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Major Political Science (B.A.)

The French Approach to Counterterrorism:
A normative assessment of the securitisation of terrorism by France between 2015 and 2017

Bachelor thesis by

Beatrice von Braunschweig

Thesis supervisor: Apl Prof Dr Dawid Friedrich (Leuphana University)

Secondary examiner: Dr Hendrik Hegemann (Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg)

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Abstract

Increasing objections have been formulated towards broadening the security category. Securitisation is used to bring attention to urgent and existential threats that cannot be resolved through ordinary political decisions. During the time of the state of emergency between 2015 and 2017, France strengthened its security forces and introduced generalised surveillance measures to curb the terrorist threat. The purpose of this Bachelor thesis is to problematise the securitisation of terrorism in the French case. To do so, the Just Securitisation Theory by Rita Floyd is used to examine the following research question: Was it just to securitise terrorism in France between 2015 and 2017? Through critical discourse analysis of 54 presidential speech acts and secondary text analysis, this study aims to scrutinise securitising moves and security practices of the French government. The presented results indicate that the justness of securitisation is highly questionable. The analysis shows that the governments set excessive goals of eliminating terrorism and that security measures were misappropriated to fight organised crime instead of terrorism.

Keywords: Securitisation; Counterterrorism; France; Just Securitisation Theory; Critical Discourse Analysis

Acknowledgements

Index of Abbreviations

CDA   Critical Discourse Analysis

CFCM   Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (Eng. French Council
                of the Muslim Faith)

CNCDH   Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l´Homme
                (Eng. National Advisory Commission on Human Rights)

CS   Copenhagen School

FIDH   Fédération Internationale des Droits de l'Homme (Eng.
                International Federation for Human Rights)

IPCAN   Independent Police Complaints Authorities' Network

ISIS/Daesh   The armed group calling itself the 'Islamic State of Iraq and
                Syria'

JST   Just Securitisation Theory by Rita Floyd

Loi SILT   La loi du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure et
                la lutte contre le terrorisme (Eng. Internal Security and Anti-
                Terrorism Act)

SoE   State of emergency

START   National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
                Responses to Terrorism

WMD   Weapons of Mass Destruction

WoT   War on Terror / War on Terrorism

WPR   'What's the problem represented to be' approach by Carol
                Lee Bacchi

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Structure

1 Introduction

1.1 Introductory Words

For years, the French counterterrorism model has proved effective and successful. The French political elite abstained from the narrative of former US President Bush's 'War on Terror' (WoT), widely known since 9/11. Instead, France treated terrorist attacks as severe crimes under the judicial and legalistic framework in combination with a counterterrorism arsenal. In this respect, President Sarkozy promoted new sanctions related to radicalisation[1] after the assassination of seven people by an Al-Qaeda-affiliated man in southwestern France in March 2012.

Three years later, terrorism rose up the political agenda when the country suffered two major terrorist attacks. First, in January 2015, two Islamist gunmen killed twelve people at the editorial office of the French satirical newspaper 'Charlie Hebdo'. Shortly after, a shooting occurred in the southern Parisian suburbs at Montrouge and a kosher supermarket in Paris. Then, in November 2015, popular Parisian night spots became sites of coordinated attacks claiming 130 lives and 400 injured persons. Besides that, passengers overpowered an armed man and averted another third shooting on a high-speed train in August 2015.

President Hollande declared the November 2015 terroristic attacks as an act of war. He declared a nationwide state of emergency (SoE), and enforced several legislative changes in the security field that are still relevant today. Hollande's government justified enhanced competencies of security agencies with a persistent threat of terrorism against France. Finally, this SoE was the longest in French history, backed by a large degree of unanimity in the National Assembly and the great majority of the French population.

1.2 Theory and Practice of Counterterrorism in Democracies

According to Max Weber's definition of the monopoly of force, only the modern state is legitimate to use violence (1980). The state decides upon civilians to be protected and enemies to be eliminated. Therefore, terrorists give the impression of indiscriminate violence against defenceless civilians and challenge the state's core competence of ensuring public safety (Bigo & Hermant 1986: 510; Truc et al. 2018: 14–15).

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[1] Loi du 21 décembre 2012 relative à la sécurité et à la lutte contre le terrorisme.

Terrorism has different sources and takes various forms, making it an interesting phenomenon to scholars from various disciplines. Until today, there is no single uncontested definition in academic literature or politics (Schmid & Jongman 1988). This political disagreement can have serious consequences. Since the members of the United Nations cannot find common ground on the difference between 'terrorists' and 'freedom fighters', international cooperation finds itself in a stalemate in joining efforts against terrorism. I refer to 'terrorists' when persons have been detained for attributes or acts of terrorism. By acts of terrorism, I mean all overt acts and related conspirations to commit acts (Choudhury 2006).

One research domain reviews antiterrorist measures through the lens of national and international law (Decoeur 2018; Müller 2018). A third evaluates the effectiveness of different counterterrorist strategies (Lum et al. 2007; van Um & Pisoiu 2011; Chowdhury & Fitzsimmons 2013). Finally, securitisation studies examine the process of leading to and justifying security measures. They help to uncover the logic behind security policies.

In contrast to the Middle East and North Africa, terrorist incidents in Europe are still few and isolated cases (START 2022). Research reveals that democratic leaders usually discuss counterterrorist strategies in an *ad-hoc* manner. In other words, they take decisions in 'extraordinary' situations under high pressure. They pass legislation within the legally permissible frames but outside 'normal' legislative procedures.

Neal sees no reason "why counterterrorism legislation should be fast-tracked". He argues that it only serves symbolic purposes and impedes open discussion on the substance of a new law which actually would be necessary (2012: 265–266). Good laws are not enacted under pressure of time and with a faulty basis for decision-making. Because of no or weak objective threat assessment, subjective security perceptions dominate political decisions. The political outcome often is reactionary, leading to unintended consequences like a "new security dilemma" (Cerny 2000). Paradoxically, politicians restrict civil liberties to protect individual freedoms (Wilkinson 2006: 189; Butler 2015). It is a challenge for democratic systems to balance security interests and freedom. History reveals that freedoms seldomly are restored once restrictions are in place.

1.3   Research Aim and Structure

France is the typical case of counterterrorism legislation being passed under the impression of a series of attacks. Surprisingly it is understudied, although, next to Great Britain and Belgium, France is one of Europe's countries that suffered the most from terrorism (Nesser 2014; Bogain 2019: 243). Richard Jackson, one of the founders of Critical Terrorism Studies, demands authors to "challenge the normative foundations of counterterrorist violence" (2005: 167). Besides some applications of the securitisation concept (Ajala 2014; Bogain 2017; Dück & Lucke 2019), it lacks a systematic normative analysis of the French approach to counterterrorism. Therefore, this Bachelor thesis aims at answering the following research question:

Was it just to securitise terrorism in France between 2015 and 2017?

By shedding light on national security policies, this study enriches the body of counterterrorism research in three ways. First, it scrutinises the presidential speech acts before, during, and shortly after the SoE to uncover patterns of the discursively constructed link between terrorism and security. Second, it shares insights from French sources with the English-speaking community. Third, it contributes to the new research agenda on the morality of security put forward by Rita Floyd.

In her research, Floyd observed that the concept of security either has a *per se* negative or *per se* positive connotation in security literature. Looking for a differentiated approach beyond black and white thinking, she developed the Just Securitisation Theory (JST), built upon three criteria: Just initiation, just conduct and just desecuritisation. If all criteria were fulfilled, the securitisation was morally permissible. This proposition of a criteria-led normative evaluation is considered valuable for intersubjective comprehensibility. Therefore the JST provides a 'red thread' to problematise the securitisation of terrorism in France. This thesis offers a starting point for normative analysis in this field.

The work proceeds as follows: It first briefly introduces the basic idea of securitisation theories in addition to the revised theory of Floyd. It then presents the criteria of the JST. Next, it moves to the presentation of the research design. Then, the qualitative analysis of the presidential speech acts follows enhancing the understanding of the securitising moves later translated into securitising practices. It prepares the ground for the following application of the JST. Finally, the work concludes with a reflection and summarises the findings.

2 Theoretical Framework

This thesis follows the JST in using Floyd's concept of securitisation as the organising principle for this study. That is why the theoretical foundations are shortly introduced, including the Copenhagen School and the revisionist points articulated by Floyd.

2.1 The Origins of the Just Securitisation Theory

The term 'securitisation' appeared for the first time in a working paper by Wæver (1989), who officially introduced it in his co-authored book 'Security: A New Framework for Analysis' (Buzan et al. 1998). The basic assumption is that powerful actors securitise a political issue when they frame it as a security matter and move it from everyday to extraordinary politics. The solution process is kept out of the public domain by claiming the immediate need for efficient actions. As a result, the public and the parliament only have limited influence on the decision-making in sensitive matters. For CS scholars, the depoliticisation process leads to the empowerment of the executive.

Securitisation has at least four units that are key to the process. First, the securitising actor is in a position of authority and declares something or somebody as threatened. Second, the object with a legitimate claim to survival and requiring protection is the referent object. It can, but it does not have to be necessarily the state. Third, the group that ideally accepts securitisation and tolerates security measures is the audience. Fourth, some functional actors are neither securitising nor the object of protection but influence the process according to their agenda and means (Buzan et al. 1998: 25, 33, 36). After the CS, speech acts are like 'transmission belts,' establishing the link between the units above. Through discursive strategies, securitising actors justify specific countermeasures outside 'normal' rules of policymaking to persuade an audience of a constructed threat (Pisoiu 2012: 299).

Today, "there coexist various theories *of* securitisation, each of which is committed to distinctive ontologies and epistemologies, as well as to […] methodology" (Balzacq 2015: 103, emphasis in the original). Next to the CS, at least two other theory schools deal with securitisation but differ in several points from the original.

First, the Sociological School attaches great importance to questions of power, audience and context (Balzacq 2005: 174). It identifies securitisation beyond speech acts since it might also occur in bureaucratic movements without evidence in rhetorical declarations. In other words, securitisation can happen without being labelled as such or mentioning explicitly the term 'security' (Bourbeau 2014: 189–192).

Second, the representatives of the Welsh School review the concept of state security, as the CS applies. Arguing against realism, critical theorists propagate the concept of positive security. Accordingly, security stands for the "absence of threats" and the emancipation of individuals or groups from "physical and human constraints" (Booth 1991: 319).[2] The different definitions lead to different normative conclusions: The CS takes a critical stance on the process of securitisation. Political elites should treat all issues with 'normal politics' if possible. On the contrary, the Welsh School promotes securitisation as a chance for human security. Based on the insights of the three theory schools, Floyd presents a revised securitisation theory serving as a theoretic foundation for the JST.

