



## RESEARCH ARTICLE

# The populist radical right, the gender gap and protective masculinity across European countries

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Various studies show that men disproportionately vote for populist radical right (PRR) parties. However, research has been unable to fully explain this gender gap. In an attempt to address this research gap, this article theorizes, quantitatively operationalizes and tests the role of ‘protective masculinity’ in the gender gap in PRR support in a cross-sectional study across 18 European countries. Using mediation analysis, we find that ‘protective masculinity’ partly explains the gender gap in PRR support. However, while more men than women hold ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes, women also do. Moderation analysis shows that these women are equally likely as men to support the PRR based on these attitudes. Bridging previous qualitative research on masculinity and quantitative research on PRR support, this article contributes a partial explanation of the gender gap. Its findings call for research on women’s conservatism and PRR support.

**Keywords** populist radical right support • gender gap • protective masculinity  
• European countries • mediation analysis • moderation analysis

### Key messages

- ‘Protective masculinity’ attitudes, defined as a combination of gender-inegalitarian and nativist sentiments, are positively related to support for populist radical right (PRR) parties.
- Men are more likely than women to hold ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes.
- Both men and women holding such attitudes are equally likely to support PRR parties.

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## **Introduction**

Studies consistently show that men are (still) more likely than women to vote for populist radical right (PRR) parties (Betz, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Lubbers et al, 2002; Norris, 2005; Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012; Hartevelde et al, 2015; Immerzeel et al, 2015; Spierings et al, 2015; Spierings and Zaslove, 2017; Coffé, 2019). Yet, this gender gap remains only partly explained, as men and women have been shown to equally hold nativist, anti-immigration and authoritarian attitudes and political discontent – key predictors of PRR support (Hartevelde et al, 2015; Ponce, 2017). This article seeks to deepen understanding of the gender gap in PRR support in Europe by applying the concept of ‘protective masculinity’.

Two key gaps in previous research help explain the inconclusive evidence. First, most studies focus on binary gender differences rather than examining the socially constructed norms and roles that shape political behaviour, especially masculinity (Hartevelde et al, 2015; Spierings and Zaslove, 2015). Yet, masculinity significantly affects men’s PRR voting (Ralph-Morrow, 2020; Coffé et al, 2023). This gender binary lens overlooks the gendered foundations of political attitudes and vote choice (Spierings and Zaslove, 2015; Ralph-Morrow, 2020). Second, although PRR voters are predominantly men, most research emphasizes women’s aversion to PRR parties, neglecting why men disproportionately support them (Ralph-Morrow, 2020).

This article addresses these gaps by examining how masculinity – conceptualized through ‘protective masculinity’ (Wojnicka and Kubisa, 2024), defined as the intersection of gender-inegalitarian and nativist attitudes – shapes PRR voting across 16 European countries. Specifically, it investigates the extent to which ‘protective masculinity’ explains the gender gap in PRR support.

‘Protective masculinity’ refers to a form of masculinity that can be seen as an embodiment of hegemonic masculinity (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005), which aims at protecting supposedly weak and vulnerable (native) women, who are required for the reproduction of the nation-state, from the clutches of allegedly patriarchal, sexually deviant and dangerous (Muslim) migrant men (Farris, 2017; Ralph-Morrow, 2020; Sauer, 2020; Wojnicka, 2023). Although ‘protective masculinity’ can exist independently of the PRR, it is utilized and heavily propagated by the party family throughout their ideology, which makes an interrogation of the link between ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes and PRR voting crucial. Given that ‘protective masculinity’ revolves around the domination of men over women – as men’s physical power is utilized as a source of protection to wield dominance (Wojnicka and Kubisa, 2024) – there is reason to believe that men and women may differ in their ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes (mediation hypothesis) and that ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes may differently affect men’s and women’s voting behaviour (moderation hypothesis). Ultimately, ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes may thus help explain the gender gap in PRR voting. Hence, this article explores both mediation and moderation mechanisms by addressing the following sub-questions:

- To what extent do ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes mediate the relationship between gender and PRR support?
- To what extent does gender moderate the relationship between ‘protective masculinity’ and PRR support?

To broaden our understanding of ‘protective masculinity’ in relation to other kinds of masculinities, this article further compares the effects of ‘protective masculinity’ to those of gender-egalitarian nativism and whether and how each of these sets of attitudes contributes to explaining the gender gap in PRR support. Gender-egalitarian nativism differs from ‘protective masculinity’: while both comprise nativist attitudes, ‘protective masculinity’ combines nativism with gender-*inegalitarian* attitudes. Conceptually and empirically, gender-egalitarian nativism resembles prominent conceptualizations of gender attitudes in the PRR literature, such as sexually modern nativism or femonationalism (Farris, 2017; Lancaster, 2019; Spierings, 2020a). Comparing the role of ‘protective masculinity’ to that of gender-egalitarian nativism contributes to a more nuanced understanding of how gender attitudes and nativism interact and influence the gender gap in PRR support.

To address our research questions, we apply multilevel logistic regression analyses to cross-national data from the 2017 European Values Study (EVS), covering 16,390 individuals nested in 16 countries. The year 2017 constitutes a time in which we expect high salience of ‘protective masculinity’ in party discourse and public opinion, given the increase in male-dominated Muslim immigration in 2015/16. We find that, similar to gender-egalitarian nativism, ‘protective masculinity’ is positively related to PRR support. Further, men are more likely to hold ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes, and these attitudes mediate a small part of men’s higher likelihood to support the PRR. That said, ‘protective masculinity’ differs from gender-egalitarian nativist attitudes, which men and women are equally likely to hold. Consequently, while ‘protective masculinity’ partly mediates the gender gap in PRR support, gender-egalitarian nativism does not. Importantly, women supporters of the PRR also submit to both forms of masculinity and are similarly affected by these attitudes in their PRR support as men. Thus, while we find small mediating effects of ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes partially explaining the gender gap in PRR support, we find no moderating effect of gender on the relationship between ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes and PRR support.

The article contributes to research on the gender gap in PRR support by operationalizing and testing a relatively novel explanation for this gender gap, namely ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes, quantitatively in a cross-country study and by comparing the effects of ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes to those of gender-egalitarian nativist attitudes. Its findings call for future research explaining PRR support among women and how and why women come to embrace and act upon attitudes that promote their own oppression, such as ‘protective masculinity’.

## **The gender gap in PRR voting**

With the growing electoral importance of PRR parties, scholars have increasingly examined the reasons for their electoral success, consistently finding that gender is among the most important predictors of PRR voting (Stockemer et al, 2018). PRR parties – with some exceptions – repeatedly receive more votes from men than women (Spierings and Zaslove, 2015), leading to PRR parties being labelled as ‘*Männerparteien*’ (Mudde, 2007).

Research on the gender gap in PRR voting tends to distinguish between mediating and moderating mechanisms. Mediating mechanisms imply that men and women differ in key attitudes and characteristics that correlate with PRR voting, for

instance, labour force participation or personality traits (Harteveld et al, 2015; Coffé, 2019). Moderation mechanisms imply that even if men and women have similar characteristics and attitudes, they evaluate whether to vote for PRR parties based on different considerations and assign different levels of importance to specific issues (Harteveld et al, 2015; Gidengil and Stolle, 2021). Both mediation and moderation mechanisms influence gender differences in vote choice. In terms of mediation mechanisms, the literature commonly presents four explanations for the gender gap in PRR voting, referring to gender differences in (1) socio-economic factors, (2) personality/socialization, (3) political efficacy and (4) political attitudes. The first explanation argues that socio-economic factors, including their occupational status and class, explain gender differences in vote choice (Givens, 2004; Rippeyoung, 2007; Giger, 2009; Coffé, 2013; Harteveld et al, 2015; Spierings and Zaslove, 2015). On the one hand, women's increasing labour force participation has led women to increasingly vote for the political Left (Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Giger, 2009). Yet, men's over-representation in blue-collar jobs has led them to disproportionately vote for PRR parties, given their increased competition for jobs with immigrants (Coffé, 2013). However, scholars agree that socio-economic factors cannot fully explain the gender gap in PRR voting (Coffé, 2013; Harteveld et al, 2015).

The second explanation focuses on gender differences in personality and socialization. Spierings and Zaslove (2017) claim that men's socialization partly relates to populist attitudes, especially regarding the notion of 'us' against 'them'. Men are found to be more prone to conflictual politics, while women are socialized to be less aggressive and more consensus seeking. Similarly, Coffé (2019) finds that masculine personality traits, such as assertiveness and aggressiveness, are positively related to PRR voting, contrary to feminine personality traits like compassion and empathy. Finally, Harteveld and Ivarsflaten (2016) find that women are more deterred from PRR voting because they are more motivated to control and not act based on their prejudice towards outgroups, and this is particularly the case in contexts where PRR parties are more strongly associated with discrimination and prejudice towards outgroups. Yet, these explanations again do not fully explain the gender gap in PRR voting.

A third explanation of the gender gap relates to women's lower political efficacy. Mudde (2007) explains women's under-representation among PRR voters by their smaller interest and knowledge in politics, which is presumed to be a product of socialization. Similarly, Gidengil et al (2005) partly explain the gender gap in voting for Canada's radical-right party, The Canadian Alliance, by gender differences in how salient politics is in people's lives. As a result of their lower political efficacy, women are more likely to follow the norm and vote for mainstream, established parties instead of giving their vote to newcomer parties that are perceived as more radical (Mudde, 2007; Immerzeel et al, 2015; Spierings, 2020b). Similarly, Harteveld et al (2017) find that men are more likely to vote for socially stigmatized parties. Yet, this explanation cannot explain gender gaps in cases where PRR parties form part of the political mainstream.

