

(1)The legitimacy of the representative is either derived from representation of the common good (trusteeship) or the representation of people with interests (delegate). Thus, in the trusteeship model, the normative justification of the democratic legitimacy of a representative is reached by the representative’s representation of the common good, which means to be identified by wisdom and expertise rather than by counting people’s votes. Contrary to the trusteeship model, the delegate model assumes that interests are attached to people and thus should be represented as accurately as possible by representatives. If the representatives fulfill this task, they are legitimate.

(2) Relational aspects of representation are different between the delegate and trusteeship models insofar as a delegate is seen as a tool of the constituency, whereas a trustee is conceptualized as a free agent. This implies different responsibilities: the delegate's task is to make the constituency's interest visible and politically effective. The constituency's task is to instruct the representative accurately. In contrast to this process, the trustees' responsibility is to oversee the constituency as a whole and estimate a common good, which they would then represent as well as discuss with their constituency. This leads to the substantive aspect of representation.

(3) The substantive aspects of representation are divided into deliberation among representatives and between representatives and constituency in the trusteeship model and the aggregation of votes in the delegate model. Whereas the trusteeship model follows the logic of finding a consensus about the common good through deliberation, the delegate model follows the logic of a numerical equality of the constituency's interests. It is difficult to divide those two dimensions of relational and substantive aspects, as Rehfeld critically notes with respect to Mansbridge's categorization of representation; Mansbridge's approach combines the conceptualization of relational aspects with the substantive aspects (deliberative and/or aggregative). This is not conducive to a clear cut categorization of representation (Rehfeld 2011).

The attempt to translate the different forms of representation to the context of TCSNs can be challenging. Overall, since it is impossible to define or count a fluid constituency among NGOs, aggregate models of representation are not suitable. Of course, based on all three aspects of representation, it seems more adequate to apply the trusteeship model in civil society networks because it is not based on aggregate numbers. In many of these networks, Western NGOs, who are mostly bigger and have more staff, are numerically dominant. Thus, if individual votes were counted, there would be a proportional representation of interests, which could lead to an underrepresentation of non-Western organizations, such as the "people from the South." The interests of such groups are often very important to network campaigners and would become invisible due to the numerical majority of Western people. Furthermore, it seems highly improbable that representatives and constituencies could fulfill the responsibilities implied in the delegate model. Representatives can neither give accurate and proportional evidence about their current constituencies (which are fluid and temporary) nor can the constituencies precisely instruct their representatives about their interests (which often need to be elaborated and defined through discussion). Even more so, as indicated, this discussion within the practice of representation is often necessary in order to define interests or a common good, especially in the civil society context. This will be elaborated in more detail in the next chapter, which is concerned with the peculiarities of representation of unelected representatives, specifically in the civil society context.

2.3 The Prospects of Non-electoral Representation for Transnational Civil Society Networks

“[...] anyone who performs a function for the group may seem to be its representative, for his actions may be attributed to it and are binding on it.” (Pitkin 1967: 40-41)

Representation is an omnipresent social and political phenomenon. Representatives of certain groups and interests can be found everywhere. The crucial question that will be further investigated in this chapter is how this representation, which is not bound to election, can be democratic. Many political and social spheres that give input to political decision-making and generate representation without electoral authorization have evolved over the last 20 years. This development is specifically prevalent in spheres of civil society activities and in spheres of transnational governance. This form of non-electoral representation outside of state contexts is conceptualized either as a claims-making of proactive representatives that need not necessarily be democratic or by considering accountability, i.e. account-giving as a substitute for electoral authorization. The second conceptualization based on accountability is thus more normatively constructed as a way to democratize representation in non-electoral settings, whereas the first conceptualization of claims-making (Saward 2010) is more of an empirical conceptualization. Both attempts to capture the practices of non-electoral representation will be presented and discussed in the following section.

The contextual nature of representation is very relevant when examining concepts about representation beyond elections and states. Representative relationships can be seen as something socially constructed, which cannot to be captured by a single one-dimensional concept. In the context of transnational networks, representative relationships are rather contingent and ambiguous (Castiglione & Warren 2006). Whereas electoral politics rely on clear temporal sequences of authorization via elections and holding representatives accountable for their actions (mainly in retrospect) through the whole term of office, in non-electoral politics, the mechanisms of authorization and accountability can be diffuse and diverse. This is even more the case in informal representative relationships such as social movements where represented groups do not pre-exist the representative relationship. They are shaped and sometimes even constructed in the process of representation. In other words, by labeling the constituency as one unit or one group, the act of representation creates the groups that are represented. In an ongoing process, representation can also stabilize groups (Castiglione & Warren 2006: 13).

2.3.1 Holding Representatives Accountable by a Blurred Constituency

Accountability is a concept currently debated in political representation theory. Accountability is an alternative form of formality in representative relationships, which is according to Pitkin the opposite concept to authorization. While in authorizational representation, the represented (i.e.

the constituents) are bound to and accountable for the actions taken and representatives are free in their mandate, in the concept of accountability these roles are changed. Here, the represented (i.e. the constituents) are rather free and representatives are bound by obligations and control (Pitkin 1967: 55). Representatives must be eventually (after the period of representation) held accountable for their actions. This is missing in the concepts of authorization theorists (Pitkin 1967: 57-58). Authorization just marks the beginning of representation, but not its final ending. In TCSNs, there is often neither a clear start nor a clear ending of representation because these network relations evolve through the practices of involved actors. Thus, representation in TCSNs is fluid, similar to other relationships between actors in networks. There is hardly any formalized attribution of representatives and constituency. Thus, formalized accountability mechanisms do not work. "In general the principal problem with network governance in this respect is that the network structure itself tends to blur the clearly defined roles of accountability holders and holdees in favour of a situation in which each actor is equally an accountability holder and holdee" (Esmark 2007: 282). The suggested solution for this problem is a widening of the definition of democratic representation in terms of the involved actors as well as the forms and directions of representation (ibid.). To further substantiate this form of holding representative accountable under the conditions of blurring roles in non-electoral representation in civil society, Castiglione and Warren (2006) suggest functional equivalents for the formal mechanisms of authorization and accountability that can be found in electoral politics. They categorize these equivalents according to different types of civil society groups. A functional equivalent of authorization in non-electoral politics may be: the ability of groups to attract follows, mission statements of groups that converge or claim to converge with a constituency, descriptive characteristics such as gender or race, experiences, public visibility (Castiglione and Warren 2006: 15). In the case of voluntary organizations and NGOs, it is also suggested that accountability can be established by the "horizontal" mutual policing of groups in a network. This specific form of accountability is borrowed from the concept of organizational learning and peer-to-peer control. This is similar to Sørensen's (2010) argument that "accountability runs not only vertically, making elected officials answerable to the ballot box, but also horizontally, across a network of relatively autonomous powers" (Sørensen 2010: 17). Those mechanisms stress the horizontal relationship between representatives and thus circumvent or mitigate the difficult definition of the constituency in TCSNs.

Accountability is specified as controlling and sanctioning of the "accountability holdee" i.e. the representative (Esmark 2007: 290). Esmark also states that representatives become automatically accountable as soon as they become representatives:

Insofar as actors take the position of representatives, they do in fact by implication become accountability holdees, not just to their readers, their organizational members or

their peers, but also to the moral constituency. In fact, widening the field of eligible accountability holdees may be an equally important democratic challenge as widening the field of accountability holders. As stated earlier, however, it is more fun being an accountability holder than an accountability holdee. (Esmark 2007: 282)

In widening the field of accountability holders, Koenig-Archibugi and MacDonald argue that accountability relationships in “non-state governance arrangements” (NGAs) (2013: 499) can be divided into direct beneficiary accountability “to the most affected by their decisions” (2013: 500) and accountability-by-proxy, which means that an actor “exercises accountability on behalf of other actors and is not itself accountable to them” (ibid.). In the non-state governance arrangements on labor rights, which were studied for their paper, Koenig-Archibugi and MacDonald identify (Western) consumers and activists as the ones who hold companies accountable on behalf of the workers and their families. They make the argument that the choice for policy instruments in these NGAs depends on whether the accountability mechanisms are pure beneficiary accountability mechanisms or hybrid forms of proxy and beneficiary accountability. While they differentiate between distant proxies (consumers), solidaristic proxies (activists) and beneficiaries (workers and their families), they find difference in policy choice between distant proxies on the one hand and solidaristic proxies and beneficiaries on the other hand (2013: 504-05). Thus, it could be argued that accountability-by-proxy of solidaristic activists could be democratically legitimate from an output perspective since the results of decisions made by solidaristic proxies resemble the choices that the “real” constituency, the beneficiaries would make. This can be explained by the much higher engagement, concrete knowledge and sense of solidarity that activists have in contrast to consumers (ibid.).

While it can be empirically observed that the boundaries of the constituency blur in TCSNs, there are also normative arguments why constituencies and their interests are not always that clear-cut and well-defined as supposed to be in liberal nation states. The argument put forward by Iris Marion Young (2000) against the liberal concept of citizens having a universal and fixed citizenship describes citizens as members of different and changing groups, as holders of a plurality of interests. This argument was picked up by several democratic theorists, for example by Dryzek & Niemeyer (2008) who transformed it into a model of discursive representation. He argues that every citizen subscribes to different discourses, and it is a matter of equally representing those discourses instead of equally representing certain individuals (Dryzek & Niemeyer 2008). This is analogous to Young who argued that citizens need to be represented according to their multiple group affiliations and not only as individual citizens (Young 2000).

In networks, it makes even more sense to think past the liberal notion of universal citizenship because it is even harder to define who is in and who is out, i.e. where are the borders of “citizenship” in networks. The complexity and openness of networks make it much harder to identify the spaces of affectedness. Much of democratic representation is linked to the external and in-

ternal boundaries of networks. People who are directly working in member organizations of the network are internally affected, and people who are the targets of the network's policy outputs are externally affected. It is not easy to clearly identify the boundaries of internal and external affectedness. In other words, the lines between the external environment of networks and the internal members are blurry. It is neither possible to give every individual in this network context a voting right (apart from that would it be impossible to "find" all individuals of one constituency and for or against whom would they vote?) nor is it possible to weight voting rights. This would conflict with the basic idea of democracy and it would dissolve the network character by introducing a hierarchy. Thus, there is no real possibility to represent individuals in networks. Representation axes can rather go along group identities or discourses.

2.3.2 Trust as a Basis for Unelected Representatives

In the condition of complexity and opacity of network structures, the constituency, represented either by vertical representation (membership base to NGO elite) or horizontal representation (between NGOs in the network), might not know everything about the decisions taken because of a lack of time, capacity, interest etc. (Mansbridge 1999). In descriptive representation, the representative represents a group as a part of the group. This relationship is tightened by resemblance or reflection (Pitkin 1967; Kröger & Friedrich 2012: 20-21). Disadvantaged groups can be empowered by descriptive representation (Phillips 1996), and descriptive representation could enable models of representation that are built on trust rather than on control. Castiglione and Warren (2006: 8) argue to emphasize trusteeship over delegation in general and in the sphere of civil society in particular because trust has the advantage that it is not as costly as control. Trusteeship as a form of representation is omnipresent in political life and beyond. Thus, Castiglione and Warren (2006) argue that this existence of trusteeship could be used to filter out democratic features of trusteeship in political representative relationships:

We might say that trusteeship is *democratic* when a citizen makes a decision to trust, based on knowledge of convergent (or encapsulated) interests or values. Clearly, this kind of representative relationship is common in civil society through voluntary association membership: we trust Greenpeace to represent our interests in their political activities, even though we are not active in the organization (Castiglione & Warren 2006: 9)

Here, trust is based on common interests that are shared by representatives and represented. This is a major difference to representative relationships between elected representatives and the constituency. The daily business of politics is usually characterized by the negotiation between conflicting interests (Castiglione & Warren 2006: 9). Trust as the basis for democratic representation could thus form one kind of representative relationship in-between other kinds of democratic representation, reflecting a representative relationship mainly found in civil society contexts. As Young pointed out, civil society follows different logic than the systematic logic of the state, which follows a specific system imperative and must handle conflicting interests

(Young 2000: 169). Public communication in civil society is often not unified and orderly, but messy, playful and emotional (ibid.). Thus, representation cannot be thought of as a linear and highly formalized process.

Rather than striving for the identity of representative and represented as a controllable measure, one could imagine representation as a process that includes communication between representatives and the represented as well as among the represented, namely on a horizontal level (Young 2000: 127). This process could also be mediated in order to ensure equal access and opportunities, but it seems not possible to control or hold it accountable in terms of an output-orientation of representation. In general, deliberation with its open-ended quality gives better communicative chances to representatives who are close(r) to the issues (Mansbridge 1999: 635-36). They are even more important and better equipped in deliberation processes under the circumstances of communicative mistrust or uncrystallized interests. Here, Mansbridge states that in the context of uncrystallized interests, the horizontal deliberation between representatives is much more important than the vertical deliberation between constituency and representative. If interests are not really clear, descriptive representation is necessary because representatives of certain groups can better judge and feel like their constituency and get into an opinion building process parallel to their constituency (Mansbridge 1999: 644-645). According to concepts beyond the liberal democracy model, the individual person that is to be represented is not only a "bundle of interests, identities and values" (Castiglione and Warren 2006: 13). Representation is always a two-way process. Persons that are represented, are represented as citizen-agents with their capacities to argue, reflect, demonstrate, write and vote. Also, the interests, identities and values do not always pre-exist the representative relationship, they are sometimes articulated explicitly prior the representation, but for many individuals, they are framed and formed in the process of representation (Castiglione and Warren 2006):

When representatives – groups, public individuals, the media – carry interest positions into public decision making, they engage in more than "individual" judgment. They function as key figures in representing and mediating public debates, in this way reflecting interest and identity positions back to their constituents. This reflexive representation of positions and arguments should, ideally, enable constituents to follow debates and to reflect upon and defend their own positions, such that representatives can, ultimately claim to represent the "public will" as reflected in a developed "public opinion. (Castiglione and Warren 2006: 13-14)

This points to the deliberative or discursive mode of democracy, which is also brought into being in the process of representation. Castiglione and Warren argue that representation can only be democratic in the sense of a representation of the public will, if there is a reflexive element in this representation. When people debate about opinions, they form and change opinions while exchanging ideas and values from different sides (ibid.).

2.3.3 The Substantive Practice of Representation

Castiglione and Warren argue, following Mansbridge (2003), that accountability or the account-giving of representatives is discursive in form and can be on-going through the term of office of a representative. Still, accountability in this sense needs regular elections as a formal mechanism to temporally frame the discursive account-giving. Non-electoral accountability, on the contrary, relies on the pro-active development of accountability by self-appointed representatives and the horizontal, “informal but effective” mutual control of different kinds of groups (Castiglione & Warren 2006: 17):

[...] the emerging political landscape provides more and more opportunities for individuals and groups to *propose* themselves as representatives, and to *function* in representative capacities. But once representation no longer has an electoral basis, *who* counts as a democratic representative is difficult to assess (Alcoff 1995). Democratic theorists should not, we believe, rule out any such claims at the outset, but we do need ways of judging their democratic credentials [sic] of representative claims. (Castiglione and Warren 2006: 15)

The proposition or self-appointment of representation is a conceptualization that frames representation as a performative action, following Judith Butler’s work on the performative construction of gender identities (Butler 2006, 1990). Representation is performatively produced (Saward 2010: 42) in an “ongoing process of making and receiving, accepting and rejecting claims –in, between, and outside electoral cycles” (Saward 2010: 36). In this framework, representation is a series of practices and events and, unlike the presence approach of representation (Phillips 1996), an institutionalized relationship between representatives and represented. In other words, representation is understood as making claims that give the impression of representation. Thus, it is less about a substantial relationship that can be explored than about the question of *how* the practice of representation is acted out, leading to the following question: How is presence constructed, defended or contested? (Saward 2010: 39).

Saward distinguishes different elements in representational practices: the maker, the subject, the object, the audience and the constituency. He provides an example about global civil society to exemplify the relation between the different elements: “Antiglobalization demonstrators (maker) set up themselves and their movements (subject) as representatives of the oppressed and marginalized (object) to Western governments (audience).” (Saward 2010: 37). There is a maker of representation, who “puts forward” a subject that stands for an object. Saward distinguishes maker and subject, although they can be the same. Also, the differentiation between constituency and audience is not automatically mutually exclusive. As he defines constituency as the people for or about whom claims are made, the audience is a group of people that are spoken to. Both groups can be overlapping or even be identical (Saward 2010: 50). Saward makes one important argument based on the assumption that representation is socially constructed; he con-

cludes that subject and object are refined and clarified through the process of representation. What Castiglione and Warren said of civil society groups, namely that they are defined by representation, is, in Saward's framework, relevant for all sorts of representation. Representation as a social construction through a performative practice creates and strengthens representational identities of the involved actors.

This argument can be traced back to concepts such as symbolic interactionism (Blumer 1986, 1969) and generally the so-called interpretive paradigm (Garfinkel 1967; Mead 1980), which see, on a more general level, interaction and its interpretation by individuals as the basis for individual identity development. Moreover, Saward describes this event of making representative claims as the core of the representative relationship: Claims-making is a constantly changing dialogue in which different actors make claims to audiences that discuss, reject or amend them (Saward 2010). Unelected representatives are even more under pressure to make their claims very explicit because they cannot rely on the structure of representative institutions (Saward 2010: 65). However, since those representatives lack an electoral basis, it becomes difficult to assess who is a representative of whom or what (Castiglione & Warren 2006). In networks, many different representative claims, often by different actors, can be made, for example hypothetical consent, mirroring, and word from the street (Saward 2000: 95-103). Representative relationships are also influenced by this dynamic structure that creates informality as well as more direct links between representatives and represented (Sørensen & Torfing 2007: 13). Here, representative relationships are "like a game whose rules change with use" (Lord & Pollak 2010: 119). Since these conceptualizations of representation do not take into account the problem of democratic control and accountability, one could ask whether this kind of network representation just leads straight to arbitrariness. Thus, the democratic quality of claims-making can be doubted. Representation as claims-making suggests that only those claims are voiced for which a "maker" is present (Kröger and Friedrich 2012: 270). Therefore, representative claims seem to be "decoupled" from the institutional environment of democratic representative government and the general democratic principle of political equality (ibid. : 271). Kröger and Friedrich attest to this "wealth of multi-faceted practices of representation in the EU", which confirms theoretical thinking about representation in non-state or semi-state contexts outlined above. Their findings show that although constituencies are addressed most frequently along national lines, the organizations of representation can have many different faces and can change dynamically back and forth between mandate, delegate or "solidarity" models of representation (Kröger & Friedrich 2012: 259-64). With regard to the democratic quality of those forms of representation, Kröger and Friedrich do not see a strong potential of the new forms of representation to replace institutionalized forms of democratic representation, as of now. At the same time, they admit that it is much more difficult to democratize non-electoral representation (Kröger

and Friedrich 2012: 274-75). From these two observations, they conclude that democratic representation “requires a strong linkage to the institutional center of decision-making” (Kröger and Friedrich 2012: 276).

In sum, this chapter on representation brought together different approaches to the question on what is political representation and how can it be democratic. Different assumptions lay the ground for diverse perspectives on representation. The crucial questions can be summarized as follows: Which roles do representatives take on (trustees/delegates)? How are representative relationships structured over time (authorization/accountability)? What is the nature of interaction in representation (descriptive/ active/ interactive)? What is the general function of representation (description/ action for or deliberation with the constituency)? What is the object of representation (unattached, attached interests/groups/discourses)? Many of the authors discussed in this chapter share the argument that representative democracy is a form of democracy with its own quality. Democratic representation is not a mere substitute for direct democracy. Furthermore, many recent works on representation assume that representation is socially constructed. Thus, normative criteria to judge the democratic quality of representation depend on the definition of representative relationships; the objects of representation and the ascribed roles of representatives, the represented and possibly the audience. Democratic representation may be differently practiced if individuals, groups, interests or the common good are represented. This rests upon the construction of representation as such and is highly contextual and ambiguous. However, it can be concluded that representation without formal elections can be democratically legitimized through different forms of accountability, for example being held accountable to a moral constituency or being held accountable by horizontal mutual peer-monitoring. These two forms of accountability are specifically suitable to a context of blurred constituencies. If a clearly defined constituency does not exist, it makes sense to either think of a moral constituency, which could be people affected by human rights violations, nature or future generations, or to install accountability mechanisms that are based on a mutual peer-to-peer accountability among NGOs in civil society. However, these principles of accountability can only work smoothly when there is trust between representatives and represented. In civil society networks, there are no capacities for extensive control measures, but there is a high potential of trust due to similar interests, common goals and homogeneity in and between the groups. Thus trust may play an important role in making democratic representation feasible in TCSNs.

The performative aspect of representation is an additional dimension that needs further empirical scrutiny. Conceptualizing representation as a performative practice decouples representation from the common assumption of a dyadic relationship between representatives and represented. It involves more actors and is driven by the proactive proposals of self-proclaimed rep-

representatives rather than by elections. How this empirical concept can be normatively undergirded in order to speak of democratic representational performances is a question that remains open and can be further elaborated through the empirical study of such instances in TCSNs.

3 Deliberative Democracy

Deliberation theory has grown into a broad strand of literature that is discussed in different research areas of social sciences and linguistics. Deliberation theory can be divided into two broad theoretical strands: (1) the epistemic conceptualization of deliberation as a more sensible and enlightened form of decision-making and the (2) conceptual theorizing on deliberation as a way to democratize democracy, i.e. democratizing the collective will-formation of citizens (see Olsen & Trenz 2011). This second strand takes up arguments of participatory democracy as well.

The epistemic version of deliberative democracy considers deliberation as a cognitive process – bent on finding just solutions and agreements about the common good. Deliberation's epistemic value rests on the imperative to find the right decision. In contrast, the participatory version of deliberative democracy highlights the active involvement and empowerment of citizens in collective will formation as a necessary condition for the creation of democratic legitimacy. Deliberation has thus primarily a moral value, driven as it is by the imperative to allow for equal participation of all. (Olsen & Trenz 2011: 2).

Democratic deliberation, as Chambers (2009) calls the version of deliberation theory which is more interested in the epistemic perspective on deliberative decision-making, is much more focused on the outcome of deliberation and defines “deliberation in terms of choosing a course of action under noncoercive and discursive conditions” (Chambers 2009: 334). In contrast, deliberative democracy, as the second more participatory version of deliberation, is more concerned with the process instead of the outcome of deliberation, and additionally focusses more on the society as a whole instead of selected discrete deliberations among few (*ibid.*).

Deliberative democracy developed out of a criticism of contemporary representative democracy, where voters see elections as consumer choices that only concern them personally and do not take those “others”, the whole society, into consideration when making voting choices. This produces an instrumental rationality that guides democratic decisions, which is not conducive to democracy as such (Held 2006: 238). Deliberationists argue that it cannot be just about pooling information and exchanging views; democracy must be about reasoning about views and testing arguments in order to make rational and enlightened decisions. Furthermore, the elected politicians in representative democracies seem disentangled from their voters (Held 2006). This remoteness of politics was also a diagnosis that participatory democrats made. Citizens should be more engaged in political decision-making and through this be able to make reasonable decisions. Deliberative democracy's premise is the force of reason-giving in collective decision-

making processes (Eriksen & Fossum 2011). Thus, deliberative democracy emphasizes the process that precedes democratic collective decision-making. Deliberation is needed to enhance the quality of decisions by avoiding the consideration of spontaneous preferences and rather by developing reflective preferences. With reference to Habermas, deliberationists argue that rationality cannot be separated from justification to others (ibid.). Furthermore, deliberation as the formation of individuals' will is seen as the primary source for democratic legitimacy instead of the mere aggregated will of individuals (Held 2006: 233). In other words, deliberative democracy makes two distinct claims: (1) Deliberative democracy argues that through the process of deliberation, i.e. the process of reason-giving and listening to the arguments of others, a political decision can be more rational and enlightened (Offe & Preuß 1991). (2) Deliberationists argue that deliberation has a developmental participatory effect. Citizens develop more sophisticated political views and make more democratic decisions considering other perspectives (Fishkin 2009: 54).

This chapter outlines these two strands of argumentation in deliberation theory, namely the epistemic reasoning of the more enlightened decisions through deliberation and the participatory reasoning of citizen transformation (Warren 1993) through deliberation. After these foundations of deliberative democracy are laid out, the chapter will outline and discuss deliberative democratic concepts in the light of IR-Theory and European Integration research as well as social movement research in order to reflect deliberative democracy's value for TCSNs. Jürgen Habermas as one of the founding fathers of deliberative democracy or deliberative politics will be discussed along with theorists, who conceptualized deliberation as a universal procedure independent from state structures. The chapter does not follow the paths of the many models of deliberation in mass societies and state structures, because the relevance of deliberation for the present study is to be found in democratic deliberation in groups of (un-elected) representatives and democratic deliberation in civil society and the transnational sphere. Thus, after having discussed the basic ideas of (democratic) deliberation, the chapter turns to the specific debate around deliberation in global politics.

3.1 The Epistemic Perspective on Deliberation

The distinct epistemic quality of deliberation is mainly based on the systematization of different types of action by Jürgen Habermas (1981) on the one hand, and Jon Elster's (1998) distinction between arguing and bargaining on the other hand. Habermas' distinction between strategic and communicative action, which he outlined in the Theory of Communicative Action (Habermas 1981) is defined on the basis of the criteria of action orientation (Saretzki 2009). Whether an action is oriented to success or to understanding defines if a social action is strategic or communicative respectively (Habermas 1981: 256-57).

Types of Action

| | | |
|------------------|---------------------|------------------------------------|
| Action Situation | Action Orientation | |
| | Oriented to Success | Oriented to Reaching Understanding |
| Nonsocial | Instrumental action | --- |
| Social | Strategic action | Communicative action |

Table 2: Types of Action¹⁷

Reaching understanding is conceptualized by Habermas as reaching an agreement, which cannot be imposed by one party only, but has a rational basis. In his linguistic conceptualization, Habermas asserts that communicative action takes place if one speech act is only successful if the other (person) takes a position on it by agreeing to it (Habermas 1981: 286-87). Habermas further differentiated communicative action into weak and strong communicative action by introducing a third action orientation, the orientation to reach consensus. Reaching consensus is conceptualized as strong communicative action, whereas reaching understanding is a weak communicative action (Saretzki 2009: 156; citing Habermas 1999: 121-134). Habermas' distinction between strategic and communicative action is complemented by a distinction of Jon Elster, who defines his categories of bargaining and arguing, in contrast to Habermas, on the basis of a rational choice assumption (Saretzki 1996). Jon Elster (1998) put forward the distinction between bargaining and arguing. While bargaining is meant, when persons bargain with each other and have their own preferences in mind, arguing means the communication where both parties are ready to be convinced and do not consequently follow their interest, but are more interested in finding true answers (Elster 1998). He further argues that deliberation becomes more probable when it is public because publicness constrains negotiation. Publicness keeps people from negotiating for their own selfish interests (imperfection constraint). Furthermore, in order to be convincing, people's arguments should be in line of what they said in the past (consistency constraint): "Once a speaker has adopted an impartial argument because it corresponds to his interest or prejudice, he will be seen as opportunistic if he deviates from it when it ceases to serve his needs" (Elster 1998: 104). Finally, public deliberation produces a plausibility constraint to deliberators in that they cannot make hypocritical statements that are not convincing to others (Elster 1998: 105).

¹⁷ (Habermas 1981: 285)

However, Elster's differentiation between bargaining and arguing is not one between equal terms, Saretzki argues. Elster rather assumes that bargaining is the 'natural' way of communication, whereas one has to be forced (by external condition or by oneself) into arguing (Saretzki 1996: 24). The normative bias of rational choice towards the presumably better communication mode of bargaining, which accepts starting positions of the involved actors and is individualistic and pluralistically oriented, can be falsified by different examples that show that also in bargaining situations starting points of actors are changed and the orientation towards a common good (in contrast to individual preferences) can also be exemplified in different bargaining situations (Saretzki 1996: 25-26). Similarly, it can be argued against the differentiation contexts between arguing as a public discussion and bargaining as a confidential communication; since also arguing processes can be conducted secretly e.g. dissident's deliberating (Saretzki 1996: 29). Thus, it can be concluded that the defining categories of arguing and bargaining such as orientations, themes, contexts and collectives are "contingent on the respective mode of communication"¹⁸ (Saretzki 1996: 32). Saretzki suggests "a narrow 'modal' definition of the two modes of communications" (Saretzki 2009: 165) that distinguishes arguing and bargaining on the dimensions of the functional reference, the basic structure and the process. Whereas the function of arguing is to solve cognitive problems, bargaining is used to solve distributive problems. From this evolves the basic structure, which is triadic in deliberation and dyadic in negotiation. In order to solve cognitive problems, arguing needs the reference to a third party, a criterion for true or right, in front of which arguments are exchanged. This also influences the process dimension. Arguing is reflexive, whereas bargaining is sequential (Saretzki 1996: 34-35).

3.1.1 Valid Norms and Enlightened Decisions – the Goals of Deliberation

Seyla Benhabib (1996) further differentiated the basic principles of discourse ethics. She argued that deliberation procedures themselves should be guided by general norms, which are outlined in the discourse model of ethics. The participation in deliberation should be governed by equality and symmetry. All should have the same chance to raise issues and arguments. Furthermore everyone should have the right to question the assigned topics of deliberation, i.e. the agenda. And finally, everyone should have the right to raise reflexive arguments about the rules of procedure as such (Benhabib 1996: 70). Following this argumentation, deliberation theorists have argued, that decisions that are taken after deliberation are better decisions because participants in deliberation have developed more reflective preferences. These reflective preferences are:

- "more *empathetic* with the plight of others;
- more *considered*, and hence both better informed and more stable; and

¹⁸ Author's translation.

- more *far-reaching* in both time and space, taking fuller account of distant periods, distant peoples and different interests.”(Goodin 2003: 7).

Similarly, Offe and Preuss define the aim of every democratic decision as being rational and enlightened: A political will is rational or enlightened if it meets three criteria: (1) fact-regarding, (2) future-regarding and (3) other-regarding. (Offe/Preuss 1991: 156-57). This rational and enlightened decision-making is to be learned in deliberation. This concept assumes also that people do not have fixed preferences, but that they can “learn” what their preferences are in discussing matters with others:

The major contention of deliberative democrats is to bid farewell to any notion of fixed preferences and to replace them with a learning process in and through which people come to terms with the range of issues they need to understand in order to hold a sound and reasonable political judgment. (Held 1996: 233)

This normative anticipation that democratic deliberation leads to better decisions through a learning process of the involved participants of deliberation is based on the epistemic aim of deliberation to solve cognitive problems, as Saretzki (1996) pointed out. Those better decisions should be grounded in universal and valid norms instead of particularistic interests. This refraining from one’s own egoistic interests and the “inclusion of the other” (Habermas et al. 2002) is possible through deliberation. Habermas stated that impartial judgment can only result from a principle that forces “*all* affected to adopt the perspectives of *all others* in the balancing of interests” Habermas 1990: 65). Thus, every valid norm must be preceded by a compelled role-taking of all affected. Habermas formulates this universalization principle as a principle of argumentation, which functions as a necessary presupposition for any practical discourse to be in place (Habermas 1990: 66, 93): “All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation).” (ibid.). In defining the bridging principle between particular observations and generalizable hypotheses in practical discourse¹⁹, Habermas formulates an extended universalization principle, which goes beyond Kant’s categorical imperative and is not solely based on a formalistic account of the universal validity of norms. Habermas pointed out in his discourse ethics that “[o]nly those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.” (Habermas 1990: 66).

3.1.2 Beyond Expert Rationality in Deliberation

Besides the relationship between preferences, learning and valid norms, there are two other epistemological questions that emerge in the discussion of deliberative democracy: (1) Does

¹⁹ Habermas names the principle of induction as the bridging principle in empirical sciences. In philosophy, he states, the suggested moral principles as the bridging principle always refer to Kant’s categorical imperative (Habermas 1990: 63).

deliberative democracy prioritize rational reasoning over emotional storytelling or can reasonable decisions also be found by different forms of citizen input? (2) Which kind of knowledge counts? Is there expert knowledge as the only form of valuable knowledge, or can local lay knowledge be brought forward by locals from bottom-up? Those two epistemological questions already point to participatory claims. If the emotional and affective voices are not taken into account, inequalities may be produced, as already outlined, in favor of the well-educated, elaborate discussants. Similarly, if local knowledge is not taken into account, the diversity of different forms and qualities of knowledge is missed out.

(1) Polletta (2006) argues that storytelling is a very important correction factor in supposedly universal rational deliberation. Although affective and subjective storytelling seems not to contribute to more considered reasoning, and the demand to argue a case in the light of the needs of others, there is a function of storytelling to deliberation that influences the rest of the group rather than the storyteller:

When members of disadvantaged groups recount their experiences of particular policies, they expose the disparate impacts of supposedly neutral policies and invite in their fellow deliberators an empathetic understanding of their distinctive needs and priorities. Far from simply asserting personal experience as the basis for policy, such stories serve to reveal the false universality of existing standards – and may open the way to construct more truly universal standards. (Polletta 2006: 83)

Thus, storytelling can give way to an even more considered account of a specific matter. By introducing storytelling as a complementary concept to rational reasoning, the epistemic process of finding “rational and enlightened” (Offe & Preuss 1991) decisions is not impeded but can be complemented and thus improved.

(2) The question of the value of local lay knowledge has a normative as well as a functional dimension. The inclusion of local or lay knowledge into deliberation processes is desirable under the notion of participatory inclusion. As already indicated, the knowledge and perspectives of local persons and groups is often unheard and therefore must be given a voice in order to fulfil the normative standards of an inclusive democratic decision-making (Phillips 1993). Equally important is the functional dimension of local knowledge. As Saretzki (1997) points out, expert knowledge comes up against limiting factors: (1) The specialized knowledge of ‘facts’ that experts can provide is not enough to solve problems in society. In order to do that, a normative evaluation against any kind of values or norms must be conducted. Otherwise, it cannot be estimated whether a social or political problematic issues needs to be solved or not. (2) Expert knowledge is in most cases too systematic and abstract in order to diagnose context-dependent problems. Systematic expert knowledge needs to be contextualized in order to be applicable to concrete local political problems. (3) Scientific expertise is disciplinary expertise, which can

hardly capture the complexities of political problems. Thus, scientific expertise is in need of an interdisciplinary integration of knowledge. (4) There is no certain scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge is inherently hypothetical, uncertain and incomplete. Thus, all allegedly certain expert knowledge has epistemic limitations and must be complemented and insured (Saretzki 1997: 181-83). Thus, emotional storytelling and local lay knowledge can be very important complements of deliberation processes and must be taken into account when thinking about the epistemic ends of deliberation. They fulfil the role to include knowledge and perspectives that are otherwise easily overlooked by expert deliberation. This leads already to the participatory claims of deliberative democracy, which will be outlined in the following.

Summarizing the epistemic dimension of deliberation, it can be concluded that deliberationists base their reasoning about good decisions for cognitive problems on a process-oriented dimension. As Habermas (1990) pointed out, it is not enough to set a formalistic universal principle that formally everyone could agree on a norm. Habermas' universalization principle must be *practiced* in discourse (1990). Thus, as he further outlines there must be a practical role-taking of other perspectives by all participants in deliberation. Only this kind of practical discourse can result in the decision about valid norms (ibid.). This kind of democratic decision-making underlines very emphatically the practice-dimension in the claim for deliberative decision-making. Thus, when adopting these basic assumption to deliberation in TCSNs, the focus in search for the quality of deliberation should be rather on the action orientation of involved participants in deliberation and the practices of role-taking and "inclusion of the other" than on formal institutional settings of deliberation.

3.2 The Participatory Claims of Deliberative Democracy

Translating discourse theory into the context of mass societies and nation state democracy, Habermas (1996) defined popular sovereignty as procedural and subjectless. While republican democratic theorists claimed that people are the bearers of sovereignty "that in principle cannot be delegated" (Habermas 1996: 301), liberals stated that political authority can be exercised by "means of elections and voting" (ibid.). Habermas suggested a third version of democracy in mass societies:

By contrast, the discourse theory of democracy corresponds to the image of a decentered society, albeit a society in which the political public sphere has been differentiated as an arena for the perception, identification, and treatment of problems affecting the whole of society. Once one gives up the philosophy of the subject, one needs neither to concentrate sovereignty concretely in the people nor to banish it in anonymous constitutional structures and powers. The "self" of the self-organizing legal community disappears in the subjectless forms of communication that regulate the flow of discursive opinion- and will-formation in such a way that their fallible results enjoy the presumption of being

reasonable. This is not to denounce the intuition connected with the idea of popular sovereignty but to interpret it intersubjectively. (Habermas 1996: 301)

Deliberative democracy in its participatory connotation is defined as “political mechanisms and social practices which facilitate the discovery of good arguments, sound justification of action and, where possible, generalizable interest” (Dryzek 1990, as cited by Held 2006: 246). The procedural notion of deliberative democracy and the definition as “practices and mechanisms” by Dryzek (1990) makes deliberative democracy adaptable to a practice-oriented examination of democracy in TCSNs. This specific conceptualization of deliberative democracy is further specified by many theorists. Goodin (2003) argues in this regard to take the input-dimension of democracy more seriously. Input is recognized as having an impact, but only in relation to the output. In liberal democratic theory, preferences are assumed to be fixed. The question how they develop is neglected. To the contrary, Goodin argues that inputs themselves can be lesser or more democratic (Goodin 2003: 10). This refers back to the distinction between different kinds of discussion, whether participants bargain or argue, or whether they act instrumentally or truth-seeking. Furthermore, deliberationists criticize that the mere aggregation of votes in liberal representative democracies does not consider the questions of how and why people come to vote. Empirical studies assess the socio-psychological determinants of voting choices, but do not target the “normative concerns of democratic theory” (Goodin 2003: 11), being the reasoning of individuals and their “internal reflective concomitants of democratic political discussions” (ibid.). These are important questions when thinking about the inclusion of the “mute”, the ones that are officially excluded from voting, the homeless and foreigners for example. Also other groups that will be affected by political decisions such as future generations or non-humans (animals, eco-systems) are excluded from the simple vote. Imagining oneself in the place of somebody or some group that is not able to vote is better possible in a deliberation process than without any deliberation, Goodin argues (ibid.: 14): “Premise matter, not just conclusions. Democrats trying genuinely to respond to one another need to ask not merely *what* people want, but *why*. What they are asking, through that further question, is not for some psycho-social explanation but rather for people’s self-conscious rationales.” (Goodin 2003: 13).

These are main reasons for deliberationists to argue for deliberative democracy as a form of democracy that can overcome the downsides and excluding effects of liberal representative democracy. However, deliberative democracy is distinct from participatory democracy in some regards.

3.2.1 Shared Notions and Differences between Participatory and Deliberative Democracy

Deliberative democracy shares the principles of participatory democracy and narrows the transformation thesis down to the reflection of preferences and the preparation of democratic deci-

sion-making through deliberation procedures. The goals and promises of such deliberation projects are similar to the broader aims of participation as such. However, deliberative democracy does not want to adopt participatory democracy's premises in full. Deliberationists doubt that participatory democracy can be realized in large scale complex societies. The "fiction of a general deliberative assembly" is not pursued by deliberation theorists. Concepts of deliberation for example by Seyla Benhabib (1996) rather envision a "plurality of modes of associations" as the spaces where deliberation takes place (Benhabib 1996: 74):

It is through the interlocking net of these multiple forms of associations, networks, and organizations that an anonymous "public conversation" results. It is central to the model of deliberative democracy that it privileges such a public sphere of mutually interlocking and overlapping networks and associations of deliberation, contestation, and argumentation. (original in italics, Benhabib 1996: 73-74).

Furthermore, deliberation theorists argue in contrast to participatory democrats that the decision-making in small communities needs not necessarily to be very democratic. To the contrary, those homogenous groups can be very susceptible to "conformity, intolerance and the personalization of politics" (Held 2006: 236). The mere increase of participation is no guarantee for more equal participation. Direct popular participation *per se* is not automatically democratizing political processes. Thus, deliberationists are cautious in seeing themselves fully as another version of participatory democracy (Held 2006: 237).

There are many deliberation experiments with citizens that strive to enhance participation in political decision-making. At first, deliberative polls and deliberation days are practiced as deliberation among citizens that constitute a microcosmic sample of the population (Fishkin 2009). In drawing them by lot, those deliberation models combine two distinct norms: equality and deliberation. Everyone has the same chance to be in and can be replaced equally by anyone else. In those polls and deliberation days, it was observed that people changed their minds after they knew more about certain political matters (Held 2006: 252). A critical point is how those enlightened decisions can be communicated to the wider public, which could have "recommending force" in a way that the public would be confronted with suggestions that might be their own if "they knew and thought more about the issues" (Fishkin & Luskin 2005: 185). Another deliberation experiment is the citizen jury which functions as an advisory body for public agencies. Besides those forms of concrete institutions of deliberation, there are many attempts to expand voter feedback through e-democracy experiments. E-democracy reduces costs and enhances the range of possible engagement (Held 2006: 248-49).

Deliberative Democracy is seen as targeting the micro-aspect of democratic theory, namely the citizens' competence to deliberate, "the quality of the citizens' thought and action" (Offe 2003: 297). Offe states that deliberative democracy might be a better solution in more and more plu-

ralist and heterogeneous societies than republican and liberal theories of democracy. However, he states that the practice of deliberative democracy is far from easily implemented. The requirements for citizens are very high and deliberative democracy only works if everybody participates (ibid.). However, he sees the supportive background context “for cultivating democratic citizenship competence” (Offe 2003: 319) in associations with open membership criteria and a discursive formation of consensus (in contrast to authoritative decision-making). Held (2006) sees these associations not unambiguously as favorable for deliberation. Rather, he states that civil society contexts can be both, hindering and nurturing deliberation: “There must be a shift in democratic theory from an exclusive focus on macro-political institutions to an examination of the various diverse contexts of civil society, some of which hinder and some of which nurture deliberation and debate.” (Held 2006: 234). These “contexts of civil society” are investigated in the present study. In adopting a micro-political perspective on deliberation it can be assessed in how far the specific civil society contexts of transnational networks hinder or further deliberation processes and the competencies of its participants. This is insofar interesting, as deliberationists argued that pluralist network-like contexts seem to be favorable for deliberation, but on the other hand the homogenous character of civil society organizations, that are part of these networks seem to rather hinder equalized deliberation. This theoretically assumed tension will be examined in the empirical cases of this study.