2.2   The Revised Securitisation Theory by Rita Floyd

Floyd's revised securitisation theory builds on Wæver and Buzan's fundamental thesis that securitisation happens when an issue is no longer treated as ordinary politics but "is moved […] into the realm of security politics" (Floyd 2019b: xvii). In harmony with Balzacq, she criticises the exclusive constructivist approach of the CS. She points out that there exist 'real' threats that the CS neglects (Balzacq 2005: 181, 2015: 106; Floyd 2019b: 11). According to Floyd, it is only a question of framing whether a powerful actor constructs a threat as a *security* threat (Floyd 2011: 430). Furthermore, Floyd joins Bourbeau in applying a broader understanding of securitisation. For her, the analysis of speech acts is insufficient. Language itself (securitising move) cannot exert a securitising force. Instead, she attaches greater importance to the change of behaviour of powerful actors (security practice); it can, but does not has to be, exceptional in nature (Floyd 2010: 59; Bourbeau 2014: 187–188; Floyd 2019b: xvii).[3]

As mentioned above, there is no consent on the underlying concept of security. Floyd rejects a generalised approach of either a positive or a negative concept. Instead, she argues that securitisation releases and devotes energies to specific political topics. In some cases, this targeted concentration can be essential for curbing an existential

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[2] For a detailed comparison of the security concepts of the CS and the Welsh School, see Floyd (2007).

[3] Studying Floyd's work in detail, one remarks a development in her theoretical assumptions. In 2010 and 2011 she wrote: "My revised securitization theory thus holds that *securitization = securitizing move + security practice.*" (2011: 428–429, emphasis in the original; see also Floyd 2010: 53) However, in her most recent book, Floyd explains that securitisation requires security practice (1) and *can* be joined by a securitising move (2) but does not have to: "Securitisation is possible without 1 but not without 2. However, in most cases 1 will feature even if it is not always traceable for security scholars." (2019b: xvii).

threat. However, in other cases, securitisation does not provide any added value. The effects can even cause more harm than good if improperly applied. Securitisation has the potential to destabilise a democratic system. To allow for this dichotomy, Floyd proposes an issue-dependent assessment of securitisation and desecuritisation (Floyd 2007: 328).

To sum up, a securitising actor integrates an issue into security politics and changes the behaviour or instructs an executor to do so. Neither all securitisation nor desecuritisation processes are morally equal. Some issues existentially threaten a referent object that is legitimate to survive. That is why Floyd invites scholars to assess securitisation processes case by case. For that purpose, JST is a tool for practical security analysis.

2.3   The Criteria of the Just Securitisation Theory

The JST explores the question of under what circumstances a securitisation process is morally right or wrong. Inspired by the Just War Theory, Floyd lays down a set of criteria.[4] Whereas the revised securitisation theory considers non-exceptional and exceptional measures, the JST only focuses on the latter. It provides an analytical framework that enables analysts to assess "security action as the exception" (Floyd 2019b: xvii). Moreover, JST informs the public and provides frame lines to decision-makers on security policies (Sahu 2021: 437; Roe et al. 2022: 251–252). A morally right securitisation requires a just initiation, just conduct, and just termination.

2.3.1   Just Initiation

Securitisation is permissible when *objective indications* of an existential threat to a legitimate referent object exist. Recall that Floyd follows an objectivist logic rejecting the assumption that only speech acts based on putative conditions construct threats (Goode 1990: 1084). Instead, the determination of a threat rests on concrete, scientifically measurable evidence. To classify an issue as an *existential threat,* the existence of a human or non-human referent object (such as states, welfare, or the environment) must be in question. A lethal threat is not necessarily an existential threat. Instead, existential threats endanger "basic human needs, which when met, enable humans to live minimally decent lives" (Floyd 2019b: 76).

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[4] Due to a limited word count, the relation of the Just War Theory and the JST cannot be explained here in detail. For more information, see Floyd (2019b).

By the same token, *referent objects* are only legible if they meet basic human needs and provide humans with "the capability to flourish" (Floyd 2011: 431, 2019b: xvi). Regardless of the geographical location and background (Floyd 2019b: 108), only political orders and states that care about physical health and autonomy merit protection through securitisation. This is the case when states invest in development, education, and enable open public discourse on individual well-being and liberal democratic values (Floyd 2019b: 111).[5] Therefore, non-democratic systems do not count as just referent objects. Humans are just referent objects as long as they are not "morally wicked" (Floyd 2019b: 119). They must not intend or cause a threat to basic human needs. Otherwise, they lose the right to self-defence or protection by a third party.

Depending on the source of the threat, Floyd differentiates between agent-caused, agent-intended, and agent-lacking threats (2019b: 85). In any case, actors should only securitise an issue for proper reasons. To find out about the *intention* of an actor, analysts compare the content of speech acts and the actions that follow (Floyd 2011: 431, 2019b: 83). If they are not congruent, one can assume that the actor did not act sincerely but provided the audience with hypocritical reasons as a pretext for securitisation. Even if "the just cause can be met […] as a side-effect" (Floyd 2019b: 127), it would not fulfil the criteria for a just securitisation. Just reasons must initiate securitisation.

Securitisation should always be a "last resort" decision duly justified (Floyd 2019a: 387). Before, a securitising actor must consider all available options. They include securitisation, inactivity and politicisation (Floyd 2019a: 384). A threat-by-threat assessment helps determine which of the three options is considered the best response to the threat. The securitising actor is morally obliged to weigh the risks and opportunities and the *chances of success*.

The moral philosopher Jeff McMahan (2009/2010) differentiates between narrow and wide *proportionality*. Narrow proportionality concerns the effects on the target persons at the source of the threat. This point is irrelevant in the case of agent-lacking threats, such as climate change. All the more important is the second, wide proportionality,

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[5] This enumeration is not exhaustive. For more information see Floyd (2019b: 111). She recommends studying the theory of human needs by Doyal and Gough (1984, 1991). They offer a theoretical approach to facilitating operationalisation of human needs through social indicators.

highlighting the risk of side effects to innocent individuals and groups who are not responsible for the threat. To use Floyd's words: "Just securitisation cannot produce more harm to innocent bystanders than it seeks to prevent." (2019b: 130) That is why well-founded arguments must indicate that securitisation is the less harmful and the most promising option to neutralise the threat.

2.3.2 Just Conduct

Next to just initiation, a just securitisation requires just conduct of the process. Under no circumstances it is permissible to depart from the original purpose and to implement policies that are not directly related to the threat. Security measures must always be limited to what is strictly required by the exigency of the emergency (Floyd 2019b: 153). Before passing commands to the executors, the decision-makers must precisely weigh different security measures against each other and choose the least harmful one. *Appropriateness and proportionality* are to prevent unnecessary destruction or harm. Not to forget that different measures affect various individuals and groups differently.

Once put in place, the persons in charge are bound to the *human rights* of affected persons, including suspects and threateners. Despite extraordinary security measures in extraordinary times, there is no 'free ticket' for securitising actors or executors. Certain rules protect to a certain degree not only victims but also perpetrators (Floyd 2019b: 158). Everyone has a right to humane treatment. Executors themselves must not become a threat giving others a reason to securitise them.

However, Floyd points out two exceptions, namely the use of lethal force and torture (Floyd 2019b: 162). In the vast majority of liberal democracies, both are forbidden by law. But, according to Floyd, the right to life is not absolute. In the case of a significant lethal threat, killing can be morally permissible if it wards off the threat. Following the philosopher Uwe Steinhoff, Floyd goes further by claiming that even torture can be morally legitimate in the case of "bona fide ticking bomb time scenarios" (Floyd 2019b: 170, see also Steinhoff 2006). In agreement with critics of torture *bar none* (Dershowitz 2002; McDonald 2020: 256–257), Floyd admits that this argument contradicts the JST criteria on compliance with relevant human rights.

2.3.3 Just Desecuritisation

Securitisation can be the answer to an objective existential threat under certain conditions explained above. To a certain extent, it provides solutions to a long-term aim for a limited period of time. A securitised stage as the 'new normal' would not be just (Huysmans 2014: 43; Kretschmann & Legnaro 2017: 473).

Desecuritisation is the deconstruction of a threat to the point that it is no longer perceived as a security concern; in other words the "unmaking of securitisation" (Huysmans: 570). Floyd describes securitisation and desecuritisation as overlapping but separate processes with different courses and outcomes. Therefore, desecuritisation requires a separate normative assessment (Floyd 2019b: 179, 181, 184).

As soon as there is no just reason or just referent object, securitisation is unjust and "is to be terminated immediately" (Floyd 2019b: 194). This also applies to cases with unjust conduct that is not adjusted once revealed. Securitisation is only one of many possible options to curb the threat. Desecuritisation can be introduced at any *time* of the process. At the latest moment, securitisation has to terminate as soon as the "real threats have been neutralised" (Floyd 2021b: 172). Dependent on the issue, this is when, first, an aggressor relinquishes the intention or loses the capacity to carry out the threat (agent-intended threat). Second, desecuritisation must follow the occurrence of the threat and when the victims' human needs are satisfied to a minimum degree (agent-lacking threat). Third, agent-caused threats are seen as neutralised as soon as the threatening behaviour has stopped (Floyd 2019b: 195).

Generally, everyone can *request* desecuritisation, but not everyone has the responsibility and the means to do so. That is why, first and foremost, desecuritisation is in the hands of the previous securitising actor (Floyd 2019b: 185–186). Like securitisation, a just desecuritisation consists of a change in language and behaviour, but in reverse logic. In any case, it needs *political action* (Aradau 2004: 389). At the same time, ensuring a *long-lasting* desecuritised state of affairs is crucial. Floyd recommends remediation. Victims of unjust security practices – intended or not – shall be compensated for damages through public apology, punishment of those responsible, or payment. Aiming at "security as a state of being" (Floyd 2019b: 199), a new or reactionary securitisation must be avoided.

3   Methodological Framework

3.1   Research Design

The normative research question requires the study of empirical data to develop persuasive arguments. Empirical and normative research enrich and support each other (Smith 2004: 86). The study is conducted at the national level in France. Therefore, bilateral, European, and other international dimensions of counterterrorism cannot be taken into account. The given timeframe of two years is explained through the 'Charlie Hebdo' terrorist event in January 2015 as the starting point and the security legislative reform by Macron entering into force in November 2017 as the endpoint. This temporal limitation covers the whole duration of the state of emergency between November 2015 and October 2017.

Language and politics often go hand in hand and interact. Therefore, as a problem-oriented methodology, critical discourse analysis (CDA) of presidential speech acts is considered appropriate for this study.[6] Research on discourse includes not only written or spoken texts but also other non-linguistic objects as documentary sources (Gee 2014: 124–143). The linguist Ruth Wodak (2012) importantly points out that politics happen on many different levels, of which only small parts are publicly available. Therefore, she proposes ethnographic research to uncover the "backstage" of politics. Having this in mind, it must be clear that presidential speech acts only represent a small but powerful fraction of the terrorism discourse in France.

The empirical source material consists of all the presidential speeches of Hollande and Macron with a specific focus on terrorism between 01 January 2015 and 31 December 2017. Every text is publicly available on the official website www.vie-publique.fr. The keyword filter 'terrorisme' (Eng: terrorism) pre-selected the relevant documents. After a qualitative assessment, only the texts explicitly dealing with terrorism in one or more paragraphs stayed in the corpus. The final corpus consists of presidential speeches, statements, declarations, and interviews. It includes 44 texts by President Hollande and 10 texts by President Macron. The smaller number of speeches by Macron results from the fact that only the first seven months of his mandate fall into the period of interest.[7]

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[6] Next to CDA, there are variants of methodological approaches, e. g. the 'What's the problem represented to be' (WPR) approach of Bacchi (2009, 2018), ethnographic research, content analysis or process–tracing – to name just a few examples. For inspiration see Balzacq (2010).