Fourth, research has tested the hypothesis that men more likely hold political attitudes that predict PRR voting. However, research suggests that while anti-immigration sentiments are the strongest predictors of PRR voting, women and men hold similar attitudes towards immigration (Harteveld et al, 2015; Spierings and Zaslove, 2015; Ponce, 2017; Hansen, 2019). In contrast, Gidengil et al (2005) find that gender differences in attitudes towards traditional moral values, such as

feminism, abortion and traditional family values, partly explain the gender gap. Furthermore, [Churi and Damerow \(2022\)](#) find that PRR parties' growing substantive representation of women's concern for gender equality increases women's likelihood to vote for PRR parties and thereby reduces the gender gap. This is in line with [Ralph-Morrow's \(2020\)](#) and [Coffé et al \(2023\)](#) argument that the PRR's masculinity particularly attracts men. Gender differences in attitudes towards gender equality may partly explain the gender gap. Relative to research on the mediation mechanism, the moderation mechanism remains under-researched in explaining the gender gap in PRR voting. As an exception, [Harteveld et al \(2015\)](#) argue that the gender gap is partly explained by men ascribing more salience to nativist attitudes and political discontent in their vote choice, which are important predictors of PRR voting. Accordingly, gender moderates the effects of these attitudes on PRR voting. [Gidengil and Stolle \(2021: 1818\)](#) argue that research on the gender gap should consider the nature and salience of people's gender identities, as 'gender identity conditions the extent to which white men experience societal transformations as threats to their masculinity and respond by acting to preserve their dominant status'. This aligns with [Coffé et al's \(2023\)](#) finding that masculinity has a stronger impact on PRR support among men scoring high on sexism than among others. Thus, not only gender but also gender identity – and masculinity in particular – may moderate the relationship between political attitudes and PRR voting.

### **PRR ideology, gender values and Islam**

Gender values, understood as a set of structured beliefs and values determining how power should be arranged according to the social constructs linked to sexed bodies ([Duerst-Lahti, 2008](#)), have been considered a significant factor in explaining PRR support. While there are differences between PRR parties' gender positions ([Mudde, 2007](#); [de Lange and Mügge, 2015](#); [Spierings, 2020b](#)), PRR parties and their voters often support claims made by first- and second-wave feminism while heavily denouncing third-wave feminism ([Spierings, 2020b](#); [Off, 2023a](#)). The party family routinely rejects gender quotas and other affirmative action policies ([Mudde, 2007](#); [de Lange and Mügge, 2015](#); [Spierings, 2020b](#)). Moreover, several PRR parties have essentialist perceptions of gender, understanding it as 'naturally' binary and determined by sex ([Kuhar and Paternotte, 2018](#); [Löffler et al, 2020](#)). While PRR parties differ in their support for female labour force participation, they generally consider women as sole caretakers and promote the heteronormative nuclear family ([Mudde, 2007](#); [Akkerman, 2015](#)). To differing degrees, they further oppose public childcare ([Mudde, 2007](#)), same-sex marriage and abortion ([Akkerman, 2015](#)). Reflecting PRR parties' gender values, recent studies find that conservative gender values predict PRR voting ([Anduiza and Rico, 2022](#); [Christley, 2021](#); [Off, 2023b](#)).

In addition, PRR parties and movements instrumentalize support for certain aspects of gender equality and gay rights to serve their nativist, authoritarian and populist ideology, especially their opposition to Islam ([Farris, 2017](#); [Spierings, 2020a](#); [2020b](#); [Townsend et al, 2014](#); [de Lange and Mügge, 2015](#); [Calderaro, 2025](#)). The framing of Islam as misogynistic and threatening to liberal values and the portrayal of Muslim immigrant men as rapists ([Farris, 2017](#)) and homophobes ([Spierings, 2020a](#)) have paved the way for PRR parties to present themselves as defenders of liberal democracy ([Betz and Meret, 2009](#)). To oppose Islam, PRR parties emphasize their support for women's

rights, including liberal divorce laws, women's financial and legal independence, and female autonomy, as well as the gender equality of (Muslim) migrant women (Akkerman and Hagelund, 2007; Betz and Meret, 2009; Akkerman, 2015; Erzeel and Rashkova, 2017; Spierings, 2020b).

In addition to the aforementioned studies showing that conservative gender values predict PRR voting, PRR parties' support for certain gender equality measures is reflected in the finding that a growing group of PRR voters supports gender equality and gay rights, which has been described as 'femonationalism', 'homonationalism' or 'sexually modern nativism' (Spierings et al, 2017; Lancaster, 2019; Spierings and Glas, 2021). In doing so, they selectively embrace elements of feminism, for example, the fight against gender-based violence, while rejecting other key principles of feminism and promoting anti-feminist stances (Calderaro, 2025). It is often argued that their support for seemingly progressive gender and gay rights stances serves a strategic purpose, namely to argue that immigrants are not welcome because they threaten women and gay people (Turnbull-Dugarte and López Ortega, 2023).

## **The PRR and (political) masculinities**

Although masculinity has long operated as a concealed norm structuring politics, it is only recently that masculinity has been made visible in the context of politics (Bjarnegård and Starck, 2024; Murray and Bjarnegård, 2024). This is due to increased scholarly attention to 'political masculinities' that are 'constructed around, ascribed to and/or claimed by "political players"' (Starck and Sauer, 2014: 6). 'Political masculinities' emerge in different levels of society with varying degrees of intensity: they are more overt in professional politicians, but can also be found in citizens' activities or attitudes in instances when they interact with the state, for example, during elections (Starck and Luyt, 2019). Hence, they are not merely a fixed configuration of gender practices but, rather, consist of a fluctuating, constantly contested composition of masculinity that is 'negotiated in the political field' (Löffler, 2020: 11).

The re-emergence of PRR parties – and especially their public appeal to the grievances of male supporters – can thus be seen as an instance of social transition, where 'new' political masculinities arise in order to safeguard the (re)production of patriarchal power relations that have been weakened by neoliberal transformations rendering male labour more precarious and resulting in a declining family income earned by the (male) breadwinner (Sauer, 2020). Moreover, neoliberal transformations helped spur a wide-ranging transition from traditional to egalitarian gender roles, causing an erosion of male dominance in both the private and public spheres, ultimately presenting a challenge to masculine hegemony (Sauer, 2020; Graf and Wojnicka, 2023). One example of 'political masculinities' in action is the activism of the English Defence League (EDL) members, analysed by Ralph-Morrow (2020). More than a quarter of the EDL's male participants are unemployed or employed in low-paying industries (Pilkington, 2016; Ralph-Morrow, 2020). Given the importance of employment, income and occupational status for men as a tool to exert control and subordinate women (Schrock and Schwalbe, 2009), Ralph-Morrow (2020) concludes that some politically involved men display certain forms of masculinities to overcome their economic marginalization and retain male dominance through physical power. Finally, certain types of political masculinities have been identified by Linders, Dudink and Spierings (2022: 18), who analyse the role of masculinity

and sexuality in the self-positioning and envisioned hegemonies of populist party leaders, claiming that ‘masculinity and sexuality are pivotal in untangling how these leaders contrast or identify their leadership with both their envisioned hegemonies and other political actors’.

### **‘Protective masculinities’**

This article builds on two main theoretical concepts: ‘protective masculinity’ and ‘foreign masculinity’. According to [Johnson \(2013\)](#), who introduced the concept to political science, ‘protective masculinity’ is a specific form of male gender performance based on strength and toughness shown by men in their protection of women and children from threats. The concept has since evolved and can now be seen as a distinct embodiment of hegemonic masculinity ([Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005](#)), an ideal form of male performance that dominates other masculinities, such as complicit, marginalized and subordinated ([Wojnicka, 2023](#)). Power, dominance and male privilege are central to this theory and essential to sustaining hegemonic masculinity. Understanding ‘protective masculinity’ as a form of hegemonic masculinity is useful, as it centres on the male domination of women, children and others. This domination is rooted in control and physical strength, with men expected to provide protection – financial and physical – to women and children ([Wojnicka and Kubisa, 2024](#)). Though often seen as noble, protection is better understood as a tool ‘utilized by men in order to protect their power and privilege’ ([Wojnicka, 2022: 13](#)). It implies that women are weak and agentless, reinforcing masculine hierarchies ([Wojnicka, 2022](#)). Male protectors require acknowledgement of their authority as ‘payment’, subordinating the protected, even when protection was neither sought nor welcomed ([Graf and Wojnicka, 2023; Wojnicka, 2022](#)).

‘Protective masculinity’ appears in many contexts, but its use by PRR supporters and party actors is particularly significant, especially in its nativist manifestations, as these are the most salient in the context under investigation. PRR parties frame women as needing protection from patriarchal (Muslim) migrant men ([Scheibelhofer, 2017](#)). Thus, native men offer physical protection to native women, seen as essential to reproducing (white) heterosexual families and the nation ([Sauer, 2020](#)). This framework allows native men to affirm their ‘virtuous’ masculinity, justify women’s subordination and vilify the masculinity of (Muslim) migrants ([Ralph-Morrow, 2020](#)). ‘Protective masculinity’ thus combines anti-immigrant, especially anti-Muslim, and gender-inegalitarian attitudes. It relies on the presence of a threatening counterpart, often Muslim men, constructed as embodying ‘foreign masculinity’. Developed during Europe’s ‘migration crisis’ following the Syrian war, this concept describes the portrayal of young, male Muslim refugees as threats to Western values ([Wojnicka, 2023](#)). ‘Foreign masculinity’ is a marginalized, ‘abnormal’ form seen as dangerous and at odds with Western norms ([Scheibelhofer, 2017](#)). Its construction aligns with the hegemonic masculinity logic: countertypes are created, problematized and dehumanized to maintain power, leading to exclusion, discrimination and violence ([Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005; Scheibelhofer, 2017](#)). PRR parties exemplify this in their depictions and treatment of male immigrants and Muslims.

