RESEARCH CLUSTER WORKING PAPER SERIES
“BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND SOCIETAL TRANSFORMATION”

NO. 5 JUNI 2026

Redistribution Preferences of Right-Wing Populists: Deservingness, Ideology and Selective Redistribution

Greta Kyriakidou-Schoolmann,
Fabian Paetzel, Christoph A. Schütt

WISSENSCHAFTSRAUM VERHALTENSÖKONOMIK
UND GESELLSCHAFTLICHE TRANSFORMATION

Gefördert durch
zukunft. niedersachsen
Ein Förderprogramm des Niedersächsischen Ministeriums für Wissenschaft und Kultur und der VolkswagenStiftung.

Redistribution Preferences of Right-Wing Populists: Deservingness, Ideology and Selective Redistribution

Greta Kyriakidou-Schoolmann[1], Fabian Paetzel[1], and Christoph A. Schütt[2,3]

[1]TU Clausthal, Clausthal, Germany

[2]Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Hamburg, Germany

[3]Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel, Germany

Abstract

Right-wing populist parties increasingly shape welfare state politics, yet whether their exclusionary conceptions of solidarity translate into concrete redistribution decisions remains unclear. We investigate this question with a third-party allocation experiment, a context that allows us to observe redistribution behavior independently of self-interest. We asked a representative sample of Germans to allocate resources between individuals who varied in citizenship (native vs. immigrant) and employment status (employed vs. unemployed). We conceptualize selective redistribution as an expression of welfare chauvinism and test whether a universalistic policy framing can attenuate such patterns by framing redistribution as a minimal-income. We find that with increasing right-wing orientation, redistribution becomes strongly selective and systematically favors native, employed recipients. Individuals with stronger right-wing populist orientations redistribute less overall and exhibit substantially greater selectivity, imposing the largest penalties on unemployed immigrants. The minimum income–like framing neither increases redistribution nor moderates the ideological differences in allocation behavior. These findings provide behavioral evidence that welfare chauvinist attitudes translate into concrete redistribution decisions and are not moderated even under a minimum income–like framing, highlighting ideological constraints on the political feasibility of universal welfare reforms.

JEL classification: C92, D31, D63, H53, D72

Keywords: Right-Wing Populism, Redistribution, Welfare State, Political Ideology

1 Introduction

Redistribution is a core function of modern welfare states and a central object of political debate (Korpi and Palme, 1998; Alesina et al., 2004). While a large literature has examined how material self-interest and fairness considerations shape support for redistribution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Cappelen et al., 2007; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011), a growing body of research shows that ideological orientations and group-based considerations play a crucial role in determining who is considered deserving of collective support (Corneo and Grüner, 2000; Van Oorschot, 2006; Klor and Shayo, 2010). These considerations are central not only to economic policy but also to broader debates about social cohesion, democratic legitimacy, and the sustainability and development of welfare states in increasingly diverse societies.

This is particularly evident in the rise of right-wing populist parties across European democracies. These parties have gained substantial electoral support and policy influence in recent years, often participating in government and shaping policy agendas, including welfare state reforms (Mudde, 2007; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Chueri, 2022). While such parties often support welfare provision in principle, they promote exclusionary conceptions of solidarity that prioritize native in-groups and emphasize cultural boundaries of belonging (Mudde, 2004; Lefkofridi and Michel, 2014; Akkerman et al., 2014). This raises a central question: Do such exclusionary conceptions of solidarity translate into actual redistributive decisions about who should receive support?

Research suggests that redistribution preferences are shaped by perceptions of deservingness, combining judgments about group membership with evaluations of effort and contribution (Van Oorschot, 2006; Hager and Veit, 2019; Tepe et al., 2021; Hager et al., 2024; Hsieh and Kline, 2025). Individuals tend to favor recipients perceived as part of the in-group and as having contributed to society, while disadvantaging those seen as outsiders or as failing to exert effort (Durante et al., 2014; Cettolin and Suetens, 2019; Nicklisch and Paetzel, 2020; Schütt et al., 2023; Grimalda et al., 2024). This pattern, often described as

welfare chauvinism, implies that redistribution is not rejected outright but is conditional on morally and socially defined criteria of deservingness (Lefkofridi and Michel, 2014; Marx and Schumacher, 2018; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2018; Busemeyer et al., 2022). At the same time, ideological orientation – particularly right-wing populist attitudes – reinforces these patterns by narrowing the boundaries of solidarity and emphasizing distinctions between "deserving" and "undeserving" groups (Mudde, 2004; Akkerman et al., 2014).

Recent work in economics and political economy has begun to study selective redistribution in behavioral settings, showing that allocation decisions respond systematically to recipient characteristics such as residency status, education, and social integration (Durante et al., 2014; Schütt et al., 2023; Grimalda et al., 2024). These studies highlight the importance of deservingness cues and selective altruism in redistribution decisions (Konow, 2000; Almås et al., 2020; Traub et al., 2023). However, they address neither how ideological orientation affects such behavior nor whether selective redistribution persists when the redistribution is framed as a universalistic benefit (e.g., a minimum income) instead of a particularistic one (e.g., a transfer to defined beneficiaries; Lorenz et al., 2017; Paetzel et al., 2018). Thus, it remains unclear to what extent selective redistribution reflects general deservingness considerations relative to ideologically grounded boundaries of solidarity.

In this study, we provide a behavioral test of whether ideologically bounded solidarity persists in concrete redistribution decisions and under a minimumincome–like framing. We do so using a third-party allocation experiment with a German general population (quasi-representative) sample ($N = 475$), in which participants decide how to redistribute monetary resources between two other individuals who differ in citizenship (native vs. immigrant) and employment status (employed vs. unemployed). This design allows us to observe redistribution behavior independently of self-interest and thereby isolate normative judgments about deservingness and solidarity (Konow, 2000; Cappelen et al., 2007; Almås et al., 2020). By measuring political orientation independently of the allocation

task, using the well-established item of self-placement on the political left–right scale, we conceptualize ideological orientation as a source of heterogeneity in redistribution preferences rather than as a descriptive grouping variable.

Moreover, we leverage policy framing to examine whether a minimum income–like framing alters selective redistribution. Instead of asking participants how much they would transfer to a recipient, we frame the decision in terms of the minimum income a person should receive, thereby shifting the normative context from giving to a minimum income-like provision. This framing – without changing the underlying allocation problem – primes the participant to interpret the redistributive policy according to a universalistic logic, allowing us to test whether selective redistribution persists when redistribution is presented as a basic entitlement rather than a voluntary transfer (Lorenz et al., 2017; Paetzel et al., 2018).

Building on the research on welfare chauvinism, we conceptualize selective redistribution as an expression of ideologically bounded solidarity rather than as a purely context-dependent response to recipient characteristics. Welfare chauvinism implies that support for redistribution is conditional on both group membership and perceived deservingness, favoring native in-groups and individuals seen as contributing members of society (Lefkofridi and Michel, 2014; Marx and Schumacher, 2018; Busemeyer et al., 2022). In this perspective, redistribution decisions are structured by stable ideological boundaries that define who is entitled to collective support. Concretely, citizenship serves as a marker of group membership, distinguishing between in-group members and outsiders (Klor and Shayo, 2010; Eger and Breznau, 2017), while employment status signals effort and contribution, shaping perceptions of moral deservingness (Van Oorschot, 2006; Jæger, 2006; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2018). These dimensions jointly structure redistribution decisions, which should lead to systematic and selective allocation patterns in our experiment.

This framework yields a key implication for institutional design. Universalistic policies – such as minimum income – aim to decouple redistribution from considerations of

individualized deservingness by framing support as a general entitlement (Korpi and Palme, 1998; Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017). However, if redistribution preferences are rooted in deeply held ideological beliefs about group membership and contribution, such framing may be insufficient to alter selective redistribution behavior. We therefore conceptualize the minimum income–like framing as an ideological stress test: It provides a setting in which universalistic principles are salient without altering the underlying allocation problem, allowing us to assess whether ideological boundaries of solidarity persist under universalistic framing.

From this perspective, we derive three hypotheses. First, individuals with stronger right-wing populist orientations should redistribute less overall (*H1a*). Second, redistribution should become more selective with increasing right-wing populist orientation, disadvantaging immigrants and unemployed individuals particularly strongly (*H1b*). Third, a minimum income–like framing should not attenuate these patterns if redistribution behavior is driven by stable ideological constraints rather than by contextual framing (*H2*). By linking political ideology to observed redistribution behavior, this study provides direct behavioral evidence that ideological boundaries of solidarity translate into concrete redistribution decisions and remain robust even under universalistic framing. These findings highlight the limits of policy design in overcoming ideologically grounded selectivity in redistribution and contribute to an interdisciplinary understanding of redistribution in contemporary societies.

2 Methods

2.1 Experimental Design & Procedures

The experiment was conducted online in collaboration with a survey company[1]. A total of 544 subjects participated in the experiment, of whom 485 completed it[2]. Ten participants were excluded for failing the attention check (an instructional item requiring selection of a predefined response option; see Supplementary Information Section S4.2), which yielded a final analysis sample of 475 participants. The sample was selected to be representative of the German population in terms of federal state of residence, age, and gender. Importantly for our research question, the sample is also representative of Germany in terms of political orientation: For instance, 17% of the respondents reported voting for the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD; see Supplementary Information Figs. S1 and S2), a figure that corresponds closely to the share of AfD voters in the 2025 federal election (Die Bundestagswahlleiterin, 2026). Each subject completed the study individually, with the average duration being approximately 20 minutes, and received a fixed payment of 6 € for participation.