[7] The annexe provides an overview of the text corpus.

This corpus size is adequate in terms of representativeness and corpus design to explore the research question not only grammatical and discourse features but rhetorical differences between the two presidents. The speeches were analysed in their original version in French. The citations in this thesis were translated into English by the author.

Discourse analysis is an appropriate tool to analyse the securitising moves. However, it is insufficient to get insights into the security actions. Floyd recommends scholars to create new knowledge based on non-public sources, interviews and the like (2010: 60). Unfortunately, this would go far beyond the scope of this thesis. That is why security practices are analysed through mainly secondary qualitative literature analysis. The research has integrated a number of documentary sources provided by the French government and academic researchers from France and beyond.Furthermore, publications of nongovernmental organisations enrich the work with oppositional points of view. Sources by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and 'Défenseur des droits' (Eng. The Defender of Rights) prove valuable because of their inside knowledge and interviews with functional actors or victims of security measures. Media articles enhance understanding of relevant political developments where necessary. Like Grounded Theory, data collection is considered an ongoing process throughout the analysis (Glaser & Strauss 1967).

Since this study is mainly based on the recommendations of Floyd and employs CDA after Norman Fairclough (1995, 2010), the work is inevitably qualitative and interpretative. Due to the strong contextuality, results are expected to have a high truth value for the national case (high internal validity). However, it will be challenging to applicate them to other countries (low external validity). A comprehensive explanation of the analytical steps in the following ensures transparency and plausibility.

3.2 Methodological Approach: Critical Discourse Analysis

There is no politics without language. Which issue is politicised or not strongly depends on the participants in the discourse (Chilton & Schäffner 2016: 214). The same is true for security. According to the JST, 'real' existential threats exist, but only through framing, they are linked to security. Generally, the rhetoric of counterterrorism "is a very carefully and deliberately constructed discourse […] specifically designed to make the war [on terrorism] seem reasonable" (Jackson 2005: 147). Therefore, before assessing the French case of securitisation, I first have to get a deeper understanding of the political discourse that "legitimise[s] and normalise[s] the institutional practices of

counterterrorism" (Jackson 2005: 148). As there is no universally accepted definition of the term 'discourse', this thesis makes its own choice explicit. Fairclough proposes various versions, of which the following summarises the most important characteristics:

> *"Discourse is a form of '**social practice'** [...]. It is **constitutive** both in the sense that it helps **to sustain and reproduce the social status quo**, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. Since discourse is so **socially consequential**, it gives rise to important issues of power." (Wodak & Meyer 2016: 6, quoted after Fairclough & Wodak 1997: 258, emphasis added)*

In other words, text, discourse practice and social context are interrelated. CDA reflects three levels by a three-fold analytic model. The first level *describes* the linguistic features of the text. The second level looks at social practice through the *interpretation* of interdiscursivity and intertextuality. The third level *explains* the relationship between discursive practice and the surrounding society. This final process pivots on reproductions or changes in the existing order of discourse. Each presidential speech was read in detail. Knowledge was put into order based on a categorical system. The analysis was then conducted on all three levels for the whole text corpus.

Figure 1: Diagrammatic representation of Fairclough's critical discourse analysis framework

Adapted from Fairclough (1995: 98).

CDA has a significant qualitative component. This strength, however, is also the Achilles tendon of CDA. Inevitably, the analyst's background knowledge affects the understanding and analysis of the discourse (Janks 1997: 333).[8] I admit the subjectivity

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[8] For a deeper discussion on the strength and weaknesses of CDA, see Janks (1997), Widdowson (2007), and Poole (2010).

of this study but disclose the theoretical and methodological assumptions to improve the clarity of my reading position. As a German student, who studied and lived in France for several months, I author this study from an external viewpoint referring to a deeper intercultural understanding. It provides an opportunity to reflect and question the status quo in France from a distance without being part of the primary audience of the securitisation process. Moreover, because this work is concerned with a large text corpus, it makes sense to marry qualitative with quantitative methods, as other scholars have done (Karyotis & Patrikios 2010; Bogain 2019; D'Amato 2019). First, the texts were separated into coding units. Then, they were assigned to categories and, more precisely, to one of the codes or sub-codes. The categorical structure was inspired by Daniela Pisoiu's work (2011; 2012) and adjusted to the purposes of the JST. Finally, the quantitative approach permits the inclusion of keywords, frequencies, and concordances across the whole corpus (Bogain 2017: 480).

3.3 Conceptualisation and Operationalisation

Before proceeding with the analysis, the main concepts of the JST must be clarified. Since the research objective is to uncover the foundations of security constructions, I work here with 'terrorism' as a political concept given by the incumbent president. It is associated with terms like 'radicalisation', 'Islamism', and 'jihadism'.[9] Similarly to terrorism, the concept of security is contested. This study refrains from conceptualising security as positive or negative. Instead, the basic assumption is that the evaluation is issue-dependent and can be assessed based on criteria.

First of all, the president is the central political figure deciding on the national guiding policies. The constitution of the Fifth Republic assigns him special responsibilities in times of crisis. Based on democratic elections, he has the legitimacy and authority to define security as head of government and commander-in-chief (Roe 2008: 632; Chilton & Schäffner 2016: 219). Therefore, the main lines of French counterterrorism can be traced back to him, making him the securitising actor for this study.

One of the research interests is to discover how groups, individuals and issues are conceptualised as threats to the referent object, namely France as a republic or nation. Analytically, a political issue becomes a threat or a security issue if it is "critically pervasive for the political system" (Balzacq 2010: 48). Moreover, there must be a

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[9] This thesis concentrates on transnational and Islamist terrorism. It is not to neglect right-wing, left-wing or separatist terrorism. Instead, the focus is owed to the Islamist terrorist attacks in the period of analysis between 2015 and 2017.

shared perception of an existential threat. Therefore, the shortage of time "looms large for political management" (Balzacq 2010: 48). Research has shown that this is the case for transnational terrorism in France (Bogain 2017; Dück & Lucke 2019). That is why the present study treats it as the security threat.[10]

The JST is only concerned with exceptional responses to a threat, namely security measures. In the present case, the declaration of war on terrorism in November 2015 implies far-reaching policy interventions. Therefore, the SoE and further legislative reforms introducing extraordinary measures are treated as security measures.

4 Analysis of Presidential Speech Acts: An Empirical Assessment

In times of crisis, all eyes are on the country's political leader. In France, the president is at the centre of media attention, substantially shaping public opinion. Boussaguet and Faucher (2018) uncovered how presidential consultants consciously constructed the messages of President Hollande in the wake of the terrorist attacks in 2015. The presidential office attached great importance to transmitting the image of a dedicated, hard-working leader ensuring security, uniting the country, and solving the threat. In the next chapter, CDA takes up and extends these points with a view to Floyd's revised securitisation theory. The main findings are organised under three subheadings: "Text", "Discourse practice", and "Sociocultural practice". It starts by closely analysing the text language.

4.1 Text: Intra-textual Analysis

A quantitative analysis of all the 54 presidential speeches found that the most common word combination of 'menace' (Eng. Threat) is 'menace terroriste' (Eng. terrorist threat), leaving no doubt that Hollande and Macron assign the threat to terrorism. Another word exploration of 'sécurité' (Eng. Security) reveals that it appears in most cases as 'sécurité intérieure' (Eng. Internal security or homeland security). The questions arise of what is terrorism and who is a terrorist, according to the speakers. What or who is threatened that the internal security is in question?

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[10] Next to the securitising actor, referent object and security threat, it should also be mentioned that securitisation scholars debate over the role of the audience and functional actors (Buzan et al. 1998: 36; Balzacq 2005; Floyd 2021a). These two concepts are only of secondary importance to the JST, which is why they are only covered marginally.

A close analysis of the texts in linguistic terms shows that the speakers construct terrorism as a depersonalised and abstract phenomenon linked with jihadism and Islamism. Primarily, terrorism is described by reviving the attacks. The speakers combine descriptive language with emotional or metaphorical attributes: "in the face of the terrorist threat, in the face of horror"[11], "Horror… Horror has once again befallen France."[12], "[the] appalling murder of the priest"[13], "in the face of this coward and intolerable behaviour"[14], "these barbarians, in their blind violence"[15], "jihadist barbarism"[16], "massacre"[17]. The speakers personalise the threat by blaming the perpetrators as 'terrorists'. Nonetheless, terrorism remains an abstract and intangible phenomenon. Often the presidents use the passive (intransitive) form when referring to terrorism. In the same logic, Macron refuses to pronounce the terrorists' name: "The truck driver whose name I do not remember anymore"[18]. On the contrary, Hollande and Macron repeat the names of the victims of terrorism and occasionally praise them as "martyrs"[19].

Table 1: Choice of words to describe membership categorisation

Words Used to Describe…	
Terrorism/Terrorists	France/French nation
Barbarism	Innocent
Murderer	Civilisation
Cruel, Violent	Freedom, Democracy, Rule of Law
Betraying	'La patrie' / Homeland
Islamist	Value-based, Human-Rights
Djihadisme	Martyr

The author's own compilation.

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[11] Hollande, 20 January 2015.

[12] Hollande, 15 July 2016.

[13] Hollande, 05 January 2017.

[14] Macron, 18 October 2017.

[15] Hollande, 18 November 2015.

[16] Hollande, 05 January 2016.

[17] Hollande, 25 August 2015.

[18] Macron, 14 July 2017.

[19] Hollande, 15 October 2016; Macron, 26 July 2017.

A closer look at the speeches reveals that President Hollande provides an interpretation of the attacks within 48 hours after the event: "This attack is a vehicle driven by one person [...]. There is no doubt that the intention was to cause an explosion. The attack was terrorist. A decapitated corpse was found with a decapitated body with inscriptions." Whereas Macron does not comment on potential goals of terrorism, Hollande uses his powerful position reflected in objective modality to explain the violence of terrorism. They pretend objectivity and universality of statements. According to Hollande's interpretation of the attacks, besides killing[20], terrorists primarily pursue political goals: "The Republic, the culture, the creation, the pluralism, the democracy. That is what is targeted by the murderers."[21]. Hollande adds that terrorists strive to "eradicate what we all represent, that means the values"[22]. Furthermore, they try to divide society[23] and sow religious mistrust[24].

Table 2: Objectives of terrorism, according to the speakers[25]

	Relative Frequency of Codes			
Terrorist Objective	President Hollande	President Macron	Sum	%
To Kill	5	0	5	10%
Societal Objectives (Division of the nation, sowing suspicion…)	16	2	18	35%
Religious Objectives (Pursuing religious ideals)	0	1	1	2%
Political Objectives (The elimination of France, destroying democracy)	25	3	28	54%
Sum	46	6	52	100%

The author's own compilation.

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[20] Hollande, 07 January 2016.

[21] Hollande, 07 January 2015.

[22] Macron, 03 October 2017.

[23] Hollande, 18 November 2015.

[24] Hollande, 14 July 2015.