3.2.2 Pluralism and Impartiality in Deliberative Processes

Deliberative democracy is suggested as an alternative to the aggregation of individual preferences. Deliberation legitimizes decision-making insofar as new information is imparted through deliberation, thus the individuals’ often conflicting wishes and views are ordered through the process of exchanging views with a group of people and the provision of new information. This implies the assumption that people do not have fixed preferences but rather an unordered set of wishes and views. Benhabib calls the assumption that individuals have an „ordered set of coherent preferences“ a methodological fiction of economic models of political theory (Benhabib 1996: 71). Furthermore the act of articulating own opinions in front of others forces individuals to think about how their views could be convincing to others as well: “Reasoning from the standpoint of all involved not only forces a certain coherence upon one’s views but also forces one to adopt a standpoint that Hannah Arendt, following Kant, had called the ‘enlarged mentality’ “(Benhabib 1996: 72).

However, the orientation towards consensus poses problems with the liberal assumption of individual autonomy and value pluralism and it is also criticized by more radical difference theorists. Difference theorists like Iris M. Young (2000) see the principle of impartiality, which says that decisions should be impartial, i.e. that they should be agreeable by literally everyone, as a

utopian vision and furthermore a principle which suppresses diversity. The vision of *the one* good decision is misleading, she argues (Young 2000: 43-44). Furthermore, she says that nobody can set aside her or his particular preference, which is why impartiality is a false reduction of multiple viewpoints to one viewpoint. She suggests a politics of inclusion as an ideal of a heterogeneous public (ibid.). Furthermore, deliberation is criticized for privileging particular types of contribution such as dispassionate and disembodied reason-giving over other types such as narratives, and thus perpetuating the dominance of citizens with “higher” communication skills (Young 2000: 38-39). Carole Gould’s definition of deliberative democracy relativizes the need for consensus in that she states that deliberative democracy means that differences are brought into the public space and are revised under discussion, either purely consensual in the end or differences are seen as contingent, both assume a generality of difference (Gould 1996: 143). This definition reflects difference as an important and general condition of deliberative democracy.

Pluralism in the political process is justified, because it “features multiple centers of power, counters authoritarianism, and provides the basic grist for political debate” (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2006: 635). An argument which is shared with participatory democrats is that political disagreement is conducive to developing competent individuals, who know the reasoning for their positions (ibid.). If pluralism is a basic value of democracy, that should not be overcome, the question is how consensus can be reached without compromising the one or other position. Dryzek and Niemeyer (2007b) conceptualized the meta-consensus as a way to solve this dilemma. “deliberation should produce agreement on the domain of relevant reasons or considerations (involving both beliefs and values) that ought to be taken into account, and on the character of the choices to be made, but it does not require agreement on the veracity of particular beliefs, or ranking of values, still less unanimity on what should be done.” (Niemeyer & Dryzek 2007: 4). Furthermore, on the basis of metaconsensus, a second outcome of deliberation can be reached:

Intersubjective rationality results from deliberative procedure in which both agreement and disagreement are possible, but are constrained by a condition of consistency regarding the reasons that produce a particular decision. An intersubjectively rational situation emerges when individuals who agree on preferences also concur on the relevant reasons, and vice versa for disagreement.(ibid.)

Similarly, Fung and Wright (2003) imagine a more pragmatic version of decision-making through deliberation: Citizens do not necessarily need to find neither consensus nor do they need to be altruistic in their positions and arguments. For a reasonable deliberation it is enough, if citizens can find reasons that they can accept in collective actions (Fung and Wright 2003: 17).

This relativization of the consensus-orientation, which even question the very ground definition of deliberation, namely the learning of citizens to include “the other” in their own preferences and arrive at *the* one valid norm (see Habermas 1990), is taking into account the diverse group constellations that occurs also in TCSNs. Thus, the evaluation of the democratic quality of deliberation practices must be cautious in regard to the output of deliberation. Furthermore, this even more strongly emphasizes the process of deliberation and puts aside the desired outcome. This can be captured by the conceptual approach of deliberation practices which is put forward in this study.

In sum, the conceptualization of deliberative democracy shares the same assumptions about educational prospects as participatory democracy. Deliberationists see democratic principles fulfilled if decisions are taken on the ground of impartial judgment, which can only be reached through deliberation and the reasonable weighing of all possible arguments and preferences (Held 2006). Deliberation over matters of public relevance forces actors to reason generally and argue in favor of a common purpose. In deliberative settings, hidden particularistic interests between certain decisions are exposed, and the perspectives of others need to be included to come to any kind of consensus. Although consensus is hard to reach, and moral disagreement will not be “solved” by deliberation, involved actors can find “significant points of convergence between one’s own understandings and those of citizens whose positions, [...], one must reject” (Held 2006: 243, citing Gutmann & Thompson 1996: 85).

3.3 The Prospects of Deliberative Democracy for Transnational Civil Society Networks

Since the end of the cold war, norms played an increasingly important role in IR research. In this regard, deliberative concepts have not only been used to assess democratic innovations such as deliberative polls but also to evaluate the democratic quality of European institutions (see e.g. Smith 2009, Friedrich 2011). The European Union is a distinct place to study deliberation in contrast to international politics. As Neyer points out, the EU is neither anarchically nor hierarchically governed, but is situated gradually in-between. Neyer calls this governance form heterarchy (Neyer 2003). The status of the EU governance in-between vertical and horizontal coordination, as well as centralization and decentralization “requires an inclusive and cooperative mode of interaction” (Neyer 2003: 690). This can be also proven by empirical evidence: “political interaction in the EU relies very much on deliberation” (ibid.). IR and EU scholars adopted the idea of deliberative democracy in which civil society plays an important part in fostering deliberative democracy. Neyer argues the case specifically for the ability of civil society to attract public attention (Neyer 2003: 695), where European or transnational media hardly exist. As argued before, this publicity may force actors into a deliberative mode. In his widely received

account of communicative action and the persuasive power of norms in the field of international human rights politics, Thomas Risse (2000) made the claim that the three modes of action cannot be seen as mutual exclusive but as intermingling and turning over in different phases of international politics. He distinguishes between the classic rational choice account of the logic of consequentialism, a rule-based action following the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen 1998a) and the logic of arguing (Elster 1998). This logic of arguing was equated with the logic of communicative action, as theorized by Habermas (1981). In this he and others wanted to empirically investigate the existence of arguing in the field of IR.



Figure 1: “Three Logics of Social Action”²⁰

Risse-Kappen et al. (1999) translated the logic of communicative action into empirical analysis of international human rights politics with the conception of the spiral model, which builds on the conceptualization of the boomerang model by Keck & Sikkink (Keck & Sikkink 1998) in the work on transnational advocacy coalitions. In the spiral model, they investigate the communication phases in international human rights politics (Risse-Kappen et al. 1999). They state that NGOs which can successfully gain attention in an international public can effectively force states to comply with human rights norms. This is not only because autocratic state leaders are easily convinced of the plausibility of human rights norms, but because at a certain point they get trapped in a rhetoric dead end. Having done “cheap talk” for a while can provoke other states and international organizations to demand consequences. Then, the international reputation, a very costly good, is at stake (Risse et al. 2002). However, Müller (Müller 2007) stated that this research program which aims at making Habermas’ theory of communicative action fruitful for the empirical analysis of global politics must fail in that the actual actor orientations that sup-

²⁰ (Risse 2000: 4)

posedly change after sequences of speech acts cannot be examined by social scientific research. Since these are “intramental” processes, they cannot be studied by social sciences (Müller 2007: 214). Thus, this approach has been criticized in that it fails to reasonably connect theoretical conceptualization and empirical analysis:

[...] the restructuring of a research design that shifts the focus of attention to the structural and institutional context of communication does not provide an answer to the question how we are to conceptualize and describe the deliberations that go on within these contexts [...] What goes on in processes of communication becomes something like a black box again, if we focus our analysis primarily on the topics and contexts of deliberation. (Saretzki 2009: 172).

However, based on this normative turn in IR and the assumption that civil society actors can play an influential role in democratizing international politics through normative argumentation, a second research program evolved. This research program has been concerned with questions of “the democratizing potential inherent in civil society participation in the institutions of global and European governance” (Steffek et al. 2008: 3). In concretely operationalizing the democratic quality of existing deliberative arrangements in global politics, the role of civil society actors as a “transmission belt” between international organizations, the global citizenry and the public sphere (Steffek & Nanz 2008: 8-9) was to be examined. By operationalizing the principles of deliberation into four indicators of democratic quality, namely access to deliberation, transparency and access to information, responsiveness to stakeholder concerns and inclusion of all voices; this research program investigated qualitatively the democratizing influence of civil society participation on European and global governance. As one of the findings suggests, civil society participation in practice is highly dependent on the policy field and the willingness of political decision-makers to include civil society’s voice in policy-making (Friedrich 2008). In considering the heterogeneous interests at stake at the EU level, compared to the relative homogeneity of the nation state context, Friedrich (2009) suggests a model of deliberative participation in order to fruitfully operationalize normative democratic theory beyond the nation state (Friedrich 2009). This model combines elements of associative and deliberative democracy in order to combine associative participation of civil society as democratizing agents and discursive justification under the conditions of heterogeneity (Friedrich 2009: 198-99). Still, a general trend of opening up of international institutions can be observed also in quantitative terms (Tallberg et al. 2013).

Although deliberative democracy as a concept of procedural democracy mainly focusses on the will-formation process prior to decision-making and the quality of decisions taken, deliberation is also applied as a discursive control mechanism that secures accountability of representatives in spheres, such as transnational relations, where representatives cannot be held formally accountable by elections. The concept of discursive representation that is suggested as a way out

of the problematic question of who is entitled to hold the decision-makers accountable in fluid spheres such as networks, shifts the point of reference for democratic legitimacy from the individual to the discourse (Dryzek 1990; Dryzek & Niemeyer 2008). In particular the context of transnational networks poses the question at the core of democratic theory of a clearly defined demos. If such demos cannot be identified, Dryzek and Niemeyer suggest to make a shift towards a subjectless discursive representation, following Habermas' concept of "subjectless forms communication" (Habermas 1996: 136), in ensuring "that a network is not dominated by a single discourse whose terms are accepted uncritically by all involved actors in a way that marginalizes other discourses that could claim relevance" (Dryzek & Niemeyer 2008: 13).

In sum, deliberative democracy is the one theoretical concept that is most widely applied in IR and transnational democracy. The appeal of deliberative democracy can be found in the procedural, subjectless notion (see Habermas 1996), that overcomes aggregative forms of democracy that are so tightly bound to the nation state. Deliberative democracy does not only provide the chance to really conceptualize a democratic form that is translatable to global politics, it is also in its normative claim more ambitious than any aggregative form of democracy. Besides the similarly high claims of deliberative democracy as of participatory democracy in terms of an alleviation of the participatory democratic quality of decision-making, deliberation is also said to produce better, i.e. more rational and enlightened decisions (see Goodin 2003). This epistemic dimension of deliberation counters also the critics of participatory democracy, who state that too broad participation of allegedly uninformed citizens is not conducive for a stable political system (see Crozier et al. 1975). However, the empirical examination of all these normative claims is still going on and it probably needs further studies to make statements about the empirical feasibility of deliberative democracy and its normative claims.

The democratic norms inherent in the three models of participatory, representative and deliberative democracy that were outlined in the previous chapters build the background against which the empirical findings of political practices in chapter 6 are interpreted and discussed (chapter 7).

4 Democracy as Practice

Since the aim of this study is to identify democratic practice in places where democratic institutions hardly exist, practice theory, and specifically its social scientist conceptualization, functions as a useful conceptual tool to empirically grasp democracy in TCSNs. The conceptual problem with the application of democratic theory in TCSNs is the starting point for a search of theoretical concepts that are adaptable to the context of fluid and transnational civil society networks.

During the previous chapters, the relevant concepts of participatory, representative and deliberative democracy were outlined. These concepts of democratic theory share a conceptualization of democracy that is either process-oriented or performance-oriented. In order to analytically translate these conceptualizations into the empirical study of democracy in transnational networks, the practice lens on democracy is adopted. This is the central focus of this chapter.

Before turning to the concept of social practice, I shall first outline the structural preconditions of transnational civil society that are the main reason for the application of practice theory: Networks as structural categories are commonly defined by what they are not: They are neither hierarchies nor market-like structures. Many authors place hierarchy and market at the two ends of one continuum. Networks are a hybrid form of organization somewhere in the middle of this continuum. Whereas hierarchies²¹ are coordinated through formal rules, the market is coordinated through prices (Weyer 2008: 42-44). Networks have no such binding, universal and rational logics of coordination. They are run by mutual trust of the actors in the network. The actors are interdependent in networks. In opposition to hierarchies, where formal rules, guided coordination and authority are used to regulate and solve conflicts, networks work in a discourse mode (ibid.). Forms of interaction are discursively managed between actors. Conflicts are solved by negotiation. The access to networks is rather exclusive and limited, compared to the market, which is open for everyone and where actors are independent from each other and coordinate only specific exchange interactions (ibid.) Other authors conceptualize networks as a specific form which cannot be compared to hierarchies or markets and cannot be positioned as a mixture between those forms of organization (Powell 1990). The discourse mode of interaction defines the (deliberative) democratic potential of networks.

The political scientist conceptualization of networks is rooted in the pluralist theory of the state²². Pluralist theorists have argued that state actors cannot impose their formal hierarchy on all parts of society. “the notion of a monolithic state in control of itself and civil society was always a myth [...]that obscured the reality of diverse state practices that escaped the control of the center because they arose from the contingent beliefs and actions of diverse actors at the boundary of state and civil society” (Enroth 2011: 30). This pluralist notion of networks can be both: a chance for democracy and a threat. Networked structures in society can lead to societal

²¹ A state or organizations are the primary examples of hierarchies.

²² Pluralist theory of democracy is similar to classic representative democratic theory in that it also aims to constrain majoritarian and executive power. A main feature of pluralist democracy is the representation of the electorate through responsible representatives. In this political architecture are a plurality of interest groups, political institutions and parties the key element which provide the two above mentioned ideal features of pluralist democracy (Schmidt 2008: 211). Pluralist democracy enjoys a renaissance as it is a theoretical framework that fits into the empirical trends of transnational civil society and the fluidity of governance through networks. Those new non-static forms of rule and interest representation cannot be captured by classic state centered theories of democracy, but by theories like the pluralist theory that focuses on different (collective) actors.

fragmentation, imbalanced democratic participation and a declining public sphere. However, by giving formalistic representative norms of democracy a discursive twist (Dryzek), networks appear to be perfect sites for “engagement across discourses in the public sphere” (Dryzek 2007: 271). Networks have a democratic potential, but these visions are rather “begging questions about how alleged democratic potential is to be actualized.” (Enroth 2011: 26-27) In order to make those visions assessable in empirical studies, a thorough conceptual reconstruction of central terms and normative assumptions is necessary. Also, networks are a phenomenon on the meso-level, they are a hinge between micro- and macro level. Network theory is neither a structural theory nor an action oriented approach. Thus, networks connect both processes (Weyer 2008). Therefore, it is difficult to assess network democracy solely either in terms of static institutional design (structural) or in terms of citizen participation (actor-oriented). Therefore, the practice approach is suitable to the structural context of TCSNs.

A specific form of networks - inter-organizational networks - is not constituted by individuals but by collective actors. Here, sociologists focus on a specific form of interaction: the trustful cooperation between autonomous actors. Civil society networks are such inter-organizational networks. They normally consist of NGOs and SMOs who cooperate in networked structures in order to coordinate campaigns and projects. Especially those civil society networks rely on mutual trust and reciprocity (Kanter & Fine 2010). Otherwise they could not function properly. As the main benefits of those civil society networks are the quick flow of information and the better output that can be generated by a coalition of NGOs (compared to single organizations), trust is an important dimension. Here, transnational advocacy networks are defined as “spontaneously organized, horizontal, and egalitarian alternatives to the state” (Lake & Wong 2006: 4). The established sociological as well as political scientist expectation about the character of political networks would thus be that networks are specifically non-hierarchical, open and egalitarian. Networks seem to be the favorable organizational type for democratic governance beyond the nation state. The transnational network is also the most appropriate institutional form in which deliberation can be exercised (Dryzek 1999). Nevertheless, it is impossible to hold networks accountable (compared to governments in nation states), especially if they cross state borders (Dryzek & Niemeyer 2008: 13-14).

Governance networks, which are defined by their function to govern in a certain policy field, are conceptualized similarly by Sørensen and Torfing (2007) as “1. Relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent, but operationally autonomous actors; 2. who interact through negotiation; 3. which take place within a regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary framework; 4. that is self-regulating within limits set by external agencies; and 5. which contributes to the production of public purpose” (Sørensen & Torfing 2007: 9). Negotiations between network

actors are framed by a common set of ideas and norms, in civil society networks even more than in governance networks, where different kinds of actors like government agencies take part. Self-regulation is an important factor in networks, which has ambiguous effects on the democratic quality. This market-like self-regulation is mainly limited by donors, who set up certain standards of project work and results that need to be met by the participating NGOs. The last point, the production of public purpose is very crucial in civil society networks. NGOs typically want to serve the public good. It is part of the legitimation of NGO campaigns and also often a requested result of donors²³. Taking these dimensions of governance networks into account, Sørensen and Torfing (2005) frame four democratic anchorage points of networks. The first point defined as “metagovernance carried out by elected political leaders within the traditional institutions of representative democracy” is not applicable in civil society networks. Further they suggest, “pro-active forms of representation in the various affected groups of stakeholders”, which points to other similarly vague notions of horizontal representation in networks. The third anchorage point is seen in the public contestation in the “wider citizenry” i.e. the public sphere. Fourthly, they suggest a set of rules and norms that regulate internal and external inclusion and exclusion and that solve conflicts in the networks (Sørensen & Torfing 2005: 202-212). The last point describes a formalization of network structures in order to ensure the “empowered inclusion” of the affected²⁴. Sørensen and Torfing (2005) argue that aggregative principles of democracy are to a lesser extent applicable in networks, because one cannot implement e.g. the principle of “one person one vote”. The network structures are too complex and the decision-making in networks are less traceable in network settings. Thus, also accountability mechanisms are not easily implemented in networks. Overall, networks that constitute the structural preconditions for the transnational civil society, are non-hierarchical, discourse-oriented, pluralist, egalitarian, but at the same time difficult to control, in danger of fragmentation and less stable.

The concept of democratic practice is a useful analytical tool to identify democracy in TCSNs because the practice approach captures two empirical preconditions of TCSNs and one theoretical presumption of transnational democracy that are in sum the basis of the present study:

²³ Depending on how public purpose is defined, the production of public purpose can also be seen as a widening of capacities and competencies of civil society actors. If public purpose is defined as e.g. building public infrastructure, then civil society actors are expanding into areas formerly administrated solely by the state.

²⁴ As already noted, networks are contrasted with hierarchy and market. States which are hierarchically structured were traditionally the place for democratic government. In the history of democracy, hierarchical institutions played a major role in concepts of democratic theorists. Until recently, only the state provided this institutional hardware, on which democracies could be built. The state’s monopoly on the use of force enables main democratic features like citizen rights, minority protection and freedom of speech. Those traditional forms of democracy are often referred to as aggregative forms of democracy. Democracy is understood by the equal aggregation of fixed interests of individuals.

Empirical Preconditions

(1) *Networks* are always changing rules and structures (Sørensen & Torfing 2005: 212). They are fluid formations that depend on the actions taken by involved actors²⁵. However, actors can only engage in the frame of the settings of the network. Thus, it can be said that neither structure nor actions determine democratic principles in networks. Or to be more precise, democratic principles evolve out of the interplay of structural settings on the one hand and actions of individual and collective actors on the other hand.

(2) Democracy in *grass-roots civil society organizations*, or *social movement groups*, is not as formalized and institutionalized as in the nation state context. First, in social movement organizations, decision-making is rather informal, decentralized, consensus-oriented, deliberative and experimental (Polletta 2002: 209). Second, democracy in social movement groups is often “made” or formed by activists through participating in those groups (Blee 2012). This informal, open and process-oriented experience of democracy in social movement organizations further determines the choice for an analytical approach emphasizing processes and performances instead of structures.

Theoretical Presumption

(1) Theorists of *transnational democracy* most often share the conviction that transnational democracy “does not have to be integrated with any particular set of formal institutions” (Dryzek 2006: 25). The prospects of a transnational democracy are rather seen in discursive or communicative arrangements and social learning processes (Risse 1999; Dryzek 2006).

Therefore, I suggest a conceptualization of democracy as practice in order to identify democracy through the regular and repeated practices in networks. The context (network), the study object (civil society) as well as the theoretical frame (transnational democracy) of this study are defined by a process-orientation and the interplay of agent and structure. Bourdieu (1977) called this the “grammar of practices,” implicit rules and regulations that evolve out of subjective interpretation and given formal rules. In civil society networks, democracy as a principle is explicitly formulated as rules that regulate access, transparency and inclusion in the network and thus define the proceedings of a formalized democracy. Due to the characteristics of civil society networks, those formalized rules are much more open for interpretation and modification, in contrast to a nation state where e.g. formal voting rights are clear cut and not subject to constant

²⁵ In general, I use the term actor as a neutral term, defining individual and collective actors. Giddens frames the term *agent* in opposition to *actor*, which, as he states, is part of subjectivist theories of action and thus implies certain attributes among actors. The agent, in contrast to the actor, is not an abstract subject, but somebody who participates in practices and changes the course of practices (Münch 2008: 477-78). When referring to Giddens’ theory of structuration, I will adopt the term agent.

change and interpretation. It is quite clear, that for example formal authorization mechanisms of representatives are not in place in TCSNs. However, there are substantive authorization *practices* that might be not very institutionalized, but collectively shared by different network actors. Thus, there is democratic practice even when democratic institutions are absent. In sum, the practice account contributes to a normative question of how democracy can work in transnational relations and to an empirical question of how democracy can be observed in the contexts of complex, interdependent and unstable TCSNs.

The following chapter will shortly outline the main concepts of practice in order to arrive at an operationalization of democracy as democratic practice in TCSNs.

The relevant criteria for a practice approach that is adaptable to this study of TCSNs are (1) the classification of practices in the social world, i.e. the way in which intention vs. behavior and action vs. structure are interrelated, and (2) the conceptualization of knowledge. Both of these criteria are relevant for the specific conceptualization of democratic practice in TCSNs. (1) Practices should be classified as phenomena between the macro- and the micro level of the social (Schatzki et al. 2005). In TCSNs they are neither pure micro-phenomena conducted by isolated individuals, nor macro-phenomena that relate to the greater structures of the networks. The practices in the examined TCSNs are collective practices that are intentionally conducted and modified by individuals *and* influenced and transformed by broader structures. At the same time, practices shape individuals' actions and the broader network structures. Furthermore, practices co-constitute structure and actions of individuals and at the same time are constituted by structure and actions (Giddens 1984). However, in the study of democracy in TCSNs the agency of actors to conduct, modify and circumvent practices must be emphasized in particular because these positionings towards practices also modify the democratic quality of these practices. This leads to the second criterion of knowledge within practices. (2) Although it should be assumed that knowledge is an integral part of practices, knowledge should not be conceptualized as a skill, buried in the subconscious which only comes into effect while doing practices in an automated way as for example Reckwitz (2003) theorized it. Democratic practice in TCSNs is sometimes complex or even complicated and must be steadily and consciously reflected by the actors. Therefore, knowledge is integrated in the practices, but it is also owned by the actors – it is practical and theoretical knowledge combined. Taking these criteria into account, the following part will concentrate on sociological accounts of practices because social theory is much better translatable into a study of democratic practice in networks than cultural accounts of practices, which are interested in very different research questions. First, Pierre Bourdieu's and Anthony Giddens' seminal theories of practice will be explored, followed by more recent works of the so-called *practice turn*.

4.1 Social Practices

The theorizing of the term “practice” evolved out of a criticism of theories of action as well as social system theories. Anthony Giddens is in this regard the most prominent theorist; he conceptualized a “grand” theory, the theory of structuration (Giddens 1984), as a way to reconcile objectivist and subjectivist social theory. Other authors conceptualized practices as new and fruitful objects of study. The “practice turn”, which recently developed in many different disciplines such as philosophy, cultural theory, history, sociology, anthropology and science and technology studies (Schatzki et al. 2005: 1), was led by many theorists to move current thinking beyond the dualism of structure and action and to link the analysis of micro- and macro phenomena. Given the diversity of disciplinary approaches, it does not come as a surprise that the account and conceptualizations of practice vary and cannot be summarized in one theory of practice. The shift in understanding of social ontology is the main contribution of social theorists to the practice turn: “the social is a field of embodied, materially interwoven practices, centrally organized around shared practical understandings. [...] Actions, for instance, are embedded in practices, just as individuals are constituted within them. Language, moreover, is a type of activity (discursive) and hence practice phenomenon, whereas institutions and structures are effects of them.” (Schatzki et al. 2005: 3). This understanding of the social builds a contrast to concepts that focus on individuals, actions, language, the life world, institutions, roles or structures as the main defining dimensions of the social. Practice theorists state that all those phenomena can only be understood through the analysis of practices (Schatzki et al. 2005: 3).

The roots of practice theory can be seen in Wittgenstein’s theory of language games in *Philosophical investigations* (1953), Garfinkel’s *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (1967), Bourdieu’s *Outline of a theory of practice* (1977) and Giddens’ *Theory of Structuration* (1984). Ludwig Wittgenstein is seen as the conceptual „backbone“ of practice theory. He stated that regular action can never be determined by explicit rules exclusively because even the most explicit rule can never cover every possible instance. Therefore, actors need background information on how to handle certain situations. Rules need to be interpreted by actors (Wittgenstein 2011 [1953]) (Schulz-Schaeffer 2010: 321). Through this interactive process between an actor’s interpretation and the systematic rule, practices emerge²⁶. Wittgenstein’s work resonates with Garfinkel’s perspectives on social rules that are implicit, ‘that are just in our heads’. With his crisis experiments, he showed

²⁶ Wittgenstein states, in his theory of language games, how little the act of speaking is influenced by general rules because the forms of language use are so manifold, and speaking as such is part of an activity: „Wieviele Arten der Sätze gibt es aber? Etwas Behauptung, Frage, Befehl? – Es gibt unzählige solcher Arten: unzählige verschiedene Arten der Verwendung alles dessen, was wir “Zeichen”, “Worte”, “Sätze”, nennen. Und diese Mannigfaltigkeit ist nichts Festes, ein für allemal Gegebenes; sondern neue Typen der Sprache, neue Sprachspiele, wie wir sagen können, entstehen und andre veralten und werden vergessen. [...] Das Wort „Sprachspiel“ soll hier hervorheben, daß das Sprechen der Sprache ein Teil ist einer Tätigkeit, oder einer Lebensform.“ (Wittgenstein 2011 [1953]:26).

that a slight change of socially appropriate action can be extremely irritating to others, although those rules are not explicitly agreed on (Garfinkel 1967). Pierre Bourdieu (1977) and Anthony Giddens (1984) built theories of practices that explain society by reconciling micro-and macro-level explanations. Whereas Bourdieu's account is structural as he sees practices as pre-conscious habits, reproducing rather static groups and distinctions in society, Giddens ascribes to his individuals the ability to reflect and change practices and therefore change structures and rules of society. Judith Butler further developed this approach in her theory of subversive acts and the performance of societal categories (doing gender)(Butler 2006, 1990). She goes even further and says that people can undermine even dominant social forces by changing daily routines and actions (ibd.).

Practice as social action is, according to Bourdieu, an action by which actors produce and reproduce social, cultural and economic realities²⁷. As a result, practice as an individual behavior becomes part of larger social developments (Münch 2004; Bourdieu 1977). The practice approach thus combines subjectivist and objectivist sociological approaches. Bourdieu distinguishes practices from any formal rule-enforced action and thus situates practices in the informal, implicit context of rituals and habits (Bourdieu 1977: 16-18). Nevertheless, according to Bourdieu, there is a "grammar of practices" that accompanies every practice and controls for the functionality of practices. This grammar can consist of spontaneous "theories" of actors. However, these secondary explanations of actors "only reinforce the structures by providing them with a particular form of "rationalization" (Bourdieu 1977: 29). Furthermore, Bourdieu does not think that the agency of actors, meaning the ability to steer the way and direction of practices, is a main characteristic of practices: "If agents are possessed by their habitus more than they possess it, this is because it acts within them as the organizing principle of their actions, and because this *modus operandi*, informing all thought and action (including the thought of action) reveals itself only in the *modus operatum*." (Bourdieu 1977: 18). Bourdieu's work focusses mainly on the explanation of structure through practices. His view on the social world is that of a static structure, which is led by informally enforced practices. These practices make sense to individual actors, but are not intentionally steered by them. Therefore, even in the field of informality and rituals, structures explain the social (ibid.).

The reproduction of society through shared practices and the reconciliation of subjectivist and objectivist social theory are two aspects that are common in Bourdieu's and Giddens' practice theories. Social practices in Giddens' theory of structuration are neither individual subjective

²⁷ Bourdieu developed his understanding of social practice after observing the Algerian Kabyls and their daily household practices, concluding that diverse practices were partly ambiguous in relationship to greater structures. Those social practices made sense for the individual actor, but not necessarily for the objectivist system. Bourdieu reconstructed the self-concepts of actors instead of looking at general and systematic rules of interaction.

choices of action nor structurally steered behavior. Giddens (1997) argues that society can neither be explained by investigating isolated individual micro phenomena nor by identifying a detached structure. The social practices are not without context and rules, but they are changeable by the people who conduct social practices. Giddens' theory of structuration emphasizes the agent. Agents are able to change everyday actions, because structural rules are only present while acting and are often not explicit (Giddens 1997: 52). According to Giddens, the primacy of either the individual subject or the institutional object needs to be dissolved into a theory of structuration, which argues that the central focus of social research should neither be on the experience of the individual agent nor on the coercion of society's structure, but on the social practices regulated by time and space. These practices are recursive (ibid.). The continuity of social practice assumes reflexivity of the agent. At the same time such reflexivity is only possible through continuous practices, which are understood as a process. Thus, reflexivity is not only self-consciousness but implies a permanent control of action of oneself and others. The assumption behind this is that individuals act with purpose, but this purpose cannot be understood isolated from time and space (ibid.). Rather, purpose develops over time and is context-dependent. Whereas people can reason and explain their action discursively, this discursive construction of purpose does not always converge with the actual action. Thus, it is possible that there is unconscious reason for action, which is not accessible for the social scientists. Giddens calls this incorporated, shared knowledge, which is not accessible by a discursive consciousness. It is a practical consciousness, in which we can find tacit knowledge about routinized practices (Giddens 1997: 55). However, the dividing line between practical and discursive consciousness is permeable. Since action is, in contrast to behavior, always understood as intentional, acting is always in a direct causal relationship to the individual, who acts. There might be unintended consequences and circumstances that "let individuals act" in a certain way, but in the end it is the agent who acts (ibid.). According to Giddens, analyzing the structuration of social systems means analyzing how those systems are produced and reproduced by interactions. Such systems are based on consciously carried out practices of situated agents, who refer to different rules and resources in different contexts (Giddens. 1997: 77).

The more recent interest in practices has a different focus. Literature of the so-called "Practice Turn" is interested first and foremost in the bodily expression of practices (Reckwitz 2003). The practice theories conceptualized by current theorists such as Schatzki et al. (2005), Reckwitz (2003) and others emphasize the object, the non-human artifact as an important part of social practices as a nexus of routines, which sometimes enable certain practices²⁸. Practices are, according to Reckwitz (2003), the smallest unit of the social. Practices are nothing more than body

²⁸ An example mentioned by Reckwitz (2003) is the invention of letterpress printing and the following newly created practices to use books.

movements and are often characterized by persons dealing with “things”, an interaction between people and artefacts. This is based on practical understanding and implicit knowledge. Knowledge is incorporated and materialized in practices. Thus, practices are always knowledge-based actions (Reckwitz 2003: 290-291). Reckwitz concludes that social practices can be understood as a combination of knowledge-dependent behavioral routines. Practices as such consist of routinized motions and actions of the body. A practice becomes social when it is a collective practice and is intersubjectively understandable, thus becoming a “skillful performance” that can be interpreted by others (ibid.). Reckwitz’s practice theory emphasizes the implicitness of knowledge. While acting, criteria are used to establish meaning for other persons and things in order to take appropriate actions. Thus, this knowledge is practical and not preceding a social practice. One aim of practice theory in this regard is to reconstruct this practical knowledge, which is comprised of three elements: knowledge as interpretive understanding, methodical knowledge and motivational-emotional knowledge (Reckwitz 2003: 290-92).

Stephen Turner (2005) rejects the necessity of a “tacit rule book”, meaning the implicit knowledge of generalizable rules people share. He states analogous to Wittgenstein that there are too many possible situations, context-dependent specific rules and expectations on how to behave so that it becomes impossible to know all those rules. There are rules, but people interpret them either according to their own purposes (How are actors pursuing their interests through the interpretation of certain rules?) or with the aim of “optimizing harmony” with others (How are actors able to share practices and reach a mutual intelligibility?)(Turner 2005). Furthermore, Turner states that especially in the field of politics, explicit rules are what make practices “hang together”:

The explicit rather than the tacit parts of politics, the vocabulary of appraisal, the body of political and historical discussion, and explicitly formulated beliefs of various kinds, do the work of making practices hang together. A practice such as scientific discovery, build around training that is oriented to enabling a person to participate in discussions involving highly specialized terms and employing common apparatus, may in some respects be more like arithmetic, [...] And explicit discussion, not the training base, pulls the practice in new directions and toward new goals and experiences. (Turner 2005: 127)

Referring to the micro-macro-linkage problem, which arises in theories of practices, Jeff Coulter (2005) notes that social practices are situated between individual and macro-phenomena. Individuals can act as spokespersons and representatives of specific institutions. They are reaffirming and instantiating the “relevant macro-phenomena” (Coulter 2005: 34) and do not just speak as private individuals. However, this occurs only under specific circumstances according to specific rules. Of course the specific person is not always the carrier of an institution. For example, the staff person does not always speak on behalf of the bank, but always when she or he is in a professional meeting with clients (Coulter 2005: 34-36). Thus, the macro-social phenomena can

be observed in daily practices, which are shared by a group of people, for example officers or craftsmen. They conduct practices in their role of belonging to a group and thus have, in this regard, similar intentions. Although practices are individual actions, there are rough patterns that can be translated into “macro-“categories of practices (Barnes 2005).

In sum, the two crucial criteria that need to be taken into account when studying democracy as practice are reflected mainly in Giddens’ theory of structuration. Giddens’ (1984) approach emphasizes the agency and knowledge of agents as important characteristics of practices and is therefore very suitable for the study of democratic practices. Democratic practices are mainly based on explicit rules and cannot be compared to rather unconscious practices, for example to tie one’s shoelaces. Whereas other works focus on this implicitness of knowledge and practice (Bourdieu 1977, Reckwitz 2003), Giddens conceptualizes practices with an eye on the agent, which is not a mere carrier of structuring practices (ibid.) such as in Bourdieu’s theory of practice. Thus, the studied civil society networks can be interpreted as systems that are based on practices of actors. Through the reference of rules, resources and contexts, the practices and the meaning of those practices can be reconstructed and interpreted. Furthermore, practice theorists state that the once acquired knowledge of practices descends to different degrees into subconscious levels of the mind (Giddens 1984, Reckwitz 2003). Whereas some practices are pure automatisms, other often more complex practices are conducted with more explicit knowledge. Many of the recent practice theorists are more interested in the former aspect of practices, whereas Giddens’ ascribes more conscious ability and intention to the agent. This makes his approach more valuable for the study of democratic practices. Democratic practices are rather complex, they follow outlined rules and require much more attention than the everyday practices investigated by more recent practice theorists. In addition, the two notions of the practice turn in recent social theory of Stephen Turner (2005) and Jeff Coulter (2005), are helpful for the analysis of practices in the study of TCSNs. Here, practices are understood as something that is worked with by actors. Actors arrange, disapprove or agree with practices and can verbalize those positionings. This is a dimension of practices which includes a cognitive aspect of practices and gives directions on how to reconstruct the knowledge around practices.

For the purpose of the present study, practices are defined as shared courses of action that are co-constituted by actors and structure and can be modified by the agency of the actors (Giddens 1984). Practices function conceptually as a linkage between macro- and micro understanding of social phenomena. As argued before, the phenomenon of civil society networks is neither well explained by structural accounts nor by actor-centered accounts because networks are constituted in the collective actions of their members which recur continuously. Thus, there is a mutual constitution of structure and actors that can only be grasped by a practice approach.

Knowledge is incorporated in practices. The knowledge that is presented by actors in networks is neither purely theoretical nor individual. It is knowledge which becomes apparent in practices and is constructed in interactive practices. Thus, when analyzing interview data of network actors, the interactive aspect of knowledge must be understood. Also, incorporation of knowledge means implicitness, which is a relevant problematic aspect of text analysis and must be reflected.

4.2 Conceptualizing Democracy as Practice

Having outlined the basic premises of the practice account in order to grasp democracy from a practice perspective, the translation of normative democratic theory into evaluation criteria is the next step. This conceptual transfer of the three normative democratic theories of participatory, representative and deliberative democracy is informed by the practice lens on democracy as outlined above. Therefore, the next part of this chapter will derive a definition of democratic practices from normative democratic theory and practice theory, before the chapter proceeds with the operationalization of the concrete evaluation criteria.

As stated above, practice can be defined as a shared activity where participants have learned tacit and explicit rules in order to perform (Turner 2005: 120). Breaking this down to the political space, Nullmeier (2003) understands practices in politics as (a) interactions and (b) communications - below the level of institutions - that create and structure the political space. Whereas communication is understood as the basic term for all kinds of social action, interaction is communication between present actors (face-to-face communication). In addition, political practices can be more or less complex in terms of how many actors and communication forms and media are involved or how many sub-practices are subsumed²⁹ (Nullmeier et al. 2003: 18).

Democracy is in its most abstract version a set of different principles that need to be fulfilled. The broadest definition of an “empowered inclusion of those affected in collective decisions and actions”(Warren 2006: 386) sets the parameter for any specific type of democracy. This means that participatory democrats apply this principle to participatory processes and as a justification of participatory democracy, which, they would say, facilitates the conduct of the democratic principle best. Similarly, deliberative democrats and representative democrats argue for their respective types of democracy. While participatory democracy on the hand and representative democracy on the other hand are sometimes used as oppositional concepts, *practices* of participation and representation can stand side by side and complement each other. Deliberative democracy is often conceptualized as a very specific form of citizen deliberation with specific set-

²⁹ Nullmeier et al. (2003) name political intrigue as one form of a very complex political practice that contains several single political practices.

tings and requirements for deliberation polls. In this study, the term deliberation is more generally used for any kind of discursive interaction that takes place in civil society networks.

Based on the assumption that there are specific participatory, deliberative and representative democratic principles, which follow the broadest definition of democracy named above, those principles can be divided into several specific *rules*³⁰. In practice theory, these rules are understood as “techniques or generalizable procedures applied in the enactment/reproduction of social practices” (Giddens 1984: 21). Thus, rules are aspects of practices. They can be explicitly formulated or be implicit (ibid.). Rules are not necessarily codified in an extensive rule book, but they are techniques and procedures that are closely linked to the conduct of the practice. The learning of rules can increase the ability of agents to conduct practices and can enable agents to position themselves towards rules and practices, i.e. go around rules, reinterpret rules (Nullmeier 2008) or disapprove/approve practices or their underlying rules. This positioning of agents in turn can modify practices or even rules. If agents are reluctant to perform a certain practice or to follow the rules of this practice, e.g. monthly reporting to their local constituency, the practice will change, and consequently, the democratic quality of this practice will change as well. Positionings of actors through practices can lead to a re-interpretation or circumvention of the norms underlying a practice. The revision and dissolution of the tension between an idealist and ambitious norm set (e.g. participatory democracy) and the necessities of functioning daily routines can be successful through re-interpretation and/or circumvention of norms. However, a permanent and consequent re-interpretation or circumvention will lead to an abolishment of the respective norm (Nullmeier and Pritzlaff 2010: 21). Actors justify their actions with reference to explicit norms or “practice” implicit norms:

If one adopts this idea of an implicit, process-oriented dimension of normativity, a typology of explicit sources of normativity has to be complemented by a conception of political practices as performative actualizations of implicit norms. A two-dimensional conception of the normativity of political practices has to address the relation between sources agents explicitly refer to when justifying their actions or proposed decision options and the implicit normative force that becomes apparent in what they actually do, the norms they observe and perpetuate in their actual engagement in political practices, like for example in different types of decision-making practices. (Nullmeier & Pritzlaff 2010: 361-62)

Network actors in this case study refer to explicit norms of democratic coordination and decision-making and at the same time perpetuate implicit norms they observe in other interactions or perform in their own daily routines. However, Nullmeier’s and Pritzlaff’s (2010) account, which states that explicit norms are pronounced verbally, whereas implicit norms can (only) be found in bodily motions and performances, is not automatically evident. To the contrary, the

³⁰ Here, I follow the path of process-oriented democracy. Traditional democratic theorists would argue for the translation of principles into structure and/or resources.

arguments of this analysis will be that implicit norms are of course also and specifically be found in discursive practices, in the speech of interacting actors. The implicitness of norms is not automatically connected to the body or non-verbal interaction, implicitness occurs in routine practices of network actors, which are not explicitly justified by the actors. To reconstruct this implicit normativity behind practices is one part of the following interview analysis.