The experiment was implemented as a third-party allocation task similar to that in Grimalda et al. (2024) in a combined between- and within-subjects design, allowing us to separately identify overall redistribution levels, selective redistribution based on recipient characteristics, and the moderating role of contextual framing. At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were randomly assigned to one of two framing conditions – a *standard redistribution* frame or a *minimum income* frame – and subsequently made four consecutive allocation decisions and one donation decision. In each allocation decision, subjects received a short description of two other individuals, labeled *Person 1* and *Person 2*, and chose an amount between 0 € and 6 € to reallocate between them (see Fig. 1).

[1] Consumerfieldwork GmbH is a private survey company with an actively maintained panel in Germany. The panel comprises about 50,000 German residents across all age groups and regions.

[2] Ethical approval was granted by the German Association for Experimental Economic Research e.V. with the No. WHVWhq7p

Person 1 corresponded to a "median" German who earned 6 € in a previous questionnaire study and is described as having German citizenship, being employed, and having an income above the poverty line[3]. *Person 1*'s characteristics were constant across all decisions. Subjects could access this information via a tool tip; that is, when they hovered their cursor over the word "poverty line" in the allocation decisions, the definition appeared. *Person 2* did not have the opportunity to earn 6 € in a previous study and had an income below the poverty line. These two characteristics of *Person 2* also remained constant across all decisions. The remaining two characteristics of Person 2 varied along the two dimensions of citizenship (German citizen vs. immigrant) and employment status (employed vs. unemployed), resulting in four distinct allocation decisions. The decisions were randomized within subjects to allow for testing of potential order effects.

In the *standard redistribution* treatment, subjects decided how many euros should be transferred from *Person 1* to *Person 2*. In the *minimum income* treatment, subjects decided the minimum amount in euros that *Person 2* should have – that is, the amount guaranteed to *Person 2*. The underlying payoffs were identical across treatments, differing only in framing.

After completing the four allocation decisions, subjects made two separate donation decisions. In the first, they could choose whether to donate 1 € to the German Foundation for UN-Refugee Aid or the German Red Cross. In the second, they could choose whether to donate 1 € to Ein Herz für Rentner e.V. or Arche für Obdachlose e.V.[4] (see Supplementary Information Section S3 for a detailed analysis).

Finally, subjects completed a post-experimental questionnaire eliciting their sociodemographic information, political attitudes, attitudes toward immigration[5], populism, and

[3] In Germany, the poverty line is defined as an income of 1,189 € for a single household and 2,973 € for a household with two children older than 14 years (Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut (WSI), 2024).

[4] These two German foundations support pensioners living in poverty and homeless people in Germany, respectively.

[5] For detailed descriptive results regarding the attitudes towards migration across voter groups and attitudes towards whether migrants are a burden on the German welfare state according to left–right political orientation, see Supplementary Information Section S1.5.



Fig. 1: Allocation decision in the *standard redistribution* framing.

Note: For an example screen of the allocation decision task in the *minimum income* framing, see Supplementary Information Section S.3.

universal basic income as well as measures of personal identity and social preferences (see Supplementary Information Section S4.2).

2.2 Statistical Analysis

Our analysis exploits both within- and between-subject variation generated by the experimental design. The two main outcomes are (1) the total amount redistributed across the allocation decisions and (2) the amount allocated to *Person 2* in each allocation decision. These outcomes capture both overall and selective redistribution levels based on *Person 2*'s characteristics.

To examine overall redistribution, we estimate linear regression models in which total redistribution is regressed on political orientation, with controls for sociodemographics.

Political orientation is treated as a continuous variable. To measure political ideology, we use as key independent variable self-placement on the political left–right scale. The validity of such self-placement as a proxy for political ideology is supported by the strong positive correlation between right-leaning placement and scores on the populism index (Pearson correlation test: $r = 0.23$, $t(1898) = 9.86$, $p < .001$; see Supplementary Information Fig. S4). Additionally, the median voter for the AfD, a party officially classified as right-wing populist, places herself on the right (7), reinforcing the link between right-leaning orientation, populist attitudes, and voting behavior (see Supplementary Information Section S1.1 for more information about left–right placement across voter groups). Because the allocation decisions have no material consequences for the participants themselves, the coefficients can be interpreted as reflecting differences in redistribution preferences rather than strategic behavior (e.g., Cappelen et al., 2007; Grimalda et al., 2024).

To examine selective redistribution, we exploit the within-subject variation in citizenship and employment.[6] We estimate models in which the amount allocated to *Person 2* is regressed on indicators for recipient characteristics, political orientation, and their interactions. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level to account for repeated observations.

To assess whether framing moderates the association between political orientation and redistribution behavior, we interact political orientation with the framing condition and recipient characteristics. Because the framing is randomly assigned between subjects, any differences in outcomes across framing conditions can be interpreted as causal effects of framing.[7]

All models include standard sociodemographic controls. The results are robust to alterna-

[6] All models include controls for presentation order (via indicators for decision position), the estimates for which are not reported. We find no systematic evidence of order effects: Only the fourth decision shows a modest negative coefficient relative to the first, consistent with mild fatigue given the randomized order. We therefore do not consider order effects further (see Supplementary Information Table S2).

[7] To assess potential sampling imbalances between the treatment groups, we conducted Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (see Supplementary Information Table S1). The tests show no systematic differences in sociodemographic characteristics or political orientation across treatments.

tive specifications. For all regressions, we also conducted Tobit models and calculated the corresponding average marginal effects (AMEs), which yield qualitatively the same results (see Supplementary Information Table S3). The results are also supplemented by analyses of the donation decisions reported in Supplementary Information Section S1.2.

3 Results

3.1 Redistribution Across Recipient Characteristics

We begin by examining the overall level and structure of redistribution in the third-party allocation task. Across all allocation decisions, participants redistributed on average 2.46 € out of the available 6 €, corresponding to 40.1% of the maximum possible transfer[8]. This level of redistribution is comparable to the average transfers reported in other third-party allocation experiments that abstract from self-interest, including recent work on redistribution preferences (e.g., Grimalda et al., 2024) and classic studies on fairness and deservingness norms (e.g, Cappelen et al., 2007; Konow, 2000). The substantial average level of redistribution indicates a general willingness to support redistribution even when allocation decisions have no consequences for participants' own material payoffs. Transfers in third-party allocation experiments generally exceed those in the classic dictator game (e.g, Engel, 2011; Traub et al., 2023), in which the decision-maker chooses how much of her own money she wants to give to a recipient.

Concurrently, redistribution varies systematically with the characteristics of *Person 2*. Figure 2 shows a clear ordering of transfers across recipient types (*Person 2* characteristics), with employed German recipients receiving the highest transfers ($M = 2.76$, $SD = 1.68$), followed by unemployed German recipients ($M = 2.53$, $SD = 1.73$) and employed immigrants ($M = 2.42$, $SD = 1.76$), while unemployed immigrants ($M = 2.13$, $SD = 1.8$)

[8]For descriptive results on the median amount redistributed across recipient characteristics in the treatments, see Supplementary Information Figs. S16 and S17.

receive the lowest transfers. This ordering is statistically significant, according to pairwise Wilcoxon signed rank tests[9]. This pattern indicates that redistribution behavior reflects both group-based and merit-based evaluations rather than a uniform concern for reducing inequality.



Fig. 2: Average amount redistributed across allocation decisions (pooled over the redistribution and minimum income–like treatments)

Note: Significance levels from pairwise Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are shown above the boxplots. *n.s.* = not significant, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 1 reports pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates confirming these patterns. Relative to employed German recipients, the baseline category combining the characteristics of in-group membership with high perceived deservingness, all other recipient types receive significantly lower transfers. Unemployed German recipients receive moderately lower transfers ($\beta = -0.283$, $SE = 0.068$, $p < 0.001$), but employed immigrants ($\beta = -0.341$, $SE = 0.058$, $p < 0.001$) and especially unemployed immigrants ($\beta = -0.682$, $SE = 0.081$, $p < 0.001$) face substantial reductions (see Table 1 model (2)). Wald tests confirm that these differences are statistically significant not only relative

[9]G&U vs. G&E: $V = 5464.0$, $z = -17.06$, $p < .001$; G&U vs. I&U: $V = 11935.0$, $z = -14.90$, $p < .001$; G&U vs. I&E: $V = 11828.0$, $z = -14.93$, $p < .001$; G&E vs. I&U: $V = 22404.0$,4$z = -11.40$, $p < .001$; G&E vs. I&E: $V = 10197.0$, $z = -15.48$, $p < .001$; I&U vs. I&E: $V = 5494.5$, $z = -17.05$, $p < .001$

to the baseline category but also across recipient types, indicating that the transfers vary systematically with both recipient citizenship and employment status (see lower panel of Table 1). These patterns remain substantively unchanged when we control for sociodemographics and political attitudes, confirming that selective redistribution is not driven by compositional differences across respondents.

Taken together, these findings provide clear behavioral evidence of overall selective redistribution. Although participants are generally willing to redistribute substantial resources, transfer decisions systematically favor in-group members and employed recipients over out-group members and unemployed individuals.