[25] Overall, 1828 segments were coded. Throughout the text corpus, President Hollande mentions five times that the terrorists' goal is to kill and 25 times that terrorists pursue some kind of political goal.

These quotes directly point to the *referent objects* in need of protection, according to the presidents: The state of France and the French nation. Attacks on core democratic symbols, like the free press, contribute to the narrative of an existential threat against the country because, according to Hollande, terrorism "concern[s] all French people, wherever they live in the country. Because it is the whole country that has been attacked."[26] Macron points out: "Your dead have become our dead, and we will fight for them as much as we mourn them."[27] In sharp contrast, the speakers conjure up historical foundations and visions of national unity: France, "the birthplace of human rights"[28]. The referent object is described by significant, positively connotated attributes underlying its resilience towards terrorism: France is a strong, value-based[29], democratic, diverse[30], laic[31] country. One can even speak of a "hyperglorification and mythification of France" (Bogain 2017: 494). On the contrary, the perpetrators of the attacks are construed as antagonistic protagonists and enemies. By linguistic means, the presidents construct a link between terrorism and national security, which they illustrate by meaningful verbs such as "hit", "eradicate", and "kill",[32] purporting an existential threat to France.

Over the entire two-year long research period, no change in threat assessment is observable. On the contrary, the conviction of a "permanent"[33], "not weaken[ing]"[34] threat of an "extreme"[35] level dominates the text: Terrorism represents a "major danger for a long time to come"[36]; France lives "the darkest times"[37]; the threats "never have been greater"[38]; France deals with "the most visible and the most noticeable [threat]"[39].

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[26] Hollande, 18 November 2015; see also Hollande, 19 November 2015.

[27] Macron, 14 July 2017.

[28] Hollande, 16 November 2015.

[29] Macron, 14 July 2017.

[30] Macron, 20 June 2017.

[31] Hollande, 31 December 2015.

[32] Hollande, 26 November 2015.

[33] Hollande, 19 August 2015.

[34] Hollande, 31 December 2016

[35] Macron, 31 October 2017.

[36] Hollande, 22 February 2017.

[37] Hollande, 05 January 2016.

[38] Hollande, 26 July 2016.

These examples contain a form of ahistorical present tense that suggests no end to the threat in sight. The alarming language continues assessing the geographical threat dimension: Hollande and Macron argue that the destinies of France and Europe[40] are closely linked because they share democratic and liberal values. If terrorists attack, they do not only attack one democratic state but the whole of Europe: "Terrorism hit Belgium, but it was Europe that was targeted, and it is everyone concerned."[41] Hollande and Macron insist on an international counterterrorist response.[42]

It is crucial to notice that on 14 July 2015, Hollande refused to call the fight against terrorism a "war of civilisation"[43]. However, the "sequential terrorist attack" (Jałoszyński 2015) in November 2015 marked a turning point in his terrorism narrative. As from 18 November 2015, France was at war on terrorism. To be precise, Hollande did not declare war on behalf of France. Instead, he underlined that so called 'Islamic State of Iraq and Syria' (ISIS/Daesh) declared war by attacking France: "These actions confirm again that we are in war, a war against a terrorism that decided to wage war against us, the jihadist organisation Daech."[44] Hollande reiterated his statement one day later, on 19 November 2015. He did not refrain from it until the end of his mandate in April 2017. Even if Macron has joined Hollande's terrorism discourse in principle, he did not copy the war narrative. There is no statement in the corpus in which Macron comments on the WoT. However, he still describes terrorism as a "permanent"[45] threat. Even if both presidents know of the vulnerability of France ("the very people who want to attack our country and who have attacked it"[46]), they do not get tired of repeating their invincibility. Instead, with the help of auxiliaries ("[they] *want* to make war"[47]), they underline the intention of terrorists and implicitly point out the relevance of countermeasures. It leads to the observation that the French discourse on terrorism touches upon various other discourses.

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[39] Macron, 13 July 2017.

[40] The meaning of 'Europe' seems to be equal to the 'European Union' in the cultural and value related context of its use in presidential speech acts.

[41] Hollande, 22 March 2016.

[42] Hollande, 27 April 2015; Macron, 18 October 2017.

[43] Hollande, 14 July 2015.

[44] Hollande, 18 November 2015.

[45] Macron, 18 and 31 October 2017.

[46] Hollande, 20 July 2016.

[47] Hollande, 22 March 2016, emphasis added by the author.

4.2 Discursive Practice: Intertextuality and Interdiscursivity

The text analysis has shown how President Hollande and President Macron use their dominant positions to spread a certain narrative of Islamist terrorism. I identify the overall discourse of a binominal thinking in terms of 'friends versus foes' presenting Islamist terrorism as something abstract, brutal, and barbaric. On the contrary, France is resilient, civilised and democratic. It is evident that French discourse on terrorism is closely linked to discourses on national identity, the values of the French Republic and Islam in France. Furthermore, it alludes to the Syrian conflict, the Iraq war, migration[48], and the international terrorism discourse since 9/11, particularly the WoT and the discussion on foreign fighters.[49] Interdiscursivity biases the audience's interpretation according to the ideas of the transmitter. Due to the complexity of interdiscursivity, a full treatment is beyond the scope of this chapter. Therefore, interdiscursivity relevant to understanding the threat and the referent object is at the centre of analysis - a process consistent with the relevant research question.

National identity is an ongoing process evolving in history. It is shaped, for example, by history, territory, and shared feelings of togetherness. Far from any stability, "national identity is incessantly negotiated through discourse. […] [It] is, therefore, a never-ending and politically consequential rhetorical struggle" (Bruner 2002: 1). Particularly in disruptive times, national identities are constructed, negotiated, developed, or solidified. Understanding nations as an in-group necessarily implies an out-group. In other words, people can only consider themselves a nation if others are not part of it.

French discourse on terrorism is interwoven with discourse on national identity. Throughout the speech acts of President Hollande and President Macron, the 'us' versus 'them' dichotomy is striking. Hollande illustrates his understanding of 'la patrie' (Eng. Homeland), which is a construct closely linked to 'nation':

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[48] See Hollande, 16 November 2015: "The refugee issue is directly linked to the war in Syria and Iraq. The inhabitants of these countries, especially those of the territories controlled by Daech, […] are fleeing; they are the victims of this same terrorist system."

[49] The list is not intended to be exhaustive and is open to discussion.

> "The *patrie* is not about attacking others; the *patrie* is about being sure that we carry the same ideals, the same principles, the same values […]. If we renounce this heritage, this idea of France, then we lose ourselves. That is what the terrorists are looking for."[50]

According to Hollande, terrorists attack France for the values it stands for. The tripartite motto of the French Republic 'liberty, equality, fraternity', dating back to the French Revolution, is a recurring feature in the text. Recalling triumphant emotions, they underline France's superiority over its 'enemies'. The texts present this reality without nuance or dilemma. President Hollande states:

> "It is because France has carried in its history but also in its choices today the highest principles [...]. The France of free expression [...]. The France of equality, first and foremost between women and men. The France of fraternity, i.e. citizens with different backgrounds but united on the essentials, shared the Republic's values and secularism. Freedom is not a handicap; it is our first asset because free peoples, and ours in particular, even if they sometimes live in apparent insouciance, are ready to make any sacrifice to defend freedom."[51]

In the same speech, Hollande includes an intertextual reference to a prominent French author:

> "It is true, as Gilles Finchenstein said, freedom is like the air we breathe [...]. The idea of homeland is not an idea that comes from the past; it is always to know why we are fighting. And France is committed to freedom."[52]

The quotes above are illustrations of promotional discourse. They are intended to highlight the values and principles at the core of the French identity. Not only are they worth defending, but also, they are the reason for France's superiority. Ultimately, 'killing' is only of secondary importance to terrorists. First and foremost, ISIS tries to divide society, sow mistrust and defeat democracy and Republican values: "That is why we are under attack; that is why we must respond"[53], underlines Hollande.

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[50] Hollande, 14 July 2015, emphasis added.

[51] Hollande, 08 September 2016, emphasis added.

[52] Hollande, 08 September 2016.

[53] Hollande, 08 September 2016.

In discourse analysis, it is not only of interest what is said but also what is not said. Interestingly, Hollande does not underpin his arguments by referring to official statements of ISIS itself. He avoids giving terrorists or ISIS any legitimation and maintains the narrative of an abstract threat. President Hollande and President Macron avoid naming the perpetrators but call out the victims' names. They speak about the incidents, including the numbers of injured and killed persons, but do not talk about the socio-cultural backgrounds of the terrorists. Prime Minister Valls even denied the need for sociological or cultural explanations, stating that explaining is equal to excusing the attack. Hereby, Prime Minister Valls provoked a considerable debate among social scientists (Lahire et al. 2016). Looking at publicly available statements of ISIS, the texts always speak about France in the third person (Hussein 2018). Consequently, both opponents avoid direct communication. They only speak about but never with each other. The rhetorical distance underlines the non-negotiable positions of the respective leaders. It also cements the narrative of the lack of alternatives to violence and force. Of course, a certain interdiscursivity cannot be neglected. However, intertextuality between presidential and ISIS statements is so far not observable. Instead, the rhetoric reminds of Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilisations" (1993), often quoted in discourse on terrorism (Neumayer & Plümper 2009). Whereas terrorists are 'on the dark side,' France symbolises the light.[54] Once more, it underlines the narrative of an existential threat that France must curb "by all means"[55]. Confronted with the thesis of the "clash of civilisations", Hollande himself denies it since terrorists were uncivilised which is why a clash is excluded.[56]

More interesting and less analysed in academic literature is that President Hollande denies that the terrorists are 'real' Muslims. Instead, according to the President, they abuse the religion of Islam for political purposes. Few parallels to the discourse of Islam representatives can be identified. The Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (Eng. French Council of the Muslim Faith, CFCM) also underlined that the men responsible for the massacre at 'Charlie Hebdo' did not avenge the prophet as they claimed to do. Instead, the Muslim representatives judged the perpetrators: "They murdered the prophet. They did not avenge him. They murdered him. It is all against Islam, it is all against what the prophet said. [...] There is no radical Islam. This is not Islam." (Ogras

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[54] Hollande, 08 September 2016; Macron, 14 July 2017.

[55] Hollande, 22 March 2016; see also Macron 23 May 2017.

[56] Hollande, 14 July 2015 ; Hollande, 16 November 2015.

& Rivière 2015). Furthermore, after the November 15 attacks, Rector Dalil Boubakeur insisted on national unity and voiced that primarily Muslims are "victims of this barbarity" (Tribune with AFP 2015).

Irrespective of secularity, Hollande and Macron incorporated the differentiation of 'barbaric', *un-Islamic* ISIS, and 'normal', 'right' Islam. Accordingly, ISIS fought "in the name of a *betrayed* god"[57]. Macron, conscious of the necessity to cooperate with Muslim communities, followed suit. He explained that ISIS gave a misleading "perversive"[58] picture of Islam:

> "We needed the support of Muslim authorities who were firm in their convictions, solid in denouncing these crimes. Not once did the CFCM fail to do so. When it came to this perverse lie that sought only to fracture our national community, it knew how to find the words without placing itself in denial"[59].