In how far actors can position themselves in a practice highly depends on their knowledge base about the broader structure (the network), the institutions (e.g. general assemblies) and the practices (e.g. decision-making). This knowledge is framed very broadly. As Giddens calls it “accurate or valid awareness” or “practical consciousness” (1984: 90) it has a mainly practical connotation, being incorporated into practices. “Practical consciousness consists of knowing the rules and the tactics whereby daily social life is constituted and reconstituted across space and time.” (Giddens 1984: 90). Through the interviews with actors in the network, the actors’ knowledge about and meanings of the practices were accessed. The interview texts provide a clear picture of the practice repertoire of an actor in the network and at the same time they provide information about possible re-interpretations and circumventions of norms.

Thus, a three-stage set of prerequisites describes the necessary conditions for democratic practices:

1. Democratic norms and rules exist in the studied context.
2. Actors know about these norms and rules.
3. Actors use their knowledge in favor of democratic norms and rules when conducting practices.

This three-stage model of requirements for democratic practices will be reflected and implemented in the analytical categories of participatory, deliberative and representation practices. The following chapter will now bring together normative democratic theory and practice approach in that it defines the normative evaluation criteria for political practices that qualify as democratically participatory, deliberative and representative.

4.3 Evaluation Criteria for Democratic Practice

The evaluation of the democratic quality of political practices marks the second part of the empirical analysis. After having explored the spectrum of political practices in the fields of participation, representation and deliberation, the evaluation part of the analysis discusses the findings of political practices in the light of the strands of democratic theory outlined in the previous chapters. The details of the analysis will be explained in chapter 5. The following chapter will

combine the insights of democratic theory on the one hand and practice research on the other hand in order to define concrete evaluation criteria for the political practices found in the two TCSNs. The evaluation criteria define the democratic quality of the political practices explored in the two TCSNs. While many democratic theorists defined criteria for democratic quality, in this study, the practice lens is inherent in the criteria. This means, that the criteria rather describe practiced principles. Thus, the criteria evaluate the practices, which “carry” democratic norms. All evaluation criteria characterize an ideal of participatory, representative and deliberative democracy respectively, which is used to evaluate the democratic quality inside TCSNs. This can be only done in an approximation. A qualitative study of this kind cannot “measure” democratic quality, but can only arrive at evaluations that mark tendencies. Therefore, the evaluation criteria mark a continuum between low democratic quality and high democratic quality.

4.3.1 Participation Practices

Translating participatory democracy into participation practices is done by reformulating its main principles as practice criteria. As argued above, participatory democracy emphasizes the tight connection between equality and freedom as democracy’s main principles. As one main characteristic of substantive freedom, participatory democrats coined the term “self-transformation”(Warren 1993). They claim that people transform into more reasonable, democratic and considerate citizens through participation and thus are better able to articulate their perspectives and actively engage as political citizens. Of course, this comes not automatically; even at the beginning of a participatory action or a deliberation, people have to have certain capabilities in order to succeed in participating (Warren 1993). Thus, the transformation and learning of people must be actively supported by educational and empowerment measures. This goes along with the democratic ideal of individual and collective autonomy (Held 2006). According to associative democrats, some or many democratic state functions and thus decision-making competencies should be entrusted to associations. The state consequently only controls compliance with democratic rules, rights and freedoms. Thus, decision-making procedures should be decentralized and conceptualized as multi-stage processes (Schmalz-Bruns 1995). A decentralized decision-making process implies also individual, or in this case organizational, autonomy of participants who can take decisions independently and only based on their (sensible) reasoning. Similarly, Held defined individual autonomy as a corner stone of democracy in that it means the “capacity of human beings to reason self-consciously, to be self-reflective and to be self-determining. It involves the ability to deliberate, judge, choose and act upon different possible courses of action in private as well as in public life.” (Held 2006: 263).

The second main principle equality can be subdivided into the criteria of transparency and inclusion. The access of participants to relevant information i.e. the transparency of processes and

decisions, which is another very important prerequisite for equal participation. Only if participants can equally access relevant, comprehensive and balanced information sources, can they fully make use of participation opportunities and sense the necessity to participate much more. Furthermore, participatory democrats argue that the participation in political processes should be broadened. Accessibility to political participation should be increased, and different interests in society should be equally considered (see eg. Philips 1998) . In civil society networks, this could be reached for example by making different campaign phases more inclusive for network members. In the framework of participatory democracy, the ideals of freedom and equality are not that easily to untangle. Criteria of freedom can have effects on equality, such as the autonomy of citizens and vice versa. The following four evaluation criteria were deducted from normative participatory democratic theory: (1) Development of (citizen) skills, (2) Autonomy, (3) Transparency, (4) Inclusion. In the following, the four criteria will be outlined.

| Freedom | Equality |
|------------------------------------|------------------|
| (1)Development of (citizen) skills | (3) Transparency |
| (2) Autonomy | (4) Inclusion |

Table 3: Evaluation Criteria: Participation Practices

(1) *Development of (citizen) skills.* The first criterion focusses on the educational aspect of participatory democracy, which is a main part of normative participatory democracy. Participatory theorists claim, and empirical studies often confirm that people are more open towards “other-regarding” through participation (Pateman 1970: 28). It is important to note that this educational criterion includes two qualitatively different phases. The first phase of education should assure equality among participants *before* equal participation is possible. This first phase is evaluated by asking: How are network members and/or affected groups trained and empowered in order to be able to fulfill the formal (mostly costs), the procedural (technical skills) and the issue-related (expert knowledge about issues at stake) prerequisites to sincerely take part in the network? The second phase of citizen transformation or education takes place during the participation itself and can be described as a side-effect of participation that often develops unnoticed. It is not characterized by pro-active measures typical for the first phase. Rather, this second phase of learning can be evaluated from the output-side: Do people value the perspectives of others more after they participated in the network? Do they appreciate the participatory forms of decision-making? And if yes, why?

(2) *Autonomy.* The practice of keeping autonomy is an important part of participation. In networks, autonomy of network members seems to come naturally because of the supposedly egalitarian and loose structure of the network. At the same time, autonomy of single organizations can be threatened by a very excluding way of decision-making in the central offices

of networks. This limits the autonomous choices of network members to organize campaigns, decide over the form of campaigning and contribution in the network as well as their own identity in their respective country/region. Thus, the following questions are relevant: How freely can network members decide on campaign issues or strategies? How autonomously can they take decisions on international network meetings? As how decentralized is the network perceived?

(3) *Transparency*. The third criterion refers to the distribution of information, which is a precondition for successful participatory democracy and serves as a basis for transparent processes (of decision-making) in the network. Sharing of information can range from a very centralized and exclusive information distribution to a rather egalitarian mode. Since civil society networks are analyzed, it could be assumed that the latter mode is prevalent. Nevertheless, is it important to distinguish again between different sorts of information and different phases of campaigning. Transparency is a main criterion of democracy. Since this study focusses on processes, it is necessary to ask if processes of information supply are equalized. More specifically: Are all network actors equally provided with relevant information about strategies, agendas and campaign goals?

(4) *Inclusion*. The fourth criterion relates to the inclusion of actors in different phases of campaign work. While the previous criteria are more general, this criterion targets mainly campaign teams, which are normally comprised of a few network member groups from different countries. These member groups form working groups with concrete campaign goals and have to collaborate over a limited period of time. Here, different ways of including and excluding groups should be analyzed and evaluated. With regard to the process of campaigns, it is worthwhile examining if routines of inclusion are implemented also on the level of campaign working groups. Thus, two questions are specifically relevant: Who is included or excluded during the campaigning process? On which grounds are network actors included or excluded?

4.3.2 Deliberation Practices

As outlined in the chapter on deliberation theory, deliberative democracy is a democratic theory that was already applied and conceptualized in the field of civil society organizations in European and Global Governance (Steffek & Nanz 2008; Friedrich 2009). Therefore, evaluation criteria on the basis of deliberative democracy were already formulated in the literature. However, these criteria must be critically examined in the light of this study's empirical context of transnational (civil society) *networks* and must be consequently translated into criteria for practices. The criteria, which Steffek and Nanz (2007) suggest, reflect the "key dimensions of democratic quality" and are named as "1. Access to deliberation; 2. Transparency and access to information; 3. Re-

sponsiveness to stakeholder concerns; 4. Inclusion of all voices (Steffek & Nanz 2007: 10). These criteria are derived from the general definition of democratic quality as “an institution or procedure as its capacity to bring about free, informed and inclusive deliberation” (ibid.: 9), which is indeed very close to the general definition of democracy as “empowered inclusion of those affected in collective decisions and actions”(Warren 2006: 386). While the criteria of equal access to deliberation, transparency and the (empowered) inclusion of all voices are adaptable to the context of TCSNs, I rather see the criterion of responsiveness as a criterion of representative democracy and will thus reflect this criterion in the section on representation practices. Furthermore, the procedural dimension of deliberation should be considered when evaluating the democratic quality of deliberation practices. One main function of deliberation procedures is collective and individual will-formation. Deliberation is understood as a reflexive learning and communication process that proceduralizes popular sovereignty (Habermas 1994: 362). The aim of the proceduralization of decision-making is a more reasonable decision-making by citizens who are aware of their own preferences and the preferences and perspectives of others. In order to ensure such a democratic deliberation procedure, general principles were formulated by Habermas and Benhabib. Benhabib formulates more explicitly the “right to question the assigned topics of conversation” and “the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the very rules of the discourse procedure” (Benhabib 1996: 70). These very important principles that mark the beginning of a deliberation procedure are considered in the present evaluation through the criterion of open and accessible agendas of deliberation. The agenda-setting in deliberative settings is a very crucial phase. A controlled and closed agenda-setting process can limit the autonomy of the individuals and groups in the decision-making process. Agenda-Setting can exclude certain topics from discussion and the structuring of deliberation can impede on the outcome (Lang 2008: 85). Therefore theorists of deliberative democracy suggested a reflexive form of agenda-setting, which is driven by the participants and understood as a work in progress (Fung & Wright 2003). However, as Lang points out reflexivity is not always feasible in practice due to time constraints and the “imperative to produce a decision” (Lang 2008: 86). Habermas and Benhabib likewise emphasize the norm of equality and symmetry of deliberation that guarantees all participants of deliberation the same rights to raise their voices, question arguments and open up new debates (see Habermas 1990: 88; Benhabib 1996: 70). Following this principle, Fishkin argued that concrete deliberation experiments should be guided by a balance of arguments. All arguments should be considered, regardless of who raised them and which ideas they incorporate (Fishkin 2009: 95-105). This is reflected in the criterion of inclusive and free deliberation. Finally, the decision-making should be guided by considered judgment (see e.g. Smith 2009: 14-20). This means, that participants of deliberation should come to reflected, informed and rational decisions that reflect also the views of others. Thus decision-making should be done

on the basis of “enlarged mentality”, meaning to put oneself in the position of others (Smith 2009: 24, citing Arendt 1968). The three criteria for democratic deliberation practices are (1) Open and accessible agenda (2) Non-coercive deliberation, (3) Considered judgment. They focus on the quality of the access to and procedure of deliberation practices.

| Procedural quality of will-formation | | Procedural quality of decision-making |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| (1) Open and accessible agenda | (2) Non-coercive deliberation | (3) Considered judgment |

Table 4: Evaluation Criteria: Deliberation Practices

(1) *Open and accessible agenda.* This criterion concerns the preparation of the deliberation processes. This can be a formalized preparation of deliberation meetings or informally spread information across network. The practice of setting up agendas and defining problems and goals can be a collective undertaking or an authoritative act of few persons. The process of finding an agenda as well as the agenda itself as a result of this process can be evaluated concerning their participatory quality. As mentioned above, the criteria to assess the quality of identifying problems and setting agendas are above all broadness of the agenda and the opportunity of all relevant members to include their ideas in the agenda or goals. Thus, crucial questions are: Is the agenda sufficiently flexible, so that possible changes by participants can be made? Are the goals broad enough so that everyone can identify with them? Are the participants of deliberation forums provided with relevant information before the deliberation? Is there enough time to read the material beforehand?

(2) *Non-coercive deliberation.* The structuration of the deliberation process and the balancing of arguments refer to the way arguments are treated in deliberation processes, for example whether there are main dominant arguments that are not challenged or whether there are practices of counterbalancing main arguments. The normative dimension of this criterion targets the process of discussion. Here, the relevant concerns are the appropriate balancing and structuring of arguments. While the balancing of arguments concerns the content and argumentative perspective of arguments, the equal consideration of arguments is more concerned with the inclusion of all persons and the consideration of arguments from everyone. The equalization of deliberation is often conducted through a professional moderator or facilitator. Relevant questions studied in this context were: Are arguments counterbalanced by alternative arguments? Is there a moderator or facilitator? How is the moderator balancing different positions and encouraging everyone to speak? Are all arguments, regardless of who offered them, considered equally?

(3) *Considered judgment*. This criterion relates to the end of deliberation practices: decision-making. Different kinds of decisions must be made during different stages of campaign work. A dynamic circle of people often make these different kinds of decisions. The sincerity of decision-making, opposed to pure strategic decision-making is assessed in this study. Actors can follow a practice of making strategic choices for arguments or they can conduct a practice of honestly reasoning about what they think is a rational argumentation (understood in the way that Offe and Preuss (1991) defined rational decisions). This criterion refers to the continuum between strategic decision-making and sincere decision-making. Deliberationists want deliberating citizens to make sincere decisions in which they really believe as opposed to what they think is useful based on strategic reasons. Consequently, this study examined the reasoning of network actors in the decision-making phase using the following questions: Are the decisions made on the grounds of sincere reasoning? When and how are decisions made out of strategic choices? How are decision taken (consensus, majority vote)?

4.3.3 Representation Practices

The analysis of representation practices is derived from those concepts of representation that are translatable to the specific context of TCSNs. Representative democracy is not that easily identified as a process-oriented form of democracy and is thus less easily translated into democratic practice than participatory and deliberative democracy. Only more recent conceptualizations that define representation as a performance (Saward 2010) or criticize the traditional understandings of representative government (Mansbridge 2003; Castiglione & Warren 2006; Dovi 2007; Dryzek & Niemeyer 2008) are suitable for the present study and will therefore be operationalized as follows. Similar to the two former criteria of deliberation and participation practices, the criteria of representative democracy focus on the input and procedural categories. Examining the input dimension of representation, we need to ask how representatives are selected and instructed (Sørensen & Torfing 2005: 206-207). If representatives are not formally elected, it remains open how they are authorized. This is tightly bound to knowledge representatives have about their constituents, how responsive they can be to the interests of their constituency and consequently how they can be held accountable. This is crucial especially in contexts such as the TCSNs where constituents groups are diffuse and overlapping and representation takes place as descriptive representation or trusteeship. Moreover, specifically in non-electoral forms of representation it is suggested to install a two-way dialogue between representatives and constituency in order to compensate the possible lack of control over representatives. The constituency should be able to make an "informed evaluation" (Sørensen & Torfing 2003: 206-07) about the representatives in order to democratize representation. Also, if the role of representatives and constituency are blurred, the dialogue between representatives and constituency can define more sharply the groups of constituents (see Saward 2010, Castiglione & Warren 2006). Finally,

the practice of representative claims-making (Saward 2010) should be made considerably. It is specifically interesting if claims are made in regard to certain (groups of) individuals or rather in regard to certain discourses. If a clearly defined demos does not exist, the representation of discourses seems more feasible (see Dryzek & Niemeyer 2008). The evaluation criteria comprise three main criteria: (1) Authorization of representatives by the affected constituency, (2) Accountability of representatives, (3) Considerate representative claims-making. While the first criterion reflects the common ideals of democratic control of representatives, namely democratic authorization. The second criterion of accountability is situated both in classic democratic control by the represented and in the adapted norm of democratic responsibility of the representative. The third criterion is idiosyncratic for the non-electoral representation in transnational settings. Since this criterion shifts the focus from the constituency as the reference point for authorization to the representative and his/her role, the democratic quality is here defined as democratic responsibility.

| Democratic control | Democratic responsibility |
|---|--|
| (1) Authorization of representatives by the affected constituency | (3) Considerate representative claims-making |
| (2) Accountability of representatives | |

Table 5: Evaluation Criteria: Representation Practices

(1) *Authorization of representatives by the affected constituency.* The selection and instruction of representatives describes the practice of finding legitimate representatives within networks for different constituencies (member groups, working groups, addressees of campaigns) and instructing them about their roles, tasks and opportunities. This can also be done by different groups, mostly either from the constituency or, in a more top-down direction, from network managers or the secretariat. The instruction and selection of representatives is conducted differently than in traditional forms of representation. Formal elections in nation state democracies need to be compensated by other selection mechanisms. Thus, network members must tackle the question of good and competent representatives. Therefore, it should be asked: Is the selection process of representatives practiced by taking into account the constituents? Are the representatives sufficiently instructed? If yes, how exactly?

(2) *Accountability of representatives.* This criterion focusses on the degree and types of knowledge that representatives have about the interests and ideas of affected groups they represent and how they can be held accountable by their constituents. The two-way dialogue between representatives and represented marks in what way representatives are held accountable. Acceptance or dissatisfaction of represented can serve as an indicator for the degree of identification with representatives. Further, the criterion also includes the way rep-

representatives acquire knowledge about their constituency and how responsibly they use it. In other words, this criterion evaluates how accountable and balanced representation of all relevant and affected groups is practiced by representatives. This is primarily derived from descriptive representation and concerns the ability to mirror the interests and preferences of the constituency in some way. Here, the following questions were investigated: Are the representatives well informed about interests and preferences of the represented? How do they perceive their own role in terms of effective and equal representation of their constituency? Is there an expression of acceptance or disapproval from the represented, and if yes, how are such reactions articulated?

(3) *Considerate representative claims-making*. The last criterion focusses on the performance of claims that are made by representatives. It concentrates on how representative claims are framed and with regard to whom or what. This criterion also addresses in how far a representation of different discourses can be observed in the network. The question is whether there are different, coexisting lines of reasoning or whether there is only one hegemonic discourse that everyone subscribes to. Dryzek's and Niemeyer's argument about a discursive representation concentrates on the plurality of discourses that are present (Dryzek & Niemeyer 2008). In civil society networks with a certain collective identity that serve a common purpose, it seems difficult to imagine that a wide range of different discourses exist in the network. In addition, the transparency of representative claims, which are primarily made by non-elected representatives, is especially important in cases where elections do not exist. The group of the represented needs to know who their representative is and what the representative's main principles and goals are. In sum, the following questions were investigated: Is there a plurality of discourses claimed to be represented in the network? How explicit and well-founded are representative claims presented to the public and the constituency? Who offers them?

The above outlined evaluation criteria are used to evaluate the political practices explored in the following qualitative case study. After having explored *what* kind of political practices are expected to be found in the two TCSNs, the evaluative part of this empirical case study investigate *how* democratic these practices are.

Part II Democratic Practice in Two Transnational Civil Society Networks

After having established the theoretical ground of this study, the second part of this study will now at first be concerned with the research design of the qualitative case study (chapter 5). This chapter will justify the choice for a reconstructive interview analysis with the 26 activists from two TCSNs, *Friends of the Earth (FoE)* and *Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC)*; it will explain the case selection as well as the methods used for the qualitative interviews and the text analysis. The main section of this second part comprises the presentation of the results from the reconstructive interview analysis (chapter 6). These results cover the political practices explored in the two TCSNs. The political practices that were reconstructed in the interview material are described in this chapter systematically according to the broad general categories of participation, deliberation and representation practices. In the subsequent chapter 7, these findings of political practices are discussed and evaluated in the light of democratic theory. The evaluation criteria which were formulated in the previous chapter are used as guiding lines to evaluate in how far the political practices can qualify as democratic practices. The last chapter of this part will draw conclusions from the empirical analysis and the theoretical conceptualization and try to bring both endeavors of this study together in a fruitful way.

5 Research Design

The aim of this explorative qualitative case study³¹ is to analyze political practices in TCSNs and evaluate these practices in the light of democratic theory. Twenty-six semi-structured qualitative interviews with activists from two TCSNs, *Friends of the Earth (FoE)* and *Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC)*, were analyzed in a two-step analysis. First, political practices were identified through a reconstructive analysis. In a second step, the democratic quality of these political practices was evaluated with criteria derived from theories of participatory, representative and deliberative democracy. The interview analysis focused on a retrospective examination of political practices, perspectives of participating actors on the practices, the positioning of actors to practices, rules and knowledge of practices, and the understanding and evaluation of practices in the two civil society networks. All those parts were meant to capture the phenomenon of political practice as a whole set of empirical phenomena and thus provided the needed broad basis for

³¹ Generally, a case study is used in order to study one case or a small set of cases intensively, aiming at a generalization across a larger number of cases of the same general type (Gerring 2007: 65). Case studies as such are not bound to a certain methodological paradigm; they can for example follow the paradigm of cross-case methodology or can be interpretive. However, case studies are more useful for generating hypotheses than for testing hypotheses (Gerring 2007: 67).

the evaluation of democratic practice within TCSNs. TCSNs are as the unit of analysis a new phenomenon in the field of IR. They are outside the three traditional analytical categories of the individual, the state and international systems (Waltz 2001). While the general research on TCSNs covers many perspectives, most of the existing scholarship does not draw on the lens of democratic theory. Therefore, in this study, democratic theory is applied to networks as a structural category. The two civil society networks, FoE and CCC, which will be investigated in this case study, address environmental issues as well as global justice and human rights issues. Since civil society actors, i.e. social movement organizations (SMOs) as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), are mostly concerned with human rights as well as with environmental, women's, religious or global justice causes (Flam 2001; Khagram et al. 2002; Kern 2008), the two chosen networks and their issue focus are typical for transnational civil society organizations.

The choice for qualitative interviews as the main instrument for data collection is appropriate in the light of this study's overall research interest and its methodological assumptions. The question of democratic practice in TCSNs can only be answered by investigating individual actors and their experiences and knowledge within these networks and the practices developed there. In the interpretive paradigm, methods that support and further the understanding of certain complex interactions, structures and motivations are useful. Consequently, qualitative interviews and text interpretations are one of the most common methods in interpretive social sciences.

5.1 Methodological Assumptions of a Reconstructive Analysis

The following section will provide reasons why a reconstructive analysis of the interview material was chosen. This choice for a reconstructive analysis within the interpretive paradigm of social science methodology is made on the grounds of the specific research interest and the characteristics of the data.

When exploring new phenomena, it seems reasonable to design an open and explorative analysis. While realist or positivist social scientists assume that there is a reality that exists independent of what and how we think about this world, where the researcher's task is to describe and explain this reality objectively, interpretive social scientists share a rather constructivist assumption about reality: there is not *the* one reality, but reality is socially constructed by the people living in it (Strübing & Schnettler 2004)³². Interpretive social sciences thus assume that the subjects of the study are also interpreting their realities while acting and even while talking about it in interviews (Helfferich 2009). Thus, we can assume that interview texts cannot be taken as an image of the objective reality; they are narrations of interpretations and can thus

³² Moderate social constructivists of course assume that there is a basis of reality that does not change. Constructivists in international relations are for example interested in the social construction of power through arguments (Risse-Kappen 1994).

only be analyzed by reconstructing the underlying interpretations of the interviewee. When implementing these two ontological assumptions in a methodological framework, realist or positivist social scientists often use standardized methods in order to detect the regularities of social life. On the contrary, interpretative social scientists argue that those regularities must be known before they can be investigated in a standardized way. Such regularities and standards are incorporated in practices and a form of a-theoretical knowledge. Therefore, they need to be empirically reconstructed. Thus, reconstructive methods of analysis, which reconstruct those regularities, are a prerequisite for the validity of theory building (Przyborski 2004: 42). While standardized methods give insight into questions of distribution and causalities of pre-determined natural standards, reconstructive methods want to ask what those natural standards are in the first place. Crucial for reconstructive methods is the shift from what to how questions in order to not remain in description (Bohnsack 2001).

The central aspects of interpretive social science methodology structure and frame the methodical process of this qualitative case study's data collection and analysis. A first methodological aspect has to do with the aim of analysis: the aim is access to social structures of meaning, as extensively and directly as possible, through interpretive understanding. Secondly, a systematically open access to the empirical reality with the aim of discovering something new is important in interpretive methodology. Interpretive social sciences are above all based on the theories of Herbert Blumer's Symbolic Interactionism (Blumer 1986, 1969) and Harold Garfinkel's Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1984, c1967). Blumer sets out with three basic methodological assumptions of symbolic interactionism that are also taken as basic principles of this study. First, individuals act with "things" according to the meaning those things have for them. "Things" can be objects, but also other persons, institutions or concepts such as friendship and honesty. Second, the meaning of things results from the interaction with other persons. Third, this interactively constructed meaning can be changed in an interpretative process in which individuals deal with those meanings and possibly modify them (Blumer 2004: 322). The second and third principles are specific to the theory of symbolic interactionism and particularly relevant for this empirical study. The second principle contrasts the realist assumption that meanings are inherently attached to objects and subjects. Symbolic interactionism declares that persons create meaning through interaction. In other words, meaning is a product of social interaction.

This assumption about reality also influences the choice of methods in interpretive social sciences. As it is assumed that the application of norms into action is not that unambiguous and unproblematic, it is necessary to gain rich and detailed information about the social context and interpret actors' choices of their actions (Joas & Knöbl 2004: 183-84). Thus, when studying the democratic practice in networks, meanings of democracy verbalized in the interviews, websites

and meeting minutes are always seen as something that was created in a process of negotiation of many actors. Even so, the interviews can be seen as reflections of one single person who is nonetheless embedded in a wider environment of social interactions. Based on the third principle, it can be assumed in this study that actors in the networks do not only adopt those meanings that were constructed through interaction, but also change them in a process of interpretation in the face of the concrete situation they are in and the goals they follow. Based on those conditions, meanings are selected and modified. This means that actors in the networks are in a constant process of construction and modification of meaning through the interaction with their peers in the networks and others outside the networks as well as through their own interpretations of situations and adequacies. Thus, the principle of democracy can also change over time and is constructed and changed through interaction. Although the actors, who are appropriately chosen according to the situation they are in and the role they fulfill (member of an organization talking to a political scientist), present their own interpretations of democracy in the interviews, their interpretations are still grounded in the social interactions they are involved with in the networks. This gives the interpretation of the interviews a broader and more general horizon.

The analysis of interview texts meant working with the medium “language.” Through language, we can access actors’ patterns of orientation and relevancy, which can be reconstructed with methods of interpretive text analysis. The qualitative semi-structured interviews with activists and coordinators of the two TCSNs in Europe were analyzed and interpreted with a reconstructive hermeneutic method of text interpretation³³. A reconstructive hermeneutic method was chosen because the reconstruction allows a close analysis of the interview texts. Although there are clear criteria for democratic principles and procedures, the practices of democracy in networks are a new phenomenon insofar as the network actors deal with those democratic principles and can create practices that might not be concurrent with the given principles and procedures. Thus, the patterns of democratic practices are only predictable to the extent that they could or could not comply with democratic principles. However, with reconstructive text analysis, it is possible to find out exactly how democratic practices are conducted and which roles

³³ Wilhelm Dilthey, one of the founding fathers of hermeneutics, defined the process of understanding as an act of recognizing an inner meaning in signs, which are externally given. He saw two different degrees of understanding, the daily understanding of others and oneself in social situations and the sophisticated understanding, which he calls interpretation. Interpretation that arrives at some controllable objectivity can only be exerted in written or otherwise documented expressions (Dilthey 2004: 23). In contrast, the volatility of social interaction makes it difficult to arrive at a deeper understanding of social practice as such in a concrete situation. Actors intuitively understand situations, in which they act, react and interact, but there is no possibility for a systemic ex-post understanding. Soeffner even speaks of the absent-mindedness of actors (*Handelnde*) who do not have any interest to speak with their actions to an (imagined) audience. Thus, action and interpretation are strictly divided spheres, and an interpretation of practice is only possible through the documentation of action (Soeffner 1979), according to the conceptualization of hermeneutics as *the* methodological approach for humanities (as it is the explanatory approach for the natural science)(Dilthey 2004).

network actors play in the democratic practices. The descriptive interpretation of both cases takes into consideration the specific contexts of both cases and thus makes for a more valuable and in-depth evaluation³⁴.

Soeffner, a German sociologist and founder of the hermeneutic sociology of knowledge, argues that social sciences are linguistics because social science data as well as social science “products” are language, texts. The object of social sciences is symbolic, meaningfully represented and therefore interpretable social action³⁵. Social scientific data are the descriptions, recordings and presentations of social life, which are texts in almost all cases (Soeffner 1979). Turner (2005) makes the same argument for verbal practices which he also sees included as practices; thus, it can be said that the analysis of practices should be, to some extent, based on linguistics: “Any account of practice that fails to account for language will be defective, because linguistic practices are part and parcel of many other practices and because linguistic practices are in principle not sufficiently different from other practices to regard them as likely to have a radically different character.” (Turner 2005: 121).

Written texts represent different verbal and non-verbal realities and are not situated in a concrete context or situation; they are independent from concrete contexts and situations and can include many different possible realities and interpretations (Soeffner 2004: 95). This is especially crucial in interviews, where actors can talk about many different situations that they have experienced, many different persons whom they have met or concepts they have in mind. Thus, text or interview analysis opens a broader horizon of reality than observation alone. The permanent availability of interpreted texts and the interpretations themselves are the formal prerequisites of scientific hermeneutics (Soeffner 2004: 118).

5.2 Case Selection

The selected cases are two politically relevant TCSNs that claim to be democratic: the environmental network *Friends of the Earth (FoE)* and the social rights network *Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC)*. Both networks are typical examples of the broader universe of civil society networks. In

³⁴ Guba and Lincoln state that the positivist paradigm of inquiry and the context-stripping/control of determining categories also leads to evaluations which are “often found to be irrelevant at the local level, leading to the much lamented nonuse of evaluation findings” (Guba and Lincoln 1989: 37), because the evaluation results are too abstract and general.

³⁵ While interpreting texts, the interpreter uses contextual information and goes back and forth between understanding the whole through its parts and the parts through the whole (hermeneutic circle). The interpreter interacts with the text and the author of the text. The text itself is a product of an interaction (Soeffner 1979: 329). Hermeneutics aims at making implicit knowledge explicit, and therefore, hermeneutics is not concerned with the interpretation of knowledge, but with rules and conditions that enable knowledge as such. The potential for generalizable evidence lies only in the reconstruction of the origin, effect and alternatives of knowledge inherent in documents and interpretations. This can only be verified in the analysis of concrete texts. Hermeneutics is the work on single cases Soeffner (2004 :108-12).

this study, the network as the unit of analysis is chosen rather than other possible units of analysis such as activists, organizations or campaigns because of its specific structural character that has not been widely investigated from the perspective of democratic theory. These two cases were selected because they are diverse in regard to some important dimensions of TCSNs and thus reflect to a certain degree the diversity of TCSNs. Diverse cases are useful for exploratory studies because they “illuminate” the full range of possible cases in one population (Seawright & Gerring 2008: 297).

Besides the rough distinction between social movements and NGOs, many scholars have categorized social movements and also non-governmental organizations in different, more well-defined ways. Whereas NGOs are typologized according to their organizational status, founding context or orientation³⁶, social movements are often typologized according to social structure, goals or group structure. Typologies based on the goals of movements prevail in much of the research (Raschke 1985: 106). A general characterization of social movements is provided by Raschke (1985) based on the dimensions of (1) goals, (2) mobilization, (3) action repertoires and changes, (4) negotiation, (5) control, (6) situative factors, (7) strategy and (8) internal dynamics. The three dimensions of negotiation, control and situative factors somewhat correspond with the concept of political opportunity structure³⁷. Those external factors of social movement typology are clearly dependent on the nation state. In transnational social movements, these factors lose some of their explanatory power because organizations are not that much (still enough, but to a lesser extent) dependent upon domestic political institutions in their home countries. It can be observed for example that organizations that do not get access to media or decision-makers or cannot expect an extensive list of allies in countries such as Bangladesh, they will seek support elsewhere and find funding and support opportunities for example in Western European organizations³⁸. While the concepts of political opportunity structures, negotiation, control and situative factors are only marginally relevant in transnational networks, the concepts of goals, mobilization, action repertoires, strategy and internal dynamics are highly relevant in the context of this study.

For the changed context of transnational activism, sociologists studying transnational social movements conceptualized a more dynamic approach of transnational social movements (Tarrow 2006: 24). Mechanisms, processes and episodes form the triad with which Tarrow et al.

³⁶ There is a myriad of acronyms out there in order to categorize every kind of NGO, for example GONGO (government-operated NGO), QUANGO (quasi-autonomous NGO) or BINGO (business-friendly NGO), which try to do justice to the different contexts worldwide, in which NGOs are founded and operate.

³⁷ Situative factors are slightly different from political opportunity structures according to (Raschke 1985: 363). Situative factors are narrow and temporary, but also provide external input to social movement development.

³⁸ This particularity of transnational activism is conceptualized in the model of the “boomerang pattern” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 12-13)

want to describe and explain complex series of developments inside and outside movements which lead to contention (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001)³⁹. Keck and Sikkink (1998) systematize transnational advocacy networks with similar dynamic categories. While examining transnational campaigns, they differentiate between the categories of internal relationships among network actors and how they are maintained, different types of resources that enable campaigning, institutional structures, both international and domestic, that frame the activists campaigning, and different ways that tactics evolve (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 7):

Campaigns are processes of issue production constrained by the action context in which they are to be carried out: activists identify a problem, specify a cause, and propose a solution, all with an eye toward producing procedural, substantive, and normative change in their area of concern. In networked campaigns this process of "strategic portrayal" must work for the different actors in the network and also for target audiences. (Keck & Sikkink 1998: 8).

Furthermore, according to these authors, it is important to identify the major actors in such networks. Such actors are very diverse and range from local social movement groups to media outlets, research institutions or even parliamentary branches of governments (ibid. P. 9). A differentiation between different issue areas and the channels and forums of communication, as well as the way of the functioning of different networks and the construction of cognitive frames (information, symbolic, leverage or advocacy politics) seems to be crucial (ibid. p. 11-16). Bennett (2005) summarized Keck's and Sikkink's different dimensions in order to differentiate between the first generation of transnational activism portrayed by Keck and Sikkink and the second generation transnational activism, whose rise he identifies in, for example, the social justice activism (Bennett 2005: 212). While the transnational advocacy approach is more NGO-centered and defines NGOs as the central actors in transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998), the transnational activist networks approach reflects a more current form of TCSNs, which are constituted of many different actors and articulate broader claims (Bennett 2005). Both of the chosen networks in this study feature different characteristics of both types to different degrees. The suggested catalogue of categories from Bennett (2005) is comprised of the following categories: (1) scope, (2) organization, (3) scale, (4) targets, (5) tactics, (6) goals and (7) capacity. He extends this list to further categories that mark the difference between national and transnational activism: (8) structure, (9) formation, (10) stability, (11) membership, (12) mobilization, (13) bridging, and (14) diffusion. They partly overlap with standard analyses of

³⁹ The concepts by Tarrow and others try to do justice to the increased range of actors and constellations in transnational relations such as NGOs, international organizations, advocacy networks or transnational labor activism. Also, they expanded the analytical focus beyond the Western liberal system and transferred the static categories of political opportunity structures into more dynamic kinds of mechanisms and processes (Tarrow 2006: 24). This further development of the concepts of social movements, as Raschke and others conceptualized them, leads to a modification of explanatory factors and descriptive categories.

new social movements, such as the typology by Raschke (1985). Some of these categories do justice in capturing the dynamic network character of organizations or the transnational level of activism.

In combining these different approaches, a rather comprehensive catalog of categories can be established that functions as a tool to describe the two cases used in this study and identify differences in these two networks. Not all of the categories are used because some of them are empirically difficult to differentiate from others. Since the purpose of this chapter is just an overview of different characteristics of the two cases, the following is a general overview that summarizes some of the categories. Furthermore, the two cases analyzed in this study will shortly be characterized based on the categories. This rough description shows the similarities and differences between the two cases and functions as a justification for the case selection. These dimensions function as this study's selection criteria in order to qualify as an appropriate case for this study of TCSNs

(1) Goals

Goals result from the specific interpretation of reality and the perceived necessary changes or perceived structural inconsistencies. Goals are the basic principles of a movement group or civil society network and project the future as an orientation for present action. Those goals can be targeted towards norms, values or institutions (Raschke 1985: 165-66).

The goals of both networks differ slightly. The *CCC*'s goals are very clear-cut criteria for living wages, working conditions and human rights implementation. The goals of *FoE* are more diverse and depend much on the local work of network members. The European branch of *FoE*, *FoE Europe*, focuses on lobbying activities in Brussels, whereas other groups in Europe have direct action and information exchange between local activists as their main goals. Both networks find themselves in the typical issue areas of civil society engagement. However, the breadth of the issues differs. The *CCC* defines a quite narrow issue area, namely the working conditions in a specific industrial sector. Moreover, the global garment industry has production facilities mainly in Asian countries such as Bangladesh, India, Cambodia and China. Thus, the issue focus also includes a regional focus. On the contrary, *FoE* has a very broad issue area that includes all kinds of environmental and ecological topics as well as social justice and participatory democracy.

(2) Collective identity/collective action frames⁴⁰

Collective action frames are schemata of interpretation and organize experience and

⁴⁰ See also Alberto Melucci and Bert Klandermans for concepts of collective identity.

guide action. Furthermore, they attract support, gain media attention and signal intentions (Tarrow 2006: 61, citing Snow et al.1986/Snow and Benford 1988, 1992)

Collective identity can be defined as “an individual’s cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice or institution.” (Polletta 2001). Both TCSNs identify as global grass-roots movements. While *FoE* frames this collective identity very prominently on its website, *CCC* states its network identity within a catalog of many ideas that they believe in. For example, “we are the world’s largest grass-roots environmental network.”⁴¹ can be read on the *FoE*’s homepage. This idea is also featured in *CCC*’s self-portrait, stating that the cooperation in the network should be “based on mutual respect for each others (sic) different roles and methods, open and active communication, participatory consensus building and constructive criticism.”⁴²

(3) Organization/formation

The organization of networks focusses on the composition of actors in the network and the form of organization between the actors (Bennett 2005). The main categories of organization in social movement research are social movement, campaign coalitions and advocacy networks⁴³. While social movement is a very broad term that classifies a very broad social protest phenomenon, coalitions and networks refer to organizational and structural traits of transnational civil societies. Furthermore, organization defines the range of members that are in the network and, which roles they play in the network.

The two chosen civil society networks are purposive in their action (the same as coalitions) and are not just networks of different “nodes” that are casually combined in the same area of activism. Furthermore, they are not just temporary coalitions that take action for a specific cause, but they are relatively stable and permanently networked cooperation structures (Tarrow 2006: 161-65). Both transnational networks are organized as networks of semi-autonomous member groups in different countries. These member groups are independent organizations that also campaign in other contexts. They pool resources, share information through their networks and agree on basic values and principles as admission criteria, but are permanent networks and not temporary, event-

⁴¹ <http://www.foei.org/en> (accessed: 13.04.2013)

⁴² <http://www.cleanclothes.org/about-us/what-we-believe-in> (accessed: 13.04.2013)

⁴³ Coalitions are defined as different groups of actors that combine efforts and pool resources in order to gain joint political influence and to create solidarity against common threats (Tarrow 2006:164). Coalitions are temporary; they “frequently form around short-term threats and opportunities, but when the occasion for collaboration passes, many disperse or subside into “paper coalitions” “(Tarrow 2006: 165). While coalitions are mainly defined by their strategic cause, the standard account of transnational advocacy coalitions focusses on principled ideas and values as the driving force behind the so-called transnational advocacy networks. Besides this, the “ability to generate information quickly and accurately, and deploy it effectively” is also an important structural feature of transnational networks and the basis of a collective identity within a network (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 1, 11). NGOs are the central actors in those transnational advocacy networks, but also other actors such as foundations, churches, trade unions, intellectuals or media participate in those networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 9).

based coalitions. Members in the *CCC* network are quite diverse. Obviously, there are trade unions, but also social NGOs, women's rights groups and church organizations. Every network member is part of a national platform, in which different kinds of organization gather. The *FoE* network is in this regard rather homogeneous and consists mainly of environmental groups.

(4) Mobilization/ Action repertoires

Mobilization describes the activation of resources with the aim of implementing the goals of the organization (Raschke 1985: 187), whereas actions describe the different forms of action that an organization or network realizes in order to reach its goals (Raschke 1985: 274). Both terms are empirically not always clearly distinguishable (ibid. P. 275) and thus will be used here as one category.

The civil society networks in this case study are both permanent campaign networks with a history of 20 to 40 years, evolving over the years into global networks of local organizations. Both civil society networks mobilize through a combination of symbolic and information politics⁴⁴. Protest events are often choreographed in public, either on important dates or during significant events with highly symbolized theatrical performances. Those public protests are accompanied by mobilization through information and petition campaigns and the reporting of grievances to the public and political decision-makers.

(5) Internal relationships⁴⁵

Internal relationships are the connections established and maintained between network actors and their allies and opponents (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 7).

In *FoE*, all network members formally have the same status as a member group. In the *CCC*, there is a division between coalitions in Europe and partner organizations in garment producing countries, which also results in different roles and obligations of different types of network members.

(6) Targets

Targets are understood as the targets or addressees of action and social change (Bennett 2005).

The *CCC* targets mainly international brands in the clothing industry such as Nike, H&M,

⁴⁴ Symbolic politics: "identifying and providing convincing explanations for powerful symbolic events, which in turn become catalysts for the growth of networks." (Keck and Sikkink 1998:22)

Information politics: "They provide information that would not otherwise be available [...] and they must make this information comprehensible and useful to activists and publics" (ibid. : 18) "Nonstate actors gain influence by serving as alternate sources of information" (ibid. : 19)

⁴⁵ Raschke's term of internal dynamics resonates with the term of relationships, but goes far beyond it in modelling the evolution of social movements in different scenarios (Raschke 1985:377-383), which seems too complex for the purposes of these categories.

and Zara in order to push them to take responsibility for their production sites in Asia. *FoE* also conducts campaigns that target specific industrial actors, but the targets of the network are in general broader and the campaigns last longer. *FoE* has been, for example, campaigning against Shell in the Niger Delta since the early 1990's. Although *FoE* has a specific target, the issues raised are much broader.