3.2 Political Orientation and Selective Redistribution

We next examine whether political orientation is associated with overall redistribution levels and with selective redistribution across recipient characteristics. Fig. 3 illustrates a clear negative association between right-leaning political orientation and total redistribution across the four allocation decisions. Individuals with a stronger right-leaning political orientation redistribute fewer resources on average (Jonckheere–Terpstra test: $JT = 597{,}701$, $p < 0.001$). The decreasing relationship indicates substantial heterogeneity in redistribution behavior across the political orientation scale.

Table 1: Pooled OLS estimates on the determinants of the redistributed amount in the vignettes

	Dependent variable: Amount redistributed (0–6)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
minimum income frame	0.064	0.064	0.083	0.080	0.300
	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.135)	(0.136)	(0.415)
German & unemployed		-0.283***	-0.283***	-0.283***	0.061
		(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.158)
immigrant & unemployed		-0.682***	-0.682***	-0.682***	0.555**
		(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.170)
immigrant & employed		-0.341***	-0.341***	-0.341***	0.542***
		(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.133)
pol. orientation			-0.231***	-0.218***	-0.068
			(0.038)	(0.046)	(0.062)
pol. orientation × German & unemployed					-0.072*
					(0.032)
pol. orientation × immigrant & unemployed					-0.258***
					(0.036)
pol. orientation × immigrant & employed					-0.183***
					(0.031)
pol. orientation × minimum income					-0.046
					(0.077)
intercept	2.428***	2.828***	3.708***	3.710***	2.990***
	(0.099)	(0.123)	(0.516)	(0.578)	(0.634)
Sociodemographic Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political Attitudes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Order Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. Obs.	1900	1900	1900	1900	1900
R^2	0.000	0.018	0.084	0.087	0.098
Adj. R^2	-0.000	0.014	0.076	0.075	0.085
RMSE	1.75	1.74	1.68	1.67	1.66
Wald-χ^2 (G&U, I&U)		$\chi^2 = 32.20$			
		($p < 0.000$)			
Wald-χ^2 (I&U, I&E)		$\chi^2 = 31.57$			
		($p < 0.000$)			
Wald-χ^2 (G&U, I&E)		$\chi^2 = 9.57$			
		($p = 0.008$)			
Wald-χ^2 (pol. orientation × G&U, pol. orientation × I&U)					$\chi^2 = 19.98$
					($p < 0.000$)
Wald-χ^2 (pol. orientation × I&U, pol. orientation × I&E)					$\chi^2 = 19.88$
					($p < 0.000$)
Wald-χ^2 (pol. orientation × G&U, pol. orientation × I&E)					$\chi^2 = 9.61$
					($p = 0.008$)

Note: The dependent variable is the amount redistributed (0–6). Estimates are from pooled OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the individual level (in parentheses). Sociodemographic controls include age, gender, place of residence (East/West), education (indicator for academic degree), income, religiosity and migration background. Political attitudes include populism index, satisfaction with democracy, trust in parliament, trade union membership and attitudes toward the European Union. Order effects are included in all specifications. Interaction terms capture heterogeneity by political orientation. Wald tests report joint significance of selected coefficients; reported statistics are χ^2 values with corresponding p-values. The sample consists of 475 participants making 4 consecutive decisions (1,900 observations). Significance levels: $^*p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$.



Fig. 3: Correlation between political orientation and median amount redistributed

This pattern is confirmed by the regression results reported for models (3) and (4) in Table 1. Across specifications that include political orientation, the left–right measure is negatively and statistically significantly associated with the amount redistributed. According to the fully specified model (5) in Table 1 with sociodemographic and political controls, an orientation one unit further right is associated with a reduction in transfers of approximately 0.22€ ($\beta = -0.218$, $SE = 0.046$, $p < 0.001$). This indicates that lower redistribution among individuals with stronger right-leaning political orientation is not driven by compositional differences in socioeconomic characteristics (H1a).

Having established that a right-leaning political orientation is negatively associated with overall redistribution, we now examine whether this relationship differs systematically across recipient characteristics (H1b). Fig. 4 illustrates how redistribution varies jointly with political orientation and recipient characteristics. The figure plots average transfers across the political orientation scale separately for each recipient type. Two patterns emerge: First, redistribution declines with right-wing political orientation across all recipient types, consistent with the negative association between political orientation and overall

redistribution documented above. Second, the slope of this decline differs markedly across vignettes. Transfers to immigrants and unemployed recipients decline more steeply as political orientation shifts rightward, whereas allocations to employed German recipients decrease more gradually. Correspondingly, the differences in redistribution across German and immigrant recipients widen substantially at higher levels of right-leaning political orientation, with unemployed immigrants receiving the lowest transfers from right-leaning allocators. This visual pattern suggests that political orientation is associated not only with lower redistribution overall but also with increasingly selective redistribution across recipient characteristics. Importantly, the increase in selective redistribution along the spectrum of left–right orientation is not sudden but gradual.



Fig. 4: Average redistribution by political orientation and recipient type

To formally test whether political orientation increases selective redistribution, we interact political orientation with each combination of *Person 2* characteristics. The results for model (5) in Table 1 confirm the patterns in Fig. 4. As political orientation shifts rightward, allocations decline more strongly for unemployed German recipients ($\beta = -0.072$, $SE = 0.032$, $p = 0.026$) and for employed immigrants ($\beta = -0.183$, $SE = 0.031$, $p < 0.001$)

and most strongly for unemployed immigrants ($\beta = -0.258$, $SE = 0.036$, $p < 0.001$). These interaction effects are robust to the inclusion of sociodemographic and political controls. The Wald test results in Table 1 (lower panel) confirm that the interaction effects differ significantly across recipient type, indicating that redistribution varies systematically with both citizenship and employment status and that these differences widen with right-leaning political orientation. Taken together, these results show that political orientation shapes not only how much individuals redistribute but also how redistribution is conditioned on group membership and merit-based deservingness; our H1b is thus confirmed. Finally, the association between right-leaning political orientation and redistribution behavior is robust across key sociodemographic groups. Additional interaction models indicate that neither income, education, age, or gender substantially attenuate the estimated effects of political orientation on overall or selective redistribution. Detailed heterogeneity analyses and additional robustness checks are reported in Supplementary Information Section S1.3. Next, we take a closer look at framing.

3.3 Framing Effect

We finally examine whether the framing of redistribution moderates allocation behavior and the association between political orientation and selective redistribution. Recall that participants were randomly assigned to either a *standard redistribution* or a *minimum income* frame, with the underlying allocation problem remaining identical across conditions. The regression results in Table 1 show no effect of framing on overall redistribution. The coefficient on the *minimum income* framing indicator is small and not statistically significant ($\beta = 0.06$, $SE = 0.140$, $p = 0.646$) across specifications, indicating that average transfers do not differ meaningfully between the two frames[10].

Nor does framing moderate selective redistribution across *Person 2* characteristics. The

[10]For more descriptive results on the attitudes of different voter groups toward a universal basic income (UBI) and their support for particular elements of how it could be implemented, see Supplementary Information Section S1.4.

estimates for the interactions of the framing condition and vignette citizenship and employment status indicators are statistically nonsignificant. Wald tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the vignette effects are equal across framing conditions ($\chi^2(2) = 0.26$ ($p = 0.88$); $\chi^2(2) = 0.69$ ($p = 0.71$)), indicating that the degree of selectivity documented in Section 4.1 remains unchanged under the *minimum income* framing.

Taken together, these results indicate that a minimum income–like framing alone is insufficient to alter redistribution behavior or attenuate the exclusionary redistribution patterns associated with a right-leaning political orientation. The minimum income–like framing does not expand the boundaries of solidarity when underlying ideological preferences emphasize deservingness and in-group favoritism. This suggests that an emphasis on need-based fairness or deservingness, which are often viewed as moral principles in the context of redistribution, cannot overcome selectivity in redistribution.

4 Discussion

This study examined how right-leaning political orientation shapes redistribution behavior in a controlled third-party allocation setting. By combining within-subject variation in recipient characteristics with a between-subject framing manipulation, the experiment allowed us to separately observe overall redistribution levels, selective allocation patterns, and the role of a minimum income–like framing.

Three main findings emerge. First, redistribution behavior is strongly selective. Participants are generally willing to redistribute substantial amounts in the absence of self-interest, their but transfers systematically favor native and employed recipients over immigrants and unemployed individuals. This pattern is consistent with behavioral evidence that redistribution preferences are shaped by deservingness considerations and social boundaries rather than by universalist egalitarianism (Konow, 2000; Van Oorschot, 2006; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Traub et al., 2023; Grimalda et al., 2024). These pat-

terns of selectivity persist with controls for individual socioeconomic characteristics, underscoring that they are not driven by compositional differences among participants.

Second, political orientation plays a central role in structuring redistribution behavior. Individuals with a stronger right-leaning political orientation redistribute less overall and display more pronounced selectivity in their allocations across recipient characteristics. These findings align with the literature on welfare chauvinism, which emphasizes support for redistribution that is conditional on in-group membership and deservingness (Lefkofridi and Michel, 2014; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2018; Busemeyer et al., 2022). Rather than rejecting redistribution in general, right-wing populists deem the boundaries of solidarity narrower. The particularly strong disadvantage faced by unemployed immigrants highlights how group- and merit-based deservingness criteria interact in shaping exclusionary redistribution behavior. The consistent increase in selective redistribution with an increasingly right-leaning political orientation can be interpreted as discrimination against immigrants. The astonishing result is that such discrimination increases gradually rather than suddenly with an increase in right-leaning political orientation.