Interestingly, at about the same time, President Obama has taken lots of criticism for not saying 'Islamic' terrorism to avoid confusion with the majority of peaceful Muslims (Obama 2016). Even if one cannot deny the link to Islam, media and experts in France and abroad discuss the genuine relationship between ISIS and Islam (Wood 2015; Marx 2015; Créteur 2016).

Keeping in mind that Islam is the second religion in France after Christianity, it is assumable that democratic leaders are concerned about the fragility of social cohesion. However, both presidents struggle with a normative ambivalence in the French politics of identity and religion. On the one hand, terrorism discourse is closely linked to discourse on Islam devaluing Muslims as 'other' than French. On the other hand, France's diversity, secularity, and unity are highlighted. This ambivalence downplays anti-Muslim sentiments and hides social inequality. As shown below, it contributes to the reproduction of social reality in France.

4.3   Sociocultural Practice: Social Analysis

Discourse has the power to reproduce or change socio-cultural practices. Following Fairclough (2003: 126), I argue that the way Hollande and Macron discussed terrorism and counterterrorism is crucial to the surrounding social reality and vice versa. This

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[57] Hollande, 08 September 2016, emphasis added.

[58] Macron, 20 June 2017.

[59] Macron, 20 June 2017, emphasis added.

sub-chapter brings together the findings of textual analyses and discursive practice. It sheds light on social determinants and ideologies. In the present case, presidential speech acts prepare and justify policies that later are translated into legislative reforms and executive acts. In the fight against terrorism, President Hollande defines territorial defence, the protection of the French people, and the defence of values as his key priorities.[60] Similarly, Macron insists that "security is the first mission of the state that must protect its citizens and ensure the security of its territory."[61] In the following, I concentrate on one social practice that was transformed and another that was reproduced by presidential discourse, making it possible to discuss some social consequences.

A change in discourse can change social practice. The reality-making effects become particularly evident under Hollande's leadership. In January 2015, Hollande condemned all acts of terrorism as criminal and raised the level of 'Vigipirate'[62]. 1.2 million people participated in the solidarity march for 'Charlie Hebdo' in Paris (Libération 2015). In November 2015 when President Hollande announced a WoT, he declared a nationwide SoE and even proposed a constitutional reform. Moreover, the government invoked the mutual assistance clause of the Treaty on the European Union followed by a request of French Defence Minister Jean Yves Le Drian demanding mutual assistance from EU member states.[63]

It might be reasonably assumed that the frequency of attacks, and the massive media attention induced President Hollande to take drastic actions. Not to forget the left-wing political orientation of President Hollande; by then, the French socialist party propagated a self-image of human rights defenders. Looking at the trade-off between security and freedom that comes with counterterrorist policies, the previous socialist agenda of 2015 insisted on protecting individual liberties (Bogain 2017: 478–479). President Hollande factually abandoned this course in November 2015 and shifted towards maximising security; a tendency that can be observed internationally. Empirical data show that "left-wing incumbents respond to terror threats more aggressively than their right-wing counterparts in order to convince voters that they can be trusted in fighting terrorism" (Di Lonardo 2019). The adoption of the narrative on

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[60] Hollande, 25 July 2016.

[61] Macron, 31 October 2017.

[62] Vigipirate is France's national security alert system on terrorism.

[63] Hollande, 16 November 2015.

WoT and the declaration of the SoE is particularly striking because it led to a fundamental change in French terrorism discourse and socialist security discourse.

Hollande and Macron repeatedly stress solidarity to victims of terrorism. They underline that their governments do everything in their power to curb the terrorist threat. It can be seen as a strategy to contain intrastate conflicts or anti-governmental sentiments. Moreover, Hollande's war metaphor is powerful since it does not allow any political opposition. On the contrary, it implicitly requests full solidarity and unity of the country to reach victory. The parliamentary voting results on the prolongation of the SoE and the public approval rates are a sign of their successful discursive strategies.

Another field of problematic social practice to which this thesis seeks to bring attention is the ongoing stigmatisation of Muslim communities. Even if Islam is the second biggest religion in France, Muslims are still marginalised in their daily life. Former President Nicolas Sarkozy proclaimed that Islam must submit to the social contract and the French Republican values (Scalvini 2013: 97). This does not deny the affiliation of Muslims to the French nation. However, it expresses the demand for assimilation. In this conviction, the French parliament banned Muslim headscarves in 2004 and *niqabs* in 2014, an attempt to enforce the secularisation of Islam. In this tradition, Hollande presented himself as the guardian of secularity. Although originally a judicial concept evolved through history (Gaudemet 2015), presidential discourse put secularity into the new context of counterterrorism. The discussion on *laicité* has taken on an ideologic orientation with national "identity-making" effects (Amiraux 2015: 89). Even if the presidents underline secularity and the equality of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, the presidents fail to dissolve the ambivalent relationship between the French state and Islam.

On the one side, Hollande and Macron show solidarity with Muslims in the wake of the terrorist attacks. They acknowledge the victimhood of religious adherents whose religion terrorists had misused for violent political purposes. Furthermore, Macron was the first Head of State in ten years who participated in the CFCM's annual dinner to break the Ramadan fast. On this occasion, Macron praised the CFCM for its firm attitude after terrorist attacks and the engagement against religious fanatism.[64]

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[64] Macron, 21 June 2017.

On the other side, these utterances also can be seen as an implicit demand that French Muslims must take due account of a particular role. It is central to the presidential narrative that terrorism has a national and international dimension. Moreover, the speakers argue that there is a direct link between the political and religious conflicts in the Middle East and homegrown radicalisation. Hollande even calls Syria and Iraq "the root of evil"[65] and "the biggest factory of terrorists the world has ever known"[66]. In both regards, French Muslims bear a special responsibility to fight terrorism, according to President Macron:

> "[We fight] a practice of Islam that organises segregation within the Republic. We must be extremely vigilant, each in his or her own responsibilities, against everything that shapes forms of identity withdrawal because basing one's political and social identity on one's faith alone is admitting that one's faith is incompatible with the Republic. This is the symmetrical reverse side of a discourse of exclusion, and it is a real political battle on both sides in the strongest sense of the term to fight them in the name of conviction."[67]

Between the lines, the presidents claim the right to distinguish between 'good' and 'bad' Muslims. It should, however, be emphasised that for the general public, the semiotic difference between "Islamist" and "Islamic" is not evident. Therefore, extreme associations of "Islamists" with "terrorists", "barbarians", or "murderers" that the presidential discourse has successfully established could be easily rubbed off on uninvolved Muslim community members. This negative effect can potentially strengthen false but severe prejudices and endanger interreligious and social cohesion. Despite the emphasis on the triviality of religion or cultural affiliation regarding national identity, the impression persists that Muslims are part of the 'others'. The caveat is made manifest in the fact of racial profiling at airports or the closure of mosques under the SoE without providing reasons to the local religious community. To use Beydoun's words: "In France, cultural assimilation and counterterrorism policy do not merely overlap, they are practically synonymous for the Muslim population." (2016: 1280).

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[65] Hollande, 31 December 2015.

[66] Hollande, 16 November 2015.

[67] Macron, 20 June 2017.

5 Application of the Just Securitisation Theory: A Normative Assessment

The CDA has shown how terrorism was successfully securitised during Hollande's presidency, which continued after Macron took office. After analysing the securitising move, the JST now serves to critically examine the securitisation's initiation, conduct and termination. In attempting to assess the moral rightness of the process, this study builds on existing scholarship to connect and interweave insights on French counterterrorism. The three normative criteria presented in chapter 2.3 are now applied to the empirical case, beginning with just initiation.

5.1 Just Initiation

Just initiation requires a just reason, a just referent object, the proper intention of the securitising actor, macro-proportionality and a reasonable chance of success. Consequently, this sub-chapter goes back to the analytical starting point of the securitisation process in 2015:

1. **Was there a just cause to securitise terrorism in 2015?**[68]
2. **Are the French nation and the French Republic just referent objects?**

An objective existential threat requires proof that the aggressor seriously intends to extinguish the referent object or, at least, to affect massively essential characteristics or properties. Additionally, the aggressor must possess the necessary resources to do so. Only if both criteria apply to an issue, it existentially threatens the referent object (Floyd 2011: 430, 2019b: 76–77, 2019b: xvi). Floyd differentiates between agent-lacking, agent-caused and agent-intended threats (Floyd 2019a: 382). Speaking about terrorism, I deal with an agent-intended threat because an individuum or a group of people wilfully prepares and commits an act. As there is no single kind of terrorism, the perpetrators, the reasons behind it, and the final performance always differ in time and region. Here, the focus lies on so-called 'Islamist terrorism'[69] inspired by Al-Qaeda and ISIS.

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[68] Recall that the just cause includes an objective existential threat and a just intention of the securitising actor. Because the second aspect overlaps with the criteria 'just conduct', I return to this point in chapter 5.2.

[69] As discussed above, the term 'Islamist terrorism' is contested because of the semantic similarity to the Islam religion. I want to underline that I do not want to draw any direct link

It is a fact that France suffered several violent attacks in the 21st century. In 2015, terrorist incidents caused more than 150 fatalities, at least several hundred injured, and further people suffering consequent mental illnesses (Gibert et al. 2018; Robert et al. 2021). By attacking civilians, terrorists present the adversary's weakness, provoke overreactions and incite potential imitators (Manin 2008). Public statements, online propaganda and the claim of responsibility for worldwide attacks leave no doubt about their intention to fundamentally shake the French state and the nation (Bartolucci & Corman 2014). Successful attacks inside and outside France show that ISIS consider massive violence in the public arena legitimate to achieve its goal. Despite the threat that it poses to France, the issue of terrorism needs to be put into perspective. According to Floyd, terrorism can be seen as an existential threat to Western societies "as long as Al-Qaeda's [or ISIS's] intentions do not change and as long as they are able to recruit new potential suicide bombers" (Floyd 2011: 431).

On the one hand, French authorities counted 700 French citizens who travelled to Syria to join terrorist groups (Barrett et al. 2014: 8). The security expert Valentina Bartolucci sees returnees "probably the biggest threat France will face in the coming years" (2017: 442). In 2015, Europol observed an EU-wide growing attraction to people travelling to and from conflict zones. Accordingly, "jihadist terrorism" posed an "overall threat to the security of EU" (Europol 2016: 6).

On the other hand, one can question whether the threat is *existential* to France as long as terrorist organisations do not succeed in acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD). There is publicly available evidence that terrorists, or more precisely ISIS, possess WMD and the most stringent safety precautions have made it almost impossible for outsiders to access them (Mueller 2006; Ellis 2014: 220). Therefore, neither today nor in 2015 they could *physically existentially* threaten the French nation in its entirety.

Less evident than the lethal threat is the threat to social cohesion. Extensive media coverage of attacks and social media discussions can produce societal fear with adverse effects on social trust and coherence (Bogain 2020; Oksanen et al. 2020). Admittedly, the state of research indicates an impact of terrorist attacks on political behaviour and policy preferences. Whereas terrorist events do not affect attitudes

between Muslims or Islam and terrorists. But, to make clear that I do refer to a specific type of terrorism inspired by religious fundamentalism or Salafism, I still refer to 'Islamist terrorism'. The term is also used in presidential speech acts.

toward immigration or socio-economic issues in France (Castanho Silva 2018), they contribute to a higher probability of shifting non-right-wing citizens to the right on security-related issues (Brouard et al. 2018: 1073).

