

Explaining African Union Conflict and Crisis Interventions

The Drivers and Dynamics of Security Regionalism in Africa

School of Public Affairs
at Leuphana University Lüneburg, submitted
as a requirement for the award of
the title of

Doctor of Philosophy
- Dr. phil. –

Approved thesis by
Niklas Krösche

born 21. April 1993 in Glandorf

Submitted on: 21.07.2023

Thesis defence on: 13.10.2023

Main supervisor and reviewer:	Prof. Dr. Tobias Lenz
Second reviewer:	Prof. Dr. Martin Binder
Third reviewer:	Prof. Dr. Fredrik Söderbaum

The individual items in the cumulative thesis are or will be published as follows:

Article 2: Krösche, Niklas. 2023. "Hybrid Regionalism in Africa: Towards a Theory of African Union Interventions." *African and Asian Studies* 22 (1–2): 39–62. <https://doi.org/10.1163/15692108-12341580>.

Year of publication: 2024

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Key Acronyms

APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AU	African Union
CA	Constitutive Act of the AU
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
IO	International Organization
IR	International Relations (Discipline)
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PSC	Peace and Security Council
RO	Regional Organization
SADC	Southern African Development Community
UCG	Unconstitutional Change of Government
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

Acknowledgements

Just a couple months ago, it would have been difficult for me to imagine to be where I am right now, reflecting and looking back on what has been a long, intense, and exciting process. As this chapter of my life comes to a close, I feel much appreciation for those who helped me along the way.

First and foremost, I am deeply indebted and forever grateful to Tobias Lenz. Without him, there may not be a dissertation to submit today. Tobias offered me the opportunity to become part of his research group on the 'Legitimation of Regional Organizations' (LegRO) and his untiring support and positive attitude throughout the years helped me to keep moving forward. I am also deeply indebted to Martin Binder and Fredrik Söderbaum. Both Martin and Fred generously accepted my request to become members of my doctoral board and have actively accompanied me throughout this process. Without hesitation they have lent me their time and expertise, and I have benefited immensely from their support.

The German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) in Hamburg, Germany, is where my socialization and growth as a researcher happened. I am grateful for the support I received from my friends and colleagues at the GIGA. Specifically, I wish to acknowledge my colleagues in the LegRO project. Lynda, Swantje and Henning have all helped and supported me in this process. Their input and our exchanges have contributed to this dissertation, and I will always be thankful for that. While I cannot even attempt to mention the many people to whom I am grateful, I would be remiss if I did not highlight Mona. We were in this together, and our regular meetings helped me keep my sanity and joy during this process.

I am a product of my family and friends in Osnabrück and Göttingen. Between a global pandemic and my long stay overseas, I have not been able to spend as much time with them as I would have liked to in recent years, but their support nonetheless mattered a lot. I would not be where I am today without the love and support of my parents, Rita and Thomas, who have all my appreciation. And, of course, there is my incredible partner and confidant, Shibaani. I would not have been able to handle crunch time without her by my side. I dedicate this thesis to my family.

1. Introduction to the Thesis

The presented thesis deals with the conflict and crisis interventions of the African Union (AU), to which I henceforth simply refer as ‘AU interventions’. Specifically, the thesis is rooted in the desire to identify and explain the broader intervention patterns. Throughout, I hope to convincingly demonstrate that contemporary cooperation in Africa is centrally driven by two different logics – problem-solving and regime-serving – with implications for AU interventions that remain hitherto understudied. Why studying AU interventions from this perspective is important and how I went about it in this thesis is the subject of this introduction.

1.1 A Tale of Two Organizations in One

In 2002, the AU formally replaced the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The OAU was founded in 1963, occurring against the backdrop of decolonization in Africa. Its primary utility and success came from the promotion of African states in the Westphalian sense, the support for independence movements, and the fight against Apartheid. Over time, however, it gained an unsavory reputation as a “trade union of tyrants” (van Walraven 2010, 47) or “a governments’ trade union” (Clapham 1996, 114) that primarily served the parochial interests of those in power. Unsurprisingly, the OAU was vested with comparatively little independent authority in matters of peace and security, and as a matter of principle eschewed interference in domestic affairs of member states – even in the most gruesome circumstances (Ibrahim 2012, 37–39). This attitude proved untenable in the 1990s. The repercussions from the end of the Cold War, which had dominated international geopolitics for decades, also affected African cooperation. The continent’s strategic importance waned with the demise of the bipolar world order, and the broader international community’s interest in African affairs turned modest (Berhe 2017, 664). Violent conflicts shook Africa in the 1990s, with crises such as the state failure in Somalia and the genocide in Rwanda shocking and alarming observers. It became clear that ‘African solutions to African problems’, a mantra first coined in 1994 by

political economist George Ayittey in response to the crisis in Somalia (Ayittey 1994) and later formally embraced by the AU (cf. African Union 2013a), were indispensable for effectively and sustainably solving the problems that plagued the African continent. Efforts to make the organization fit for purpose led to gradual change but eventually culminated in wholesale reform with the agreement to establish the AU in 1999.

In 2002, the AU officially succeeded the OAU. The establishment of the AU was undoubtedly a milestone in African cooperation. It was meant to ensure African agency and provide African solutions to African problems. Among other changes, a new 'era of non-indifference' was hailed which was supposed to supplant overly dogmatic adherence to non-interference norms within Africa (Mwanasali 2008). The revolutionary Article 4(h) of the AU's Constitutive Act (CA) conveys "the right of the Union [AU] to intervene in a Member State [...] in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity" (African Union 2000). It meant that member state governments could no longer rely on the AU to just stand idly by in the case of grave circumstances. Commitments to prioritize human security, to promote democracy, and to assume greater responsibility in Africa's security affairs presented a shift in the AU's normative framework. Profound institutional transformation accompanied this normative shift. Member states agreed on pooling sovereignty and delegating authority to an unprecedented degree (cf. Hooghe et al. 2017). A new core body, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), was vested with remarkable authority and given a broad mandate to lead Africa's ambitious conflict prevention and resolution agenda. Moreover, the PSC Protocol (African Union 2002b) provides the PSC with the discretion to insert itself into any situation with implications for continental peace, security, and stability (Art. 7.11) and to "take initiatives and action it deems appropriate" (Art. 9.1). Hence, the AU holds all the formal cards required to deliver on its new normative framework and pursue an active role in security affairs in the way it sees fit.

At the same time, the AU's transformation has not led it to abandon the OAU and its foundational principles. On the contrary, foundational treaties and official documents continue to hold up high the norms related to national sovereignty, put member states in the driver's seat when it comes to formal decision-making processes, and reaffirm the primacy of con-

sensual decision-making. It should therefore come as little surprise that observers have raised questions about the extent to which the OAU's 'club'-mentality survived and continues to influence the AU's present activities. "Can the leopard change its spots?" wonders Udombana (2002) with respect to the AU's prospective human rights promotion and protection. "A club of incumbents?" is the question posed by Omorogbe (2011) in reference to the OAU's reputation as he concludes that the AU's policy on unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs) leaves it open for criticism that protecting incumbent regimes takes priority over advancing democracy on the continent. "A 'Culture of Conservatism'" among AU member states is what Welz (2014, 19) believes to be responsible for a situation in which "vision outpaces reality." How the AU deals with the dilemma of being stuck between emerging ambitions and persistent attitudes, and what that means for AU interventions at large, remains an open question.

1.2 Researching AU Interventions

This uncertainty is where this thesis comes in. It is dedicated to studying and explaining AU interventions, defined broadly as diplomatic efforts – military and non-military – determined through formal resolutions and decisions to address a crisis or conflict involving at least one member state. Specifically, the thesis asks: what are the broader intervention patterns, and how can we explain them? Even a cursory glance at the pertinent literature and prominent cases reveals that a uniform AU response to crises and conflicts across Africa does not exist. In some cases, the AU chooses to intervene, whereas in others it chooses not to. In some cases, the AU intervenes strongly (e.g., mounting a peace operation) whereas in others it intervenes only weakly (e.g., issuing demands) or not at all. In some cases, the AU intervenes coercively (e.g., imposing sanctions) whereas in others it opts for more gentle measures (e.g., facilitating mediation). Some of the conflicts in which the AU intervenes are primarily domestic in nature, whereas others are characterized by their transnational nature. A key point of departure for this thesis is that neither the AU's regime-serving roots, which emphasize the primacy of incumbents' parochial interests, nor the AU's problem-solving commitment, which emphasizes the pursuit of its declared organizational mission, can convincingly explain the

broader conflict intervention patterns on its own. Instead, we should understand the AU as being driven by two different logics of cooperation at the same time: a problem-solving and a regime-serving logic. Both logics inform AU decisions, and the conflict intervention patterns we observe are crucially shaped by how they are balanced in practice.

Jointly and individually, the three articles that make up this thesis contribute to answering the overarching research question, namely what are the broader conflict intervention patterns, and how can we explain them? At this point, it bears clarifying what exactly the thesis does – and does not – seek to provide. First, the thesis and its articles study the logics that drive the AU and its interventions, and demonstrate the ensuing observable implications. Hence, the thesis strives to contribute to a better understanding of what AU interventions look like and why. It decidedly does not attempt to evaluate the normative appropriateness of AU interventions, nor does it attempt to evaluate their effectiveness. Besides, the thesis focuses on output in the form of intervention decisions, which produce discernable intervention patterns, rather than input (i.e., the processes behind those decisions). Second, I define interventions broadly as diplomatic efforts that can be both military and non-military in nature, including certain kinds of forceful rhetoric. Including responses beyond military operations has become common in research on United Nations Security Council (UNSC) interventions (Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel 1996; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012). Due to the emphasis on conflict and crisis interventions, I focus only on those interventions decided on by the PSC in its function as the AU's primary body for the prevention and resolution of conflicts.

The rest of the introduction is structured as follows. First, I outline why it generally matters to study AU interventions, and why it specifically matters to understand what drives them. Second, I provide an overview of the pertinent literature with respect to empirics and theory, and outline the tendencies and gaps that still exist. At the same time, I point out the ways in which this thesis adds to the literature and helps fill existing gaps. Third, I turn to the subject of data and methods that underpin the thesis at large. Finally, I close with a summary of the individual articles and how they contribute to answering the overarching research question.

1.3 Why Study AU Interventions?

In this section, I present the argument why studying the drivers and dynamics of AU interventions and explaining the ensuing intervention patterns is relevant and important. To this end, I identify and distinguish three different aspects of relevance: empirical relevance, theoretical relevance, and policymaking relevance.


1.3.1 Empirical Relevance

First, studying AU interventions is worthwhile because they are empirically relevant, in the sense that they matter in practical terms.

The PSC, the AU's central conflict management organ, has proven to be highly and increasingly active. The PSC has met well over 1,000 times since it became operational in 2004 and with increasing frequency. In these meetings, the PSC takes decisions on responses to conflict and crisis situations. As a result, the PSC has intervened in more than half of all violent conflicts in Africa in some capacity between 2005 and 2019 (see Figure 1.1). Murithi (2012) aptly refers to the PSC's stance as 'interventionist'. Therefore, the AU simply cannot be ignored by domestic and international stakeholders when it comes to conflict resolution in Africa. Interventions range from peace operations and related interventions to non-military measures such as sanctions, mediation, observer missions, forceful rhetoric, and institution-building. None of these interventions are rare either. Since its establishment, the AU and its PSC have authorized and extended – albeit not always led – a dozen different military and peace operations. It has publicly imposed, extended, or strengthened sanctions against actors across 15 member states and 31 country-years between 2005 and 2021, and threatened or requested the imposition of sanctions in many more cases. Conflicts and crises of more than one third of AU member states saw the PSC conduct, request, or support mediation or other conciliatory conflict resolution measures. It played an important role in the formalization of international cooperation around some of the continent's most serious crises, and the use of condemnatory speech acts and other types of forceful rhetoric is ubiquitous with several hundred such instances on public record. Besides intervention frequency, the possibility as well as use of

strong responses, including authorizing the use of military force and various tools of coercion, renders the AU an authoritative actor and potentially powerful peace broker. Moreover, the broad range of intervention types at the AU's disposal reflects its potential to prevent and manage conflicts in different ways, and to adapt its approaches depending on conflict developments and exchanges with relevant stakeholders.

Figure 1.1. PSC Interventions in Violent Conflicts in Africa¹



1.3.2 Theoretical Relevance

Additionally, studying AU interventions is worthwhile because they are theoretically relevant, in the sense that they can help us explain and make sense of empirical reality.

First, studying AU interventions can make an important contribution to theorizing African International Relations (IR) and beyond. African IR continues to be underexplored due to being neglected as a source for theorization historically (Isike and Iroulo 2023). Thus, theorizing and explaining AU interventions already contributes to the literature on African IR.

¹ Intensity definitions taken from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Themnér 2016, 8).

Beyond that, however, it may also pollinate non-African IR theory. Security regionalism² is on the rise across the world (Kirchner and Dominguez 2011; Kacowicz and Press-Barnathan 2016). The case of the AU, as an authoritative IO with frequent conflict and crisis interventions, has the potential to help with developing expectations for other regions that see security regionalism evolve. Perhaps most importantly, the AU consists of member states which range from full democracies to closed autocracies, and is dominated by mixed regimes that straddle the line (see Table 1.1). Far from having witnessed the ‘end of history’ characterized by a final victory of liberal democracy with the end of the Cold War (Fukuyama 1989), the battle between democracy and autocracy, or liberalism and illiberalism, may indeed define our current times. Africa, like no other region apart from Southeast Asia, symbolizes the co-existence of these antagonistic forces. Thus, researchers can look to Africa for a clue regarding how the resulting tensions may evolve and play out.

Second, focusing specifically on when and how interventions take place helps us to better understand the effectiveness, normative foundations, and limitations of AU interventions and, to a lesser extent, the organization at large. This provides important information for researchers. Concerning effectiveness, we cannot understand or explain the overall effectiveness of the AU’s intervention practice without understanding the conditions in which they take place, do not take place, or vary in important ways. Understanding determinants of interventions is “a methodological precondition for developing accurate assessments of the effectiveness” (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012, 34), and studies of effectiveness – especially when focusing only on positive cases – are inherently limited otherwise (for this argument, see also Mullenbach 2005, 530). Moreover, the adequate assessment of effectiveness, meaning the achievement of a desired result, requires knowledge about the purposes that interventions serve. Concerning normative foundations, AU interventions constitute a rich source for identifying the norms that underpin African regionalism. As they are often more consequential or contentious than diplomacy in less sensitive areas of cooperation, studying interventions can help to reveal which norms and logics drive the AU in practice. Concerning

² I use the term regionalism to refer to “cognitive or institutionalized (state-centric) projects” (Bach 2014, 183).

limitations, understanding which factors have driven and shaped AU interventions in the past allows us to project into the future and predict when and how interventions are likely to take place.

Table 1.1. Regime Type of African States (2022)

<i>Closed Autocracy</i>	<i>Electoral Autocracy</i>	<i>Electoral Democracy</i>	<i>Liberal Democracy</i>
Chad	Algeria	Botswana	Seychelles
Eritrea	Angola	Cabo Verde	
Eswatini	Benin	Ghana	
Guinea	Burkina Faso	Kenya	
Libya	Burundi	Lesotho	
Mali	Cameroon	Liberia	
Morocco	CAR	Malawi	
Somalia	Comoros	Mauritius	
South Sudan	Congo, Rep.	Namibia	
Sudan	Côte d'Ivoire	Niger	
	Djibouti	São Tomé and Príncipe	
	DRC	Senegal	
	Egypt	Sierra Leone	
	Equatorial Guinea	South Africa	
	Ethiopia	The Gambia	
	Gabon	Zambia	
	Guinea-Bissau		
	Madagascar		
	Mauritania		
	Mozambique		
	Nigeria		
	Rwanda		
	Tanzania		
	Togo		
	Tunisia		
	Uganda		
	Zimbabwe		
			<i>Not Listed</i> Sahrawi Republic

Source: Varieties of Democracy, v13, 'Regimes of the World' Classification (Coppedge et al. 2023, 287).

1.3.3 Policymaking Relevance

Moreover, studying AU interventions matters for policymakers and practitioners.

External partners, led by the European Union (EU) and several non-African states, provide considerable funding for the AU's peace and security role. In 2021, it was noted that approximately 75 percent of contributions to AU initiatives came from external partners, particularly in the area of peace and security (Institute for Security Studies 2021, 7–8). Besides financial commitments, the UN Charter calls on the UNSC to “utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action” under Chapter VIII (United Nations 1945), which has been the basis for cooperation and coordination between the AU and the UN in security matters. Both organizations underscore the “imperative for close coordination and cooperation” because “African peace and security challenges are too complex for any single organization to adequately address on its own” (United Nations – African Union 2017). Moreover, the AU not only has an authoritative mandate but also seeks to use its leverage at the global level to exert influence and assume an even more central role in conflict resolution. One notable example is the AU's quest for permanent representation in the UNSC (African Union 2005a). Lastly, conflicts in Africa cannot be considered geographically isolated. Their effects are felt in other parts of the world – particularly in Europe – and joint efforts to deal with these conflicts and minimize negative externalities require close coordination with the AU, which stands at the center of the famous African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (Vines 2013; Bah et al. 2014). To summarize, the investment in and reliance on the AU as a peace and security actors renders it crucial for policy-makers outside of Africa to learn about of the drivers behind AU intervention as well as to use the information that can be obtained from identifying the broader intervention patterns (e.g., when interventions are (not) to be expected, how they are designed, and how designs vary depending on context) to foster mutually beneficial and agreeable relations.

Beyond this, understanding the effectiveness, normative foundations, and limitations of AU interventions based on when and how they are conducted is not only relevant from a theoretical but also from a policymaking perspective. Specifically, it contributes towards

building realistic expectations and anticipating developments or actions. Policymakers and practitioners can use this to adjust their policies and approaches accordingly, and to identify opportunities and priorities for cooperation. Finally, AU interventions represent an African attempt to exert agency and drive conflict resolution efforts in accordance with its norms and priorities. A critical part of the reason why the AU was borne out of transformation of its predecessor, the OAU, was to more effectively provide ‘African solutions to African problems’ and advance continental peace and security as global players increasingly disengaged from Africa in the post-Cold War period (Berhe 2017, 664). The prevalence and diversity of security threats, with ripple effects that often even transcend continental boundaries, render African-led interventions not only a matter of normative desirability but, indeed, a functional demand. Hence, AU interventions concern every policymaker who is interested in a peaceful Africa.

1.4. Prior Research and Contribution

This section presents a structured overview of the existing literature. To this end, I concentrate on the focus, contributions, and limitations of prior research, structured along three core aspects when it comes to doing research: empirics, theory, and (subsequently) methods. While scholars have made important contributions to the field of AU interventions, notable gaps in the relevant academic literature to date remain. In his recent book, Herpolsheimer (2021, 2) correctly observes that “both empirically and theoretically, few scholars have focused on what African ROs actually do or how they do it.” Hence, I identify in this section the hitherto existing empirical and theoretical gaps (and limitations) in the literature and outline how this thesis seeks to contribute towards closing them.

1.4.1 Existing Literature and Empirical Contribution

Over time, a strong research program on the APSA and the AU developed. A prominent part of literature on the APSA and the AU is characterized by a tendency to focus on what they

are, how they are structured and how they (are supposed to) operate, rather than on what output (in the form of policies, decisions, or actions) is produced. Numerous informative publications have focused on the broader structure and evolution of the APSA (Engel and Porto 2010; Bah et al. 2014; Vines 2013; Berhe 2017). Additionally, individual parts, such as the PSC (Williams 2009b; Sturman and Hayatou 2010; Murithi and Lulie 2012), the African Standby Force (ASF) (Warner 2015; Onditi, Okoth, and Matanga 2016; Darkwa 2017) and the AU Commission (Hardt 2016; Tieku 2016; 2021) have received considerable attention. Moreover, scholars have taken great interest in analyzing norms and normative changes underlying the APSA, including the ‘culture’ that they create (Williams 2007; Glas 2018). Most notably, many studies prominently focus on the shift from ‘non-interference’ to ‘non-indifference’ (e.g., Williams 2007; Mwanasali 2008; Welz 2013).

When it comes to AU interventions, we can see that they are studied rather selectively. On the one hand, this is evident by the dominance of case studies, especially on the most high-profile interventions (Murithi 2008; Williams 2009a; Aning and Edu-Afful 2016; Wilén and Williams 2018). On the other hand, this is reflected in the focus on specific types of interventions (for recent exceptions, see Herpolsheimer 2021; Henneberg 2022b). This concerns first and foremost peace operations (Dersso 2016; de Coning 2017; de Oliveira and Verhoeven 2018), but also sanctions (Omorogbe 2011; Charron 2013; Charron and Portela 2015) and, albeit less frequently, mediation (Engel 2012; Nathan 2017). Moreover, there is a strong tendency in many studies to focus on the effectiveness of interventions. This is often accompanied by a tendency to ‘prescribe’ and provide policy recommendations, as demonstrated by the various ‘policy-driven’ reports that have been published, such as the ‘APSA Impact Report’ (GIZ 2016; IPSS 2017; 2019) and the ‘Annual Review of the (African Union) Peace and Security Council’ (Dersso 2013; 2014). Rarely is the question of the conditions under which interventions are more or less likely to occur, or the factors which determine their nature and design, the primary focus of empirical analysis. Succinctly put, research focuses on the consequences rather than the sources of interventions.

Beyond explaining, even mapping AU interventions and identifying patterns is still in its infancy stage despite clear progress over the past couple years. Particularly noteworthy are

the contributions made by Herpolsheimer (2021) and Henneberg (2022b) to this end. Herpolsheimer, focusing on spatializing practices, asks in his book how African international organizations (IOs) intervene in conflicts and how this relates to space-making (2021, 2). In this context, he takes into account a diverse set of practices, explored by analyzing official reports, which he subsumes under two broad categories: ‘from afar’ (knowledge production, meetings and discussions, public pronouncements) and ‘on the ground’ (diplomatic missions and liaison offices, technical support, and peacekeeping missions) in addition to strategic engagement of other regional or international actors (2021, 8–9). Thereby, this research provides an important contribution for a more complex and comparative engagement with AU interventions. Henneberg, on his part, introduces a new dataset that captures military and non-military peace and security activities of 24 international organizations (IOs) (22 of which are considered African IOs) between 1997 and 2016 (2022b, 1). The dataset rests on an evaluation of country reports from the Economist Intelligence Unit, and includes activities ranging from economic sanctions, mediation efforts and military interventions to capacity building measures and election observation (2022b, 2). Besides similarly contributing to understanding AU interventionism beyond its most prominent interventions and intervention types, the dataset will prove to be particularly useful for comparative studies and the study of overlap of African IOs. In a discussion paper, Desmidt and Hauck (2017) map out conflict interventions and, importantly, non-interventions by IOs as part of the APSA over a short period of time (2013-15). They offer a first useful probe into enabling and restraining factors at the level of correlations. Some global datasets or mapping exercises which include the AU help provide a first overview of on specific intervention types. Examples include the Military and Non-Military Interventions Dataset (MILINDA) (Jetschke and Schlipphak 2020), the Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDB) (Felbermayr et al. 2020), and the mapping of condemnatory speech acts across 27 IOs (Squatrito, Lundgren, and Sommerer 2019). Due to their global nature and focus on specific intervention types, however, these datasets are necessarily limited and do not provide detailed and comprehensive overviews of AU interventions. Lastly, some publications focusing on the AU or APSA offer helpful overviews with respect to prominent intervention types such as peace operations (e.g., Williams 2009a) and sanctions (e.g.,

Charron and Portela 2015). However, these tables are once again narrowly focused and are to be seen rather as a first overview and reference point for cross-checking than a comprehensive mapping of AU interventions. Importantly, with very few and limited exceptions, these datasets or overviews are not used by their authors to systematically study the driving factors behind these interventions and explain their presence, absence, design, or nature.

The presented thesis contributes to filling an existing empirical research gap by offering a broad and systematic analysis of AU interventions over time, across different intervention types, and without bias towards high-profile cases. The original analysis is made possible only because of the extensive coding of interventions on which the thesis rests. The systematic analysis of almost 1,000 PSC documents to reliably identify instances of intervention and, subsequently, the broader intervention patterns creates a new dataset. The dataset represents, to the best of my knowledge, the most comprehensive effort to capture the AU's responses to crises and conflicts over time and across different – and in some cases largely neglected – intervention types. The second article, in particular, offers a uniquely detailed look into the AU's use of coercive interventions. Jointly, the second and third article advance our understanding of the driving factors behind interventions beyond prominent individual cases and intervention types. This directly contributes to a hitherto under-researched aspect of AU interventions, as scholars have regularly given precedence to evaluations of effectiveness and appropriateness.

1.4.2 Existing Literature and Theoretical Contribution

Theorization of AU interventions is limited to date. This is not a surprise considering “Africa's marginalisation in IR discipline and theory” (Bischoff, Aning, and Acharya 2016b) for most of the field's existence. Moreover, as Engel and Porto (2014, 193) succinctly put it, “[t]he debate on ASPA is dominated by contributions that share a strong interest in policy rather than in theory.” The few exceptions the two authors do highlight are primarily interested in theorizing security cooperation among African states at the structural level rather than theorizing interventions by the AU and other relevant actors. Especially when it comes to developing

hypotheses that postulate causality between two or more variables, theorization of AU interventions is lacking. These interventions being undertheorized is a direct consequence of the literature's tendency to focus on specific high-profile cases and to front questions of effectiveness around AU interventions. Such a focus also encourages case-specific explanations with limited connection to broader theoretical debates. This notwithstanding, the literature provides rich material that can be used to develop clear and testable hypotheses.

The common themes in the literature on APSA and the AU's role in security matters can be broken down into two overarching themes: delivering on the organizational mission for the common good, and promoting the interests of self-serving regimes. Scholars speak to them either by centrally focusing on one of the two themes or by directly relating to both. When the AU replaced the OAU, scholars showed great interest in the supposed move from 'non-interference' to 'non-indifference' (Williams 2007; Mwanasali 2008; Welz 2013). The former, representing the 'old' paradigm, refers to the tendency to not interfere in member state affairs (unless explicitly invited by those in power), whereas the latter, representing the 'new' paradigm, closely links to the notion of 'responsibility to protect' and refers to the promise to not let prohibitive interpretations of national sovereignty stand in the way of intervening when it is deemed necessary. In this context, scholars have also discussed the shift towards human security (and away from regime-centric conceptions of security) (Hutchful 2008; Owolabi 2018) and debated the promotion of democratic norms (Leininger 2015; Abebe and Fombad 2021). While not as explicitly focused on the well-being of the African people, the evolving notion of regional security also fits under the theme of delivering on the organizational mission to benefit the broader community. Scholars have developed various concepts to describe security regionalism on the continent. This includes the notions of 'multilayered security communities' (Franke 2008) and, in direct contrast, 'communities of insecurity' (Nathan 2010). Elsewhere, the security governance system in Africa has been described as 'cooperative security' (Kirchner and Dominguez 2011). The concept of the 'regional security complex' (Lake and Morgan 1997; Buzan and Wæver 2003) has also been picked up and adapted to the African context by introducing concepts such as 'African security regime complex' (Brosig 2013) and 'trans-state security complexes' (Obamamoye 2020). Despite their

differences, these accounts share a view on African cooperation as resulting from regional security concerns and in this context emphasize the role played by African IOs to address them.

At the same time, scholars continued to look at the AU through the lens of a tool to further the parochial interests of member states, especially when it comes to their domestic problems or legitimacy concerns. Söderbaum (2004b; 2004a; 2016) developed the concept of ‘regime-boosting’ – or ‘sovereignty-boosting’ – based on the African case to demonstrate that regional cooperation may be used to boost incumbent regimes rather than solve transnational problems. This is in a line with a tradition of scholars who have depicted African regional cooperation as primarily being a useful tool for incumbents and their individual ambitions (Clapham 1996; Herbst 2007). Indeed, Hentz and colleagues have used the notion of sovereignty-boosting, next to the notion of ‘responsibility to protect’, to study interventions by African IOs (Hentz, Söderbaum, and Tavares 2009). Recently, research on what has been dubbed ‘stabilization missions’, which are conducted by the AU and others, added to this theme (Dersso 2016; de Coning 2017; de Oliveira and Verhoeven 2018). Moe and Geis (2020, 389) describe such missions as “new opportunities for African actors to reclaim sovereignty” as these actors seek to support incumbent governments in establishing control over their own territory. Moreover, even scholars who do not depict the *raison d’être* of African cooperation as being to serve incumbent regimes often identify a reluctance to challenge member states, or invocations of national sovereignty norms to prevent undesired interference, as an obstacle to the pursuit of the AU’s intended organizational mission. Take the example of Burundi in 2015, in which the PSC authorized the peace operation MAPROBU to resolve the Burundian crisis (African Union 2015b). At this point, decision-makers were already being acutely aware of the Burundian government’s refusal to cooperate. This, then, turned into a situation in which, to borrow from McCormick (2016), “high-minded ideas about continental solutions ran headlong into the crude political realities of an institution that has long been accused of prioritizing the interests of member heads of state over all else” and the plan of deploying MAPROBU even without consent from the Burundian authorities was quickly discarded.