(7) Tactics/strategy

Strategy is the unit of basic rules of action for a multitude of situations. Tactics is understood as the behavior in a concrete situation (Raschke 1985: 368). The claims of *CCC* are made through strategic campaigns, which are often initiated by specific findings of drawbacks in clothing factories. One main instrument of campaigning is the *CCC* urgent appeals, which are published as reactions to particular human rights abuses or catastrophes in clothing factories. The *CCC* network uses consumer communication as a main tool for public protest. They are publicly addressing consumers and their choices of action. The *FoE* network does not focus on a specialized public; it changes from campaign to campaign or is assumed to affect all citizens globally.

(8) Capacity /social differentiation

The capacity of a network defines the range of issues and the fields of action that a network targets (Bennett 2005).

The *CCC*'s explicit issue focus is very narrow. Its capacities focus on the workers' rights in the global garment industry. At a second glance, it seems that there are different fields of action where the *CCC* is also involved; this concerns human rights advocacy (for workers whose rights were violated) and gender equality issues (advocacy for women's workers). *FoE* naturally has a very broad capacity of issues that they are addressing. Environmental issues such as climate change, biodiversity, or pollution are at the center of their agenda, but social topics such as land grabbing are also emphasized.

In sum, despite the two cases, *FoE* and *CCC*, differing in many main dimensions outlined above, they have the organization as a network, the collective identity as part of a grass-roots movement and the style of mobilization in common.

5.3 Qualitative Semi-structured Interviews

The qualitative interview is the most common method in qualitative research. Many different forms of qualitative interviews that are conceptualized for different kinds of research interests exist. Qualitative interviews are not standardized methods; they are communicative situations, which means that the quality of the data depends on the successful conduct of a highly complex interactive situation (Helfferich 2009: 9). The interest in investigating very specific issues is different from the interest in exploring new and unknown issues, typically done via qualitative in-

interviews. The technique of asking questions must therefore vary over the course of the interview (Bryman 2008: 469). Qualitative interviews are “second-order observations” (Foerster 2000), where the interviewee, in addition to asking questions, observes what interviewees disclose. This kind of observation is fruitful for research interests that focus more on the *how of* issues rather than the *what*. The exploration of subjective structures of relevancy is the aim of qualitative semi-structured interviews. Therefore, they are more flexible and open than quantitative, structured interviews. Throughout the interview, the interviewer can change the order and wording of the questions and will try to adjust to the interviewees’ narrations and emphases (Bryman 2008: 437).

The interviews for this study were conducted between April 2012 and February 2013. 26 interviewees from both civil society networks were interviewed from 17 European countries and from 4 non-European countries. On average, each interview took an hour, and all interviews were recorded and transcribed. Interviewees were recruited via e-mail and telephone. They were contacted based on their position in the organizations and the organization’s position in the network. All interviewees are involved in international campaigns within their network and can be categorized in three groups: international campaigners in charge of one specific campaign; international coordinators in charge of all international communication in their organization; and international network coordinators in charge of coordinating the whole network. The organizations’ positions differ with regard to their network centrality and affiliation status. Some of the organizations are central players with many responsibilities, whereas other organizations are rather marginal and/ or new network members or they are only associated with the network.

Beside the qualitative interviews, which form the central part of the empirical data, other sources and data are used in order to complement the interview data. The websites of network member organizations are a very instructive source for background information about the organization as well as the statutes and general self-images of the organization and campaigning activities. Besides this publicly available information, internal documents of meeting proceedings and decision-making procedures are important; for example, they support the evidence from the interviews. However, all the complementary material is of secondary importance compared to the interview data. The interview data were systematically analyzed, whereas the other empirical data was used as additional evidence supporting the interview analysis.

In general, the exploration of practices by using interview data can cause a translation gap because practices cannot be observed directly in interviews. In qualitative interviews, interviewees just tell their stories about practices and thus discursively construct meaning of what *they* think of how such practices are taking place and how they are to be classified and judged. Thus, the

practices “as such” are not to be observed by conducting qualitative interviews⁴⁶. It could seem more plausible to conduct participant observation in order to analyze social and political practices (Nullmeier et al. 2003). Participant observation is advantageous insofar as the participant observer is in much closer contact with group members for a longer period of time. She or he can possibly better see what the observed persons see and do in their social settings and understand the “native” language as it is used in day-to-day conversations. The interview in contrast only offers a small selection of how individuals use language and view their environment. In participant observation, implicit features of social life are more likely to be unearthed than in interviews, which rely only on verbal behavior. Due to fewer structuring elements compared to interviews, participant observation also provides more space to encounter unexpected issues⁴⁷ (Bryman 2008: 465-66). However, practices can also be researched with the help of qualitative interviews. The false assumption that people cannot talk about their practices (Hitchings 2012) is even less true in this specific context, where not the subconscious forms of practices are investigated, but the consciously formed and framed practices of democracy. Furthermore, these qualitative interviews are valuable to examine of reasons for certain decision-making or deliberation strategies that actually cannot be observed. Interviews are also the better choice when processes need to be reconstructed because the development of certain strategies and practices are best investigated by interviewing people with a certain history in the networks. Furthermore, interviews allow for a greater breadth of topics and at the same time specify issues much more. For example, interviewees can talk about many more persons in their daily lives than any participant observer can observe. Also, very specific topics might not be captured by unstructured observation while an interviewer can simply ask about such very specific issues (Bryman 2008: 465-69). Political practices are a very specific phenomenon that requires a focused investigation with the help of structured interviews. Furthermore, some of the political practices are not visible to an observer, such as the writing of e-mails, and need to be elaborated by interviewees. Thus, qualitative interviews carry more weight under the perspective of reconstructing political practices. Also, this study’s research interest is not solely on the practices as such, but also includes the knowledge, positioning and patterns of practices. The knowledge of the actors and the development of certain practices play a major part in reconstructing why certain political practices occur and are used in TCSNs, and such information is much more accessible via interview than participant observation.

⁴⁶ However, the question can be posed in general, if it is possible at all to observe a social interaction “as such”. When we assume that social sciences are mostly doing second-order observations; they observe what people in their social context observe (Luhmann 1997), then there is no “pure” observation of facts (first-order observation) in social sciences.

⁴⁷ Participant observation might be the more encompassing method of data gathering, but also participant observation creates an interactive situation, where persons react on the presence of the researcher and her/his behavior. Thus, also in participant observation, only the image of a practice, which is created by the actors in front a specific public (the researcher), can be observed.

The qualitative interviews with activists and coordinators of two civil society networks in Europe were semi-structured. That means there were interview guidelines with questions that are partly theory-driven and partly open (Helfferich 2009: 36). Semi-structured interviews are not completely open such as narrative, biographical interviews and not completely structured the way highly structured interviews as well as quantitative surveys are. Interview questions varied between open and focused questions in order to balance between the research interest in discovering new phenomena and the focus on specific (theory-guided) categories of interest.

The analytical categories, which structured the interview guidelines in main parts, were open and continuous categories. Those preliminary categories could be opened up to new phenomena found in the text material during the process of analysis. The conceptualization of the interview guidelines was a multistage process developed by qualitative interview methodologists (Helfferich 2009; Kruse 2011). This method of interview guideline construction is divided into four phases: (1) collection of interview questions in an open group brainstorming; (2) check and elimination of inapplicable questions; (3) arranging and reformulating of the chosen questions; and (4) subsumption under the guiding lines of the interview (Kruse 2011: 79).

During the construction of the guidelines, two dilemmas needed to be solved: first, the conflict between structure vs. openness, and second the conflict between inductive or deductive derivation of the interview questions. Both conflicts can be seen as a continuum, with the extreme poles of highly structured versus open narrative, and inductive and a-theoretical versus deductive and concept-driven. The interview guidelines in this study were not constructed with the aim of following one of the extreme or ideal types. Rather, the method of these interview guidelines was situated in the middle of both continua. The first conflict relates to two areas: the general research interest of the project (How structured/open should the guideline be?) and the potential operationalization of the conceptual categories (How structured/open can the guideline be?).

The research interest of this project lies in the exploration of an empirically under-researched field: the democratic practices in transnational civil society networks. There is no clear and highly defined empirical expectation about what to find in the field. Therefore, a certain openness needed to be kept. At the same time, different normative and theoretical arguments exist and need to be taken into consideration as structuring elements. This leads to the second area, the operationalization of conceptual categories. Many concepts that are proposed from different scholars are not translated into clear-cut categories. Those concepts are rather thoughts, questions and visions about different variants of democracy in networks (Enroth 2011). For this reason, the operationalization process is marked by a series of translation problems. Normative theory cannot be translated into analytical categories without losing (necessary) complexity. As

a result, the empirical study needs to be kept (to a certain degree) in the logic of the normative theoretical concepts. This also means that openness is necessary and that there cannot be clear-cut definitional variables. The interview guidelines provided a categorical structure, but the questions within the categories remained relatively open. The different items of the interview guidelines are grouped along the following clusters: (1) network architecture, (2) deliberation (3) representation (4) participation, (5) deliberation and (6) evaluative items⁴⁸.

5.4 The Method of Reconstructive Analysis

The integrative method, developed by Jan Kruse (Kruse 2011), which is chosen in this study, has many advantages. It integrates parts of different approaches, but mainly follows the logic of the documentary method (Garfinkel 1967; Mannheim 1980; Bohnsack et al. 2001). Bohnsack developed a method of text interpretation based on this documentary method of Mannheim. Mannheim and Bohnsack argue that there is a division between an action and the draft of such an action, the motive. Motives cannot be observed. They can only be speculated about. If actors are asked about their actions, we find only their subjective theories about practices, but not practices as such. The radical change of this analytical approach has led to the questioning of common sense. It should not be relevant to ask what the motives are, but how they are constructed, produced and ascribed. Second-order observations are more important than the search for an objective meaning of first-order observations⁴⁹. In this sense, the question of the meaning of an action is a question about the structure, the generative pattern of the construction of that action. The identification of this generative pattern requires the observation of practices. Those practices can be observed directly or through stories and descriptions of actors.

In this study, the integrative method is chosen because the interpretation of texts remains focused on very close readings of the actual texts⁵⁰. The integrative method is based on different assumptions and principles:

1. At first, it is assumed that there is meaning in every word, transcending the actual or literal meaning of the word. Within the documentary method, those two meanings are labelled as immanent meaning and documentary meaning. Every word is a document for further meaning.

⁴⁸ The interview guidelines can be found in the Annex.

⁴⁹ Luhmann marked this as a turning point in social science methodology. In second-order observations, social scientific typification can be distinguished from common-sense typification (Luhmann 1997).

⁵⁰ Objective hermeneutics as an interpretation method, on the other hands, is a radically open method with less rules and regulations than the documentary method and the applied integrative approach. The results of interpretations can vary significantly and can be of limited value if the interpretations are not done by a very experienced scholar.

2. Rules and relevancies determine choices of articulation. In other words, how individuals verbalize their thoughts is not arbitrary, but follows rules of grammar as well as symbolic structures; subjective relevancies and interpretation patterns determine how things are said.
3. Those rules and relevancies can be reconstructed with the methodical process of analysis.
4. Analysis and interpretation are two distinct processes; analysis includes the reconstruction of the text's meanings, followed by the interpretation of these meanings.
5. The analysis must be strictly data-centered, while interpretations must be consistent with the text material.
6. A reconstructive attitude must be adopted. The interpreter needs to reconstruct the subjective meaning within the text material rather than putting one's own subjective meaning into the text.
7. It is assumed that the articulations of the interviewees make sense to them and are "objectively" valid for them. There should be no claims about truth in those statements.
8. The interpretation must be transparent and intersubjectively verified and comprehensible (Kruse 2011: 156; Lucius-Hoene & Deppermann 2004: 95-100).

According to these basic premises, the texts of interview data are reconstructed. Reconstructive interview analysis means first of all an open hermeneutic method of description and interpretation of texts. The first step of the interview analysis is purely descriptive. Description without interpretation can be reached with several methods that deepen "Fremdverstehen" (the understanding of other), i.e. stepping back from one's own personal subjective systems of meanings. The general idea is to slow down the process of analysis. The description of the text, which includes a sequential analysis according to the principle of emergence (line-by-line analysis) of the introductory parts of each interview, is an instrument that helps to get to as many different ideas expressed of the text as possible. The following different levels are examined: the pragmatic level of interaction positioning, the syntax level of grammar using, timing and rhythm of language, and the semantic level of word choices as well as the creation of "semantic fields" (Kruse 2011: 161-62). The level of pragmatics, in which interviewees position themselves vis-à-vis narrative figures (persons they are talking about), is specifically relevant when reconstructing practices. This level of text analysis captures the positioning and agency of network actors and can give valuable insights into the conduct of political practices from different perspectives. Agency and positioning analysis will be outlined below.

As already mentioned, the positioning of interviewees can help to explain relationships between actors in networks and the practices that constitute and form those relationships. Positioning analysis, which is the analysis of discursive practices, "the stories through which we make sense

of our own and others' lives.", was developed by discursive psychologists in order to study identities or the self of individuals by investigating how they verbally interact within a specific context (Davies 1990). Three reconstructive levels in positioning can be identified: (1) "How the conversational units (i.e. characters, events, topics, verb structure, etc.) or general conversational structure are positioned in relation to one another within the reported events"; (2) „How the speaker both is positioned by and positions him/herself to the actual or imagined audience"; and (3) „How do the narrators position themselves in answering the specific and general question of ‚who am I?‘ and ‚how do I want to be understood?‘" (Korobov 2001: 15-16). The third level focuses on the identity construction, which is a main aim of positioning analysis. However, the first and second level are more relevant for the present empirical study. On the first level, the structures of events and persons are reconstructed. Here, the characterization of individuals and their agency are formulated. The second level contains interaction and speech acts such as giving excuses, blaming other persons, or giving advice. This conversational structure and content "is analyzed as a means to an end—one that is concerned with situating conversational structure within certain distinctive audience-driven interpretive modalities." (Korobov 2001: 16).

Those specific interpretive modalities that interviewees are using in order to position themselves within the context of the network are always positionings that are relational and can only be successful if the actors share specific knowledge and context. Actors are influenced by the context of norms, values and structure, but at the same time, they are "capable of exercising choice" (Davies 1990: 3).

Since actors are actively positioning themselves and others, they are constructing dynamic network relations. Those positionings of many actors in the network can be condensed into different types of practices in the networks. The interviewed activists in the two networks in this study of democratic practices reflected upon their own roles and tasks in the network, evaluated processes of decision-making and deliberation and thus positioned themselves as specific actors in the network, for example as the rather marginalized group with only a few chances of influence or the powerful coordinator who firmly controls developments in the network. Through those narrations of roles and positionings, certain practices of "how things are done" can be identified and extracted. Of course, positioning analysis also provides valuable insights into power relations between network actors, which is very useful in evaluating democratic quality.

Agency analysis is a second analytical tool that is used to investigate political practices with the help of the interview material. Agency is a specific form of positioning. The agency concept focuses on the cognitive representation of one's own initiative power to action and the possible courses of action. Agency analysis categorizes different forms of subjective ideas about one's own involvement in certain events or results. In the present case, it would be the interviewees'

involvement in democratic decision-making practices. This agency can be anonymous, collective, structural, indirect, consensual or individual (Kruse 2011: 203-04).

After this first period of descriptive analysis, the findings were structured and grouped into several interpretative pathways. In this phase, heuristics helped to structure the different findings. In this way, it is possible to categorize them based on different interpretations of positioning, agency and practice. In a next step, the different interpretations were condensed into one consistent interpretation. In a last step, the empirical interpretation were put into the theoretical context and evaluated based on normative criteria (Kruse 2011: 224-228). This step-by-step analysis was also done in an interpretation group that met every week in order to discuss interview sections. This is very important in order to avoid one interpretation that might be full of very specific assumptions and classifications. Interpretation groups provide an opportunity to collectively develop analyses and interpretations, which are validated through the triangulation of many subjective positions. Group interpretation also leads to theoretical sensitization (Kruse 2011: 183). The reconstructive analysis of interview material was grouped and systematized with the help of the qualitative data analysis software MAXQDA.

Particularities in analysis and interpretation arose when the interviews were held in a language that was foreign to both the interviewer as well as the interviewee. Interviews that are conducted in a foreign language seem to be problematic in the sense that we never know if the interview partners are really saying what they want to say with the same accuracy as if it were their mother tongue. At first, it must be assumed that individuals are able to articulate what they “really” want to say. Without this assumption, the analysis and interpretation would not be possible or lead to arbitrariness. The limited semantic repertoire of interviewees in a foreign language context is a phenomenon that needs specific and sensitive analysis of the choice of words and a specific concentration on the reconstructive and distancing attitude (*Verfremdungshaltung*). The interpretation of, for example, metaphors must be even more careful. Nevertheless, the foreignness of language makes it easier to adopt this distancing attitude in the interview situation and in the interview analysis. The understanding of language of the other person is not taken for granted, and thus a “*Verfremdungshaltung*” comes more naturally. During the interview, meanings and choices of words are more often questioned and asked for. Thus, the foreignness of language can help the reconstructive analysis in a positive way. Since the understanding of language is never trivial, be it the mother tongue or not, the commitment to basic principles of reconstructive analysis is even more necessary, but also even easier to conduct because the implicitness of meaning is not the same as in native-language communication (Kruse 2012: 20).

6 Political Practices in Transnational Civil Society Networks – An Exploration

“How does politics function in its everyday occurrence?” asked Nullmeier et al. in their book about political practices in higher education policies (Nullmeier et al. 2003). The following chapters attempt to answer the question of how *democracy* functions in its everyday occurrence in the two TCSNs. The democratic practices that were observed in this study are defined as political practices that are orientated towards specific democratic rules. These rules in turn are deducted from general democratic principles. In general, political practices result from interactions between actors as well as between actors and pre-given rules. Thus, democratic practices develop out of the actors’ (collective) examination of rules (in this case rules that serve a democratic normativity) and the positioning towards other actors. The interpretation and positioning of actors were reconstructed through the interviews with actors in these two networks.

The analysis of democratic practice in TCSNs is subdivided into two steps. The first step of analysis is the exploration of the spectrum of political practices in the two cases of TCSNs (chapter 6). It comprises a thorough reconstruction of the different political practices that range in the spectrum of participation, representation and deliberation. Analytical categories broadly define participation, representation and deliberation practices and build a heuristic in order to identify them as political practices as such. The different categories of participation, deliberation and representation practices can appear in different settings and phases and can develop different shapes. In a second step the democratic quality of these political practices is evaluated in order to assess if these political practices qualify as democratic practices (see chapter 7).

The exploration of political practices is roughly guided by the heuristics that define open categories in which the political practices discovered can be clustered:

Participation practice encompasses learning and empowerment practice, information distribution, cooperation and joint decision-making and decentralized governance. First, learning and empowerment are practices of participation that involve the learning of skills to participate effectively and the learning processes that take part during participation. Empirically, this comes mainly into effect in empowerment practices of marginal or weaker groups. Second, information distribution is a practice that is crucial to keep processes and strategies open to input. Thirdly, cooperation and joint decision-making is the main part of participation practice in the two networks. It is a broader category that involves many kinds of different practices of campaigning, coordination and decision-making. Lastly, the decentralization and establishing of autonomy is an important set of participation practices that aim at providing members with the freedom they need to decide on their own campaigns and let member participate in tasks that are devolved

from the central offices to the local organizations. Participation practice is very broad set of categories. Deliberation and Representation practice mark narrower sets of practices.

Deliberation practice is subdivided into the identification of problems and defining of agendas, the structuration of deliberation processes and the decision-making during and after deliberation. All categories mark rather concrete practices that take place during deliberation or encompass deliberation processes. While the problem identification is not directly connected to deliberation, these practices prepare deliberation processes in that they set the points that will be discussed during deliberation practice. Structuring the deliberation is a practice that involves all actors in the network, namely coordinators, campaigners and facilitators. During deliberation we can again differentiate deliberation as such and decision-making practices. These practices are specifically interesting because they define how output is generated in deliberation.

Representation practice comprises practices of selection and instruction of representatives, communicating between representatives and represented and the making of representative claims. All those practices of representation are related to the performance of the relationship between representatives and represented. The different ways of instructing or communicating thus form the representative relationships.

| Political Practice | Analytical Heuristics (open categories) |
|---------------------------|---|
| Participation | (1) Learning and empowering |
| | (2) Distributing and diffusing information in the network |
| | (3) Cooperation and joint decision-making |
| | (4) Decentralized governance |
| Deliberation | (1) Identifying problems and setting agendas |
| | (2) Structuring the deliberation process |
| | (3) Decision-making during and after deliberation |
| Representation | (1) Selecting and instructing representatives |
| | (2) Communicating between representatives and represented |
| | (3) Making representative claims about individuals and discourses |

Table 6: Analytical Heuristics of Political Practice

Political practice, analytically defined as an action taking place in a relational structure of more than one actor, a “community performance” (Nullmeier 2008: 22), is conceptually and empirically related to the analytical dimensions *knowledge* of actors and the *positioning* of actors, which are equally important for the interview text analysis (Korobov 2001). The political practices and the knowledge about them influence the actor’s positioning towards the political practices. Positioning can be self-positioning as well as intentional or unintentional positioning of other in the practices. The positioning of an actor is in turn based on a complex practice. When conducting political practices, actors use their specific knowledge. The modification of this specific actor’s knowledge can evoke certain political practices and enable or disable a certain positioning of the actor (Nullmeier et al. 2003: 16). The two analytical dimensions of positioning and knowledge structure the analysis and interpretation of the empirical material and help to identify political practices by recognizing the actors’ ways of positioning and forms and scale of knowledge.

As outlined in the previous chapter, the interview analysis was conducted on the basis of the open categories of participation, deliberation and representation practices. Through the ascribed meaning, namely the positioning and agency of interview partners within the two TCSNs, the practices in the networks were reconstructed⁵¹. This reconstruction was based on the systematic interview analysis as described in the methods chapter. At first, the introductory paragraphs of each interview were precisely reconstructed through a language analysis. After that, the entire interviews were coded on the basis of the open categories (see table on page 115). These analytical categories functioned as a guideline for a deeper interpretation of interview passages in a third step of analysis. The results of this three-step interview analysis will be presented in the following chapter 6.3. After a general introduction of the two cases in chapters 6.1 and 6.2, the results of the reconstructive analysis are presented in chapter 6.3. This section does not follow the process of the interview analysis, but presents the results of this process divided into the analytical categories and complemented by further categories that were generated inductively throughout the process of the interview analysis. As empirical reality is always more chaotic and fragmentary than theory, the description of the individual political practices cannot fulfil any demand of completeness that is given in theory. It is rather the case, that political practices found in the two networks and fit in the categories are described without completely filling out the analytical scope of the single categories.

⁵¹ That means in concrete terms, that practices such as that of a specific form of decision-making script specific roles such as moderators, working group leaders, presenters or discussants and at the same time network actors position themselves through the practice of decision-making in the context of the broader network for example as outsiders, opinion leaders, listeners or information brokers.

6.1 A Campaign for Better Working Conditions in the Garment Industry: the CCC

The Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) was founded in Amsterdam, Netherlands, as the “Schone Kleren Campagne” in 1989. The campaign is seen as “one of Europe’s most influential multi-stakeholder initiatives for pressuring companies to assume responsibilities for workers’ rights at their suppliers’ factories” (Egels-Zandén 2011: 259). With its 24 years of existence, the CCC can be classified as a permanent campaign network that is highly institutionalized and does not merely campaign on a temporary basis. As of today, it consists of 17 national platforms in 16 countries that were established over time. Although the CCC consists of many sub-campaigns that are conducted by its 16 national platforms, the general issue area of the campaign is very focused: The CCC concentrates on “improving working conditions in the global garment industry”⁵². The CCC started in 1989 with a campaign against the clothing retailer C&A in the Netherlands. An activist at this time summarized the reasons for this first anti-brand campaign against C&A: “[...] it was Dutch, it was big and we already had information about its use of sweatshop labour” (Sluiter 2009: 9). Although internationalism and international solidarity were big topics among leftist activists, women’s groups and a few academics, the wider public was not interested at all. Where their clothes were stitched and manufactured was not a “hot” topic or of any concern for consumers at that time (Sluiter 2009: 14-15).

During the period of internationalization of NGOs during the 1990’s, the CCC expanded its network in Eastern Europe and outside of Europe. This development was also accompanied and influenced by the outsourcing of garment production outside of Europe, which began in the 1970’s. From the 1980’s to 1993, the garment production by European retailers that was actually manufactured in Europe dropped from 70% to 35% (Sluiter 2009). Reacting to this development, CCC has led more and more international campaigns about this issue. The campaigns were often successful in getting companies to sign codes of conducts or protect workers from prosecution and mistreatment:

The CCC has taken up more than 250 cases and many have been resolved: health and safety conditions improved; dismissed workers reinstated; unions recognized and activists released from prison. Some brand name companies have responded by adopting codes of conduct and drafting policies on corporate responsibility, considered an important first step in the process of abolishing sweatshop conditions.⁵³

⁵² <http://www.cleanclothes.org/> (accessed: 8.1.2013)

⁵³ <http://eudevdays.eu/2011forum/news/success-stories/campaigning-clean-clothes> (accessed: 09.04.2013)

Goals

The CCC-network wants to reach its goals through the cooperation between trade unions and NGOs on a regional, national and global level: “Such cooperation should be based on mutual respect for each others [sic] different roles and methods, open and active communication, participatory consensus building and constructive criticism.” Furthermore, the empowerment of workers in their own local campaign work is a main instrument of the CCC-network. Besides this, public action is valued as an important instrument to reach better labour standards for workers, although the CCC does not promote boycotts.⁵⁴

The International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) *Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work* (1998) and Article 23 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights are the basis for the CCC’s code of labour practices. Furthermore, CCC principles state that workers have a right to know about their rights and to be educated and trained. According to the CCC, consumers as well have a right to information about the production conditions of their clothing and sportswear. Public campaigns of CCC must be conducted with consultation of the affected workers. Also, gender issues must be addressed⁵⁵. The garment industry, the CCC claims, has a responsibility to ensure good labour standards because their position of power enables them to enforce good labour standards⁵⁶. The CCC spent around one million Euros in 2012 for “press and political influencing” and national and international campaigns (Clean Clothes Campaign 2012).

Organization/formation of the campaign network

The CCC is a network of different organizations. Most organizations in Europe affiliated with the CCC are located in Western European countries. All these European organizations have built national coalitions that are called CCC platforms. Some of the smaller and younger groups can be found in Central-and Eastern European countries. The national platforms in each country consist of many national organizations. Trade unions are welcome to be part of these platforms. Besides trade unions, there are social justice organizations, women’s rights organizations, human rights organizations and church groups that are included in those national platforms. In most cases, one organization is the leading national organization on these platforms. Since the organizations that form national platforms often existed before they joined the CCC, the size and structure of the national organizations vary. The internal organization of national member organizations is diverse; some organizations have a broad membership base and/or very formal decision-making procedures while some organizations are very large with complex structures. Other organizations are very small and do not have formal members. Over the years, the CCC grew into a Euro-

⁵⁴ <http://www.cleanclothes.org/about-us/what-we-believe-in> (accessed: 4.1.2013)

⁵⁵ The gender dimension was a reason for targeting the garment industry in the first place, most of the sewers are women and therefore it was of course a reason to engage for women’s groups (Sluiter 2009: 16).

⁵⁶ <http://www.cleanclothes.org/about-us/what-we-believe-in> (accessed: 4.1.2013)

pean network. The most recent newcomers are Finland and Ireland who joined in 2010. The International Secretariat, which is located in Amsterdam, split from the Dutch Clean Clothes Platform in 2003 and is now working independently for the entire network. The International Secretariat is more than just a secretariat with administrative responsibilities. It is very dynamic and does not simply serve the membership, as one British member of the CCC notes (Sluiter 2009: 171), but has started its own programs and initiatives. Staff members of the International Secretariat are going on field trips to Asian countries such as Bangladesh, India, and Hong Kong every year. Due to the network's growth, in recent years, the network coordinators formed a steering committee in order to plan a restructuring of the network and adapting procedures with regard to the growing number of participants.

The sample of organizations that were interviewed in this study consists of different typical types of organizations that can be found in the network as such. First of all, there are organizations from different regions in Europe: from Southern Europe, Western Europe, Northern Europe and Central-and Eastern Europe. There are smaller and bigger organizations, organization with more or less resources, organizations that have been in the network for a very long time, and organizations that have recently joined the network. There are organizations that play a central role in the network and have many projects with other organizations, and there are organizations that are more peripheral and only to a limited degree involved in projects. Some of the organizations are grass-roots organizations with many volunteers; others are much professionalized with many paid staff members. Furthermore, the focus of campaigning is very different among the interviewed organizations: there are organizations that are focusing on fair trade issues; there are women's organizations, development aid organizations, Christian organizations, trade unions and human rights groups.

| | |
|---|---|
| International Secretariat Amsterdam | Italy Campagna Abiti Puliti c/o Centro Nuovo Modello di Sviluppo Vecchiano (PI) |
| Austria Clean Clothes Kampagne c/o Südwind Agentur Wien | The Netherlands Schone Kleren Campagne Amsterdam |
| Belgium Schone Kleren Campagne c/o Wereldsolidariteit Brussels | Norway Kampanjen Rene klær Oslo |
| Belgium achACT – Actions Consommateurs Travailleurs Louvain-la-Neuve | Poland Clean Clothes Polska Warszawa |
| Denmark Clean Clothes Campaign Denmark c/o MS ActionAid Copenhagen | Spain Campaña Ropa Limpia c/o SETEM Barcelona |
| Finland Puhtaat Vaatteet Helsinki - Helsingfors | Sweden Rena Kläder/Clean Clothes Campaign Sweden c/o LO-TCO Biståndsnämnd Stockholm |
| France Ethique sur l'étiquette Paris | Switzerland Clean Clothes Campaign c/o Erklärung von Bern/c/o Déclaration de Berne Zürich/ Lausanne |
| Germany Kampagne für Saubere Kleidung c/o Vereinte Evangelische Mission Wuppertal | Turkey Clean Clothes Campaign Turkey c/o Temiz Giysi Kampanyasi |
| Ireland Clean Clothes Campaign Ireland Dublin | United Kingdom Labour Behind the Label Bristol |

Table 7: List of European national platforms and International Secretariat of the Clean Clothes Campaign⁵⁷

Besides the European groups, there are international partner organizations, for example Canadian and American partner organizations that are collaborating with the CCC. International partners in garment producing countries such as Bangladesh, Hong Kong, Taiwan, India etc. also play a crucial role because they are doing research on the ground and have established relationships with workers in the garment industry. Those partner organizations are often involved rather temporarily in specific CCC projects and are not institutionally connected with the European network. The CCC has only recently established a more formal structure of regional coordinators and started to hold frequent meetings in the Asian region⁵⁸. The coordination of all network

⁵⁷ <http://www.cleanclothes.org/about/contact> (accessed: 24/8/2013)

⁵⁸ One interviewee spoke about this (pseudonym: C1).

activities is managed by the International Secretariat in Amsterdam. Different coordinators plan and structure meetings and forums, coordinate the communication between European platforms and international partners and strategize about long-term plans. The operative planning of campaigns is still done by the national platforms.

Internal Relationships

The internal relationships are characterized by the diversity of actors involved. Compared to other NGO-networks, trade unions are involved in the CCC. Those specific NGO-trade union relationships are not always harmonious, as the study by Egels-Zandén and Hyllmann (2011) about the cooperation of the Swedish Clean Clothes Campaign with trade unions has shown. They argue that the different financial capacities (trade-unions being more or less self-sufficient because of membership fees, and the NGOs getting only temporary project-based funding) lead to different time horizons and priorities in campaigning (ibid.). This poses specific challenges for internal relationships in the CCC.

In general, every organization in the network is quite autonomous in their operative work. Except for the general principles, which were described above, there are no other binding rules that prescribe the way how organizations can campaign and take action. This network of relatively autonomous groups is beneficial for a productive cooperation across ideological borders: “Also the coalition model implied that partners could cooperate on a practical level, even if they had different ideological agendas.” (Sluiter 2009: 17). The relationships between the single platforms in the network vary. Some of them are collaborating very closely on a transnational level, whereas others are mainly concentrating on national campaigns.

The CCC-network is structured around the so-called Euromeetings, which take place three times a year in different cities in Europe. Every platform is supposed to send a representative to those meetings. It is also a rule that the same representative should attend the meeting in order to secure continuity in information supply and negotiation. Within the Euromeetings, there are different working groups which pre-discuss certain issues. Those working groups are often formed around specific topics or campaigns. Everyone who is involved in that campaign or interested in that topic can participate. Usually, those working groups also prepare proposals for the general discussions in the plenary sessions. The partner organizations from Asia do not take part in the Euromeetings and do not have voting rights for decisions that concern the inner net-

work. However, there are regional meetings that are mainly steered by the partner organizations and where all matters that concern this cooperation are discussed and decided⁵⁹.

Mobilization/Action Repertoire

The action repertoires of the CCC differ depending on the specific contexts of the individual groups. In Western European countries, the mobilization is mostly awareness-raising action targeted at consumer behavior. Besides consumer education, which is a priority in Western Europe, worker's empowerment is one of the main fields of action in the international network. One of the main campaigning tools for workers' empowerment and solidarity action is the urgent appeals network. Urgent appeals are sent from workers or workers' organizations in garment factories whose rights were violated. The International Secretariat of the CCC examines those requests and decides if the CCC takes action and goes public with the case. It is very important for the International Secretariat that the workers really want to attract an international public audience as well as that the workers decide the demands of the campaign:

URGENT APPEALS ACTIVITIES include writing letters of protest to companies or public authorities, launching large-scale public e-mail and fax campaigns to pressure companies or governments to take positive action, writing letters of solidarity to workers and their organizations, and carrying out a variety of awareness-raising events (speaker tours, press conferences, demonstrations) to draw attention to cases of rights violations, both among the general public and the media. (Clean Clothes Campaign 2005).

Besides the urgent appeals, there are typical CCC campaigns that consist of phases of lobbying, public blaming of brands and research about working conditions. In Central-and Eastern European countries, which used to belong to the garment producing countries, the context is slightly different, and campaigns focus more on women's rights or education. In this region, a critical consumership hardly exists, which can be partly explained by the communist past and the only short history of a free market in these countries. In the current garment-producing countries in Asia, the action repertoires are mainly comprised of public street action. However, this can be dangerous for activists in some countries; therefore, many groups focus on counseling workers and educational activities in order to make workers aware of their rights.

As two campaigns in the fall and winter 2012 showed, concerted local street actions are one of the main forms of public protest. In September and October 2012, CCC activists "fainted" in front of H&M stores in European and US cities to protest against bad working conditions and malnutrition of workers in H&M factories in Cambodia. In December 2012, many European and US-American activists joined "fashion mobs" to raise awareness among Christmas shoppers about

⁵⁹ The information of this paragraph is taken from different interviews with CCC members. The interviewees were given pseudonyms. The pseudonyms of the interviewees that gave this information are C4, C7 and C10.

the sweatshops of big brand companies⁶⁰. Such actions are also taken to convince passers-by to sign petitions and letters to brand companies in which they are demanded to pay living wages or engage otherwise in an improvement of working conditions.

Targets

CCC is mostly doing public awareness raising campaigns for an audience of Western consumers. They are the main targets of CCC campaigns, as they have a great “weight” in terms of buying many kilograms of clothes per year per person (März 2010: 198-99). The CCC frames consumers as *consumer citizens* who are responsible for their choices and not just mere passive and unconcerned shoppers. The term *consumer citizen* grew out of a debate about the question whether responsible citizens are reduced to infantile consumers within their commercialized life-world in Western societies and whether this development threatens the democratic political culture (Barber 2007). The rising of anti-corporate campaigns that address citizens as consumers can be interpreted as one part of this democratic erosion, but it can also be understood from the opposite perspective: through anti-corporate campaigns, consumption is politicized, the division between private and public action is dissolved, and acts of consumption become political actions (Baringhorst 2010: 33).

Besides consumer citizens, the CCC wants to target brands and retailers to hold them accountable for the control of their supply chains. A decade after the founding of the CCC, a widely debated CCC code of conduct was written down, which is used as a guideline to motivate companies to implement a code of conduct and to assess the work of many brand companies with the help of this measure. While consumer citizens and brands are the main targets of the CCC, governments and politicians are also asked to develop laws and regulations that would force companies to supervise production and pricing standards and establish transparency. Lastly, garment workers themselves are supported in their own campaigns and in the establishment of trade unions (Sluiter 2009: 17).

Advocating fair clothes – one Campaign in depth

The campaign „Discover Fairness“ is a typical Clean Clothes Campaign and addresses the working conditions of workers in the outdoor clothing industry. As the outdoor clothing sector has a “natural” eco-image, which is often mistakenly associated with “clean” and ecological production of outdoor clothes in public opinion, the campaign targets this “misconception” by investigating the actual conditions of clothing production in the outdoor clothing sector. The main coordinating team is composed of two larger and one smaller organization in the network.

⁶⁰ <http://livingwage.cleanclothes.org/2012/12/17/my-christmas-wish-a-living-wage/> (accessed: 4.1.2013)

This campaign is conducted with different instruments of campaigning: There is the dialogue with the producers of outdoor clothes, the research about the working conditions in the factories and a public awareness-raising campaign. This campaign was initiated in 2010, when the first research reports were published. The research was conducted by local partners in South-East Asia who interviewed workers and investigated the local conditions of the factories that produced clothes for the big outdoor clothes companies such as North Face, Jack Wolfskin or Vaude. Questionnaires that were sent to the companies about production conditions functioned as the second data source for the evaluation of fair clothing production. The investigated factories were evaluated according to ILO standards and the Human Rights convention. Main parameters were: social security, work contracts, work hours and salary, hygiene and medical services. A yearly report shows any development of the investigated companies.

The 2012 report is 68 pages long and is comprised of comprehensive company profiles that were created with the help of the questionnaires that were sent out to companies and the research at local production sites. The topic of the campaign is approached with a knowledge-based perspective. The aim of the campaign is to spread information about the companies and educate consumers of outdoor clothing. The research about the companies is the cornerstone of the campaign. Besides the comprehensive research reports, the campaign's public action is also centered on information supply and education. Traveling exhibitions about clothing production in the outdoor sector are at the heart of the campaign. These exhibitions as well as workshops about the issue can be booked by the organizing Clean Clothes Campaign groups.

While anger about the companies' policies towards fair working conditions was the campaign's initiating impulse, the campaign itself is created in a very positive, adventurous style. The symbolism in the campaign uses semantics from outdoor vocabulary, starting with the name of the campaign itself: "Discover fairness", imitating a potential slogan of outdoor clothing advertisement. During an exemplary protest action in Berlin, the activists proclaimed "no peak is unconquerable" (Kein Gipfel ist unbezwingbar). The protesters were wearing mountaineers' clothes, pretending to be typical costumers of outdoor firms. The message of this protest action is very positive, namely that it is possible to implement fair working conditions. The campaign is funded by the EU and thus has to fulfill certain requirements.

One national platform in depth

The German CCC Campaign platform represents a specific type of national platform. The platform is quite big, involving many powerful organizations. There is a platform coordinator who coordinates the activities of 22 national organizations and 7 regional groups. The circle of involved organizations consists of mainly Christian organizations (14 out of 22) and trade unions (4). This is not typical for the Clean Clothes Campaign, but shows that the typical German actors

in the field of international solidarity and development aid are Christian-based. The internal organization is formalized and hierarchical. Decisions are taken during board meetings of all responsible organizations (TrägerInnenkreis) by majority voting.

The board of the national platform meets quarterly and decides about strategy and planning as well as the implementation and evaluation of campaigns. There are additional annual action meetings and closed door meetings. Each organization has one vote. The operational planning during the meetings is delegated to the managing committee (Geschäftsführender Ausschuss) (Kampagne für saubere Kleidung 2010). Local groups are supposed to support the activities of the national campaign platform (ibid.). Although the structure of the German national platform is much formalized, there is still room for maneuver in the local groups. However, the autonomy of local groups is limited since there are many precise rules of action that are implemented quite rigorously. This is different to other CCC platforms in Europe. Other organizations' platforms are rather loose coalitions that do not conduct such formalized procedures.

6.2 A Network for Environmental Protection Worldwide: FoE

The second case in this empirical study is the Friends of the Earth (FoE) network, which is mainly concerned with environmental issues. FoE is an international grass-roots environment network, the world's largest of this kind, according to the organization's statements. Clearly, FoE belongs to the three biggest environmental NGOs, but in contrast to Greenpeace and WWF, the other two main environmental NGOs, FoE addresses environmental issues in reference to social and political inequality and voices explicit critique on neoliberalism in a broader ideological agenda than Greenpeace or WWF (Doherty 2006: 862). Furthermore, FoE's federal structure makes it different from the rather centralized NGOs Greenpeace and WWF. Seventy-six member organizations overall, present on every continent, and 2 million members⁶¹ campaign for environmental and social justice and sustainability. FoE was founded in 1971 by organizations from France, Sweden, England and the USA. A small secretariat was set up in 1981. Annual meetings took place and an executive committee was built in 1983 in order to govern the network and issues between the meetings. In 1985, the European member organizations set up a regional coordinating body in Brussels, FoE Europe. The narration around the founding of FoE by some "environmental people" and above all David Brower, founder of the Sierra Club, is very a mythic and emotional story of a group of engaged people:

These first gatherings were passionate, multicultural exchanges of concerns and ideas. According to Richard Sandbrook, an early FoE activist from Britain, "The start of Friends

⁶¹ <http://www.foei.org/en/who-we-are> (accessed: 3.1.2013)

of the Earth, and indeed of FoEI, was romantic to be sure, but it was also very hit and miss and mundane. Day by day you never knew where the money was coming from, nor who would take the slightest notice of what we did."⁶²

FoE arose from an emerging global environmental movement in the 1960's and 1970's. The anti-nuclear protests, they envisioned, were the driving force behind the founding of FoE. David Brower, the founder of FoE, coined the famous slogan: "Think globally, act locally."⁶³ The environmental movement is according to activists as well as scholars very broadly and inclusively defined as "very diverse and complex, their organizational forms ranging from the highly organized and formally institutionalized to the radically informal, the spatial scope of their activities ranging from the local to the almost global, the nature of their concerns ranging from single issues to the full panoply of global environmental concerns." (Rootes 1999: 2). The global nature of environmental movements cannot be doubted since global protest events like the Seattle WTO protests in 1999 took place. FoE has also consultation status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and other relevant United Nations bodies⁶⁴.