Both utilized concepts are partly related to the notion of femonationalism, as theorized by [Farris \(2017\)](#). Her concept provides a powerful critique of how feminist discourses are co-opted by nationalist and xenophobic political agendas in Western

Europe. However, it remains primarily concerned with how political parties and state institutions mobilize gender equality rhetoric to justify exclusionary practices. In this framework, (Muslim) migrant men are portrayed as inherently patriarchal and violent, positioned as threats to both migrant women and to broader ‘European values’, such as gender equality (Farris, 2017; Sager and Mulinari, 2018). This narrative situates sexism and patriarchy as external to European societies, projecting them onto the racialized male Other. By contrast, the concept of ‘protective masculinity’ shifts analytical attention from the instrumentalization of feminist ideals to the central role of masculinity itself as a political and cultural force. It does so by foregrounding how traditional, dominant norms of masculinity, not gender equality, form the ideological basis of nationalist and anti-migrant discourses. Here, the figure of the ‘protector’ male is valorized not through a commitment to equality but through an ideal of male dominance and authority over women, children and subordinated men (Young, 2003; Wojnicka, 2023). Importantly, ‘protective masculinity’ encompasses a broader and more multidimensional understanding of protection, not only protection from ‘foreign masculinity’ but also economic protection through the breadwinner model. In this vision, men are positioned as financial providers, while women are not necessarily seen as equal participants in the labour market (Wojnicka and Kubisa, 2024). This sharply diverges from femonationalism, which often centres women’s labour market participation (Farris, 2017).

In addition, while femonationalism remains a concept primarily used to analyse elite-level discourses – those of political parties, state actors and institutions – ‘protective masculinity’ is also reflected in the everyday rhetoric of voters themselves. It provides a more intuitive and emotionally resonant vocabulary for expressing anxieties around gender, migration and social change (Wojnicka, 2023). As such, it captures a wider ideological field, extending beyond top-down policy rhetoric to bottom-up cultural attitudes and identifications. This makes ‘protective masculinity’ not only analytically versatile but also more attuned to the lived realities and political imaginaries of ordinary citizens. Finally, while we recognize femonationalism as a highly influential and inspiring concept, especially in the original context of Western European countries like France, Italy and the Netherlands (Farris, 2017), we argue that ‘protective masculinity’ is ultimately broader. It enables us to account for contexts, such as those in Central and Eastern Europe, where far-right actors reject gender equality altogether and where gendered nationalist logics rely not on the appropriation of feminist values but on the reinforcement of traditional, hierarchical gender norms (Grzebalska and Pető, 2018; Korolczuk, 2020). In these settings, ‘protective masculinity’ offers a more comprehensive and contextually grounded analytical tool.

## **Hypotheses**

This article applies the concept of ‘protective masculinity’ to the study of the gender gap in PRR voting. It contributes to the literature by adding a potential explanation to the inconclusive evidence on the gender gap, operationalizing a particular type of masculinity in a cross-country study and testing both mediation and moderation effects in how ‘protective masculinity’ affects the gender gap in PRR voting. Further, to deepen our understanding of ‘protective masculinity’ in relation to other types of masculinity, this article compares the role of ‘protective masculinity’ – the combination of gender-inegalitarian and nativist attitudes – to that of gender-egalitarian nativist

attitudes (for example, femonationalism or sexually modern nativism) in explaining the gender gap in PRR voting. Building on the aforementioned literature and theoretical framework, it investigates three hypotheses.

First, since both ‘protective masculinity’ and gender-egalitarian nativism are inherent to PRR ideology and propagated by PRR parties, we hypothesize the following:

H1: ‘Protective masculinity’ and gender-egalitarian nativist attitudes are both positively related to PRR party support.

Next, we investigate to what extent ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes can explain the gender gap in PRR support. Given that men are more strongly punished for transgressing gender norms by both men and women (Sirin et al, 2004; Kane, 2006), they have a stronger incentive to approximate the ideals of hegemonic masculinity. Since these ideals are based on the domination of men and the subordination of non-hegemonic masculinities (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005), ‘protective masculinity’ allows men to conform to traditional gender norms and shield themselves from social punishment. Men should therefore be more likely to hold ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes than women. Conversely, women should not be particularly less likely than men to hold gender-egalitarian nativist attitudes. This results in the following hypotheses:

H2a: Men are more likely than women to hold ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes.

H2b: Men and women are similarly likely to hold gender-egalitarian nativist attitudes.

If H1, H2a and H2b are true, ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes may mediate the effect of gender on PRR support. Conversely, gender-egalitarian nativist attitudes cannot mediate the gender gap in PRR support if H2b holds true, that is, men and women do not significantly differ in their likelihood to hold gender-egalitarian nativist attitudes. We thus proceed to test the following hypothesis:

H2c: The effect of gender on PRR support is (partially) mediated by ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes but not by gender-egalitarian nativist attitudes.

Finally, in addition to the mediation hypothesis, we consider a moderation hypothesis in investigating the role of ‘protective masculinity’ in the gender gap in PRR support. We argue that women may also hold ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes because they are socialized into societies marked by hegemonic masculinity. However, women are less likely than men to base their vote choice on these attitudes because they have less to gain from supporting politics driven by ‘protective masculinity’. In contrast, men may be more likely to base their vote choice on their ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes, as this helps them to affirm their gender identity and approximate the ‘hegemonic’ ideals of manhood. Gender may thus moderate the effect of ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes on PRR support. We therefore hypothesize that:

H3a: The effect of ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes on PRR support is stronger for men than for women.

In comparison, women holding gender-egalitarian nativist attitudes may gain more from voting based on these attitudes, given that these attitudes assert the protection of gender egalitarianism from the alleged threat of (Muslim) migrant men. We thus hypothesize that:

H3b: The effect of gender-egalitarian nativist attitudes on PRR support is similar for men and women.

## Data and methods

To test these hypotheses, we use the 2017 wave of the European Values Study (EVS), which includes survey items relating to the main concept of interest of ‘protective masculinity’. The 2017 data are used to capture the time period following the 2015/16 increases in refugee immigration, which gave salience to the topic of Muslim male-dominated immigration that has been shown to influence the rise of PRR parties (Dennison and Geddes, 2019). It further follows an instance of mass sexual harassment committed by immigrants on New Year’s Eve 2015 in Cologne, Germany, which received international attention and even influenced grass-roots mobilization related to the far right in other European countries than Germany (Calderaro, 2025). Thus, this type of immigration was also likely to be particularly associated with ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes in the studied time period.

The study includes all European Union and European Free Trade Association countries with PRR parties covered by the 2017 EVS wave, resulting in a sample of 16,390 individuals nested in 16 countries (see Table A2 for summary statistics and Table A3 for correlations in Appendix 1). The following countries are included in the analysis: Austria, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and Switzerland.<sup>1</sup>

### Data

Our dependent variable is a binary measure of PRR support, captured by the respondent’s answer to the question, ‘Which (political) party appeals to you most?’. As done in previous research (Berlingozzi and Piccolino, 2019; Schwörer and Romero-Vidal, 2020), PRR parties that are both populist and far right are identified using The PopuList (Rooduijn et al, 2020), resulting in the inclusion of 25 PRR parties. Respondents without a party preference were coded as ‘missing’. All included PRR parties and their number of supporters in the EVS sample are listed in Table A1 in Appendix 1.

As regards our independent variables, ‘protective masculinity’ is operationalized as an interaction of (1) gender-inegalitarian attitudes and (2) nativist attitudes. To establish whether respondents hold gender-inegalitarian attitudes, we use a variable capturing (dis)agreement with the statement that ‘A man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and family’. This is based on McDaniel’s (2008: 59) definition of gender egalitarianism as the belief ‘that men and women should attain a certain degree of equality within both public and private realms of society, and that women’s status should not depend on their reproductive behaviour’. The question assesses respondents’ beliefs regarding equality in the public sphere

(labour market integration) and the private sphere (caretaker role). The answers are coded such that 1 = ‘agree strongly’, 2 = ‘agree’, 3 = ‘disagree’ and 4 = ‘disagree strongly’, where higher values equal more gender-egalitarian attitudes. In a binary variable, respondents who ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’ with the statement are coded as respondents with gender-inegalitarian attitudes (‘1’), and respondents (strongly) disagreeing with the statement are coded as ‘0’.

In addition to gender-inegalitarian attitudes, respondents with ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes should hold nativist attitudes. To measure nativist attitudes, we create a binary variable capturing whether respondents mention ‘Muslims’, ‘people of a different race’ and/or ‘immigrants/foreign workers’ when asked the following question: ‘On this list are various groups of people, could you identify any that you would not like to have as neighbours?’.<sup>2</sup> Notably, this survey item does not specifically capture that respondents perceive (male) Muslims/immigrants/people of colour to be a strong cultural and, more importantly, sexual threat. Nonetheless, in the absence of an item specifically capturing sexual threat perceptions, it is a suitable approximation for measuring whether respondents perceive Muslims/immigrants/people of colour to be a sexual and/or cultural threat, given the assumption that respondents do not want to live close to those they presume to be such a threat. Finally, protective masculinity is operationalized as the interaction between gender-inegalitarian and nativist attitudes, where respondents are considered to hold ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes if they hold both gender-inegalitarian and nativist attitudes. [Table 1](#) illustrates the possible combinations between the two variables used to capture gender-inegalitarian and nativist attitudes and the respective number of observations for each possible combination, highlighting in grey the combination that is most central to this article: ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes. To analyse the relationship between these four sets of attitudes and PRR support, we create a nominal categorical variable with four categories capturing these sets of attitudes. Next to ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes, the combination of gender-egalitarian and nativist attitudes is of particular interest, as it partly reflects the concepts of sexually modern nativism (see, for example, [Spierings et al, 2017](#); [Lancaster, 2019](#)) and femonationalism ([Farris, 2017](#)) elaborated earlier. Both are argued to play a role in PRR support; thus, as we hypothesized, the combination of gender-egalitarian and nativist attitudes constitutes a particularly interesting comparison to ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes. Finally, the second independent variable in this study is gender, coded as ‘0’ for men and ‘1’ for women.

We control for factors that the literature has shown to influence either PRR support or ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes. At the individual level, these include age, education, occupational status, rural versus urban residency and satisfaction with the political system. At the country level, we control for a communist past.

**Table 1:** Possible combinations of gender attitudes and nativism, respective number/share of observations

	Gender-egalitarian (0)	Gender-inegalitarian (1)
Non-nativist (0)	Gender-egalitarian/non-nativist ( <i>n</i> = 9,224; 56.28%)	Gender-inegalitarian/non-nativist ( <i>n</i> = 1,825; 11.13%)
Nativist (1)	Gender-egalitarian/nativist ( <i>n</i> = 3,060; 18.67%)	Protective masculinity ( <i>n</i> = 2,281; 13.92%)

As regards age, studies suggest that younger people are more likely to vote for the PRR (Lubbers et al, 2002; Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012; Hartevelde et al, 2015; Immerzeel et al, 2015).<sup>3</sup> Conversely, older people may more likely hold ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes, as younger generations are socialized into a more globalized and gender-egalitarian world, making them less likely to hold ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes (Norris and Inglehart, 2019). Age is measured as a categorical variable with six categories ranging from ‘15’ to ‘65+’ years.