In conclusion, there is a clear lack of explicit theorization of AU interventions in literature. At the same time, the existing literature does provide useful markers for such theorization, as it developed frameworks that can be applied to interventions in conflicts and crises.

This thesis contributes to closing the theoretical gap around AU interventions by, first, developing a set of testable theory-driven expectations and, second, probing and testing their empirical validity. To this end, I specify two different logics of cooperation that can be identified in the existing literature on the APSA and the AU but often remain implicit, under-specified (especially in terms of causal effects) as well as isolated from each other. Moreover, accounts in the literature are not centered on how the different logics influence intervention decisions. A core purpose of this thesis is to bring these two logics together and theorize (and subsequently demonstrate) the effects their parallel presence has on the AU and its interventions. I draw on established IR literatures, one relating to the logic of problem-solving and one relating to the logic of regime-serving, to place the theoretical framework firmly within the broader debates on international cooperation. This opens the door for applying the theoretical framework beyond Africa, which is something that continues to be relatively rare when it comes to the Africa-focused literature.

1.5. Data and Methods

Finally, I turn to the issue of data and methods, and their relation to research design. This section serves to present how the thesis conducts its research on interventions and, wherever appropriate, highlight the contribution this makes to the existing literature. The overall thesis employs a large-N mixed-methods approach to studying AU interventions, at the macro-level, that has thus far not been used. This means that the thesis analyzes a large number of intervention cases using both qualitative and quantitative research methods. The idea that not only quantitative but also qualitative methods can be used to study a large number of cases is constitutive for the emerging approach called ‘Large-N Qualitative Analysis’, or LNQA, which refers to “either purely qualitative or multi-method designs that include a large number of case studies and even a consideration of all cases with a stipulated scope” (Goertz and

Haggard 2021, 2). While the thesis does not follow LNQA specifically (which would entail efforts to trace causality within cases), it does view the use of qualitative tools to study a large number of interventions not only as feasible but as beneficial when it comes to producing generalizable findings. The overall contribution the thesis seeks to make reaches from the collection to the analysis of data – topics which are not explicitly discussed in many of the pertinent studies.

1.5.1 Identifying AU Intervention Patterns

To start with, the thesis seeks to contribute to transparently and reliably identifying instances of institutional responses and, on this basis, interventions and finally intervention patterns. To this end, I created an original dataset.

Let me briefly clarify how the concepts of institutional responses and interventions relate. The Codebook defines institutional responses as the formal and public activation of relevant diplomatic tools. Each activation constitutes an institutional response that I code. When the AU, through its PSC, authorizes a peace operation, this is considered an individual institutional response. Similarly, when the AU imposes sanctions, it is coded as an individual institutional response. The same holds true for authorizing non-military missions, conducting mediation, undertaking field visits, expressing condemnation, and so on. Interventions, as I conceptualize them, can – and usually do – consist of multiple institutional responses. Let me offer an example. In 2010, the PSC reacted to the coup d'état in Niger by suspending the country's membership, condemning the coup, and demanding the return to constitutionality (African Union 2010b). Each of these reactions are separately coded as institutional responses but would not be considered separate interventions. Instead, the three institutional responses jointly comprise the AU's intervention in the 2010 Nigerien crisis. Hence, if we seek to define the 2010 AU intervention in Niger, we must look at the PSC's different institutional responses. In this sense, the institutional response is the unit of observation, whereas the intervention is the unit of analysis.

So as to not code everything as an institutional response, three criteria must be fulfilled. First, institutional responses require formal and public communication by the PSC. Hence, I use all publicly accessible communiqués and press statements issued by decision-making bodies of the PSC. Second, institutional responses must link to relevant diplomatic tools. Relevant are those diplomatic tools which plausibly require the use of resources ('substantive'), plausibly serve to exert pressure or reach into the domestic sphere of member states ('intrusive'), or both. Similar distinctions can be found in the literature on UNSC interventions (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1996; Binder 2015) and, through a deductive-inductive approach, this yields a list of coding categories (Table 1.2). Third, institutional responses require activation by the PSC. For a document passage to be coded as an institutional response, the PSC must take a decision or issue a request, which it expresses in different ways. Detailed information about the coding rules, procedure, and categories can be found in the designated Codebook (see Appendix A1, Part I). This way, researchers can understand the process and potentially use the Codebook to replicate the results, code future years for the PSC, or code statements of comparable bodies of other IOs.

Moreover, the disaggregated nature of institutional responses allows researchers to select and aggregate as needed for their research. For this thesis, I apply it in both interventions-focused articles. For the second article, this approach allowed me to identify the categories that fall under the chosen theme (i.e., being coercive), and subsequently filter for and distinguish between them. Thus, I was able to use the dataset to identify the broader coercive intervention patterns. For the third article, I was able to operationalize interventions in a way that suited the research interest and method (i.e., distinguish no, any and resource intervention for a given country-year) and use the institutional response dataset to determine the corresponding values for the variable. The flexibility of this approach for identifying and categorizing interventions means that researchers have very few limits when it comes to choosing how to operationalize interventions and aggregate the data, as well as which filters to apply, for their own research.

Thus, the approach to collecting data makes a clear contribution to the research on AU interventions. Due to the dominance of case studies (which require and produce expert

knowledge in very specific contexts) and the focus on specific plus prominent intervention types (whose identification usually does not require the extensive and systematic study of documents), a guide towards reliably and transparently identifying different types of institutional responses and, subsequently, interventions as well as broader intervention patterns is thus far lacking. The few – highly commendable – efforts to systematically map AU interventions (Herpolsheimer and Warnck 2020; Henneberg 2022a) have prioritized defining coding categories (i.e., which are the relevant intervention types) rather than defining coding rules (i.e., when is an intervention to be coded on the basis of a statement). This is understandable considering their combination of sources and categories but limits the coding scheme as intercoder-reliability can only be assumed for a fixed set of straightforward categories. Especially when analyzing public communiqués, however, language usually matters, and coding rules are therefore crucial for reliable and replicable in-depth coding. Moreover, these efforts rely on a closed (and less granular) list of categories that may lead to missing out on less prominent but nonetheless meaningfully substantive or intrusive (including coercive) responses to conflicts and crises.

Table 1.2. Overview of Institutional Response Coding Categories

11 Peace Operation	21 Fact-Finding Mission
12 Military Intervention	22 Election Observation Mission
13 Military Observer Mission	23 Human Rights Observer Mission
14 Other Military Mission	24 Other Observer/F-F. Mission
31 Technical Assistance Mission	41 Mediation Mission/Delegation
32 Technical/Needs Assessment Mission	42 Mediation Measures
33 Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Mission	43 Special Envoy/Office
34 Political/Visiting Mission	44 Follow-Up Delegation/Mechanism
51 Suspension	61 Condemnation
52 Targeted Sanctions	62 Behavioral Demand
53 Embargo	63 Discretionary Mandate
54 Prosecution	64 Terrorist Declaration
71 Formalized Third-Party Cooperation	
72 Road Map	
73 Authoritative Decision	
74 Other (Rest)	

1.5.2 Explaining AU Intervention Patterns

Besides identifying intervention patterns, this thesis also seeks to explain them. This necessitated certain research design choices which, I contend, add to the existing literature.

First, I opted for a hypotheses-driven research design. All three articles develop and subsequently either test or probe their empirical validity. This deviates from most of the existing studies on AU interventions, whose main purpose tends to lie in the provision of detailed explanations or exploratory overviews of specific cases, which can be used to evaluate and make policy-recommendations. Besides, this may also at least in part be attributed to a long-standing attitude among scholars specialized in one region to consider their case to be *sui generis* (Söderbaum 2016a, 69) and, consequently, to require original explanations (see also Bischoff, Aning, and Acharya 2016b, 1–2). Studying AU interventions largely in isolation with limited consideration for generalization and possible cross-fertilization, however, poses the risk that we miss connections not only across different AU interventions but also to broader IR debates or to other regions and IOs. As this thesis not only develops hypotheses based on theories that are not limited to Africa but also factors in the African context, it hopes to serve a dual purpose: better understanding AU interventions by learning from broader debates in IR and research on regionalism, on the one hand, and adding to those debates by applying and adapting them to the reality of the security cooperation in Africa, on the other hand.

Second, I opted for a large-N research design. Explaining the broader AU intervention patterns requires us to move beyond individual or even comparative case studies that dominate the literature. While smaller- and single-N studies are undoubtedly valuable for producing detailed case knowledge, the greater risk of selection bias is important to consider when it comes to making inferences about the AU's interventions in general. The second and third article of this thesis take a different approach. Article two studies the design and nature of coercive interventions by looking at the entire population of institutional responses between 2005 and 2021 that fall under one of three categories: military operations, sanctions, and forceful rhetoric. Article three focuses on the presence and absence of (any or strong) inter-

ventions across all 227 country-years for which a violent conflict³ was recorded in an AU member state. This approach circumvents concerns about selection bias beyond setting the basic parameters for case selection and allows for broader conclusions about AU interventions.

Third, I opted for a mixed-method approach. Large-N studies present opportunities and limitations when it comes to the choice of research methods. In particular, they provide an opportunity to use quantitative methods. The dominance of case studies is likely the reason why quantitative approaches have yet to take hold in the research on AU interventions. The third article uses a quantitative approach and methods of statistical analysis, which follows a path paved by research on UNSC interventions (e.g., Mullenbach 2005; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Binder and Golub 2020), and may serve to inspire future research to continue on this path also for research on the PSC. However, it is not only a quantitative approach that is thus far missing. Discussions about research design and methods in general are not common in the literature on AU interventions. Hence, open questions often remain concerning what and how data is collected, measured, analyzed, and interpreted as well as why the respective choices were made. While the third article uses a quantitative approach, the second article uses a qualitative approach and employs methods of content analysis while transparently presenting the sources as well as the coding process (see Appendix A1, Part II). Both articles directly focusing on AU interventions strive to walk the walk and address questions about research design, methods, and replicability head-on.

1.6 A Summary of the Articles

In this section, I briefly introduce and summarize the three main articles, describe their respective contribution to the overarching research question, and conclude with final remarks on the core argument of this thesis.

³ At least 25 battle-related deaths based on UCDP definition and data (Croicu and Sundberg 2016, 15), and excluding exclusively interstate conflicts.

1.6.1 Two Logics of Cooperation and the AU's Design and Practice

The first article deals with the two central logics of cooperation I identify in this thesis – problem-solving and regime-serving – and asks how they influence the AU's institutional design and practice. Due to its broader perspective, the article serves as a precursor to the subsequent articles that deal more directly with the topic of AU interventions. It argues that the two logics, despite sharing a rationalist core, differ in terms of three key aspects of cooperation: 1) the primary intended beneficiaries, 2) the problems to be solved, and 3) the role of national sovereignty. This, in turn, is hypothesized to have clear and observable implications for the institutional design and practice of IOs across three relevant institutional dimensions: input (how), output (what), and membership (who). Studying the case of the AU, I find that the two logics influence cooperation in parallel and are actively balanced, which is reflected in the AU's design and practice. By demonstrating the utility of the theoretical framework and its relevance for the AU case, this article provides strong justification for applying the framework to the study of AU interventions. Furthermore, the pointed presentation and analysis of the AU's institutional design and practice introduces the reader to the organization from the perspective of the two logics of cooperation, and thereby provides useful context information for the subsequent articles.

1.6.2 Towards a Theory of AU Interventions

The second article similarly deals with the two logics of cooperation – problem-solving and regime-serving – but adapts the framework specifically for the nature and design of interventions. It introduces the concept of *hybrid regionalism* in Africa, which recognizes the parallel presence and influence of the two logics, and asks how the hybrid nature of African regionalism impacts the AU's intervention practice. In the article, I formulate expectations concerning what the nature and design of interventions – their prevalence, context, and targets – should be if the parallel presence of two logics of cooperation indeed shapes them. To probe the empirical validity of the expectations derived from theory, I analyze all coercive

responses of the PSC between 2005 and 2021 by means of content analysis. The results demonstrate that the AU strives to prevent and manage crises through interventions but does so in ways that protect or promote incumbent regimes, either by producing direct benefits for them or, when their actions contribute to the crisis, by avoiding head-on confrontations. The results strongly support the theory. As the nature and design of interventions are key components of the broader intervention patterns, and the theoretical framework proves useful for explaining them, this article contributes to answering the overarching research question.

1.6.3 The AU PSC's Interventions in Violent Conflicts

The third article studies the subject of interventions from a different angle. Its purpose is to explain the presence and absence of interventions conducted by the PSC. Specifically, it asks which factors determine PSC interventions in violent conflict in AU member states. To this end, the article outlines hypotheses falling under one of two paradigms identified as relevant for explaining UNSC interventions – organizational mission and parochial interests – which closely relate to the two introduced logics. To test these hypotheses, I conduct an original large-N regression analysis of PSC (non-)interventions in African conflicts between 2005 and 2019 with the help of an original dataset. I find strong support for the notion that the PSC is driven by its organizational mission. Most notably, the PSC is more likely to intervene in conflicts that are intense or have strong regional implications. At the same time, the influence of PSC members and powerful states keeps certain conflicts off the agenda and thereby works as a constraining factor. Hence, both paradigms offer value when it comes to explaining the presence and absence of interventions. Understanding the circumstances increasing or decreasing the likelihood for an AU intervention in a member state conflict and offering an explanation as to why, as this article does, contributes to the overarching research goal of identifying and explaining the AU's broader intervention patterns.

1.6.4 Key Takeaways

Jointly, the articles support the central argument of this thesis: that the AU is driven by both a problem-solving and a regime-serving logic of cooperation, and that this has implications not only for the AU's design and practice but for the broader intervention patterns we observe. Throughout the articles, I find that a theoretical framework that considers and hypothesizes the influence of both logics in parallel proves valuable for trying to explain these patterns. While there does not appear to be a uniform way in which the AU deals with the challenge to successfully navigate the different drivers behind cooperation, the findings strongly support the idea that the AU does incorporate both logics in some capacity into its decision-making. This contributes not only to a better understanding of AU interventions but also has a chance to enrich other important debates, including the debates on African regionalism, comparative regionalism, and multilateral interventions.

2. Article One – Solving Community Problems or Serving Incumbent Regimes?

Two Logics of Cooperation and the African Union's Design and Practice

Abstract⁴

How do different logics of cooperation influence the design and practice of the African Union (AU)? Two dominant literatures on international cooperation coexist. Traditional International Relations (IR) scholars posit that cooperation among states is driven by the desire to solve transnational problems in the broader community's interest. This implies that governments are willing to cede some degree of sovereignty and control to an international organization (IO) in an effort to better manage problems resulting from interdependence. A more recent literature on regime-boosting and authoritarian regionalism, on the contrary, posits that cooperation primarily serves to strengthen domestic regimes and their survival, and protects regimes from a loss of sovereignty and control. As a result, the benefits expected from cooperation do not require governments to cede sovereignty and control to any meaningful degree. In this paper, I demonstrate empirically that the AU's design more closely reflects a problem-solving logic, whereas its practice continues to be more closely linked to a regime-serving logic. This constitutes one of potentially various ways of balancing different logics of cooperation. This observation has implications for theory-building. While it is important to understand how each logic of cooperation influences an IO's design and practice in an ideal-type scenario, it is equally important to acknowledge that they are not mutually exclusive with IOs choosing one or the other. Instead, their parallel existence compels IOs to actively balance both logics, which shapes their designs and practices. Hence, this paper not only pre-

⁴ I wish to acknowledge the contribution made by Swantje Schirmer who was instrumental in the development of the broader theoretical framework.

sents a novel perspective for studying and explaining the AU's design and practice but also holds promise when it comes to explaining variance across IOs more generally.

Keywords: African Union; international organizations; regime-serving; problem-solving; logics of cooperation

2.1 Introduction

How do different logics of cooperation influence the design and practice of the African Union (AU)? I identify two distinct logics of cooperation, both applicable to the regional level, as central to answering this question: a logic of problem-solving, and a logic of regime-serving. The problem-solving logic closely corresponds to the classic rationalist IR literature on international regimes (Keohane and Martin 1995; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001b; Abbott and Snidal 1998; Keohane 1984) which views IOs primarily as a means to solve collective action problems. The regime-serving logic, on its part, is reflected in more recent literatures on sovereignty-/regime-boosting (Söderbaum 2004b; 2004a; Taylor and Söderbaum 2016; Feraru 2018) and authoritarian regionalism (Vinokurov and Libman 2017; Obydenkova and Libman 2019a; 2019b; Debre 2022), which views IOs primarily as tools for governments of member states in pursuit of their parochial interests. This stark difference may be the reason why, to this date, the literatures around the two logics have hardly interacted and remain therefore largely isolated from each other. However, these two logics share a rationalist core. Classic rationalist theories postulate that “states use international institutions to further their own goals, and they design institutions accordingly” (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001b, 762). IOs are thus “the result of self-interested states interacting in a deliberative manner to solve specific problems” (Koremenos and Snidal 2003, 433). This also holds true for the regime-serving logic, which can be studied under the same rationalist umbrella (Debre 2022; see also Herbst 2007, 129–31). Both logics lead the charge to explain cooperation among states, share a rationalist core, and centrally deal with the same three dimensions of cooperation (i.e., beneficiaries, problems, sovereignty). This, I contend, renders using them in the same framework not only possible but indeed called for to explain the designs and practices

of IOs and their variance. While design refers to an IO's formal features such as rules, guidelines and structures, practice refers to the workings of the IO, how it operates and makes use of these features. In this paper, I argue that both logics of cooperation can operate in parallel and when this happens, it can be observed in the design and practices of IOs as the two logics are balanced. Subsequently, I demonstrate that the AU is a case that falls on the spectrum between these two logics on all relevant dimensions.

Hence, this paper makes two primary contributions: a theoretical one, and an empirical one. First, the paper presents and connects two important literatures on cooperation among states. By analyzing and juxtaposing the two pertinent logics of cooperation, I develop clear theoretical expectations for the design and practice elements of corresponding ideal-typical IOs. This is an important step because, as Parsons (2007, 15) puts it, “[e]ven – or rather especially – those who want to combine logics into complex arguments must break down their claims into comprehensible segments before building them back together.” The approach implies a series of hypotheses, namely that an IO exclusively driven by one logic is likely to feature those elements of design and practice associated with it in the presented framework. However, the main thesis of this paper is that the two logics of cooperation are not mutually exclusive and, resulting from the attempt to balance them, an IO driven by both logics at the same time will fall somewhere on the spectrum between the two extreme ends of the ideal types with respect to its design and practice. The important contribution here is the development of a framework that can be used to help identify and explain different set-ups and workings of IOs and, by implication, their notable empirical diversity (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001b, 761–62). Establishing the links between the two logics of cooperation, on the one hand, and design and practice, on the other hand, is a first and necessary step towards more comprehensive theorization. The focus on practice in addition to design further serves to connect the two logics, as the attempts to balance the two logics may lead to notable differences between design and practice and must therefore be part of any comprehensive theoretical framework. Moreover, this addresses critical voices in the literature who view the tendency to fixate on formal design of IOs without due regard for their behavior and practices as problematic and necessarily incomplete (see, for example, Stone 2013).

Second, the paper uses the parallel presence of two logics of cooperation to provide an explanation for the design and practice of today's AU. This constitutes a second step that provides us with information on how the two logics are balanced in the empirical world. The AU is an important case not only because it developed into an important regional-level IO. Its regional and historical context also suggests the relevance of these two logics, and its institutional transformation must be viewed against this background. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), the AU's direct predecessor, was established in 1963 amid the decolonization period in Africa by mostly nascent and weak states. Its Charter has been described as representing "the most clear cut possible victory for the principle of juridical sovereignty" (Clapham 1996, 110), and the OAU itself was commonly seen as a 'trade union of tyrants' (cf. van Walraven 2010, 47) that serves the interests of incumbent regimes. Over time, however, leaders realized the need to transform the OAU to better offer 'African solutions for African problems' (cf. Berhe 2017) and more effectively tackle the problems that threaten or impede, among others, development, security, and democracy (African Union 2000). Hence, the AU is selected as a most-likely case in order to probe the theoretical argument (cf. Levy 2008). Due to the parallel presence of both logics combined with recent institutional evolutions, we can expect to observe traces of both logics in the AU's design and practice. Moreover, the study of the AU also produces valuable case-specific knowledge. The chosen perspective has the potential to help researchers and policymakers understand why the current AU looks and acts the way it does and develop expectations accordingly. This also exposes as flawed the often implicit and at times explicit notion that cooperation (especially at the regional level) is simply dysfunctional or failing when it does not effectively produce collective goods for the public. This is because the different logics that may underpin IOs are important to recognize and consider when we evaluate whether and to which extent an IO delivers on its purpose(s).

Before proceeding, two clarifications are in order. First, this paper does not contest the value of alternative explanations derived from different theoretical perspectives or even different rationalist accounts. Instead, this paper seeks to complement and join existing research and approaches by linking two important literatures that stand to benefit from joint consideration to explain the designs and practices of IOs. Second, and directly following from

the recognition of the validity of alternative accounts, this paper does not make the claim to explain all elements of AU design and practice on its own. Instead, its purpose is to demonstrate that using this approach enhances our understanding of the AU's overall design and practice. The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I introduce the two different logics of cooperation – a logic of problem-solving and a logic of regime-serving – and outline how they differ along three central dimensions of cooperation, namely: 1) intended primary beneficiaries; 2) types of problems; and 3) role of national sovereignty. Next, I theorize their effects on the design and practice of IOs along three dimensions: input (related to how the IO takes decisions and sets up its institutions), output (related to what the IO produces through these decisions and institutions), and membership (related to who forms part of the IO). Finally, I analyze the case of the AU and demonstrate how the influence of both logics of cooperation is reflected in its design and practice as the AU is actively trying to balance them. I conclude with a summary of the findings and avenues for future research.

2.2 Two Logics of Cooperation

This section introduces the two logics of cooperation which, I argue, are central to understanding the AU's design and practice. The logics are important to understand why states choose to cooperate in the first place. When comparing IOs, why they were created and how they function, existing research has long built on one main logic for cooperation, which I refer to as the 'problem-solving logic'. This is the logic that underpins classic rational choice institutionalism that has crucially shaped IR literature on cooperation among states (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001a, 1056). Meanwhile, recent strands of literature that focus mostly on regional-level IOs build on a 'regime-serving logic' of cooperation (Taylor and Söderbaum 2016; Obydenkova and Libman 2019b; Debre 2022). The closely related and instructive concept of 'regime-boosting'⁵ was introduced by Söderbaum (2004b) for the African context,

⁵ I opted for the term 'regime-serving' instead of 'regime-boosting' for three reasons. First, I subsume under the former also literatures that do not explicitly use the concept of regime-boosting. Second, I consider it to be

but the underlying premise is similarly reflected in the broader literature on authoritarian regionalism (Vinokurov and Libman 2017; Obydenkova and Libman 2019a; 2019b; Debre 2022). Both logics, as conceptualized, share a rationalist core, emphasize the value of institutionalized cooperation, and can be applied to the regional level. The literature associated with the problem-solving logic unequivocally shares the view that states are self-interested and strategic utility-maximizers who cooperate when the benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs (Keohane 1982; Abbott and Snidal 1998). The literature associated with the regime-serving logic, meanwhile, is less explicit about it and does not fall squarely under the umbrella of rational choice institutionalism. However, these foundational rationalist assumptions equally apply and have at times been openly embraced (see Debre 2022, 491). The two logics, meanwhile, differ with respect to three key dimensions of cooperation. This, I argue, leads to diverging expectations for the design and practice of IOs. First, they assume different primary beneficiaries of cooperation (broader community versus incumbent regimes). Second, they emphasize different types of problems that cooperation is supposed to address (inter-/transnational versus domestic). Third, they diverge on how they view the role of national sovereignty in cooperation (input versus outcome). In the following, I present each logic of cooperation along these three dimensions and – to provide an idea as to when each logic is likely to be relevant – briefly outline the assumptions about states on which the respective literatures are built.

2.2.1 Problem-Solving Logic

The problem-solving logic, as defined in this paper, is grounded in three central assumptions that determine the expectations for the design and practice of IOs that are built on it.

indecorous to potentially stretch the concept beyond what those who introduced it are comfortable with, for instance by emphasizing the rationalist core. Third, in my conceptualization, the regime-serving logic is *also but not exclusively* about boosting incumbent regimes. Key under this logic is that cooperation is driven by the parochial interest of incumbent regimes which may, for example, already be the case when they are merely shielded from negative consequences rather than strengthened as indicated by the term ‘boosting’.

First, the problem-solving logic assumes that the community of states, including their broader publics, is the intended primary beneficiary of cooperation. It closely links to the idea of ‘collective goods’ (Abbott and Snidal 1998, 6). For a long time, rationalist IR theories took ‘state preferences’ for granted (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998, 674). States were assumed to pursue some form of ‘national’ interests in interactions with each other. Such theories, which treated states as black boxes and unitary actors, had to assume that the preferences of all states converge to a sufficient degree to explain cooperation. In a world of diverse states, this necessitated thinking in broad categories such as ‘security’ or ‘welfare’ that could reasonably be considered universal priorities among states and link to the notion of collective goods. Rationalist IR theories factoring in domestic-level factors tended to view state preferences as being shaped by “some subset of domestic society” and “societal pressures” (Moravcsik 1997, 518–19) and emphasize the importance of building “domestic coalitions” for foreign policy choices (Putnam 1988, 448). While this does not imply that states represent all domestic interest groups equally, nor that cooperative gains are distributed equally among them, this perspective overall elevates the importance of domestic constituencies well beyond those formally in power.⁶ Hence, it can be argued that under the problem-solving logic, states which strive to provide collective goods for their citizens enter cooperation arrangements to provide those goods that cannot be provided solely at the domestic level.⁷

Second, the problem-solving logic assumes that the types of problems to be addressed through institutionalized cooperation are primarily inter- or transnational in nature. Rational choice institutionalists, whose work is central to the problem-solving logic as conceptualized

⁶ Even though Moravcsik (1997, 518) explicitly acknowledges the “extreme hypothetical case” that a government may only represent “a narrow bureaucratic class or even a single tyrannical individual”, this is clearly not the primary point of departure for the domestic-rationalist foreign policy perspective.

⁷ Importantly, this logic does not preclude incumbent regimes from being beneficiaries, which may indeed drive cooperation. Instead, the problem-solving logic merely stipulates that those benefits would be indirect and tied to the successful provision of collective goods.

in this paper, “tend to see politics as a series of collective actions dilemmas” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 945) and the purpose of IOs, among other international regimes, lies in solving cooperation problems among states (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001a, 1051). Collective action problems are at the center of game-theoretic approaches which have dominated the rational choice literature. Game theory applies to situations with multiple self-interested and interdependent actors that lack complete control over the situation and are thus compelled to consider and anticipate the actions of other actors to make their own choices (cf. Bennett 1995, 20–21). In other words, the presence and actions of other states are the reason for, as well as the impediment to, cooperation or coordination. States are considered at least as central to the problem as they are considered central to the solution. This explains the focus on inter- and transnational rather than domestic problems. Especially transnational problems are intimately tied to the problem-solving logic, with the transnational nature of problems implying geographic proximity and defiance of artificial boundaries. Hence, it can be argued that states strive to overcome inter- and transnational problems through institutionalized cooperation under the problem-solving logic which consequently produces benefits for the community of states.

Third, the problem-solving logic assumes that national sovereignty is an input of cooperation. This means that national sovereignty is considered a means towards an end. Where national sovereignty stands in the way of cooperation and its benefits, states apply a rational cost-benefit analysis (Abbott and Snidal 1998, 5; see also Keohane 1984). This allows, at least in principle, for trading some of their national sovereignty and decision-making control in exchange for collective goods. Ceding sovereignty may even be considered “an *inevitable corollary*” of cooperation that results in the provision of such goods (Mcnamara and Meunier 2002, 851, my emphasis). National sovereignty becomes, so to speak, just another kind of resource that is traded when it maximizes utility. Importantly, none of this implies that states are enthusiastic about the idea of ceding sovereignty in the form of decision-making autonomy to IOs. As Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001b, 790) correctly point out, concern for sovereignty “limits the extent to which states will delegate strong coercive capacities to international organizations.” The literature linked to the problem-solving logic is, however, open

in principle to the idea that states may voluntarily allow IOs to infringe on their sovereignty to the extent that it is required to overcome important cooperation problems.

Finally, it is important to briefly elaborate on the notions of states associated with the problem-solving logic that help us understand when we can expect it to apply. One, the problem-solving logic tends to view states as inherently similar. The core of rational choice institutionalism, for instance, treats states as at least outwardly unitary actors with similar sets of preferences that allow for institutionalized cooperation. Two, the problem-solving logic operates under the idea of strong states. To be more precise, it presupposes functioning states that not only have the will but also the capabilities to look outward and credibly commit to solving inter- and transnational problems through institutionalized cooperation. Three, the problem-solving logic displays a 'liberal bias'. States that are – at least to some degree – pluralist, economically open and build on the rule of law, are not only associated with being better positioned to credibly commit to solving inter- and transnational problems, but also overrepresented in the empirical foundations of the rationalist literatures (i.e., focus on the US or US-led institutions, or on the European context). This, while usually not made explicit, is reflected in the corresponding theories. Lastly, the problem-solving logic also emphasizes the relevance of interdependence among states for cooperation. Jointly, these notions are important to understand when the problem-solving logic is more or less likely to apply.