Goals

FoE state that their mission is "to collectively ensure environmental and social justice, human dignity, and respect for human rights and peoples' rights so as to secure sustainable societies. To halt and reverse environmental degradation and depletion of natural resources, nurture the earth's ecological and cultural diversity, and secure sustainable livelihoods."⁶⁵ Besides those environmental goals, FoE include in their mission statement also the empowerment of indigenous peoples, local communities and women. Furthermore, it is part of the mission statement to broaden public participation, further the equality between and within societies, and to link diverse groups in the global struggles (ibid.).

The top priorities of FoE for 2012 were land grabbing, climate and biodiversity financing and "corporate capture"⁶⁶. The issues raised by FoE touch many different problem areas. For example 'land grabbing' is first of all a legal problem of land use, but it is also a problem of global injustice, environmental destruction, food sovereignty and poverty. The land lease to corporations in developing countries is framed as land grabbing, because local peasant often lose their land. FoE does not only react to the complexities of global environmental problems by campaigning comprehensively on all problematic details, they also campaign on issues, which are not originally environmental. The campaign against corporate influence on public institutions and gov-

⁶² <http://www.foei.org/en/who-we-are/about/25years> (accessed: 3.1.2013)

⁶³ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1373616/David-Brower.html> Obituaries: David Brower, 8.Nov. 2000 (accessed: 11.1.2013) / (Radkau 2011: 611)

⁶⁴ <http://www.foei.org/en/who-we-are/about/structure> (accessed: 24.4.2013)

⁶⁵ http://www.foei.org/en/who-we-are/about/mission_statement (accessed: 2.1.2013)

⁶⁶ <http://www.foei.org/en/what-we-do> (accessed: 2.1.2013)

ernments is one example for a campaign that is concerned with a political problem of democracy and transparency.

Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE), the European branch of FoE, name their focus areas as follows: climate and energy, corporate accountability, finance, food and agriculture, and resource use⁶⁷. Those areas are divided into “programs”, which are all coordinated by a program coordinator:

- *“Climate Justice and Energy*: including the EU's climate responsibility, UN climate talks strategy, energy savings and community-based renewables;
- *Economic Justice*: including corporate transparency and responsibility, impact of European companies on developing countries, corporate lobby power, food speculation and extractive industries;
- *Food Agriculture and Biodiversity*: including GMOs, biofuels, EUs Common Agriculture Policy and biodiversity;
- *Resources and Consumption*: including measuring and reducing Europe's resource use (waste policy, resource use, consumption and production patterns);
- *Sustainable EU Funds* (in co-operation with CEE Bank watch Network): including environmental and social indicators as the basis for the programming of EU funds over the period 2013-2020;
- *Network Development*: including capacity building within the network, strengthening Young Friends of the Earth Europe and support to campaigns”⁶⁸

The broad range of issues, FoE is tackling, stands in contrast to their rather small budget. In 2012, FoE spent around 4,5 Mio. Euros in total (Friends of the Earth 2012), compared to 183,4 Mio. Euros that for example Greenpeace spent on their campaigns in 2012 (Greenpeace 2012). However, the capacity to maintain a broad range of issues comes also from the local organizations, which often set their own agenda. This allows for a broader frame and the capacity to pursue different topics as well as use different strategies to reach the aims. While the Brussels organizations naturally focus on lobbying, other organizations are concentrating on maintaining relations with specific countries by helping other local organizations or considering one specific environmental issue as their top priority. FoE Europe is mainly funded by EU institutions, for which they got criticized⁶⁹ and their independent campaigning can be doubted or criticized, depending on the perspective. The Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for

⁶⁷ <http://www.foeeurope.org/> (accessed: 2.1.2013)

⁶⁸ <http://www.foeeurope.org/about/how-we-work> (accessed: 9.8.2013)

⁶⁹ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/environment/climatechange/9339045/Revealed-how-taxpayers-fund-climate-change-lobbyists.html> (accessed: 12.1.2013)

Administrative Affairs, Audit and Anti-Fraud, Siim Kallas says in his report: “Last year, Friends of the Earth Europe received 50% of their funding from the EU and EU national governments – a high proportion for a ‘non-governmental organisation’. Despite receiving € 635,000 from the Commission, they were initially very highly critical of our car CO2 emission proposals.” (Kallas 2007).

Organization/formation of the campaign network

Each of the above named programs is usually managed in a steering group. All program coordinators are located in the Brussels office and take the decisions for strategic and operational choices. Bigger questions are decided with the whole network, for example at one of the general meetings (F2, P.11). The Annual General Meeting (AGM) is their “ultimate decision-making body”, where all organizations in Europe should be present⁷⁰. Besides this, there are also annual meetings of climate change campaigners and other campaign areas (F2, P. 24). The general meeting is supposed to be attended by representatives that have a leading role in their organization. There is also a possibility to send a “proxy”, if representatives from one organization cannot come (ibid.). Besides the representatives of the single organizations, Brussels staff is attending the meetings in order to provide facilitation or follow up on other developments. Those meetings are divided in two parts: a formal part with approval of the accounts, the election of Executive Committee and setting strategic priorities. The second part includes workshops and discussions with members (ibid.). The Executive Committee meets four times a year and takes strategic decisions, oversees the implementation of strategies and appoints the director of FoEE⁷¹.

FoE International consists of 74 national organizations, 31 of them are situated in Europe, 14 organizations in Latin America, 14 organizations in Africa, 13 in the Asian-Pacific region (including Australia) and 1 organization in the US and Canada respectively. Thus, around 42 % of all organizations come from European countries and for example only 17, 5 % are situated in the whole Asian-Pacific region. There are regional umbrella associations of FoE in Latin America, Asia-Pacific region, Africa and Europe. The FoE-network integrates different local organizations that are independent organizations and often have existed before they joined the FoE-network.

| | |
|---|---|
| European regional Office Brussels | Ireland Friends of the Earth Ireland |
| Austria Global 2000 Vienna | Dublin |
| Belgium (Flanders & Brussels) | Italy Amici Della Terra Italy Rome |

⁷⁰ <http://www.foeeurope.org/about/how-we-work> (accessed: 9.8.2013)

⁷¹ <http://www.foeeurope.org/about/how-we-work> (accessed: 9.8.2013)

| | |
|--|---|
| Friends of the Earth Vlaanderen & Brussel Gent | Latvia Latvijas Zemes Draugi Riga |
| Belgium (Wallonia & Brussels) Les Amis de la Terre Belgique Namur | Lithuania Lietuvos Zaliuju Judejimas Kaunas |
| Bulgaria Za Zemiata Sofia | Luxembourg Mouvement Ecologique Luxembourg |
| Croatia Zelena Akcija Zagreb | Macedonia Dvizhenje na Ekologistite na Makedonija Skopje |
| Cyprus Friends of the Earth Cyprus Limassol | Malta Moviment Ghall-Ambjent Valletta |
| Czech Republic Hnutí Duha Brno | The Netherlands Milieudefensie Amsterdam |
| Denmark NOAH Friends of the Earth Denmark Copenhagen | Norway Norges Naturvernforbund Oslo |
| England, Wales and Northern Ireland Friends of the Earth England, Wales and Northern Ireland London | Poland Polski Klub Ekologiczny Kraków |
| Estonia Eesti Roheline Liikumine Tartu | Scotland Friends of the Earth Scotland Edinburgh |
| Finland Maan Ystävät Ry Helsinki | Slovakia Priatel'ia Zeme Banska Bystrica |
| France Les Amis de la Terre France Montreuil | Spain Amigos de la Tierra Madrid |
| Georgia Sakharvelos Mtsvaneta Modzraoba Tbilisi | Sweden Jordens Vänner Gothenburg |
| Germany Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland Berlin | Switzerland Pro Natura Basel |
| Hungary Magyar Természetvédők Szövetsége Budapest | Ukraine Zelenyi Svit Kiev |

Table 8: List of members of Friends of the Earth Europe with the regional office in Brussels⁷²

FoE International has three official languages: English, French and Spanish. In FoE Europe English is the only official language. FoE International meet biannually at a general meeting. National member organizations are supposed to send representatives to the general meetings. The national member organizations are quite autonomous; the network is coordinated like a federation. It is emphasized that all local organizations are enabled to participate in all international campaigns and activities of the FoE-network:

The Annual General Meeting is the ultimate decision-making body of Friends of the Earth Europe. Senior representatives from member groups attend the AGM to take part in evaluation, planning and decision-making, and the election of the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee meets four times a year to take strategic decisions between AGMs and to oversee the implementation of the decisions made by the AGM. Executive Committee appoints the director and delegates operational decision-making to her.⁷³

The Executive Committee of FoE Europe is elected annually by the member organizations at the annual general meeting. The Executive Committee consists of five representative of member organizations and is responsible for the general agenda and strategies together with the managing board (F4, P. 60). Further responsibilities are shared between the Executive Committee, the secretariat in Brussels and the director in Brussels:

I'm not sure if it's really an executive body i mean friends of the earth europe is a strong secretariat in Brussels with a lot of staff and a director, so the work of the excom is to support the work of the director and of the main coordinators of the programs, and of course take a number of decisions which have to be taken by STATUTE by such a body which is elected, we are elected by the general assembly which takes place every year. and so we meet i think four times every year for two days in brussels, HAVE some e-mail conversation, it's not something very huge in fact BECAUSE it's the OFFICE as we say is very strong and work very well and very competent people, strong director et cetera so it's a bit formal but not only, i mean we have real discussion when we meet have to take decisions but i mean everything is well prepared and documented (F5, P. 30)⁷⁴

Collective identity

Our vision is of a peaceful and sustainable world based on societies living in harmony with nature.⁷⁵

There are different principles that member organizations need to agree with. First and foremost, the democratic principle is important and there is a commitment to participatory democracy in the network, which is demanded to be reflected in local organizations, too: "Our decentralized

⁷² (<http://www.foeeurope.org/network>, accessed: 26/8/2013)

⁷³ <http://www.foeeurope.org/about/how-we-work> (accessed: 2.1.2013)

⁷⁴ The interviewees were given pseudonyms from F1-F14.

⁷⁵ http://www.foei.org/en/who-we-are/about/mission_statement (accessed: 2.1.2013)

and democratic structure allows all member groups to participate in decision-making.”⁷⁶. The members need to be dedicated to the FoE vision, participatory democracy, gender balance, grass-roots and national activism, transparency and accountability to their constituents and FoE’s fundraising principles. Furthermore, the member organizations should work independent from political parties, economic interests, state and religious organizations, work on multiple environmental topics and justice perspectives and engage also on the international level of FoE⁷⁷.

The internal relationships in the FoE-network are characterized by a deep commitment to equal north-south relations. This commitment is not always easy to pursue. During the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development in South Africa in 2002, FoE went into a crisis over the balance of north-south agendas, which finally resulted in the resignation of Acción Ecológica (FoE Ecuador) (Doherty 2006: 862). The main dividing lines were identified in different ideological visions (Southern organizations being more radically anti-neoliberal, whereas northern organizations are sometimes either apolitical nature conservation organizations or rather moderate lobby organizations) and different capacities in putting forward the own agenda. (ibid.).

Action repertoire

One of the major campaigns and at the same time one of the biggest successes of the European branch of FoE, was the so-called “Big-Ask-Campaign” to pressure national governments in Europe to reduce CO₂-emissions. After the British FoE organization mobilized successfully to demand a climate change law, which was passed in 2008 and was the first climate change law with legally binding targets for reducing carbon dioxide emission⁷⁸.

FoE promotes their actions as “mobilize – resist – transform”.⁷⁹ Local direct action is a main part of FoE’s work. FoE Europe focusses their action on influencing European policies and raising public awareness on environmental issues. They provide information and expertise on different campaign topics. Grass-roots activities are supported from the Brussels office through knowledge, skills and resource sharing. The European network of FoE concentrates much on lobbying in Brussels and their role as experts. Thus, they focus much on providing reports about EU legislation and specific circumstances in EU countries and to a lesser degree on public mobilization. This is also done in rather spectacular events that try to raise media attention and get into national news all over Europe. The mobilization of citizens and potential activists is primarily organized on the national level in the respective organizations in one country. In national or-

⁷⁶ <http://www.foei.org/en/who-we-are/about> (accessed: 9.3.2013)

⁷⁷ <http://www.foei.org/en/who-we-are/about/membercriteria>(accessed: 9.3.2013)

⁷⁸ <http://www.thebigask.eu/About%20the%20Big%20Ask.html> (accessed: 9.4.2013)

⁷⁹ <http://www.foei.org/en/media/archive/2011/friends-of-the-earth-international-celebrates-40-years-of-mobilization-resistance-and-transformation/?searchterm=40th%20anniversary>(accessed: 2.1.2013)

ganizations, mostly classic mobilization strategies and action repertoires prevail: from public street action to informational campaigns. The international network mobilizes also via online-petitions and on big global events like UN conferences. In contrast to CCC, the FoE-network does not have a short-term campaigning tool like the urgent appeal actions. The campaigns are in general longer lasting and often broadened in their issue focus. Permanent campaigns with broad political goals are initiated mainly by one local organization, which cooperates with other organizations. Alliances with farmers' movements, indigenous organizations, women's organizations, human rights organizations and unions⁸⁰ are quite usual.

Targets

While FoE Europe targets mainly EU institutions, above all the EU Commission, the local organizations and the international network targets different actors, ranging from international institutions like the UN or the World Bank to multinational corporations like Shell to state governments like in the "Big Ask"-campaign to reduce CO₂-emissions. FoE claims to speak to the citizens of the world, but there is a clear concentration in European and Northern American countries. The public is spoken to as a potentially environment sensitive constituency, which is informed and mobilized through different campaigns on various topics. Thus, also the type of audience can be defined very broad: peasants, consumers, pacifists are only few organizations that are talked to.

6.3 The Political Practices of Representation, Participation and Deliberation

After the general description of the two networks, the focus of the following chapters is on a detailed presentation of the results of the interview analysis. The analysis of the cases of CCC and FoE is based on 13 qualitative semi-structured interviews for each network. These 26 anonymous interviews are numbered consecutively from C1 to C13 and from F1 to F13 respectively. Single quotes of the interview texts are included in order to make the analysis more transparent and comprehensible. Since the interviews were transcribed with intonations and accentuations, the quotes read differently compared to standard language. The quotes represent spoken language to the degree that they are still readable. Accentuations are marked by capital letters and all words, also nouns and pronouns such as "I", are not capitalized. Furthermore, if interviewees refer to concrete persons; names, countries and nationalities are anonymized in order to guarantee the anonymity of interviewees.

⁸⁰ <http://www.foei.org/en/who-we-are/about/an-introduction-in-video> (accessed: 9.3.2013)

The reconstruction of the interview texts was done in several steps. A first step was the precise reconstruction of the introductory passage of each interview. After that, the interview texts were coded on the basis of the open categories. With this broad and open heuristic, it was possible to reconstruct and interpret the relevant text passages. The logic of this chapter is to present the results of the interview analysis and systematize them in the light of the research question of how political practices of representation, participation and deliberation take place in civil society networks.

This chapter is organized as follows: at first, the general perception of the networks in which campaigns take place and network members interact is summarized. After that, the main part of this chapter concentrates on the three core elements of analysis: participation practices, deliberation practices and representation practices. These three different political practices are described on the basis of the analytical categories. New categories that were inductively discovered in the interview material that did not fit into the analytical categories are described at the end of each section.

6.3.1 Inside the Transnational Civil Society Networks: General Perceptions

The network character and the respective joint missions of the two transnational civil society networks greatly influence the perception of members about their own organizing. This is insofar interesting, as it gives a broader overview of the general positions in the two networks. I will start by describing the perceptions in the CCC-network and after that will outline the general positions in the FoE-network.

At first, the interviewees' *shared* perception of the network contributes to the collective identity⁸¹ of the Clean Clothes Campaign. The main meaning that is attributed to the network is that of a loud and powerful coalition. Single organizations become stronger and louder when entering the network and therefore join the network (C5 P.55). When network member organizations speak for a whole network of very many organizations, it gives their word more power; they say (C1, P. 177-180/C10, P. 65; C4, P.138-144; C5 P.55). The network is also meant to be a mouthpiece for the interests of workers in Asian countries. Through the campaigning in Europe, fueled by the ground research in affected countries, the issues of workers are heard, and there is more and more pressure on the companies (C14, P. 62). Thus, the network is perceived as a strong community that strengthens individual members and reinforces the common cause.

However, the CCC-network is perceived very differently from the central members in the network and peripheral members in the network. It can be divided into different (geographical)

⁸¹ Collective identity can be defined as "an individual's cognitive, moral and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice or institution" (Polletta 2001: 285).

areas. While the core network consists of the oldest members in Western Europe, there are peripheries that vary in their marginal status according to self-perceived peripheral positions or peripheral positions that result from exclusionary rules or routines. The periphery stretches from Central-and Eastern Europe and Southern Europe to South-East Asia. Peripheral organizations have regular contact with other network members, but contacts are not very tight. They have few contact persons or manage their communication via the International Secretariat. Peripheral network members perceive the network as a highly professionalized network with a lot of complex structures and procedures, a very advanced network. They ascribe much expertise to the network. Beside the image of the network as having a strong outward voice, these organizations thus add another meaning to the network: a place for learning and struggle (C 7, C8, C12). The perceived high level of professionalism has ambivalent consequences for peripheral organizations: On the one hand, the network is perceived as a place where everything about successful campaigning can be learned; on the other hand, the adaptation to habits and practices in the network is critically evaluated as sometimes quite hard and difficult (C7, C8, C12). One person of a new member organization in the network summarized those difficulties in the following way: "Sometimes like i said before we have to adopt different ways of working here and there is no space for such big discussion in euromeeting (...) so that's why it's so difficult, i think it takes us more time to follow the processes in a way that it makes sense for us." (C7, P.12). A peripheral organization in the network describes a contrary experience: "i have also learned a lot because at the beginning i was really inexperienced but now i can really work with the projects and everything so it's really good for me, i understood the logic of EC projects" (C8, P. 75). Although both organizations are in the periphery of the network, they look at the network from a different angle. The first organization is a new official member of the network, whereas the second one is not an official member of the network. This results in different expectations about the participation in the network. The second organization uses the advantages of being associated with the network without having to take part in Euromeetings, whereas the first organization is involved in all the network activities and has to fulfill obligations and might have more expectations about the network's functioning as such. The longtime established practices in the network can make smooth participation for peripheral or new members very difficult. Since peripheral members are often also new members of the network, this specific perception of being marginalized is also reflected in the practice of welcoming new organizations.

Core network members have a different outlook on the network than peripheral members. Many of them express how proud they are about the achievements of the Clean Clothes Campaign and frequently describe the efficient use of the network structures with few capacities as a real asset of the Clean Clothes Campaign. One network member describes this from the perspective of an outside visitor: "they [outside visitors] quite realized how small we actually are and how much

work we get done” (C10, p.63). Besides many examples, given by interviewees, that illustrate the public visibility of the campaign network, central members of the network do not see the proficiency of the network organization and the complexity of its structures as something that has to be mentioned explicitly or even should be seen as a problem. Rather, members of the International Secretariat and core members of the CCC-network praise the efficient mode of collaboration through a dynamic information flow inside the network:

I would say beCAUSE we are a network and also because you have a kind of formal structure in place it means campaigns like the sandblasting campaign can go very quick and have an impACT because you have the some different organizations involved and they KNOW the network they know the basic premises so SOME campaign topics can very easily be can go very quickly spread and have some impact, right? (C2, P. 114)

Core members in the network appreciate the participatory approach to decision-making in the network, although they also see flaws in realizing participation practices (e.g. C1, C9, C3). There is a critical, realistic, but overall positive meaning ascribed to the network, which is above all substantiated by the efficient information flow in the network and the successful public campaigning.

Similarly, many FoE-members are very enthusiastic and emotionally attached to their network. As one interviewee states, FoE “is one of the greatest networks in europe,” (F6, P.58). The network is perceived as an alliance of like-minded environmentalists with a diverse set of approaches: “i think the fact that we are a network of thirty autonomous national member groups who all have their NATional level strategies and campaigns and LEgal structures and so on vision and mission, means that we have a very diverse range of voices when we discuss the issue” (F2, P. 70). Political alignment plays an important role in the network, as well as the diversity of voices and interests. Although political ideals must be shared, different approaches of campaigning and differing political opinions and goals in specific thematic fields are tolerated.

The diversity of the organizations in the FoE-network is, in general, a frequently referred category. Diversity means uniqueness, because other large NGOs, such as Greenpeace or WWF, are not that diverse. Activists in the FoE-network understand the network as a coalition of very passionate grass-roots people (F2, F6, F9). However, there are organizations that also value strategic choices and an output orientation more than the original grass-roots or social movement framed activism (F2, F3, F5). Thus, the diversity of the network organizations with a common political understanding is valued:

We have enormous diversity we have enormous victories we have enormous strength in our groups but also in some cases significant challenges within our groups we have a WIDE range of different ways of working we have a very i think high level of common understanding of the MAIN environmental ISSUES facing us and or is driving those envi-

ronmental issues in terms of kind of political structures and economic structures driving some of the problems. (F2, P. 80)

This wide range of difference among the organizations in the network can be seen very clearly when looking more deeply at some of the interviewed organizations: Some of the organizations are big organizations that are quiet giants in the network. They are concerned with nature conservation and biodiversity issues, i.e. issues that are not automatically political. Those organizations do not, or only to a limited degree, prefer (radical) public protest actions. They see the network as an umbrella organization for their interests and often see their own role in the network as a supporter for smaller or weaker organizations. Traditions of the organizations and of the environmental work are also very important. The language spoken by their representatives (the interviewees) is rather formal and self-confident. Those organizations are located in Western/Central Europe. Other organizations are very passionate about their campaigns and see the formal network framework as a second-range matter that helps to keep up their ideals and meet friends with same mindsets. They are not so much concerned with formalized procedures, but are rather attracted by the political opportunities and cooperation. They seem to have a grass-roots background, although they have somehow grown out of being a pure grass-roots organization. Still these organizations show a very strong commitment to grass-roots democracy. Typically these organizations are to be found in Southern European and Scandinavian countries. A third group of organizations can be characterized as active, independent, standing at the edge of the network. These organizations emphasize their own projects and the cooperation with other international networks. The contacts and communication with the network is not that intense. They are mostly also geographically at the edge of the network, in Central-and Eastern Europe or outside of Europe.

Whereas there are very obvious differences between the European organizations, the international differences are even more striking. This can be troubling when a common position is needed to be found. Different views on issues can inspire discussions, but it can at the same time prohibit any consensus on a matter of discussion. As pointed out in the quote below and also in other interviews, the difficulty to even find an agreement on how to articulate claims or problems comes mainly from the different cultural and political backgrounds of the involved organizations. Different organizations specialized in different topics such as climate change or anti-nuclear politics. Thus, other interviewees also say they would desire a stronger, more united campaign network, although they value the grant of autonomy for every organization (F4, P. 92). This will be again picked up in the chapter about deliberation practices and consensus.

There are groups that are well like [org. in country] or friends of the earth [country] that are more mainstream and not that well lefts left-win and then we have groups in latin america that are really environmental organizations but also in the forefront of the

struggle for human rights and democracy so that have a completely different position in their society and different view of the struggles that have to be fought to get sustainable future and then it's of course very difficult to find a common language" (F1, P. 39)

The diversity of the FoE-network goes hand in hand with a certain degree of complexity and the questioning of effectiveness of the network:

Of course the structure is relatively, especially if we speak about ah if we think about the international or the global level is relatively complex, not complex but i mean relatively not effective in the sense that very much bottom-up contrary of an organization like greenpeace which is maybe more effective in the sense that many things are decided in amsterdam in the head office and then the groups just implement. this FoE-networks totally different at friend of the earth so especially the international level, i mean the approach the cultural context, the views et cetera of the groups in the different regions are SO different and diverse so sometime it's even a miracle that we can increa- our number of BASIC position et cetera. but then when it comes to REALLY make international programs work really challenging (F5, P. 104)

Thus, the diversity of organizations can be seen as both: a gain in strength and a loss in decision-making effectiveness. It seems to be a matter of perspective, and position in the network, what is weighted more: the advantages or disadvantages of diversity. Whereas grass-roots-minded organizations are more inclined to value the diversity, lobby organizations are rather seen the inefficiencies in overly long discussions. This results in different speeds of internal decision-making and a situation at the transnational level, which produces different perceptions of the procedures of decision-making.

If two organizations work in VERY different WAYS, let's say that you have one organization that make all their decisions within on a volunteer base that they all have to agree with every decision and the other organization makes their decisions only by a BOARD or a small GROUP that makes their decisions or by their office or whatEVER then they gonna work in very different PACES they are gonna be one is kind of running but the other one is walking- you know so of course that is a fact but then you have to plan a project after the politics that the organization has as well so and it is always important to be aware of the effect (F9, P. 129)

Besides the European focus of campaigning, international solidarity with grass-roots organizations is viewed as something, which makes FoE quite unique: "we are probably the only network of environmental groups in europe which takes seriously solidarity with grass-roots struggles in other regions" (F2, P. 81). Furthermore, the diversity of the network is raising the feeling of political efficacy.

We can link the struggles you know. we can SEE when we are in a federation, that we are not alone, i mean as affected groups affected people, you know you see, we are not alone. the same problem is happening in amazonia and the same problem is happening in indonesia and it is linked with a campaign in the netherlands, (...) this federation GIVES to us this opportunity to LINK the struggles, to work with other local groups to exchange the experiences and experiences with campaigns you see, (...) it makes us stronger to fight

against something or for something. as a federation we have more power to FIGHT yes, with a company for example or court, or government. (F 13, P. 97)

If many different organizations are participating in campaigns, so the line of reasoning, it raises the pressure and has a bigger effect (F4, P. 86; F6, P. 56). This membership in a big and well-known environmental protection network can not only put more strength on specific campaigns and claims, it can also make local members more attractive “at home”. This can be a motivation to join the network because it helps in recruiting new members at the local level (F11, P. 81).

6.3.2 Participation Practices

The analysis of participation practices is structured based on the analytical categories: (1) learning and empowering; (2) distributing and diffusing information in the network; (3) including (and excluding) network members in the campaigning process; and (4) decentralized governance.

(1) Learning and empowering

The major effort of learning and empowerment in the CCC-network is targeted toward the workers in garment producing countries. The empowerment of workers in production countries is an important part of the network’s self-understanding. It is reflected in their principles as follows:

Workers themselves can and should take the lead in their own organising and empowerment. Workers can best assess their needs and the risks they take when asserting their rights. Public campaigns and other initiatives to take action in cases of rights violations and the development of strategies to address these issues must be done in consultation with workers or their representatives.⁸²

The empowerment of workers is not only written down in the principles; it is also seen as a central part of the mission of the CCC: “besides the principles we then have what we should distinguish. are four areas of work, so in order to reach our mission, which is improving working conditions in the global garment industry AND empowering workers in those industries” (C 10, P. 29). This mission is practiced through coordinated projects with NGOs in the producing countries. Via mediation through these NGOs, workers are encouraged to raise concerns, problematize issues and get support for campaigns and self-organization. This empowerment-approach aims on the one hand at increasing the participation of workers in local workers’ committees and workers organizations; on the other hand, it aims at increasing the participation in the international NGO network.

⁸² <http://www.cleanclothes.org/about/principles> (accessed: 01.10.2016)

NGOs that work locally with garment workers⁸³ have the difficult responsibility to bridge participation problems: they are translators, supporters and educators of the workers and help them in regard to negotiations with local factory owners and multinational companies. Furthermore, local NGOs consist of researchers and educators for the international network and become the mouth-piece for the workers in a transnational public sphere. The following quote of an Asian NGO activist, who works in close collaboration with the CCC-network, exemplifies how difficult it is to support and educate workers in their struggle for better working and living conditions. Here, we can also see that empowerment involves also a gender aspect:

Then you know that garment workers are always feel powerless many of course young women, those women who are very submissive some well that's why it's difficult i mean to organize them, so that's why we have DESIGNED the PROgrams how to involve the garment workers, how to train training up the unions support them to i mean bargain with the company with the company with the owners with their bosses, so that, or even the governments so that their wages right can be guaranteed or i mean increased. (C12, P.26)

The interviewee describes the young women working in garment factories as very submissive, thereby making it difficult to mobilize them. In general, this quote captures the implicit aim of education and empowerment. Workers feel powerless; they do not see their political efficacy. The aim of designed programs is to train and support workers and union members. "Submissive" (woman) workers should develop awareness of their rights and learn skills of how they can "bargain" with the companies (C12, P.58). The empowerment approach in participatory democracy can be identified in the practices of encouraging workers' participation. The wording in the previous quotation from one of the interviewees already reveals that this seems to be a more top-down empowerment than a bottom-up learning process.

The empowerment, or capacity building, as FoE members call it, is practiced in the FoE-network in a very systematic and formalized way. One program, which is called "capacity building through campaigns", is mainly aimed at building the capacity of the campaigners to "win campaigns" (F2, P. 22). The program contains skill sharing, information and knowledge exchange between national campaigners and the Brussels office. This means concretely that network events are set up to support campaigners in their development of necessary skills, but also that campaigners are supported in and through their campaign work at the national level (F2, P.22).

⁸³ The learning and empowerment of workers, as an important part of participation practices, can only be described from the perspective of the NGOs in producing countries and not from the workers themselves because they were not interviewed. It would have been almost impossible to do that because it is very difficult, even for the European NGOs, to get in contact with the workers because of existing language barriers.

In order to find out how organizations are working and what they could need, a questionnaire was designed by the Brussels office and sent around to the organizations: "based on that we are developing some interventions with specific groups" (F2, P. 22). This questionnaire had also other impacts in that it inspired one organization to reactivate their connections to FoE: "THEY sent us a questionnaire membership development questionnaire and many organizations also raised this question about membership of friends of earth. so we decided to reconnect with them again" (F11. P. 73).

Besides those activities, which are centrally planned from the Brussels office, there was a twinship program aiming at bringing stronger and "weaker" organizations together in order to develop a peer-to-peer learning process.

We have been involved a lot during some years in friend of the earth europe CAPACITY building projects which were BASED on the idea of twinship between STRONGER groups and weaker groups or more developed and less developed groups et cetera so we have been part of this program and contributed to support we have been supporting, i mean the program was a rule with common activities et cetera but there was also this twinship and so we have been supporting foe [country 1] and foe [country 2] with visit, training, organized by ourselves et cetera. now this model has been a bit put aside, not because it was not good, i think it worked RATHER well in most of the cases, but well it was also a bit some time-expensive or time consuming or meaning a lot of resources so NOW we are developed we have developed more capacity within the campaigns. another approach that we find interesting currently in friend of the earth europe. so we are a bit LESS involved than before but will be contributing to that (F5, P. 80)

Although this program is already stopped, there is a huge sense for solidarity in the FoE-network, which is expressed in much formalized practices of systematic support from the Brussels office as well as through a peer-to-peer system. This formalized support practices from the Brussels office are also applied to the participation of general meetings. Organizations that cannot come are supported by a specific budget. However, there are growing difficulties on how to distribute the financial support, as more and more organizations are in need of a travel budget:

There is a there is a budget to support such groups who have difficulties i can i couldn't explain you how exactly this budget is shared but there are there is some money europe to support some european groups, for example this year there were MORE groups willing to get this budget than we had. so for example this was a decision from the board from the european board to decide to not whom will come but to whom we will give the money which is not necessarily an easy decision of course but you have to share the budget (...) it's really something difficult especially as we have more and more groups so the organization of such a meeting is something quite big, expensive and not easy to organize (F5, P. 62)

One of the organizations even sees support for other member organizations as one of their main activities (F5, P. 6):

Of course when other groups want to do something at that meeting we try to arrange our plans so that it's not prohibitive for them or we try to support other groups that want to

join in so it's mostly that we DESIGN our campaigns so that it's attractive for other friends of the earth groups to join then that we first sit together and we try to really design it together (F1, P. 35)

The sense of an increased political efficacy through participating in network meetings is a second dimension of learning and empowerment practices in the network, which is underlined by many interviewees, exemplified in the following quote: "It's the opportunity to see US altogether all the groups, this is really, really good because it makes the feeling that we can achieve BIGGER things if we work altogether than every than each group does what he wants" (F3, P. 53).

The empowerment practices in the FoE-network are very comprehensive and cover mainly the capacity building of organizations. Financial support is given to organizations with lesser capacities in order to establish equal opportunities of participation. Additionally, the second dimension of empowerment practices, which can be observed as the increased sense of political efficacy and the consideration of different perspectives, is an important part of empowerment practices in the FoE-network.

(2) Distributing and diffusing information in the network

The general information practice in the CCC-network has two sides. On the one hand, information spreads easily through the whole network, and network member organizations feel that they receive regular updates (C7, C8). On the other hand, this less formalized way of distributing information through different actors and channels of communication cannot guarantee that information is really accessible by everyone in the network. As one interviewee states, due to this large amount of information, it can happen that actors are simply forgotten in the information distribution or receive the information with a certain time lag (C1, P. 166-167). This can be the case when network members are not directly connected to central coordination offices, but receive the information indirectly through other network members (C 8, P. 8).

The information diffusion from wider parts of the network to the European core of the network seems to work quite well:

WE came to i mean there are activists came to know about some labor rights violations and then workers were given capital punishments on the, were beaten, trashing and everything happening, on the shop floor, which we can - we got to know and we raised it and we and we also shared it witch ccc, then and ccc wrote an article and a campaign criticizing [brand name] because they were there. (C14, P. 40)

This fast information flow between affected groups of workers in South-East Asia and the campaigners in Europe also contributes to the output of campaign work and provides the CCC-network with relevant information for effective and target-oriented campaigns.

Informal contacts and formal meetings established a functioning information practice in the FoE-network as well:

In my perception friends of earth is very transparent organization, like the decisions are with open voting and everything is visible, they're sending all the reports all the conclusions TIME and circulating through the members so i think that is very democratic and very open organization, so i'm really satisfied regarding with the work, and the way of choosing all the members and everything else which is connected to transparency (F11, P. 77)

Whereas many network members state that they appreciate the easy communication and the resulting good information flow, especially in regard to new events and cooperation, the decision-making processes are perceived as difficult to understand. One interview person put it in a nutshell: "The decision making process is often very mysterious" (F1, p. 98). The reasons for this evaluation of decision-making processes as very opaque and complex are explained by this interviewee as follows:

Not even in friends of the earth it could be transparent for ME but i just don't have the time to be involved in all those decision making processes only if it's really related to oil and mining my colleague or i will really be involved in the decision making process (F1, P. 94)

It can be observed, that the transparency of decision-making processes is tightly connected to representation practices. The dialogue between representatives, who go to meetings where decisions are taken, and the members of the organization that stay at home, influences the degree of information sharing about decision-making process. Of course, as stated in the quote above, this information supply by representatives is an interaction between both parties: representatives and represented. If the represented individuals, such as the interviewee quoted above, do not have time and capacities to follow up on decision-making procedures, then this results in the perception of a "mysterious" process of decision-making.

(3) *Cooperation and joint decision-making*

Decision-making is conducted on different levels in the CCC-network: within the European CCC-network, within specific campaigns with international partners, and on the local level with workers and trade unions. A Western European NGO coordinator from the International Secretariat, who describes a scene in a Sri Lankan union's office, provides a first example of the local workers' level of decision-making. The interviewee takes this example to emphasize the general principle of providing equal participation, especially at the workers' level. Workers are the represented group, which makes a claim for legitimacy even stronger. This coordinator described the practice of talking to workers in union offices as a practice of formulating demands in collaboration with union staff. The coordinator described the overall campaign in very positive terms. The team that coordinates campaigns and cases from Western Europe is always "hyper careful" to make sure that workers decide what should be done. Although this interview does not allow us to estimate how common the described practice is, it shows that there is a deep awareness of how practices should look like:

The demands are actually formulated by the workers or at least by their representatives so by the union you know, that THEY're talking to so you know i was in sri lanka last year and there was a case going on at that time and i went to one of the union offices and some of the workers were IN the office, talking to some of the people, and they were discussing the case. so you know, that's how you can SEE how it works, how the demands are formulated in that way (C10, P. 42)

A local NGO activist, who states that there are several practices of getting in touch with the workers, confirms the practice of inclusion as described by the International Secretariat coordinator; however, this interviewee describes practices that involve the pro-active locating of workers in their factories and the surroundings instead of awaiting them in their office. Similar practices are described by another local activist who was also interviewed (C14, P. 60). Thus, here we can observe two similar practices of workers' participation that are described quite differently from the "local" and the European perspective. The local NGOs emphasize their active part in "reaching" the workers or going to their factories or homes, whereas the coordinator from the CCC's International Secretariat suggests that workers pro-actively show up talking and discussing in the office of a trade union. Overall, both descriptions of these participation practices draw a picture of a mutual, collective practice that is conducted without disruptions.

So we have a several ways to reach the workers right the one is that well we can go to the industrial zone when we do the research right that so-called national wage research and then we will go to the factory and then wait for the workers, right and then meet with the workers and also interview them the other way is go through the brand company and brand company they invite us go into the factory the supply factories and then to meet with the workers (C12, P. 58)

The participation of workers in decision-making is drafted as a dialogue between the representatives (local NGOs or trade unions) and the workers. However, none of the interviewees focuses on participatory decision-making as a *collective* practice of workers. It appears that the practice of involving actors is rather a person-to-person practice. In general, local NGOs and representatives of the European network position themselves in favor of a pro-active inclusion of workers in decision-making within the network.

In contrast to the fairly smooth cooperation between workers, local NGOs, and the International Secretariat, NGOs that work as partner organizations in the periphery of the CCC-network seem to struggle with cultural differences and their role in the network. Both issues are ambivalent. Cultural differences produce misunderstandings and make it hard to adapt to practices of the network (C12); however, border-crossing cooperation is a source of enrichment and power for the project and the involved NGOs (C14). The cooperation with European NGOs makes the work for local NGOs sometimes more secure because the public visibility in European countries protects them from threats from local factory owners (C14). In that way, participation in the network is very valuable for NGOs in producing countries. However, when looking at participation

practices of international partners, it can be observed that there are different meanings of participation. For example, one of the organization's representatives explains that they are from time to time *"called for these meetings and workshops to Europe"* (C14, p. 6). This is an indicator of a rather instrumental and unequal partnership within the network. In other interviews, this instrumentality of participation practices is highlighted by assigning roles of mere researchers and information suppliers to international partners. For example, one person from Western Europe describes the way how most European partners begin to cooperate with "international partners" as follows:

Normally you would look at the country and think which group can be doing what kind of research or you have a discussion with groups and it's decided so it's i mean you in china you want to use a group that can connect with workers know the situation and et cetera. i think we normally choose more activist and client organizations so because then they know what we expect and they are not expensive (C2, P. 36)

Here, the instrumental rationality of involving international partners is chosen over a normative participatory argumentation. The practice of beginning cooperation and negotiating about research work is characterized by a reasoning of how to get the best results they need without spending too much money. In this positioning towards practices of cooperation, a normative participatory approach is not involved. The participation of international partners is framed like an asymmetrical contractual relationship, where the activist organizations do not have much to say. This marks a contrast to what the same person says about the principle beliefs and norms of the network:

We would probably be careful to describe things in in geographically convined terms because it's almost NEVER a euroPEAN camPAIGN if WE do a campaign well and i would say we always do that well but or our STARTing point should be that SOUTHern organizations should be involved in the camPAIGN on a deCISIOon-making level so and this is not always how things happen cause sometimes you have campaigns where southern partners are probably relatively SMALL (C2, P. 17)

With the comparison of the both statements above, there seems to be a gap between rules and norms on the one hand and the perception of practices on the other hand. Although these rules are described in the interview, they are to a certain degree avoided or re-interpreted in the practices. This cannot only be observed in the wider global network, but also inside the European network. Some working groups, for example, that form around organizations that are not official platforms in the network, struggle to have a voice in the network. This makes them subordinate groups, which are sometimes overrun by bigger and more influential groups. This is exemplified in a description of a working group that is mainly composed of peripheral organizations:

The people who are involved in this group are not in euromee- eurocoordination group so they are they do not have decision-making power so i guess it will be good to involve more people from european platform in this group THIS was also what we discussed during one meeting, but i was also near to this group so i did not i thought it has more

IMPACT, but it seems that it all i think all in clean clothes depends on how people are engaged (C 7, P. 23)

Besides the lack of formal participatory rights, the interviewee also thinks that this working group does not have a concrete enough topic to lobby it effectively inside the network. It seems that the initiative to do something in these working groups lies with the International Secretariat. Thus, the practice of decentralizing responsibilities can also lead to the opposite of participation. Groups that are less experienced and not in the core network are having difficulties to adapt to the working routines of the network and thus fall behind.

Although the CCC-network is very open to influence and input from the network environment, the actual procedure of integrating new members in the network is perceived by some new members as a challenging task on both sides: the network and the new members. Some organizations only recently joined the CCC-network while others have been long-term members. New members had different initial experiences with the CCC-network. These experiences present an unbiased and fresh outside perspective on the network. Some CCC organizations value their initial contact with the network as a very positive and inspiring experience. They describe the first meeting they attended as very creative, vivid and varied (C11) with a lot of opportunities to get in contact with fellow campaigners, which also helped them in future projects (C8). In the Euromeetings and other network meetings methods of facilitation, moderation, note-taking and evaluation are applied that are sometimes quite uncommon in the national contexts of the platforms. Besides the creativity of different brainstorming and workshop methodologies, the network's work is perceived as very constructive and efficient. This is seen as a consequence of the professionalized methods used in the meeting. However, it is also perceived as an obstacle for integration into the network, especially when organizations evaluate their own work as being different, for example by being less efficient or doing things differently (C5, C12). Then, new organizations have doubts about how they can "fit in".