Third, a minimum income–like framing does not affect selective redistribution. Framing redistribution as a minimum income instead of a transfer has no meaningful effect on allocation behavior, nor does it moderate the association between political orientation and redistribution. This null result complements the research showing that support for UBI varies systematically with political orientation and beliefs about deservingness (Vlandas, 2019; Schwander and Vlandas, 2020) but contrasts with the experimental evidence that framing can affect redistribution choices in other contexts with groups of five players and individual involvement (Lorenz et al., 2017; Paetzel et al., 2018). A minimum income–like framing alone may therefore be insufficient to override ideological commitments to deservingness and in-group favoritism.

Together, these findings indicate that redistribution decisions are constrained by ideological boundaries of solidarity. Contextual factors such as framing appear to operate within

rather than reshape these boundaries.

Some limitations should be acknowledged. First, our experimental setting abstracts from the institutional complexity, long-term policy consequences, and strategic considerations that characterize real-world redistribution. While this allows us to identify behavioral mechanisms, it may limit the external validity of our findings. Second, the framing manipulation captures a specific dimension of universalism – normative presentation – rather than full institutional designs. Other features of universalistic policies, such as financing mechanisms or benefit levels, may generate different responses. Third, the analysis focuses on a single national context, and the extent to which these patterns generalize across countries with different welfare regimes and political environments remains an open question.

From a conceptual perspective, the findings provide a behavioral foundation for theories of welfare chauvinism. Our results demonstrate – in contrast to interpretations of welfare chauvinism as solely an attitudinal phenomenon – that exclusionary conceptions of solidarity manifest in concrete allocation decisions even in settings not constrained by self-interest. This suggests that individuals' ideological orientation influences not only how they evaluate policies but also how they behave when making distributive choices.

The findings also have implications for the design of universalistic welfare policies. Universalistic approaches, such as minimum income schemes and UBI, are often motivated by the idea that decoupling redistribution from individualized deservingness can broaden support for redistribution and reduce social divisions (Korpi and Palme, 1998; Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017). However, our results suggest that the framing of redistribution in universalistic terms may be insufficient to overcome selective allocation patterns rooted in deeply held perceptions about membership and contribution. More broadly, this may limit the political potential for inclusive welfare reforms in increasingly diverse societies, as resistance to redistribution may reflect enduring disagreements about the boundaries of social membership and entitlement.

In sum, this study provides direct behavioral evidence that the ideological boundaries of solidarity robustly shape redistribution decisions even under a universalistic framing. These findings highlight the limits of policy design in overcoming ideologically grounded selectivity and underscore the importance of political ideology in structuring redistribution in contemporary societies.

Acknowledgments

We thank participants of the Workshop on Microeconomics (2025) at Leuphana University and the conference of the German Association for Experimental Economic Research (2025) at Helmut-Schmidt University in Hamburg for helpful comments. We also thank members of the Research Cluster "Behavioral Economics and Societal Transformation" for valuable feedback.

References

Akkerman, A., C. Mudde, and A. Zaslove (2014). How populist are the people? measuring populist attitudes in voters. *Comparative political studies 47*(9), 1324–1353.

Alesina, A. and G.-M. Angeletos (2005). Fairness and redistribution. *American economic review 95*(4), 960–980.

Alesina, A., R. Di Tella, and R. MacCulloch (2004). Inequality and happiness: are europeans and americans different? *Journal of public economics 88*(9-10), 2009–2042.

Alesina, A. and P. Giuliano (2011). Preferences for redistribution. In *Handbook of social economics*, Volume 1, pp. 93–131. Elsevier.

Almås, I., A. W. Cappelen, and B. Tungodden (2020). Cutthroat capitalism versus cuddly socialism: Are americans more meritocratic and efficiency-seeking than scandinavians? *Journal of Political Economy 128*(5), 1753–1788.

Baader, M., C. Starmer, F. Tufano, and S. Gächter (2024). Introducing ios11 as an extended interactive version of the 'inclusion of other in the self'scale to estimate relationship closeness. *Scientific Reports 14*(1), 8901.

Busemeyer, M. R., P. Rathgeb, and A. H. Sahm (2022). Authoritarian values and the welfare state: the social policy preferences of radical right voters. *West European Politics 45*(1), 77–101.

Cappelen, A. W., A. D. Hole, E. Ø. Sørensen, and B. Tungodden (2007). The pluralism of fairness ideals: An experimental approach. *American Economic Review 97*(3), 818–827.

Cettolin, E. and S. Suetens (2019). Return on trust is lower for immigrants. *The Economic Journal 129*(621), 1992–2009.

Chueri, J. (2022). An emerging populist welfare paradigm? how populist radical right-wing parties are reshaping the welfare state. *Scandinavian Political Studies 45*(4), 383–409.

Corneo, G. and H. P. Grüner (2000). Social limits to redistribution. *American Economic Review 90*(5), 1491–1507.

Die Bundestagswahlleiterin (2026). Bundestagswahl 2025. Accessed: 2026-02-13.

Durante, R., L. Putterman, and J. Van der Weele (2014). Preferences for redistribution and perception of fairness: An experimental study. *Journal of the European Economic Association 12*(4), 1059–1086.

Eger, M. A. and N. Breznau (2017). Immigration and the welfare state: A cross-regional analysis of european welfare attitudes. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology 58*(5), 440–463.

Engel, C. (2011). Dictator games: A meta study. *Experimental economics 14*(4), 583–610.

Ennser-Jedenastik, L. (2018). Welfare chauvinism in populist radical right platforms: The role of redistributive justice principles. *Social Policy & Administration 52*(1), 293–314.

European Social Survey (2016). *ESS round 8 source questionnaire. ESS ERIC Headquarters c/o City University London*.

Grimalda, G., L. Detlefsen, F. Paetzel, and C. A. Schütt (2024). Preference for redistribution: Does the recipient's residency status, education, and volunteering matter? *Available at SSRN 4578532*.

Hager, A., H. Hilbig, and S. Riaz (2024). Refugee labor market access increases support for immigration. *Comparative Political Studies 57*(5), 749–777.

Hager, A. and S. Veit (2019). Attitudes toward asylum seekers: Evidence from germany. *Public Opinion Quarterly 83*(2), 412–422.

Hsieh, P.-H. and R. Kline (2025). Deservingness heuristics drive redistributive choices, but weights on recipient effort vary. *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications 12*(1), 1–12.

Jæger, M. M. (2006). Welfare regimes and attitudes towards redistribution: The regime hypothesis revisited. *European Sociological Review 22*(2), 157–170.

Klor, E. F. and M. Shayo (2010). Social identity and preferences over redistribution. *Journal of Public Economics 94*(3-4), 269–278.

Konow, J. (2000). Fair shares: Accountability and cognitive dissonance in allocation decisions. *American economic review 90*(4), 1072–1092.

Korpi, W. and J. Palme (1998). The paradox of redistribution and strategies of equality: Welfare state institutions, inequality, and poverty in the western countries. *American sociological review*, 661–687.

Lee, S. (2021). Politics of universal and unconditional cash transfer: Examining attitudes toward universal basic income. *Basic income studies 16*(2), 191–208.

Lefkofridi, Z. and E. Michel (2014). Exclusive solidarity? radical right parties and the welfare state. *Radical Right Parties and the Welfare State (December 2014). Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper* (2014/120).

Lorenz, J., F. Paetzel, and M. Tepe (2017). Just don't call it a tax! framing in an experiment on voting and redistribution. *Journal of Experimental Political Science 4*(3), 183–194.

Marx, P. and G. Schumacher (2018). Do poor citizens vote for redistribution, against immigration or against the establishment? a conjoint experiment in denmark. *Scandinavian Political Studies 41*(3), 263–282.

Meltzer, A. H. and S. F. Richard (1981). A rational theory of the size of government. *Journal of political Economy 89*(5), 914–927.

Morgenstern, S. and C. Vargas-Silva (2025). Gender attitudes, inequality and migration decision-making. *Population, Space and Place 31*(4), e70044.

Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. *Government and opposition 39*(4), 541–563.

Mudde, C. (2007). *Populist radical right parties in Europe*, Volume 22. Cambridge university press Cambridge.

Mudde, C. and C. Rovira Kaltwasser (2018). Studying populism in comparative perspective: Reflections on the contemporary and future research agenda. *Comparative political studies 51*(13), 1667–1693.

Nicklisch, A. and F. Paetzel (2020). Need-based justice and distribution procedures: The perspective of economics. In *Need-Based Distributive Justice: An Interdisciplinary Perspective*, pp. 161–189. Springer.

Paetzel, F., J. Lorenz, and M. Tepe (2018). Transparency diminishes framing-effects in voting on redistribution: Some experimental evidence. *European Journal of Political Economy 55*, 169–184.

Pryce, D. K. (2024). Us residents' current attitudes toward immigrants and immigration: A study from the life in hampton roads survey. *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race*, 1–19.

Ranehill, E. and R. A. Weber (2022). Gender preference gaps and voting for redistribution. *Experimental Economics 25*(3), 845–875.