2.2.2 Regime-Boosting Logic

Like the problem-solving logic, the regime-serving logic, as interpreted in this paper, is grounded in three central assumptions that determine the expectations for the design and practice of IOs that are built on it.

First, the regime-serving logic – as reflected in its name – assumes that the incumbent regime is the intended primary beneficiary of cooperation. This is a defining feature of the literature on regime-boosting and authoritarian regionalism. Besides benefitting the incumbent regime directly, cooperation may also be used to benefit a small domestic group that is key to the regime's power. This is decidedly distinct from the assumption that the com-

munity at large, including its citizens, is the primary beneficiary of cooperation. Debre (2022), distinguishing autocracies from democracies, makes this explicit by referring to the need to provide ‘club goods’ as opposed to ‘common goods’. Similarly, Feraru (2018, 102) points to the prioritization of regime security and notes that “regime survival imperatives sometimes clash with state and societal interests.” Söderbaum and Taylor (2016, 139), for the African context, comment that regional cooperation “may or may not promote the ‘interests’ of the citizenry and the broader public.” This statement is important. It clarifies that cooperation may still produce benefits for the broader public under the regime-serving logic, but that it is better understood as a byproduct of cooperation in the sense that the production of collective goods still hinges on regime interests and only occurs when the regime expects tangible benefits. Overall, this demonstrates that incumbent regimes under this logic enter into cooperative agreements primarily to serve and further their own parochial interests.

Second, the regime-serving logic assumes that the type of problem to be addressed through institutionalized cooperation are primary domestic in nature.⁸ While parts of the literature that closely link to problem-solving logic have recognized that cooperation among states may be used to solve domestic problems, this usually happens from a democratization perspective (see Voeten 2019, 150–51). Hence, it is a different point of departure compared to the literature on which the regime-serving logic builds. Here, cooperation is induced by the need and desire of incumbent regimes to enhance their (domestic) legitimacy; maintain or expand control over their national territories; or stifle internal and external challengers. In those contexts, regime survival builds less on the provision of collective goods and more on a fragile equilibrium between repression and the display of power paired with the provision of individual benefits for select groups considered vital to the regime (Wintrobe 1998; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). Regional-level IOs are viewed as being either created for the purpose of serving incumbent regimes (e.g., Libman and Obydenkova 2018b; Debre 2022), or exploited

⁸ Note that this does not imply that the problems addressed through cooperation are *only* domestic in nature, especially if external regime legitimacy – as opposed to domestic regime legitimacy – is considered a non-domestic problem.

to this end (e.g., Debre 2021; Agostinis and Closa 2022). As a result, these IOs are deputized to help solve domestic problems of regimes rather than inter- or transnational problems that affect various member states and their broader publics.

Third, the regime-serving logic assumes that national sovereignty is a desired outcome of cooperation. Instead of trading sovereignty for benefits from cooperation, states operating under a regime-serving logic consider sovereignty itself an end of cooperation that can thereby be protected or boosted. This holds especially true at the regional level. Söderbaum (2004a, 425) emphasizes that the belief “that regional integration requires a ceding of state sovereignty and national decisionmaking authority to supranational institutions” creates a false dichotomy. Meanwhile, Acharya (2016, 117) notes that “the foundational goal of most regional groups in the post-colonial non-Western world was autonomy, defined as the protection and preservation of state sovereignty” (see also Taylor and Söderbaum 2016, 5). Overall, the desire to ensure the upholding of sovereignty norms creates a situation in which states are incentivized to cooperate and create or join regional-level IOs but, at the same time, eschew enhanced cooperation and limit IO authority (cf. also Feraru 2018, 119). Accordingly, regional cooperation is evaluated based on its usefulness in the maintenance or expansion of national sovereignty primarily in the form of regime control and autonomy, and the IO becomes an agent of the incumbent regimes that operates to their benefit.

Finally, it is once again important to briefly elaborate on the kind of state the regime-serving logic presupposes. The literature on regime-serving revolves around cases which satisfy at least one of the two following criteria. One, the state in question is authoritarian in nature. This is the key point of departure for the literature on authoritarian regionalism, and it provides clear scope conditions. It is worth noting, however, that the degree of authoritarianism is usually left unspecified, and it is therefore possible and indeed plausible that the logic may be relevant for any authoritarian-leaning regime even when the states themselves are still widely classified as (flawed) democracies. Two, the state in question is weak. In line with the idea of sovereignty-boosting, state weakness relates to precarious empirical sovereignty. Governments in such states do not have full control over the entire territory or face serious challenges to it. Naturally, a state can be both authoritarian and weak. What connects

these two is that regimes are precarious and threatened in their survival, and that democratic pluralism is either weak or entirely absent. Once again, the regime-serving logic is more likely to apply to states that meet at least one of the two criteria even though it is not necessarily limited to such states.

2.3 IO Design and Practice

This section conceptualizes the design and practice of two ideal-typical regional-level IOs: one that is entirely driven by a problem-solving logic, and one that is entirely driven by a regime-serving logic (see Table 2.1). I opt for this approach because in order to understand the design and practice of an IO that is influenced by both logics, we must first understand what the design and practice would look like according to each logic. The paper argues that when both logics exist in parallel within or across member states, regional-level IOs – on which this section focuses – will attempt to balance them. This leads to outcomes in their designs and practices that lie somewhere on the spectrum between the two extreme ends. This calls on us to define these two ends, associated with the two logics, before we trace their impact empirically, evaluate how the IO in question balances them, and identify where it lies on the spectrum. The focus on practice in addition to design is important to understand the balancing of the two logics, as a central balancing strategy may be one in which design and practice diverge, that is, in which they fall into different places on the spectrum between the two logics.⁹

In the following, I outline the design and practice of regional-level IOs along three analytical dimensions. Each dimension relates to both design (i.e., the formal features) and practice (i.e., the actual workings). First, I look at *input*, which relates to decision-making processes

⁹ While there are several possible reasons for divergence, one possibility is to view it as a rational strategy to cope with competing expectations or influences. For instance, the design of an IO may resemble that associated with the problem-solving logic of cooperation, whereas the practice resembles that associated with the regime-serving logic (or at least does not reflect the problem-solving logic as strongly), and vice versa.

and institutional set-up, i.e., how the IO produces output. Second, I look at *output*, which relates to the products of cooperation, i.e., what the IO produces through its decision-making processes and institutional set-up. Third, I look at *membership*, which relates to the characteristics of members and their relationship with the IO, i.e., who the IO integrates and grooms as members. I opted for these three dimensions for two related reasons. For one, these dimensions cover the three remaining central questions of ‘how’, ‘what’, and ‘who’ around cooperation after the previous section dealt with the ‘why’ question. Additionally, the dimensions are sufficiently broad to capture a variety of implications. For instance, the ‘Rational Design’ project looked at five different dimensions in which IOs may vary. Those are: membership, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001b, 770–73). Considering that this paper not only considers design but also practice, it makes sense keep the number of dimensions reasonably low and ensure that they are relevant for both design and practice. Still, the dimensions of said project can be fitted under the three dimensions proposed in this paper. Membership is a dimension in both cases. Scope relates the output of IOs as understood in this paper. Centralization and control relate to the input dimension. Flexibility, on its part, can be subsumed under either the input or the output dimension depending on whether it affects the IO’s processes or its products. Hence, the three-dimensions approach is sufficiently comprehensive (insofar as it covers all relevant observable implications) as well as open (insofar as it allows for other observable implications to be added as needed), while also being meaningful and clear enough to allow for useful differentiation.

Table 2.1. Ideal-Typical IOs: Problem-Solving vs. Regime-Serving (Observable Implications)

Input (How?)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Delegation of authority to independent bodies • Pooling of sovereignty in decision-making (majority-based) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Centralization of authority in government-led organs • Protection of sovereignty in decision-making (unanimity-/consensus-based)
Output (What?)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Binding decisions, and extensive implementation and enforcement of common rules • Support around and focus on transnational issues across MS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-binding decisions, and limited implementation and enforcement of common rules • Support around and focus on domestic issues within MS
Membership (Who?)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Preference for exclusivity in the admission of MS • Promotion of homogeneity and convergence among MS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Preference for inclusivity in the admission of MS • Acceptance of heterogeneity and divergence among MS

2.3.1 Input

Input concerns the institutions and processes pertinent to making decisions and generating institutional output. For this, the concepts of pooling and delegation are key (Hooghe and Marks 2015). Pooling and delegation affect the extent to which IOs can exert authority independent of their member states, which varies depending on the logic of cooperation. Whereas the pooling of sovereignty describes the transfer of “states’ legal authority over internal and external affairs [...] to the Community as a whole, authorizing action through procedures not involving state vetoes” (Keohane 2002, 748), delegation refers to the “conditional grant of authority by member states to an independent body” (Hooghe and Marks 2015, 307).

Under the problem-solving logic, states are willing to transfer authority to institutional bodies to the extent that this facilitates the solving of transnational problems and provision of collective goods. This willingness of states which operate under a problem-solving logic

leads to comparatively high levels of pooling and delegation. Member states have two main options to empower IOs. They can transfer authority from the central government-controlled decision-making organ to independent institutional bodies (delegation) as well as transfer authority from individual member states to the collective by allowing for majority-voting rules (pooling). Meaningful levels of pooling and delegation allow for more output and efficiency in cooperation through reducing risks of institutional deadlocks and transaction costs. Lake (2007, 232), for instance, describes that though “states are compromising to some extent on their ideal policy” by pooling authority, they in turn “get a policy that actually ‘works’ and solves the problem before them”. Similarly, Hawkins et al. (2006, 16) suggest that delegation allows states “to control their [IO] agents but nonetheless collectively grant the IO a small amount of discretion so that it can more effectively provide public goods or, alternatively, police their individual contributions.” The institutional bodies to whom authority is delegated include parliaments, courts, and autonomous commissions. These bodies are strong and autonomous under the problem-solving logic and complement institutional decision-making processes. Jointly, they perform functions akin to the different branches of government (executive, legislative, and judiciary) even as their authority will be limited to the areas in which collective goods are sought to be produced. This serves to benefit from the modern state-like governance structures designed to ensure the reliable and efficient production of such goods.

IOs designed to serve incumbent regimes, in turn, are characterized by comparatively low degrees of pooling and delegation, with member states reluctant to cede control to institutional bodies. The importance attached to sovereignty and domestic control under the regime-serving logic prevents any regional set-up that poses a risk to unrestricted national autonomy (see, for example, Feraru 2018). Hence, the relevant tasks performed by the IO remain centralized under the control of national governments (absence of delegation) and all decisions are taken unanimously or consensually with veto powers reserved for each member state around any consequential decision (absence of pooling). The absence of meaningful delegation implies the absence of strong and autonomous institutional bodies that influence the decision-making processes. Strong bureaucracies with delegated authority

threaten to become influential actors in their own right (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). Such actors may be more beholden to the IO's formal – and often ambitious – mandate than the parochial sovereignty-protecting interests of the IO's member states. Organizational bodies with the potential to weaken the ultimate authority of leaders' summits, such as parliaments and courts, may exist for legitimation purposes (cf. Rocabert et al. 2019), but will not be endowed with the authority to function as a check on centralized leadership.

2.3.2 Output

Besides input in the form of institutions and processes around decision-making, I also argue that organizational output differs considerably depending on the underlying logic of cooperation. Output refers to the decisions, policies, and behavior of an IO that are the result of institutional processes. I also subsume their implementation and enforcement under this category.

Under the problem-solving logic, bindingness of decisions is required to ensure common standards and adherence to joint rules necessary to effectively solve transnational problems. Legalization, which entails legally binding obligations, serves to increase the credibility of commitments made by member states and reduce transaction costs (cf. Abbott and Snidal 2000). A key purpose lies in overcoming free-rider problems that stem from inconsistent implementation of decisions or regulations across member states. Especially when states cannot be excluded from the benefits produced through cooperation, IOs can be vehicles to alleviate problems of free-riding (Sandler 2006, 9–10). As the problem-solving logic seeks to address inter- and especially transnational problems, cooperation focuses on issues in areas such as trade, health, environmental sustainability, and transnational security which often defy artificial state boundaries. A desire to solve transnational problems and the participation of actors beyond the national leaders in the decision-making process already pushes member states to implement agreements, policies, and decisions without undue delays. Greater scrutiny, be it from the broader community and public that stands to benefit or regional control mechanisms such as courts and parliaments, may add to this push by rendering non-

implementation less attractive due to increased risk of exposure, which inflicts reputational costs. However, enforcement mechanisms in cases of non-compliance with policies and decisions exist as an additional safeguard and are actively used in practice when appropriate. Enforcement clauses may envision the imposition of sanctions or the exclusion from benefits.

Under the regime-serving logic, cooperation produces mostly non-binding decisions, or recommendations, for member states. The emphasis on national sovereignty means that regimes insist on full control over domestic policies, and the desire to solve domestic rather than transnational problem renders adherence to common standards and convergence of policies less relevant. Hence, the need to legalize cooperation is not present as incumbent regimes, being the primary beneficiaries of regional cooperation, stand to benefit first and foremost from public declarations and mutual support in areas of domestic concern (see, for instance, Libman and Obydenkova 2018a, 156–58). Those areas include national security, consolidation of power, and national sovereignty which may be threatened by domestic opponents or external actors and rally the IO. Other areas, such as economic integration which poses a threat to (neo)patrimonial regimes in particular, are less likely to be genuinely prioritized (Collins 2009). As member states view regional cooperation primarily as an opportunity for public legitimation and the provision of mutual support, the compliance with institutional rules, decisions and policies is comparatively low and implementation occurs slowly, spottily, or not at all. The meaningful action is the declaration, not the execution (see also Vinokurov and Libman 2017, 12–13). This relates to what Söderbaum (2011b, 61) called ‘summitry regionalism’, which emphasizes the publicity gained from summits over the substance of cooperation, and the common notion of IOs as ‘talking clubs’ (Vinokurov and Libman 2017, 23). Mechanisms to enforce regional policies and decisions are not only eschewed by member states who seek to retain full control but also not needed to fulfil the purpose of cooperation. As such, they either do not exist at all or, to the extent that they were created for the purpose of legitimation, do exist merely on paper without being used in practice.

2.3.3 Membership

Furthermore, we can expect different membership criteria and composition depending on the logic of cooperation. Membership refers to the criteria for admission to the IO, the tendencies as to which states become members, and the efforts of the IO to change its composition.

Regime-type homogeneity and convergence in membership is a distinct quest under the problem-solving logic. The legalization of cooperation presupposes certain levels of good governance and the rule of law at the member state level. Other basic features of a market economy are needed to benefit from economies of scale that frequently underpin cooperation. This is at the root of the ‘liberal bias’ that underlies classic integration theories (cf. Börzel and Risse 2019, 1232–34). This results in more selective membership criteria based on domestic systems and beyond geographical proximity for regional-level IOs. Consequently, IOs that maximize the provision of collective goods may be more exclusive and homogenous with respect to their domestic economic and political systems than IOs with other foci. Such IOs may also have fewer members all else being equal, although the respective geographical parameters will naturally still have an outsized impact on every regional-level IO. Beyond admission criteria, the preference for similar liberal (market) economies, shared legal frameworks, and democratic state structures means that IOs are bound to prioritize and push for further convergence among member states in terms of rules and mechanisms even after their admission. This means that the domestic sphere of a member state is decidedly not beyond the reach of IO policies.

When the regime-serving logic is the primary driver behind regional cooperation, homogeneity and convergence in terms of regime type and economic conditions become less important. Therefore, regional cooperation at least allows for hybridity and variance in regime types.¹⁰ This is because for the resolve to solve domestic problems to the benefit of

¹⁰ While the literature on authoritarian regionalism often refers to pertinent IOs as ‘Clubs of Autocrats’ (Debre 2022), the literature usually does not assume the IOs are only open to autocratic members (which is unrelated to the

incumbent regimes, the domestic structures and legal frameworks of cooperation partners are not relevant – if there is a mutual acceptance that cooperation must not encroach on the sovereign spheres of member states. To this end, a common culture and identity are beneficial to ensure this shared understanding and facilitate mutual legitimation, but otherwise domestic factors do not form part of the criteria catalogue. This makes IOs less exclusive and therefore potentially more heterogeneous and, all else being equal, larger in size. This is not accidental. Two of the primary purposes of IOs under the regime-serving logic are legitimation, on the one hand, and protection from external influences, on the other. Inclusive regional IOs that span an entire region may be seen as more legitimate due to their representativeness, and larger IOs may be better equipped to limit external influences by presenting a united front, invoking their legitimacy, and throwing around their diplomatic weight. This overall perspective is supported by Obydenkova's and Libman's (2019b, 62–64) analysis of non-democratic IOs which emphasizes the greater level of heterogeneity among member states with respect to regime type, culture and religion, and economic development, which has an effect on the size of the IO. Due to the emphasis on national sovereignty and a lack of need for regional cooperation, IOs under the regime-boosting logic do *not* reach into the domestic sphere of member states to push for convergence.

2.4 The Case of the African Union

This section illustrates empirically how the two distinct logics of cooperation shape the design and practice of the AU in terms of input, output, and membership. This serves to demonstrate the key argument of the paper, namely that the two logics can operate in parallel and when this happens, it can be observed in the design and practices of IOs as the logics are balanced. The AU is an appropriate case to this end as important conditions for each logic

assumption that the focus of such IOs makes them more *attractive* to autocracies). Indeed, parts of the literature are focused on how authoritarian regimes exploit IOs that include democratic members to advance their parochial interests (cf. Debre 2021; Agostinis and Closa 2022).

are present. This becomes clear when looking at the broader regional and historical context outlined in the next section, before I turn to the three dimensions of input, output, and membership.

2.4.1 Regional and Historical Context

The OAU, the AU's direct predecessor, was established in 1963 amid the decolonization period in Africa. While the continent-wide struggle for juridical sovereignty and independence continued, incumbent regimes in the newly independent African states sought to secure their fragile empirical statehood and solidify their rule domestically (Clapham 1996; Herbst 2007; van Walraven 2010). Hence, the prioritized problems are better characterized as domestic rather than transnational in nature. Unsurprisingly, the prevalent attitude at the time elevated the norms around national sovereignty, which underpinned interstate relations. This found expression in the preamble of the OAU Charter, which expressed determination “to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our states, and to fight against neocolonialism in all its forms” (Organization of African Unity 1963). For member states, the absence of established democratic structures in addition to people's limited reliance on government services alleviated pressure to prioritize the immediate provision of benefits for the broader public. These circumstances can be expected to facilitate a strong regime-serving focus of IO member states.

Over time, however, these circumstances changed. This includes both the internal state structures and the broader regional and international environment. State structures not only became increasingly established but a wave of democratization across the African continent in the 1990s meant that states increasingly, albeit unevenly, tapped into democratic norms and principles (cf. Taylor 2018). Constitutional turnover, as opposed to ‘leaders for life’ only threatened by military coups, became more common. Moreover, the transnational nature of many of Africa's problems became apparent. The identification of new security threats, negative externalities emanating from domestic crises and conflicts, and persistently high poverty rates were among the numerous challenges that called for regional solutions. At the

same time, the post-Cold War environment, in which Africa's strategic relevance waned, was characterized by the international community's neglect of Africa. Key shock-events such as the state collapse in Somalia in the early 1990s and the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 imprinted on the collective conscience of African states and made it clear that it was on them to provide 'African solutions to African problems' (Berhe 2017). This manifestation of a growing problem-solving logic in regional cooperation culminated in the institutional transformation that saw the AU replace the by then institutionally unfit for purpose OAU in 2002. Importantly, the AU continued to emphasize sovereignty norms and many regimes continued to have incentives to use the AU to solve domestic problems to their benefit. This led to the "strategic balancing between two main ideological paradigms: state-centric (or sovereignty-reinforcing); and supranational (or federalist) regionalism" (Fagbayibo 2018, 630).

Hence, the newly designed AU is to be understood as the result of a re-balancing of the two logics of cooperation, rather than an instance of replacement. This renders the AU a useful case study to observe how IOs (re-)balance the two logics over time and let both logics impact their design and practice in parallel. In other words, studying the AU provides us with a clearer picture of the parallel presence of the two logics and its implications for design and practice, and demonstrates why they should be studied not as distinct but rather intrinsically linked *empirical* phenomena.

2.4.2 Input

For most of its existence, the OAU was characterized by centralized decision-making processes in the hands of national leaders and comparatively low levels of pooling and delegation. Delegation and pooling have, however, increased over time and by now the AU ranks comparatively high in the world of IOs. The high degree of pooling, in particular, stands out for the modern AU (Hooghe et al. 2017). The supreme organ of the Union, the Assembly, may take substantial decisions by a two-thirds majority (Art. 7.1, Constitutive Act (CA)), as does the Executive Council (Art. 11.1, CA) (African Union 2000). The PSC, an organ with considerable authority in peace and security matters, consists of only 15 member states (Art. 5.1,

Protocol) and may also take decisions by a two-thirds majority (Art. 8.13, Protocol) (African Union 2002b). A member of the PSC that is party to a conflict or situation under consideration “shall not participate either in the discussion or the decision making process relating to that conflict or situation” (Art. 8.9, Protocol). Hence, member states do not hold formal veto power. At the same time, the formal decision-making procedure calls for decisions to be taken by consensus and envisages majority-voting rules only if consensus cannot be reached. It is, however, the institutional practice that best illustrates the balancing act. Despite formal provisions, majority-voting remains highly undesirable. Instead, the consensus norm is not only preferable, as stated in the treaties, but it is central, to the point that members of the PSC, for instance, “may exercise a kind of veto” (Sturman and Hayatou 2010, 67). Regarding the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the agreement explicitly envisions consensual decision-making by state representatives as a general principle (Art. 5(k), 10.2, 14.1) (African Union 2018b). To some extent, the decision-making practice clearly walks back from the exceptionally high degree of formal pooling.

Delegation to and the presence of independent and authoritative institutional bodies is ambivalent. On the face of it, the AU’s institutions and bodies constrain regime control and national sovereignty, including through the establishment of the African Court of Justice (and Human Rights) (ACJ / ACJHR), the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). Their authority, however, remains limited and “[i]n practise, the functional process of the AU has largely been intergovernmental” (Fagbayibo 2013, 414). In fact, the most recent protocols to create a parliament with greater legislative powers (in 2014) as well as a stronger regional court (in 2008) have still not entered into force due to a lack of ratifications. The AU Commission, on the other hand, plays an outsized role within the AU. Its resource advantages, even over intergovernmental bodies, render the AU Commission an important factor in, for example, peace and security affairs (cf. Hardt 2016). The AU Commission is independent enough to occasionally challenge member states by, for instance, demanding that “[w]e must overcome our fears, our national constraints, however legitimate they may be, and the barriers that may arise from overly restrictive interpretations of our sovereignty” (African Union 2018c).

Nonetheless, differences in attitudes and the reluctance of some member states to delegate additional authority became obvious when a proposal to transform the AU Commission into the AU Authority, a stronger body, entered the agenda. While the Assembly decided in 2009 to move along with this quest (African Union 2009), a document handed in by Namibia, and supported by other member states, in 2010 bemoaned the lack of implementation of this decision, and the desire of other members to re-negotiate the content, fearing consequences for the 'culture of consensus' and reputational costs for the AU (African Union 2011a). This document was taken up on the 17th Summit of the Assembly (African Union 2011b), in which it merely decided to defer any decision on that item to the 18th Summit where no decision was taken at all. To this day, the AU Commission has not been transformed into the AU Authority. This illustrates the war-of-tag between members who pursue different logics of cooperation, and the effect this can have on the design of an IO.

2.4.3 Output

The AU produces output in various forms, including regulations, directives, recommendations, declarations, resolutions, agreements, and actions. Adopted decisions are either applicable in all member states (for regulations) or binding on them in their objectives (for directives) (Rule 33, Rules of Procedure), and are 'automatically enforceable' thirty days after publication or as specified in the decision (Rule 34, Rules of Procedure) (African Union 2002a). Decisions of the PSC are also binding on member states (Art. 7.3, Protocol), as are decisions regarding the AfCFTA, consensually made by a Council of Ministers, for state parties to the agreement. The production of binding decisions remains, however, exclusively in the hands of state-led bodies for the time being.

The AU's output focuses on issues of mutual concern, including transnational security challenges, trade and economic integration, environmental protection, health, and international issues of concern to Africa. At the same time, the AU continues to be a staunch supporter of national sovereignty norms in their decisions and communications, and pushes back against external interference in member state affairs. This was the case against, for

instance, unilateral coercive measures by non-African actors (African Union 2018d), external interference through the supply of weapons (African Union 2019), and prosecutions conducted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) against African leaders (African Union 2017a). Importantly, some issues are relevant from the perspective of the problem-solving as well as the regime-serving logic. This includes the prevalence of unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs), the activities of transnational criminal and terrorist networks, and the prospect of state failure. Those are security challenges which pose a threat to both incumbent regimes and the broader community, and classify simultaneously as domestic as well as transnational problems. From the perspective of two logics of cooperation, it is therefore not a surprise that it is those areas in which the AU takes or authorizes some of its strongest measures (see article two of this thesis).

Compliance with decisions, rules, and policies of the AU and the execution of agreements is mixed among member states. Especially when they threaten to weaken control of member states, adopted Protocols take can take years to be ratified by enough member states to even enter into force. This is, for instance, the case for the 'Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights' (adopted in 2008 but ratified by only 8 member states) and the 'Protocol to the Constitutive Act of the African Union Relating to the Pan-African Parliament' (adopted in June 2014 but ratified by only 14 member states) as of February 2023. At the same time, the desire to improve trade relations among members has led to a quick ratification of the 'Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area', which was adopted in March 2018 and already entered into force in May 2019 with currently 54 (out of 55) signatures and 44 ratifications as of February 2023. Another example of ambivalence is the financing of the AU. For years, the AU struggled to raise enough funds from member states and heavily relied on external donors. Thus, it was agreed to institute a 0.2 percent Levy for eligible imports to secure the financing of the Union – which would limit decision-making autonomy of member states. Implementation, however, is still far from being completed (African Union 2020). Moreover, various norms touted by the AU's CA and additional Protocols – democracy, human rights, constitutionality, non-interference – continue to be violated by many member states with questionable – at best – efforts to remedy this.

The transformed AU can, at least on paper, rely on strong enforcement mechanisms. Failure to comply with the decisions and policies of the Union is subject to political and economic sanctions (Art. 23.2, CA). The lack of specificity grants the Assembly considerable discretion regarding the imposition of sanctions, but also makes it more difficult to reach consensus among member states. This differs starkly from highly specified framework on UCGs which clearly outlines the kind of sanctions to be imposed on perpetrators (Organization of African Unity 2000). The Assembly shall also “determine the appropriate sanctions to be imposed on any Member State that defaults in the payment in the following manner: denial of the right to speak at meetings, to vote, to present candidates for any position or post within the Union or to benefit from any activity or commitments, therefrom” (Art. 23.1, CA). The strongest enforcement authorization is provided through Article 4(h) of the CA which codifies “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” Intervention without host state consent, to which only two thirds of members must agree, is an unequivocal testament that regional cooperation not merely serves incumbent regimes and can instead be used as legitimation for military force to protect the broader public. Article 4(h) is complemented by Article 4(j), which grants member states the right to request intervention.

Importantly, however, the institutional practice is characterized by a reluctance to make use of enforcement mechanisms whenever they would target incumbent regimes. The AU has often been lenient with member states when it comes to being in arrears in payment, and opted for measures below the threshold of sanctions (African Union Board of External Editors 2018, 4) – even though it has recently paved the way for a stricter approach (African Union 2018a). As for the right to intervene in grave circumstances, AU members have been reluctant to even consider invoking the corresponding article (Porto and Engel 2010, 152–53). The one time when the PSC publicly pondered over recommending the use of such an intervention to the Assembly, it ended with a strong rejection of the idea and reaffirmed the primacy of national sovereignty norms when invoked by incumbent regimes (cf. McCormick 2016). At the same time, the AU has relied on clauses establishing its authority to intervene

upon request and conduct peace operations as it uses military force for the benefit of incumbent regimes (as demonstrated in the second article of the thesis). Moreover, the AU – through its PSC – has generally been quick to use sanctions in cases of military coups, not least as deterrence to protect other regimes in the region, while having a much spottier record when it comes to sanctions against incumbent regimes that use unconstitutional means to stay in power or otherwise subvert democratic principles (Nyinevi and Fosu 2023).

2.4.4 Membership

Today's AU is characterized by a diversity of regime types and political systems. It ranges from closed autocracies to full democracies, with most member states falling somewhere on the spectrum between these two extreme ends. Besides presidential and parliamentary republics, the AU also counts monarchies among its members and the prevalence of military coups since the establishment means that various governments have been on-and-off headed by military juntas. Moreover, economic conditions and priorities vary starkly among member states.