Furthermore, member organizations also perceive the integration process into the network differently. While some feel that they were supported very well, especially by the International Secretariat, during the adaption period; other organizations do not see that they were helped much in the first phase of becoming a network member. Network member candidates have to fulfill certain criteria, for example having an office and forming a platform that consists of many organizations and trade unions. These criteria must be met before they can be a CCC platform. The dividing line between being a CCC platform in the network and just being an organization in the network is very clear. While organizations without a platform are not involved in Euromeetings, other relevant forums, and decision-making processes, official CCC platforms receive many more "services" (C11) from the International Secretariat and are much more involved in information distribution, meetings and strategic planning. One interview person describes the transi-

tion from a non-member to a member as being enabled to participate (C7). Thus, new network members gain many opportunities to participate and capacities to campaign, but the transition and integration process as such is quite difficult. Adapting to established practices of collaboration in general seems to lead to frustration and an inability to cope with certain rules and procedures.

International solidarity is a cornerstone of the international FoE-network and an important rule for cooperation in the European FoE-network. However, there is a certain distinct role allocation between European and non-European organizations within campaigns of FoE Europe. As it was described above, most of the funding for FoE Europe organizations comes from the EU. Therefore, there is often a clear capacity-related role distribution: European organizations have money that they can spend on campaigning, whereas Non-European organizations are often the organizations that represent affected people, villages or regions of diverse environmental damages. The non-European organizations in FoE Europe campaigns are “where the problems are” (F1, P.80). Cooperation between an African FoE organization and a European FoE organization shows the dilemma between maintaining mutual communication and at the same time having differences that cannot be easily diminished:

We want to be involved of course as an organization and what our involvements is that we make the case for the wider environmental issue is not only the harm done to the [local] citizen but also harm done to the [local] environment in general and then of course the lawyer is doing the case for us and the [locals] so it's not that we do it for the [locals] It's a [local] and WE together do it (...)the LAWyer has the leading role and the farmers, they are the most important persons but because they are quite far away. (F1, P. 63-68)

While there is a law suit going on in Europe against a big oil company causing environmental damage in Africa, the campaigner of the European organizations broadens the frame of participation in the quote above. The claims of the campaign is made on a much more general level as a “case for the wider environmental issue” being not only a local problem in this country. On this ground it is made clear that the European organization is not doing this *for* the African organization but *together with* the African organization. When it comes to the concrete practices of involving the local FoE organization as well as even the farmers (who are the group of affected people in this case), the language of the interviewee changes:

So the farmers are not very much involved on a day-to-day basis, we tell them about what's happening in general terms and [the local FoE group] has an important role in also translating what's happening in [own country] to THEM and to their villages which is very important (...) [the local FoE group] is very important in explaining what's happening and also organizing that and preparing people that if the court case will be successful (F1, P.69)

Now, the practice of participating in a campaign together is described differently. The European FoE organization explains the local FoE organization what is happening and the local FoE organ-

ization explains to the farmers the proceedings of the campaign and translates documents. This gives the impression of a rather unidirectional interaction between the European and the African organization. There is surely a dilemma between the participatory claims of a desired form of cooperation and real practices. Many such claims cannot be realized fully because of constraints of daily work and structural conditions.

The perspective of a Central-African FoE organization coordinator underlines these observations. The urgent need for more campaigns that serve the local needs is articulated:

Most of the time campaigns are designed for international people, you see? and there is most no coordination no, so you can do five years of activities, but local people of the country will not be affected of the origin, the country of origin will not be affected the situation will not be changed that much, so what we really need is YES, it's good to have national or international campaigns, and sometimes national campaigns in europe, european countries but it's also good to have some possibility to convert or to use the part of the project, data and everything for NATIONAL cause to national problem, we are trying to face, because there is SOMETHing to share the situation with international campaign it to international awareness BUT it's also good to TACKLE problems to find solutions to the national problems (F12, P. 64)

In this quote, the different target levels of campaigns are compared. There are many campaigns for “international people”, which are targeted in order to share problems that occur at the national or local level. However, with these international campaigns, the shared problems at the local level are not solved. This would be a different sort of campaign, according to the interviewee. The interviewee wishes to use the data they collect locally for European partners about e.g. environmental damages and their consequences, for primary local campaigns, too.

A strong hint towards the relevance of practices instead of institutions in the implementation of rules and norms in transnational civil society networks is the way how people get involved in campaigning. Here, it can be observed that there are no clear rules of how to include whom in which phases of campaigning. It is rather a matter of perception and dynamic decisions:

I would guess about TWENTY of those people are really involved in camPAIGNing and that mainly people that we call campaigners and some people who are program coordinators who are responsible for coordinating two or three camPAIGNS within a particular topic and most of that negotiation, most of that discussion and strategic planning happens at the level of campaigner or occasionally the program coordinator would be involved if it's a bit more strategic discussion or if there is maybe a bit more at **STAKE where we feel that we maybe have a DIFFerent position from some allies then the program coordinator might get involved or potentially the director to come in** (F2, P.20)

It can be learned from the quote above, which is similarly stated by many other interviewees too (e.g. F4, F1, F5), that rules of inclusion are inherent in practices. They evolve dynamically and are probably rather based on experience than on explicit rules. Furthermore, inclusion is also dependent on the engagement of those that would need to be included. As one interviewee from

a Central-African country states, being included and being heard is a constant active struggle over awareness:

I think MOST of the time our role is to bring to show or to display some EVIDence from the field, so we have to give the INSight the regional view of the situation of people on the ground. WHAT really matters in our countries in the fields where we are from, what we need or what we would LIKE people to do in europe, for example in order to help changing the situation. (F11, P.57)

In stark contrast to this organic evolution of cooperation, the formal gathering, such as the Europe meetings in the CCC-network, are very structured, 2-3 day meetings where all representatives (one per country) meet in a European city and discuss urgent issues and longtime strategy.

Decentralized governance

Decentralization in the network can work in two ways: through the establishment of autonomy of national member organizations and even local organizations within national member organizations, and through the consideration of local and national perspectives in transnational campaigning. The following quote from a non-European activist shows how local perspectives differ from transnational campaigning goals and how they can be taken into account:

We need to TALK to that research institute to understand well if there are some aspects we need to understand well, at that we can still have or bring more informations about some aspect that we THINK we need to display in the report. because sometime you can just contribute to international campaign without taking into account WHAT the people are LIVING to what's the local situations of people, WHAT we really need to make (...) like consent of local farmer, if for example the report is about water, it can be really great to know what the situation of water in the cotton commodity cultivations, BUT most of the time you can realize that on the fields the needs of people is above water. so at that time we need to add that aspects of the discussion, so that the report can take it into account. and to display it in a general report. (F12, P. 22)

However, different interests or even different realities, as stated in the quote below, also produce difficulties in coordinating projects: "Maybe they have good things to say cause i think is very difficult coordinate all these groups i think we are twelve groups twelve or i don't know, more than that, and we work with the impacts of european consumption (...) so it's the realities are very different and of course interest are very different" (F13, P. 62-63).

The practice of different forms of participation is suggested as a solution of the dilemma of diverging interests in a decentralized network. If network members can decide relatively autonomously in which way they want to participate, some conflicts would be resolved.

There are different levels of campaigning that are decided during the when we write the projects and for instance for this project, the [project name] projects there are in Europe six or seven (...) that CAN participate and there is and some decided at the beginning to participate with a broader approach so being more propositive, more active and some

other does decided to participate in a in a more passive way which means that some group decided to participate and do also the dissemination of the campaign contents in the schools, some other not and decided only to participate to the campaign to disseminate reports that are produced by issue and couple of press release per year et cetera so. (...) and of course the budget is allocated in different way. budget for the campaign that is moved from let's say from the BIG budgets is moved a budget to one country that does few things less budgets more things more budget (F 6, P. 54)

Network member organizations are autonomous in their decisions about operative questions. The network structure is equated with a federal democratic system, with no steep hierarchies and long chains of command (F6, P. 58). This decentralized structure especially within the European network of FoE is seen as a real asset in the daily lobby work in Brussels. Local knowledge can be transferred to the center of decision-making:

When the brussels ngos are working with the brussels institutions they tend to exchange this very formalized brussels language which does not always reflect what are the problems on the ground in the countries because they do not have neither the commission european commission nor the ngos themselves without these networks would have really the understanding of what are the problems on the ground so we are with the structure we are very effective in transferring this knowledge very fast (F3, P. 103)

Network organizations in the CCC-network are in constant negotiation over the degree of local autonomy in a global network. Many interviewees state that they have the possibility to plan and conduct specific national activities, stand aside in decisions they do not agree with, or adapt campaigns to their national contexts (e.g. C9, C10, C3). The role of the International Secretariat is seen by many as ambiguous. Some interviewees argue the International Secretariat does not influence national groups, whereas others say that the International Secretariat is of course the central coordination institution that exerts its influence on members. This tension between autonomy and centralization is also reflected in outward relations and the network identity:

This is one of the KEY mechanisms of ccc, both in term of decision-making as in terms of campaigning and it's this DIFFerent way of looking at in terms of decision-making and in terms of campaigning (...) i'm not sure if it's a balance, but is this changing or shifting from tell me what to do, don't tell me what to do. both in terms of when we are in the eumeeting, we take a decision and there is like okay. we want to know what we - please please let's decide so we know what to do. tell us what to do and then there's the other part that says DON'T tell me what to do. yeah? because i will decide and then in terms of when you have to decide on what are demands or what's an approach towards companies, okay. tell the companies what to do, don't tell the companies what it's not our role to tell the companies what they should do. (C4, P.106)

Even on the local level, it is a difficult negotiation process about the autonomous space of action for local groups (C5, P. 6). Therefore, the tensions between autonomy and decentralization on the one hand and centralization and support from the International Secretariat on the other hand cannot easily be dissolved. However, the interview material suggests that these tensions are constantly and interactively dealt with through discussions.

Tensions between leadership, power and participation

A rather unexpected finding from the interview analysis is the practice of taking over leadership. The question arose: Which network actors position themselves as leaders in which practices? At first, it can be observed that there are explicit norms and rules that identify certain persons or organizations as leaders. For example, if network actors apply for funding from the EU, it is obligatory to name one leading organization. The (implicit) rule is that the active and often bigger members will “take the lead”. The justification for single leaderships is based on daily experiences: “my experience is that we need somebody, who takes the final decision, because first time is always running and there are just so many ways on how to write an application for funding” (C9, P. 86, author’s own translation). This quote shows that decision-making is interpreted with reference to functionality and efficiency of processes. Also, the reference to the implicit rule of leadership is taken as a justification of inequalities in decision-making: “well in this project we are very small partners, very small but we are the small the smallest partner so we usually stick on the if there is a decision made between [organization a, organization b] and the International Secretariat, we usually stick to it.” (C8, P. 27). The clear emphasis on the small size of the organization justifies the practice of not including this organization in decision-making processes in one campaign although formally they are equal partners. On the other hand, some interviews reveal that there is not always agreement on who takes the leadership role. As two partners in one campaign claim to be the only leaders in the campaign, it seems that there is no absolute consensus about who is the leader (C1, C9). The performance of these “leading practices” is also evaluated by others in the group: “because it's different in various projects, in THIS project we have leading partner from [organization] and [person] is very like capable of really sticking to agenda and sticking to a time plan and so this is a good thing that the discussion remains constructive in a way”(C8, P. 16). The explanation for the good quality of leadership is explained by the individual personality of the leader: “i mean this is i guess really like in the individuality of the leader, and also were of course the individual the personality of the coordination, here the coordinator here, for example my coordination and cooperation with other (organization) leader is really good and i'm really glad” [C9, P. 47]. Being the leading organization means also taking responsibilities within certain practices. The leading partner prepares the deliberation, moderates and stimulates the discussion (C8, P. 19). Thus, leadership practices are on the one hand evaluated as conducive for constructive, structured participation. On the other hand, the legitimation of leadership reproduces inequalities, for example based on the size of organizations.

6.3.3 Deliberation Practices

Deliberation practices usually take place during Euromeetings. Those deliberation practices are in most cases very structured and extensively prepared by the organizers. Besides the formal-

ized settings of Euromeetings, deliberation takes place in Skype meetings and during informal contacts within the network. Within the deliberation practices of FoE, we find fewer explicit rules and more routines. While there are rules and procedures of facilitation, structuration and preparation of deliberation, it is not always regulated, under which conditions those rules apply. New practices of deliberation arise in this free space, which in turn create rough patterns of interaction.

There are three analytical categories that I developed in order to analyze deliberation practices, namely: (1) identifying problems and setting agendas; (2) structuring the deliberation process; and (3) decision-making during and after deliberation. I will particularly emphasize the peculiarities of Skype meetings and other kinds of deliberation practices that have not been taken into consideration by theorists of deliberative democracy so far. A special focus will also be on the relationship between language practices and deliberation.

(1) Identifying problems and setting agendas

The identification of problems is the first step of a campaign, followed by an agenda setting practice. The overarching goals of the CCC have been defined through a broad, long-term consensual process. Core members of the CCC-network refer to this extensive deliberation about their own code of conduct as an initiating ritual, which is fundamental for the collective identity of the campaign network (e.g. C1, C10).

In contrast, the definition of concrete campaign goals is often an ad-hoc process: “you have some brainstorm and then one says okay i will make a proposal” (C4, P. 92). Those brainstorming meetings take place in national groups as well as at European meetings (C1, C9). Many ideas or frames for campaigns are taken from the urgent appeal cases, which are perceived as mini-campaigns. Some of the urgent appeals that are evaluated as relevant are broadened and perpetuated. Consequently, the definition of new agendas often takes place in reaction to concrete events, such as workers getting fired or people getting killed in factories. Most often, interviewees say that things come up somewhere in the network and then go viral in the network until a critical mass is reached and a campaign starts (C10, P. 31/C5, P.16). Thus, the identification of problems is practiced in very diverse ways. Furthermore, the practices of problem formulation are interconnected, interchanging between brainstorming sessions, authoritative decisions and rewriting of proposals. After problems are identified and ideas are formulated, the preliminary framing of such campaigns is often done in national platforms or working groups of the international network. Those preliminary proposals are then included in the agenda of the Euromeetings. However, much of the agenda setting is steered by the International Secretariat, which initiates new campaigns and suggests plans for further action. This can be very well exemplified by a typical agenda setting discussion at one Euomeeting, as described by one of the interviewees:

Well it used to be sort of like an empty flip chart and then people start calling out things but sometimes that took a bit much time so basically the way i do it now i KNOW some topics that we have just discussed that will need an either an update or a longer discussion so they are pretty clear right? so i sort of make ah a suggestion i write on the flip chart a few of the topics that i think will probably people will want to discuss but you, people don't always agree with me so then we start sort of almost like negotiating (...) then we just sort of see where most people think it's most useful to discuss. but you know it's that's a way a bit EASier because it's yeah some of the topics it's pretty CLEAR that you know need to be on the agenda but there is often one or two that you know that COULD be interchanged by something else or sometimes that i would say ah it's fine have an update, people say no no no we really think we should discuss it longer or vice versa (C10, P. 19)

The quotation above is also interesting insofar as it describes a development of a very open agenda setting. The interviewee states that "it used to be an empty flip chart". Everyone could contribute to the practice of finding topics that need to be added to the agenda. However, over time, this practice seemed to become too time-consuming, and the International Secretariat learned about the crucial topics in the network. As a result, the agenda setting practice became more goal-oriented, driven by the majority and less open. Still, according to the interviewee, it is possible to exchange and emphasize specific topics. In sum, it can be observed that problems are identified in the network through different channels of information. After that, the agenda setting practices are rather centrally coordinated.

Deliberation procedures are often extensively planned in the CCC-network, especially the preparation of deliberation practices at meetings is very thorough. A typical preparation practice of international meetings goes on as follows:

Basically the way it works is that the local national coalition will do a lot of the preparation on the ground. regarding the venue, accommodation, getting a note taker there you know those kinds of logistics (...) it's the european coordinator at the international secretariat(...)who then prepares more the content side and (...) the content side is basically after you know we we've set the different items of the agenda previously but to sort of then determine the ORder which day will be discussing which item and in what order trying to make the agenda kind of not too intensive and you know interesting for different people and stuff. and so then the draft agenda is made and then the euro coordinator contacts the different working groups about their input documents that they will prepare and also (...) will discuss with the facilitator of the meeting about different sessions. (C10, P. 8)

The central coordination office prepares the deliberation procedure with regard to the order of topics, the intensity and length of discussions, and the role of the moderator. The central coordinator takes into consideration the diversity of participants and receives input documents from different working groups. This suggests a structured central preparation process with different opportunities to open up the preparation to the input of participants.

Deliberations on Skype are also extensively planned:

Normally a skype meeting is PLANNED, so first is an email contact about we have a meeting at this and this TIME, the agenda will be and the- we have a list we have a list for eurocoordinators, so they distribute a lot of joined emails and on this email list that there will be a skype meeting and this is this time, sometimes it's coordinated who will be able to when. we use some of the tools for to finding to find a time where most of the interested people can join so it's decided when to have a meeting, who is responsible for calling the others and quite often it is also distributed an agenda on the email before you start the meeting and then the person who's responsible for the meeting calling the others, also is responsible for the agenda and leading the discussion. and quite often one of the participant is appointing (...) a short note of the meeting and that is also distributed afterwards on email, so that's the way it normally works. (C11, P. 30)

Skype meetings often include fewer participants, which makes it possible to expand the preparation practice even more. The quote above seems to suggest that almost all preparatory questions are decided collectively. However, it is not really clear who is involved in the decision-making since the interviewee articulates these phrases in passive constructions.

Overall, preparing deliberation is mainly a practice of setting a suitable agenda that fits with the interests and expectations of the participants and to gather input from different angles about the contents of discussion. Therefore, a lot of material is gathered beforehand in order to prepare participants for the deliberation practice. Some interviewees even note that the preparation is very, almost too extensively planned. There is much to read beforehand (C12, P.24), and the focus of the planners is very much on efficiency of the debate and much less on deeper discussions (C3, P. 98-99).

Prior to deliberation practices, which are mainly conducted either at network meetings or at campaign meetings and telephone conferences, agendas and preparative information is circulated by the organizers of the meetings. These practices are strongly dependent on the responsible person or organization. The timing of preparation is specifically diverse:

I would say at the european level usually it comes much BEFORE than at the international level, it's a bit a question of culture, but even it comes late if you compare to swiss or i think german standard, so some people sometimes they it's impossible. so i have to deal with all these differences you know, but that the international level it comes sometimes a bit late, at european i think it's quite okay, we get all the documents we can we can work out if we wish if we are willing for" (F5, P. 70)

Similarly as in the CCC network, the problems and ideas for campaigns in the FoE-network come to the network from different members of even partners of the network. This open process is made possible by the specific network structure, which connects organizations so that they are just one e-mail away from each other:

We were involved and come there, so from the beginning. but this is because actually in a friends of the earth we are a NETWORK, everytime it a group wants to apply or at european level on a specific budget for a project and usually these projects says that you have to involve at least three four five (...) different groups in different countries, **we as a net-**

work are quite facilitated in doing this because we are a network and it's simply an e-mail in the in the network e-mail address to say HEY we are preparing this who want to join? and who want to join, says okay i'm interested let's talk about and the process start this way. (F6, P. 34)

This identification of problems and brainstorming of ideas seems very common in the FoE-organizations (F4, F6, F10). Besides e-mail requests, campaigns are often initiated through informal personal contacts within the network (F6, P. 34). This process is a step-by-step project within a group of organizers. Finally, the ideas that everyone can agree to are implemented (F10, P. 67). After finding an idea and possible campaign partners, the process gets more centralized in that the campaign idea is subsumed under one of the programs of FoE Europe and a steering group is formed, which functions as a leading committee of the campaign. This very initiation of a campaign is centrally steered by the Brussels office (F6, P. 14) due to better facilities and infrastructure in the Brussels office. Furthermore, the elected board is in charge of the general agenda setting (F4, P. 60). However, the questions in the agenda such as when to launch the project, how to approach issues or how to communicate to the public are discussed afterwards with the whole project groups. Thus, the process of agenda setting is opened again after an initial phase of formulating the campaign and setting the preliminary agenda (F6, P. 22-24).

(2) Structuring the deliberation process

Core members of the network are very concerned about the rules of procedures and the “real” implementation of those rules in practice (C1, C10, C9). This is a very important point that is often made because democratic standards of equal participation and consensus are highly valued (C1, C11, C10). However, the time-consuming exercise of deliberation is not always seen as positive, also among the core members in Western Europe (C11, C1, C4). One interviewee from a smaller Western European organization shares the impression that there is an interest in the network to avoid conflicts and arrive at a consensus as early as possible: “it's also a way of pushing for or for stopping discussions you do not want to have because you think it would be too tricky too difficult [...] i think sometimes it's an easy way to not enter into lot of disagreements also” (C3, P.55). From the perspective of a newcomer to the network, the formal structure of the network meetings prohibits further discussion that would be helpful for individuals who are not yet that familiar with the structure and topics of the meetings:

The euromeetings are very structured, there is certain method of facilitation, there is usually the way of discussing things, it's the network works for very long time so some things are you know established. (...) for us everything was new, not only the way the euromeeting is organized, but also the topics (...)maybe it's enough discussion for people who are working on this because you know the platforms are different. and but there are people who are working on this topic for twenty years so sometimes they do not need to discuss things from the beginning and i understand this because it would be you know a waste of time, but you know when you are just dropped there as a new person some-

times you would MAYBE need more explanation, but there is no space for it because the agenda has to be you know followed. (C7, P. 12-21)

This interviewee described this situation as a dilemma. The person's organization is new to the network and has difficulties to adapt. Comprehensive discussions and explanations would help to understand and make participation easier. However, there is also the necessity of proceeding efficiently. The first quoted interviewee from a long-time member organization identified conflicts and disagreements with regard to specific topics in the network that are not solved in structured discussions. Similarly, the younger network member would welcome such discussions that could facilitate an easier adaptation, which in turn would increase their ability to participate in discussions.

Although formal procedures are important, there should be room for discussing informally about important matters. Thus, efficiency and deep deliberation are hard to combine in one practice. What this person thus suggests, is a combination of structured deliberation practices and informal deep discussions.

I think in one way what is really efficient in the network is the organization with schedules timelines moderators note-takers, i mean it's a guarantee of efficiency but i think it's not enough you sometimes you need to forget the schedule because some points have to be discussed as priorities so i think efficiency cannot be a goal as such we do not we just do not we do not just NEED to be efficient as such and sometimes yes our obsession for schedule consensus really prevents us from being maybe MORE efficient if we take the time to discuss very DEEP questions (C3, P.99)

It can be observed that the different network members share the understanding that deliberation practices are very important and are not too inefficient to further proceed with them. Some actors in the network would even argue for more frequent, deeper and even more informal deliberation practices.

In this situation, we can see the different positionings towards deliberation practices in the network. While a certain degree of inequality in deliberation is accepted somehow by both sides (core members and peripheral members), tension arises when concrete and closer cooperation develops. As seen in the last quote, the concrete practice of understanding, learning and strategizing at common meetings remains a difficult experience for both sides. This tension is not only a tension between different cultures of cooperation, but it also reveals the basic dilemma between efficiency and "deep" deliberation, which might be even more dramatic in a transnational network.

As it is pointed out by some network members in the FoE-network, facilitation is only used, when there are really important strategic decisions to be taken, or when there is a long input and brainstorming session about the start of new campaigns or kick-offs of certain devel-

opments (F2, F6). There are efforts to increase the rate of facilitation by training the staff in the Brussels office in facilitation and moderation, but since there are no rules, when to apply facilitation, it is not clear, when facilitation really takes place in meetings: “we would HOPE that people are equalizing participation in meetings which they are facilitating, but we can’t you can’t really enforce it” (F2, P. 47). Thus, the facilitation of meetings by FoE-staff is desired but not enforced, and usually conducted in meetings where people do not know each other or when difficult decisions are to be made (F2, P. 47-49). External facilitators come in only at the European level in order to have someone without interests in specific campaigns (F2, P. 51). “during the meeting we have a moderator usually it is a person of friends of the earth, sometimes in the network are we when we meet at friends of the earth europe level to discuss network and programs for the networking strategies then he's also an external moderator”(F6, P. 44). However, engaging an external facilitator is a matter of costs and sometimes this function is taken over by leading staff in the Brussels office (F2, P. 51).

It is already mentioned, that the purpose of facilitation is to “equalize participation in meetings”. This is done also through a large variety of facilitation methods:

Varying between having plenaries and if you are having plenaries making sure that everyone can really participate, using small group discussion, having some time for informal discussion or for example PAIR discussion making really CLEAR what the OBJECTIVES of the meeting should be so that the people can prepare in advance [...]i think that is kind of crucial skills if you are really gonna engage in network and not just bring thirty people together to kind of nod and listen to some two or three experts standing on a panel speaking cause you might as well just send them the notes of the meeting afterwards. (F2, P.60)

In this quote the necessity to facilitate and structure deliberation meaningfully is made very clear. However, there is also the other side of the coin. Those methodologies are also used to push deliberation process into certain directions and outputs:

I think we have some really skilled facilitators within our network and within the groups that i'm working with and i also know that we have some people who are very able to manipulate is probably too strong a word but kind of SHAPE the outcome of discussions because of the methodologies they are using because of the way the meeting has been set up, and i think that's you know that's not ALWAYS illegitimate way of running of doing things, because as long as everyone AWARE of these sort of different methodologies then you know you are not abusing someones trust (F2, P. 66-67)

This is certainly a difficult practice, where much depends on the facilitator. As the network coordinator points out, there are shades of grey: some facilitators are just not that open to disagreement and diverging opinions, whereas others (as mentioned in the quote above) are clearly and consciously leading discussions into certain directions (ibid.). Although we would commonly assume that the facilitation of deliberation is an asset because it structures the deliberation, opens up discussions and balances the consideration of arguments, we can see in this case, that

facilitation is not always the same matter. If and when facilitation is taking place seems to depend very much on the persons involved in organizing deliberation meetings and even if deliberation takes place, it is a matter of personality and interests of the facilitator, how the facilitation is conducted.

(3) Decision-making during and after deliberation

As already noted, the Euromeetings are very structured, 2-3 day meetings where all representatives (one per country) meet in a European city and discuss urgent issues and longtime strategy. There are plenary sessions as well as working group meetings. Normally, the plenary sessions are prepared by working groups. The aim of all discussions is to most efficiently find a consensus in the end. One interviewee from an international partner organization articulated the impression of being in the way of a consensual decision because they need to understand, clarify and discuss so many issues that it takes too much time. One interviewee even described participating in these meetings and coming to a shared understanding as “a painful experience” (C12, P.76). Another interviewee has the complete opposite impression:

The methods are very trying to involve participants as much as possible, (...) because sometimes we could be sixteen twenty people sitting around a table and that can be boring, so it's always organized with the WAYS to make small discussions on the way and to different ways to work and sometimes in-between some games to make it more vivid, and that was positive too” (C11, P.54)

Decision-making processes are affected by the specific form of non-verbal communication on Skype. In this regard, the drawbacks of Skype communication become clear. Decision-making during deliberation on Skype is only possible if you have met once in person (C11). The interviewee, who mentioned this, argued that regular decision-making ends with non-verbal signs of agreement or disagreement: “When you’re with a group of colleagues and you have to make a decision, you always look around of people faces whether they oppose or whether they consent what is going on and you can see much more than they actually express” (C11, P. 25). Since on Skype the deliberation participants cannot see each other this non-verbal communication is not possible. Consequently, Skype deliberation is very time-consuming if everybody expresses their opinions verbally or involved persons must already assume how this or that person might decide because they already know each other.

One of the main criticisms of decision-making practices is that they are not practical because they take too much time. It is not efficient to discuss everything with everybody until consent is reached. This debate is going on in the CCC-network as well. Many would agree that deliberation is time-consuming and gets on their nerves from time to time. The consensus-building process is also something that poses problems. Decisions are postponed to next meetings, which is not conducive to campaigning effectively and cooperating efficiently. However, despite those down-

sides, all network members are convinced of those procedures. One very important argument for deliberation is that decisions last much longer than if single individuals take decisions that the rest of the network does not want to live with.

The big strategic choices in the international general meetings are taken by majority vote: “officially our general meetings make decision by majority rather than by consensus so you could in THEORY have a situation where one group or two groups or even ten groups have said NO to the strategic plan” (F2, P.75). However, this majority voting is only the last step after discussion: “it’s not the voting itself which makes the decision but the decision is more like based on the consensus EARLIER and then the voting is more formal just a formal manifestation because it has to be in line with the statute and so on so on but it’s rather a matter of discussion.” (F3, P. 59). Consensus is the desired outcome of deliberation (F5, P. 36).

Since organizations send representatives that have different degrees of knowledge, expertise and mandate about the discussed topics, decision-making at international or European general meetings is often seen as preliminary and it must be possible to go back to the home organization before a final decision at the next general meeting is taken (F4, P. 32). At least one person of each member organization should be present when decisions are taken at the general meeting. However, this is not always the case, since some organizations do not have the capacities to attend every general meeting. This issue will be further explored in the section on representation practices. However, the positioning towards a transparent and democratic decision-making procedure is very strong and positive:

The process is mostly transparent, yes of course for the decision we have to take or to get at democracy in friends of the earth is very broad, (...) they invest we invest a lot in their on the democratic process of taking decision or to get at it, when we are talking about stuff to do together, it is a political decision so a political position or something that we have to proceed or the get at or to do, this is it happens without USUALLY without problem. it happens that someone doesn’t agree on a political position with another country or with another political position and in THIS case in the network we have the opportunity to say it can’t we insist on our position and we don’t (?) your position, so there is a lot of independence, but it happens not so often (F6, P. 38)

One interviewee also evaluates the decision-making procedure as usually not that top-down, meaning not through majority voting (F10, P. 85). Many interviewees criticize that it is sometimes very difficult to find consensus on certain important issues. This disturbs the efficiency of campaigns, when there is not the one voice, the one statement which FoE can promote. Many FoE-activists compare FoE to Greenpeace, which just has very powerful message because they do not have this inclusive internal deliberation process. Especially across the continents, there are many disagreements that cannot be solved (F13, P. 49), but also inside Europe it is difficult and leads to unfortunate and uncomfortable situations:

The problem then is that we don't have a EUROpean position which is sometimes is a shame because it of course european union also gives huge funds to CCS projects and maybe even the groups that are NOT against CCS would oppose putting so much public money into the projects but then it's difficult to really have a press release because then it's this ongoing discussion (F1, P.84)

Thus, the outside message of FoE is sometimes complicated by their internal deliberation practices.

Language practice

The aspect of language in deliberation practices is very crucial in a transnational network. The interviewees in the network articulate their positions towards deliberation that show how important language skills are for an equal balance of arguments as well as the self-evaluation of effective participation in deliberation practices. It begins with the access to information prepared for deliberation: some policy papers are only available in English. If people in the national network want to discuss them, they must read them in English (which can be difficult for many people) or they must be translated, which is an extra effort in terms of time and costs for the organization. Also, information brochures or policy papers that are written in other languages than English cannot be read by members of other national platforms. This also limits the informational basis before deliberation. While some non-native speakers feel confident using the English language in meetings and for general communication (C4, C14,), others are describing difficulties in practicing deliberation because of their lack of English proficiency. One network member explains this as follows: "When you need to explain complex things (...) it's very difficult to use i mean more simple and maybe more generic words. (...) so you feel that your idea is never translated in a very accurate way" (C3, P. 43). When deliberation starts, some interviewees have had the impression that they cannot push their arguments convincingly because they lack the self-esteem or capabilities to discuss them in a way that they would discuss them in their native language. Furthermore, it is difficult for some actors to follow native speakers. It is a very frustrating situation when members cannot express their ideas very well. This problem is also recognized by the International Secretariat. One coordinator points out that meetings would of course have a different dynamic if all participants could speak in their mother tongue (C2). In addition, the fact that every meeting is in English limits the group of people who can participate at all. Some organizations must send the same person to each and every meeting because there is only this one person in the organization who speaks English. The experience of having difficulties to "make my point" is also relevant for skilled English speakers who are confronted with native speakers. Thus, translation is crucial, but hinders again the deliberation process as such (C2, P. 60-62). One person from the Asian region stresses the importance of translators. Without translators, international cooperation does not make sense according to this interviewee (C12, P.

45). However, deliberation practices are modified due to the need of translators. These translators disrupt the deliberation process and impose breaks in the deliberation. Also, the direct contact with the campaigners from different countries is hindered by translations. Deliberation without translation is difficult, too. One interviewee interprets this unfortunate situation as being an instrument to shut discussions down, namely using the English language as a tool to exert authority where there is no legitimate authority ascribed (C3). In conclusion, those inequalities in the level of language proficiency also influence the outcome of deliberations because different degrees of English proficiency limit the ways how arguments can be formulated and even limit the arguments made as such:

When you don't have the same LEVEL of language (...) you can't PUSH for your ideas or for what you want with the same strength that someone who speaks VErY good english or so. it can be (...) you are a bit reluctant to speaking out loud and in front of everybody because your english is not so well so either you do not really speak enough you do not tell what you would need to tell or you are misunderstood or you do not know how EX-ACTLY to yeah express the ideas, so it has to my opinion an impact on the results of the discussion. (C3, P. 45-46)

In this quote, the practice of deliberation is interpreted as a practice where power through skills plays a very dominant role. Language also becomes a distinguishing dimension when transnational campaigns consist in parts of national organizations that share the same or a similar language. These members of national organizations usually speak with each other in their mother tongue. However, as in one case, this has led to an at least temporary exclusion of members of other organizations who do not understand the language. These tendencies can also be caused by other circumstances, but it seems that language is often a catalyst for already existing inequalities (C1, C8, C9). Another crucial point concerning the impact of language is the remark of one interviewee who states that it is not only the English language that poses problems, but the technical jargon. For this person, it was hard to understand all internal abbreviations used during discussions, especially in the beginning. The technical jargon that is used in many meetings of course increases efficiency, but again presents an obstacle for newer and more passive participants in deliberation, especially in combination with the use of English as a foreign language (C7, P. 41).

In the European FoE-network, English is the official language. The positions towards the policy of speaking English in all the meetings varies from extreme difficulties in even understanding what is spoken, to holding back opinions because of difficulties speaking English to the absolute irrelevancy of language skills in deliberation processes and the highlighting of other differences, like class, age, experience, that matter much more than language proficiency (F8, F4, F2). I want to compare those three positions below. The first quote exemplifies the position of a non-native speaker, who, at least in the beginning of the network membership, "could not understand any-

thing". The person makes an even broader claim in generalizing this experience to "the rest of Europe", who has this impression as well, and also formulates the consequences of this impression: namely that people do not dare to speak English. Taking this seriously, we must assume that communication in meetings is hardly possible. We can see parallels to the CCC network, where one person expressed similar difficulties in participating successfully in English deliberation processes: "In my first meetings ten years ago, sometimes i could not understand anything. well this is i mean i suppose all the rest of europe, except english people have this impression, so well in the north you speak much better but, it's a problem also because you know you do not dare to speak SO MUCH than native English" (F8, P. 103).

A more moderate position comes from a person, who acknowledges that a lack of English proficiency can be a problem for the participation of some people. The person even admits that people are naturally excluded from deliberation. This applies to people, who do not speak English. However, persons, who have basic English skills can somehow learn to deliberate in English and learn to not be shy of speaking in front of others because other persons speak the same basic English.

The most positive evaluation of language and deliberation comes from a person with a central coordinating position in the network, whose native language is English. This person does not necessarily see a link between language skills and participation in deliberation processes. It is rather assumed that people do not express their opinions out of other reasons like being less experienced than others, being shy in general or coming from a specific political culture. Also gender, age and class, the typical categories of intersectionality are named in order to explain difference in speaking out loud:

I mean some people, i mean to put it really bluntly it's not because you are the best english speaker or a native english speaker that you have a big mouth (...) i think there are also native english speakers who are not confident about speaking in groups (...) we certainly do have some native english speakers who like speaking and have a lot to say in meetings but i think that's not necessarily because they are native english speakers, (...)that can be to do with GENDER that can just be to do with all sorts of LIFE experience or to do with HOW OFTEN you have to speak in meetings and that you develop that confidence or it can be to do with CLASS or it can be to do with AGE quite often in some meetings so i think those are all cutting across also having language issues and DIFFERENT cultural traditions of DEFERENCE and RESPECT and willingness to challenge authority and all these other things which are also not purely kind of NATIONALLY determined but i think to certain extent come from having a background in former communist country or having a background in northern european kind of scandinavian democracy where i think people seem to be more willing to speak so i think that's you know i think that's many different sorts of ISSUES cutting across that, as well as just the personality, it's kind of a very personal thing" (F2, P. 45)

However, the interviewee still admits that language might be a problem in the selection of persons for the participation in deliberation. Those people that come to the meetings mostly have a

quite good command of English, whereas the real problem arises earlier. The people who do not speak English that well do not even come to the meetings. This exclusion process could be also observed in the CCC network. The implications are that there is no balanced participation of people within one organization in the network meetings and the selection of participants is done on the grounds of already established capacities (here language skills) instead of equal share or knowledge. In sum, it can be seen that language plays a more or less important role, depending on the position of the speaker. Persons at the center of the network and/or with excellent language skills see the relation between language and deliberation very positive, whereas persons who position themselves at the margins of the network have sometimes a very negative outlook on the influence of language skills on deliberation.

Deliberation and Technology

Online telephone/video conferences are a very useful communication tool within both networks because they allow campaigners to have meetings without needing to travel. Network members say that they only recently began to use Skype for video conferences. Since Skype meetings are often not that large in terms of the participating persons, they are often a little less pre-structured. The context of having a Skype meeting evokes certain, very specific deliberation practices that are adapted in the light of the conditions of online meetings. Online meetings change the way people interact and talk to each other. Although Skype meetings are similarly structured as face-to-face meetings, i.e. there is an agenda that is sent out beforehand, and there is also more often a moderator, there are certain limits of practicing deliberation on Skype. At first, it is not possible (and this is confirmed by many interviewees) to discuss with more than a handful of people on Skype. The methodology that is used in face-to-face meetings to initiate or reinforce more and broader participation cannot easily be adapted on Skype⁸⁴. Technical problems, especially in countries with slower internet connections, make the deliberation as such difficult. Thus, there are some factors that limit the possibilities of deliberation on Skype and consequently disturb the equality of voices in particular. If participants cannot really follow the discussion because their internet connection breaks down frequently or if there is no chance to make deliberation more accessible through different moderation methods, the consideration of arguments in deliberation is severely obstructed. This is not that much a problem in the European network, but when we look beyond the narrow borders of the European network, we see many difficulties with that. Internet is of course not that naturally available in other continents of the “South” than it is in Europe.

In africa internet is not good, the bandwidth of internet is not good (...). so most of the time it will be difficult to have a voice call you will just type it and then you wait for the

⁸⁴ Working with cards, using visual media etc.

reply and you type another time, (...) it's not really usual to have internet with voice with discussions like we are DOing with because in [home country]i have a café cyber café, where i can have such discussions live voice and message you can type the message i can have VOICE and discussion, but IN the office it's not usual it's not common to have people on skype with voice, it's not usual. and in togo, the situation is WORSE there. so most of the time they can just call them through the telephones and they can to through telephone easy, just to have an information, yeah they can try to call them like that but most of the time for MEETing for discussions for long discussions, we use skype, conference calls. (F12, P. 49)

This representative of an African network member of FoE clearly points out how difficult it is to have those skype meetings, which became the main way to communicate in the network. In order to handle the situation, adaption practices are conducted. Since the internet is too slow for voice call, they type in their messages in Skype while others are talking on Skype at the same time. Thus, these actors with slow internet connection participate in deliberations through written texts, while the rest of the group is talking at the same time. This of course obstructs them from hearing what is said during discussion. While they could talk on the phone, phone calls seem to be rather used for giving information, while discussions take place on Skype. This is of course a disadvantage for organizations with slow internet and even their coping practices do only mildly solve the problem. However, this practice of deliberation as a mixture of writing messages and talking is clearly a unique one, and interesting to further evaluate. A similar experience is described by an interviewee from Latin America, who concludes that it was impossible for them to communicate with Skype. This campaign group, which consists of many organizations in Asian, Latin American, African and European countries took the decision to communicate via e-mail instead of Skype (F13, P. 70), which might impede the coordination process in the campaign as such, but at the same time does not produce inequalities between campaigners in different countries.

Besides this tendency towards exclusion, the limits of communicating in a wholesome way are also interfering with a smooth deliberation. Decision-making during deliberation on Skype is only possible if you have met once in person (C11). The interviewee, who mentioned this, argued that regular decision-making ends with non-verbal signs of agreement or disagreement: "When you're with a group of colleagues and you have to make a decision, you always look around of people faces whether they oppose or whether they consent what is going on and you can see much more than they actually express" (C11, P. 25). Since on Skype the deliberation participants cannot see each other this non-verbal communication is not possible. Consequently, Skype deliberation is very time-consuming if everybody expresses their opinions verbally or involved persons must already assume how this or that person might decide because they already know each other.

The identified difference between Skype and face-to-face meetings makes also clear how the increasing role of Skype meetings influences styles, structuration and outcomes of deliberation. There are different reasons, why deliberation on Skype is perceived as something different. One argumentation is based on cultural characteristics and a sort of long-practiced habit of personal meetings, which makes it difficult to adapt to those technology supported meetings. Later on the interviewee who expressed this cultural characteristic, also raised the issue, that due to a language barrier, people have much more opportunities (probably non-verbal) to express themselves in face-to-face contacts than during a Skype call. Thus, using Skype calls reinforces the language problem, which was already outlined above.

There is a difference. (...) when you have a skype meeting(...) it's sometime it's not easy to express exactly what you have to let people know about but physically is more as africans is i do not know but it's really GOOD to have people physically, to talk to people to meet people we are used to that and we really like that. as african i think is like a CULTURAL so it's, but coming back to the contents IF we have a topic to discuss, normally we can discuss, it even through skype maybe, we do not have problems to share or discuss our view so that but we prefer to have a physical meeting physical contacts with people (F12, P. 38)

A similar alienation from Skype calls is expressed by a Central-Eastern European interviewee. While the reference to the African culture in the quote above is an expression of cultural identities, the positioning towards Skype calls in the following quote is taking place on the level of working routines. The major disadvantage is not the limited opportunities to communicate, but the not very efficient and focused way of communication.