Lower education levels are consistently associated with PRR voting (Lubbers et al, 2002; Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012; Hartevelde et al, 2015; Immerzeel et al, 2015). Additionally, lower education levels may be related to stronger ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes, as the highly educated are generally less conservative and more tolerant (Stubager, 2008; Lindskog and Oskarson, 2022; Scott, 2024). Education is measured in eight categories, where 0 = ‘less than primary’ and 8 = ‘doctoral or equivalent’.

Further, respondents’ occupational status is expected to affect PRR voting, as manual workers, the self-employed and the unemployed are often more likely to vote for the PRR (Lubbers et al, 2002; Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012; Hartevelde et al, 2015). Similarly, occupational status may be negatively related to ‘protective masculinity’. Occupational status is here operationalized by the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) by Ganzeboom, De Graaf and Treiman (1992), ranging from 1 to 100, with higher values denoting a higher occupational status.

We also control for rural versus urban residency. Urban residents are often argued to hold more progressive values and vote for more progressive parties (Scala and Johnson, 2017; Kelly and Lobao, 2019), and rural residents feel less like the government will respond to their demands (García del Horno et al, 2024). As such, rural residents may more likely support PRR parties and hold ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes. In the EVS, the survey interviewer indicates the size of the respondent’s town of residence. It is measured on a 1–5 scale, where 1 = ‘under 5,000’ and 5 = ‘500,000 and more’ inhabitants.

All full models control for respondents’ satisfaction with the political system. As populism is marked by anti-establishment rhetoric and sentiment, political satisfaction should be low among supporters of populist parties (Stockemer et al, 2018). Satisfaction with the political system is measured on a 1–10 scale, where 1 = ‘not at all’ and 10 = ‘completely’ satisfied.

Lastly, we control for post-communism at the country level. Hartevelde et al (2015) find that post-communist countries have higher levels of PRR support than other European countries. Recently, though, PRR parties have become increasingly successful in Western European countries, leading to unclear expectations about the relationship between post-communism and PRR support. As regards ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes, on the one hand, we may expect people in post-communist countries to be more likely to hold ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes due to the social conservatism observed in post-communist countries. On the other hand, the rather gender-equal legacy of communism on the labour market may also lead to more gender-egalitarian attitudes. To control for post-communism, we include a dichotomous variable that equals ‘1’ for all post-communist countries, that is, Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, and 0 otherwise.<sup>4</sup>

## *Methods*

To account for the hierarchical structure of the data, with individuals nested in countries, we apply multilevel models (Snijders and Bosker, 2012). The intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) confirms that 21.5 per cent of the variation in PRR support is explained at the country level, which further warrants the use of multilevel models.

Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, PRR support, we apply multilevel logistic regression models. We specify fixed-slope, random-intercept models (for robustness checks with random-slope models, substantially confirming all results, see Appendix 4). We cluster standard errors at the country level to account for the fact that the observations from respondents in a given country are not independent of each other. We further apply survey weights to adjust socio-demographic characteristics in the sample population to the distribution of the target population. To test H2a and H2b, we use generalized structural equation modelling to specify multilevel multinomial logistic regression models and thereby account for both the data structure (individuals nested in countries) and the nature of the dependent variable (four nominal categories). To test H2c, we conduct a mediation analysis based on Hicks and Tingley (2011). This type of mediation analysis is chosen because it is suitable for models with binary variables. Again, we cluster standard errors at the country level.

The study's research design and methodology come with some limitations. First, the applied data are observational, which renders any causal claims impossible. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that social desirability bias might lead to respondents under-reporting their support for PRR parties and their conservative ideology. As Hartevelt et al (2015) note, women may particularly under-report their support for the PRR party family due to social desirability, which would bias the results towards a larger gender gap. As is usual for survey research, it is unfortunately not possible to account for social desirability bias and its potentially gendered nature in this study. Lastly, the applied data were collected in 2017/18 in the wake of the refugee crisis, which brought salience to the topic of male-dominated Muslim immigration and, in turn, 'protective masculinity'. This time period is therefore rather particular, limiting the generalizability of our results over time. However, given the continued and intensified anti-Muslim/immigration discourse prevalent in many European countries in recent years, we do not expect that the role of 'protective masculinity' in vote choice has diminished since 2017.

## **Results**


### *Descriptive statistics*

Summary statistics show that 18.71 per cent of all respondents support a PRR party in their country (see Table A2 in Appendix 1). Further, 25.05 per cent of respondents (strongly) agree that it is the man's job to earn money and a woman's job to look after the home and the family, and 32.59 per cent of all respondents hold anti-Muslim/immigrant/people of colour (that is, nativist) attitudes, as they do not wish either one or several of these population groups to be their neighbours. As previously stated, 'protective masculinity' attitudes consist of both gender-inegalitarian and nativist attitudes. Interestingly, although roughly a quarter of respondents hold gender-inegalitarian attitudes and roughly one third

of respondents hold nativist attitudes, recall that [Table 1](#) indicates that only 13.92 per cent of respondents hold ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes. Still, this group is sizeable considering the potential number of supporters it offers for PRR parties, especially in multi-party systems.

[Figure 1](#) shows the mean PRR support of respondents in the four possible combinations of gender-(in)egalitarian and nativist attitudes outlined in [Table 1](#). The graph suggests that respondents holding ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes are more likely to support PRR parties, closely followed by people with gender-egalitarian nativist attitudes. It is noteworthy that [Figure 1](#) hides considerable cross-country variation (for individual country graphs, see [Figure A1](#) in [Appendix 5](#)). Respondents holding ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes are more likely to support the PRR than respondents with other gender/nativist attitudes in seven out of 16 countries: Finland, France, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland. Interestingly, these countries include both relatively gender-equal societies, including some Nordic countries, and contexts with relatively powerful so-called ‘anti-gender’ movements, including Poland and Hungary (see, for example, [Graff, 2014](#); [Grzebalska and Pető, 2018](#)). In five countries, respondents holding gender-egalitarian nativist attitudes are most likely to support the PRR, namely in Austria, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia and Germany. In the case of Germany, this corresponds with the strong femonationalist discourse dominating the public debate after an incident of mass sexual harassment committed by immigrants on New Year’s Eve in 2015/16 in Cologne ([Wigger et al, 2022](#)). In three countries, namely Bulgaria, Italy and Slovenia, respondents with gender-inegalitarian non-nativist attitudes are either most likely or equally likely as respondents with ‘prospective masculinity’ attitudes to support the PRR, pointing to the important role that gender inequality plays in PRR support in these countries.<sup>5</sup>

**Figure 1:** Mean PRR support over combinations of gender-(in)egalitarian and (non-)nativist attitudes




Next, [Figure 2](#) shows how men and women cluster across the four combinations of gender and nativist attitudes. It illustrates that women are (slightly) over-represented among those with gender-egalitarian attitudes, including those with gender-egalitarian nativist attitudes. In comparison, men hold more gender-inegalitarian attitudes, including more ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes. Next, [Figure 3](#) shows the gender gap in PRR support in our sample: 22 per cent of men indicate that they support PRR parties, compared to 18 per cent of women. Finally, [Figure 4](#) shows the mean levels of PRR support for men and women who hold each of the four combinations of gender and nativist attitudes. It shows that women who hold gender-egalitarian non-nativist attitudes are least likely to support the PRR, with a mean support level of 10 per cent. Further, among women, those with ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes are most likely to support the PRR, with a mean support level of 33 per cent. In contrast, among men, those with ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes and those with gender-egalitarian nativist attitudes are similarly likely to support the PRR: their mean support levels of the PRR equal 34 and 35 per cent, respectively.

*Multilevel logistic regressions*


[Table 2](#) shows a baseline model regressing PRR support on gender (see Model 1) and models including the four different combinations of gender and nativist attitudes (see Model 2, reference category: gender-egalitarian non-nativist attitudes) and relevant control variables (see Model 3). The models show that women are less likely to support PRR parties. Further, compared to the most progressive respondents holding gender-egalitarian non-nativist attitudes, respondents holding any of the three other combinations of gender and nativist attitudes are more likely to support PRR parties ( $p$ -value < 0.05). Accounting for relevant control variables (see Model 3), respondents

**Figure 2:** Combinations of gender-(in)egalitarian and (non-)nativist attitudes by gender




Graphs by Gender (1=Woman)

**Figure 3:** PRR support by gender



**Figure 4:** PRR support by gender and gender-(in)egalitarian/(non-)nativist attitudes



holding ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes are 26.5 per cent more likely to support the PRR than the most progressive respondents combining gender-egalitarian and non-nativist attitudes. In comparison, gender-egalitarian nativists are 34.3 per cent more likely to support the PRR than the most progressive respondents with gender-egalitarian and non-nativist attitudes. Both sets of attitudes, ‘protective masculinity’ and