French citizens as human beings are *just referent objects* on principle (Floyd 2019b: 100). France is an established democratic state regularly listed on the top of international indexes on political and civil liberties (Freedom House 2016: 22), albeit not perfect (Human Rights Watch 2015). Democratically elected officials like the president are entitled to represent the citizens and to protect the population and the state as a legitimate institutional setting and organisational form. The French state cares about basic human needs and provides health care, education, and employment. Consequently, the French citizens as a nation and the French Republic are just referent objects.

3. **Does the expected good from securitisation outweigh the expected harm?**
4. **Is securitisation the way to achieve the defined goals with the highest probability? Or have alternatives been available with the same or even higher prospects of success?**

Beginning with question four, there are "at least two alternatives to securitisation […]: politicisation and inaction" (Floyd 2019a: 384). Understandably, the French government could not leave the sequential terrorist attacks unanswered not to lose legitimacy and authority. The analysis in chapter 4 revealed that Hollande committed himself to the emergency paradigm constraining the French government to act fast and decisively. The immediate, profound policy announcements within several hours after the November attacks confirm research insights stating that counterterrorism strategies often do not follow a logical selection process (Duyvesteyn 2008: 87). This is against the JST. It demands decision-makers and practitioners to "make informed judgements" (Floyd 2021b: 173). Müller states that ordinary criminal law had already allowed prosecution and provided a toolkit of safeguards, like a judicial arrest warrant and a prompt trial (2018: 589). The 'Syndicat de la magistrature', one of the national sydicates of judges, questions the necessity of an extension of the arsenal of anti-terror legislation (FIDH 2016: 19–20). It could be argued that French counterterrorism has a long history dating back to the 1980s, and that previous approaches failed to prevent the attacks on Charlie Hebdo and Bataclan in 2015. However, French authorities had been somehow aware of all perpetrators of 2015 (Fenech & Pietrasanta 2016: 145). It

is only partly true that the securitisation of terrorism was the last resort. There are no indications that there had been any serious attempts to politicise the terroristic threat and as such try to raise awareness among different groups in society, mobilise political and societal actors as well as argue with alternative proposals and dissenting opinions (Hegemann & Schneckener 2019: 142).

A glance at the past reveals the high controversy of securitisation of terrorism. On the one hand, securitisation should support security forces to identify potential assassins, prevent terrorist incidents and guarantee security and a life free of anxiety for French citizens. Inaction could lead to distrust in police and justice and a decrease in the legitimacy of the government. On the other hand, the SoE shifts the balance of power to the executive branch and accepts the interference of security measures with civil rights undermining the very foundations of a democratic and liberal democratic system.

The 'livre blanc 2006' summarises the French goals of counterterrorism, notably preventing terrorist attacks, protecting, and defending the country (Gouvernement Français 2006). President Hollande goes beyond law enforcement, strengthens prevention and introduces preemption through WoT aiming at the elimination of terrorism.[70] For Floyd, the utterance of 'war on terrorism' by an official indicates "a state-led securitisation" (2019b: 152), whereas Goldstein (2004) takes it verbatim and states, that "not to win [the WoT] is to lose". Taking this idea to its logical conclusion, it is hard to imagine what such warfare and eventually an outcome might look like. One must keep in mind that terrorism - understood as a strategy - is in principle impossible to be defeated (Bayley 2012: 50; Vilmer 2017; Hegemann 2020). Taking the 'WoT' literally, Goldstein, US President Bush (2001), and President Hollande misled their audiences by claiming that it is possible to eliminate terrorism as such. Optionally, one state could try to defeat a terrorist organisation. If the elimination of terrorism is not possible, can exceptional security measures at least prevent terrorist attacks?

Securitisation can enable fast, efficient actions in the crucial phase, and must then be replaced by ordinary politics. In the case of the November 2015 attacks, the security measures were reasonable to accelerate police investigations at a time when the offenders were still on the run, and the acute threat level remained objectively high.

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[70] For a distinction between prevention and preemption see Duyvesteyn: "Preemption has been defined as 'striking in advance of hostile action to prevent its occurrence and to avoid suffering injury'. In contrast to prevention, a long-term approach, pre-emption is a short term [sic!] pro-active response." (Duyvesteyn 2008: 335, quoted from Livingston 1990).

However, prevention is a long-term approach. Accordingly, securitisation, limited in time, is not suitable for long-term purposes. Therefore the chances are low that it can effectively contribute to prevention or defence purposes. Otherwise, securitisation makes "the entire community less safe, not more" (Bartolucci 2017: 453).

Policymakers have to be sensible about unintended consequences of security governance at home and abroad (Daase & Friesendorf 2010). They must withstand the provocation by terrorists to overreact and, thus, delegitimising themselves (Duyvesteyn 2008: 90). Civil rights restrictions do not differentiate between ordinary citizens or potential terrorists and their sympathisers. Instead, any limitation of rights applies to everybody irrespective of individual motives or personal background. When every citizen, passenger or migrant is a suspect, it turns the principle of the state upside down, namely the principle of the presumption of innocence. Important to notice that this point affects groups in society differently, dependent on ethnic or religious affiliation. Predictably, the securitisation of terrorism would primarily impact the lives of Muslim and migrant communities (Jackson 2007; Połońska-Kimunguyi & Gillespie 2016; D'Amato 2019). This fact is not changed by emphasising secularity and interreligious dialogue by President Hollande. Not to forget the foreign military interventions fighting ISIS, causing thousands of civilian deaths since 9/11, creating uncertainties on-site and destabilising the region (Cerny 2000; Ehrhart et al. 2014: 153; Forestier 2019; Watson Institute 2021).

In sum, it is doubtful whether the expected goods from securitisation for protecting a few on an abstract level could outweigh the civil rights restrictions. They mainly harm marginalised groups and undermine the foundations of a democratic society. However, this strongly depends on the conduct of securitisation.

5.2 Just Conduct

The SoE is an elementary part of the securitisation process of terrorism because it opened the door for extraordinary measures. After uttering ambitious words, the French government was constrained "to demonstrate through acts the validity of its interpretations: beyond words, framing what happened as war involved symbols such as police on the streets, house raids, legislation and military investments" (Faucher & Boussaguet 2018: 184). Legislative texts had far-reaching consequences, but vague judicial terms provided the gendarmerie and police with space for subjective interpretation. From now on, administrative authorities, the Ministry of the Interior and subordinated security forces were suddenly responsible for a broader range of tasks

and allowed to act within a much larger margin of discretion. Furthermore, the revival of the highly contested 'note blanches' (Eng. White Papers)[71] gave secret and intelligence services the power to provide the operational basis for police raids, car searches, restriction of freedom of movement, and temporary closing of public places without being obliged to present any hard evidence. Anyone suspected to be a terrorist threat or a concern to public security could become subject of such a measure. Administrative judicial control was suspended *posteriori* to the police operations. It raises the question of whether the security measures only addressed the threat or whether they also served other purposes.

Listening to President Hollande's aggressive rhetoric statements on terrorism, one could assume that the police's priority was to curb the terrorist threat from November 2015 onwards. French authorities succeeded in foiling 32 attacks during the SoE (Ministère de l´Intérieur 2017: 3). Dominique Raimbourg, President of the Committee on Legal Affairs of the National Assembly, argued that the SoE facilitated the work of the security forces. It enforced the various security departments on the national and local levels to cooperate. The acceptance of presumptions and increased institutional efficiency speeded up working processes (CNCDH 2017: 26).

However, another view is possible. Official statistics reveal the following numbers of police executions between November 2014 and October 2017[72]: 29 forced closures of places of assembly, 39 bans of demonstrations and public gatherings, 656 individual residence bans and a total of 4,600 house searches. These outstanding numbers could neither avert five deadly attacks killing 92 persons (Magnanville, Nice, St Etienne du Rouvray, Champs-Elysées et Marseille) nor 13 attacks with injuries (Assemblée Nationale 2017; Ministère de l´Intérieur 2017: 3). Consequently, strong evidence suggests that the security measures also served other purposes than counterterrorism. If so, this would conflict with Floyd's criteria of just conduct.

In fact, the French counterterrorist strategy was mingled with the fight against organised crime. This becomes evident by looking at the headings of the newly

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[71] Prohibited by Nicolas Sarkozy in 2002, President Hollande again allowed the police to act on the vague basis of the 'notes blanches', a decision heavily contested by critical observers of the SoE (Dumas 2015; FIDH 2016: 22; Alix & Cahn 2017: 850). In the minority of the cases, judicial control followed demanding further evidence than a 'note blanche' (Assemblée Nationale 2016; FIDH 2016: 22).

[72] Numbers are missing for the period between 14 November 2015 and 21 July 2016 (Assemblée Nationale 2017).

introduced law "on terrorism and safety in public transport"[73] as well as the law on "terrorism and organised crime"[74]. Organised crime and terrorism have in common that they are not clearly defined and, hence, provide a wide scope for definition (De Massol De Rebetz & van der Woude 2020: 2). Representatives of a trade union of police officers admitted that particularly the drug squad in the Paris region and the division pursuing illegal weapon possession frequently took advantage of the extraordinary security measures (FIDH 2016: 19–20). Statistics presented to the National Assembly revealed that in the first 13 months of the SoE (November 2015 – December 2016) 4,292 police searches took place. Only 61 uncovered some kind of connection to terrorism of which 20 had a direct relation to a terrorist scene (Raimbourg & Poisson 2016: 138–139).[75]

*Figure 2: Police Searches between 15 November 2015 and 25 May 2016*

Figure 3: Police Searches between 21 July and 06 December 2016

Even if the executions contributed to a destabilisation of the criminal field "that could have served as support for possible terrorist attacks" (Raimbourg & Delivertoux 2017), these side effects cannot justify the SoE or the securitisation of terrorism.

It could be further objected that the French issued a ban on demonstrations and imposed house arrests without any reference to terrorism but explicitly referring to the SoE. One famous example is the demonstration ban during the international climate conference COP21 in Paris in November 2015. Surprisingly, the Conseil d´Etat supported this decision and confirmed that the security measures also apply "for reasons other than those justifying the application of the SoE" (Assemblée Nationale 2016). Even if the "French courts have found no violation of fundamental rights in the majority of cases brought before them" (Morand-Deviller 2016: 59; Müller 2018: 582), civil society representatives and human rights defenders point to the careless use of security measures violating human rights.

First, the law of the SoE allowed house searches at night hazarding the consequences of psychological and physical violence. Police officers acted irrespectively in the presence of children or innocent family members potentially leading to traumata and the loss of trust in public agencies (IPCAN 2017: 3). Second, house arrests could be *de facto* extended without limit. Similar to imprisonment, this heavily affects the daily life of the person in question and can lead to the loss of the job and destabilisation of the personal network (CNCDH 2017: 16). On 30 October 2017, 41 persons were under house arrest, for 350 days on average (Assemblée Nationale 2017). Third, the law of 21 July 2016 permitted video surveillance of certain detainees in prison. Psychologists and human rights defenders pointed out the psychological damages caused by the invasion of privacy combined with the deprived right of movement (CNCDH 2017: 33). Fourth, the general public support of the SoE can easily hide the fact that particular persons from the Muslim or migrant communities were affected disproportionately (YouGov France 2016; Bogain 2020).