We also have skype talks which is (...) i think this is major feature of our work, and personally i find it a bit even you know it's a bit even exaggerated, the amount of time that we spend on this discussions because they tend to be quite slow especially if you have a group of people and then people might not be always focused on the call if you are just sitting on your earphones for one and half an hour, so but this is definitely, THIS was for me new when i came to [own organization] and i do not think that many organizations work like this to this extent but i have some colleagues in the office who were even more involved in this international activities and they really spend a lot of time on skype. so i think that this is very characteristic feature. (F3, P. 14)

The contrary position, namely that Skype conferences are a very efficient communication tool, can be found in the network as well (F4, P.74). In this person's argumentation, the reasons for the efficiency of Skype calls can be found in one of the advantages of it: there is no space for chatting over coffee and possibly coming to new (and unintended) ideas or projects in the coffee breaks. However, even Skype conferences are getting unproductive at a number of around 15 people (ibid.). Another interviewee from an Italian NGOs underlines the limitation of communication and the inefficiency of Skype calls, what is described here as pure "chaos": „Chaos because conference call with five six people on phone you know each other by person but on phone you do not know you do not see the gesture of the people so you do not, some-someone is speaking

maybe he's speaking too long, you want to say SOMETHING then it's right to interrupt but then the communication is slightly postponed (...) but in the very end it works" (F6, P. 30).

In sum, we can see many disadvantages that Skype deliberation brings for deliberation. Skype of course eases deliberation in that it does not necessitate travel costs and travel time to meetings. Everyone can install it on their computers. But this is only a conditional advantage when we look at the positions of the interviewees above. Especially those organizations that are at the periphery of the network have difficulties in participating in Skype meetings.

Talking about politics

In the FoE-network, there seems to be a particular European deliberation style, which is very strategic, goal-oriented and straight-forward. A Southern American activist describes that there are sometimes adoption problems and even a lack of understanding, why European don't talk politically:

It's very good meetings you know they are very productive, they do a lot of things in a short time, but still it's very different from our meetings here in south america for example. cause **we include more how can i say that, we include more POLITICAL issues**, you know current issues and we talk about, first of all, we talk about what is going on in the continent in a political and economic level and THEN we start to work in you know in very RATIONAL things, to DECIDE some campaigns and what strategy we take with some partners and so and sometimes in europe in a meeting of some campaigns, **they don't do it**. i don't know if, i really don't know, but i have some idea but i don't know WHY they don't do it, because i think i believe it is really, really important for friends of the earth, since we OUTSIDE you know outside the federation we do it. we discuss in a political level. (F13, P. 33-34)

It could be even said, that the deliberation that is classified as specifically European is not deliberation but negotiation or strategy talk. The open and substantive quality of deliberation cannot be found in the description of this FoE member from Southern America. However, naturally European activists see this differently. They see the deliberation quality in the open access to deliberation and the consideration of all voices in deliberation (F10, P. 143). The contents of deliberation are not considered a feature of the quality of deliberation.

6.3.4 Representation Practices

Representation practices and participation practices are sometimes closely tied together in the CCC-network. The practices of involving workers in decision-making are connected to the different representative roles of European NGOs, local NGOs and workers themselves. European NGOs see themselves as mere tools for workers' representation. This attitude with regard to representative claims towards workers is reflected in the representation practices (such as the claims-making) as well as in participation practices that were described above. This section outlines the four analytical categories of representation practices, namely: (1) selecting and in-

structuring of representatives, (2) communicating between representatives and represented, and (3) making representative claims about individuals and discourses.

(1) Selecting and instructing of representatives

The preparation of representatives for their representational tasks regularly takes place “at home” in the member organizations. Before representatives of a national platform in the CCC go to a Euromeeting for example, the meeting and tasks of the representatives are prepared in the national platform. The thoroughness and scope of preparation differs among national platforms. The initiative of such preparation often lies with the representatives themselves because they are mostly the national coordinators of the platform. How much they involve their constituency of national groups often depends on their perceived role in the platform and their knowledge about the platform. The more knowledge they have about their fellow group members and the more they feel secure and trusted, the less they involve other members in the preparation process of meetings. For example, a newer member of the network from Central-Eastern Europe describes the preparation with national organizations for Euromeetings as very thorough: “so when me or another person goes to the meeting we have a Skype call and we I circulate first the agenda and the materials so they can look at it and then we have goal issue by issue what we want to know what we want to be decided or what's important for us what's not”(C7, P. 49). This very formal practice of preparing the representative for their task of representing the platform in transnational network meetings is very uncommon in other platforms and could be explained by the novelty of the network practices for this national platform. This platform copes with the insecurities about the treatment of certain agenda points by including all national organizations of the platform in the preparation process. Other older network members’ representatives seem much more confident of their own ability to judge what is important. One interviewee of a Western European platform, who has been in the network for over a decade, says that the person knows beforehand what will be discussed within the Euromeeting and that checking back with the national organizations is no more than a formal exercise without any surprises (C4, P. 71). Due to the interviewee’s long experience with the network, the representative only checks back with the platform when it is really relevant: “i have been the coordinator for sixteen or have worked with ccc for sixteen years. i know what is issues are delicate. so i know when i have to get back to my platform to be able to express our position at the euro-meetings” (C4, P. 70). Thus, trust is an important factor in the selection and authorization of representatives. Many representations are practiced on the basis of the trusteeship model. This is interesting insofar as inside the European network, trusteeship prevails, but in the global context and among the constituency of workers in garment factories, there is the claim that the network representatives are delegates of their constituency rather than trustees.

A representation modeled on trusteeship does not only develop out of the longtime experience of the representative, but this practice can also evolve out of a different priority setting at the national level, as the following quote indicates:

I can say have the chance that they (the national organizations in the platform, H.K.) really trust me for the international level because i think i mean there are different kind of involvement for the national platforms in the international network some are really involved because they have either more capacities or decided that it's that the international network is the priority, in [own country] it's not really the case so it's not that people are inter- interested or do not feel it's important, but they feel the work i do as a national coordinator participating in the international network is sufficient or is enough and that we have to deal with other with a LOT of other topics at the national level" (C3, P. 77)

In this case, it seems that the instruction of the representative is nothing that seems to be relevant for the platform. One interviewee describes the difficulties of the delegation model of representation within his own national platform: Besides the top level decision-making board with representatives of all organizations involved, working groups are formed at the national level that must report to the board. Topics are then delegated into the working groups. However, sometimes time restrictions make it impossible to first report to the board and then decide. Much more often, decisions are already taken in the working groups without further consultation (C1, 146). Thus, there are many reasons why representatives decide that trusteeship is a better and less cost-intensive way to handle representation. However, for some organizations, it might have specific advantages to consult beforehand, especially if the representatives are inexperienced and would benefit from advice. This seems to be a rather horizontal peer-to-peer consultation and representation than a top-down or bottom-up representational relationship.

The selection of representatives is conducted differently in the individual national member organizations. Some organizations send their managing director, others send international coordinators and some organizations decide the selection according to the agenda. If there are many agricultural topics, for example, they will send the agriculture expert. This is very different among the organizations in the FoE-network because organizations are differently organized. Some are working on a volunteer basis, others have a big office with many staff members. Thus, some organizations cannot select representative out of a big pool of possible candidates, whereas others have even specialized experts for different topics.

Trust is an important matter in the instruction practices of representatives in the FoE-network as well. On the one hand, there is a need for trust, because not all decisions can be discussed with the sending organization out of time constraints. Similar as in the CCC-network it is also described that the interest in matters of international meetings is sometimes not that high in the national organization (F1). One interviewee also articulates the aspect of trust as follows: "I know in the spirit of whom I have to act" (F4, P. 54, author's own translation). Only if so-called

ad-hoc topics arise at the meeting, the representative decides depending on the importance of the issues, if the national board should be consulted (ibid.). This is a main practice of representation. Asked on which grounds an international coordinator represents, the interviewee responds: "good will good understanding of how the organization operates and yeah. in my own thinking."(F5, P. 72). Thus, the knowledge of the representative plays a very important role in this kind of trusteeship representation practice.

Under the condition that national organization members are not that interested in "high level" international meetings, the chances are good that representation is practiced as trusteeship:

Because the meetings and the results of those meetings are often quite or the general meetings are quite on a high level so they are not really VERY important for the day-to-day work of me and my colleagues so therefore there is not TOO much interest in really preparing those meetings and the person going there knows generally what's is important for [own organization] so there is no NEED to prepare it in a better way but i think it would be good to give more attention so that people feel more connected to the process and for the campaigns meeting well there will be a campaigner going generally the coordinator of a campaign so he's supposed to know EVERYthing so then there is also no need for bigger preparation but if well if necessary discuss it before the meeting. (F1, P. 45)

This lack of instruction of representatives is critically evaluated. A common preparation would let people in the local organizations "feel more connected to the processes" (F1, P.45). Intensive instructions of representatives take place, when representatives go to international meetings for the first time (F7, P. 24) or when new campaigns start. Most often this dialogical instruction of representative takes place within a restricted circle of interested persons in the organization (F1, F5, P. 66). When the topics are more sensitive or more political, then more people or even directors are involved in the preparing discussions (F4). Thus, also the envisioned topics to be discussed at the international meetings are influencing the way how representatives are instructed by the represented constituency.

(2) Communicating between representatives and represented

The knowledge of representatives in the CCC-network can be characterized in two dimensions: On the one hand, representatives of the whole network in the International Secretariat are not always best informed about what is going on in the European member groups. They position themselves as being able to get feedback from groups via social media such as Facebook pages and twitter posts, but the bulk of information gathering should be done by the national platforms (C10, C2). On the other hand, the relevant and needed information is gathered from the constituency that is geographically farther removed, the workers. What *their* preferences and interests are is of much more interest and a focus of deeper research (ibid.). It seems that the interviewees from the International Secretariat perceive their roles as informed representatives in terms of the substantive interests of workers rather than as informed representatives of Eu-

ropean national groups. At the representative level of national platforms the information situation is mostly very good. Representatives themselves evaluate their own knowledge of constituencies' interests and positions as very high, especially if issues are not completely new (C4). If this is not the case, representatives not knowing what is going on poses problems to the functioning of campaigns,(C9). Thus, the national representatives need to stay informed.

The degree of knowledge that is needed to properly fulfill the roles as representatives, differs between the International Secretariat and national organizations. Representation at the International Secretariat is accounted for at the Euromeetings. Thus, there is a quite tight and frequent control of the representation practices of the International Secretariat. This is not the case in the representation of workers, where control mechanisms are at best informal. This explains the worry of International Secretariat staff about a good information flow from the workers to the International Secretariat. At the national level, representatives, as was described in the former section of this chapter, rely much more often on their experience and anticipations. Formal meetings where representatives' mandates are formulated and controlled are not as common on the local level than on the transnational level.

The practice of going through the decisions, topics and deliberation results of the Euromeetings with the national partner organizations also differs among the CCC national platforms. Whether there is a practice of informing the represented constituency at the national level about decision outcomes and new developments in the international network depends on many factors. One person from a Western European platform described this reporting as very difficult because documents (e.g. written reports) have to be translated from English into the native language, as almost nobody speaks English in the national platform. Furthermore, there are time constraints that hinder a thorough translation until the next meeting with platform members (C3, P. 75). Other network members view the reporting of representatives to the national membership as a necessity in order to either comply with certain norms of representation in the national platform or to get the campaign work done, in other words to coordinate the work with other activities at the national level. Issues from the international network level must be discussed in the national groups in order to see if there are disagreements in the group on the one hand and to start working on the campaign in order to stay on schedule on the other hand (C12, P.47).

Reporting back to the represented organization also requires that this fits with the working routines of the national organization. While some organizations meet very frequently, for example every week, others meet only once a month or even less frequently. The lower the frequency of general meetings is, the lower is the chance that representatives transfer their knowledge to the other organizations about the decisions made at the Euromeetings (C3, C4, C8). Some interviewees say that they fall back on e-mail communication as an alternative, but such communication

does not really reach their constituency (C3, C4). In general, it can be observed that newer members of the network are much more prone to reporting back and deliberating with their constituency at home about the experiences and decisions at European or international meetings of the CCC-network than older members.

Representation dialogues differ among different target groups and representatives' responsibilities. The representative, in this case the international coordinator in a national campaign, represents the international campaign in the national group as well as vice versa the national group at international campaign meetings. The representation of the national group in international meetings is more relevant because at the international meetings, decisions are taken that affect the national groups. International coordinators see themselves as the bridge or the mediator between two very different spheres. One interviewee talked about the representative role as being the hinge between individual groups in the national platform and the international campaign network (C9). This role as a hinge often requires a balance between suggesting new ideas for projects in the international and national meetings and coordinating the wishes and ideas of the represented, i.e. the national groups. Many of these representational dialogues are done by e-mail. However, some people from the national groups might not read their e-mails or only some of them get back to their representative, the international coordinator, in order to discuss whether they agree on certain projects or not. This specific characteristic of e-mail communication is sometimes even desired because the represented are not that interested in all matters of international campaign activities. This can be because there is not much time left for the decision (C5, P. 2), or because the representative does not want to disturb the national groups during their work:

In fact i report in between euomeetings and in between steering meetings by e-mail (...) let's say these ten people of my network. they are very busy so if i send an e-mail i do not disturb them during their work and they can read if they like and if they don't read it, it's a pity but after a while i can tell them, they start reading like five e-mails one after the other an- okay they catch up with it. so the e-mail is like a sort of NICE way to stay in touch. if i REALLY need input i will call them. and i do this, both when i expect they will support some point OR when i suspect they will completely disagree because i feel it's my role both to deal with agreement and disagreement. sometimes i even know that beforehand, that some organization or some person in organization will disagree, so i will look for that disagreement just to make sure that they have done a proper consultation (C4, P. 73)

In the quote above, it seems as if the representative is seeking the discussion with the represented groups only if the representative senses a sort of disagreement. This can be a zigzag course between convincing and disapproval: "maybe two-thirds of the steering committee who thought it was not a good idea so they dropped - i dropped the idea fine. i mean i need the back-up of i will try to if i'm really convinced i will try to convince them but if they disagree i will drop the idea." (C4, P. 77). The ability of the represented constituency to build an informed opinion

and express feedback about the representative's performance very much varies between national platforms and highly depends on the involved persons. This influences the deliberation processes among representatives at such international meetings. If directors who cannot know all the details of one specific campaign sit together with experts of one campaign, these discussions can be only preliminary. Consequentially, there is a practice of going back home after deliberation and talking to the constituency again (F4, P. 31).

If coordinators represent volunteers in the international campaign, they have to manage this bridging role in a very ambitious way. Volunteers who give their spare time for projects expect more from their representatives than people who are employed in a member-NGO of the international campaign network. Volunteers want to agree to projects because this is their only motivation to join a project. They are not contracted employees who need to do projects because they are paid for them. Thus, the dialogue between representatives and represented is much more essential in this situation. Volunteers can literally always opt for the exit option. Thus, representatives care much more to "fill out" their role, help with coordination and office services, and above all keep the communication channel very open. In order for this to work well, there must be an institutional frame, reliability of the representative, and clarity of responsibilities (C5, P. 42). This picture of the relationship between representative and represented is characterized by a very caring role of the representative, which initiates much of the decisions to be taken, filters information for the represented, and helps out in other matters. The represented are dependent on the good will and power of judgment of the representative. The representative in turn is dependent on the represented, too. If the represented volunteers decide that the representative is not doing a proper job, they can just quit.

The representation practice involves a high amount of deliberation between representatives and represented, which go beyond the mere delegation of tasks or the anticipation of preferences. As exemplary shown in the quote below, the mandate of the representative for an international meeting is, at least in contested issues, broadly and openly discussed in order to have a real mandate to decide in the name of the national group of volunteers.

I think it is about to DISCUSS! all things like that this is not something that's happening often (...) but if it DOES happen it is important to have a meeting WITHIN the organization where you discuss PROs and CONs and if it is something we stay BEHIND or NOT and if it is NOT we then just go back and say sorry this is not something that we can WORK on. so it is VERY important to have this implemented within the organizations since a lot of the work is done by volunTEERS. (F9, P. 41)

Here, the representative's function is not only to gather preferences from their constituency, but to actively engage in discussion with the constituency and try to find a solution that suits all. However, the dialogue of representative and represented can look very different from the per-

spective of an employed campaigner. In the following quote, we can see a different practice of representation that creates an impression of opacity:

I think the decision making processes in other organizations are always big mysteries for their colleagues and then sometimes EVEN for the organizations themselves because it's always a big struggle in because organizations are part of international networks well and often it's the director that goes there and then there is a big discussion and then there is a result and there were so many steps involved and then inbe= and then also that's mixed with FUNDing cause if it's possible to get money a lot is possible (F1, P. 98)

In addition to the opacity of a multi-step decision-making process, that is conducted by the representative and cannot be traced by the constituency, the interviewee also articulates a suspicion why there is so little representative interaction: "if it's possible to get money a lot is possible" (ibid.). This means it is better if decision-making processes are not attuned with the national organizations, if funding is already in place. The difficulties in the representation dialogues between representatives and represented is confirmed by a representative. Asked the question: "Would you say you represent Friends of the Earth here in [local organization]?" The following interviewee becomes very clear it is necessary to explain and advocate the matter of FoE at the national level:

Yeah i do. CLEARLY, **i have really to constantly EXPLAIN** and yes because most of the peop- especially friends of the earth europe you know it's mostly dealing in the eu level (...) i mean many of things are not really relevant for us, and friend of the earth international yeah. we're not involved in many of the of the programs. for MANY here and here it's a HEAD office, but if i speak or think about people you know in our local groups, they really have very they know very little of friend of the earth and CARE really little about it, i guess and our members well i don't know but yeah. we in general (local organization) does not communicate a lot, it's really euphemism, about friend of the earth for different reason that i don't always understand myself but it's like that. (F5, P. 75-76)

(3) Making representative claims about individuals and discourses

The practice of making representative claims differs depending on the constituency that is targeted by the claim and on the range of the claim, i.e. how many people/groups or how many matters are covered by the claim. Nobody in the CCC-network, for example, made a general claim to represent the garment workers in Asian countries: "i do not really know how to formulate this, because i think it would be to BOLD to say that we are actually representing the workers? but they are the ones that it in the end it's all about." (C10, P. 39). While this was expressed by a Western European organization, similar statements were made by NGOs that are in close contact with the workers: "I will think that as campaigner we are only play these supportive role and the garment workers they have to stand up to the fight for their own rights. but of course the method, we will we design a lot of programs and activity trying to s=support the worker garment workers to fight for higher wages." (C12, P.26).

The role of the representative is limited to that of an assistant who supports the workers in their fight. Both quotes show a denial of real agency, the agency is ascribed to the workers themselves. In this network, we can observe a complex interplay of representation practices. While the local NGOs normally represent the workers' demands towards the international or European network organizations, those European organizations, unlike the local NGOs, represent the workers' demands towards companies and national governments. Local NGOs receive the legitimate right to participate in the network through their "working with workers": "Well because we are this is in the human rights project or in urgent appeal we are not, i mean we are not getting funds for a project a particular so= amount, but this just because just for the fact that we are working with the garment workers for their rights and entitlements, that allow us to be in ccc, and that is why ccc also involves us in their work" (C14, P.16).

The representation of local workers towards companies and in the international network entitles these NGOs to participate in the network and to benefit from funds and support. If asked whom a local NGO represents, an NGO activist refers to the workers' *rights*, not the workers themselves and to corporate social responsibility. Thus, they rather claim to represent certain normative concepts instead of a constituency as such: "we represent the workers' rights (C2) and CSR interested to call corporates accountable and to uphold workers' rights "(C14, P.55-56). It seems that many of the representative claims are very cautious and rather abstract. NGO activists in Western Europe and Asia alike emphasize the autonomy of workers and the mere instrumental role of the representative serving the represented. If direct claims are made, then they are made in relation to norms such as workers' rights, or standards for socially responsible entrepreneurship.

Inside the European network, representative claims are pronounced with much more self-esteem and implicitness. Representative claims are made here in a very formal way. Interviewees see themselves as representing the matters of their organization in the network meetings. They are *the* representatives of their organization, platform or even campaign (C1, C4, C5). It becomes complicated to decide if they represent their organization or the entire European CCC-network only when facing the international network (C2, 14-15).

The following representative claim points to a topic that was discussed earlier: representing a whole network gives more strength also at the national level and vis-à-vis politicians and other decision-makers. In this representative claim, southern organizations are specifically named as being important represented organizations because they give even more credibility to the organizations in Europe. International solidarity is thus claimed, as a concept to serve northern and southern interests. It is very important that the claim to speak for Southern organizations is sub-

stantiated by the reports of Southern organizations. Thus, the constituency's "testimonies" are the backbone of the general message of international solidarity.

In the end we represent here in [country] what seventy-six organization are thinking, so it's very important for example in our relation north-south it's ah really important for us to be of an organization that has a lot of members in southern countries. so this is quite often part of our message, that the impact of the north on the south and we can translate, we can show that because we are testing on it from our southern groups, so it's not just because of their view or because we saw image, NO it's because people from the south TELL us what is going on and altogether we try to find solutions that fits for north and for south together, so this is, it think this is really the strength of friends of the earth international, that the northern and the southern component are together and try to find a solution valid for both. (F8, P. 87)

Besides the north-south solidarity that is that basis for broader representative claims, the federal character of the FoE-network is also used to argue that one can claim to represent the whole FoE-network:

Well i well whenever i speak in [country] or communicate with the outside world like media and politicians the way i see it is that i am communicating on behalf of [own organization] which is part of (...) the international federation so i don't **i can also say I'm representing (...) in some cases like the entire federation because we have a common position on something so there is this double identity i'd say.** (F3, P. 90)

This quote can be complemented by another interview passage, in which the interviewee speaks about representing at first the network, because this is where all stand together (F4, P. 64). So, the national and transnational sphere are of course two spaces, where constituencies are spoken for but it seems that the transnational network is the main reference point for representative claims. However, for global network actors outside of Europe it can be quite unclear what the representative positions of the FoE-network are:

Friends of the earth europe work at the parliament, so but they talk with everybody at the parliament and when they when we have to **when i have a meeting most of the time it's not clear what POSition does friends of the earth europe have.** you know, is not clear. IF you are in the parliament, okay because we talk with someone from the conservatives, someone from the link, someone from the greens but and friends of the earth is really important, is really very clear WHAT position about something do you have. and sometimes for me it's not clear you see from me as an activist in [home country] it's not clear when i go europe, some groups, i don't know if they if they have the same position of the whole federation or of us , it's not clear (F13, P. 36)

Another representative claim targets the other way around, representing the own organization and especially the volunteers, who cannot go to the international meetings:

What i repreSENT? **i represent MY organization** - i hope, i mean i am there beCAUSE basically because nobody else in my organization has been elected to go when it comes to like volunTEERS when they have the ability to go then follow me but it is also that i

have a responsibility to make their work easier as volunteers that is basically my=so i take up their ideas and i motivate them to do stuff within the organization what they are expected to do -and i also handle the boring parts of projects (...) and such-reporting so therefore i very much feel that i represent my organization when i go. (F9, P. 113)

In this representative claim is an emotional component of representation. The interview partner expresses the feeling to represent the organization, because there is a felt responsibility towards the volunteers. The one strong representative claim towards the main cause of FoE, the environment, is articulated by a big Western-European organization's activist, who claims to "give effect" to the "voice of the environment" (F10, P.2, author's own translation).

6.3.5 Conclusions

The CCC is a global network of NGOs which is rooted in Europe. The political practices that are conducted in the network alter through different phases of campaigning and in different contexts within the network. The practices also changed over the time of the existence of CCC. This variability of practices can be specifically observed in the way how participation and representation practices are conducted. While participation practices are changing in terms of the scope of inclusion during the course of campaign work, representation practices are differently practiced according to the specific context.

The participation practices in both networks are in the first phases of campaigning based on long-term processes of broadening the access to problem identification, closing and steering the concrete formulation of campaign goals and then opening up processes again. The empowerment and learning practices inside the CCC-network are differently interpreted by the interviewees. While core European network members value the norms of empowerment and try to foster their practices through workshops and workers' participation, local NGOs in the garment producing countries identify a lack of a sense of political efficacy among workers, which makes it hard for local NGOs to effectively reach workers with their empowerment strategies. Additionally to empowerment in the form of capacity building, the interviewees in the FoE-network also describe learning processes that evolve out of the collective experiences at meetings. These learning processes encompass the increasing sense of self-efficacy and the awareness of being part of a strong network. The networks are generally open, but specialized and exclusive network practices create boundaries between the core and the periphery. Since the funding comes for most parts from European donors such as the European Commission, the European network members administer the money, whereas non-European network members are often responsible for the field work. Although non-European network members feel included in a way, they raise concerns about this specific role allocation which produces problems for participation. Leadership practices are on the one hand reinforcing existing inequalities to a certain degree, but on the other hand, leaders contribute to a more formalized, structured participation and

they take charge of time-consuming administrative responsibilities so that others in the campaign have more time for the actual planning and decision-making practices.

Deliberation practices in the CCC-network are generally very thoroughly planned and prepared. A big difference can be identified between the face-to-face Euromeetings and Skype meetings. While the Euromeeeting deliberations are accompanied and structured by different deliberation methods and a moderator, Skype talks are often more informal and unstructured. Both forms of deliberation are structured by an agenda. Skype talks differ from Euromeetings in that they allow for a broader access to deliberation due to the lower costs of participation. However, there are restrictions of expressing oneself, following the deliberation and encouraging participation in deliberation that make Skype deliberation an ambiguous experience. Similar restrictions are caused by the different level of English proficiency in the CCC-network. Thus, deliberation practices are usually prepared and conducted in a very considerate manner with an eye on efficiency. The deliberation practices in the FoE-network are characterized by step-by-step procedures of agenda-setting, which change between openness and authoritative steering. A huge variety of facilitation methods are outlined by many interviewees. However, due to scarce capacities, facilitation is only used at the big general meetings, if people don't know each other that well or if the issues are delicate or very important. The deliberation seems also very dependent on the moderators or facilitators in charge. As in the CCC network, the use of language influences deliberation practice.

Representation practices in the CCC-network depend very much on the national organizations. Due to the high autonomy of network members, the representation practices of instructing representations, informing representatives and constituencies, and reporting back to the constituencies depend on the internal coordination practices of the member organizations, especially the degree of internal formalization, the priority setting, and the member's familiarity with network practices. The trusteeship model of representation is practiced in the national organization with changing degrees. The overall representational claims with regard to workers' representation are rather cautious and sensitive in terms of workers' self-determination. Representation practices in the FoE-network are the most diverse practices among the three different types of practices. This can be explained by the diversity of network member organization which are directly involved in conducting representation practices. The positionings towards representation thus vary from organization to organization and are thus conducted in many different ways. This results in the gathering of very differently mandated, skilled and experienced representatives at international meetings and is also expressed in the practice of horizontal representation. However, far geographical distances, structural inequalities and differently organization network members influence the agency of actors to practice representation.

7 How Democratic are the Political Practices Explored?

After the previous descriptive presentation of the results of the qualitative interview analysis, the following section is concerned with the evaluation and discussion of the categorized practices in the light of democratic theory that was outlined and discussed in the first part of this dissertation.

7.1 Participation Practices

The participation practices that were found in the two TCSNs are often very complex and even opaque because they take place at many different levels. At the same time, practices in the CCC-network evolve dynamically and are open to the diverse input in decision-making due to the easy and quick practice of information sharing. Similarly, interviewees from the FoE-network successfully reframed what is usually seen one of the main struggles in conceptualizing democratic legitimation beyond the nation- state, namely the large heterogeneity of interests (see Friedrich 2009). Many FoE-network members evaluate the huge diversity inside the network as a factor that gives much reason for all of the participation practices described above. While diversity lets them learn much more from each other, feel stronger about their own political efficacy, it is also a reason why autonomy of network members and a decentralized federation structure is necessary.

The following sections summarize and evaluate the findings in the CCC and the FoE-network in regard to the different evaluation criteria of participation practices. In the light of democratic theory, the chapter will discuss as how democratic the political practice in the two networks can be qualified.

| Freedom | Equality |
|------------------------------------|------------------|
| (1)Development of (citizen) skills | (3) Transparency |
| (2) Autonomy | (4) Inclusion |

Table 9: Evaluation Criteria: Participation Practices

(1)Development of (citizen) skills. This criterion is divided into two aspects: the empowerment of groups and individuals *in order to* participate effectively and the development of skills *through* participation. For the first aspect, I defined the following questions as relevant: How are network members and/or affected groups trained and empowered in order to be able to fulfill the formal (mostly costs), the procedural (technical skills) and the issue-related (expert knowledge about issues at stake) prerequisites to sincerely take part in the network? For the second aspect of this criterion, the questions that target the development of self-efficacy and “democratic attitudes”

play an important role: Do people value the perspectives of others more after they participated in the network? Do they appreciate the participatory forms of decision-making? And if yes, why?

Empowerment understood as a “process aimed at consolidating, maintaining, or changing the nature and distribution of power in a particular cultural context”⁸⁵ is a conceptual model broadly applied in participatory theories of democracy, gender studies, but also management, social work and psychology. The idea behind it is in all these very different spheres similar: workers, women, elderly, disabled people, citizens etc. should be equipped with the necessary capacities in order to work more independently, be more creative and autonomous, have more voice in political institutions or live a more independent life. In that characterization it is one major claim of participatory democracy. The development of citizen skills as an end of democracy is furthered by empowerment, especially of subordinate groups.

Empowerment practices in the CCC-network are characterized by the strong commitment towards workers empowerment and a conduct of these empowerment practices that is balanced and sometimes charged with tension between European network members and local partners in the Asian region. The second phase of empowerment, which is anticipated to bring about education effects and an increased sense of political efficacy (Pateman 1970: 50-52), is not mentioned as a relevant practice in the network. This finding is in stark contrast to the observations in the FoE-network. The CCC-network empowerment approach is first of all targeted at the workers in garment producing factories. As a secondary form of empowerment, new and smaller CCC-network members are empowered. The worker’s empowerment is practiced with a reflective and cautious positioning and the awareness of the inequalities between workers in South-East Asia and European NGOs. It is desired, that workers are leading their own empowerment, as written in the CCC principles: “Workers themselves can and should take the lead in their own organising and empowerment.”⁸⁶ This norm of workers’ self-empowerment, which is discursively reiterated and reinforced by European NGOs, is not what local NGOs experience. They are not aware of the norm of self-empowerment and see even many difficulties in a top-down-led empowerment because workers are sometimes not easily contacted and in a second step not easily convinced of an empowerment, positioning themselves in a submissive way, as one NGO activist describes it (*C12, P.26*). This points to the dilemma that theorists face in deliberative and participatory democracy: people need to be in a certain already empowered, informed, educated state in order to participate or deliberate. This is a crucial problem in the application of those demo-

⁸⁵Bookman and Morgen (1988 : 4) cited by:

http://www.sociologyencyclopedia.com/public/tocnode?id=g9781405124331_yr2012_chunk_g978140512433129_ss1-22 (accessed: 2013/12/13)

⁸⁶<http://www.cleanclothes.org/about/principles> (accessed: 19.07.2013)

cratic theories, which is reflected in the tensions between the ideal vision of European NGOs and the probably more realistic assessment of local NGOs in the Asian region.

Empowerment practices in the CCC-network entail also a problem of overlapping interests and interferences in a multi-level system of actors. Many actors are involved in empowerment practices and thus differing levels of interests interfere. The campaign network is very committed to worker's empowerment. Although the general empowerment goals are the same, there are partly conflicting interests of local, mostly Asian, network members and European network members. While the local organizations are interested in educating workers and supporting them, especially in risky situations, the European organizations must additionally "sell" this cause to a European audience, being the European consumers. This causes diverging interests because not every worker's empowerment action is 'interesting' for the European consumers and, even more important, the mainly European donors.

The FoE-network conducts very formalized empowerment practices. The central coordination office focusses on empowering smaller groups with systematic programs and continuous support. The empowerment and education measures are aimed to reach groups inside the network. Besides these observations, there is a second important part of the category "empowerment and learning" which reflects the epistemic perspective on learning. Characterized as "citizen transformation" (Warren 1993), the effect of participation practices on the learning of autonomy and political efficacy is crucial for participatory democratic theory. It can be observed that this is taking place almost solely at face-to-face meetings. Participation practices at international meetings lead to a better sense of the individual members for political efficacy of the network and for the different legitimate perspectives on political issues at stake (see e.g. F8). Thus, the empowerment and learning practices are observed as strong practices, which can struggle with interfering interests on different levels of the network. Furthermore, citizen transformation, namely the learning of democratic norms is limited almost exclusively to practices at face-to-face meetings, which confirms the argument of a better democratic quality of network practices through personal contact.

Furthermore, the FoE-network has defined a quorum, which sets a mark of 28-29 out of 31 network members participating in the meetings. This number is tried to reach (F4, P. 46). This attempt to reach a participation rate as high as possible is reasoned by one campaign coordinator as an attempt to create broad ownership of decision. Only if as many network members as possible discuss and finally agree on important topics, the campaign work is done "with high quality" and in time: "The member group feels as the WHOLE member group that this is an important topic and we want to do it so then it's easier to make sure that their work plan is done properly

and in time and with high quality than if it was completely imPOSED it would not work effectively in this kind of structure that we have” (F3, P. 49).

The concept of ownership which is used here to argue for a broad participation points to the relationship between participatory decisions and the responsibility by all participants to properly carry out the decisions that were once taken by them. Thus, strategic arguments speak for participatory decision-making. Another strategic argument of broader participation is named by one Western-European campaigner. Broader participation legitimates the campaign and makes the campaigners more credible:

They make themselves more credible and we make OURselves more credible by showing that we have a counterpart in [country] so well both parties benefit so then both parties are motivated to really put an effort because well all environmental organizations have more issues than they can handle and always short of time and money you really have to be conVINCED that this is something important because otherwise it's very difficult to really do an effective campaign (F1, P. 80)

Besides the legitimation of organizations through the broad global participation of organizations in the network, the federal structure of the network and the participation of various organizations from all over the world increases effective and efficient campaigning through the exchange of strategy, experience and knowledge and the increase of voice. The more organizations are involved and the broader “struggles are linked”, the better the campaign will be heard by the public and decision-makers:

We can link the struggles you know. we can SEE when we are in a federation, that we are not alone, i mean as affected groups affected people, you know you see, we are not alone. the same problem is happening in amazonia and the same problem is happening in indonesia and it is linked with a campaign in the netherlands, (...) this federation GIVES to us this opportunity to LINK the struggles, to work with other local groups to exchange the experiences and experiences with campaigns you see, (...) it makes us stronger to fight against something or for something. as a federation we have more power to FIGHT yes, with a company for example or court, or government. (13, P. 97)

(2) *Autonomy*. Individual and collective autonomy is a relevant principle of participatory democracy. Thus, this criterion evaluates how freely network members can decide on campaign issues or strategies, how autonomously they can take decisions on international network meetings, and as how decentralized the network is perceived.

The International Secretariat in the CCC-network plays a quite important coordinating role and contributes to a centralized coordination, especially when member groups themselves cannot be that active due to a lack of capacities. Thus, the network is seen as very decentralized and organizations are perceived as autonomous by stronger and more active network members and it is

seen as more centralized and controlled by weaker and more passive network members. This partly centralized coordination must not be per se undermining democratic quality as long as the centralized coordination implies also an empowerment of these weaker groups and gives way to a more independent campaigning of these groups. This cannot be always observed. Some dependencies of network members on the International Secretariat seem to endure over years (C 7, C8). Therefore, political practices in the network do not always grant autonomy equally.

FoE-network members refer to FoE as a federation of like-minded organizations. The identity of FoE as a federation has a very important meaning to many interviewees in the FoE-network. It is stressed as very productive in particular because of the high diversity of network members. However, coordination problems arise, which are solved with granting more autonomy to each network member in that every organization participating in specific campaigns can choose their degree of participation in the campaign. This contradicts the description of quite pre-determined roles in the inclusion practices described above. Consequently, this supposed freedom of choice could possibly be more of a theoretical freedom. Thus, the autonomy of network members can also lead to a reinforcement of existing inequalities in that weaker network members could choose to participate less due to fewer capacities. If it is assumed that the more prosperous organizations also choose to take the more active part in campaigns, they in turn get also the higher budgets and consequently unequal structures are reinforced. However, the strong emphasis of the federal structure affects the participatory inclusion of many different groups and enables them to cooperate together in the network.

(3) Transparency. This criterion evaluate the equal access to information. It thus asks: Are all network actors equally provided with relevant information about strategies, agendas and campaign goals?

Information is distributed in both networks quite frequently and easily due to the network character and the digital communication patterns. Everyone is connected to everyone in the network via e-mail lists and network databases. This is a very accessible practice of information sharing. It provides broad access for literally everyone, regardless of geographical place or capacities. Everyone has the opportunity to be informed and to gain knowledge about procedures as well as issues and campaigns at stake. However, in reality this information flow can be overwhelming and can lead to confusion about which information can be accessed by whom. Thus, equal access is granted, but not always equal opportunities are guaranteed. This observation can be clearly attributed to the network-like structure with its informal character and open boundaries.

The dissolution of borders in both cases first of all contributes to a better and equalized sharing of information. This creates transparency, but the overload of information can also lead to an

excessive demand of the participating member groups. This can lead to the practice, that representatives do not always forward the information to their national member groups. These members can thus sense the practices of decision-making for example as something “mysterious” that they do not understand, as one FoE member states (F1). Thus, the evaluation of transparency is mixed, although the prospects of quick information sharing for more inclusive political practice must be underlined.

(4)Inclusion. The last criterion targets the question of equal inclusion in campaigning activities and is thus a very broad criterion. Here, I asked: Who is included or excluded during the campaigning process? On which grounds are network actors included or excluded?

Inclusion and exclusion practices are fluid due to dissolving boundaries and decisions that are sometimes made on the spur of the moment. This makes equal inclusion in the broader network not a universal democratic practice. Including groups or persons in specific campaigns or campaign phases is often an ad-hoc decision left to a small group of persons’ discretion. This decision-making process is an inclusion practice between different representatives of member organizations. It is practiced horizontally among peers, but there is no universal authoritative rule that would stand above them. Organizations are sometimes included temporally if they suit a campaign’s interest, without becoming formal members (e.g. partner organizations doing research in Asia or Africa are called to participate). This is often initiated by the central coordinating office or member organizations in Europe. It is an unequal authoritative decision by a few involved persons that leads to a functional inclusion. However, they are often not included in the agenda setting of the campaign. Thus, most often inclusive and equal campaigning is difficult in the FoE-network as soon as the borders of Europe are crossed. The role allocation between European and non-European organizations is quite clearly divided in the organizations that apply for and receive the funding on the one hand, and the organizations that do the field work on the other hand. Although the positioning of European network members is often egalitarian and very respectful for the non-European groups, positionings occur that show a rather paternalistic or instrumental relationship with non-European partners. Similarly, the positionings of non-European organizations are undecided between the recognition and indignation about an unequal and less inclusive campaigning and the acceptance of one’s own role. Thus, network members are included, but not necessarily on equal terms.

Besides these principal decisions about campaign team compositions, the concrete work on campaigns in smaller teams of three to five organizations is often well balanced between participatory equal inclusion and leadership. The necessity of leadership for the functioning of participation practices is clearly perceived and accepted by almost all groups in the networks. As Polletta (2002) pointed out in her study on participatory democracy in social movements groups,

participatory democracy is not anymore seen as a total power-free enterprise. The dogmatic principles of participatory grass-roots democracy developed by new social movement groups in the 1970's are often relativized by present-day activists. This can be clearly observed in the participation practices of the members in the CCC-network. The discursive positioning of interview partners demonstrates the valued contribution of leading persons to an equalized and easily accessible campaigning process. Leaders do not only take over power, they also take over responsibilities and tasks, which can relieve others for example from exhausting administrative work and give them the time to concentrate on the important issues. Thus, a certain amount of leadership can structure procedures and reduce complexity, which can be even motivating for people to participate. Thus, on a small-scale inclusion practices work much better than on the large-scale of the broader network.

Fluid Participation Practices: Conclusions

In the overall evaluation of participation practices in the two TCSNs, two main aspects of participatory democracy are important: (1) the emphasis on difference and pluralism in participatory democracy and (2) the claim of self-transformation.

(1) In general, the inclusiveness of participation practices is quite high: many organizations can get easily access to the networks and become part of it. The fluent information circulation eases this access. The other side of the coin is that once organizations are really part of the network, the network structures of interfering levels, multiple participation practices and a cognitively unmanageable crowd of organizations makes the networks appear very complex and opaque and thus makes participation sometimes very unlikely and unattractive for the individual campaigner. A retreat to national or local arenas is a common reaction.

The participatory ideal to include the diversity of groups and individuals in participation processes is realized in practice in both networks. While Warren(2001) and Polletta (2002) argue that civil society groups tend to be homogenous and action oriented(Warren 2001), or tend to consist of befriended persons (Polletta 2002), which both undermines participatory processes, we can observe that only rarely do befriended groups exclude others. To the contrary, although FoE is quite homogenous in their goals, attitudes and organizations structures (as any civil society network is, compared to the diversity of the broader society), through the emphasis of their diversity, FoE groups developed very strong participatory ideals. The inclusion of difference is treated with much care and sensibility in the FoE-network. It could be observed that the diversity of network members is a crucial part of the identity of the network and almost always considered as very important. There are attempts in avoiding allegedly universal positions and on the contrary praise diversity as a main characteristic of the network. Although one could say that the

inclusion of difference in the FoE-network is done in an appropriate way, Phillips' (1998) argument of conducting a politics of presence for marginalized groups could be a recommendation for the FoE-network in order to reinforce and further the equalization of participation. Through the presence of marginalized groups (for example in meetings or telephone conferences), the actual voice of these groups is heard, in contrast to a mere anticipation of interest of specific groups, according to Phillips.