**Table 2:** Multilevel logistic regression of H1 (dependent variable: PRR support)

Dependent variable: PRR support	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Women	-0.287*** (0.09)	-0.215** (0.08)	-0.217* (0.09)	-0.191 (0.13)	-0.183 (0.14)
Ref: gender-egalitarian/non-nativist					
Gender-inegalitarian/ non-nativist		0.851*** (0.09)	0.701*** (0.08)	0.819*** (0.11)	0.689*** (0.09)
Gender-egalitarian/ nativist		1.433*** (0.17)	1.343*** (0.15)	1.543*** (0.17)	1.453*** (0.15)
Protective masculinity		1.450*** (0.22)	1.265*** (0.20)	1.392*** (0.22)	1.217*** (0.21)
Age (6 categories)			-0.100*** (0.03)		- 0.100*** (0.03)
Education (8 categories)			-0.118*** (0.03)		- 0.118*** (0.03)
Socio-economic status (0–100)			-0.007*** (0.00)		- 0.007*** (0.00)
Size of town (5 categories)			-0.112** (0.04)		-0.113** (0.04)
Satisfaction with political system (1–10)			-0.021 (0.07)		-0.020 (0.07)
Post-communist			0.195 (0.58)		0.202 (0.58)
Women # gender- inegalitarian/non-nativist				0.086 (0.17)	0.037 (0.17)
Women # femonationalist				-0.236 (0.15)	-0.235 (0.16)
Women # protective masculinity				0.131 (0.20)	0.112 (0.21)
Constant	-1.390*** (0.24)	-2.144*** (0.23)	-0.632 (0.50)	-2.154*** (0.22)	-0.655 (0.51)
Variance: country- specific intercept	0.908* (0.41)	0.869* (0.34)	0.855** (0.31)	0.873* (0.35)	0.857** (0.31)
N (countries)	16	16	16	16	16
N	16,390	16,390	16,390	16,390	16,390

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*  $p < 0.1$ . Coefficients are log odds. For Models 1–3 with random-slope specification, see [Table A13](#) in [Appendix 4](#).

gender-egalitarian nativism, thus increase respondents' likelihood to support the PRR, and this effect is slightly stronger for gender-egalitarian nativism. These results translate into predicted probabilities to support a PRR party of 31.9 per cent for gender-egalitarian nativists and 30.6 per cent for people with 'protective masculinity' attitudes, compared to 12.9 per cent for the more progressive gender-egalitarian non-nativists and 21.5 per cent for those combining gender-inegalitarian and non-nativist attitudes (see [Table A4](#) in [Appendix 2](#)). These results support H1 that 'protective masculinity' and gender-egalitarian nativist attitudes are both positively related to PRR party support, and this effect is slightly stronger for gender-egalitarian nativist attitudes.

To test H2a, that is, that men are more likely than women to hold ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes, two multilevel multinomial logistic models are calculated using the four combinations of gender and nativist attitudes as the dependent variable (see [Table 3](#)). Model 1 consists of a baseline regression of the four different combinations of gender and nativist attitudes on gender, and Model 2 includes various control variables ([Table A5](#) in [Appendix 2](#) shows the full models). All coefficients are interpreted in relation to the baseline outcome category comprised of the more progressive respondents with gender-egalitarian non-nativist attitudes. In line with H2a, Models 1 and 2 show a negative and statistically significant relationship between being a woman and holding ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes ( $p$ -value < 0.01) relative to women’s likelihood of holding gender-egalitarian non-nativist attitudes. In Model 2, being a woman decreases the log odds of holding ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes relative to holding gender-egalitarian non-nativist attitudes by  $-0.637$ . These logged odds translate into a predicted probability of 15.2 per cent for men to hold ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes, compared to women’s predicted probability of 11.5 per cent. This represents a difference of 3.7 percentage points (see [Table 4](#)). In line with H2b, it is further noteworthy that men and women are similarly likely to hold gender-egalitarian nativist attitudes: men’s predicted probability of holding gender-egalitarian nativist attitudes equals 18.3 per cent, compared to women’s predicted probability of 18.7 per cent (see [Table 4](#)). Importantly, as we hypothesized (H2c), the fact that men and women hold similarly gender-egalitarian nativist attitudes implies that gender-egalitarian nativism cannot explain and cannot act as a mediator of the gender gap in PRR support. Regarding gender-inegalitarian non-nativist attitudes, men have a predicted probability of 13.5 per cent to hold such attitudes, compared to women’s predicted probability of 9 per cent. Finally, women are over-represented only among those holding gender-egalitarian non-nativist attitudes: women’s predicted probability

**Table 3:** Multilevel multinomial logistic regression of H2a

Reference category: gender-egalitarian/ non-nativist	(1)	(2)
2. Gender-inegalitarian/non-nativist		
Gender (1 = woman)	-0.640*** (0.05)	-0.679*** (0.06)
Constant	-1.055*** (0.24)	-1.049*** (0.22)
3. Gender-egalitarian/nativist		
Gender	-0.212*** (0.05)	-0.239*** (0.05)
Constant	-0.786** (0.28)	-0.640** (0.21)
4. Protective masculinity		
Gender	-0.585*** (0.05)	-0.637*** (0.06)
Constant	-1.214** (0.43)	-1.477*** (0.34)
Variance (country)	0.871** (0.31)	0.260** (0.10)
Includes control variables		x
N (countries)	16	16
N (individuals)	16,390	16,390

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*  $p < 0.1$ . Coefficients are log odds. Control variables included in Model 2 are age, education, socio-economic status, size of respondents’ place of residence, satisfaction with the political system and post-communism. The full Model 2 is shown in [Table A5](#) in [Appendix 2](#), and full models with random-slopes specification are shown in [Table A14](#) in [Appendix 4](#).

to fall into this category is 60.8 per cent, compared to men’s predicted probability of 52.9 per cent (see [Table 4](#)).

To test H2c, that is, that the effect of gender on PRR support is (partially) mediated by ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes but not by gender-egalitarian nativist attitudes, we start by referring back to Models 1 and 2 of [Table 2](#). Model 1 shows a bivariate logistic regression of PRR support on gender. In Model 2, the explanatory variable comprising all four combinations of gender and nativist attitudes is added. To support the mediation hypothesis, the direct effect of the gender dummy on PRR support must decrease – or even become insignificant – once the mediating variable of ‘protective masculinity’ is included in Model 2. Furthermore, the average mediation effect reported by the causal mediation analysis from [Hicks and Tingley \(2011\)](#) must be statistically significant.

[Table 2](#) shows a consistently negative and statistically significant relation between gender and PRR support (for predicted probabilities, see [Table A6](#) in [Appendix 2](#)). Comparing the coefficient for gender in Model 1 to its coefficient in Model 2, which includes the possible combinations of gender and nativist attitudes, does indeed decrease the direct effect of gender on PRR support. While this decrease from  $-0.287$  to  $-0.215$  log odds is associated with a decline in the statistical significance of the effect, the coefficient in Model 2 remains significant at  $p < 0.05$ . Thus, combinations of respondents’ gender and nativist attitudes may act as a weak mediator of the relationship between gender and PRR support. However, we do not know which particular combination of gender and nativist attitudes drives this effect.

Next, we run mediation analyses to formally test the mediating effect. We create four binary dummy variables, one for each combination of gender and nativist attitudes, equalling ‘1’ if a respondent holds the respective combination of gender and nativist attitudes and ‘0’ if otherwise. We run four separate mediation analyses to test the mediating effects of each possible combination of gender and nativist attitudes. As regards our key variable of interest, ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes, [Table 5](#) presents a summary of the mediation results (for full results, see [Tables A7–A10](#) in [Appendix 3](#)). The average indirect effect of gender on PRR support that operates through the mediator ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes is  $-0.003$ . To compare, the direct effect of gender on PRR support is  $-0.032$ . The total mediation effect of 9.1 per cent is relatively small in size yet statistically significant.<sup>6</sup> This analysis therefore lends support to H2c.

**Table 4:** Predicted probabilities of holding different sets of gender and nativist attitudes for men and women, based on Model 2, including control variables

		Predicted probability (%)	SD	z	P > z	95% confidence interval	
Gender-egalitarian/ non-nativist	Men	52.9	0.029	18.470	0.000	0.473	0.585
	Women	60.8	0.027	22.870	0.000	0.556	0.660
Gender-inegalitarian /non-nativist	Men	13.5	0.008	17.130	0.000	0.120	0.151
	Women	9	0.006	15.360	0.000	0.078	0.101
Gender-egalitarian/nativist	Men	18.3	0.010	17.490	0.000	0.163	0.204
	Women	18.7	0.011	16.630	0.000	0.165	0.210
Protective masculinity	Men	15.2	0.016	9.370	0.000	0.121	0.184
	Women	11.5	0.014	8.200	0.000	0.087	0.142

Note: A replication of this table based on random-slopes models is shown in [Table A15](#) in [Appendix 4](#).

**Table 5:** Causal mediation analysis of H2b (mediator: 'protective masculinity' attitudes)

Effect	Mean	95% confidence interval	
ACME1	-0.003	-0.007	-0.000
ACME0	-0.003	-0.008	-0.000
Direct effect 1	-0.032	-0.058	-0.008
Direct effect 0	-0.032	-0.058	-0.008
Total effect	-0.035	-0.065	-0.009
% of total via ACME1	0.087	0.047	0.318
% of total via ACME0	0.095	0.051	0.346
Average mediation	-0.003	-0.007	-0.000
Average direct effect	-0.032	-0.058	-0.008
% of total effect mediated	0.091	0.049	0.332

Note: Full mediation models are shown in [Table A10](#) in [Appendix 3](#), ACME = Average Causal Mediated Effect.

As regards the potential mediation effects of other combinations of gender and nativist attitudes, as noted earlier and hypothesized in H2c, gender-egalitarian nativist attitudes do not act as mediators because men and women are equally likely to hold such attitudes. Further, gender-inegalitarian non-nativist attitudes also do not act as mediators because these attitudes are not significantly related to PRR support. Finally, holding gender-egalitarian non-nativist attitudes, that is, the most progressive, widespread and female-dominated set of attitudes, has a strong mediating effect: 33.6 per cent of the effect of gender on PRR support is explained by the fact that women are more likely than men to hold gender-egalitarian non-nativist attitudes (for full mediation results of all mediators, see [Tables A7–A10](#) in [Appendix 3](#)).


Lastly, to test the moderating effect of gender on the relationship between 'protective masculinity' and PRR support (H3a and H3b), an interaction variable between 'protective masculinity' attitudes and gender is introduced. Model 4 of [Table 2](#) displays the interaction effect of gender and different combinations of gender and nativist attitudes on PRR support, and Model 5 includes the interaction term and control variables. Both models show no significant interaction effects for either combination of gender and nativist attitudes. [Figure 5](#) illustrates that the effect of holding any of the four combinations of gender and nativist attitudes on PRR support does not differ by gender. While these results support H3b, they do not lend support to H3a, that is, that the effect of 'protective masculinity' attitudes on PRR support is stronger for men than for women. Rather, men and women who hold 'protective masculinity' attitudes are equally likely to support PRR parties, and this holds true for the other three combinations of gender and nativist attitudes as well.