Rincon, L. and T. Vlandas (2023). Universal basic income: the new political economy of an old idea. In *Handbook of Labour Market Policy in Advanced Democracies*, pp. 309–325. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Schütt, C. A., D. Pipke, L. Detlefsen, and G. Grimalda (2023). Does ethnic heterogeneity decrease workers' effort in the presence of income redistribution? an experimental analysis. *European Journal of Political Economy 79*, 102440.

Schwander, H. and T. Vlandas (2020). The left and universal basic income: The role of ideology in individual support. *Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy 36*(3), 237–268.

Tepe, M., F. Paetzel, J. Lorenz, and M. Lutz (2021). Efficiency loss and support for income redistribution: Evidence from a laboratory experiment. *Rationality and Society 33*(3), 313–340.

Traub, S., M. Schwaninger, F. Paetzel, and S. Neuhofer (2023). Evidence on need-sensitive giving behavior: An experimental approach to the acknowledgment of needs. *Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 105*, 102028.

Van Oorschot, W. (2006). Making the difference in social europe: deservingness perceptions among citizens of european welfare states. *Journal of European social policy 16*(1), 23–42.

Van Parijs, P. and Y. Vanderborght (2017). Basic income: A radical proposal for a free society and a sane economy. In *Basic income*. Harvard University Press.

Vlandas, T. (2019). The politics of the basic income guarantee: Analysing individual support in europe. *Basic Income Studies 14*(1).

Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut (WSI) (2024). Armutsgrenzen nach haushaltstypen. WSI Verteilungsmonitor – Informationen zu Armutsgrenzen nach Haushaltstypen, abgerufen am 26. März 2026.

Supplementary Information

Contents

5 Supplementary Results

5.1 Descriptive statistics

Table 2 shows the basic descriptive statistics of our sample and for each treatment group. The average age of our sample is approximately 49 years, which is slightly older than the average age in Germany in 2024 (44.9%) (Statista, 2025). Looking at the gender distribution in our sample, it is nearly gender-balanced (51.3% female) with only a slightly higher proportion of women. In addition, our sample is somewhat overrepresented for people living in eastern Germany, with 16% of respondents living in the east. According to the Federal Statistical Office (2025), 12.4% of people lived in eastern Germany (Berlin excluded) in 2024.

Regarding income, the sample distribution is skewed towards high income with 10,1% having low income (≤ 1300), 13% low medium income (1301-2000 Euros), 31,2% medium income (2001-3200 Euros) and 45,7% have a high income (> 3200).

23,3% in our sample have low education, 18,2% have vocational training, 34,7% have high education and 23,8% very high education.

The majority in our sample indicate that their political orientation is in the middle of the political spectrum, while 22,9% describe themselves as left-wing and 16,8% as right-wing. Fig. 5 shows the overall distribution of political self-placement, indicating a concentration around the center. In addition, Fig. 6 presents the distribution of voter groups in the sample.

Fig. 7 illustrates the distribution of left–right self-placement across voter groups and confirms the expected ideological differentiation between party supporters. In addition, Fig. 8 shows a positive association between political orientation and populist attitudes, providing further support for the validity of our ideological measures. This yields a balanced distribution of participants across the political extremes. Consequently, our sample includes a substantial number of right-wing populist voters that closely reflects

their prevalence within the German population, even though it was not possible to sample this in advance. Our results can therefore be considered broadly representative of the German population.

To assess whether there are differences between the two treatment groups with regard to the descriptive variables discussed above, we conducted for metric variables Wilcoxon-Ranksum-Tests and for binary variables Fisher-Tests. The distribution of socio-demographic characteristics across treatments, is almost identical, with the exception of the minimum-income frame, which includes a slightly higher proportion of participants from the political extremes (approximately +2%).

Table 2: Summary Statistics

Variables	All	Minimal-Income-Frame	Redistribution Frame	p-values
Age	49.49 (15.651)	49.11 (15.290)	49.86 (16.008)	0.5574
Gender	1.49 (0.504)	1.49 (0.509)	1.49 (0.501)	0.7823
Female	51.3%	51.7%	51%	
Region	0.16 (0.370)	0.16 (0.369)	0.16 (0.369)	1
East	16.3%	16.2%	16.2%	
Income	5.85 (2.051)	5.92 (2.088)	5.79 (2.019)	0.3674
Low	10.1%	9.4%	9.4%	
Low medium	13%	14.7%	14.7%	
Medium	31.2%	32.6%	32.6%	
High	45.7%	43.3%	43.3%	
Education	4.88 (2.453)	4.85 (2.504)	4.91 (2.409)	0.5737
Low	23.3%	23%	23%	
Vocational	18.2%	21.3%	21.3%	
High	34.7%	31.5%	31.5%	
Very high	23.8%	24%	24%	
Political orientation	4.82 (1.829)	4.82 (1.859)	4.82 (1.804)	0.969
Left	22.9%	24.6%	21.2%	
Middle	60.4%	57.3%	63.3%	
Right	16.8%	18.1%	15.5%	

Note: Values are means with standard deviations in parentheses for continuous variables and percentages for categorical variables. $N = 485$. Differences between groups are tested using two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for continuous variables and Fisher's exact tests for categorical variables. Income is categorized as low (≤€1,300), low–medium (€1,301–2,000), medium (€2,001–3,200) and high (>€3,200). Education levels are defined as low (no or lower secondary education), vocational (completed vocational training), high (upper secondary or tertiary education) and very high (university or doctoral degree). Political orientation is measured on an 11-point scale and grouped as left (0–3), middle (4–6) and right (7–10).

5.2 Donation decision

To further assess the external validity of our findings, we analyze respondents' donation decisions. In particular, we examine whether individuals with more right-wing political orientations (a) exhibit a preference for organizations that primarily benefit perceived ingroup members, and (b) apply merit-based criteria in their allocation choices, as reflected in the second donation decision.

With respect to the first donation decision, descriptive evidence indicates that respondents across most voter groups—excluding Green Party supporters—prefer donating to the German Red Cross over UN Refugee Aid (see Fig 20). Results from logistic regression analyses, however, point to a systematic relationship: the probability of donating to the German Red Cross increases with respondents' right-wing political orientation (see Fig. 11). This pattern suggests that donation choices are structured by political attitudes rather than being random.

A comparable relationship is observed in the second donation decision(see 12). Individuals with more right-wing political orientations are more likely to allocate donations to "A Heart for Pensioners" than to homeless aid organizations (see Fig. 13). This finding is consistent with the interpretation that right-wing respondents' allocation decisions are informed by merit-based evaluations of deservingness.

5.3 Heterogeneity analyses

Previous research has shown that age and gender are important predictors of both redistribution behavior (Ranehill and Weber, 2022; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011) and attitudes toward immigration (Pryce, 2024; Morgenstern and Vargas-Silva, 2025). Given that these characteristics are also disproportionately represented within the right-wing cluster, we assess whether the observed behavioral patterns may be driven by underlying sociodemographic differences rather than political attitudes.

To this end, we estimate multivariate linear regression models including interaction terms

between key sociodemographic characteristics and recipient characteristics. This approach allows us to test whether the effects observed for right-wing populist respondents are conditional on age or gender.

The results indicate that none of the interaction terms reach conventional levels of statistical significance (see Fig. 9). This suggests that the observed differences in redistribution behavior are not systematically moderated by these sociodemographic factors. Instead, the findings are consistent with the interpretation that political attitudes and ideological orientations—particularly those related to deservingness and the scope of welfare provision—constitute the primary drivers of redistribution decisions within the right-wing cluster.

5.4 Attitudes towards Universal Basic Income (UBI)

To assess respondents' support for universalistic policy designs, we examine attitudes toward the introduction of a universal basic income (UBI) in Germany. While the experimental component employs a minimum-income framing to capture such preferences, the UBI items provide a complementary measure in a more explicitly universalistic policy domain. Descriptive evidence indicates that center-left voter groups are more likely to support or strongly support such a policy. In relation to *H2*, while a substantial share of AfD voters expresses strong opposition to UBI, the proportion of respondents who can, in principle, envisage its introduction is higher among AfD supporters than among CDU/CSU voters (see Fig. 14).

At the same time, there is considerable heterogeneity in preferences regarding the specific design features of a UBI, reflecting broader political debates and implementation challenges. Within the context of this study, items ubi_5 and ubi_6 (immigrant eligibility) are particularly informative. The results suggest that center-right voters, although not exclusively, are more likely to oppose extending UBI payments to newly arrived immigrants (see Fig. 15). This finding is consistent with prior literature (Section 2.2.4), which

identifies the principle of universality as a central point of contention in UBI debates (Lee, 2021; Rincon and Vlandas, 2023).

Furthermore, the view that eligibility for UBI should be conditional on prior contribution (ubi_2) is more prevalent among center-right respondents, indicating a stronger emphasis on merit-based criteria within this group.

To complement the quantitative findings, we analyze responses to an open-ended question asking participants to describe additional consequences they associate with the introduction of a UBI. Fig. 16 presents a word cloud summarizing the most frequently mentioned terms, thereby providing an exploratory overview of recurring themes in respondents' answers. Frequently occurring terms such as poverty, costs, and immigration suggest that respondents primarily associate UBI with distributional, fiscal, and migration-related considerations. While this visualization does not constitute a systematic text analysis, it offers indicative evidence that complements the observed patterns in attitudes toward UBI and its design features.