For the initial purposes of the OAU, these differences were secondary. The focus lied on ensuring full decolonization on the African continent and the independence of all African states, in addition to creating a regional environment that promoted respect for national sovereignty and the borders from the time of independence. To some extent, the differences were also not easily predictable as members joined as young states with fluid state and leadership structures. The OAU and its member states benefitted from being a large IO that could legitimately claim to represent the African continent and its newly independent states. Hence, Article IV of the OAU Charter stipulated that “[e]ach independent sovereign African State shall be entitled to become a Member of the Organization” (Organization of African Unity 1963). Therefore, the two only criteria were one of geography and one of independent statehood, the latter of which also excluded states under Apartheid rule from joining.

The CA of the AU was “open to signature, ratification and accession by the Member States of the OAU in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures” (Art. 27.1 of the

CA) (African Union 2000), and all OAU members became members of the newly formed AU. Geography continued to be the (now only) explicitly formulated admission criterion, with 'any African state' eligible to apply for membership. This is then put to a vote and decided by a simple majority of member states (Art. 29 of the CA). While the vote by simple majority takes away control from member states, this also demonstrates that membership access is not heavily controlled. Hence, it is obvious that the AU continued to pursue a path of unity and legitimate representation of the African continent even as this meant embracing the difficulty of balancing the interests within a large IO composed of heterogeneous members. To this end, the AU even re-admitted Morocco, a country that left the OAU in 1984 over the full admission of the Sahrawi Arab Republic and continues to have an unresolved territorial dispute with the member state, in 2017.

At the same time, the AU has departed from the OAU's rigid stance to not interfere in the domestic sphere of member states with the aim of achieving or preserving convergence at the systemic level (i.e., beyond policies). A key illustrative commitment in this regard is the collective agreement to not recognize regimes that have come into power through unconstitutional means. This regional policy stipulates that matters around domestic rule must be resolved in accordance with constitutionality principles or else the respective member state faces membership suspension and targeted sanctions for regime actors. More generally, the AU has committed itself to the promotion of democratic norms and principles within member states already in its founding document, the CA. To this end, the Assembly further adopted the 'African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance' (ACDEG) in 2007 which specifies in greater detail how member states shall set up their domestic systems (African Union 2007a). Moreover, the – voluntary – African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) has the mandate "to ensure that their [Participating States'] policies and practices conform to the agreed political, economic corporate governance and socio-economic values, codes and standards [...]" (African Union 2016, 7). While these efforts by the AU merely nudge rather than pressure member states into making changes to their domestic systems, it remains an important observation that the domestic realm of member states, even in sensitive governance areas and beyond regional policies, is not per se out of reach for the AU. Clearly, efforts

to achieve greater convergence among members are undertaken. This could, among other reasons, be aimed at improving conditions for deeper and more effective regional integration and cooperation that is closely linked to the problem-solving logic.

2.4.5 Summary

The case of the AU has demonstrated the balancing of the two logics of cooperation. The level of pooling and delegation, and the institutional set-up, resembles a design associated with the problem-solving logic much more closely than a design associated with the regime-serving logic. The AU is concerned with solving transnational problems and has the authority to exert pressure on incumbent regimes, including through enforcement, when it is deemed necessary to promote regional norms and policies. This includes those norms and policies that reach into the domestic sphere of member states, as exemplified by the promotion of democracy and constitutionality. At the same time, institutional practices continue to often reflect a regime-serving logic, and both protect and promote national sovereignty norms. Central decision-making processes continue to be exclusively in the hands of governments, and the emphasis on consensus largely protects incumbent regimes from undesired interference. Indeed, the AU's output is strongest where the two logics align. Regional norms and rules are inconsistently adhered to across member states. Due to Africa's history, the AU's membership is comparatively heterogenous with representativeness and legitimacy being given priority over the ability to effectively integrate. All this reflects an IO that was borne out of a regime-serving logic but, over time, transformed itself to better solve of transnational problems to the benefit of the broader community without completely changing its spots. The balancing of the two logics within the AU has led to a notable degree of divergence between design and practice. The AU's design resembles the expectations outlined under the problem-solving logic more closely than the expectations outlined under the regime-serving logic, albeit with notable restrictions rooted in Africa's history and the reluctance of leaders to relinquish control in various areas. At the same time, the practice is often highly reflective of the regime-serving logic and does not make full use of authoritative design elements that

facilitate the production of collective goods. However, the design of the AU renders it possible that, over time, it will continue to move closer towards the ‘problem-solving’ end of the spectrum without institutional transformation.

2.5 Conclusion

Different logics of cooperation lead to different designs and practices of IOs. This was the point of departure for this paper as it set out to explain how different logics of cooperation influence (regional-level) IOs such as AU. The paper argued that different logics of cooperation can operate in parallel and when this happens, it can be observed in the design and practices of IOs as the two logics are balanced.

To start with, I presented the two central rationalist logics of cooperation that exist on opposite ends of the spectrum: a logic of problem-solving, and a logic of regime-serving. The logics differ on three key dimensions of cooperation: the primary intended beneficiaries, the types of problems to be solved, and the role of national sovereignty. A problem-solving logic emphasizes the solving of transnational problems to the benefit of the community, including the broader public, and views sovereignty as a means to enhance the effectiveness of (regional) cooperation. A regime-serving logic of cooperation emphasizes the solving of domestic problems to the benefit of incumbent regimes, and views sovereignty as an outcome of – or, at least, a value to be protected through – such cooperation.

The prevalent logic, I postulate, can have a strong impact on the designs and practices of IOs. I structured the expected observable implications along three dimensions – input, output, and membership – for ideal-typical IOs that fully commit to one of the two logics. On the one hand, I theorized that an IO driven by a problem-solving logic will pool sovereignty and delegate authority to strong independent institutional bodies that are involved in the decision-making processes. The IO produces binding decisions in areas of inter- and transnational concern and ensures their enforcement. Furthermore, the IO requires a degree of homogeneity among members – which is reflected in its composition and commitment of member states to regional norms and compliance with regional decisions – and reaches into

the domestic spheres of member states to increase or maintain convergence. On the other hand, I theorized that an IO driven by a regime-serving logic will not meaningfully pool sovereignty or delegate authority and eschew setting up strong and independent institutional bodies. The IO produces non-binding decisions and produces most of its output with a view to solving domestic problems within member states. Enforcement mechanisms are irrelevant. Homogeneity among members is not paramount, and the IO is therefore open to a broad set of regional states and eschews unsolicited interference in domestic affairs of members.

In the final section, I looked at the case of the AU to empirically demonstrate the dealing with the parallel influence of two different logics of cooperation. The results suggest that the AU actively balances these two logics with respect to its design and practice. The AU is a most-likely case to demonstrate the constant balancing of the two logics. Originally closely aligned with the regime-serving logic, the AU transformed itself to incorporate the problem-solving logic to deal with transnational problems. The result is an IO whose design more closely corresponds to the expectations for the problem-solving logic with meaningful transfer of authority, efforts to address inter- and transnational problems, enforcement mechanisms, and a desire to achieve convergence among member states. At the same time, specific safeguards are in place to ensure that ultimate control remains in the hands of member state governments. Most importantly, the AU's practice often diverges from its strong design and indeed resembles more closely a logic of regime-serving. Incumbent regimes remain largely insulated from undesired interference, exert central control, and even provide mutual support around domestic problems. The fact that the AU lies on the spectrum between a strong problem-solving logic and a strong regime-serving logic is a testament to the influence of both logics and the balancing act that this induces.

This paper contributes to literature on cooperation among states, especially on the design and practice of IOs. It links to the literatures on problem-solving and regime-serving regionalism and advances them by theorizing and demonstrating the observable implications that follow from the underlying cooperation logics and how IOs, as illustrated by the AU, balance them. Moreover, it adds to the growing literature on Global South IOs by studying them from

a rational choice point of view. The extent to which the introduced framework helps to explain the design and practice of other IOs remains to be determined. This is a direct consequence of the most-likely case design. I believe that the application of the framework holds the most promise when the following three conditions are fulfilled. First, it is a regional-level rather than a global-level IO. The literature underlying the regime-serving logic is focused on the regional level, and it is unclear to which extent its assumptions apply to the global level. Moreover, the emphasis on interdependence under the problem-solving logic elevates the importance of geographical proximity. Second, the IO in question is general-purpose rather than task-specific. Scholars have demonstrated general-purpose and task-specific IOs to be demonstrably different (Lenz et al. 2014), and the presumed policy scope affects expectations regarding the IO's output. Finally, the IO exists in a context in which functional pressures for cooperation are present. IOs that exist in a context without such pressures must be assumed to be set up or managed in fundamentally different ways as the demand for and importance of effective cooperation is low.

Future research should prioritize IOs that fall within these scope conditions when applying and adapting the framework, before moving on to IOs outside of this scope. Moreover, researchers may want to investigate the underlying processes through which the logics of cooperation shape the design and practice of an IO. This will allow linking the present research more closely to adjacent research on, for instance, regional hegemons, critical junctures, and bureaucratic agency in IOs. Lastly, an important contribution to the literature would be the study of how states balance different impulses toward different logics of cooperation domestically, the conditions under which specific logics dominate – domestically and internationally –, and the factors that determine different forms of balancing at the IO level.

3. Article Two – Hybrid Regionalism in Africa

Towards a Theory of African Union Interventions

A version of this article¹¹ was published in *African and Asian Studies* 22 (1–2). Please cite as: Krösche, Niklas. 2023. “Hybrid Regionalism in Africa: Towards a Theory of African Union Interventions.” *African and Asian Studies* 22 (1–2): 39–62. <https://doi.org/10.1163/15692108-12341580>.

Abstract

Since its establishment, the African Union (AU) takes on an active role in regional security matters through different types of interventions. These interventions, however, remain undertheorized. This paper argues that African hybrid regionalism, which combines problem-solving and regime-serving logics of cooperation, shapes the AU’s intervention practice in specific ways. To this end, I first theorize how the parallel presence of these logics shapes AU interventions before probing the empirical validity by studying coercive interventions undertaken by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) between 2005 and 2021. For this purpose, I employ methods of content analysis to systematically code all publicly available meeting documents issued by the PSC. The results demonstrate that the AU strives to prevent and manage crises through interventions but does so in ways that protect or promote incumbent regimes, either by producing direct benefits for them or, when their actions contribute to the crisis, by avoiding head-on confrontations. This suggests careful balancing of the two main impetuses in African security regionalism, namely solving transnational problems and serving the interests of incumbents.

¹¹ The version presented in this thesis does *not* differ substantively from the published version. Merely some changes in the terminology were undertaken to promote consistency throughout this thesis.

Keywords: African Union, hybrid regionalism, problem-solving, regime-serving, interventions

3.1 Introduction

Cooperation among states is a key feature in contemporary international relations. Already in the 1990s, Hurrell (1995, 331) sought to explain what he called the “resurgence of regionalism in world politics.” According to Bach (2014, 183), regionalism refers to “cognitive or institutionalized (state-centric) projects.” States cooperate around these projects for various specific reasons, but I identify two central logics of cooperation. One strives to solve transnational problems for the broader community (‘problem-solving logic’), whereas the other strives to benefit incumbent regimes of member states and promote their claims to national sovereignty (‘regime-serving logic’). These two logics are distinct but not mutually exclusive. For instance, solving transnational problems for the collective good may indirectly help the incumbent regime, and deriving benefits for the incumbent regime may also produce certain collective goods. Nonetheless, they differ in their focus, and shape cooperation at the regional level in specific ways. In the African Union (AU), we find traces of both logics of cooperation. The result is what I call ‘hybrid regionalism’¹² in Africa.

On the one hand, African leaders replaced the defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU) with the rejuvenated AU to create an organization that was fit-for-purpose and able to provide ‘African solutions to African problems’ (Kufuor 2005; Berhe 2017). As a result, the AU became an international organization (IO) with a comparatively high degree of pooling and authority (cf. Hooghe et al. 2017). This was meant to usher an era of African leadership in dealing with African problems. Nowhere was this shift more apparent than in the peace and security realm. The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), which became fully operational in 2004, was established to stand at the center of the newly emergent African Peace and Security

¹² The concept of ‘hybrid regionalism’ is unrelated to its previous use to describe Asian regionalism (He 2012), where it appears to largely fall into the realm of geopolitics and not refer to different logics of cooperation.

Architecture (APSA). Akin to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the PSC is the body of a larger organization – the AU – that is specifically designed to deal with conflict and crisis situations. The PSC Protocol provides considerable discretion for the PSC to insert itself into any situation it deems relevant (see Article 7.1r) and decide on the appropriate action (see Article 9.1) (African Union 2002b). Meanwhile, a key paradigmatic shift towards conditional sovereignty was expressed in the AU's Constitutive Act (CA) (African Union 2000). Article 4(h) of the CA grants the AU the right to intervene “in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”¹³ – even without host state consent if necessary. This is the foremost expression of the widely acclaimed shift towards ‘non-indifference’ (cf. Williams 2007; Mwanasali 2008). All of this demonstrates the desire of member states to create an organ with unusual authority to deal with security problems in Africa.

On the other hand, African leaders continue to be concerned about national sovereignty and staying in control. Historically, defending sovereignty and related matters such as territorial integrity, independence, border maintenance and non-interference was at the very heart of the OAU, and its entire *raison d'être* arguably hinged on it (Clapham 1996, 114; Warner 2017, 168). Also, the OAU at the time of its existence was widely seen as “a trade union of African leaders” that served to provide mutual support (cf. Rembe 1991, 38). Hence, the question is warranted: ‘can the leopard change its spots?’ (Udombana 2002). The CA continues to codify the defense of “sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States” as one of the AU's objectives (Art. 3(b)) and leaders reaffirmed the “unconditional respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each of its Member States” as one of the fundamental objectives upon the 50th anniversary of the OAU (African Union 2013a). Even as the AU has become more authoritative, institutional processes continue to be largely inter-governmental (Fagbayibo 2013, 414). Despite formal majority-voting rules and pooled sovereignty, the PSC continues to operate under a consensual decision-making doctrine

¹³ Article 4(h) of the CA does not, however, define ‘war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’ any further, leaving it to the discretion of members to decide when to invoke the clause.

which allows governments to exercise “a kind of veto” (Sturman and Hayatou 2010, 67), and primacy continues to lie with the Assembly, which includes all members, when it comes to the most consequential decisions. These practices serve to protect incumbent regimes from institutional overreach. Incumbent regimes also stand to benefit from a supportive AU framework which includes the right to request AU military intervention under Article 4(j) of the CA. Moreover, the AU’s implementation of its policy against unconstitutional changes of governments (UCGs) “leaves it open to the criticism that it continues to protect incumbent governments” (Omorogbe 2011, 154). All of this illustrates the two different impulses that shape cooperation in the AU.

In this paper, I ask how the hybrid nature of African regionalism impacts the AU’s intervention practice. I contend that balancing problem-solving and regime-serving logics of cooperation, which characterizes African hybrid regionalism, not only has an impact on the structures and processes of the AU but also on its interventions. Specifically, this paper argues that the AU seeks to problem-solve by striving to prevent and manage conflicts and crises through interventions, but does so in ways that protect incumbent regimes, either by ensuring direct benefits for them or, when their actions contribute to the crisis, by avoiding head-on confrontations. The paper backs up this argument in two steps. First, I synthesize the literatures around the two logics of cooperation and, in doing so, develop clear theoretical expectations for the nature and design of AU interventions. Second, I probe the empirical validity of those expectations by using a new dataset. This dataset captures coercive diplomatic interventions, both military and non-military, conducted by the PSC between 2005 and 2021 based on the coding of primary documents. For each intervention, it contains information about the specific type, the proclaimed subject or trigger, and its declared target in addition to relevant context information. By developing a novel theoretical framework and using a new dataset to demonstrate its utility, this paper helps us better understand AU interventions, and thereby contributes to the broader literature on African International Relations (IR).

3.2 Theory

There are two central logics of cooperation among states, namely problem-solving and regime-serving. The first one is linked to rationalist and classic integration theories (Krasner 1983; Keohane 1984; Mattli 1999), and the second stems from arguments about the sovereignty- and regime-boosting functions of regionalism (Söderbaum 2004a; Vinokurov and Libman 2017; Debre 2021). I argue that both logics are relevant for explaining African security regionalism and the behavior of the AU. These two literatures, however, have not yet been sufficiently synthesized and are instead too often studied separately. The result is an artificial separation that risks missing out on understanding how both logics interact and coincide in real-world situations. This is particularly the case for African security regionalism and African IOs. In the next part, I present the two logics of cooperation. Subsequently, I synthesize both theoretical perspectives and develop theoretical expectations as to what this means for the nature and design of interventions by the AU.

3.2.1 Classic Rationalist and Integration Theories

Theories that seek to explain intergovernmental cooperation and organization have long been a mainstay in IR research. Classic rationalist theories are characterized by an understanding of international politics as being driven by states as rational decision-makers in pursuit of national self-interests in an anarchic international system. Rationalist theories have in common that they assume states to pursue some type of collective good, such as security or economic welfare (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998), and cooperate with each other if the expected utility outweighs the costs. Rationalist theories which emphasize absolute over relative gains view cooperation as a logical step to solve transnational problems that defy national boundaries (Keohane 1984; Abbott and Snidal 1998). To achieve effective cooperation under conditions of anarchy, states often institutionalize their cooperation by creating IOs. Abbott and Snidal (1998) argue that in addition to the functions performed by international regimes, IOs offer cooperative benefits by virtue of being more centralized and inde-

pendent. Thus, “states are able to achieve goals that they cannot accomplish on a decentralized basis” (1998, 29).

Classic integration theories, such as neofunctionalism (Haas 1977; Schmitter 2005) and intergovernmentalism (Hoffmann 1966; Moravcsik 1993), move down to the regional level and seek to explain regional integration. In line with rational institutionalist theories, these theories take interdependence as the impetus for states to integrate at the regional level even though they differ, most notably, in the actors they emphasize (cf. Börzel 2016). Despite these distinctive features, both theories draw from, and focus on, European integration. Integration theories typically view national sovereignty as a resource that states are prepared to cede, if not enthusiastically, for the actualization of mutual benefits. Moreover, they often imply pluralistic democratic states in and across which the formulation of national interests takes place in order to provide certain collective goods for the broader public. In this regard, classic integration theories imagine national interests and mutual benefits to be primarily economic in nature, and cooperation in matters of ‘high-politics’, such as security, is considered less likely or at least lagging economic cooperation. Especially outside of Europe, however, common security threats among states are salient. Nowadays, scholars with a functionalist perspective increasingly acknowledge that security interdependence may drive regionalism and “prompt states to create or resuscitate regional organizations” (Legrenzi and Lawson 2018, 692). According to this perspective, security is considered one of the salient functional demands that spur regionalism (Kacowicz and Press-Barnathan 2016; Börzel and Risse 2019). This functional demand is undoubtedly present in Africa.

3.2.2 Sovereignty-/Regime-Boosting Theories

Over time, the dominance of classic rationalist and integration theories became increasingly challenged. With the aim of understanding African security regionalism, the theoretical currents of sovereignty- and regime-boosting regionalism are of particular importance. These currents draw from experiences outside the European context. Thereby, they challenged common Eurocentric perceptions of regionalism and expanded our horizon with respect to

the reasons why states choose to pursue regionalism. Importantly, these conceptions of regionalism are neither inherently ‘irrational’, in the sense of actors not being strategic utility maximizers, nor are they necessarily driven by anything but ‘functional’ demands (see Stoddard 2015). Instead, they shift the reference point (in whose interests?) and expand on the purposes behind regionalism (to which ends?). While sovereignty-boosting and regime-boosting has been used interchangeably at times (see Söderbaum 2011a, 76), I argue that it makes sense to draw an analytical distinction (see also Vinokurov and Libman 2017, 22 for this distinction, albeit with a slightly different emphasis). Strictly speaking, sovereignty-boosting introduces a new purpose of regionalism, whereas regime-boosting – which is also the focus of the authoritarian regionalism literature – emphasizes a different beneficiary of regionalism. While there is undoubtedly a large intersection in practice, they are nonetheless conceptually distinct.

The term ‘sovereignty-boosting regionalism’ was first introduced by Söderbaum (2004a) as one of the modes of governance in Africa. He explicitly challenges the prevalent idea that states must choose between pursuing regional integration and keeping their national sovereignty intact (2004a, 425). Instead, national sovereignty is even introduced as a new purpose of regionalism. As Acharya (2016, 117) notes, “the foundational goal of most regional groups in the post-colonial non-Western world was autonomy, defined as the protection and preservation of state sovereignty.” Besides de jure sovereignty, the literature on weak postcolonial states emphasizes their quest for ‘empirical statehood’ (see Jackson and Rosberg 1982). While particularly relevant to the case of Africa, similar concerns about the empirical dimension of sovereignty can also be found in regions such as the Asia-Pacific (Narine 2004) and the Middle East (Barnett and Solingen 2007). I distinguish two central ways in which sovereignty is ‘boosted’. First, sovereignty-boosting regionalism typically entails the commitment to the norms of non-interference and territorial integrity among members and against external interference (*passive support*). Second, sovereignty-boosting regionalism may entail the commitment to provide support – military or otherwise (financial, logistical, rhetorical etc.) – to recognized national governments who seek to (re-)establish or maintain control over their own territory (*active support*). While both passive and active support likely have regime-

boosting effects, the prime concern under this logic is to protect the region from negative externalities and general instability that frequently emanate from fragile or weak states.

Regime-boosting regionalism, also coined by Söderbaum (2004b), denotes a type of regionalism that primarily serves the interests of incumbent regimes. This stands in contrast to classic IR and integration theories which presume the pursuit of broader ‘national’ interests. Thus, regime-boosting theories introduce a new reference point. Leading in this regard is the literature on authoritarian regionalism (Libman and Obydenkova 2018a; Obydenkova and Libman 2019a; Debre 2021). At its core stands the question why authoritarian regimes push for or partake in regionalist projects. Centrally, the authoritarian regionalism literature challenges the idea that (meaningful) regionalism is limited to regions with democratic and pluralistic states. Instead, the literature contends that regionalism is attractive to authoritarian regimes due to the benefits it produces for them. The impact of regional-level IOs may be either direct (‘autocracy promotion’) or indirect (‘autocracy diffusion’) (Obydenkova and Libman 2019a, 59; see also Libman 2015, 134–36). Importantly, regime-boosting as a phenomenon is not inherently limited to IOs composed solely of autocracies (cf. Stoddard 2017; Agostinis and Closa 2022). Indeed, the beneficiary must not be an authoritarian regime in the first place. In line with the logic behind sovereignty-boosting regionalism, governments in weak states as well as weak governments – irrespective of the level of democratization in the country – have an inherent incentive to use regional-level IOs to pursue their parochial interests (Taylor and Söderbaum 2016, 139–40). This is especially relevant under conditions of neopatrimonialism, in which political power and control over economic resources are intrinsically linked.

3.3 Towards a Synthesized Theory of Intervention

This section draws on the two outlined logics of cooperation and theorizes how their parallel presence impacts the nature and design of AU interventions. I define interventions broadly as diplomatic efforts, military and non-military, determined through formal resolutions and decisions to address a crisis or conflict involving at least one member state. I take off from the

observation that the AU's institutional design reflects a type of security regionalism that genuinely seeks to deal with security interdependence and regional instability, and to address transnational security problems. This roughly follows the ideas of classic rationalist and functionalist IR theories. However, theories around sovereignty- and regime-boosting flag the importance of two characteristics found in contemporary regionalism. First, boosting sovereignty can be a purpose of regionalism, and sovereignty is not merely a resource states trade to reap other (often economic) benefits of regional cooperation. Second, incumbent regimes are a key reference point, and boosting their rule may trump the pursuit of broader national interests in regional cooperation. This has implications for the behavior of the AU and the nature and design of its interventions, which has thus far not been properly theorized.

In the following, I outline three main theoretical expectations regarding AU interventions that we should observe in practice in the context of an African hybrid regionalism that continuously balances the two central logics of cooperation.¹⁴

First, regarding their 'prevalence', we should expect African hybrid regionalism to lead to (1) *frequent interventions* and (2) *the use of diverse diplomatic tools, including coercive ones*. Two distinct but interrelated sources contribute to this. On the one hand, there is African security regionalism. African IOs were transformed to be active managers of security matters on the continent. The comparatively high frequency of violent conflicts and the great diversity of security threats implies that numerous situations require the attention of the AU, among others, and spark regional reactions. This requires a certain degree of flexibility to make use of context-appropriate diplomatic tools. Different types of security threats call for different approaches to deal with them. To this end, the AU has modified its foundational treaties and claimed a key role in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and crises in Africa (African Union 2002b). First and foremost, this entailed the establishment of the PSC with considerable discretion to decide on when and how to intervene (Art. 7r, 9.1 of the PSC Protocol). On the other hand, African security regionalism is complemented

¹⁴ Note that this paper strictly eschews any judgement of the appropriateness of the practice, as it is solely interested in understanding and explaining the empirical phenomenon of interventions.

by a regime-boosting form of regionalism. This adds to the list of instances that draw in the AU, as even intrastate issues may be considered relevant. The partiality, in favor of the incumbent regime, also means that intervention types beyond mediation become increasingly relevant. This is because ‘antagonistic’ interventions enable the AU to act aggressively towards and exert pressure on challengers of incumbents. This differs from the dominant view within the OAU, held at least for the first decades, which was that “conflicts within States fell within the exclusive competence of the States concerned” as noted by former director of the OAU’s political affairs department, Sam Ibok (quoted in Powell 2005, 10) – not only when the incumbent regime committed atrocities and other violations of international norms, but also when the regime itself was threatened or overthrown by domestic opponents (cf. Udombana 2002, 1208–19; Ibrahim 2012, 37–41). The AU has demonstratively renounced this view. What is more, the threat that intrastate conflicts or crises spill over and produce regional instability is higher in weaker states (cf. Obamamoye 2019), often rendering regional and regime security two sides of the same coin.

Second, regarding the ‘context’, we should expect (1) *interventions to be triggered by a wide array of norm violations* and (2) *the strongest interventions to take place when problem-solving and regime-serving logics converge*. African security regionalism is broad in its scope, not least because conflicts and crises in Africa are notoriously prone to exceed state boundaries and become regionalized, which necessitates regional solutions and prompts regional responses (Keller 1997, 300; Söderbaum and Hettne 2010, 19). The African continent is also increasingly confronted with non-traditional security challenges such as failing states, terrorism and transnational crime which broadens the security agenda (cf. Emerson and Solomon 2018). Additionally, regional actors acknowledge the inherent link between security and the adherence to good governance norms such as democratic practices, the rule of law, and respect for human rights (see Art. 3f of the PSC Protocol). Hence, these issues require collective attention and likely become points of emphasis under problem-solving regionalism. At the same time, threats to incumbent regimes and their claims to sovereignty are relevant in accordance with a regime-serving logic of cooperation even if these threats remain rather localized within a country’s internationally recognized borders. This adds to the instances in which the AU feels

compelled to intervene, even though it is still incentivized to frame those interventions as responses to violations of widely accepted norms instead of blunt efforts to protect or otherwise benefit national leaders. The strongest and most coercive types of interventions are likely to take place when a regional security concern coincides with a challenge to an incumbent regime or their claims to juridical, or exercise of empirical, sovereignty as both logics of cooperation interact. This includes cases of armed rebellions, especially in weak states, and terrorist groups operating across borders. On the opposite end of the spectrum, interventions are likely to be weaker or not present at all when there is neither a transnational problem to solve (i.e., in primarily domestic contexts) nor a reason to support the incumbent regime (i.e., the regime is not threatened, and might even reject external involvement).

Third, regarding their ‘targets’, we should expect interventions to (1) *frequently target groups other than the incumbent regime*, and (2) *seldom openly target incumbent regimes*. The first part refers to coercive interventions being considerably more likely to exert targeted pressure on non-regime actors. This includes rebel groups and criminal or terrorist networks, operating nationally or transnationally, but potentially also external state and non-state actors. The actions of these actors challenge the incumbent regime’s claim to sovereignty or threaten its survival directly. Targeting these actors through interventions largely follows the regime-serving logic as boosting incumbent regimes often implies rallying against its challengers, rhetorically or otherwise. The second part is an expression of hybrid regionalism as it reflects both logics of cooperation. Violations of norms and threats to regional security may compel the AU to intervene, but the supportive environment for incumbent regimes renders a head-on challenge of the regime unlikely even when the regime contributes to those violations or threats. Such reluctance could be seen during the days of the OAU, in which incumbent regimes cooperated for their own benefit and refused to hold each other accountable for even the most egregious norm violations (Ibrahim 2012, 39). As a result, ambiguous target references, in which incumbents are not called out explicitly but potentially implied, are to be expected when such inherently contentious instances come up.

3.4 Empirics

This section serves to illustrate the empirical usefulness and validity of the above outlined theoretical expectations for the nature and design of interventions that come with the AU's hybrid regionalism.