Finally, we conduct two robustness checks on the results shown in [Table 2](#), applying alternative model specifications. Instead of applying multilevel logistic regression, first, we apply a simple logistic regression model, including country dummy variables. Second, we re-estimate the regressions with a heteroscedasticity-robust standard error. As shown in [Tables A11](#) and [A12](#) in [Appendix 4](#), all results are substantially confirmed.

## Conclusion

Research consistently shows men's disproportionate support for the PRR. The literature has offered many diverging theories, yet no conclusive explanations for the gender gap have been found, as men and women have been shown to similarly hold

**Figure 5:** Moderation hypothesis: predicted probability of PRR support by gender-(in) egalitarian/(non-)nativist attitudes and gender



authoritarian and nativist attitudes and express political discontent, all of which are characteristics commonly argued to influence PRR support. The role of masculinity in politics, be it among voters or parties, has long been overlooked. This is glaring, given that masculinity might serve as an analytical tool helping to explain PRR support and the gender gap in PRR support. Adding to recent qualitative work on the UK context (Ralph-Morrow, 2020) and a quantitative study of the Spanish context (Coffé et al, 2023), this article has quantitatively addressed this research gap via a study of 16 European countries in 2017, a time period marked by a relatively widespread nativist political and public discourse.

We first asked whether ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes – operationalized as a combination of gender-inegalitarian and nativist sentiments – explain PRR support. To broaden our understanding of ‘protective masculinity’ in relation to other kinds of masculinities and their role in PRR support, we further compared the effects of ‘protective masculinity’ to those of gender-egalitarian nativism. First, we found that, similar to gender-egalitarian nativism, ‘protective masculinity’ is positively related to PRR support. In our descriptive analysis, we also found considerable cross-country variation regarding the relationship between ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes and PRR support. However, it is beyond the scope of this article to explain this cross-country variation. Future research may take on this endeavour. Second, our analysis has revealed gender gaps in ‘protective masculinity’ and PRR support in line with our expectations: men are more likely to hold ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes and to support the PRR. Herein, ‘protective masculinity’ differs from gender-egalitarian nativist attitudes, which men and women are equally likely to hold. As hypothesized, we also find that ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes mediate the relationship between gender and PRR support, though only to a small extent of 9 per cent. In contrast,

gender-egalitarian nativism does not mediate the gender gap in PRR support. Contrary to our expectations, gender does not moderate the relationship between either ‘protective masculinity’ or gender-egalitarian nativism and PRR support, indicating that men and women who hold these attitudes are equally likely to support PRR parties.

Our results point towards several new avenues for future research on the role of masculinity in political behaviour. Although ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes only partially explain the gender gap, our article has shown that including different kinds of masculinity as an analytical tool in political behaviour research nonetheless proves fruitful, especially in understanding PRR support. Yet, much remains to be researched, especially regarding the cross-country variation in the relationship between different kinds of masculinity and PRR support. In terms of measurement, we further call for future research to develop more refined empirical operationalizations of ‘protective masculinity’. While our measurement works with binary variables and thereby simplifies the variation in gender (in)egalitarianism and nativist attitudes and therefore ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes, future research may develop scales to better capture variation in such attitudes.

Importantly, we have found that women also hold ‘protective masculinity’ attitudes and are similarly affected by these attitudes in their PRR support as men. This is the case not only for masculinity forms that forward gender egalitarianism to some extent (for example, gender-egalitarian nativism in our analysis) but also for masculinity forms that explicitly comprise gender inegalitarianism, that is, ‘protective masculinity attitudes’. Future research may explore what motivates women to do so.

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Croatia, Portugal and Romania were dropped from the analysis because the 2017 EVS data set includes only two, 14 and 11 PRR supporters from these countries, respectively. Further, among the respondents having answered the variables used in this study, there were no PRR supporters from Iceland, Lithuania and Spain. For the UK and the Netherlands, no data exist on our independent variable capturing nativist attitudes. Thus, we drop these countries too.

<sup>2</sup> Additionally, the survey question lists the following groups of people: heavy drinkers, drug addicts, homosexuals, Christians (this response option is optional in countries with a Christian majority), Jews (optional response category) and Gypsies (optional response category). It is possible for respondents to mention multiple groups of people in their response.

<sup>3</sup> Cultural backlash theory (Norris and Inglehart, 2019) states the opposite: older people are theorized to feel threatened by changes to earlier status quos and are argued to be more likely to vote for PRR parties. Yet, cultural backlash theory has been scrutinized on the grounds of conceptual and empirical problems. Schäfer (2021) replicates many of the analyses done by Norris and Inglehart and finds, in line with the aforementioned authors, older cohorts to be less likely to vote for PRR parties.

<sup>4</sup> East Germany is not included because the EVS does not distinguish between East and West Germany. Given that East Germany is much smaller than West Germany with regard to population size, we do not include Germany as a post-communist country.

<sup>5</sup> Interestingly, in Slovakia, respondents in the more progressive group holding gender-egalitarian non-nativist attitudes are more likely than other respondents to support the PRR. In light of this puzzling finding, we suggest that future research may investigate whether Slovak nativism is better captured via other indicators than the ones we use here.

<sup>6</sup> Ideally, we would conduct a sensitivity analysis to investigate the robustness of the results. However, this model includes both a binary mediator and a binary outcome variable, which does not allow for a sensitivity analysis as developed by [Hicks and Tingley \(2011\)](#).

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### **Conflict of interest**

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

### **Author biographies**

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## Appendix 1: Summary statistics

**Table A1:** PRR parties included in this study and their code and number of supporters in the EVS

Countries	PRR parties	PRR party code in the EVS	Supporters per party in the EVS
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria	4003	268
Bulgaria	Attack	10004	15
	VMRO – Bulgarian National Movement	10007	59
	Political Party VOLYA	10008	30
	National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria	10015	1
Czechia	SPD (Freedom and Direct Democracy – Tomio Okamura)	20308	99
Denmark	Danish People's Party	20805	378
Estonia	Estonian Conservative People's Party	23306	114
Finland	Finns Party	24608	90
France	France Arise	25013	26
	National Front (since 2018: National Rally)	25014	143
Germany	Alternative for Germany	27606	108
Hungary	Fidesz	34802	536
	Movement for a Better Hungary	34804	128
Italy	League	38013	266
	Brothers of Italy	38014	49
Norway	Progress Party	57803	91
Poland	Law and Justice	61601	424
	Kukiz'15	61603	88
Slovakia	Slovak National Party	70308	74
	We Are Family – Boris Kollár	70309	65
Slovenia	SDS – Slovenian Democratic Party	70502	113
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	75203	80
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party	75604	524
	Ticino League	75613	18

**Table A2:** Summary statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
PRR support	16,390	0.187	0.39	0	1
Gender-inegalitarian attitudes	16,390	0.251	0.433	0	1
Nativism	16,390	0.326	0.469	0	1
Gender (1 = woman)	16,390	0.529	0.499	0	1
Age (6 categories)	16,390	4.183	1.574	1	6
Education (8 categories)	16,390	4.022	1.812	0	8
Socio-economic status (0–100, ISEI)	16,390	46.319	21.743	11	88
Size of town (5 categories)	16,390	2.627	1.321	1	5
Satisfaction with political system (1–10)	16,390	5.904	2.489	1	10
Post-communist	16,390	0.333	0.471	0	1

**Table A3:** Pearson's *R* correlation coefficient of the main variables

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
(1) PRR support	1.000									
(2) Gender inequality	0.149* (0.000)	1.000								
(3) Nativism	0.228* (0.000)	0.283* (0.000)	1.000							
(4) Gender (1 = woman)	-0.055* (0.000)	-0.072* (0.000)	-0.004 (0.625)	1.000						
(5) Age (6 categories)	-0.026* (0.001)	0.138* (0.000)	0.088* (0.000)	0.018* (0.023)	1.000					
(6) Education (8 categories)	-0.146* (0.000)	-0.234* (0.000)	-0.172* (0.000)	0.004 (0.574)	-0.159* (0.000)	1.000				
(7) Socio-economic status (0–100)	-0.149* (0.000)	-0.240* (0.000)	-0.189* (0.000)	0.014 (0.075)	-0.029* (0.000)	0.626* (0.000)	1.000			
(8) Size of town (5 categories)	-0.093* (0.000)	-0.101* (0.000)	-0.108* (0.000)	0.004 (0.591)	-0.058* (0.000)	0.195* (0.000)	0.184* (0.000)	1.000		
(9) Satisfaction with political system (1–10)	-0.040* (0.000)	-0.091* (0.000)	-0.176* (0.000)	-0.032* (0.000)	-0.003 (0.663)	0.119* (0.000)	0.121* (0.000)	0.004 (0.622)	1.000	
(10) Post-communist	0.158* (0.000)	0.325* (0.000)	0.422* (0.000)	0.076* (0.000)	0.051* (0.000)	-0.085* (0.000)	-0.150* (0.000)	-0.081* (0.000)	-0.283* (0.000)	1.000

Note: \*  $p < 0.05$ .