In the wake of 9/11 US President Bush established the link between Islamism, often confused with Islam, and terrorism. Since then, Muslims have been victims of 'othering' and discrimination (Ajala 2014: 10). Like Bush, President Hollande also declared the fight against Islamist terrorism and added fuel to the fire of already existing racist and discriminatory practices. Securitisation should provide security to as many persons as possible without a discriminatory manner. Instead, it unsettled the Muslim and migrant communities. The Defender of Rights complained about inappropriate and discriminatory security measures due to religious practices (IPCAN 2017: 3).

Anti-Muslim attacks required the protection of religious and cultural sites by national armed forces (Lequesne 2016: 309). Not to forget that President Macron anchored racial profiling in the legislation.[76] This cannot be justified by the fact that 15 out of 150 jihadists had a Maghreb-Algerien or Maroccan background (Crettiez & Barros 2019: 12). Cole and Dempsey warn against racial profiling for a number of reasons. One argument is that counterterrorism efforts can only be purposeful in cooperation with relevant communities (Golder & Williams 2006: 57, quoting Cole & Dempsey 2002). Therefore, it is elementary to establish and maintain mutual trust between community members and French authorities. Otherwise, it is neither effective nor cost-efficient.

The French authorities did not use the security measures – a product of the securitisation of terrorism – exclusively for counterterrorism purposes. In some police departments, the measures served to facilitate the operative day-to-day business (Assemblée Nationale 2017; Raimbourg & Delivertoux 2017). This was possible due to vague formulations, and a missing guiding definition of terrorism. It seems as if counterterrorism was no longer the main subject but became a side effect of securitisation. Hence, security words and actions did not match. Evidence suggests that the intention of the securitising actor was unjust, according to the JST criteria.

5.3   Just Desecuritisation

Just Desecurisation is defined by the right time, political action, and the long-term assurance of a desecuritised state of affairs. The French case of counterterrorism misses, depending on the assessment, the just cause. However, it certainly lacks just conduct. Consequently, it is possible to pursue two lines of argument.

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[76] Loi du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme. Article 19 allows identity controls at train stations and airports "to verify compliance by persons *whose foreign nationality can be deduced from objective elements external to the person concerned*" (emphasis added).

First, terrorist groups, despite their glorification of violence, do not pose an *existential* threat to France and its nation. It is further questionable whether securitisation was needed to curb the threat or whether an alternative could have had similar chances of success. Following this reasoning, the securitisation should have ended without delay because its initiation was unjust.

The second line of argument is that the initiation of securitisation was just, but the conduct was unjust. Therefore, the French government was obliged to correct the authorities' behaviour whenever misconduct was uncovered. An adaption of behaviour only happened in marginal points. First and foremost, the contrary occurred, as demonstrated below. Political and judicial institutions reinforced the behaviour and contributed to the perpetuation of unjust conduct. The following elaborates on this second line of argument because it gives considerable cause for discussion.

Indeed, during and after the November 2015 attacks, the French authorities faced exceptional and unprecedented circumstances. At the time, it could justify securitising terrorism and declaring a SoE for a limited period. Apart from isolated intellectual protests from day one (Agamben 2015; Butler 2015; Leclerc 2015), even civil society organisations accepted the security measures as long as they served to bring the exceptional and unprecedented situation under control (FIDH 2016: 20; Amnesty International 2016: 6).

JST requires the desecuritisation of an agent-intended threat as soon as the threateners stop threatening. In this line, the incumbent president has the special responsibility of desecuritisation. As the (de-)securitising actor, he is morally obliged to terminate the security measures after the perpetrators of the November 2015 attacks were detained or executed and the *concrete* danger was eliminated. However, reality proves to be different. The demonstration ban and house arrests imposed due to the COP21 invoked incomprehension and suspicion of observers. The French authorities should have allowed the security measures for counterterrorist purposes only. Furthermore, the discourse analysis showed that President Hollande stuck to his security language and practice until he left office, with one exception. In July 2016, President Hollande was about to end the SoE if not the attack on the national holiday in Nice happened (CNCDH 2017: 12).[77]

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[77] See also the speech of President Hollande on 14 July 2016.

Neither President Hollande nor President Macron ever made serious attempts to *de*securitise. Instead, they regularly transferred former extraordinary security measures into common law. Jean-Baptiste Perrier, professor of criminal sciences, remarks that the SoE has already been redundant in June 2016: "The state of emergency would no longer have been necessary, […] not because the risk would have disappeared, but because the exceptional measures were no longer exceptional. No added value to the emergency state because the 3 June 2016 integrates it into ordinary law. The exception becomes special law, or even common law; one could speak of a permanent state of emergency, or a long-time exception." (CNCDH 2017: 31) Besides fundamental critique of law experts and civil society organisations specialised in human rights, there is no evidence for desecuritisation requests by the French electorate as the continuously high public support for the SoE shows (Bogain 2020: 592).

However, the newly elected President Macron kept his election promise and announced the end of the SoE at the Congress of Versailles on 03 July 2017. In the same breath, he announced a new antiterrorist law, later known as SILT[78]. The law SILT was to anchor the tools and means of the SoE in the permanent antiterrorist legislation, contrary to the original governmental promises on the extraordinary nature of the security measures. It shows that securitisation has survived the SoE. Signed in July and entered into force on 1 November 2017, the common law allowed prefects to establish protection perimeters on potential places subject to a risk of terrorist acts and to close places of worship for apology or provocation of terrorism. Furthermore, the law allows the Interior Minister to decide on surveillance measures of individuals and extends the possibilities for controls in border areas. The codification of the closures of religious sites (article 2), restriction of movement, electronic ankle bracelets (article 3), and house searches (article 4) have generated the most criticism because of the abuse of basic laws.[79] These security measures restrain freedom of religion, freedom of movement and right to privacy. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Council declared the law constitutional to a great extent (Institut du Sénat 2021; Ministère de l'Intérieur 2021). The Defender of Rights criticised that decision because of the "absence of a situation of public danger threatening the life of the nation" (Transnational Institute 2020: 16–17).

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[78] Loi du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme (Loi SILT).

[79] Loi SILT.

As explained above, it is impossible to defeat terrorism itself. A certain risk always remains despite security measures. If any, securitisation can help to curb the terrorist threat transitionally. A long-term counterterrorism strategy must harmonise with democratic principles and establish a balance between freedom and security. Understandably, some precautionary and legal measures stay in place after the desecuritisation of terrorism. One example that can be cited is the counter-radicalisation program to prevent people from joining terrorist organisations. If the government insists on some security measures, like surveillance measures, the French society should, at least, expect specification of legal terms. Furthermore, the government should return *a priori* control of police operations to administrative and judicial judges. It would minimise the risk of abuse and promote legal certainty.

Despite the change in government, there was no serious attempt to adjust or terminate the securitisation process. Neither one of the presidents deescalated rhetorically nor withdrew security measures. Compensation for victims of security measures was challenging and, if granted, inadequate (FIDH 2016: 23). The French administration did not take any precautionary measures to reduce the harm to marginalised groups particularly affected by the security measures. Consequently, it did not make any real effort to introduce restorative measures to heal the relationship with harmed groups.

Instead, a 'new normal' found its place in French legislation. The New York Times critically noted: "But these [antiterrorist] tools are here to stay, regardless of which government is in power, and there is a lot of room for interpretation." (Breeden 2021) Yet, it would be illusionary to speak of a desecuritisation, not to mention a *just* desecuritisation. Neal (2012) proves to be right by expressing concern that exemption clauses and legislative exceptions become normalised over time.

6 Conclusion

6.1 Challenges and Reflection

This Bachelor thesis is located in the relatively young research field of morality and security that owes a lot to Rita Floyd. Even if Just War Theory provides important insights, Floyd discovers new territory by systematically assessing the rightness of securitisation. This study first and foremost relied on her work which over time resulted in the JST. Despite its novelty in both concept and area of application, the JST provided a robust framework to assess the securitisation of terrorism in France.

Because the JST has not yet found much application by other scholars, there were only a few exemplary studies that could provide inspiration and guidance to this thesis.

It was challenging to give adequate consideration to the philosophical-scientific concept of Floyd. That is to say to combine the objectivist assumption of the realness of an existential threat with the constructivist approach to the threat-security link. That is why the most controversial aspect might be the assessment of the objective existential threat.

At this point, it becomes evident that some criteria are hard to measure because a wide range of phenomena is touched upon. The applicability of the JST is a strength, but it is difficult to answer each criterion with Yes or No. Delicate issues like securitisation sometimes require recognising decisive nuances. Since all criteria have to be fulfilled for just securitisation, the JST is not flexible enough in this regard. Furthermore, without having access to insiders of the political domain, it is almost impossible to learn about the intention and motives of the securitising actor.

As Floyd admits, the theories of securitisation and, particularly, desecuritisation are still under development. Floyd attaches great importance to a human needs-based approach but does not clarify what that means. Furthermore, particularly in terms of methodology, Floyd provides no guidance. Instead of critical discourse analysis, this study could have used the WPR approach, process tracing or ethnological research. Next to this, a further theoretical discussion is needed on whether there are cases where a securitised state of affairs might be accepted. Until so far, the Copenhagen School as well as the JST favour a desecuritised state of affairs.

It proved demanding to achieve and display the scientific and empirical depths necessary for meeting the requirements of sound normative analysis. Due to an ever-larger increase in security politics in other fields and the blurring lines between national and international security, the study could only provide limited insights into the single subdisciplines of security. That is why the thesis is a snapshot of a much larger research field.

6.2 Limitations

The findings of this study have to be seen in the light of some limitations. First and foremost, this thesis condenses publicly available information provided by academic scholars from political science and law and governmental and non-governmental institutions. The variety of sources is considered a strength of the study because it

gives voice to different actors involved in the securitisation process. However, due to a limited research scope, this study neither consulted undisclosed sources nor conducted interviews with political insiders of the securitisation process, as requested by Floyd.

Furthermore, the text corpus of the CDA was limited to presidential speech acts. As explained, discourse consists of linguistic and non-linguistic elements of which only presidential speeches, statements and press interviews could be included. In future, it would be interesting to uncover the interrelation between counterterrorism policies, social media discussions, media publications, contributions of civil society as well as public opinion.

A potential limitation of this study is the issue of translation. The text corpus of the CDA was analysed in its original language. It is possible that the subtle meaning attached to related discourses got lost in translation.

Finally, the normative assessment of desecuritisation could be perceived as too early in time. Since the securitisation process is not yet terminated and the future is uncertain, it makes sense to come back to the research question at a later point in time.

6.3 Conclusion and Outlook

This study differs from previous literature on French counterterrorism and securitisation in several important aspects. Not only does it take a comprehensive approach to securitising moves and security practices, but also it aspires to draw normative conclusions from empirical data considering the viewpoints of different actors. Although this Bachelor thesis does not aim at providing a definite answer to the research question of the justness of securitisation of terrorism, the case study of France is informative. The insights reflect a broader array of problems that can be observed in various counterterrorist strategies in Western societies. For example, vague legal terms and missing judicial control lead to a misuse of security measures, and an imbalance of security and freedom.