5.5 Attitudes towards migration

When examining attitudes toward migration and immigrants, descriptive evidence indicates that AfD voters are more likely than other voter groups to agree with the statement that immigrants and refugees constitute a burden on the German welfare state. Such perceptions may be relevant for understanding observed differences in redistribution behavior.

In addition, 33.8% of AfD voters in our sample report opposing, and a further 23.4% strongly opposing, the provision of financial support to refugees to secure their livelihood (Fig. 17). This pattern suggests comparatively lower levels of support for redistribution toward this group among AfD voters. These attitudes are consistent with the behavioral patterns observed in the allocation decision.

Fig. 18 and Fig. 19 further indicate that these differences are not solely attributable to

party affiliation but are associated with broader ideological orientations. In particular, the results suggest that such attitudes are linked to more authoritarian value dispositions within this voter group.

6 Supplementary Figures



Fig. 5: Distribution of political left–right self-placement in the sample

Note: The histogram displays the distribution of respondents' self-placement on an 11-point left–right scale (0 = left, 10 = right). Bar heights indicate the percentage of respondents in each category.



Fig. 6: Distribution of voter groups in the sample

Note: The figure shows the proportion of respondents by self-reported party preference.



Fig. 7: Distribution of left–right self-placement across voter groups

Note: Raincloud plot showing the distribution of respondents' self-placement on a left–right scale (0–10) across voter groups. The shaded densities represent the distribution, horizontal lines indicate central tendencies (medians), and points denote group means.



Fig. 8: Relationship between political orientation and populist attitudes

Note: Scatter plot with linear regression line and 95% confidence interval. Each point represents an individual observation. The blue line shows the predicted values from a linear regression, with the shaded area representing the 95% confidence interval.



Fig. 9: Interaction effects of sociodemographic characteristics and recipient types

Note: Coefficients correspond to interaction terms between sociodemographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, income) and recipient characteristics. Points represent estimated coefficients, and horizontal bars denote 95% confidence intervals.



Fig. 10: First donation decision across voter groups

Note: Bars show the distribution of the first donation decision within each voter group. The x-axis reports the party voted, while the y-axis reports the percentage share. Percentages sum to 100% for each party group.



Fig. 11: Estimated coefficients form logistic regression model of the first donation decision

Note: Coefficients represent log-odds from a logistic regression with clustered standard errors. Horizontal bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. The dependent variable is the second donation decision (1= German Red Cross, 2= UN Refugee Aid).



Fig. 12: Second donation decision across voter groups

Note: Bars show the distribution of the second donation decision within each voter group. The x-axis reports the party voted, while the y-axis reports the percentage share. Percentages sum to 100% for each party group.



Fig. 13: Estimated coefficients from logistic regression model of the the second donation decision

Note: Coefficients represent log-odds from a logistic regression with clustered standard errors. Horizontal bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. The dependent variable is the second donation decision (1= Ein Herz für Rentner e.V., 2= Arche für Obdachlose)



Fig. 14: Support for the implementation of an UBI across voter groups

Note: Bars show the distribution of the answer categories for each voter group. The x-axis reports the party voted, while the y-axis reports the percentage share. Percentages sum to 100% for each voter group.



Fig. 15: Attitudes towards the components of an UBI across voter groups

Note: Bars represent the distribution of answer categories for each item. Facets represent each voter group. The x-axis reports the percentage share, while the y-axis reports the items. Bars are 100%-stacked within each item. Ubi_1 = It should replace many other social benefits.
Ubi_2 = Everyone receives the same amount regardless of whether they work or not.
Ubi_3 = People of working age must find paid work.
Ubi_4 = People of working age do not have to look for paid work.
Ubi_5 = Newly arrived immigrants should also receive an UBI.
Ubi_6 = Newly arrived immigrants should be excluded from receiving it.
Ubi_7 = Should be financed from taxes.
Ubi_8 = People are allowed to keep money from other sources in addition.

Fig. 16: Word cloud of perceived consequences of a Universal Basic Income

Note: The figure displays a word cloud based on responses to an open-ended question on additional perceived consequences of introducing a UBI. Word size reflects the relative frequency of terms mentioned by respondents. The visualization is intended for descriptive purposes and does not represent a formal text analysis.



Fig. 17: Attitudes toward migration across voter groups

Note: Bars represent the distribution of answer categories for each item. Facets represent each voter group. The x-axis reports the items, while the y-axis reports the percentage share. Bars are 100%-stacked within each item and voter group. m_welfare_1 = Migrants are a burden on the German welfare system.
m_welfare_2 = Refugees are a burden on the German welfare system.
m_jobs = Immigrants are taking jobs away from Germans.
m_asylum_1 = Most people who apply for asylum in Germany are coming for economic reasons.
m_asylum_2 = People who are granted asylum should receive financial support from the German state to secure their livelihood.
Good = Immigrants are generally good for the German economy.



Fig. 18: Left-right attitudes towards the influence of migrants on the German welfare state

Note: Bars show the distribution of the answer categories within each political placement. The x-axis reports the self-reported left-right-placement, while the y-axis reports the percentage share. Percentages sum to 100% for each step on the political spectrum.



Fig. 19: Left-right attitudes towards whether refugees should receive financial support from the state

Note: Bars show the distribution of the answer categories within each political placement. The x-axis reports the self-reported left-right-placement, while the y-axis reports the percentage share. Percentages sum to 100% for each step on the political spectrum.



Fig. 20: Median redistribution in the standard redistribution framing

Note: The boxplot shows the redistribution of the amount redistributed across recipient characteristics in the standard redistribution framing. Boxes indicate the inter-quartile range, horizontal lines the median and whiskers the highest or lowest value that is not an outlier.



Fig. 21: Median redistribution in the minimum-income-framing

Note: The boxplot shows the redistribution of the amount redistributed across recipient characteristics in the Minimal Income Framing. Boxes indicate the inter-quartile range, horizontal lines the median and whiskers the highest or lowest value that is not an outlier.



Fig. 22: Redistribution across voter groups and framings

Note: The party voted is displayed on the x-axis, while the mean value of the amount redistributed is indicated on the y-axis. Blue bars indicate the redistribution in the Minimal Income framing and the purple rose bars indicate the redistribution in the classic redistribution frame.

7 Supplementary Tables

Table 3: Estimation results: Amount redistributed

		Dependent variable: Amount redistributed (0-6)				
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Mininmal income	0.064	0.064	0.083	0.080	0.300
		(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.135)	(0.136)	(0.415)
Recipient Type	German & unemployed		-0.283***	-0.283***	-0.283***	0.061
			(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.158)
	Immigrant & unemployed		-0.682***	-0.682***	-0.682***	0.555**
			(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.170)
	Immigrant & employed		-0.341***	-0.341***	-0.341***	0.542***
			(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.133)
Order Effects	Order 2		-0.052	-0.052	-0.052	-0.054
			(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.065)
	Order 3		-0.081	-0.081	-0.081	-0.095
			(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.072)
	Order 4		-0.161*	-0.161*	-0.161*	-0.182**
			(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.069)
Sociodemographic Controls	Male			-0.100	-0.104	-0.113
				(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.082)
	age35–49			0.311	0.303	0.308
				(0.199)	(0.200)	(0.201)
	age50–64			0.018	0.012	0.016
				(0.186)	(0.186)	(0.186)
	age65+			0.161	0.169	0.178
				(0.210)	(0.218)	(0.218)
	East Germany			0.157	0.183	0.182
				(0.168)	(0.171)	(0.172)
	academics			-0.120	-0.078	-0.071
				(0.150)	(0.152)	(0.153)
	income			-0.035	-0.030	-0.028
				(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
	religiosity/yes			0.182	0.265	0.257
				(0.169)	(0.163)	(0.166)
	migration background			0.028	0.154	0.151
				(0.264)	(0.250)	(0.251)
Political Attitudes	pol. orientation			-0.231***	-0.218***	-0.068
				(0.038)	(0.046)	(0.062)
	populism/index				-0.137	-0.124
					(0.426)	(0.427)
	satisfaction with democracy				-0.004	-0.003
					(0.072)	(0.072)
	trust/parliament				0.026	0.028
					(0.039)	(0.040)
	tradeunion/yes				-0.031	-0.035
					(0.163)	(0.165)
	eu/good/thing				-0.035	-0.045
					(0.185)	(0.185)
	eu/bad/thing				-0.263	-0.262
					(0.263)	(0.264)
	perceived identity				0.051	0.060
					(0.167)	(0.169)
Interaction Terms	pol. orientation × german & unemployed					-0.072*
						(0.032)
	pol. orientation × immigrant & unemployed					-0.258***
						(0.036)
	pol. orientation × vignette4_migr_empl					-0.183***
						(0.031)
	pol. orientation × immigrant & employed					-0.046
						(0.077)
	Intercept	2.428***	2.828***	3.708***	3.710***	2.990***
		(0.099)	(0.123)	(0.516)	(0.578)	(0.634)
	Num. Obs.	1900	1900	1900	1900	1900
	R^2	0.000	0.018	0.084	0.087	0.098
	Adj. R^2	-0.000	0.014	0.076	0.075	0.085
	RMSE	1.75	1.74	1.68	1.67	1.66

Note: Tobit-regression. The dependent variable is the amount of money redistributed, which coincides with the number of tokens redistributed for $\delta = 1$. (1) Main regression including decisions for $\delta = 1$ only; (2) Marginal effects for (1); (3) Full sample including decisions for all δ; (4) and (5) Model (1) with further control variables.