## Appendix 2: Additional information on regression analyses

**Table A4:** Predicted probabilities of PRR support for respondents with and without 'protective masculinity' attitudes, based on Model 3 of Table 1 in the main text

	Margin	SD	z	P > z	95% confidence interval	
Gender-egalitarian/non-nativist	0.129	0.028	4.680	0.000	0.075	0.183
Gender-inegalitarian/non-nativist	0.215	0.038	5.590	0.000	0.139	0.290
Gender-egalitarian/nativism	0.319	0.045	7.070	0.000	0.231	0.408
Protective masculinity	0.306	0.054	5.690	0.000	0.200	0.411

**Table A5:** Multilevel multinomial logistic regression of H2a, full models for Table 3 in the main text

Ref: gender-egalitarian/non-nativist	(1)	(2)
2. Gender-inegalitarian/non-nativist		
Gender (1 = woman)	-0.640*** (0.05)	-0.679*** (0.06)
Age (6 categories)		0.214*** (0.02)
Education (8 categories)		-0.212*** (0.02)
Socio-economic status (0-100)		-0.016*** (0.00)
Size of town (5 categories)		-0.027 (0.02)
Satisfaction with political system (1-10)		-0.000 (0.01)
Post-communist		1.568*** (0.26)
Constant	-1.055*** (0.24)	-1.049*** (0.22)
3. Gender-egalitarian/nativist		
Gender (1 = woman)	-0.212*** (0.05)	-0.239*** (0.05)
Age (6 categories)		0.104*** (0.01)
Education (8 categories)		-0.092*** (0.02)
Socio-economic status (0-100)		-0.009*** (0.00)
Size of town (5 categories)		-0.080*** (0.02)
Satisfaction with political system (1-10)		-0.067*** (0.01)
Post-communist		1.837*** (0.28)
Constant	-0.786** (0.28)	-0.640** (0.21)
4. Protective masculinity		
Gender (1 = woman)	-0.585*** (0.05)	-0.637*** (0.06)
Age (6 categories)		0.250*** (0.02)
Education (8 categories)		-0.246*** (0.02)
Socio-economic status (0-100)		-0.018*** (0.00)
Size of town (5 categories)		-0.142*** (0.02)
Satisfaction with political system (1-10)		-0.005 (0.01)
Post-communist		2.916*** (0.46)
Constant	-1.214** (0.43)	-1.477*** (0.34)
Variance (country)	0.871** (0.31)	0.260** (0.10)
N (countries)	16	16
N (individuals)	16,390	16,390

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*  $p < 0.1$ . Coefficients are log odds.

**Table A6:** Predicted probabilities of PRR support for men and women, based on Model 3 of Table 1 in the main text

	Margin	SD	z	P > z	95% confidence interval	
Men	0.218	0.037	5.970	0.000	0.146	0.289
Women	0.190	0.037	5.080	0.000	0.116	0.263

### Appendix 3: Full mediation models

**Table A7:** Mediation analysis: Mediator 1 – gender-egalitarian and non-nativist attitudes

Gender-egalitarian/non-nativist	Coefficient	SD	z	P > z	95% confidence interval	
Gender	0.433	0.062	6.970	0.000	0.311	0.555
Age	-0.184	0.018	-10.380	0.000	-0.219	-0.149
Education	0.158	0.021	7.620	0.000	0.117	0.198
Socio-economic status	0.013	0.002	7.260	0.000	0.010	0.017
Rural/urban	0.090	0.035	2.570	0.010	0.021	0.159
Satisfaction with politics	0.051	0.031	1.670	0.096	-0.009	0.112
Post-communist	-1.988	0.287	-6.910	0.000	-2.551	-1.424
Constant	-0.281	0.237	-1.190	0.235	-0.746	0.183
PRR support	Coefficient	SD	z	P > z	95% confidence interval	
Gender	-0.167	0.080	-2.090	0.036	-0.323	-0.011
Gender-egalitarian/non-nativist	-1.037	0.143	-7.240	0.000	-1.318	-0.756
Age	-0.120	0.031	-3.830	0.000	-0.181	-0.058
Education	-0.129	0.028	-4.670	0.000	-0.184	-0.075
Socio-economic status	-0.006	0.001	-4.090	0.000	-0.009	-0.003
Rural/urban	-0.115	0.058	-1.980	0.048	-0.229	-0.001
Satisfaction with politics	0.016	0.061	0.260	0.793	-0.104	0.136
Post-communist	0.339	0.598	0.570	0.571	-0.833	1.512
Constant	0.411	0.557	0.740	0.460	-0.680	1.502
Effect	Mean		95% confidence interval			
ACME1	-0.011		-0.017 -0.007			
ACME0	-0.012		-0.018 -0.007			
Direct effect 1	-0.023		-0.045 -0.001			
Direct effect 0	-0.024		-0.047 -0.001			
Total effect	-0.035		-0.059 -0.012			
% of total via ACME1	0.320		0.185 0.945			
% of total via ACME0	0.351		0.203 1.037			
Average mediation	-0.012		-0.017 -0.007			
Average direct effect	-0.023		-0.046 -0.001			
% of total effect mediated	0.336		0.194 0.991			

**Table A8:** Mediation analysis: Mediator 2 – gender-inegalitarian and non-nativist attitudes

Gender-inegalitarian/non-nativist	Coefficient	SD	z	P > z	95% confidence interval	
Gender	-0.465	0.059	-7.910	0.000	-0.580	-0.350
Age	0.156	0.031	5.070	0.000	0.096	0.216
Education	-0.147	0.035	-4.210	0.000	-0.216	-0.079
Socio-economic status	-0.011	0.001	-8.010	0.000	-0.014	-0.008
Rural/urban	0.025	0.053	0.480	0.628	-0.078	0.129
Satisfaction with politics	0.003	0.024	0.120	0.908	-0.044	0.049
Post-communist	0.312	0.194	1.610	0.107	-0.068	0.692
Constant	-1.687	0.289	-5.840	0.000	-2.253	-1.120
PRR support	Coefficient	SD	z	P > z	95% confidence interval	
Gender	-0.232	0.090	-2.590	0.010	-0.408	-0.056
Gender-inegalitarian/non-nativist	0.156	0.100	1.560	0.118	-0.040	0.351
Age	-0.082	0.032	-2.580	0.010	-0.145	-0.020
Education	-0.155	0.027	-5.660	0.000	-0.209	-0.102
Socio-economic status	-0.008	0.001	-5.830	0.000	-0.011	-0.005
Rural/urban	-0.129	0.061	-2.110	0.035	-0.248	-0.009
Satisfaction with politics	0.006	0.066	0.090	0.931	-0.124	0.135
Post-communist	0.736	0.594	1.240	0.216	-0.429	1.901
Constant	-0.080	0.556	-0.140	0.886	-1.170	1.010
Effect	Mean		95% confidence interval			
ACME1	-0.001		-0.003		0.000	
ACME0	-0.001		-0.003		0.000	
Direct effect 1	-0.034		-0.062		-0.008	
Direct effect 0	-0.034		-0.062		-0.008	
Total effect	-0.035		-0.064		-0.009	
% of total via ACME1	0.032		0.017		0.119	
% of total via ACME0	0.036		0.019		0.133	
Average mediation	-0.001		-0.003		0.000	
Average direct effect	-0.034		-0.062		-0.008	
% of total effect mediated	0.034		0.018		0.126	

**Table A9:** Mediation analysis: Mediator 3 – gender-egalitarian and nativist attitudes

<b>Gender-egalitarian/nativist</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>z</b>	<b>P &gt; z</b>	<b>95% confidence interval</b>	
Gender	0.022	0.110	0.200	0.844	-0.193	0.236
Age	0.006	0.024	0.260	0.796	-0.041	0.053
Education	-0.019	0.029	-0.650	0.514	-0.077	0.038
Socio-economic status	-0.001	0.002	-0.290	0.770	-0.006	0.004
Rural/urban	-0.047	0.036	-1.310	0.192	-0.117	0.023
Satisfaction with politics	-0.078	0.024	-3.270	0.001	-0.125	-0.031
Post-communist	0.908	0.182	5.000	0.000	0.552	1.264
Constant	-1.229	0.271	-4.530	0.000	-1.760	-0.697
<b>PRR support</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>z</b>	<b>P &gt; z</b>	<b>95% confidence interval</b>	
Gender	-0.252	0.084	-3.010	0.003	-0.417	-0.088
Gender-egalitarian/nativist	0.681	0.154	4.420	0.000	0.379	0.983
Age	-0.081	0.033	-2.480	0.013	-0.145	-0.017
Education	-0.161	0.027	-5.850	0.000	-0.214	-0.107
Socio-economic status	-0.009	0.001	-5.680	0.000	-0.011	-0.006
Rural/urban	-0.125	0.063	-1.990	0.047	-0.247	-0.002
Satisfaction with politics	0.015	0.064	0.240	0.813	-0.109	0.140
Post-communist	0.652	0.606	1.080	0.282	-0.536	1.840
Constant	-0.209	0.527	-0.400	0.691	-1.242	0.823
<b>Effect</b>	<b>Mean</b>		<b>95% confidence interval</b>			
ACME1	0.001		-0.003		0.004	
ACME0	0.001		-0.003		0.005	
Direct effect 1	-0.036		-0.062		-0.013	
Direct effect 0	-0.036		-0.062		-0.013	
Total effect	-0.036		-0.061		-0.012	
% of total via ACME1	-0.015		-0.044		-0.008	
% of total via ACME0	-0.017		-0.052		-0.010	
Average mediation	0.001		-0.003		0.004	
Average direct effect	-0.036		-0.062		-0.013	
% of total effect mediated	-0.016		-0.048		-0.009	

**Table A10:** Mediation analysis: Mediator 4 – protective masculinity attitudes

Protective masculinity	Coefficient	SD	z	P > z	95% confidence interval	
Gender	-0.386	0.066	-5.860	0.000	-0.515	-0.257
Age	0.172	0.029	5.820	0.000	0.114	0.230
Education	-0.185	0.040	-4.660	0.000	-0.263	-0.107
Socio-economic status	-0.012	0.003	-4.150	0.000	-0.017	-0.006
Rural/urban	-0.105	0.049	-2.120	0.034	-0.201	-0.008
Satisfaction with politics	0.004	0.024	0.180	0.855	-0.042	0.051
Post-communist	1.969	0.285	6.900	0.000	1.410	2.529
Constant	-1.964	0.320	-6.150	0.000	-2.591	-1.338
PRR support	Coefficient	SD	z	P > z	95% confidence interval	
Gender	-0.222	0.085	-2.610	0.009	-0.388	-0.055
Protective masculinity	0.436	0.210	2.070	0.038	0.024	0.848
Age	-0.090	0.032	-2.850	0.004	-0.151	-0.028
Education	-0.150	0.028	-5.380	0.000	-0.204	-0.095
Socio-economic status	-0.008	0.001	-5.720	0.000	-0.010	-0.005
Rural/urban	-0.123	0.060	-2.050	0.040	-0.240	-0.006
Satisfaction with politics	0.005	0.065	0.070	0.940	-0.123	0.133
Post-communist	0.626	0.596	1.050	0.294	-0.542	1.795
Constant	-0.118	0.545	-0.220	0.828	-1.187	0.950
Effect	Mean	95% confidence interval				
ACME1	-0.003	-0.007			-0.000	
ACME0	-0.003	-0.008			-0.000	
Direct effect 1	-0.032	-0.058			-0.008	
Direct effect 0	-0.032	-0.058			-0.008	
Total effect	-0.035	-0.065			-0.009	
% of total via ACME1	0.087	0.047			0.318	
% of total via ACME0	0.095	0.051			0.346	
Average mediation	-0.003	-0.007			-0.000	
Average direct effect	-0.032	-0.058			-0.008	
% of total effect mediated	0.091	0.049			0.332	