The successful presentation of terrorism as an existential threat secured the president a parliamentary majority and public support in security affairs, though it could not provide President Hollande with a second term. Framing terrorism as a threat to security is advantageous because leaders can assign political and financial resources to a particular issue.

The 'war on terrorism', declared by President Hollande in November 2015, clearly points to a "state-led securitisation" (Floyd 2019b: 152). The sequence of terrorist attacks in 2015 opened the door to link terrorism and security. Suddenly, President Hollande deviated from his socialist agenda and set up increasingly generalised surveillance measures that would have been impossible to accept by the left-wing electorate before. The newly elected President Macron continued Hollande's security policy and transferred extraordinary measures into common law. The escalating rhetoric combined with the introduction of extraordinary measures against terrorism made it relevant to analyse the French counterterrorist strategy from a normative securitisation perspective.

The critical discourse analysis as articulated by Fairclough revealed the membership categorisation denouncing perpetrators of the violent attacks as terrorists nameless barbarians and highlighting France as the homeland of human rights, civil liberties, and a nation of natural superiority against all enemies of democracy. Despite the secularity, the French presidents, in harmony with popular French Muslim voices, denied the 'true' religious affiliation of terrorists to Islam and marked them as political antagonists to France. The differentiation between 'good' and 'bad' Muslims contributed to the reproduction of anti-Muslim discourse. The unjust conduct of securitisation reflects the stigmatisation whose effects were felt by Islam and migrant groups.

Informed by the criteria of the JST of Rita Floyd, this study shed light on the initiation, conduct, and termination of security measures. Generally, mechanisms of security centralised the apparatus of state control and gave security forces unprecedented responsibilities and duties. The justness of initiation is debatable since researchers disagree on the existential nature of the terrorist threat. The discussion above offers two different approaches. On the one hand, terrorism poses no existential threat unless terrorist groups do not gain access to weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, the situation immediately, during, and after the November 2015 attacks was opaque to such an extent that one could assume an existential threat to the state and its population.

In contrast to just initiation, the answer to the question of just conduct is less ambiguous. There is clear evidence of misuse of security measures, their imprudent implementation by executors, and a missing governmental will to adjust the police behaviour. Therefore, the conduct is contrary to the postulates of the JST. Concerning the last criterion, President Macron's anti-terrorist legislation gives no indications of

desecuritisation, despite the termination of the SoE after two years. The validation of these political choices by the Constitutional Court underlines the importance of not confusing legality with morality. In this respect, up to now, the securitisation of terrorism in France does not fulfil all three criteria of the JST by Floyd.

Instead, further research is needed on the normalisation of emergency measures as it is already apparent in France. There are key junctures in history when substantial redirections in discourse and policy-making are possible. It would be also interesting to examine the potential role of institutional authorities, like the Constitutional Court, to guarantee just securitisation. The securitisation of terrorism should not be accepted as inevitable and timeless. Instead, such narratives and practices need to be analytically problematised as a product of a historically contingent process and discursive construction. In the future, academic research should continue to ask how to decouple the solution of emergencies from a logic of a security-freedom trade-off. Governments must not overlook the importance of human rights in disruptive times. How can we overcome the assumption that rights must be curtailed in order to protect them? Often the restriction of liberties is subject to ineffective counterterrorism responses. Securitisation can bring adverse effects by increasing insecurities, from what the Copenhagen School warns as 'security traps'. It remains to see to what extent this nexus between terrorism and security is maintained in the future.

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Annexe

Number	Date (DD/MM)	Original title of the document
		2015
1.	07/01	Déclaration à la suite de l'attentat au siège de l'hebdomadaire "Charlie Hebdo"
2.	20/01	Déclaration sur la lutte contre le terrorisme et sur la réforme de l'Etat, à Paris
3.	17/01	Déclaration sur la lutte contre le terrorisme et sur les efforts en faveur des zones rurales, à Tulle
4.	18/03	Déclaration sur le terrorisme et la destruction du patrimoine culturel en Irak et en Syrie, à Paris
5.	27/04	Déclaration conjointe avec Tony Abbott, Premier ministre australien, sur la coopération franco-australienne dans la lutte contre le terrorisme, à Paris
6.	20/05	Point de presse conjoint avec Petro Porochenko, président de la République d'Ukraine, sur les relations franco-ukrainiennes, la situation en Ukraine, le Partenariat oriental, le terrorisme et sur la condamnation à mort d'un Français en Indonésie
7.	14/07	Entretien avec TF1 et France 2 sur la Grèce et la Zone euro, la construction européenne, le nucléaire iranien, la lutte contre le terrorisme et sur la politique économique
8.	26/06	Déclaration de suite à l'attentat terroriste en Isère, à Paris
9.	24/08	Déclaration de , sur l'attentat terroriste dans le train Amsterdam-Paris, à Paris
10.	19/08	Interview avec le groupe de presse EBRA sur la question climatique, les baisses d'impôts, la politique économique et sur la lutte contre le terrorisme
11.	21/10	Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la République, sur les relations entre la France et le Mali, la lutte contre le terrorisme, la crise des réfugiés et sur la Conférence de Paris sur le climat, à Paris
12.	16/11	Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la République, devant le Parlement réuni en Congrès à la suite des attaques terroristes perpétrées à Paris et en Seine-Saint-Denis, à Versailles
13.	18/11	Déclaration sur les attentats du 13 novembre, la lutte contre le terrorisme et sur la crise des réfugiés, à Paris
14.	19/11	Déclaration sur la lutte contre le terrorisme, à Paris
15.	16/11	Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la République, devant le Parlement réuni en Congrès à la suite des attaques terroristes perpétrées à Paris et en Seine-Saint-Denis, Versailles
16.	31/12	Déclaration sur la France face au terrorisme, la lutte contre le chômage et sur la construction européenne, à Paris

		2016
17.	05/01	Déclaration sur la place des réligions en France et sur la lutte contre le terrorisme, le racisme et l´antisémitisme, à Paris
18.	07/01	Déclaration sur le rôle des policiers, gendarmes, militaires et pompiers au service de la sécurité des Français, à Paris
19.	13/01	Déclaration sur la lutte contre le terrorisme et sur la réforme de l'Etat, à Paris
20.	01/03	Déclaration sur l'Ecole nationale de la magistrature, le projet de loi sur la justice du XXIème siècle, la lutte contre le terrorisme et sur l'indépendance de l'autorité judiciaire, à Bordeaux
21.	22/03	Déclaration sur les attentats terroristes à Bruxelles, à Paris
22.	22/03	Déclaration sur les attentats terroristes à Bruxelles et la lutte contre le terrorisme, à Paris
23.	25/03	Déclaration sur l'homme politique israélien, Shimon Peres, le terrorisme, la crise des réfugiés et sur le conflit israélo-palestinien, à Paris
24.	30/03	Déclaration sur l'abandon de la révision constitutionnelle relative à l'état d'urgence et à la déchéance de la nationalité, à Paris
25.	14/06	Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la République, sur la lutte contre la corruption et le terrorisme, à Paris
26.	26/07	Déclaration sur l'attentat à Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray et la lutte contre le terrrorisme, à Paris
27.	01/07	Déclaration en hommage à Jessica Schneider et Jean-Baptiste Salvaing, deux policiers victimes d'un terroriste, à Versailles
28.	15/07	Déclaration sur l'attentat terroriste à Nice, à Paris
29.	20/07	Déclaration sur la lutte contre le terrorisme, à Saint-Astier
30.	22/07	Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la République, sur la lutte contre le terrorisme, à Paris
31.	25/07	Déclaration sur le rôle de l'Armée dans la lutte contre le terrorisme, au Fort de Vincennes le 25 juillet 2016
32.	08/09	Déclaration sur la démocratie face au terrorisme, à Paris
33.	29/09	Déclaration sur l'imprimerie où s'étaient retranchés les frères Kouachi deux jours après les attentats de Charlie Hebdo, à Dammartin-en-Goële
34.	15/10	Déclaration en hommage aux victimes de l'attentat du 14 juillet 2016, à Nice
35.	26/11	Déclaration sur un attentat déjoué sur le territoire national, à Paris
36.	28/11	Déclaration à la presse sur les attentats terroristes du 13 novembre 2015, la commémoration de l'Armistice du 11 novembre 1918 et sur l'élection de Donald Trump à la présidence des Etats-Unis, à Paris
37.	31/12	Déclaration sur la France face au terrorisme, la politique étrangère, la lutte contre le chômage et sur l'élection présidentielle de 2017, à Paris

	2017	
38.	05/01	Déclaration sur le terrorisme islamiste et sur le dialogue entre les religions, à Paris
39.	22/02	Déclaration sur le CRIF, le terrorisme islamiste, l'antisémitisme, les relations franco-israéliennes et sur le conflit au Proche-Orient, à Paris
40.	10/03	Déclaration sur l'aide aux victimes du terrorisme au sein de l'Union européenne, à Paris
41.	11/03	Déclaration en hommage aux victimes des attentats terroristes de Montauban et de Toulouse de mars 2012, à Paris
42.	22/03	Déclaration sur l'attaque terroriste de Londres et sur la sécurité dans les établissements pénitentiaires, à Villepinte
43.	18/04	Déclaration sur l'arrestation de deux personnes soupçonnées de préparer un attentat terroriste, en Saône-et-Loire
44.	20/04	Déclaration à la suite d'un attentat aux Champs-Elysées, à Paris

Annexe 2 List of speeches of President Macron between May 2017 and December 2017

Number	Date (DD/MM)	Original title of the document
	2017	
45.	23/05	Déclaration sur l'attentat terroriste à Manchester au Royaume-Uni et sur la lutte contre le terrorisme, à Paris
46.	13/06	Déclaration sur la lutte contre le terrorisme, à Paris
47.	20/06	Déclaration sur l'islam en France, à Paris
48.	22/06	Entretien dans "Le Figaro", "Le Soir", "Le Temps", "The Guardian", "Corriere della Sera", "El Pais", "Süddeutsche Zeitung" et "Gazeta Wyborcza" sur les défis et priorités de la politique
49.	13/07	Déclaration sur les défis et priorités de la politique de défense, à Paris
50.	14/07	Déclaration en hommage aux victimes de l'attentat de Nice du 14 juillet 2016, à Nice
51.	14/07	Déclaration de M. Emmanuel Macron, Président de la République, sur la fête nationale, les relations franco-américaines et sur l'armée française, à Paris
52.	26/07	Déclaration de M. Emmanuel Macron, Président de la République, en hommage au Père Hamel, un prêtre assassiné par des terroristes, à Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray
53.	18/10	Déclaration sur les efforts du gouvernement en faveur de la sécurité intérieure, à Paris
54.	31/10	Déclaration sur la France et la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme, à Strasbourg

Statement of Originality

This is to certify that to the best of my knowledge, the content of this thesis is my own work. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or other purposes. I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work and that all the assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources have been acknowledged.

Date / Signature