3.4.1 Data and Method

To this end, I focus on the AU PSC's coercive interventions. Coercive interventions, as herein defined, seek to alter the behavior of targeted groups through the application of pressure or the use of force. The focus on coercive interventions is justified for two reasons. First, they constitute partial interference in an ongoing conflict. This makes them not only potentially more contentious and intrusive, but also requires the AU to take a clear stand and reveal its priorities. Second, legal provisions for coercive intervention types are part of what separates the AU from the OAU. The shift is exemplary for a new type of regionalism, one with a broader security mandate and the right to become involved in ostensibly domestic affairs, both as a possible check on regimes as well as a boost for their survival and exercise of sovereignty. I differentiate three broad categories, namely military operations, sanctions, and forceful rhetoric. These are the key diplomatic tools that are used to apply pressure on conflict actors. The PSC is chosen due to its primary agency in dealing with security matters on the continent, its high level of activity, and its broad mandate and authority.

This paper employs content analysis. Content analysis refers to “a systematic, replicable technique for compressing many words of text into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding” (Stemler 2000, 1). I identify instances of coercive diplomatic interventions with the help of a coding scheme that defines the activation of various diplomatic tools, including – from stronger to weaker – the authorization of military deployment; the imposition and threat of targeted sanctions, suspensions, embargos, and other punitive consequences; and instances of public condemnation, as well as behavioral demands directed at conflict parties. In an in-depth coding exercise, I applied this coding scheme and analyzed close to 1,000 Communiqués and Press Releases issued by the PSC between 2005 (its first full

operational year) and 2021. For each instance of coercive intervention, I coded its type, proclaimed subject or trigger, declared target, and additional context information such as the date, the affected countries, and normative justifications where provided. It bears mentioning that this approach only captures positive cases, that is, those in which an intervention takes place. Hence, this paper does not comprehensively analyze the conditions under which an intervention is more or less likely to take place. Instead, it derives insights from the positive cases to illustrate the influence the AU's hybrid regionalism has on its coercive interventions. This is done by looking at the prevalence, context, and targets of military operations, sanctions, and forceful rhetoric. The following section dives into the AU's coercive interventions and outlines the results of this analysis along the three main theoretical expectations.

3.4.2 Prevalence of Coercive Interventions

First, interventions were hypothesized to be frequent and use a diverse set of diplomatic tools under African hybrid regionalism due to the convergence of problem-solving and regime-serving logics of cooperation. I identify three overarching types of coercive interventions by IOs under which individual interventions can be subsumed. Those are military operations, sanctions, and forceful rhetoric. The AU and its PSC have provisions that allow for the use of various coercive intervention types. The AU has the authority to conduct peace and other military operations under Articles 4(h) and 4(j) of the CA, and Article 7.1c of the PSC Protocol. Regarding sanctions, Article 23.2 of the CA provides the AU with considerable discretion to impose sanctions for failure “to comply with the decisions and policies of the Union.” Through the PSC Protocol, the PSC is only explicitly tasked with imposing sanctions in cases of UCGs (Art. 7.1g) but does possess the discretion to “take initiatives and action it deems appropriate” in executing its mandate to prevent and resolve conflicts (Art. 9.1). Forceful rhetoric, as the third type, is not explicitly part of the mandate but practiced by many IOs around the globe (Squatrino, Lundgren, and Sommerer 2019). Importantly, the AU not only established frameworks that allow for various types of interventions but actively uses its coercive diplomatic tools.

The AU has conducted multiple peace operations, including most notably the missions in Somalia (AMISOM, 2007 to 2022), Sudan (AMIS, 2004 to 2007), the Central African Republic (MISCA/AFISM-CAR, 2013 to 2014) and Burundi (AMIB, 2003 to 2004). In the Comoros, the AU authorized a special military operation and deployment of security forces to the island of Anjouan. Moreover, the AU has undertaken a joint peace operation with the UN to Darfur (UNAMID) which replaced AMIS in 2007. Indeed, the AU has developed into a peace operations partner for the UN with an established division of labor (Williams and Boutellis 2014; de Coning 2017). Lastly, the AU has formally authorized or backed various peace operations by other African IOs as the *de jure* primary security IO on the continent, including an ECOWAS mission in Mali (AFISMA), an SADC mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), and an IGAD mission in Somalia (IGASOM). This is in addition to repeatedly authorizing cross-border military operations against the LRA in the Great Lakes region (RCI-LRA), Boko Haram in the Lake Chad basin (MNJTF), and violent extremists in the Sahel region (G5-Sahel Force). This level of involvement in multilateral military and peace operations is exceptionally high among regional-level IOs (for reference see, for instance, the MILINDA dataset by Jetschke and Schlipphak 2020).

Unlike some other IOs, the AU's treaties do envision the use of sanctions. The affirmative attitude can be traced back African historical experiences with apartheid (Hellquist 2014). In practice, the AU has suspended members and imposed sanctions against domestic groups on multiple occasions. I identified over 50 instances in which the PSC publicly imposed, extended, or strengthened sanctions – with each type of sanction counted separately – on 15 different member states across 31 country-years. Instances in which the PSC threatened imposition of sanctions, or unspecified punitive measures, are even more frequent. Moreover, the PSC occasionally calls on other actors – mostly the UNSC – to impose or consider imposing sanctions. This further underscores the AU's propensity to use or threaten coercive measures in reaction to perceived norm violations.

A recent study by Squatrito, Lundgren, and Sommerer (2019) analyzed condemnatory speech acts between 1980 and 2015 across 27 IOs. According to this study, the (O)AU ranks fourth in the use of condemnatory speech acts with a total of 63. However, this relatively high

ranking still underestimates the prevalence of naming and shaming in AU documents, as the study only looks at public documents from the AU Assembly and not from the more active PSC. Public condemnations are highly frequent in PSC communiqués. The PSC issued public condemnations more than 400 times between 2005 and 2021, or around 25 condemnations per year. Behavioral demands are less frequent but nonetheless common features in PSC communiqués with slightly over 150 instances. Consequently, forceful rhetoric is by far the most used coercive diplomatic tool of the PSC.

In summary, coercive interventions of various types are used frequently by the AU. This is in line with the corresponding expectation that the AU's form of hybrid regionalism incentivizes interventions due to being driven by two logics of cooperation. While the level of frequency and diversity in tools alone do not prove that these interventions are driven by the combination of the two logics that underpin the AU's hybrid regionalism, they provide a first hint to this end that justifies further inquiry.

3.4.3 Context of Coercive Interventions

Second, interventions were hypothesized to be a response to a wide array of norm violations and the strongest when problem-solving and regime-serving logics converge. The strongest coercive interventions that are at the AU's disposal are military operations, followed by sanctions and forceful rhetoric.

Military operations under AU leadership occur in some of the worst crises that destabilize the entire region. The conflicts in Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and the CAR, which triggered AU-led peace operations, are among those with the highest numbers of refugees since the AU came into being. At the same time, these countries tend to lack empirical sovereignty with a monopoly on the use of force across their territory. These armed conflicts usually challenge both statehood and incumbent regimes. For this reason, the concept of 'stabilization' has become a staple of AU peace operations (cf. Dersso 2016; de Coning 2017; Moe and Geis 2020). The fact that the AU intervenes in some of the most severe crises on the continent with a 'stabilization' mandate, which frequently includes the restoration of state authority in weaker

states (African Union 2007b; 2013c) or, as done in the case of Somalia, very open and explicit support for the incumbent regime (African Union 2013b), underscores that problem-solving and regime-serving logics operate hand in hand. Still, military operations conducted or authorized by the AU also regularly refer to widely accepted humanitarian norms and include mandates to protect civilians, promote human rights, or facilitate humanitarian relief. In one exceptional case, the AU approved military intervention to restore government authority in a conflict with limited negative externalities with reference to democratic norms (African Union 2007c). This mission was in support of the efforts of the central government of the Comoros to regain control over one of its islands, Anjouan, after the island's regional government declared independence. Regarding transnational conflicts driven by armed groups in the Sahel, the Lake Chad basin and the Great Lakes region, the AU continues to demonstrate its willingness to authorize military operations initiated and led by the incumbent regimes of the involved countries to deal with regional security threats (African Union 2011d; 2015a; 2017c).

The imposition of sanctions is more prevalent in cases of UCGs, especially around coups d'état. Various agreements and documents depict UCGs as a threat to regional security. The strict UCG policy itself has its roots in the 1990s, during which member states increasingly realized that prevalence of coups threatens peace and security in Africa (Organization of African Unity 2000). At the same time, the primary form of UCGs that is of concern to the AU are coups d'état which, by their very nature, threaten incumbent regimes. Even when the AU does not demand that an overthrown regime is reinstated, the strict UCG policy on coups d'état indirectly serves the broader community of incumbent regimes through desired deterrence effects. Typically, the AU seeks a return to what it calls 'constitutional order' when it imposes sanctions. This links back to the norms of constitutionality, democracy, good governance, and the rule of law that are enshrined, among others, in the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance (ACDEG) (African Union 2007a). Beyond this, sanctions and threats are only sporadically used in lower-intensity conflicts that threaten to (re-)ignite such as in Burundi in 2015 and Guinea Bissau in 2018. In this regard, it is common for the PSC to use the threat – and to a lesser extent imposition – of sanctions in the aftermath

of brokered transition, ceasefire, or other types of peace agreements to compel violators into compliance and avoid a resurgence of violence. Warnings of consequences are quite frequent in cases of attacks on civilians or human rights violations. Surprisingly, this is not the case when it comes to the imposition or threat of sanctions, where invocations of humanitarian norms are comparatively rare albeit not entirely absent.

Forceful rhetoric, as the lowest form of coercion, is used in a much broader range of contexts and not largely limited to UCGs or the most severe conflicts. This is unsurprising as it is a comparatively cheap diplomatic tool that can be quickly and effortlessly used to publicly position oneself in a conflict situation and respond to norm violations. The fact that public condemnations can be found in country-specific communiqués dealing with security issues in 29 different countries, or more than half of all AU member states, speaks to this idea as it suggests a great variety of contexts in which this comparatively less coercive tool is used. It is notable that violence against civilians, including attacks and human rights violations, is the most frequent action condemned by the PSC with more than 200 statements. This is followed by condemnations of attacks against the state, including government officials, security forces, and military or civilian infrastructure at around half that rate. Demands also often link to violence against different entities but are, in relative terms, more likely to demand adherence to agreements or constructive engagement with peace processes. Rejection of external interference is common albeit not dominant for either type of forceful rhetoric. Explicit reasons as to why condemned or rejected behavior is harmful vary from civilian suffering to the threat of conflict escalation, national and regional instability, and norm violations. Curiously, sovereignty infringement is rarely referenced as an explicit reason for this type of intervention.

In conclusion, the expectation that interventions are triggered by a wide array of norm violations holds true. At least in terms of public presentation, the AU has intervened due to violations of democratic and constitutionality principles, human rights violations and violence against civilians, violence against the state or international actors, breaches of agreements and external interference. It has also intervened in cases in which national or regional stability and the incumbent regime were threatened. Moreover, the findings support the expectation that the strongest measures – military operations – are more frequently present

in conflicts that combine regional security implications with threats to incumbent regimes and their claims to sovereignty. UCGs, for their part, constitute an obvious threat to incumbent regimes but are also perceived and framed as a regional security threat. Hence, the fact that most sanctions are imposed in this context also fits the hybrid regionalism paradigm. The observation that less coercive measures, in turn, are found in a broader variety of contexts only lends further credence to the idea that those crises which threaten regional security as well as incumbent regimes and their claims to sovereignty are most likely to unify member states and produce the strongest responses.

3.4.4 Targets of Coercive Interventions

Third, interventions were hypothesized to frequently target groups other than the incumbent regime, and seldom openly target incumbent regimes.

Regarding military operations, the AU operates with the consent of the host government. For this reason, they do not target the incumbent regime directly or even challenge it through other means. Article 4(h) of the CA, the only way to intervene without host state consent, has yet to be invoked. The PSC only threatened to recommend invoking Article 4(h) to the Assembly once, in the context of the Burundian crisis in 2015, which sparked bellicose rhetoric from the Burundian authorities in response and concerns among various member states, and ultimately saw the PSC walk back from its threat (cf. McCormick 2016). The Burundian case is exceptional and effectively ended with a strong affirmation of norms that protect incumbent regimes and their claims to sovereignty. Instead, AU military operations are commonly designed to target criminal and terrorist networks, and increasingly do so by name, and at times explicitly mandate their elimination or neutralization such as in the Sahel and the CAR (African Union 2014b; 2017c). Host states, and thereby incumbent regimes, also benefit from AU efforts to enhance the capabilities of national institutions and train national security forces (African Union 2007b; 2012; 2013c). As such, AU-led and AU-authorized military operations by and large target armed groups opposed to the incumbent regime or

established state structures, and benefit incumbent regimes through the efforts to enhance empirical statehood in the short and long term.

Similarly, the AU imposes or threatens sanctions directly against the recognized incumbent regime and its country only in extraordinary circumstances. In fact, the PSC itself has never explicitly imposed sanctions in this context, but merely supported targeted sanctions and an embargo against Eritrea in 2010 (African Union 2010a), and an embargo against Côte d'Ivoire in 2005 (African Union 2005b). In both cases, the PSC followed the lead of the UNSC. At the same time, sanctions are most frequently imposed on 'rogue' actors whose claim to government is not recognized in the region. This includes those that came into power through a coup, to which the PSC refers as 'de facto authorities', and their loyal security forces. Concerning armed groups, including rebels and terrorist networks, the PSC is more likely to threaten than impose sanctions, which can be explained by unofficial division of labor practices with the UNSC. This is notwithstanding the observation that most threats issued by the PSC lack specification and address all groups that engage in sanctionable behavior or blanketly refer to all parties to a conflict. This is especially the case when it comes to violations of negotiated peace or truce agreements and, to a lesser extent, violence against civilians.

A lack of specificity continues to be an important theme for forceful rhetoric, but the range of targets broadens. As is the case for other coercive means, incumbent regimes are rarely openly named as the targets of condemnations. For demands, however, there is a clear increase in the number of statements that can be identified as *also* being directed at the incumbent regime that is part of a conflict. This notwithstanding, condemnations that exclusively target armed groups, by name or generic reference, occur at a ratio of roughly 15 to 1 when compared to condemnations that explicitly and exclusively target incumbent regimes, including through references to parts of the government as well as generic references to the state. This lends further credence to the notion that government actors are comparatively insulated from public naming and shaming diplomacy. External actors are occasionally condemned for their actions. However, with just slightly more than one such condemnation per

year on average, this theme is perhaps less common than one might expect considering Africa's historical experiences with external interference.

Overall, it becomes strikingly obvious that incumbent regimes are almost fully insulated from being openly targeted through coercive interventions. They may, however, be implied in rhetoric that references 'all actors' and 'the conflict parties', especially when it comes to non-adherence of agreements or violence against civilians. This reflects a concern for the collective good that is not primarily driven by a regime-serving logic even though this logic constrains the public messaging around the misbehavior of regime actors. Conversely, opponents of incumbent regimes are regularly, strongly, and unequivocally targeted even as much of the less coercive rhetorical posturing remains vague or ambiguous. The findings are generally in line with the outlined expectation regarding the targets of interventions under African hybrid regionalism. It bears mentioning, however, that the AU does not target external state actors, or IOs, by name when criticizing external interference. Instead, the language used in communiqués remains either below the threshold for forceful rhetoric or, when such rhetoric is used, the targets remain vague with references to 'foreign elements' or 'non-African states'. This could hint at the AU's keenness on being on good terms with current or future regional, interregional, or global partners as it strives to solve Africa's problems.

3.5 Conclusion

This paper demonstrated how two different logics of cooperation among states, namely problem-solving and regime-serving, influence African security regionalism. I argued that both logics provide important impetuses and, as a result, the AU developed a form of hybrid regionalism. This hybrid regionalism has implications for the AU's conflict and crisis interventions through its PSC. The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, I developed a set of theoretical expectations about the nature and design of AU interventions. This presents a first step towards a theory of interventions under African hybrid regionalism. Second, I probed the empirical validity of these expectations by analyzing the coercive diplomacy

undertaken by the PSC using a new dataset. Taken together, this paper contributes to our understanding of interventions in Africa, and thereby to the literature on African IR.

The results show that the AU is an active intervener that uses coercive means to address security crises and challenges of regional concern, including threats to incumbent regimes and their claims to sovereignty. To this end, it uses a variety of coercive diplomatic tools, including military operations, sanctions, and forceful rhetoric. In line with expectations, the strongest interventions tend to take place when both regional and regime security are threatened, and the two central logics of cooperation coalesce. Moreover, the empirical results support the theoretical expectation that interventions seldom openly target incumbent regimes. While the desire to solve transnational problems means that the AU does intervene in matters that involve the government of the targeted state, it is cautious with respect to the incumbent regime and largely refrains from head-on challenges. Instead, challengers to the incumbent regimes are considerably more likely to be on the receiving end of AU pressure. All of this suggests a careful balancing of the two main impetuses in African security regionalism, namely solving transnational problems and serving the parochial interests of incumbents.

Future research may draw on those insights and test to which extent the theoretical framework and the concept of hybrid regionalism travels to other African IOs, different policy areas, and other world regions. Moreover, future research should look at the impact these interventions have in order to assess the extent to which the two logics of cooperation not only influence intervention decisions but also impact Africa's political landscape as a result. Effective hybrid regionalism would imply that interventions not only attempt but indeed succeed at simultaneously serving the interests of incumbent regimes as well as solving transnational security problems.

4. Article Three – Led by the Organizational Mission or Parochial Interests?

The African Union Peace and Security Council's Interventions in Violent Conflicts

Abstract

The African Union's (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) has unquestionably established itself as a central actor in matters of continental security with an extensive diplomatic toolbox to deal with conflict on the continent. However, not every conflict elicits the same kind of response or, in fact, any response at all. This paper seeks to better understand the factors that determine whether the PSC intervenes in a violent conflict in an AU member state. To this end, I juxtapose its organizational mission and the parochial interests of its members as drivers behind interventions. The paper tests the ensuing hypotheses using binary logistic regression on an original dataset that includes all instances of violent conflict in Africa and corresponding PSC interventions between 2005 and 2019. I find strong support for the notion that the PSC is driven by its organizational mission. Most notably, the PSC is more likely to intervene in conflicts that are intense or have strong regional implications. At the same time, the influence of PSC members and powerful states keeps certain conflicts off the agenda and thereby works as a constraining factor.

Keywords: Peace and Security Council, Conflict Interventions, Parochial Interests, Organizational Mission, Logistic Regression

4.1 Introduction

In 2002, the defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU) was transformed into the rejuvenated and more authoritative African Union (AU). This ushered a new era of African security regionalism that emphasizes African agency and the mantra 'African solutions to African

problems' not least due to the perceived disinterest on the part of the international community (Berhe 2017). The new era is one characterized by frequent conflict interventions. The AU decides on its interventions primarily through the Peace and Security Council (PSC), a permanent organ of the AU that consists of 15 periodically elected members. Indeed, the PSC takes on a very active role and has been aptly described as 'interventionist' (Murithi 2012, 87). It uses a variety of intervention types ranging from peace operations to non-military interventions such as sanctions, mediation, observer missions, forceful rhetoric, and institution-building. Yet, the drivers behind PSC interventions remain acutely understudied compared to those of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

This is somewhat surprising. Regional arrangements as referenced in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter have become increasingly important in dealing with threats to international peace and security, especially as it concerns Africa (Boulden 2013). As the continent where violent conflict is most prevalent, Africa warrants special attention. At the institutional level, the AU – through its PSC – has not only been exceptionally active and vested with considerable authority when it comes to conflict interventions, but also developed into a key cooperation partner for the UNSC. Considering the prevalence of conflicts and interventions in Africa and the prominent role of African international organizations (IOs) in the maintenance of international peace and security, it is important to understand what drives conflict interventions by Africa's premiere IO. With this paper, I seek to narrow the existing research gap. To this end, I ask which factors determine PSC interventions in violent conflicts in AU member states. While the question of effectiveness regarding interventions is usually given primacy, it is essential to identify the conditions under which interventions occur before we can properly evaluate the overall effectiveness of an IO's intervention practice (cf. Beardsley and Schmidt 2012, 35).

Specifically, this paper studies whether PSC interventions are driven by its organizational mission or the parochial interests of its members. This theoretical distinction is commonly found in studies on interventions conducted by the UNSC (cf. Neack 1995; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Binder and Golub 2020). It is relevant across all institutions where states wield power but requires adaptation to the African context. In this sense, the paper shares the views

expressed by Bischoff, Aning and Acharya (2016a, 5) about “the need for eschewing African exceptionalism” while still ensuring that African agency and its context are properly taken into account. This cross-fertilization ensures that the paper contributes to better understanding African multilateral interventions without being isolated from the broader debate on multilateral interventions. Empirically, the paper makes a valuable contribution to the AU interventions literature with its original large-N analysis of PSC (non-)interventions in African conflicts. To this end, it draws on a novel dataset that captures whether and how the PSC responded to violent conflicts in its member states between 2005 and 2019. The dataset captures the information contained in the more than 800 primary documents (communiqués and press releases) publicly issued by the PSC during these years which form the foundation of the comprehensive coding project. Beyond its empirical value, this research contributes to theory-building by helping scholars to develop or adapt expectations regarding interventions conducted by the AU and, potentially, other IOs and thereby facilitate and refine the theorization of conflict interventions.

The paper is structured as follows. First, I outline relevant prior research and identify remaining gaps. Then, I briefly introduce the PSC. Next, I develop a set of hypotheses explaining the drivers behind the presence or absence of PSC conflict interventions. These hypotheses, subsumed under the two broader paradigms ‘organizational mission’ and ‘parochial interests’, are subsequently tested in binary logistic regression analyses and the results interpreted. Finally, I close with concluding remarks.

4.2 Prior Research

Existing literature relating to security regionalism in Africa has grown increasingly diverse. Still, Herpolsheimer (2021, 2) correctly observes that “both empirically and theoretically, few scholars have focused on what African ROs actually do or how they do it.”

While researchers have not eschewed the study of AU interventions, notable gaps remain. Two key tendencies exist hitherto in the study of AU interventions. First, regional interventions are studied rather selectively. On the one hand, this is evident by the dominance of case

studies, especially on the most high-profile interventions (Murithi 2008; Williams 2009a; Aning and Edu-Afful 2016; Wilén and Williams 2018). On the other hand, this is reflected in the focus on specific types of interventions (for recent exceptions, see Herpolsheimer 2021; Henneberg 2022b). This concerns in particular peace operations (Dersso 2016; de Coning 2017; de Oliveira and Verhoeven 2018), but also sanctions (Omorogbe 2011; Charron 2013; Charron and Portela 2015) and, albeit less frequently, mediation (Engel 2012; Nathan 2017).

Second, there is a strong tendency in most studies to focus on the effectiveness of regional interventions. This is often accompanied by a tendency to ‘prescribe’ and provide policy recommendations. This is best illustrated by the number of detail-oriented and more ‘policy-driven’ reports such as the ‘APSA Impact Report’ (GIZ 2016; IPSS 2017; 2019), the ‘Annual Review of the (African Union) Peace and Security Council’ (Dersso 2013; 2014) and the ‘Peace and Security Council Report’ series (ISS n.d.). A study by Desmidt and Hauck (2017) on the management of violent conflict within the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) between 2013 and 2015 addresses questions of motivations and predictors of interventions more directly. Still, it remains at the level of correlations, forwards rather ‘ad-hoc’ explanations, is limited to a comparatively short period of time.

For systematic analyses of drivers and predictors of interventions in conflicts, we must turn to the UNSC. Peacekeeping missions have received particular attention (Neack 1995; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Mullenbach 2005). While participation in peacekeeping missions may often be based on self-interests (cf. Neack 1995), the findings indicate that whether such missions are deployed is determined by a variety of factors including conflict deaths, state power, and regional biases. Other studies have focused on agenda-setting (Iwanami 2011; Frederking and Patane 2017; Binder and Golub 2020). Relevant determinants include refugees and other measures of conflict severity, but also the parochial or strategic interests especially of the UNSC’s permanent members. Most studies tend to focus on a particular type of diplomatic intervention with few but important exceptions. For instance, Binder (2015), looking at humanitarian crises, and Beardsley and Schmidt (2012), looking at interstate conflicts, consider various diplomatic tools ranked on an ordinal scale. Duque, Jetter, and Sosa (2015) primarily focus on UN military interventions but compare those results to interventions with

lower resource commitments. The results of these studies provide additional support for the idea that a mix of factors related to the UNSC's organizational mission, the parochial interests of its members, and the power or influence of the conflict state explain (non-)interventions.

Thus far missing is a comprehensive quantitative analysis of conflict interventions that focuses on the AU and Africa, is not restricted to a particular type of diplomatic tool, and – most crucially – studies determinants for interventions instead of fronting the questions of effectiveness or appropriateness. This is precisely what this paper offers. Thereby, it enables the further development of a theoretical framework around AU interventions. It is, I argue, more important than ever to understand what drives AU conflict management actions and what can be expected of the organization going forward. After all, African security challenges are manifold, and the AU clearly assumes a central role in dealing with them. Furthermore, it has been rightfully argued that “any valid analysis of the effectiveness of third-party conflict management efforts necessitates a thorough understanding of the conditions under which intervention occurs” (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012, 35; see also Mullenbach 2005, 530).

4.3 The AU Peace and Security Council

At the center of the APSA stands the PSC. The PSC was established by the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the PSC ('PSC Protocol') (African Union 2002b) and launched in 2004. It consists of 15 elected members (Article 5.1) with a fixed regional representation formula (Art. 5.2). The Assembly of Heads of State and Government ('Assembly') is called upon to select prospective PSC members based on, among other criteria, their contributions to peace and security, capacity to shoulder responsibilities, as well as respect for constitutional governance, the rule of law, and human rights (Art. 5.2). A total of 42 different states have been a member of the PSC for at least one year between 2005 and 2019, which demonstrates its diversity and suggests that equity and rotation principles trump stricter adherence to the formal selection criteria. The PSC meets at least once per year each at the level of Heads of State and Government and at the ministerial level. Meetings of the permanent representatives take place as often as necessary but at least twice a month (Art. 8.2).

Unlike the UNSC, the PSC does not have any permanent members.¹⁵ Members also do not hold veto power. At the same time, an emphasis on consensus in decision-making processes means that members may exercise “a kind of veto” (Sturman and Hayatou 2010, 67). Formally, a member which “is party to a conflict or a situation under consideration” by the PSC may not be part of the discussion or decision-making process, although it may be invited to present its case (Art. 8.9). Informal influence, however, cannot be ruled out. For instance, while any item may be placed on the (provisional) agenda (Art. 8.7), member states have at times successfully prevented their conflicts from being placed on the agenda (for an example, see Williams 2012, 13).

Apart from military interventions without host state consent in grave circumstances as well as upon request from a member state, which require approval from the Assembly, the PSC is the ultimate continental authority¹⁶ in matters of peace and security. The PSC is crucially supported by the active and influential AU Commission (Hardt 2016), the PSC’s agent. Through the PSC Protocol, the PSC is tasked with roles in the areas of conflict prevention, conflict management, post-conflict reconstruction, and security cooperation (Art. 2). Its powers and tasks include, among others, authorizing peace support missions, imposing sanctions in cases of unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs), ensuring the implementation of relevant treaties and conventions, promoting interorganizational cooperation, and supporting humanitarian action (Art. 7). It plays a role throughout all stages of violent conflict, namely conflict prevention through early warning and preventive diplomacy (Art. 6b); peace-making through, for instance, the use of good offices and mediation (Art. 6c); as well as peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction (Art. 6e).

¹⁵ However, any member is eligible for immediate re-election. Nonetheless, the only country that has been a member of the PSC every year since its establishment is Nigeria.

¹⁶ In other words, this excludes the UNSC which remains the ultimate authority in matters of international peace and security. Still, the PSC has gained a status that even the UNSC will no longer authorize subregional mechanisms to conduct peace operations without its consent (de Coning, Gelot, and Karlsrud 2015, 16–17).

The PSC Protocol provides considerable discretion for the PSC to insert itself into any situation it deems relevant. Akin to the UNSC, which possesses the discretion to determine and act on any issue it deems a threat to international peace and security (cf. Yamashita 2007), the PSC has discretion to make decisions on any issue it deems relevant for regional security (see Article 7r). Discretion with respect to the means is added through Article 9.1, which establishes that the PSC “shall take initiatives and action it deems appropriate with regard to situations of potential conflict, as well as to those that have already developed into full-blown conflicts.”

In practice, the PSC authorizes military missions, including peace operations, as well as various non-military missions such as electoral observation, fact-finding, and human rights observer missions. It also undertakes its own field visits. Furthermore, the PSC conducts or requests mediation, including through the dispatch of mediation delegations, the use of special envoys or liaison offices, and the establishment of follow-up mechanisms. Common sanctions imposed by the PSC include suspension of membership and targeted sanctions against individuals or groups. The PSC also uses the threat of sanctions as well as other types of forceful rhetoric, such as public condemnation and demands, in its diplomatic practice. Lastly, institution-building around conflicts, often in coordination and cooperation with international actors, include creating and using international fora, but also creating and lobbying for road maps to solve a particular conflict.