Table 4: Estimation results: Amount redistributed

		Dependent variable: Amount redistributed (0–6)				
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Minimal income frame	0.045	0.046	0.050	0.077	0.335
		(0.150)	(0.150)	(0.150)	(0.145)	(0.409)
Recipient Type	German & unemployed		-0.282***	-0.283***	-0.295***	0.082
			(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.166)
	Immigrant & unemployed		-0.736***	-0.738***	-0.771***	0.789***
			(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.194)
	Immigrant & employed		-0.374***	-0.375***	-0.386***	0.650***
			(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.149)
Order Effects	Order 2		-0.063	-0.063	-0.074	-0.080
			(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.070)
	Order 3		-0.084	-0.085	-0.087	-0.105
			(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.082)	(0.078)
	Order 4		-0.168	-0.169*	-0.186*	-0.213**
			(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.074)
Sociodemographic Controls	male			-0.118	-0.104	-0.115
				(0.147)	(0.152)	(0.154)
	age35–49			0.035	0.288	0.292
				(0.224)	(0.228)	(0.227)
	age50–64			-0.061	0.062	0.068
				(0.212)	(0.211)	(0.211)
	age65+			0.118	0.184	0.198
				(0.213)	(0.207)	(0.208)
	East Germany			0.242	0.223	0.224
				(0.179)	(0.185)	(0.187)
	academics			-0.121	-0.077	-0.071
				(0.160)	(0.151)	(0.153)
	income			-0.035	-0.030	-0.028
				(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
	religiosity/yes			0.182	0.265	0.257
				(0.169)	(0.163)	(0.166)
	migration background			0.028	0.154	0.151
				(0.264)	(0.250)	(0.251)
Political Attitudes	populism/index				-0.027	-0.017
					(0.478)	(0.482)
	satisfaction with democracy				-0.027	-0.027
					(0.072)	(0.072)
	trust/parliament				0.033	0.035
					(0.043)	(0.043)
	tradeunion/yes				-0.031	-0.035
					(0.163)	(0.165)
	eu/good/thing				-0.035	-0.045
					(0.185)	(0.185)
	eu/bad/thing				-0.263	-0.262
					(0.263)	(0.264)
	perceived/identity				0.051	0.060
					(0.167)	(0.169)
	pol. orientation				-0.229***	-0.050
					(0.046)	(0.062)
Interaction terms	pol. orientation × german & unemployed					-0.080*
						(0.033)
	pol. orientation × immigrant & unemployed					-0.329***
						(0.043)
	pol. orientation × immigrant & employed					-0.216***
						(0.036)
	pol. orientation × minimal income frame					-0.054
						(0.079)

Note: Marginal effects based on Tobit regressions of models 1–5 with clustered standard errors at the individual level. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$.

8 Experimental Materials

At the beginning of the experiment, participants received general information about the procedure and the preservation of anonymity, followed by detailed instructions for the third-party redistribution task. Prior to the four main decision tasks, participants completed a practice decision to familiarize themselves with the decision-making process. Before each decision task, participants were presented with an information screen outlining the characteristics of the two recipients (*Person 1* and *Person 2*). This was followed by a screen displaying the same information in a structured format, on the basis of which participants made their redistribution decision using a slider. Participants were required to confirm their choice before proceeding to the next decision task.

After completing all redistribution decisions, participants made a final donation decision. The experiment concluded with an extensive questionnaire collecting additional sociodemographic information, political attitudes, attitudes towards immigration, populism, and universal basic income as well as measures of personal identity, and social preferences.

8.1 Part one of the experiment - Decisions

Screen 1

Welcome

Welcome and thank you for taking part in our study!

This study is conducted jointly by Helmut Schmidt University Hamburg and Clausthal University of Technology.
The study consists of two parts. In the first part, you will be asked to make several decisions. The second part consists of a questionnaire.
The total time required is approximately 20–30 minutes.
You will receive €6 for full participation, regardless of your answers.
Please read the following instructions carefully! If you are using a smartphone to complete the study, please switch to landscape mode now.

All decisions and responses, as well as your identity and the identities of the other study participants, will remain anonymous and will not be shared with third parties. We are legally obliged to ensure the anonymity of your data.

Next

Screen 2

Instructions

In Part 1 of the study, you will make 5 decisions. The decisions you make affect the payments of two other people, who will hereafter be referred to as Person 1 and Person 2.

Person 1 and Person 2 are real people who actually exist. Person 1 and Person 2 are real people who actually exist. Before you make each decision, you will receive information about Person 1 and Person 2. The information about Person 1 is the same in each of the four decisions, but it is always a different person. The information about Person 2 changes across the four decisions. Person 2 is also always a different person. Accordingly, in the decision situations you are always making decisions for other people.

All information you receive about both people is truthful. In each decision situation, you must provide an answer before you can proceed to the next page by clicking "Next." The two people do not participate in this study at the same time but at different times, and they will be paid based on your decisions.

At the end of the study, one of your decisions will be randomly selected and, according to your choice, paid out to Person 1 and Person 2.

Next

Screen 3

Screen 4



Screen 5

Test decision

This decision is a test decision. Here you have the opportunity to familiarize yourself with entering your decisions. The decision you make on this page is not yet relevant for the payment to Person 1 and Person 2.

At the bottom of the screen, you will see an example of a decision situation. Here you can decide how much money you would like to transfer from Person 1 to Person 2.

Your task is to decide whether you want to transfer an amount between €0 and €6 from Person 1 to Person 2 .

Before you make each decision, you will receive information about Person 1 and Person 2. The varying characteristics of Person 2 are highlighted in bold on each information page before the decision situations.

Please note that this decision is independent of your own payment for participating in this study.

You will make your decision using a slider. Please touch the slider to move it. When you have made your decision, please click "Next." Note that you can only click "Next" after you have touched the slider at least once. A window will then appear asking you to confirm your decision. If you want to change your decision, please click "Back." If you are satisfied with your decision, please click "Confirm."

Take your time and use this page to familiarize yourself with the input system. When you feel comfortable with the task, please proceed with the study.

Your task: Please use the slider to select how much money should be transferred from Person 1 to Person 2 .

Person 1

- german citizen
- is employed
- receives €6 for completing a task in a study
- has a monthly income above the poverty line in Germany

Person 2

- **german citizen**
- **is not employed**
- does not have the opportunity to complete the task and therefore receives €0
- has a monthly income below the poverty line in Germany

Continue

Screen 6[11]



Screen 7

[11] Recipient characteristics were randomized across decisions


Decision 1
Your task: Please use the slider to select how much money should be transferred from Person 1 to Person 2 .
Person 1
german citizen
is employed
receives 6€ for completing a task in a study
has a monthly income above the poverty line in Germany
Person 2
german citizen
is not employed
does not have the opportunity to complete the task and therefore receives €0
has a monthly income below the poverty line in Germany
Continue

Screen 8


Information 2
Before you make your decision, you will receive the following information about Person 1 and Person 2.
Person 1
german citizen
is employed
receives €6 for completing a task in a study
has a monthly income above the poverty line in Germany
Person 2
german citizen
is employed
does not have the opportunity to complete the task and therefore receives €0
has a monthly income below the poverty line in Germany
Next

Screen 9


Decision 2
Your task: Please use the slider to select how much money should be transferred from Person 1 to Person 2 .
Person 1
german citizen
is employed
receives 6€ for completing a task in a study
has a monthly income above the poverty line in Germany
Person 2
german citizen
is employed
does not have the opportunity to complete the task and therefore receives €0
has a monthly income below the poverty line in Germany
Continue

Screen 10


Information 3
Before you make your decision, you will receive the following information about Person 1 and Person 2.
Person 1
German citizen
is employed
receives €6 for completing a task in a study
has a monthly income above the poverty line in Germany
Person 2
Immigrant
is not employed
does not have the opportunity to complete the task and therefore receives €0
has a monthly income below the poverty line in Germany
Next

Screen 11


Decision 3
Your task: Please use the slider to select how much money should be transferred from Person 1 to Person 2 .
Person 1
german citizen
is employed
receives 6€ for completing a task in a study
has a monthly income above the poverty line in Germany
Person 2
immigrant
is not employed
does not have the opportunity to complete the task and therefore receives €0
has a monthly income below the poverty line in Germany
Continue

Screen 12


Information 4
Before you make your decision, you will receive the following information about Person 1 and Person 2.
Person 1
German citizen
is employed
receives €6 for completing a task in a study
has a monthly income above the poverty line in Germany
Person 2
Immigrant
is employed
does not have the opportunity to complete the task and therefore receives €0
has a monthly income below the poverty line in Germany
Next

Screen 13



Screen 14[12]

[12]Options were randomized across participants.

Decision 5 - Donation

In this decision, we will make a donation to two charities of your choice. The donation has no effect on the amount of the payment you receive in this study.

Decision	Amount	Organization
○	1 €	Deutsches Rotes Kreuz
○	1 €	UNO Flüchtlingshilfe

Decision	Amount	Organization
○	1 €	Arche für Obdachlose
○	1 €	Ein Herz für Rentner e.V.