(2) This is in line with the findings of the interview data that the more often people of different organizations are present in face-to-face meeting, the more aware they are of the different perspectives in the networks and their overall shared cause. In contrast to the CCC-network, which does not emphasize its diversity that much, the FoE-network members more often state that they gain a better sense of their own power, when they meet with all the diverse groups of FoE at international meetings. The diversity of organizational voices in the networks enriches many participation practices by manifold inputs. This furthers the democratic transformation of individuals, in the two ways that were described by Pateman (1970) as increasing sense of political efficacy and by Warren (1994) for example as enhancing psychological qualities, which are important claims of participatory democracy. Through the face-to-face meeting of people with the same cause but a different perspective, network members become aware of the wide range of different perspectives and the worthiness of their shared cause. Thus, although homogeneity of civil society exists, if civil society actors reformulate it into diversity, inclusive participation and self-transformation can be successful and common practices within TCSNs.

Participation practices in the contexts of transnational networks can reinforce positive aspects of participatory democracy, such as inclusion, transparency of information and empowerment/democratic transformation. However, looking at procedural steps, it looks as if the borderless networks with multiple arenas of interaction give more access than real equalized opportunities to participate, at least for some network members. This can be understood as an erosion of democratic rule bindingness through disembodied and dispersed participation practices. TCSNs, such as the two networks investigated in this study, live from the informal and spontaneous participation of many volunteers in many different places. However, this participation of active citizens and organization members is geographically very dispersed, often temporal, informal and dynamic. As one network member states, activists come and go (C1). This is mirrored in the respective organization's participation at the transnational level. If an organization has many motivated activists and volunteers, it will be more likely to actively engage at international meetings with other organizations. In turn, also a very participatory international meeting will radiate from the event to the local groups and national organizations. Since coordination of activities in-between meetings by e-mails, Skype meetings or telephone conferences are for many active

volunteers a rather frustrating participatory experience, the meetings and workshops that take place as personal gatherings build much of the collective identity that is needed to motivate activists to keep on participating. Especially the equal participation of the poorly resourced and small organizations is only provided by the offering of personal meetings. Otherwise, it is quite hard to stay on track under conditions of uncertainty and high personal costs, if the goals and ideals of the network are not strengthened and reaffirmed on international network meetings. For many network members, the international meetings also give them a sense of their own political efficacy and the strength of the international network. Thus, online meetings might be an efficient mode of coordination, but they can only rarely contribute to participation practices inside the TCSNs. Regarding the inclusion and empowerment of new and/or weaker organizations, international network meetings are the most effective way to introduce new and marginalized groups to the networks, empower and educate groups through workshops and include marginalized groups in giving them the opportunity to gain contacts and voice. These experiences of network members point to the essential relevance of face-to-face meetings for the quality of participation practices. Although participation practices take place locally and via the Internet throughout dispersed places, the need for a central gathering on international events is expressed by many network members.

7.2 Deliberation Practices

Deliberation practices in both networks are very skillfully planned and goal-oriented, which is supposed to guarantee equal chances for all to participate. However, as the findings of the interview analysis show, the formal guaranteeing of equalized deliberation does not solve substantial problems that hinder equal and inclusive deliberation. The goal-orientation can also impede deeper deliberation and an easy participation of newer and more marginal network members. Furthermore, the increasing use of Skype as a tool to deliberate online reinforces existing inequalities and can even complicate deliberative decision-making. In the following the three criteria that define the different steps in the procedures of deliberation will be applied to evaluate the deliberation practice in the two networks.

| Procedural quality of will-formation | | Procedural quality of decision-making |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| (1) Open and accessible agenda | (2) Non-coercive deliberation | (3) Considered judgment |

Table 10: Evaluation Criteria: Deliberation Practices

(1) Open and accessible agendas. As the first step of deliberation, I examined the openness of agenda-setting practice and thus defined the questions: Is the agenda sufficiently flexible, so that possible changes by participants can be made? Are the goals broad enough so that everyone can identify with them? Are the participants of de-liberation forums provided with relevant information before the deliberation? Is there enough time to read the material beforehand?

The claim for inclusion to keep agendas of deliberation open for questions and modifications by participants is articulated by many deliberative democrats (see Habermas 1990, Benhabib 1996, Fung 2008). This inclusion at the beginning of deliberation procedures is practiced with some effort in the CCC-network. While the very first phase of problem identification is very open to input from any corner of the network and even the network environment, the agenda setting process is increasingly steered as the process goes on. However, this must not necessarily impede the openness of the agenda. Even if certain points are already set by the International Secretariat, for example in preparation of the Euromeetings, there seems to be always room for discussing the points on the agenda, as many interviewees state. However, the accessibility of agendas at least for certain participants can be questioned due to the overload of material and planning that confuses participants sometimes more than it guarantees accessibility. This a dilemma since the provision of information is necessary in order to adequately prepare deliberation processes.

Although the practices of problem identification and agenda setting seem to be balanced between efficient leading practices and inclusive decision-making in the FoE network as well, there are two problematic tendencies: (1) The initiation of campaigns at the local level depends very much on the capacities of local members. It needs motivating, engaged and talented people with time and money to be able to set the agenda for a new campaign (e.g. F7, P. 42). In turn, this means that underprivileged organizations in the network are more often the ones, who just join an already existing campaign, where the relevant decisions about the agenda are already taken. This leads to the second problem. (2) Especially organizations outside of Europe participate in campaigns only as passive contributors of campaign material. As one activist outside Europe put it: "so they decided to include it (=their campaign material, H.K.) in the campaign in the project, and we said YES." (F13, P. 57). Thus, the inclusive agenda setting does only take place among the European campaign partners. Non-European campaign partners are rather asked for contributions, but not extensively included in the problem and agenda definition process (F12, F13). However, the procedural, step-by-step character of the observed practices contributes to a certain horizontal peer-to-peer democratic control. If one step of the agenda setting process such as problem identification, formulation of ideas, brainstorming approaches, has been practiced in a non-participatory way, the process can be opened up again in the following steps of agenda set-

ting, when different actors lead the process. Thus, there is a democratic control mechanism that lies in the procedural character of the practice and the involvement of many different decision-makers in the different phases of the practice.

(2) *Non-coercive deliberation.* When evaluating the practice of deliberating itself, the democratic ideal of a free and balanced deliberation process is defined. Precisely, the results of the analysis are examined while asking the questions: Are arguments counterbalanced by alternative arguments? Is there a moderator or facilitator? How is the moderator balancing different positions and encouraging everyone to speak? Are all arguments, regardless of who offered them, considered equally? The positioning of central actors towards free and inclusive deliberation practices is very clear and positive. Rules are seen as very important to implement equalizing procedures of deliberation. Those rules are in turn evaluated as very complex and overwhelming by new or marginal network members. Due to the lack of knowledge about rules and procedures of deliberation practices, some of these organizations seem to be excluded from certain circles of deliberation and decision-making at first, or even for a longer period. This creates power imbalances that should be avoided according to deliberative democracy's norms.

Deliberation in transnational networks is practiced in a space of geographical dispersion. Disembodied practices result as a consequence of it. The democratic anchor in deliberation practices is the direct, not computer-mediated deliberation. Only the regular face-to-face deliberation in the two networks establishes commitment of participants, reliability among participants of deliberation and an honest and deep deliberation. Face-to-face deliberation holds many more opportunities for organizers to structure, balance and focus the deliberation process. Since online deliberation is taking place solely on Skype, which means a situation similar to a telephone conference with frequent interruptions caused by bad internet connections or technology errors, the potential for a balanced and equalized deliberation is limited. Furthermore, many network members state that they need the personal meeting, the look into the faces of deliberation partners in order to find consensus among diverging positions, make more timely decisions and be more encouraged to participate in the future (C11, F8, F2). On the one hand, online computer-mediated deliberation is increasingly used in both networks. It contributes to more equality in the sense that more people can easily participate in deliberation processes without having to bear the costs of traveling. On the other hand, online deliberation is only of limited use for deliberative democracy inside these two networks because (1) the decisions made in Skype deliberation are not that far-reaching as face-to-face deliberation at international meetings, and (2) the participation rate in online deliberation is limited to a handful of persons due to the technological restriction and the impracticability of moderating and following discussions without the distinction marks of space and vision. If deliberation participants cannot see the person behind

the voice and all voices come from the same angle (the computer loud speaker), it is practically impossible to have more than five participants in a deliberation exercise. Thus, also deliberation practices need the direct contact between participants in order to secure equality and balance of voice during deliberation. This need of personal meetings and face-to-face communication is expressed by almost every interviewed network member. Face-to-face situations provide actors with more opportunities to create reliability among participants: “obviously face-to-face meeting is a much STRONGer way of getting people's engagement, because once you've gotten in the room effectively shut the door and then they are there for EIGHT hours of discussion they can't get away” (F2, P. 34). Furthermore, face-to-face situations enable participants of deliberation to find consensus through non-verbal adjustment or expressions of disagreement (C11, P. 25).

In the Foe network, deliberation practices are described by interviewees as structured in various ways. The inclusion of all the different organizations in the network into deliberation practices is emphasized. Therefore, actors can choose from a wide repertoire of equalizing deliberation practices and seem to be very much committed to equalizing access to deliberation. This seems to be a very good basis for the practice of inclusive and free deliberation inside the network. However, there are certain obstacles in the way. First, the structuration of the deliberation process depends very much on the capacities that can be used to hire a facilitator. Second, the facilitator's own preferences and mode of structuring can influence the degree of inclusion of deliberation practice. The understanding of non-coercive deliberation must not necessarily be shared by every facilitator, as one interviewee states. Thus, there is a high contingency at the level of individual facilitators. Furthermore, the increase in online deliberation has the same two-fold effect on deliberation as in the CCC network. It broadens the access to deliberation because geographical distances and therefore capacities to travel do not play a role anymore. However, it also narrows down the access to individuals that have access to fast Internet connections. Otherwise, deliberation practices are modified in a way that obscure the idea of inclusive and free deliberation. If people can only write in the chat protocol without hearing what others are saying, then there is no free and inclusive deliberation practiced.

Moreover, the balance of arguments during deliberation practices is hindered by the inequality in language skills and by the differences of deliberation styles, specifically between European and non-European organizations. The language gap does produce inequalities that are not only caused by the inability to speak English like a native speaker, but also by the lack of attention paid to language issues. This evokes the question of dominance and exclusion problems in deliberation. Although the imbalance of arguments through language barriers is not a problem that could be easily solved by the modification of collective practices, it seems very problematic, that

central actors do not recognize this as a problem. This neglect makes deliberation practices not very sensitive towards balancing arguments across language barriers.

(3) Considered judgment. Finally, the decision-making in deliberation processes should be considerate, reasonable and balanced. Thus, this part of the deliberation is evaluated by asking: Are the decisions made on the grounds of sincere reasoning? When and how are decisions made out of strategic choices? How are decision taken?

Rational and enlightened decisions are not always mentioned as the outcome of deliberation in the CCC-network. However, the rigid focus on consensus which drives deliberative decision-making in a sometimes difficult direction. Finding consensus is by itself a challenging and ambiguous task and in recent deliberation theory relativized in favor of more moderate forms such as the “meta-consensus”, i.e. agreeing on the disagreement (Niemeyer & Dryzek 2007). The difficulty in TCSNs is the need to find consensus on many levels, at least the national and the transnational level. This can be an infinite back and forth, further complicated by the mediation through Skype, which makes non-verbal shortcuts of agreement, for example looking around to other people and see if they are nodding with their heads or not, impossible (C11). This is described as nerve-racking for many deliberation participants. Similarly, the need to find a consensus is seen by some interviewees in the FoE network as a burden. Some differences cannot be overcome by deliberation, as also deliberation theory suggests (Niemeyer & Dryzek 2007), but since the network is very diverse, this poses a problem for the network members’ capability to act. If there is no clear position for a certain issue, many network members complain that it is difficult to campaign on it or represent the network publicly. This is why some network members and also moderators in both networks justify their practice of circumventing the ideals of deliberation for the sake of efficiency. This practice of steering deliberation into certain strategic directions and a specific decision is at the same time criticized by deliberation participants in the CCC-network that would welcome real “deep” deliberation (C3). The practice of making decisions is further very much influenced by the use of online deliberation. This form of communication leads to a disembodied practice of deliberation, which is evaluated as difficult especially if decisions have to be made. Without the non-verbal notions of fellow deliberation participants it is hard or very time-consuming to find out the individuals positions on a specific topic. Thus, decision-making can only work, according to some interviewees, if the individuals involved have met each other beforehand. Thus, for the collective considered judgment over a specific topic, it needs more than a well-structured and balanced deliberation. The face-to-face experience seems to be a crucial factor in the deliberation process. If we assume that people are more prone to show signs of consent or dissent with gestures and mimics than to explicitly express their opin-

ion verbally, deliberation on Skype also changes the quality of the decision in that it is a decision made by those few who talk most.

Disembodied Deliberation: Conclusions

Norms of deliberative democracy play different roles in the deliberation practices in the two TCSNs. While the formal inclusion of all interested is guaranteed in almost all cases in the two networks, arguments must not always be balanced due to different capacities, mainly in language and technology. Furthermore, the goal to arrive at a considered judgment after deliberation is often torn between the very idealistic claim to find consensus and the pragmatic considerations of moderators and participants. The deliberation practices in the two networks are the most difficult practices for participants and they are the practices that become most likely undemocratic.

Deliberation practices are often conducted in a very sincere and planned manner. This makes them quite formal, which furthers formal access to deliberation. As many democratic theorists would argue, stability and formality can ensure democratic quality (MacDonald & MacDonald 2010). Also, the agendas for deliberation are often kept very open for participants' input, which defines a democratic norm of deliberation (see Benhabib 1996). At the same time, the extensive planning and structuration of deliberation deters participants, who have different understandings of debate; for example participants, who would like to discuss more "political" and less goal-oriented; participants, who are not used to these kinds of structured, focused and rational discussions or participants, who do not have the capacities to read the material and prepare for the deliberation with their organization "at home". Moreover, the strict focus on consensus can lead moderators to frame deliberation processes and steer the discussion into a certain direction. This limits the equality of arguments dramatically. Thus, the very strong commitment of central members of the networks to formality in deliberation can have ambiguous effects. In this regard, it can exclude alternative forms of input that are often regarded as very valuable to solve problems through deliberation (Saretzki 1997, Polletta 2006).

The use of Skype as a tool to deliberate online is conducive to equally considering different arguments in the deliberation practice as people from around the world can meet on Skype as frequent as they want to. Skype broadens participation in deliberation. This is first of all an improvement for the communication processes within the network. However, the disembodied online deliberation, which is more and more practiced in both networks, impedes the structuration of deliberation processes. In contrast, face-to-face deliberation can be more balanced because it is easier to be structured and balanced by a facilitator. This facilitator can work more effectively to encourage all people to articulate arguments in a face-to-face situation. Further-

more, the seemingly equal access of all kinds of alternative discussants to online deliberation is not always as equal as it seems. Due to lacking technological capacities, Skype calls are not manageable for many activists outside Europe or the Skype deliberation is so immensely affected by bad Internet connections and breakdowns, that an equalized deliberation and the consideration of all voices is virtually impossible.

7.3 Representation Practices

While the selection and instruction of representatives is a highly arbitrary practice, the representatives' practices with regard to gaining knowledge and being accountable to the constituency is appropriately adopted to the different constituencies in the networks. Representation practices are characterized by trustful bonds between peer-organizations within the network and a careful representation practice in regard to local volunteers and an almost complete absence of representative claims towards a general constituency. It can be observed that the stronger the bonds between representatives and represented, the fewer control mechanisms are implemented in representation practices. Representation practices are perceived as an organic process, which points to the non-linearity of the representation practice and the different "organs" involved with different roles to play, which complement each other in the representation practice.

| Democratic control | Democratic responsibility |
|---|--|
| (1) Authorization of representatives by the affected constituency | (3) Considerate representative claims-making |
| (2) Accountability of representatives | |

Table 11: Evaluation Criteria: Representation Practices

(1) Authorization of representatives by the affected constituency. The authorization of representatives marks the beginning of a representative relationship and is crucial in legitimating representatives. Thus, with the following questions the empirical results were examined: Is the selection process of representatives practiced by taking into account the constituents? Are the representatives sufficiently instructed? If yes, how exactly?

A thorough instruction and selection of representatives by their constituency is only a rare occurrence. Many representatives are taking over the representative role qua office. It is rather a matter of choosing the right position to go to the international meetings, be it the international coordinator or the managing director. This is justified by the solid knowledge of representatives about their constituency's preferences and best interest and consequentially the trust of the constituency in the representative's decisions. Furthermore, the remoteness of topics is taken as an argument, why local constituencies such as members in the network organizations are not interested in giving the representative a clear mandate. These practices and the positionings are

debatable in the light of democratic theory. While from a trusteeship perspective, this could be evaluated as a democratic practice of representing in general, the lack of a clear mandate *and* the lack of any formal authorization is a combination in which no control as such takes place. Since these representation practices take place inside network member organizations with often only one representative at this level, there is also no real peer-to-peer control as suggested for unelected representatives by Castiglione and Warren (2006). The argument that the topics discussed in international meetings are too far away from the realities of local constituencies is a clear hint that the democratic anchor of such network assemblies is not very strongly rooted in the respective local constituencies. Otherwise the topics discussed by representatives would have some connection to local topics.

Instruction practices vary gradually between very thorough and explicit instruction of representatives and no preparatory instruction at all. If instruction practices take place, they are conducted in a dialogical manner between representatives and represented. Instruction is a practice that is continuously conducted, especially during the preparation of international meetings. Although there are many forms of instructing representatives, the majority of interviewees said that they either only instruct representatives in a limited circle of people or only in specific situations and/or sensitive matters. It can be said, that instruction takes place, but most often the representative decides when it is necessary to get a clear mandate. The power to act and decide seems to be very much on the side of the representative, whereas constituencies in national organizations often pull themselves out of the preparation process. However, representatives seem to be very sensitive about their own role and responsibilities and tend to justify their actions. This points to an anticipated authorization that controls the representative's actions.

(2) Accountability of representatives. Defining the democratic quality of the representative relationship, we must further examine the accountability of representatives towards their constituency: Are the representatives well informed about interests and preferences of the represented? How do they perceive their own role in terms of effective and equal representation of their constituency? Is there an expression of acceptance or disapproval from the represented, and if yes, how are such reactions articulated?

As authorization is not extensively practiced in the network, it would seem necessary that representatives are held accountable during representation, as theorists of non-electoral representation suggest (Castiglione & Warren 2006). What can be observed is that the accountability of representatives is shifted horizontally. This practice of handing over the responsibility to represent to a peer network member follows again the logic of trusteeship and descriptive representation, since these responsibilities are often handed to peers that resemble the own organization without giving a clear mandate to this peer-representative. As noted in representation theory,

especially in civil society, trust plays a very important role in representation practices. Specifically because of the complexity of the network structure, the resemblance of representatives and represented in horizontal representation practices such as the ones in the FoE-network are important substitutes for accountability mechanisms. By descriptive representation, representatives can assume much better, what the interests of the represented are. It is also important in this regard that the one network member organization made the decision to trust the other network member organization in representing their interests and thus, this kind of trusteeship can be regarded as democratic (Castiglione & Warren 2006).

In the CCC-network, the perceived role of a representative is more carefully practiced in regard to workers' representation than in regard to the representation of network member groups at international meetings for example. The concern about workers' interests is much higher and thus information supply and the sense of accountability towards workers is perceived as much more important than the accountability towards European network member organizations, where representatives rely much more on trust than on control. Thus, we can see two different approaches of practicing representation in this regard. They follow a different logic and are practiced under completely different preconditions. The accountability towards and knowledge about workers is seen as a crucial aspect of representation practices in the CCC-network. However, it is more difficult to reach than the accountability towards and knowledge of European organizations. While the knowledge of the European constituency is quite solid, they do not consider accountability mechanisms as that important, in contrast to the accountability towards workers.

Representative dialogues are defined by the sequential timing of reporting and communicating back and forth between representatives and represented, which is sometimes complicated by the different and overlapping schedules of international and national campaigns. This is partly solved by the extensive use of e-mail communication, which is independent of time sequences. However, E-mail communication is easy in the way that the representative fulfills their duty of reporting back to the constituency, but these practices seem to be without any effects in providing a channel of communication for the represented. Only the personal conversation is effective in managing the mandate of the representative because only in face-to-face communication the relationship between representative and represented can be create as a reliable and mutual dialogue.

The representation of volunteers differs considerably to the representational dialogue between employed members of the organizations and their representatives. The relationship between volunteers and their representatives is very close and certain and the expression of an informed opinion of volunteers is taken very seriously. In this case, the representative relationship is prac-

ticed as a mandated delegate relationship. Consultation between representative and constituency (volunteers) is practiced frequently. Volunteers are informed and are able to form an opinion about decisive matters. The urgency of this kind of delegate representation is not perceived at the level of organization employees. Here the mode of representation dialogue changes from delegation to trusteeship. The expression of the represented is not that frequently and thoroughly practiced. The medium of communication is also very different. While the dialogue with volunteers is always local and face-to-face, the communication with different national organizations and board members for example is often done by e-mail. It can be said that the form of communication reinforces the tight bonds between volunteers and representatives and the loose relationship between representatives and other national stake holders. The disembodiment of the communication between representatives and represented leads to a decreasing bindingness of this representational practice.

(3) Considerate representative claims-making. As a specific characteristic of non-electoral representation, the claims-making gives much responsibility to the representatives. Thus, I focus on this specific characteristic by evaluating in how far there is a plurality of discourses claimed to be represented in the network and how explicit and well-founded representative claims are presented to the public and the constituency.

The representative claims within the two networks are what Saward defines as claims of “wider interests and new voices” (2010: 99). He further subdivides these claims into categories, one of them being stakeholder claims: “based on the notion that one stands for or speaks for a group that has a material stake in a process or a decision” (ibid.).

While internal representative claims made by national representatives in the CCC-network are articulated in a quite confident manner, the claims to represent the wider causes and people for whom/which campaigns are made for are articulated much more cautious. A second interesting finding in the networks is that those cautious representative claims are complemented by claims that target abstract concepts such as corporate social responsibility or sustainability. Representing such abstract concepts is also a consequence of the lack of a well-defined constituency. The dissolving borders in and between constituencies lead to representative claims of for example workers’ rights, which can be applied to many different constituencies without running the risk of making too bold claims about a specific constituency of people.

The representative claims made in the FoE-network are often very considerate and well-founded. Network members are cautious in making too bold representative claims and are rather relating their claims to the federation of FoE or the own organization, but never to a concrete external constituency. The only claim that is made in this direction is vaguely referring to

giving more voice to the environment. Thus, network members in the FoE-network are very sensitive towards claims-making and back up every claim by reasonable argumentations and the reference to the legitimacy of their claim. Thus, representatives in both networks are very aware of the necessity to make claims that position themselves in the role of democratically legitimate representatives.

Dissolved Boundaries in and between Constituents and Representatives: Conclusions

Representation practices in TCSNs are rooted in a direct horizontal democratic control. Since there are no hierarchical institutions of democratic government and control, accountability and balance of power is established and controlled through peer-to-peer practices. Whereas state democracy is thought of as a control of the many over the few, where the few have more power and responsibilities and must be accountable to the many, in transnational networks such as the examined networks, there is no such hierarchical differentiation. Formally all members in the network have similar power and responsibilities. There are temporary representatives, who have more responsibilities, but these positions can change from one project to the next one, or even from one meeting to another.

Accountability of representatives within the networks is interpreted as a horizontal accountability between peers. Representatives are selected among a relative small group of colleagues in the organization members at the national level. At the transnational level, representatives of the campaign network are equally accountable horizontally to their colleagues in other countries. Thus, a peer-to-peer monitoring as a form of holding unelected representatives accountable (see Castiglione & Warren 2006; Sørensen & Torfing 2010) is practiced between peers in the national organization and between peers in the network across country borders. Thus, the circle of accountability holders for one representative is widened and the roles of accountability holders and accountability holdees are not fixed (see Esmark 2007). However, when representatives of national organizations for example go to transnational meetings and practice representation, there is often no clear point in time before or after representative tasks, when representatives are either authorized beforehand or held accountable afterwards. There are instances of authorization and accountability, but these instances are practiced in a continuous and not always clearly timed dialogue-based form of interaction between representatives and the represented. As one interviewee noticed, this form of giving representative a mandate or hold them accountable is an “organic” process (see F4) that develops over time but not in a pre-determined manner. This gives more responsibility to the representatives who better oversee the issues under discussion at transnational meetings. This greater responsibility necessitates that representatives are trusted by their accountability holders. Due to the rather common interests in civil society networks between representatives and represented, trust is a good basis for representa-

tion. Trust becomes even more relevant as these TCSNs can seem complex and opaque to individual members, which can result in rather uncrystallized interests on for example which strategic decision to take on a specific network campaign that the individual member may only barely know about. Mansbridge (1999) argued that under these conditions, representation by deliberation among representatives and a resemblance of representative and represented are the best way to practice representation. This can be clearly observed in the network. Even so can we observe instances of gyroscopic representation, when representatives with much experience use their own knowledge to make 'good' decisions. However, the extensive deliberation processes that Mansbridge envisioned are simply not practicable due to time restraints, different priority settings and lack of resources, as many interviewees state. Although representation based on trust is, as Castiglione and Warren (2006) argued, a good way to solve the problem of time-consuming control mechanisms, I argue that this can only be realized through instantaneous and direct representation practices. In the representation practices of the two networks, there are only rare occurrences of authorization acts at one point in time. Authorization is rather a continuous matter of dialogue between representatives and represented. Since representation is already a form of indirect democracy, the contact between representatives and represented should not be indirect. The mediated communication via e-mail for example loosens the bond of accountability. The necessity for prompt responsiveness is literally not given. This is true for both sides of representation. Thus, the horizontal representation practices need the direct contact between representatives and constituency in order to enforce accountability.

Regarding the representation of affected or beneficiary constituencies, it is clearly avoided by network members to make representative claims about "external" constituencies, e.g. all workers in a specific industry or all populations affected by climate change. This is not to say that the existence of affected constituencies is denied. Representative claims are rather articulated on a meta-level. Network members claim to represent concepts such as a living wage or sustainable agriculture instead of concrete, real constituencies. Thus, there is no direct accountability-giver in the sense of democratic representation. It can be claimed that accountability functions as accountability-by-proxy (Koenig-Archibugi & Macdonald 2013). Since activists, as solidaristic proxies hold companies and political decision-makers accountable on behalf of the affected constituency in a way that is very sensitive towards the affected constituency, one can speak of an indirect accountability within the network that can be evaluated as democratically legitimate.

The relationship between formality and democracy is a contested field in both networks. It is also crucial for the conceptualization of democracy as practice. How much institutionalization is necessary to establish democratic practice? The positioning of interviewees range from the equation of formality with democratic quality to the argument that formal procedures un-

dermine motivations to participate. While formal procedures are a very important cornerstone of the functioning of both networks, they are at the same time deterrent for local activists or volunteers. As one interviewee notes, there are people who just want to “do something about fair clothing”; they do not want to be involved in bureaucratic procedures within the network. They just want to be temporarily active for this cause (C1, P.114). Thus, formal procedures can be demotivating for participation in general. What can be observed as well is that the formality of procedures and contacts seems to decrease in the margins of the network (C2, P. 92). There is a loose network “in the south”, and the contacts to the partner organizations in the periphery are also rather informal (C3, P.89). Also, the formal and rightful participation of international partners in the European network is something that is seen as a structural and democratic improvement: “we want to like to change the structure maybe to include to have more formal representation of southern organizations in it” (C2, P.92).

When it comes to concrete participation in meetings, the participation practices are framed by rules, that ensure equality on the one hand, and effectiveness and efficiency on the other hand. Being efficient is necessary for staying focused in the democratic process of decision-making, as one campaigner argues: “This democratic process is SO BROAD that sometime you lose the point, but fortunately that there is people that is involved enough to get you back to the right point and is very well organized at european level especially” (F6, P. 58). Rules are good to ensure a certain goal orientation, but there must be people who implement the rules and monitor the compliance with these rules.

Thus, the evaluation of formality in the networks and how it contributes to more democracy is ambivalent. On the one hand, formal procedures secure the democratic quality of democratic practices; on the other hand, formal procedures demotivate activists to participate.

8 Conclusions: Democracy in Contexts of Dissolving Boundaries

“In a world (...) where transnational actors and forces cut across the boundaries of national communities in diverse ways, the questions of who should be accountable to whom, and on what grounds, do not easily resolve themselves. Overlapping spheres of influence, interference, and interest create fundamental problems at the centre of democratic thought, problems which ultimately concern the very basis of democratic authority” (Held 2003: 522)

The aim of this study was to explore the forms of political practices in TCSNs and to evaluate how democratic these political practices are according to the theoretical framework based on more recent procedural concepts of participatory, representative and deliberative democracy. As a first step, the concept of practice was introduced and adapted to the theoretical framework in order make participatory, representative and deliberative democracy visible in TCSNs. TCSNs

are rather informal, not very institutionalized structures (compared to nation states) and thus institutional democracy cannot be observed in TCSNs.

The main empirical finding of this study is that democratic practice can be observed in both of the two networks in various forms, mostly dependent on the commitment and capacity of involved actors and the structural preconditions of these networks. While the structural influencing factors are similar in both networks, the commitment and capacities of actors make up for changing practices within the networks and between the networks. On a theoretical level, it can be concluded that the perspective on practice opens the spectrum of possible democratic forms in transnational relations. Although democracy can be practiced without the prior existence of institutions, it can be observed that practices either develop into routines and become institutionalized or the democratic norms inherent in democratic practices are in need of constant actualizations (see Blee 2012).

In general, it can be observed that political practices take place in a space of overlapping spheres of responsibility, interactive modes of coordination and very transparent and open modes of communication. This leads to a very participatory and open practice on the one hand, and a tendency towards over-complexity and disembodiment on the other hand. While the network actors have a clear understanding of their participatory democratic ideals and the opportunities to live this inclusive democracy, they are at the same time constrained by the overwhelming complexity of coordination practices and the forms of disembodied online communication. The study does not confirm the assumption that fluid, temporary and complex network structures generally deteriorate democratic norms. It could indeed be observed, that the complexity of the network structures and the overlapping spheres of decision-making make it more difficult for network actors to participate, make democratic decisions or hold their representative accountable. However, the findings of the interview analysis also show that democratic practices can be very innovative on the one hand, and can be guided by an implicit normativity that creates very stable democratic practices on the other hand. This confirms the normative claim by Nullmeier and Pritzlaff (2010) that an explicit normativity must be complemented by an implicit normativity which comes into being in political practices (Nullmeier & Pritzlaff 2010). Considering this implicit normativity in political practices allows us to detect democratic practice, where it would otherwise be overseen. The conceptual focus on practices can help theorize the forms of democracy that occur below the level of institutions (Nullmeier 2003: 18). The “in-process” normativity of practices (Nullmeier & Pritzlaff 2010: 357) becomes especially relevant in spheres, where explicit normativity in the form of explicit formal rules hardly exists. The diagnosis for democracy in a transnational sphere would be very pessimistic, if explicit normativity was the only guarantee for democratic quality. As stated earlier, TCSNs lack many conditions of democratic con-

trol and rule compliance. Since democratic practice can be observed in TCSNs, there must be another form of binding normativity that is inherent in the practice, constituted in-process. However, democratic practices and democratic institutions cannot be seen as mutual exclusive concepts.

David Held identifies the main struggle of democracy in the lacking institutionalization of transnational spheres: Dissolving boundaries and overlapping responsibilities and interests create a problem of equivocal accountabilities. Democracy is thought of as a principle to govern in a community that needs to be rooted in defined borders. These borders are crossed in transnational democracy and thus, Held speaks of “fundamental problems at the centre of democratic thought”.

These fundamental problems of democratic thought also relate to the main topic of this study. In TCSNs, the tensions between practices and institutions, between stability and temporality become apparent. While democratic theorists argue that democracy should be always subject to change, many democratic institutions gain their democratic quality from their stability. The findings of this study speak to this democratic tension. The contribution of this study is two-fold. (1) I argued conceptually to integrate the practice account into the assessment of democratic quality. (2) I could find through this conceptualization of democratic practice a number of characteristic political practices within the two TCSNs and could evaluate the democratic quality of these political practices with the analytical scheme I developed.

(1) The Theoretical Contribution of a Democracy as Practice

Democratic entrenchment of transnational democracy and governance networks is often conceptualized with institutional control measures such as the anchor of a territorially defined citizenry, the governance by elected politicians in governance networks (Sørensen & Torfing 2005) or the ideas of an “architecture” (Zürn 2002) of transnational democracy. I argue that those institutional measures are difficult to apply in a sphere of informality and dissolving boundaries. As argued before, there is no defined demos in transnational relations (see: Näsström 2010), nor are there formally elected representatives. Whereas norms and practices of democracy can be found in TCSNs, there are obviously very different preconditions of democracy than in nation states. Hierarchical institutions and clear borders as the anchors of state democracy do not exist in transnational networks. Thus, democracy in TCSNs must be rooted differently.

In defining the analytic framework of this study, I argued that democracy should be observed in practices rather than institutions. Practice is a relevant analytical category in order to identify democracy in TCSNs and to evaluate its quality. The institutional construction of a transnational

democracy is too vague and utopian. Concrete democratic practices need to be examined in order to think about a functioning and legitimate transnational democracy. However, the open question remains how practices can solidly be evaluated. It can be criticized in this study that the evaluation criteria still remain in a partly institutionalist logic. In this regard, it must be asked whether “only” the forms and practices of democracy should change, or whether democracy’s norms should be rethought, too (Bohman 2007). I argue that the core of democracy, namely the “empowered inclusion of those affected in collective decisions and actions” (Warren 2006: 386) should not be subject to change. However, with the development of procedural concepts of democracy such as deliberative democracy, we could already witness a modification of democratic norms. As for example Dingwerth and Blauburger (2011) define three dimensions of criteria to evaluate transnational democracy as (1) participation and inclusiveness, (2) democratic control and (3) discursive quality, it seems that the norm of good deliberation arrived as a corner stone of democratic norms in a transnational democracy. Although I argue that there is a core of democratic norms that should remain at any rate, there are questions arising on how democratic control should be thought of differently. The criterion of democratic control as an institutionalist and formalistic criterion of democracy seems indispensable. The present study showed that formalistic criteria are not always applicable in the empirical reality of TCSNs because formalized instances of e.g. democratic control are only rarely installed, and do not guarantee for substantive democratic practices. If for example participatory decision-making is formalized, the actual practice can still be of rather elitist or exclusive character. Thus, I argue that the study of democratic practice must concentrate more on substantive practices than on formalistic accounts of democratic institutions.

Still, empirical reality is not that easily fenced in by democratic theory. As it is observed, “the nature and quality of democracy within a particular community and the nature and quality of democratic relations among communities are interlocked” (Held 2003: 524). The TCSNs, observed in this study, are networks of different local communities. Their local forms of practicing democracy influence the transnational network level and vice versa. Thus, the complexity of multi-level interactions influences democratic practices and makes it even more difficult to formulate or practice democratic norms that are universally applicable.

(2) The Empirical Exploration of Political Practice and its Democratic Aspirations

The TCSNs that were observed in this study can be distinguished from institutionalized democracy systems by their geographical dispersion, dissolution of boundaries, indistinct roles and fluid responsibilities, disembodied communication and a multiplication of interaction forums. Virtually every political practice in those networks is interactive. Mutual dialogue prevails over a unidirectional chain of command. Information flows and a stimulating diversity among network

members contribute to a very pro-active form of democratic decision-making. At the same time, political practices in the two TCSNs become disembodied practices in many respects. Due to the necessity of online communication between network members, dispersed in different countries and continents, practices of deliberation, representation and participation become disentangled from face-to-face communication and personal contacts.

Overall, contrary tendencies towards democratic norms can be observed in the two networks. While participatory claims of empowerment and transparency are eagerly pursued, inclusion in the networks is often subject to authoritative decisions of individuals. Similar tendencies can be observed in the democratic criterion of decentralization and autonomy of network members. Although the two networks are much decentralized and the autonomy of network members is formally granted, the contrary positionings of interviewees in the margins of the network rather point to potentials of dependencies and centralization. Besides this, the very strong commitment to participatory democracy and the flexible roles inside the networks can contribute to more democratic participation practices and a better self-imposed democratic control over power.

Deliberative democracy is practiced with a strong commitment to democratic norms of deliberation of organizers and participants. This strong commitment positively influences the democratic quality of deliberation, as in the phase of agenda setting and in the structuration of deliberation. However, it can also impede effective deliberation through a complexity of preparation and a fixation on consensus. Furthermore, there are many observed practices that underpin the thesis that disembodied deliberation, as in online Skype or telephone deliberation is reducing the equality and balance of voice in deliberation. Although the Skype meetings give much broader access to virtually everyone with an Internet connection, it makes the practice of exchanging ideas and taking decisions itself more difficult and less balanced and power-free. In addition to the impediments of digital communication, many deliberation and participation practices have the potential to stick less to democratic norms over time. They are very democratically planned, but often lose the bindingness to participatory and deliberative norms in the course of the cooperation. There are for example many concepts used to democratize deliberation, but it could be observed that facilitators or other participants often use short cuts or frame deliberation processes in order to enforce a specific decision or simply save time. Deliberation is conducted in virtual conference rooms, representation is practiced through the exchange of e-mails, and participation practices are spread in a multitude of local spaces, connected through the Internet. What can be found in the interviews is that democratic practices need face-to-face contacts and “real” personal meetings. E-mail communication and Skype meetings are only moderate substitutes for face-to-face discussions.

Representation practices vary according to the specific constituencies that are targeted. While the instruction and selection of national representatives, who are sent to international meetings, is a rather informal practice based on trust, the accountability towards workers is taken much more seriously. Similarly, representative claims towards workers are made only cautiously. Thus, the external dimension of representation of the affected constituency is much more democratically (self-) controlled than the international dimension of the representation of national groups within the internal network. While participatory or deliberative democracy is difficult to practice in a constant democratic way, representation practices seem to be very democratic over time. The innovative ways of handling representation in the FoE network show that different practices of representation can emerge, which can be legitimized with existing norms of democratic representation. Moreover, it can be observed that representatives often follow an implicit normativity, which they have internalized very strongly but which is not explicitly formulated or written down.

The above named transnational network characteristics of dissolving boundaries, disembodied communication and multiple interferences translate into a re-interpretation of democratic practice. Dissolved boundaries are reflected in representation practices: the boundaries between constituents and representatives blur, the constituency as a territorially defined demos does not exist. Dissolved boundaries precipitate also changed participation practices. It is not clearly defined who is to participate in the network practices, the information sharing is practiced with varying participants. Disembodied communication is clearly affecting deliberation practices. It limits opportunities to equalize and balance deliberation. Disembodied communication limits representation practices in a similar way. The opportunities to hold representatives accountable are weaker due to the lack of bindingness. Disembodied communication has the advantage of gaining a broader scope, reaching broader circles of persons and organizations. At the same time, this expansion of participation diminishes the bindingness and control opportunities within the practices. Lastly, multiple interferences affect the participation practices in a way that practices become more interactive between different levels of participation while at the same time becoming more complex and difficult to time.

Although both civil society networks are committed to democratic principles, there is a need to actualize the binding character of these principles through face-to-face political practices. Online communication as a daily practice of democracy in transnational networks can work as a way to provide and distribute information, keep in touch and update involved persons about the current situation of a campaign. These practices can further equality and transparency. However, these kinds of practices cannot *account* for democratic legitimation, be it control and accountability. Thus, those practices must be rooted. If roots do not develop out of a distinct collectivity,

they must be pro-actively sought through frequent direct interaction. Without the clear structuration of an institutional democracy, the commitment of involved actors is much more important and must be fostered. The binding character of democracy is even more in need of actualizations and reinforcements in the fluid and digital spheres of TCSNs than in institutionalized democracy.

Critical Remarks and Future Research

The data basis grounded on qualitative interviews with activists in two TCSNs is of course limited. In particular for the further study of democratic practice, research can be done with methods of participant observation in order to come closer to the democratic practices as such. However, the chosen method of qualitative interviews provided the opportunity to gather richer data about the positioning and agency of network actors, which reveals power (im-) balance, the exercise of democratic rights and the fulfilling of obligations. However, this empirical complexity could not be in every detail bound back to democratic theory. That is why specific relevant observations were selected. Another critical point of this qualitative study is of course the European perspective on the subject. Although the primary interest of this research was on the TCSNs inside Europe, the study underlined that the perspective of non-European network organizations must be taken into account when interpreting the democratic practice inside Europe.

Formality, a localized community, collective identity, defined geographical boundaries let a state democracy function. TCSNs are mainly characterized by informality, a geographically dispersed and definitional diffuse community, a multitude of local collective identities, fluid boundaries. These unfavorable conditions for principle-led, binding practices of democracy suggest that personal commitment to a democratic normativity is much more important in a practiced network democracy than in the conventional institutional state democracy. Although globalization processes led to the tendency that even in the nation state, territorial political communities do not exist “in isolation as bounded geographical totalities” (Held 2003: 517), the transnational democracy practices of civil society networks differ not only gradually from liberal democracy bound in a nation state. Liberal democracy is almost exclusively connected to the principles and institutions of the modern nation state (ibid.). Held names these taken-for-granted principles as “the link between the demos, citizenship, electoral mechanisms, the nature of consent and the boundaries of the nation state”. This “entrenchment of accountability and democratic legitimacy inside state boundaries” (ibid.) is lacking in TCSNs. Political communities are not clearly defined inside state borders and thus the ideal of a community of fate identifying the common good as what is best for the collectivity is not applicable in transnational networks. There is a political community, but it is not assembled in one democratic system. Network members are living in different nation states and the regulation inside the network is not that explicit and institutional-

ized as in nation state democracies. Furthermore, the boundaries of the network are not explicitly defined. In these networks, democratic entrenchment is not an a priori fact of state borders; it is a condition that needs to be constituted through democratic practice.

The analytical shift from democratic institutions to democratic practice in transnational relations does not cure the problems of transnational democracy. Even in the sphere of transnational civil society, where democracy is probably practiced most enthusiastically, the democratic quality is mixed. However, the practice lens made democratic practices visible that can contribute to a better understanding of the functioning of democracy at the transnational level.

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