4.4 Theories and Hypotheses

This paper follows a perspective found in the research on the UNSC by studying whether PSC conflict interventions are primarily determined by its organizational mission or the parochial interests of its member (cf. Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Binder and Golub 2020). For every new research agenda, it is important to start out by testing the utility of existing frameworks. Both Councils operate based on a formal, albeit somewhat discretionary, mandate that the subset member states are entrusted to pursue on behalf of the IO at large. At the same time, African states have been found to “pursue their individual, national security-related foreign

policy goals” through African IOs (Warner 2018, 75). Hence, it makes sense to use the two theoretical frameworks, related to the AU’s organizational mission and the parochial members of PSC members respectively, as a baseline to determine what drives decisions to (not) intervene in conflicts. Despite important similarities between the two Councils, there are important differences that concern, *inter alia*, the context of conflicts and the negative impact they have on member states, the capabilities and geopolitical ambitions of member states, the decision-making processes and composition of the two Councils, and potentially less preference heterogeneity among members due to shared historical experiences, geographical proximity, and common problems that influence priorities. Therefore, it becomes important to study the PSC and its interventions on its own and compare the extent to which the PSC and UNSC operate based on similar logics rather than simply assume congruence. The following section develops hypotheses that are subsumed under the two theoretical frameworks.

4.4.1 Organizational Mission

States create and rely on IOs, with some degree of centralization and independence, to pursue a set of shared goals (cf. Abbott and Snidal 1998). These goals constitute the organizational mission. Acting, or at least being perceived to act, in accordance with this mission is key to an IO’s legitimacy and aligns with both constructivist and rational-functionalist logics of cooperation (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012, 38–39). Therefore, a first central thesis is that the PSC acts in accordance with its organizational mission – the reason for its existence and approved mandate. In its Constitutive Act, the AU lists as one of its objectives to ‘promote peace, security and stability on the continent’ (Article 3f). In the Protocol of the PSC, the preamble makes explicit that the organization is “determined to enhance our capacity to address the scourge of conflicts on the Continent and to ensure that Africa, through the African Union, plays a central role in bringing about peace, security and stability on the Continent.” In the following, I develop four hypotheses regarding the circumstances under

which PSC interventions should be expected if this organizational mission indeed drives its behavior.

First, I hypothesize that the intensity of the conflict itself matters. Managing conflicts is fundamental to the PSC's mandate, and stabilization of ongoing violent conflicts – at least through peace operations – has predominantly been a task of the APSA rather than the UN (de Coning 2017). Intense conflicts on the continent are of great concern to the AU not least because they may threaten regional spillover and cause human suffering. A study by Desmidt and Hauck (2017) for the years 2013 to 2015 provides first evidence that higher conflict intensity increases the odds of a PSC intervention. Crisis intensity or severity as explanatory factors feature in most relevant analyses and are found to be strong predictors for UN engagement in conflict situations (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Frederking and Patane 2017). Intensity, however, does not have a universal definition, let alone operationalization. So as not to conflate conflict intensity with the negative externalities a conflict produces for neighboring states, I propose to view intensity as the extent of combat violence. The first hypothesis is:

H1: The greater the intensity of the conflict, the more likely the PSC is to intervene.

Second, I hypothesize that conflicts that transcend state boundaries trigger PSC interventions. The AU, by virtue of its multilateral design, is an institution that deals first and foremost with issues of regional concern, that is, issues that concern more than one of its member states. Conflicts and crises in Africa are notoriously prone to exceed state boundaries and become regionalized, which necessitates regional solutions and prompts regional responses (Keller 1997, 300; Söderbaum and Hettne 2010, 19). Indeed, severe negative externalities of conflicts may even “prompt states to create or resuscitate regional organizations” (Legrenzi and Lawson 2018, 692). The AU and the PSC themselves frequently invoke the notion of regional security – and express concern over spillover effects – in the context of numerous violent conflicts such as, among others, in Mali (African Union 2018f), the Central African Republic (African Union 2013d), South Sudan (African Union 2014a) and Libya (African

Union 2014d). An important declaration by African leaders captures the essence of the regional security paradigm as it points to the “indivisibility of security in Africa, and particularly the fact that the defence and security of one African country is directly linked to that of other African countries” (African Union 2004).

On the one hand, negative security externalities produced by a conflict are likely to be of concern to the PSC. Even when the immediate violence is confined within one state’s territory, the conflict may produce negative effects for neighboring states. Besides the uncontrolled proliferation of weapons, whose ripple effects are exemplified by the case of Libya (African Union 2011c), the focus often lies on refugees. Some research has identified refugees as an important source of conflict diffusion (cf. Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006), and the large influx of refugees can also burden countries already challenged by a lack of resources (African Union 2018e). This is on top of the humanitarian concern expressed not least in the preamble of the PSC Protocol. Importantly, previous studies on the UNSC have already discussed and often demonstrated the importance of the number of refugees for its involvement (Iwanami 2011; Frederking and Patane 2017; Binder and Golub 2020). This leads to the following hypothesis:

H2a: The greater the negative externalities of the conflict, the more likely the PSC is to intervene.

On the other hand, the inherently transnational nature of some violent conflicts, in which multiple countries face the same enemy, is likely to draw in the PSC. The struggles against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (al-Shabaab), Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Jamā’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-Jihād (Boko Haram) are all examples of violent conflicts that cross state borders. More generally, the PSC contends that “cross-border movement of spoilers in particular, non-state actors and negative forces, still remains one of the major challenges to the efforts towards resolution of conflicts and crises in Africa” (African Union 2017b). Hence, I propose a second hypothesis related to regional security, namely:

H2b: The more transnational the nature of the conflict, the more likely the PSC is to intervene.

Lastly, the PSC is acutely aware of the security risks posed by political processes around changes in government and likely to be particularly sensitive to violence in such contexts. The PSC Protocol contains special provisions for UCGs, which are widely recognized as “one of the essential causes of insecurity, instability and violent conflict in Africa” (African Union 2007a; see also Dersso 2017) and fall under the PSC’s responsibility. This includes most notably military coups, attempted or successful, which have seen a resurgence in recent years. Besides UCGs, the time around elections constitutes a period of enhanced risk for violent conflict and the PSC is generally attentive to these situations. This became abundantly clear in 2014 when the PSC formally “requested the Department of Political Affairs [of the AU Commission] to make quarterly briefings on national elections in Africa to the PSC” (African Union 2014c). This leads to the following hypothesis:

H3: If the conflict takes place around (possible) changes of government, the PSC is more likely to intervene.

4.4.2 Parochial Interests

A second central thesis is that the PSC gives primacy to the preferences and priorities of its members. In other words, PSC members are self-interested actors and use their position in the PSC accordingly. This argument has been prominent in the literature on the UNSC and its permanent members (see, for example, Bosco 2009). For Africa, Warner (2018) contends that African states pursue their own individual foreign policy goals through African IOs. In a recent report on the new election of PSC members, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) emphasized the competitive nature of the process and predicted that the “PSC’s dynamics will be shaped by its composition” (Diatta et al. 2022, 3) – indicating that national priorities do matter on the PSC. In the following, I develop four hypotheses regarding the circumstances under which PSC interventions would be expected if the parochial interests of its members drive the PSC’s behavior.

First, PSC members may use their position to keep their own conflicts off the agenda. Individual examples of this are at times pointed out in the literature. Nigeria, for instance, has kept the conflict in the Niger Delta off the PSC agenda for years (cf. Williams 2012, 13). Uganda also initially rejected regional support in its fight against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) (Walsh 2020, 314). This overlapped with Uganda's PSC membership between 2006 and 2009, during which this conflict received very little attention from the PSC, especially as it concerned Uganda directly. For the UNSC and in the context of intrastate conflict, researchers have found evidence that even allies of the veto powers are targeted less frequently (Mullenbach 2005; Iwanami 2011; Binder and Golub 2020), not to mention the Council members themselves. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H4: If the conflict takes place in a PSC member state, the PSC is less likely to intervene.

Second, PSC members may use the PSC to advance or protect their own diplomatic endeavors. In the realist school of thought, IOs are mostly viewed as instruments of its powerful members (cf. Mearsheimer 1994; see also Panke 2020, 475). The overall relevance of the PSC as a diplomatic actor is demonstrated by its considerable and increasing activity. Following the realist paradigm, it makes sense to expect that members push to address or avoid addressing a conflict in accordance with their strategic interests in the concerned country. Studies on the UNSC have thus consistently considered this aspect, even though expectations are ambivalent regarding whether intervention is more or less likely when a permanent member's interests are concerned (see Binder and Golub 2020, 3). Hence, the hypothesis is as follows:

H5: The more PSC members have strategic interests in the country in which the conflict takes place, the less or more likely the PSC is to intervene.

Third, I hypothesize that negative security externalities produced by a conflict matter differently depending on who bears the burden. Unlike the general hypothesis on negative externalities (see Hypothesis 2a), it can be assumed that self-interested PSC members are

more likely to respond to a conflict through the PSC when it affects them directly. Hence, the sixth hypothesis is:

H6: The greater the negative externalities of the conflict are for the PSC members, the more likely the PSC is to intervene.

Lastly, pursuing parochial interests may include creating a regional environment that serves to protect incumbent regimes. Literature on sovereignty-boosting regionalism in Africa views African IOs as means to strengthen national sovereignty or incumbent regimes (Söderbaum 2004a; Hentz, Söderbaum, and Tavares 2009). While the OAU – widely seen as “a trade union of African leaders” (Rembe 1991, 38) at the time of its existence – pursued a rather passive approach and focused protecting and ensuring juridical sovereignty of member states (cf. Clapham 1996, 110–14), the AU has taken a more active approach. Centrally, the AU has demonstrated its willingness to conduct so-called ‘stabilization’ missions that support incumbent regimes in establishing control over state territory (Dersso 2016). Against this backdrop, it makes sense to consider the idea that conflicts which threaten the national power and claims to sovereignty of the incumbent regime are of particular interest to all incumbents, including those on the PSC, who are incentivized to keep this supportive system in place. This leads to the last hypothesis:

H7: If conflict threatens an incumbent regime and its claim to sovereignty, the PSC is more likely to intervene.

4.5 Research Design and Data

To test these hypotheses, I have developed a new dataset that starts with the PSC’s first full operational year (2005) and captures the entire population of interventions in violent conflicts through 2019. I draw on the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths, used by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (cf. Croicu and Sundberg 2016, 15), to define violent conflict. Battle-related deaths are based on location (country) rather than actors (conflict dyad) to

correspond to the chosen unit of analysis (country-year). In total, there are 227 (out of a maximum 807) country-years with a relevant violent conflict between 2005 and 2019. All of those are internal, transnational, or internationalized conflicts. I leave out conflicts that were exclusively interstate, as the logic behind (non-)interventions to classic violent interstate conflict may vary and such conflicts are also almost non-existent in Africa over that period. The only such conflicts which (barely) passed the threshold are the border clashes between Djibouti and Eritrea (2008) as well as Eritrea and Ethiopia (2016). I also exclude the case of South Sudan in 2011 from the dataset. This is because it only became a member of the AU in the second half of the year, and it blurs the boundaries between inter- and intrastate conflict. Moreover, some of the relevant data sources naturally struggle to neatly differentiate between South Sudan and Sudan for that year.¹⁷

To analyze the determinants for interventions, I use binary logistic regression analysis. Binary logistic regressions are used when the outcome is dichotomous. This is appropriate to answer the research question at hand, which asks about the conditions that lead to the presence or absence of an intervention in a violent conflict in a member state. In other words, the main interest of this paper is to explain the circumstances under which the PSC becomes active and intervenes, and not to measure and explain the strength or nature of interventions.¹⁸

¹⁷ The results also remain largely unchanged whether these conflict instances are included or left out. Hence, this decision does not have notable empirical implications (see Appendix A2, Table A2, Model A1).

¹⁸ Besides, sample size and distribution of cases also lend themselves to separate binary logistic regressions rather than an ordered or generalized ordered logistic regression with an ordinaly ranked dependent variable. Choosing binary logistic regression makes it also possible to run models with a higher number of predictor variables without consistently violating the 'rule of thumb' that at least ten observations per category are required for each added predictor variable (e.g., Harrell Jr., Lee, and Mark 1996).

4.5.1 Dependent Variable

This analysis uses novel data on interventions of the PSC based on an extensive systematic review of the more than 800 publicly available communiqués and press releases issued after PSC meetings between 2005 and 2019. I define interventions broadly as diplomatic efforts, military and non-military, determined through formal resolutions and decisions to address a crisis or conflict involving at least one member state. To ensure that not every statement or action is coded as an intervention, I only consider them relevant when they fulfill two criteria. First, it must be a decision or action taken by the PSC itself or an explicit request to one of the AU's subsidiary organs, and not merely a request to a third party that is not bound by decisions taken by the PSC. Second, the decision, action or request must imply a certain degree of coercion, resource commitment, or both. The latter roughly follows a logic used by some intervention scholars (cf. Binder 2015, 7). Besides peace operations, sanctions, mediation, other types of missions and the creation of institutions, I also include forceful rhetoric in the form of threats, demands and acts of condemnation as a form of coercive diplomacy. This covers the broad range of relevant diplomatic activity identified by various intervention scholars (see, for example, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1996, 115, 121–33; Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel 1996, 691; Kirchner and Dominguez 2011, 8; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012, 39–40; Binder 2015, 7; Herpolsheimer 2021, 8).

The dependent variable is then dichotomized in two different ways. First, I identify whether any intervention is present in a given country and year ('any intervention'). This approach is preferable to using information about the PSC agenda based on meeting subjects. For one, it avoids the automatic coding of meetings in which the PSC merely talks about an issue without any notable output. An issue must not only be discussed, but the members of the PSC must indeed agree upon a relevant response for it to be coded. Moreover, the PSC regularly (and increasingly) holds meetings on broader topics or regions in which institutional responses for specific countries are taken. Therefore, merely coding the subject of a meeting cannot adequately capture which conflicts are ultimately addressed by the PSC. This approach allows us to identify those conflicts that featured on the PSC agenda and led to a

diplomatic response which constitutes an intervention as defined in this paper, and therefore goes beyond the mere identification of agenda items.

Second, I identify whether an intervention requiring organizational resources is present in a given country and year ('resource intervention'). This removes those instances in which institutional responses are exclusively 'on paper' but do not, or at least not automatically, require resources for their execution. In other words, it serves to filter out those instances in which a resource commitment is entirely absent. This is particularly the case for forceful rhetoric such as threats, demands, and acts of condemnation without any further action, which critics may view as 'token statements'. Sanctions on their own also do not constitute a resource intervention. Also excluded are interventions that do not require mission deployment, such as the establishment of contact groups or mediation measures outside of mediation missions. A resource intervention is coded as present when the PSC mandates non-military and observer missions, decides to undertake field visits, mandates or authorizes peace operations and other military missions, and when it takes concrete measures towards the support of such operations by other IOs or bodies beyond rhetoric. I also include authorizations of military operations in this category even when they are not directly conducted by the AU. This is because these operations can be assumed to come with opportunity costs. They tie up the limited resources that member states or the international community are willing to provide for operations in Africa.

Table 4.1 shows the number and share of PSC interventions in violent conflicts. There are at least eleven countries that experience violent conflict every year, but violent conflict – and with it the occurrence of PSC interventions – has become more prevalent over time. In total, there have been 126 interventions of any type in the 227 country-years for which a violent conflict was recorded. This means the PSC has intervened in more than half of Africa's violent conflicts since 2005. Importantly, the PSC usually commits at least some resources to its interventions. I identify the presence of resource interventions for 107 country-years, or slightly less than half of all violent conflicts. At the same time, however, this means that in 19 cases, the PSC opted for the use of forceful rhetoric without any further action.

Table 4.1. PSC Interventions in Violent Conflicts, 2005-2019

Year	AU Member States (MS)	AU MS with a Violent Conflict	PSC Intervention (Any) (% of Conflicts)	PSC Intervention (Res.) (% of Conflicts)
2005	53	14	7 (50%)	7 (50%)
2006	53	12	6 (50%)	4 (33%)
2007	53	15	6 (40%)	5 (33%)
2008	53	14	5 (36%)	3 (21%)
2009	53	14	6 (43%)	3 (21%)
2010	53	11	5 (45%)	3 (27%)
2011	54	13	8 (62%)	7 (54%)
2012	54	12	6 (50%)	6 (50%)
2013	54	15	8 (53%)	6 (40%)
2014	54	14	8 (57%)	6 (43%)
2015	54	17	12 (71%)	12 (71%)
2016	54	22	11 (50%)	9 (41%)
2017	55	18	12 (67%)	12 (67%)
2018	55	18	13 (72%)	12 (67%)
2019	55	18	13 (72%)	12 (67%)
Total	807	227	126 (56%)	107 (47%)

4.5.2 Independent Variables

In the following, I outline the operationalization of the independent variables. First, hypotheses on the organizational mission as the determinant for PSC interventions must be operationalized. Relating to Hypothesis 1, conflict intensity is measured by the total number of battle-related deaths based on location at the country-level for each year. This variable is based on data provided by the UCDP GED Dataset (Croicu and Sundberg 2016; Sundberg and Melander 2013). Relating to Hypothesis 2a, negative externalities are operationalized as the total number of refugees, asylum-seekers, and other persons of concern to the UNHCR from conflict countries in other African states. To this end, I add up data provided by the UNHCR at the country-year level (UNHCR n.d.) to include only African states as destinations. Relating to Hypothesis 2b, the extent to which a conflict is transnational is captured by the notion of ‘conflict clusters’. I define conflict clusters as conflicts that are transnational in nature due to taking place on multiple states’ territories or involving one state actor operating on another state’s territory. It is scored on a four-point ordinal scale (0-3). The score is determined by the

number of countries involved as well as the number of conflict deaths for each territory of the cluster based on actor-based information in the UCDP GED Dataset. Higher scores depict greater conflict clusters.¹⁹ Relating to Hypothesis 3, possible changes of government are coded as present for those years in which there was a major election or a coup d'état, either attempted or successful. I obtained data on election years from the International Foundation for Electoral System's (IFES) 'Election Guide' for elections of Heads of State and Heads of Government (IFES n.d.). Data on attempted or successful coups d'état stem from the 'Coup D'État Events, 1946-2018' dataset from the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) (Marshall and Marshall 2019). Information for 2019 were manually added for relevant country-years, leading to the inclusion of the Sudanese coup and the attempted coup in Ethiopia.

Second, hypotheses on the parochial interests of PSC members as the determinants for PSC interventions must be operationalized. Relating to Hypothesis 4, I identify whether a state experiencing violent conflict was a member of the PSC for most of that year. This information comes from documents issued by the AU Assembly after their Ordinary Summits, during which they formally confirm the (new) members of the PSC for two or three years. Relating to Hypothesis 5, the number of PSC members with a strategic interest in the conflict country is determined by the number of PSC members that historically provided support to the respective conflict country. This support may be provided to the government, opposition forces, or both. Support includes, among others, the supply of money and free arms, the provision of shelter and intelligence information, and the active deployment of troops. I rely on data provided by the UCDP External Support Project (Högbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér 2011) for the period between 1975, the first year in the dataset and around the time the last African countries achieved independence, and 2004, the year in which the PSC became operational. Relating to Hypothesis 6, I operationalize negative externalities affecting PSC

¹⁹ Scoring: 1 if two or more countries are involved, either as a location or as actor, with at least 25 battle-related deaths for each; 2 if three or more countries are involved with at least 25 deaths for each, or if two countries are involved with at least 100 deaths for each; 3 if three or more countries are involved with at least 100 deaths for each; 0 if none of this applies.

members as the total number of refugees, asylum-seekers, and other persons of concern to the UNHCR from conflict countries in PSC member states. To this end, I added up data provided by the UNHCR at the country-year level to include only PSC member states as destinations. Relating to Hypothesis 7, a conflict is coded as threatening the incumbent regime or its claim to sovereignty when the conflict item is either national power, secession, or both. I identify conflict items based on the annual Conflict Barometer published by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) (HIIK n.d.).²⁰ For a conflict to be coded as a conflict over national power or secession for this analysis, it had to be coded as violent by the HIIK to correspond to the herein used definition of violent conflict and involve the government as one of the conflict actors.

Lastly, as a key control variable, I included ‘state power’ in all models. States differ in their ability to exert ‘countervailing power’ (cf. Binder 2015, 4). The idea is that more powerful states are less likely to experience external interference, which has found consistent support in research on the UNSC (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Fortna 2004; Mullenbach 2005; Duque, Jetter, and Sosa 2015). Similarly, Desmidt and Hauck (2017, 28) find that “larger AU member states” based on nominal GDP “remain relatively more insulated from diplomatic interventions.” Therefore, state power must be controlled for in the models. I operationalize state power based on a country’s GDP (in constant 2010 US\$) and population size (both equally weighted) relative to other African states for each year in the dataset. This serves to approximate the relative power and potential influence of a state. Demographics and the economy are two of the three dimensions of the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) (the other being the military), and information about GDP and population size are consistently available across time and for all African states. Other relevant studies have similarly included population (e.g. Duque, Jetter, and Sosa 2015) or GDP (e.g. Desmidt and Hauck 2017) as variables linked to a state’s power and found them to decrease the likelihood of an intervention.

²⁰ I opted for the HIIK’s classification instead of the UCDP’s classification (‘state-based armed conflict’, ‘non-state conflict’, and ‘one-sided violence’) because the items of ‘national power’ and ‘secession’ more precisely capture the theory behind the corresponding hypotheses.

The relevant data for this variable is taken from The World Bank's World Development Indicators (The World Bank n.d.).

4.6 Results

The main results are shown in Table 4.2. It shows the results for the two operationalizations of the dependent variable (intervention). For each operationalization, I present three models. First, the OM-Model includes the variables that fall under the 'operational mission' paradigm in addition to the separate state power variable. Second, the PI-Model includes the variables that fall under the 'parochial interests' paradigm in addition to the separate state power variable. Third, the Full Model includes all variables included in the previous two models. Quality control measures for the regression demonstrate that collinearity for the two separate models is not an issue (variance inflation factor (VIF) scores are consistently below 2). For the full model, VIF scores for the two refugee variables are slightly higher (2.38 and 3.03), indicating some expected collinearity. This is still well below a common threshold of 10 (cf. Dormann et al. 2013, 32) or even a more conservative threshold of 5, which means the full models are nonetheless useful. Nevertheless, appropriate caution should be used when interpreting the results. Moreover, diagnostic tests to identify influential observations reveal one possibly problematic observation that is consequently removed – Nigeria 2014. Removing this one observation from the regression is justified upon closer inspection. Nigeria in 2014 saw the highest number of conflict-related casualties in decades according to UCDP data, and thus presents a statistical outlier. Importantly, the PSC formally authorized Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram and its adjusted mandate in January 2015 (African Union 2015a). It is only plausible to assume that the events from 2014 played a role in the establishment of the MNJTF. In this case, it is difficult to justify treating Nigeria 2014 as an instance in which the PSC chose not to intervene – even as it did decide to intervene during

the first PSC session at the heads of government level in 2015 – considering the influence this observation would have on the regressions.²¹

Table 4.2. Binary Logistic Regression Models, PSC Interventions

VARIABLES	OM-Model	PI-Model	Full Model	OM-Model	PI-Model	Full Model
	Any Intervention	Any Intervention	Any Intervention	Resource Intervention	Resource Intervention	Resource Intervention
Conflict Intensity (100s)	0.172*** (0.044)		0.167*** (0.047)	0.079*** (0.029)		0.073** (0.031)
Refugees (Africa) (10,000s)	0.040*** (0.012)		0.048** (0.021)	0.069*** (0.014)		0.080*** (0.022)
Conflict Cluster	0.330* (0.169)		0.358** (0.181)	0.495*** (0.168)		0.487*** (0.175)
Electoral/UCG Context	0.919** (0.455)		1.126** (0.497)	0.727 (0.453)		0.845* (0.488)
PSC Membership		-1.129*** (0.363)	-1.188*** (0.427)		-0.991** (0.385)	-0.848* (0.446)
Historical Support (PSC)		-0.684*** (0.196)	-0.786*** (0.245)		-0.549*** (0.199)	-0.766*** (0.256)
Refugees (PSC Members) (10,000s)		0.208*** (0.047)	0.048 (0.050)		0.221*** (0.046)	0.048 (0.050)
Conflict Item (NP or S)		0.122 (0.361)	0.508 (0.468)		0.278 (0.367)	0.413 (0.465)
State Power	-0.058*** (0.013)	-0.022*** (0.008)	-0.057*** (0.014)	-0.033*** (0.010)	-0.015* (0.008)	-0.033*** (0.011)
Constant	-0.810** (0.337)	0.778** (0.347)	-0.372 (0.447)	-1.866*** (0.374)	-0.150 (0.345)	-1.497*** (0.482)
Observations	226	226	226	226	226	226

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

²¹ The inclusion of this case reduces significance levels for the conflict intensity variable but enhances them for the refugees (in Africa) and conflict cluster variables (see Appendix A2, Table A2, Model A2). Hence while impactful, the overall interpretation regarding the two juxtaposed paradigms remains largely unaffected.

4.6.1 Organizational Mission

The OM-Model roots in the assumption that the PSC makes decisions based on factors related to its organizational mission. I find strong support for this assumption.

More intense conflicts are indeed more likely to be addressed by the PSC (Hypothesis 1). The analysis demonstrates that intensity matters even after controlling for other relevant factors. The effect appears to be strongest for the decision to (not) intervene in any capacity, but the coefficients are positive and statistically significant for both operationalizations of the dependent variable and across all models.

The same holds true for negative externalities in the form of refugees (Hypothesis 2a). The more refugees a conflict produces for mostly adjacent African countries, the more likely is a PSC intervention. Unlike conflict intensity, the effect is stronger for resource interventions. This indicates that the PSC is more likely to also commit organizational resources in the face of stronger negative externalities. This aligns with the notion that the PSC is importantly driven by a regional security paradigm.

This notion is further supported by looking at the spillover tendencies of a conflict or its transnational nature, which is positively linked to the presence of a PSC intervention (Hypothesis 2b). Once again, the effect is stronger and more significant in the context of resource interventions. This indicates the PSC's willingness to commit resources to the resolution of conflicts that are not confined to one member state's border, especially as the conflict cluster increases in size. Looking at both the refugee and conflict cluster variables, an argument can be made that greater regional implications resulting from a conflict increase the odds that the PSC commits resources to its solution or mitigation.

Lastly, I find some support for the hypothesis that conflicts which occur around potential changes in government – either through unconstitutional means or elections – are more likely to elicit a PSC intervention (Hypothesis 3). While the coefficients are positive across all models, results are only significant for the question whether any intervention is present. This indicates that whereas the PSC is more likely to concern itself with conflicts in those settings, it often limits itself to forceful rhetoric or coercion. Indeed, suspensions, condemnations,

demands and threats of sanctions around coups d'état are common policy for the PSC, and they often occur in isolation before any other action on the ground is taken.

4.6.2 Parochial Interests

The PI-Model assumes that PSC interventions are importantly or even primarily driven by the parochial interests of its members. I find some but uneven support for this assumption.

PSC members are indeed less likely to be targets of a PSC intervention all else being held constant (Hypothesis 4). This holds true across all models. It supports the idea that PSC members are better equipped to reject interference than non-members despite official stipulations that members may not be involved in decision-making processes around their own conflicts (Art. 8.9 of the Protocol). This is particularly noteworthy as the models control for state power and conflict intensity; two factors that may already play a role in deciding whether a state receives sufficient support to take a seat on the PSC in the first place. The fact that state power is also significantly negatively correlated with interventions lends strong credence to the notion that influential states in general are comparatively insulated from interventions.

Similarly, historical support from PSC members to conflict countries is statistically significant with a negative coefficient (Hypothesis 5). This could indicate that PSC members are able to keep conflicts in countries in which they have strategic interests off its agenda. Perhaps the most plausible explanation, however, is that the PSC simply avoids controversial cases – either by choice or due to not reaching consensus. With more countries having strategic interests in a specific country, odds increase that these interests diverge. This, in turn, may render the PSC less able or willing to get involved. This is especially true considering its emphasis on consensus despite having formal majority voting procedures in place.

The hypothesis that self-interested PSC members are most likely to address a conflict when it produces severe negative externalities for themselves (Hypothesis 6) finds weaker support than the corresponding variable under the organizational mission paradigm. This is because even though the variable is highly significant with a positive coefficient for the PI-Models, it becomes insignificant in the full models. Even a conservative interpretation leads

us to the conclusion that while negative externalities for PSC members may play a role in the decision-making process, the results certainly do *not* support the assumption that they matter more than the negative externalities a conflict produces more generally.

I find no support for the hypothesis that the PSC is more likely to intervene when the incumbent regime is under threat (Hypothesis 7). While there is a slightly positive relationship between a PSC response and conflict around national power or secession, this relationship is not statistically significant in any model. It bears mentioning, however, that this finding does not imply impartial diplomacy on the part of the PSC when it does choose to respond. How the PSC intervenes, and to whose benefit, cannot be answered with the data used for this analysis.