## Appendix 4: Robustness checks

**Table A11:** Logistic regression models (replication of Table 2 in the main text without multilevel specification)

Dependent variable: PRR support	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Women	-0.287*** (0.09)	-0.216** (0.08)	-0.218* (0.09)	-0.191 (0.13)	-0.183 (0.14)
Ref: gender-egalitarian/non-nativist					
Gender-inegalitarian/non-nativist		0.850*** (0.09)	0.700*** (0.08)	0.817*** (0.11)	0.688*** (0.09)
Gender-egalitarian/nativist		1.435*** (0.17)	1.344*** (0.15)	1.545*** (0.17)	1.455*** (0.15)
Protective masculinity		1.451*** (0.22)	1.268*** (0.20)	1.393*** (0.22)	1.219*** (0.21)
Age (6 categories)			-0.100*** (0.03)		-0.100*** (0.03)
Education (8 categories)			-0.118*** (0.03)		-0.118*** (0.03)
Socio-economic status (0–100, ISEI)			-0.007*** (0.00)		-0.007*** (0.00)
Size of town (5 categories)			-0.112** (0.04)		-0.113** (0.04)
Satisfaction with political system (1–10)			-0.021 (0.07)		-0.020 (0.07)
Post-communist			-0.006 (0.18)		-0.008 (0.17)
Women # gender-inegalitarian/non-nativist				0.086 (0.17)	0.037 (0.17)
Women # gender-egalitarian/nativist				-0.237 (0.15)	-0.236 (0.16)
Women # protective masculinity				0.132 (0.20)	0.112 (0.21)
Constant	-1.263*** (0.04)	-2.021*** (0.08)	-0.430 (0.52)	-2.029*** (0.08)	-0.448 (0.53)
Country-fixed effects	X	X	X	X	x
N	16,390	16,390	16,390	16,390	16,390

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p < 0.01; \*\* p < 0.05; \* p < 0.1. Coefficients are log odds.

**Table A12:** Replication of [Table 2](#) in the main text applying robust standard errors (instead of standard errors clustered at the country level)

PRR support	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Women	-0.287*** (0.09)	-0.215** (0.08)	-0.217* (0.09)	-0.191 (0.13)	-0.183 (0.14)
Ref: gender-egalitarian/non-nativist					
Gender-inegalitarian/non-nativist		0.851*** (0.09)	0.701*** (0.08)	0.819*** (0.11)	0.689*** (0.09)
Gender-egalitarian/nativist		1.433*** (0.17)	1.343*** (0.15)	1.543*** (0.17)	1.453*** (0.15)
Protective masculinity		1.450*** (0.22)	1.265*** (0.20)	1.392*** (0.22)	1.217*** (0.21)
Age (6 categories)			-0.100*** (0.03)		-0.100*** (0.03)
Education (8 categories)			-0.118*** (0.03)		-0.118*** (0.03)
Socio-economic status (0–100)			-0.007*** (0.00)		-0.007*** (0.00)
Size of town (5 categories)			-0.112** (0.04)		-0.113** (0.04)
Satisfaction with political system (1–10)			-0.021 (0.07)		-0.020 (0.07)
Post-communist			0.195 (0.58)		0.202 (0.58)
Women # gender-inegalitarian/non-nativist				0.086 (0.17)	0.037 (0.17)
Women # gender-egalitarian/nativist				-0.236 (0.15)	-0.235 (0.16)
Women # protective masculinity				0.131 (0.20)	0.112 (0.21)
Constant	-1.390*** (0.24)	-2.144*** (0.23)	-0.632 (0.50)	-2.154*** (0.22)	-0.655 (0.51)
Variance: country	0.908* (0.41)	0.869* (0.34)	0.855** (0.31)	0.873* (0.35)	0.857** (0.31)
N	16,390	16,390	16,390	16,390	16,390

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*  $p < 0.1$ . Coefficients are log odds.

**Table A13:** Replication of Models 1–3 of Table 2, applying random-slope models (instead of fixed-slope models)

PRR support	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women	-0.292*** (0.09)	-0.213* (0.08)	-0.206* (0.09)
Ref: gender-egalitarian/non-nativist			
Gender-inegalitarian/non-nativist		0.677*** (0.12)	0.539*** (0.09)
Gender-egalitarian/nativist		1.293*** (0.21)	1.206*** (0.19)
Protective masculinity		1.372*** (0.24)	1.201*** (0.22)
Age (6 categories)			-0.102*** (0.03)
Education (8 categories)			-0.118*** (0.03)
Socio-economic status (0–100, ISEI)			-0.008*** (0.00)
Size of town (5 categories)			-0.109** (0.04)
Satisfaction with political system (1–10)			-0.014 (0.07)
Post-communist			0.583 (0.53)
Constant	-1.393*** (0.23)	-2.002*** (0.22)	-0.689 (0.53)
Variance: random slopes for gender	0.074** (0.03)	0.065* (0.03)	0.071** (0.03)
Variance: random slopes for gender-inegalitarian/non-nativist		0.051 (0.04)	0.035 (0.03)
Variance: random slopes for gender-egalitarian/nativist		0.439 <sup>+</sup> (0.17)	0.442** (0.17)
Variance: random slopes for protective masculinity		0.599** (0.23)	0.586** (0.23)
Variance: random country intercepts	0.843 <sup>+</sup> (0.39)	0.771 <sup>+</sup> (0.31)	0.668 <sup>+</sup> (0.28)
<i>N</i>	16,390	16,390	16,390

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*  $p < 0.1$ . Coefficients are log odds.

**Table A14:** Replication of Models 1 and 2 of Table 3, applying random-slope models (instead of fixed-slope models)

Ref. gender-egalitarian/non-nativist attitudes	(1)	(2)
2. Gender-inegalitarian non-nativist attitudes		
Women	-0.575*** (0.05)	-0.626*** (0.06)
Age (6 categories)		0.215*** (0.02)
Education (8 categories)		-0.211*** (0.02)
Socio-economic status (0–100, ISEI)		-0.016*** (0.00)
Size of town (5 categories)		-0.026 (0.02)
Satisfaction with political system (1–10)		0.000 (0.01)
Post-communist		0.826*** (0.23)
Constant	-1.092*** (0.23)	-0.768*** (0.23)
Variance: random country intercepts	1.000 (.)	1.000 (.)
Variance: random country slopes for men	1.000 (.)	1.000 (.)
Variance: random country slopes for women	1.000 (.)	1.000 (.)
3. Gender-egalitarian nativist attitudes		
Women	-0.206* (0.08)	-0.252** (0.08)
Age (6 categories)		0.104*** (0.01)
Education (8 categories)		-0.092*** (0.02)
Socio-economic status (0–100, ISEI)		-0.009*** (0.00)
Size of town (5 categories)		-0.080*** (0.02)
Satisfaction with political system (1–10)		-0.066*** (0.01)
Post-communist		1.061*** (0.23)
Constant	-0.811*** (0.24)	-0.306 (0.20)
Variance: random country intercepts	2.162 (314.01)	1.128 (256.43)
Variance: random country slopes for men	-0.070 (314.01)	0.570 (256.43)
Variance: random country slopes for women	0.517 (314.01)	1.359 (256.43)
4. Protective masculinity		
Women	-0.587*** (0.08)	-0.659*** (0.08)
Age (6 categories)		0.250*** (0.02)
Education (8 categories)		-0.245*** (0.02)
Socio-economic status (0–100, ISEI)		-0.018*** (0.00)
Size of town (5 categories)		-0.140*** (0.02)
Satisfaction with political system (1–10)		-0.004 (0.01)
Post-communist		1.619*** (0.39)
Constant	-1.236** (0.41)	-0.929** (0.34)
Variance: random country intercepts	3.897 (279.18)	3.180 (179.44)
Variance: random country slopes for men	-0.355 (279.18)	0.139 (179.44)
Variance: random country slopes for women	0.031 (279.18)	0.708 (179.44)
Variance: random country intercepts	0.211** (0.08)	0.096* (0.04)
N	16,390	16,390

Note: The random-intercept and random-slope variation is constrained to 1.0 in the first part of the model to enable model convergence.

Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*  $p < 0.1$ . Coefficients are log odds.

**Table A15:** Replication of [Table 4](#), based on the results in [Table A14](#)

		Predicted probability (%)	SD	z	P > z	95% confidence interval	
Gender-egalitarian /non-nativist	Men	51.1	0.034	15.160	0.000	0.445	0.577
	Women	59.7	0.040	15.050	0.000	0.520	0.675
Gender-inegalitarian/ non-nativist	Men	14.3	0.009	16.210	0.000	0.126	0.160
	Women	9.9	0.006	16.480	0.000	0.087	0.111
Gender-egalitarian/nativist	Men	19.6	0.008	23.960	0.000	0.180	0.212
	Women	19.5	0.018	11.130	0.000	0.161	0.229
Protective masculinity	Men	15.1	0.021	7.330	0.000	0.111	0.192
	Women	10.8	0.019	5.810	0.000	0.072	0.145

### Appendix 5: Cross-country variation

**Figure A1:** Mean level of PRR support by gender-(in)egalitarian/(non-)nativist attitudes, by country, replicating [Figure 1](#) in the main text




Figure A1: Continued





Figure A1: Continued



Note: These graphs do not account for the overall vote shares of PRR parties. All mean values of PRR support will generally be higher in countries with stronger PRR parties.