Next

8.2 Part two of the experiment – Questionnaire

Screen 15



Screen 16[13]



[13]We used the representation of the "Inclusion of Other in the Self" scale by Baader et al. (2024)

Screen 17

Questionnaire

2 / 7

2. How old are you?

3.Which gender do you identify with?

- Female
- Male
- Diverse

4.Were you born in Germany?

- Yes
- No

5. Do you have a migration background?

- Yes
- No

6. If yes, which one?

7.Please enter the postal code of your current place of residence.

8. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- No qualification
- Lower secondary school certificate (Hauptschulabschluss)
- Intermediate secondary school certificate
- University entrance qualification (Fachhochschulreife/Abitur)
- Other school-leaving certificate
- Bachelor
- Master
- Dual vocational training/apprenticeship
- Master craftsman qualification (Meister)
- Doctorate (Dr.)
- Other professional qualification

9. How important is religion in your life?

- Very unimportant
- Unimportant
- Neutral
- Important
- Very important
- Don't know

Next

Screen 18



Screen 19[14]

[14]Populism scale based on Akkerman et al. (2014)

Questionnaire

4 / 7

12. In politics, people sometimes talk about “left” and “right.” Where on the scale would you place yourself if 0 is left and 10 is right? Please position the slider at the corresponding point.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

left right

13. Did you vote in the last federal election?

- Yes
- No

14.If the federal election were next Sunday, which party would you vote for?

- AfD
- CDU/CSU
- SPD
- FDP
- Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
- Die Linke
- Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW)
- Other
- Don't know

15. How much do you personally trust the parliament? Where on the scale would you place yourself if 0 means no trust at all and 10 means full trust? Please position the slider at the corresponding point.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

no trust at all full trust

16.Overall, how satisfied are you with the functioning of democracy in Germany?

- ○ Very dissatisfied
- ○ Dissatisfied
- ○ Satisfied
- ○ Very satisfied
- ○ Don't know

17.Are you or have you ever been a member of a trade union or a similar organization?

- ○ Yes, currently
- ○ Yes, previously
- ○ No
- ○ I don't know

18. Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements.

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
Politicians should lead and not follow the people.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Politicians in the German parliament must follow the will of the people.	○	○	○	○	○	○
To show that you are still paying attention as you complete the study, please click "Don't know."	○	○	○	○	○	○
The people, not the politicians, should make our most important political decisions.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The political differences between the elite and the people are greater than the differences within the people.	○	○	○	○	○	○

19. In your opinion, Germany's membership in the European Union is...

- ○ A good thing
- ○ Neither good nor bad
- ○ A bad thing
- ○ Don't know

20. Do you see yourself as...

- ○ Exclusively German
- ○ German and European
- ○ European and German
- ○ Don't know

Next

Screen 20[15]

[15]Items on Migration are taken from Grimalda et al. (2024)

Questionnaire

5 / 7

21. What do you think—Is German culture in Germany undermined or enriched by immigrants?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Culture is undermined

Culture is enriched

18. Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements.

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
Immigrants are a burden on the German social welfare system.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Refugees are a burden on the German social welfare system.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Immigrants are generally good for the German economy.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Immigrants take jobs away from people born in Germany.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Among those who apply for asylum in Germany, most are people who come to Germany for economic reasons and do not have a right to asylum.	○	○	○	○	○	○
People who have been granted asylum in Germany should receive financial support from the German state to secure their livelihood.	○	○	○	○	○	○

Next

Screen 21

Questionnaire

6 / 7

23. Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements.

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
Wealth should be redistributed.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Income and wealth disparities in Germany are too large.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The differences in income and wealth in Germany are fair.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Hard work is important in determining a person's income.	○	○	○	○	○	○

24. How would you assess yourself? Are you a person who is generally willing to share with others without expecting anything in return, or are you not willing to do so?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

0: not at all willing to do so

10: very willing to do so

25. How well does the following statement describe you as a person? "At work, I am only willing to do something for a colleague if I expect they would do the same for me."

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

0: does not describe me at all

10: describes me perfectly

26. Imagine the following situation: You unexpectedly received €100 today.

How much of this amount would you donate to a good cause?

27. Please indicate how much you agree with the following statement:

It is important to me that societal resources are used efficiently.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Agree
- ○ Disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree
- ○ Don't know

Next

Screen 22[16]

Questionnaire

7 / 7

A few questions about a universal basic income will follow.

Definition: The term "basic income" refers to the idea that all citizens receive a fixed monthly payment that ensures a basic standard of living.

28. What should a universal basic income include, in your opinion?
Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements.

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
It should replace many other social benefits.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Everyone receives the same amount, regardless of whether they work or not.	○	○	○	○	○	○
People of working age who are not working must seek paid employment.	○	○	○	○	○	○
People of working age who are not working do not have to seek paid employment.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Newly arrived immigrants should also receive a universal basic income.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Newly arrived immigrants should be excluded from a universal basic income.	○	○	○	○	○	○
This system should be financed through taxes.	○	○	○	○	○	○
People may also keep the money they earn from work or other sources.	○	○	○	○	○	○

[16] Questions are taken from European Social Survey (2016)

29. How much would you support the introduction of a universal basic income in your country?

- ○ Strongly support
- ○ Support
- ○ Neutral
- ○ Oppose
- ○ Strongly oppose
- ○ Don't know

30. Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements about the consequences of a universal basic income.

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
A universal basic income would primarily benefit the poorer members of society.	○	○	○	○	○	○
A universal basic income would lead to fewer people working.	○	○	○	○	○	○
A universal basic income would enable free self-determination.	○	○	○	○	○	○
A universal basic income would allow more time for social contacts.	○	○	○	○	○	○
A universal basic income only teaches people that they don't have to work for their money.	○	○	○	○	○	○
A universal basic income would narrow the gap between the rich and the poor in society.	○	○	○	○	○	○

31. What other consequences can you imagine from a universal basic income?

Next

8.3 Minimal Income Framing

Participants assigned to the minimal income framing received the same introduction and instruction screens as those in the standard redistribution framing. The treatments differ only in the framing of the decision task, while all other elements remain identical. The following screens provides an illustrative example of the sequence of screens, including the practice decision, the first information screen, and the first decision task.

Screen 24

Test decision

This decision is a test decision. Here you have the opportunity to familiarize yourself with entering your decisions. The decision you make on this page is not yet relevant for the payment to Person 1 and Person 2.

At the bottom of the screen, you will see an example of a decision situation. Here you can decide how much money you would like to transfer from Person 1 to Person 2.

Your task is to decide the amount between €0 and €6 that Person 2 is guaranteed to receive .

Before you make each decision, you will receive information about Person 1 and Person 2. The varying characteristics of Person 2 are highlighted in bold on each information page before the decision situations.

Please note that this decision is independent of your own payment for participating in this study.

You will make your decision using a slider. Please touch the slider to move it. When you have made your decision, please click "Next." Note that you can only click "Next" after you have touched the slider at least once. A window will then appear asking you to confirm your decision. If you want to change your decision, please click "Back." If you are satisfied with your decision, please click "Confirm."

Take your time and use this page to familiarize yourself with the input system. When you feel comfortable with the task, please proceed with the study.

Your task: Please use the slider to select the amount between €0 and €6 that Person 2 is guaranteed to receive .

Person 1

- german citizen
- is employed
- receives €6 for completing a task in a study
- has a monthly income above the poverty line in Germany

Person 2

- **german citizen**
- **is not employed**
- does not have the opportunity to complete the task and therefore receives €0
- has a monthly income below the poverty line in Germany

Continue

Screen 25



Screen 26

Decision 1

Your task: Please use the slider to select the amount between €0 and €6 that Person 2 is guaranteed to receive .

Person 1

- german citizen
- is employed
- receives 6€ for completing a task in a study
- has a monthly income above the poverty line in Germany

Person 2

- german citizen
- is not employed
- does not have the opportunity to complete the task and therefore receives €0
- has a monthly income below the poverty line in Germany

Continue

STUDY: REDISTRIBUTION PREFERENCES OF RIGHT-WING POPULISTS: DESERVINGNESS, IDEOLOGY AND SELECTIVE REDISTRIBUTION

DOI https://doi.org/10.48548/pubdata-3900

Research Cluster Working Paper Series "Behavioral Economics and Societal Transformation"
ISSN 3055-1897

Version dated: 23.06.2026

This working paper was produced within the context of the Research Cluster "Behavioral Economics and Social Transformation", a collaboration between seven universities in Lower Saxony (Clausthal University of Technology, Georg-August University of Göttingen, Leibniz University Hannover, Leuphana University Lüneburg, Carl von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg, University of Osnabrück, University of Vechta) and the Fraunhofer Institute for Applied Information Technology. As part of the "Wissenschaftsräume" funding line, the project is supported by the Volkswagen Foundation and the Lower Saxony Ministry of Science and Culture through the zukunft.niedersachsen program. Further information on the project and additional working papers can be found at www.wissenschaftsraum-verhalten.de.

Contact:
Research Cluster "Behavioral Economics and Social Transformation"
Fon +49 4134 667 2938
Mail wissenschaftsraum-verhalten@leuphana.de

Greta Kyriakidou-Schoolmann, Fabian Paetzel, Christoph A. Schütt
greta.kyriakidou-schoolmann@tu-clausthal.de

Institute of Economics (IVWL)
Leuphana University Lüneburg
Universitätsallee 1
21335 Lüneburg