4.6.3 Robustness

To test the robustness of the findings, I included additional control variables and altered the operationalization of independent variables. The variables and results are presented in Table A2 (Appendix A2) of this paper.

I control for the composition of the PSC with respect to polarity among members (Models A3-4). Polarity, or preference heterogeneity, has been identified as an important variable in the context of UNSC interventions (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Binder and Golub 2020). Greater polarity may reduce chances to find consensual solutions as emphasized by the PSC. To approximate polarity, I use the standard deviation of freedom and democracy scores among members. Larger differences between members regarding the levels of freedom and democracy in their countries imply greater polarity. This is preferable to measuring preference heterogeneity that considers ‘ideal points’ based on UN Assembly voting behavior (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017), as there is comparatively little variance among African states. Curiously, greater polarity appears to increase the chances for a PSC intervention, although the finding only holds true for freedom scores and is therefore less robust. Importantly, controlling for polarity does not have a noteworthy impact on the variables from the main models.

Moreover, regional biases may exist within Africa when it comes to conflict interventions. Research on UNSC interventions often consider the role of geography around interventions and control for world regions (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Mullenbach 2005; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Duque, Jetter, and Sosa 2015). The AU itself identifies five different African regions – Central, Eastern, Northern, Southern and Western – which partially overlap with membership in different African regional IOs. Different regions may receive different levels of attention as a result of (not) being a member of an active regional IO that is prepared to intervene in conflicts. To this end, I control for membership in Africa’s two most interventionist IOs with a security mandate at the regional level – the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (cf. Tavares 2011) (Model A5). The results suggest that the PSC is more likely to intervene with resources when the conflict country is a member in one of the two IOs. The effect, however, is only significant for resource interventions and driven by ECOWAS membership. This could suggest that the PSC is willing to follow the footsteps of the regional-level actors. The results for the main independent variables, however, remain largely unaffected with only minor changes in significance levels for some of them, and therefore do not affect the overall interpretation of the models.

Furthermore, two independent variables are composites of two variables. This concerns the variables on possible changes of government (election or coup d’état) and conflict type (national power or secession). To see if any individual variable has a different effect when looked at on its own, I split these variables up and add them separately in the respective control models (Models A6-7). The results show that coups are indeed what drives interventions more than elections when we look at all interventions, although elections have a more – albeit still only weak – statistically significant impact when looking at interventions that require resources. Taken together, this continues to support the idea that interventions are generally more likely around domestic power shifts or contestations. Regarding conflict type, the results show positive coefficients for both types but neither of them turns out to be statistically significant on their own just as it is the case for when they are combined into one variable.

4.6.4 Summary

Overall, it can be concluded that the results lend credence to aspects of both the organizational mission as well as the parochial interest paradigms. However, I find strong support especially for the idea that the PSC is driven by an adherence to its organizational mission. This includes both a desire to address the most severe conflicts on the continent as well as those conflicts that transcend national boundaries either through conflict spillover or negative externalities. The PSC also appears to be particularly reactive to conflicts around instances of governmental change in member states, especially in the context of its well-established task to deal with coups d'état. Besides a possibly genuine interest of the members to diligently pursue the PSC's mission, the role of the AU Commission may also support this tendency. Established delegation practices, resulting from informational and resource constraints on the part of PSC members, elevate the AU Commission's relevance in the process (cf. Hardt 2016). The Commission, in turn, is better positioned to prioritize mandate over national interests due to its supranational character.

At the same time, there can be no doubt that the parochial interests of PSC members are an important part of the equation. There is, however, comparatively less evidence that the PSC is used as a tool to actively further the parochial interests of its members. Instead, the interests of PSC members – and powerful states more broadly – appear to be mostly relevant when it comes to *not* intervening in a specific conflict. In other words, the influence of PSC members and powerful states works in a negative rather than positive direction. They put restrictions in place and keep certain conflicts off the agenda. This is likely related to the composition of the PSC and its decision-making processes. On the one hand, the diverse and fluid membership of the PSC decreases the likelihood that any group of states can control the PSC and use it as their own diplomatic tool. This also stretches to regionally dominant states, who find it harder to be as influential as they are in smaller African IOs (cf. Warner 2018). On the other hand, the great practical importance of the consensus principle means that any one

member or group of members has the potential to block advances of other members to address a conflict and thereby effectively paralyze the organ.

4.7 Conclusion

This paper examined the drivers behind PSC interventions in violent conflicts in member states. To this end, I drew on a novel dataset that captures PSC interventions based on the extensive review of more than 800 public meeting documents issued between 2005 and 2019. The quantitative analysis that includes all conflicts within that time frame is the first of its kind for the AU and therefore makes a unique empirical contribution.

Drawing on research on UNSC interventions, the hypotheses relate to the question of the role that the organizational mission and the role that the parochial interests of its members play in the PSC's decision to (not) intervene in violent conflicts. I find strong support for the idea that the AU's organizational mission is an important driver behind interventions. This challenges conventional wisdom. Eminent scholars have depicted African IOs as only functional and active to the extent that they served narrow regime interests. For example, Jeffrey Herbst (2007, 129) noted that “[r]egional institutions usually work in Africa when they help African leaders with their domestic problems”, while Christopher Clapham (1996, 121) similarly contended that “[w]here regionalism amounted to anything more than a formality, it did so because it helped to serve the cause of state and regime preservation.” The pursuit of the organizational mission does not imply that the reasons for the pursuit were not self-interested, or that the design of interventions does not tend to benefit incumbent regimes. It does, however, demonstrate that the drivers behind interventions strongly reflect the interests of the broader community, especially as it relates to dealing with conflicts that have regional implications. In this sense, the key takeaway from Beardsley and Schmidt (2012, 35) that “UN behavior more strongly reflects the original organizational mandate [...] than its critics typically suggest” holds true for the AU as well.

At the same time, parochial interests do matter for the decision to (not) intervene. The results indicate that the influence of those interests is largely negative in nature. This means

that the narrow and individual interests of PSC members may not drive the decision to intervene but can prevent interventions from occurring. This is likely a result of the emphasis on consensual decision-making despite the existence of majority-voting stipulations, which means that individual members can attempt to stifle decision-making processes and keep certain items off the agenda. The evidence suggests that this countervailing power may also be successfully exerted by powerful states that are not members of the PSC at the time. Overall, the finding that factors related to the organizational mission matter – more strongly than is commonly assumed – when it comes to interventions, while parochial interests of members also have an impact, is consistent with the results presented in comparable studies on UNSC interventions (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Binder and Golub 2020). Indeed, the evidence in support of the organizational mission – as opposed to parochial interests of members – as the main driver behind interventions appears to be even stronger for the PSC than it is for the UNSC. This could be explained at least partly by the prevalence of common security concerns among PSC members due to geographical proximity and shared historical experiences, as well as the absence of competing global powers, equipped with permanent seats and veto rights, who pursue divergent geopolitical agendas and associate with different strategic allies as is the case for the UNSC.

This is relevant for policymakers. An IO that pursues its organizational mission maintains legitimacy and creates dependable expectations. The findings of this paper provide a first clue that support for the AU means support for its mission to deal with the most intense conflicts and those conflicts with severe regional security implications. Moreover, knowing the conditions under which interventions take place constitutes the first step towards assessing the effectiveness of the AU's interventionism at large. In this regard, the paper also provides a useful starting point for future research on the effectiveness of AU interventions, especially beyond the most prominently studied intervention types such as peace operations and sanctions. Moreover, future research should strive to further complement the hitherto case study-driven research agenda, which prioritizes individual and prominent intervention instances, by investigating the AU's intervention practices at large. Besides the emphasis of this paper on the overall drivers behind interventions, this concerns especially the design of interven-

tions – whom they benefit and how they are justified –, the interplay of overlapping IOs, and the informal processes that lead up to intervention decisions. This would contribute to closing the research gap around AU interventions that continues to exist despite their growing relevance.

5. Conclusion of the Thesis

5.1 Summary

I introduced this thesis with the story of how the AU, in essence, consists of two organizations: one meant to serve incumbent regimes, and one meant to solve community problems. This has implications for cooperation among states. How the AU deals with the dilemma of being stuck between emerging ambitions and persistent attitudes, and what that means for AU interventions, remains an open question to date. This set the table for the entire thesis, which was driven by the overarching research question: what are the AU's broader intervention patterns, and how can we explain them? Across three articles, I introduced theoretical frameworks and tracked interventions, seeking to provide an answer to this overarching research question, step by step and through original research. Jointly, these articles contribute to a better understanding of the AU and its interventions in conflicts and crises of member states.

In the first article, I studied the AU's design and practice. It started off from the idea that different logics of cooperation lead to differing designs and practices of IOs. Drawing on insights from pertinent literatures on interstate cooperation, the article presented the two central rationalist logics that exist on opposite ends of the spectrum: a logic of problem-solving, and a logic of regime-serving. The logics differ on three key dimensions of international cooperation: the primary intended beneficiaries, the types of problems to be solved, and the role of national sovereignty. A problem-solving logic emphasizes the solving of transnational problems to the benefit of the community, including the broader public, and views sovereignty as a means to enhance the effectiveness of regional cooperation. A regime-serving logic of cooperation emphasizes the solving of domestic problems to the benefit of incumbent regimes, and views sovereignty as an outcome of – or, at least, a value to be protected through – regional cooperation. I developed clear and testable expectations for the influence of each logic on institutional design and practice across different dimensions of cooperation. While insisting on the indispensability of first understanding the effects each

logic has on its own before trying to tie them together, the article is fully aware that the logics often operate in parallel in the empirical world and IOs do not simply choose one or the other. Indeed, I argued that it is their parallel existence that compels IOs to actively balance both logics, which shapes their designs and practices in specific ways. To this end, the AU is an important and logical choice for a case study as an organization in which both logics are expected to play a central role in cooperation. I demonstrated empirically that the AU's design and practice is influenced by both logics of cooperation. While neither design nor practice fully reflects one logic of cooperation, an important finding of the study is that the AU's design more closely reflects a problem-solving logic, whereas its practice continues to be more closely linked to a regime-serving logic. The meaningful transfer of authority, efforts to address inter- and transnational problems, enforcement mechanisms, and a desire to achieve convergence among member states, which are associated with the problem-solving logic, is contrasted with strong elements of a regime-serving practice, which largely insulates incumbent regimes from undesired interference, offers support for their domestic problems, and ensures that ultimate control remains in the hands of member state governments. This arrangement, then, constitutes one of potentially various ways of balancing different logics of cooperation.

In the second article, I theorized how these two different logics of cooperation among states, namely problem-solving and regime-serving, influence the nature and design of AU interventions. I argued that both logics provide important impetuses and, as a result, the AU developed a form of hybrid regionalism. I argued and demonstrated that this hybrid regionalism has implications for the AU's conflict and crisis interventions conducted through its PSC. Specifically, I pointed out that if hybrid regionalism is indeed shaping AU interventions, we can expect them to (1) be frequent and diverse in the tools they use; (2) be responses to various kinds of norm violations and strongest when the two logics converge; and (3) target frequently non-regime groups and seldom openly the incumbent regime. I probed the empirical validity of these expectations by analyzing the coercive diplomacy undertaken by the PSC using a new dataset for the years between 2005 and 2021. The results showed that the AU is an active intervener that uses coercive means to address security crises and challenges of

regional concern, including threats to incumbent regimes and their claims to sovereignty. To this end, it uses a variety of coercive diplomatic tools, including military operations, sanctions, and forceful rhetoric. In line with expectations, the strongest interventions tend to take place when both regional and regime security are threatened, and the two cooperation logics coalesce. Moreover, the empirical results support the theoretical expectation that interventions seldom openly target incumbent regimes. While the desire to solve transnational problems means that the AU does intervene in matters that involve the government of the targeted state, it is cautious with respect to the incumbent regime and largely refrains from head-on challenges. Instead, challengers to the incumbent regimes are considerably more likely to be on the receiving end of AU pressure. All of this suggests a careful balancing of the two main impetuses in African security regionalism, namely solving transnational problems and serving the parochial interests of incumbents.

In the third article, I turned to the presence and absence of AU interventions. Specifically, the paper set out to better understand the factors that determine whether the AU, through its PSC, intervenes in a violent conflict in an AU member state. To this end, I juxtaposed in a first step its organizational mission and the parochial interests of its members as drivers behind interventions, and in doing so introduced four hypotheses for each paradigm. In a second step, I tested these ensuing hypotheses using binary logistic regression on an original dataset that includes all instances of violent conflict in Africa and corresponding PSC interventions between 2005 and 2019. I found strong support for the idea that the AU's organizational mission is an important driver behind interventions. The likelihood of intervention increases with the intensity of the conflict and the negative externalities it produces for the region, as well as when the conflict relates to a core area of organizational concern, namely changes of government through elections or unconstitutional means. At the same time, parochial interests do matter for the decision to (not) intervene. The results indicated that the influence of those interests is largely negative in nature. This means that the narrow and individual interests of PSC members may not drive the decision to intervene but can prevent interventions from occurring. Overall, I found factors related to the organizational mission to matter – more strongly than is commonly assumed – when it comes to interventions, while parochial

interests of members also have an impact. The results lend further credence to the idea that the AU balances the two logics of cooperation that frame the broader thesis in specific ways.

Table 5.1. Key Takeaways

Article One	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Both logics of cooperation influence the AU's design and practice in parallel. ◆ The AU's design leans heavily into the problem-solving ideals of cooperation. ◆ The AU's practice moves back closer to the regime-serving end of the spectrum.
Article Two	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Both logics of cooperation shape the nature and design of AU interventions. ◆ The influence of both logics increases the prevalence of interventions. ◆ The coalescing of both logics leads to the strongest interventions. ◆ Regime-serving impulses render problem-solving biased in favor of incumbents.
Article Three	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Organizational mission and parochial interests drive AU conflict interventions. ◆ Organizational mission pursuit is key to explaining the presence of interventions. ◆ The influence of parochial interests keeps certain conflicts off the agenda.

Jointly, the articles provided strong evidence that the AU is indeed driven by both a problem-solving and a regime-serving logic of cooperation, and that this serves as the foundation for explaining the AU's broader intervention patterns. Specifically, the articles demonstrated the different ways in which the AU balances the influences of the two logics in various aspects of cooperation: the design and practice of the organization at large, the nature and design of interventions, as well as the presence and absence of interventions.

5.2 Research Implications and Contribution

The findings of this thesis have important implications for scholars in addition to practitioners, and contribute to our knowledge not only about AU interventions but also about African regionalism as well as interstate cooperation more broadly. In its introduction, the thesis set out to make important empirical and theoretical contributions in addition to offering a novel

methodological approach. Now, in this concluding section, I seek to flesh this out more by linking the envisaged contributions to actual examples, results, and takeaways from the different articles. In the following, I distinguish between the contribution to research on AU interventions, on the one hand, and to research beyond AU interventions, on the other hand.

5.2.1 Research on AU Interventions

The most obvious subject to which the thesis contributes is AU interventions. Thus far, research on AU interventions is dominated by case studies focusing on specific interventions, or intervention types, and often prioritizes detailed case knowledge over addressing broader empirical intervention patterns. The articles have sought to contribute to a literature on African IOs and their varied activities in peace and security affairs that only recently started to emerge (Desmidt 2019; Herpolsheimer and Warnck 2020; Henneberg 2022b). To this end, the thesis offers a novel way of identifying and categorizing interventions. By focusing on those diplomatic activities that require resources, are coercive in nature, or otherwise reach into the domestic sphere of member states, the thesis ensures that its research on AU interventions is not detached from the broader debates on multilateral interventions, especially on the UNSC, which has used similar conceptualizations (see Binder 2015, 7). At the same time, the deductive-inductive approach to establishing relevant categories ensures that the research still reflects African realities and adequately captures its idiosyncrasies. Built on this foundation, the thesis contributed to a better understanding of something only few scholars have focused on: the actions of an African IO (cf. Herpolsheimer 2021, 2).

Article two, for example, clearly demonstrated that the AU not only uses different coercive intervention types, but that it does so regularly. Particularly with respect to forceful rhetoric, the article breaks new ground. It finds it to be ubiquitous in the PSC's language and used to push back against violations of various norms. When it comes to academic debates, the empirical and conceptual research on stabilization missions that has blossomed in recent years (e.g., Dersso 2016; de Coning 2017; de Oliveira and Verhoeven 2018; Moe and Geis 2020) benefits from the insights from the second article. The comparative study of different inter-

vention types sheds light on the extent to which the idea behind stabilization, as the strongest form of domestic regime support, can be traced in other forms of coercive diplomacy. Research on sanctions imposed by the AU or African IOs (e.g., Souaré 2014; Charron and Portela 2015; Hellquist 2015; 2021) similarly stands to benefit. Not only does the article offer information on the sanctions themselves, but it also provides important information on the threat of sanctions. When focusing only on imposed sanctions, this empirically relevant category is disregarded. Yet, sanctions research stands to benefit from having information about the prevalence of sanctions threats and potentially other forms of forceful rhetoric (especially compared to the prevalence of imposed sanctions), and from understanding the extent to which they differ from, or align with, imposed sanctions in terms of triggers and targets. Perhaps most importantly, however, it is a critical aspect for better understanding the division of labor with the UNSC that scholars have highlighted (Charron 2013; Charron and Portela 2015). The results support the idea of a division of labor, as in many cases in which the AU does not impose sanctions itself, it shows itself to be open to or even lobbying for their imposition. This can help researchers with identifying the scope of the division of labor and assessing situations in which the AU appears supportive for UNSC sanctions.

Article three, meanwhile, contributes to our understanding of the AU's activity level as an intervener in conflicts. This information cannot be obtained from case studies and studies of specific intervention types which dominate the literature. One key takeaway from the article is that the AU intervenes in numerous violent conflicts in some capacity, and even invests resources in many of them. In other words, the AU is present. It is worth studying AU interventions because they seek to influence the outcome of many crises and conflicts on the continent. The findings also support those who emphasize the relevance of the regional level and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter when it comes to conflict resolution; this is a sentiment expressed not least in the former UN Secretary General's *An Agenda for Peace* (Boutros-Ghali 1992, 35–38). Besides the level of activity, understanding the factors that increase or decrease the likelihood of an AU intervention also helps with the assessment of effectiveness (Mullenbach 2005, 530; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012, 35). While the literature on AU interventions is highly interested in the question of effectiveness, it usually draws its insights from

specific *positive* cases, meaning individual cases in which an intervention occurred. The regression results, on the other hand, are useful starting points for broader assessments. For instance, the results would suggest that the AU is less likely to make an impact when conflicts are of lower intensity, involve more powerful and otherwise influential states, and produce only limited negative externalities – simply because the AU is less likely to intervene in any capacity in those cases.

Beyond specific results, the theoretical framework applied throughout the thesis has implications for the study of effectiveness as well as for expectations management. It can and – by virtue of developing and testing hypotheses – already did offer insights into which situations matter to the AU and what purposes its interventions serve. The former is required to project into the future and assess the prospects of AU leadership in different contexts. The latter is an often-neglected aspect of effectiveness and allows us to evaluate interventions from the perspective of the AU rather than the normative perspective of researchers or outsiders. Conventionally, the AU is judged against an external set of normative criteria usually linked to the problem-solving logic and not focused on what matters *to the AU*. For instance, an intervention that stabilizes a conflict situation to the benefit of an undemocratic regime may be viewed as insufficient by some observers but nonetheless satisfy the AU's expectations derived from the two logics of cooperation. The AU's intervention in Libya in 2011, which competed against the military intervention backed by the UN and others, is a case in point and demonstrates that success and, thus, evaluations of effectiveness very much depend on the reference point (see, for example, the different conclusions reached by Omorogbe (2012) and Hove (2017) in this context). The parallel presence of problem-solving and regime-serving logics, which are actively balanced, also has implications for expectations management. For example, while the AU should not be expected to lead in situations that call for pressure on rogue incumbent regimes, it can be expected to play a constructive role in dealing with matters of regional security once the conflict states consent to multilateral intervention.

5.2.2 Research beyond AU Interventions

Beyond AU interventions, this thesis also has implications for research in other (related) areas. I shall distinguish two areas: research on the AU (and the broader APSA), and research on international cooperation beyond Africa.

With respect to the AU and the APSA, the existing literature on their normative foundations may take an interest in this thesis. It directly speaks to common topics addressed by scholars of both. This includes, for example, the debates on non-interference versus non-indifference (Williams 2007; Mwanasali 2008; Welz 2013); state or military versus human security (Hutchful 2008; Owolabi 2018); and sovereignty-boosting versus the responsibility to protect (Hentz, Söderbaum, and Tavares 2009). Throughout the thesis, I demonstrated that rather than following one or the other, African cooperation tends to be about following both at the same time. Consequently, the key to understanding AU interventions lies in understanding how different logics are balanced across different contexts and situations. Scholars regularly ask different flavors of the same question: ‘can the leopard change its spots?’ (Udombana 2002). That means, should we buy into the idea that the AU truly evolved from the club of incumbents that its predecessor was widely perceived to be? This thesis provides an answer to the effect of: it evolved, but it is not a different beast entirely. It added to its qualities, but old qualities have not ceased to exist. Not least for policymakers, it is important to understand that the AU indeed pursues its organizational mission and seeks to solve community problems – but that the protective qualities of national sovereignty and the desire to benefit incumbent regimes still shape and, in some ways, limit the AU’s behavior. This has implications for projecting cooperation opportunities. The thesis also speaks to the debate on ‘African solutions to African problems’ (see, for example, Williams 2008; Gebrewold 2010; Vines 2013). The AU’s interventionism, paired with a desire to solve community problems, speaks to the organization’s effort to make the mantra reality. At the same time, the results show that the solutions are ‘African’ not only because they are driven by African actors but also because they are driven by Africa’s political realities, which require the balancing of the two premiere logics underlying African cooperation. Those expecting the AU to take on responsibility, and those assessing the viability and success of African solutions, would do

well to keep this in mind. African solutions to African problems are not merely the solutions *we* want, to solve problems *we* identify as relevant, simply carried out by African actors; they are solutions to problems that will, for the better or worse, reflect the reasons why African states choose to cooperate with each other in the first place.

This thesis also has implications for research on international cooperation beyond Africa. The literatures that underpin the logics of problem-solving and regime-serving have thus far not primarily focused on interventions and therefore benefit individually from the theorization of interventions presented in this thesis. After all, interventions are not only very salient and consequential actions taken by IOs. The fact that they actively reach into the domestic spheres of member states and strive to effect outcomes to the satisfaction of IO leaders means that we can also learn a lot about the essence of cooperation beyond pen and paper proclamations. Moreover, the results may prompt the two sides that have largely existed in isolation to consider the relevance of the respective other side, and provide guidance when it comes to explaining cooperation outcomes globally and across regions. For scholars operating under a problem-solving paradigm, the thesis can help distinguish feature from failure of cooperation. That is, it offers new explanations for why the design and practice of cooperation and interventions looks a certain way beyond the assumption of inefficiency or failure. For scholars operating under a regime-serving paradigm, the thesis can help (re-)introduce the solving of community problems as a key reference point. Overly cynical interpretations that are inclined to view all aspects of cooperation as efforts to prop up incumbent regimes above all else may miss the influence the problem-solving logic has on an IO's design and practice, including its interventions. Regarding both logics, the thesis casts doubt on the validity of an 'either-or' perspective, which assumes that an IO is either primarily or even exclusively pursuing only one of the two logics, and offers instead support for the belief that this perspective is misguided.

Moreover, the findings also matter for debates on the role and influence of regime type – democratic or authoritarian – in international cooperation (e.g., Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; Kaoutzanis, Poast, and Urpelainen 2016; Libman and Obydenkova 2018a; Debre 2022). This literature tends to focus on cooperation among states of the same regime types and the

benefits that are expected from it. Scholars who have studied the consequences of ‘mixed’ IOs often do so by zooming in on the benefits authoritarian regimes may extract from cooperation with democracies in regional-level IOs (Stoddard 2017; Debre 2021; Agostinis and Closa 2022). The findings of this thesis strongly suggest that active regional cooperation, including in high-stakes areas, remains a possibility even when member states prioritize different problems and seek different benefits. Specifically in regions with similar (expected) tensions between these two logics of cooperation, this thesis can be instructive for explaining existing security cooperation or assessing the prospect of future security cooperation and multilateral interventions.

5.3 The Promise and Limits of Generalization

A core question of every research endeavor is the question of generalizability. To which extent do the findings travel beyond what is directly researched? Due to the large-N research design, we can confidently make claims for AU interventions in general. We know *that* and *how* the two logics of cooperation matter for AU interventions, not just in specific cases but in general. This is because the thesis was set up to test its hypotheses and draw conclusions based on a large sample of AU interventions. While some open questions about generalizability remain, such as the extent to which the nature and design of non-coercive interventions reflects the two logics of cooperation, the overall point stands. This ability to make claims about the AU’s interventionism at large comes, of course, with the trade-off of not being able to provide the kind of detailed case-specific explanations associated with small-N research designs. Considering that every research endeavor must accept certain trade-offs, the central purpose of this thesis – identifying and explaining the AU’s broader intervention patterns – renders it reasonable or even necessary to prioritize generalizability for AU interventions. Still, the question of generalizability does not end here. What remains to be addressed is the extent to which the framework and findings of this thesis can be expected to travel beyond the AU and the African continent. Does the thesis study a unique case, or can it inform research on multilateral interventions and cooperation among states beyond the AU and Africa? In the

previous section, I already alluded to the usefulness of the thesis' framework and findings for scholars of other regions. It is worth unpacking this in more detail below.

5.3.1. Multilateral Interventions in Africa

First, on the topic of interventions in Africa: can we expect the findings to travel beyond the AU and explain interventions by other African IOs? After all, other African IOs also conduct conflict interventions even though their level of activity and readiness varies greatly. The ECOWAS, for example, broke new ground in Africa when it comes to security interventionism as demonstrated by its 1990s military interventions, starting in Liberia (Sesay 1996). Besides the ECOWAS, other African IOs such as the SADC and the IGAD also demonstrate a considerable level of activity when it comes to conflict resolution in their regions (cf. Coe and Nash 2020, 164–67) and make use of various diplomatic tools at their disposal. A strong argument can be made that the circumstances allow for some generalization; but the different African IOs are by no means mere copies of each other, and therefore we cannot expect the findings concerning one to seamlessly apply to all others.

Certainly, there are crucial factors that the AU and other security-relevant African IOs share. To start with, the AU and other African IOs have common members. Indeed, since all African states are currently members of the AU, all members of lower-level African IOs are at the same time members of the AU. This has important implications for their relationship and our assumptions. For one, all members have ratified the AU's core mandate and enabled its authority in matters of peace and security on the continent. Moreover, the most relevant African IOs with a security mandate are components of the AU-led APSA, to which they have formally acceded (African Union 2008). The PSC Protocol makes it clear that they “are part of the overall security architecture of the Union” (Art. 16.1), and that it shall be ensured that their “activities are consistent with the objectives and principles of the Union” (Art. 16.1a) (African Union 2002b). Finally, each of the five regions recognized under the APSA is guaranteed fixed representation on the PSC (Art. 5.2). All this clearly indicates that other African IOs, including those actively intervening in member states, identify with and back the AU's

broader shift towards a problem-solving logic. The fact that coordination around and support for interventions is common also demonstrates a joint (albeit not always unproblematic) understanding of the core logics behind cooperation. This includes the regime-serving logic. All African regions are shaped by their colonial past and espouse the importance of national sovereignty norms. While the strength and functionality of states varies not only across states but also regions, challenges are nonetheless similar in this regard. Similarly, the degree and prevalence of authoritarianism differs but remains a concern across the continent. In other words, there are good reasons to assume that both logics of cooperation outlined in this thesis exist in parallel across Africa and influence the intervention decisions and patterns of all African IOs.

At the same time, we must proceed with caution when it comes to using the findings of this thesis to explain multilateral interventions in Africa beyond the AU. Not only does a scientific approach demand that the assumption of generalizability, even when substantiated, is tested before being accepted as valid, but there are other factors that may limit generalization. First, capabilities across African IOs strongly diverge to the extent that some (such as the ECOWAS and the SADC) have the ability to decide on a broad range of intervention types whereas others even struggle to stay barely operational. For instance, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), recognized as one of eight RECs by the AU, has been a ‘zombie’ for much of its existence (Gray 2018, 7). This must naturally factor into any discussion about generalizability. Second, despite similarities, the backgrounds of African IOs differ. This can lead to different cultures that influence interventions. The ECOWAS and the SADC, for instance, have developed different organizational structures, cultures, and approaches which bleeds into all areas of cooperation (cf. Hulse 2014). In particular, the SADC continues to be much more hesitant or unable to move beyond a highly protective conceptualization of sovereignty. Finally, the role of hegemons is more pronounced in smaller regional IOs compared to the AU. Whereas Africa at large is not dominated by one hegemonial power, this is different in some of the regions. Warner (2018, 67) notes that “especially for regionally hegemonic states, RECs are profoundly more important for the pursuits of national security interests” compared to the AU because they are easier to manipulate. Consequently, regional hegemons are less

likely to take full control of the security agenda of the larger AU. Thus, interventions by those IOs may be shaped to a greater degree by hegemonial interests (which may or may not reflect a problem-solving or regime-serving logic as developed in this thesis) than those of the AU.

Hence, I believe a fair conclusion to be one which claims that the theoretical framework with respect to interventions is applicable and likely to add value to research on other African IOs, and that we can reasonably expect the core findings of this thesis to travel to them. This is particularly useful because not only the lower frequency of interventions but also the comparative lack of transparency when it comes to intervention decisions makes it more difficult to conduct similar research studies, which move beyond case studies and the most prominent intervention types, on other African IOs. A necessary note of caution, however, must raise awareness of the differences across African regions and their respective IOs, and emphasize the outsized role of factors not directly related to the two logics of cooperation that will lead to somewhat different intervention patterns, and explanations for these patterns, compared to the AU.

5.3.2 Multilateral Interventions beyond Africa

Second, on the topic of interventions beyond Africa, it is important to ask ourselves to which extent scholars of multilateral interventions beyond the AU and Africa can use the insights this thesis provides, or whether AU interventions are too unique. The answer to this must be, I believe, ambivalent. Certainly, the AU is an exceptionally active intervener. Its institutional set-up, which provides the foundation for the AU's interventionism, is in many ways unique. The AU not only has a security mandate but also a designated organ, the PSC, that consists only of a subset of member states and is endowed with considerable discretion to deal with its many different tasks around conflict prevention and resolution. Its treaties include provisions that allow for military interventions with or without host state consent and for even the most consequential decisions to be taken by a two-third majority vote. Over the course of its history, the AU has overseen several peace operations and imposed sanctions on various member states, including suspensions of membership and targeted sanctions. Due to the

prevalence of conflict combined with a large membership and relatively weak borders, the AU was also presented with numerous situations that called for its attention.

At the global level, only the UNSC shares a lot of these important traits. First and foremost, this concerns the considerable level of authority, the relatively high frequency of interventions, and the mandate conducive to dealing with transnational security problems effectively. Moreover, the UNSC's agenda is likewise dominated by African conflicts (cf. United Nations 2023). In this sense, the PSC and the UNSC are indeed comparable and research on the interventions of the two bodies can pollinate each other, especially considering the relationship, characterized by division of labor and mutual legitimation, they already have developed (cf. Gelot 2012; Charron 2013; de Coning 2017; see also United Nations – African Union 2017). Such a relationship, even though contentious at times, would not be possible without sufficient overlap in terms of goals of and approaches to interventions. This, in turn, lends some credence to the idea that better understanding AU interventions can – to a much lesser degree, of course – also help with better understanding UNSC interventions.

At the same time, article three of this thesis already highlighted some important differences that are worth reflecting on again. The starkest institutional difference is the existence of permanent members with veto powers on the UNSC. This contributes to them having an outsized influence on intervention decisions (cf. Keating 2016). Another obvious difference is the fact that while the UNSC's agenda is dominated by African conflicts, the UNSC itself consists mostly of non-African states – and none of the African members hold veto power. One potential consequence of this could be that the incentives to operate under a broader regime-serving logic of cooperation are weaker, as most members are not directly afflicted by the conditions that give rise to the logic on the African continent. In this context, it also bears repeating that the regime-serving logic builds on literatures that focus on regional-level IOs. The extent to which it applies to the global level and whether it influences UNSC interventions in ways similar to the AU remains an open question – but certainly a question worth exploring beyond what has already been done.

Moving down a level, few regional-level IOs share any – and much less all – of the characteristics that shape AU interventionism. At the same time, interventions by regional-level IOs

are not at all uncommon. Herein lies the value of research on AU interventions for other regions and IOs.

The prevalence of AU interventions allows us to identify broader patterns and develop explanations that move beyond individual cases in ways that are not possible in many other regions. Yet, this does not mean that these patterns and explanations are not relevant for those other regions. Security regionalism is spreading, driven in part by regional-level IOs which previously focused on economic cooperation but later veered into the security realm (Haftel and Hofmann 2019). Various regional-level IOs have intervened in conflicts or crises of member states. In some cases, IOs such as the League of Arab States (LoAS) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have indeed weakened strict adherence to non-interference principles in recent years to conduct interventions (Beck 2015). The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), on its part, continues to wrestle with its stance towards Myanmar and its ruling military junta but has taken the exceptional step of banning the junta's representatives from participating in meetings in 2021 (Bandial 2021). Disagreement among members and inconsistent as well as limited pressure on the junta, however, demonstrate that diverging views regarding the nature and boundaries of cooperation impact the resolution of the crisis. In South America, the Organization of American States (OAS) and, in recent years, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) regularly conduct (non-military) interventions to deal with regional crises as they vie for leadership roles (Weiffen, Wehner, and Nolte 2013). The European Union (EU), on its part, can be considered an interventionist organization, using many different types of interventions from mediation to sanctions to peace operations, but focuses primarily on conflicts and crises outside its member states, including in Africa.

With conflict and crisis interventions being common among an increasing number of IOs with a security mandate, the study of AU interventions and its findings can be instructive for other regions. This is particularly true for IOs in regions with a history of colonial rule, weak states, and/or authoritarian regimes, all of which contributes to a strong emphasis on sovereignty norms and a regime-serving logic of cooperation, as well as with common security concerns and therefore functional demands for regional security cooperation, which can be

considered a prerequisite for a problem-solving logic to take hold. Here, both the AU's historical path as well as the pool of information we have on its intervention practice due to their high frequency can help scholars of other regional-level IOs to anticipate or make sense of their respective interventions. At the same time, regional and organizational contexts naturally differ, and it remains important to be cognizant of those differences (e.g., the respective role of regional hegemons) when applying the framework and findings of this thesis to non-AU interventions.

5.3.3 International Cooperation beyond the AU

Third, on the topic of cooperation more broadly, the question is to which extent the theoretical framework helps us understand cooperation among states even beyond interventions. While the main interest of this thesis lied in identifying and explaining intervention patterns, the theoretical framework is not inherently limited to interventions – even though I do contend that the delicate nature of interventions, as they relate to questions of security, power, and sovereignty as well as require tangible actions in crisis situations, makes the true impact of the two logics of cooperation particularly visible. Furthermore, the theoretical framework is not limited to the AU. I do, however, present the AU as a most-likely case for the parallel presence of the two logics in the first article. Passing the test as a most-likely case means that the theoretical framework may also be useful for other cases. The AU was considered a most-likely case because the conditions associated with the development of both logics appeared to be fulfilled. A historical emphasis on national sovereignty norms, weak states as well as weak and/or authoritarian regimes are associated with a regime-serving logic, whereas interdependence and empirically sovereign and functioning states with the ability to credibly commit to dealing with community problems are associated with a problem-solving logic. For the AU, the thesis expected – and subsequently demonstrated – that both logics exist in parallel with implications for cooperation.

While what I call 'hybrid regionalism' in Africa may not be pronounced in other regions, the parallel desire or impulse to solve community problems and serve incumbent regimes is

likely present elsewhere as well. For one, we have seen pooling and delegation increase over time across IOs, driven not least by changes in regional-level IOs (Hooghe et al. 2017, 107–62). One possible explanation for this development is that IOs are increasingly expected to solve transnational problems in their respective regions. This is particularly noteworthy for regions that are known for authoritarianism and/or their strong affinity for national sovereignty norms. Moreover, uneven trends of democratization and autocratization have left many regional-level IOs with a membership that is neither aptly described as democratic nor as autocratic. Prominent examples besides the AU include the ASEAN, the ECOWAS, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the SADC and even the OAS. What is more, even the EU with its firm guidelines on democracy for (prospective) members is witnessing the rise of right-wing populism across the continent and democratic backsliding in member states such as Hungary and Poland. Both trends, relating to the increasing authority and diverse composition of regional-level IOs respectively, enhance the relevance of the theoretical framework with the two logics of cooperation for other regions. Whether the AU offers a glimpse into the future of other IOs or simply provides one example of how the parallel presence of the two logics influence cooperation at the regional level remains to be determined. It is not far-fetched to believe, however, that the framework and findings of this thesis are timely for researchers of other regional-level IOs and warrant consideration with respect to their application to other cases.

5.4 Future Research

Based on the results and limitations of this thesis, new avenues for research emerge and existing avenues for research receive fresh support. In this section, I will focus on two broader subjects: explaining AU intervention patterns, on the one hand, and applying the theoretical framework beyond the AU, on the other hand.

5.4.1 Explaining AU Intervention Patterns

To start with, the research program on identifying and explaining AU intervention patterns has commenced but is far from concluded. This thesis offered an explanation centered around logics of cooperation and found strong support for the claim that both problem-solving and regime-serving logics drive and shape interventions. While I contend that this serves as the foundation for explaining the AU's broader intervention patterns, it would be hubris to believe that it alone can explain all variance. Instead, other factors warrant closer consideration in our quest to explain more of the empirical variance. I shall focus on a couple of factors which have already been acknowledged in this thesis but should be expanded on in future research.

First, institutional overlap is an important variable. Africa is a crowded field for IOs active in the security field. Unsurprisingly, this has piqued the interests of scholars. Research on interorganizational relations, in particular, has taken up notable space in the academic discourse. For the AU, the bulk of the literature has focused on AU-UN cooperation (e.g., Gelot 2012; Williams and Boutellis 2014; Charron and Portela 2015; Carayannis and Fowlis 2017), but research also exists on the relationship between the AU and its RECs (e.g., van Nieuwkerk 2011; Obi 2014; Suzuki 2020). Institutional overlap is unlikely to alter underlying logics of cooperation. Moreover, besides the absence of an overarching authority, the APSA's emphasis on complementarity and division of labor, in addition to hierarchy-establishing norms such as subsidiarity and primary responsibility, also renders it unlikely that the presence of an overlapping organization would cause the AU to not intervene at all in a conflict it cares about. It may well, however, influence the intervention dynamics. For instance, overlap may lead to different forms of cooperation, coordination, and competition, and generally affect calculations around decision-making. The second article has already hinted at the implications that the presence of the UNSC has for the PSC in the context of coercive interventions. However, studying the ways in which institutional overlap influences intervention decisions and thereby changes intervention patterns, and determining how that may help to explain variance across cases, remains an important task for future research projects.

Second, bureaucratic agency warrants attention. The belief that bureaucrats in IOs have agency, and that this agency matters, is not new. Indeed, studies on the AU Commission have demonstrated that bureaucratic agency matters for African cooperation, including in matters of peace and security (Hardt 2016; Tiekou 2016; 2021). While intervention decisions formally remain exclusively in the hands of member state representatives and require their approval, the AU Commission plays a central role in providing information, setting the agenda, and drafting documents (Hardt 2016; for a concrete example, see also Wilén and Williams 2018). In article three, I acknowledge this when surmising that the AU Commission's role likely benefits the pursuit of community rather than national interests. In one of their seminal works on IOs, Barnett and Finnemore (1999, 700–701) depict bureaucracies as potentially “unresponsive to their environments, obsessed with their own rules at the expense of primary missions [...]” We know, however, that in at least some cases regional-level IOs “speak of goals and objectives that their founders do not actually want to achieve” (Vinokurov and Libman 2017, 13). Hence, bureaucrats – bound by the organization's charter – may well contribute to the pursuit of an IO's declared mission rather than stray away from it. Concerns about national sovereignty, which feed strongly into the logic of regime-serving, are the primary domain of member states – not the international bureaucracy. Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the AU Commission, notably implored member states to “overcome our fears, our national constraints, however legitimate they may be, and the barriers that may arise from overly restrictive interpretations of our sovereignty” (African Union 2018c). While the AU's formal shift towards problem-solving hinges on member states, it is not far-fetched to believe that for the practical shift, bureaucratic agency plays an important role. How bureaucrats influence the AU's intervention patterns that emerge, then, is a question worth studying.

Talking about the role of institutional overlap and bureaucratic agency leads me to a larger point: the study of processes. The primary purpose of this thesis was to identify and explain AU intervention patterns. To this end, I focused on output and linked it to the underlying logics of cooperation. The thesis did not, however, dive into the processes through which the parallel presence of problem-solving and regime-serving logics influence observable patterns. This is an area with much potential for future research. Institutional overlap and

bureaucratic agency, for instance, can be conceived of as mechanisms, or parts of a multi-level process, through which the underlying logics of cooperation flow before producing the results we observe. Changes in those respects would then, presumably, change these results to some degree. It is in this context that we can also study other relevant variables, such as state power and organizational capabilities. Article three already controls for the former and finds powerful states to be significantly less likely to experience AU interventions. How and when this factor enters the process and influences decisions, however, remains unclear. To which extent powerful states are not only able to exert negative influence (e.g., reject interventions in their own conflicts) but indeed influence decisions around other conflicts, as the accounts of traditional realists would suggest (cf. Mearsheimer 1994), similarly requires further investigation. The question of capabilities is commonly part of discussions about the AU and its interventions, specifically as it concerns the AU's resource limitations. While limited capabilities are not likely to stop the AU from adding a conflict to its agenda and intervene if deemed necessary, they very likely factor into the AU's decision *how* to intervene. Peace operations, for example, cannot be mounted without sufficient financial and military resources, and certain types of sanctions, such as embargos, require enforcement capabilities to be successful. When those capabilities are lacking, the AU may opt for a different approach. Naturally, this has an impact on intervention patterns. Hence, our efforts to explain as much of the variance as possible requires closer consideration of the processes – beyond individual cases – behind the results.

5.4.2 Applying the Theoretical Framework in Different Contexts

Finally, future research should consider using the theoretical framework emphasizing the two logics of cooperation for their case studies as well as to explain cooperation beyond the AU.

With research on AU interventions being dominated by individual case studies for the primary purpose of obtaining case-specific knowledge, there are two notable risks: first, research runs the risk of missing out on proper theorization and speaking to existing theoretical debates, and second, research runs the risk of missing common threads or notable differences

across intervention cases. This thesis can serve to alleviate both concerns. It presents a useful theoretical framework that can guide individual and comparative case studies. Researchers can refer to the results for their case selection process, and use it, for instance, to select critical or deviant cases, or to specify most similar or dissimilar systems design studies. It offers an idea of what we should expect individual cases to look like in accordance with the broader intervention patterns, and which factors to look at. The thesis provides hypotheses to be tested, variables to be integrated, and explanations to be considered. Thereby, it can structure case studies and serve to integrate these case studies into broader theoretical debates on problem-solving and regime-serving. In turn, such case studies have the potential to enrich the theoretical framework by not only testing its validity in specific cases but by introducing new variables, outlining variable interactions, identifying scope conditions, and so on.

Last but not least, future research should apply the theoretical framework developed in this thesis to explain cooperation and interventions beyond the AU. The previous section outlined that the usefulness of the broader framework is not inherently limited to the AU or even Africa. Indeed, the coexistence of the two logics, reflecting the impulse to solve community problems as well as serve incumbent regimes, may be the norm everywhere even as the prominence of each respective logic will naturally vary. Hence, the framework has great potential to enrich future research in the growing field of comparative regionalism (Söderbaum 2016b). Researchers have identified incumbent regimes as intended beneficiaries of regional cooperation across various regions, including Africa (Taylor and Söderbaum 2016), the Middle East (Barnett and Solingen 2007), the Asia-Pacific (Narine 2004), Eurasia (Libman 2015), Central Asia (Collins 2009), and Latin America (Agostinis and Closa 2022). Research on IOs in these regions should focus on the extent to which regime-serving and problem-solving logics coexist and how IOs cope with this parallel presence, particularly when it comes to security cooperation and interventions. Can we speak of hybrid regionalisms in the plural? Do the emerging intervention patterns resemble those in Africa and are they driven by the same two logics? Or, if not, what factors explain the differences? Answering these questions would go a long way to advance the research field of comparative (security) regionalism and our understanding of cooperation among states and across regions more generally.

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Appendix A1: Codebooks

Codebook to the Doctoral Thesis ‘Explaining African Union Conflict and Crisis Interventions’

July 2023 Version

Niklas Krösche
Leuphana University Lüneburg

In the first part, the Codebook introduces coding rules for the identification and categorization of institutional responses by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) which forms the foundation of the dissertation. In the second part, the Codebook introduces coding rules for the identification and analysis of coercive responses which corresponds to the second constitutive article of the thesis. In the third part, the Codebook introduces rules for and provides information about the classification of interventions as well as the various explanatory variables used in the third constitutive article of the thesis.

Part I: Institutional Responses

This part outlines the coding rules for the identification and categorization of institutional responses by the PSC.

I.1 Documents

To determine institutional responses by the PSC, I collected all publicly available ‘Communiqués’ and ‘Press Releases’ issued by the PSC between 1 January 2005 and 31 December 2021. These documents correspond to PSC meetings which are held at three different levels: the level of Heads of State and Government; the ministerial level; and the level of permanent representatives. Not every PSC meeting has a corresponding (publicly available) document, whereas for some meetings multiple documents are issued. I collected the relevant documents using the following procedure:

I started out going through the digital PSC archive on its official website which lists meetings with a produced document. This list is fairly comprehensive but misses some individual documents. In a number of cases, there is also no document produced for a given meeting.

Hence, I undertook additional steps specifically in the following cases:

1) A meeting is not listed in the PSC archive with a corresponding document (e.g., in the archive’s list, it jumps from 37th to 39th meeting, with no reference to the 38th meeting).

2) A hyperlink leads to a different meeting communiqué than what is noted in the description, or the hyperlink is broken.

3) The document signature indicates that more than one communiqué might have been produced under that meeting number (e.g., the signature ends with a 'COM.1' or 'COM.2')

In those cases, I first consulted the AU's digital archive and searched for the corresponding meeting document. In a second step, I used specific search terms to conduct a Google search. The simplest search term is '[insert meeting number, e.g., 37th] meeting PSC [add one of: COM, communiqué, press release, pdf]'. If that does not yield any results, I entered the expected document signature if it were to exist. Signatures have the following basic structure:

➔ PSC/[AHG or MIN or PR]/[COM. or COMM. or BR.] ([Roman Numerals for Meeting No.]);
e.g., the signature of the communiqué produced for the 648th meeting was:
PSC/PR/COMM.(DCXLVIII)

This approach allowed me to procure a relatively small but not insignificant number of additional documents. If this search did not yield any results either (including no references in academic publications), I did cross-check with the meetings list provided in the 'Report of the Peace and Security Council on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa' presented to the AU's assembly whenever it was publicly accessible and included such a list. After compiling all available documents, I also searched all documents for the meeting number to see if any subsequent documents referred to the meeting in question and its corresponding document.

Only in cases in which this double-checking suggested that a meeting document I have not yet been able to procure should exist, I used further less systematic ways such as a more specified search (e.g., with information about subject, date, location etc.), a search in a different language (e.g., French), a search in (third-party) reports or publications that may have referenced the meeting or document, and trying to reach out to the archives.

1.1.1 Basic Information

Each coded statement is linked to a specific document. I capture several general information that serve as basic identifiers and filter options. The captured general information includes:

Country

– Refers to the country targeted by an institutional response. Usually, the country of concern is listed in the introduction of each document and the responses are subsequently linked to that country. Some documents, however, may refer to multiple countries (e.g., in case of interstate conflict) or to a general topic (e.g., terrorism on the continent). Moreover, some responses may target a country not mentioned in the introduction (e.g., condemnation of activities in a different country's conflict). In those cases, the country to be coded for an institutional response is the targeted country in that context and not the country listed in the introduction. If a codable statement references more than one country, a separate institutional response is coded for each country. If a document does not reference any country explicitly in its introduction and a codable statement cannot be clearly linked to any specific country either, the corresponding code is 'Other' instead of the name of a country.

Year

– Refers to the year in which the meeting took place.

Meeting Number

– Refers to the number of the meeting as indicated at the beginning as well as in the signature of each document.

I.2 Coding Rules

The coding rules relate to two central aspects of the coding procedure: statement rules and category rules. ‘Statement rules’ refer to those rules that determine whether a specific text passage contains a codable statement or not. ‘Category rules’ refer to the type of institutional response that is to be selected for each coded statement.

The core purpose of the coding is to convey central information about an institutional response without requiring others (e.g., researchers, practitioners) to read each statement, and – due to the standardized nature of codes – also to allow researchers to filter and compare different institutional responses easily and flexibly. To maximize transparency, however, each code is to be linked to the respective statement that is behind the code.

I.2.1 Statement Rules

In a first step, it must be identified whether a statement contains an institutional response and is therefore to be coded. I define institutional responses as the formal and public activation of relevant diplomatic tools. I developed and applied a coding scheme to reliably identify such institutional responses. To be coded as an institutional response of the PSC, two criteria must be fulfilled.

First, institutional responses must link to relevant diplomatic tools. Relevant are those diplomatic tools and activities which plausibly require the use of resources (‘substantive’), plausibly serve to exert pressure (by means of coercion) or reach into the domestic sphere of member states (‘intrusive’), or both. Similar distinctions are commonly found in the literature on interventions (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1996; Binder 2015). This yields a list of categories of relevant diplomatic tools used by the PSC (see section on ‘Category Rules’). Yet a mere reference to such a relevant response type is not sufficient. Instead, it is necessary that the PSC is directly linked to this response. This occurs through textual cues and leads us to the next criterion.

Second, institutional responses require activation by the PSC. For a document passage to be coded as an institutional response, the PSC must take a decision or issue a request linked to one of the coding categories.

Decisions are expressed mostly by use of the term ‘decides’ but may also be expressed by terms such as ‘approves’ and ‘authorizes’. In cases in which the statement itself is the activated diplomatic tool, a decision is implied.²²

An additional form is a request directed at an *internal* entity, meaning a body or relevant entity of the AU other than the PSC. This request can be expressed through terms such as ‘requests’, ‘demands’, ‘mandates’, ‘authorizes’, ‘instructs’, ‘orders’, ‘approves’²³, ‘expects’, ‘asks’ or ‘calls on’. All these formulations clearly signal the Council’s expectations and, as most requests are directed at subordinate bodies such as the Commission, are comparable to decisions by the Council itself.

A final form is a request directed at an *external* entity, meaning another international organization, including the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Since the Council does not have the same authority to decide on what these entities are to do, this category is not only separated from the previous one but also tailored more narrowly. Requests of this kind can be expressed through terms such as ‘requests’, ‘urges’, ‘expects’, and ‘demands’. These formulations clearly signal the Council’s expectations and are argued to put at least some pressure on the targeted entity to comply with the request. Less strong terms such as ‘asks’ are excluded. Not coded are requests for support that do not imply a relevant institutional response on their own.

These three forms are captured by the variable ‘Decision-Type I’, for which the following codes are available:

1 – Decision

Example: “Decides to undertake, from 23 to 25 November 2009, a field mission in the Sudan.” (African Union 2009c)

2 – Request (internal)

Example: “Requests the Chairperson of the Commission to take the necessary measures to dispatch a pre-electoral and security situation assessment mission to the DRC [...]” (African Union 2017a)

3 – Request (external)

Example: “Urges ECOWAS to urgently dispatch a ministerial mission to Guinea-Bissau, as part of the follow-up steps for the implementation of the Conakry Agreement [...]” (African Union 2017b)

Finally, a ‘Decision-Type II’ is coded to provide additional information that are useful as filter options as well as to better understand the within-case evolution of institutional responses. There are six different types of decisions captured by the ‘Decision-Type II’ variable. This is important because a decision on an institutional response must not necessarily be its establishment or introduction, that is, the creation of its first presence (the default coding selection). Instead, institutional responses may also be removed or terminated, especially as regards sanctions and military missions. While this does not constitute a positive institutional response, it is important

²² For instance, when the PSC “condemns all acts violence in Libya” (category: condemnation) (African Union 2014d), it is implied that the PSC *decides* to condemn all acts of violence in Libya and therefore to be treated as a decision by the PSC.

²³ Meaning ‘formal’ approval in the sense of authorization, and not approval in the sense of positive assessment.

to identify when an ongoing institutional response ends (e.g., since the imposition of sanctions is coded, it is important to also code the lifting of sanctions to be able to identify the period of time during which sanctions were in place). Similarly, institutional responses may also be extended or renewed, especially when there is an underlying mandate that was temporary (e.g., for peace operations which are often only approved for six months or one year). Also, certain institutional responses may be strengthened, meaning a change in mandate or size, as well as expedited, meaning sped up to deliver on a prior decision. Decisions to support strong measures of other entities and, by virtue of doing so, adopting them as their own (esp. sanctions) are coded as strengthening. Lastly, an institutional response may just be openly considered, indicating a general willingness to undertake a certain action and, especially for intrusive responses, also putting pressure on target entities to alter their behavior if they wish to avoid being targeted by such an action (e.g., the threat of sanctions is coded as consideration).

The 'Decision-Type II' variable is therefore structured as follows (with the numbers representing the coding values), designed to capture the decision or request to...

1 – Introduce

Example: “Decides, in the light of the foregoing, to immediately suspend the participation of the CAR in all AU activities, as well as to impose sanctions, including travel ban and asset freeze, on leaders of the Seleka group [...]” (African Union 2013a)

2 – Remove

Example: “Decides, in view of the successful completion of the transition process and the restoration of normal constitutional order [...] to lift the suspension of the participation of the CAR in the activities of the AU.” (African Union 2016a)

3 – Extend

Example: “Decides to extend the mandate of MAES for an additional period of one month, until 31 August 2007;” (African Union 2007a)

4 – Strengthen

Example: “[Council further] decides to increase the number of human rights observers and military experts deployed by the AU in Burundi.” (African Union 2015a)

5 – Expedite

Example: “Urges the Commission to speed up the deployment of its observer mission to enable it to observe, in an adequate, effective, efficient and credible manner, all phases of the electoral process, as soon as possible and no later than the end of this month.” (African Union 2010)

6 – Consider

Example: “Warns that punitive measures, including targeted sanctions will be considered against any individuals or entities, for any action deemed to be obstructing the holding of a violent-free elections and undermining efforts towards the search for a durable solution to the persistent political and constitutional crises in Guinea Bissau.” (African Union 2019a)

... a relevant institutional response type.

Table A1.1. Overview of Decision-Type Codes

Decision-Type I	Decision-Type II
1 – Decision	1 – Introduce
2 – Request, internal	2 – Remove
3 – Request, external	3 – Extend
	4 – Strengthen
	5 – Expedite
	6 – Consider

1.2.2 Category Rules

This Codebook uses a comprehensive, exhaustive, and yet still meaningfully distinct list of categories (see Table A1.2). The list of relevant categories is based on a deductive-inductive approach. In a first step, I consulted the literature on interventions in addition to relevant AU treaties and protocols, which helped identify meta-categories that capture different types of diplomatic tools and yielded a preliminary set of categories. In a second step, I refined and added categories inductively by pre-coding a randomized subsample of the documents to ensure that the final categories are jointly exhaustive, meaningfully different, and empirically relevant. The list of categories is deliberately broad to ensure that the coding exercise is as comprehensive as possible, but filters can subsequently be applied as needed (e.g., filter for all missions involving military troops, 11-14). In the following, I outline and define the institutional response categories used for coding.

Table A1.2. Overview of Coding Categories

11 Peace Operation	21 Fact-Finding Mission
12 Military Intervention	22 Election Observation Mission
13 Military Observer Mission	23 Human Rights Observer Mission
14 Other Military Mission	24 Other Observer/F-F. Mission
31 Technical Assistance Mission	41 Mediation Mission/Delegation
32 Technical/Needs Assessment Mission	42 Mediation Measures
33 Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Mission	43 Special Envoy/Office
34 Political/Visiting Mission	44 Follow-Up Delegation/Mechanism
51 Suspension	61 Condemnation
52 Targeted Sanctions	62 Behavioral Demand
53 Embargo	63 Discretionary Mandate
54 Prosecution	64 Terrorist Declaration
71 Formalized Third-Party Cooperation	
72 Road Map	
73 Authoritative Decision	
74 Other (Rest)	

11 – Peace Operation

Refers to any operation conducted by military troops that is mandated to keep or enforce peace that did not occur on the explicit (based on the coded document) basis of Article 4(h) or 4(j) of the Constitutive Act.

Example: “Decides to authorize the deployment of AMISOM, for a period of 6 months, starting from the date of this decision, with the mandate (i) to provide support to the TFIs in their efforts towards the stabilization of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation, (ii) to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, and (iii) to create conducive conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia.” (African Union 2007f)

12 – Military Intervention

Refers to those military operations that are explicitly based on the invocation of Article 4(h) or 4(j) of the Constitutive Act.

Example: “In this regard, Council decides, in the event of non-acceptance of the deployment of MAPROBU, to recommend to the Assembly of the Union, in accordance with the powers which are conferred to Council, jointly with the Chairperson of the Commission, under article 7 (e) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, the implementation of article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act relating to intervention in a Member State in certain serious circumstances.” (African Union 2015g)

13 – Military Observer Mission

Refers to those type of military missions that are deployed with the explicit purpose of observing a situation on the ground without having a formal peacekeeping or peace enforcement mandate.

Example: “Authorizes, should the need arises, that Military Observers be deployed under the authority of the AU and in coordination with the Commission, in order to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to the successful holding of the elections.” (African Union 2006a)

14 – Other Military Mission

Refers to those missions that are military in nature, especially due to (ostensibly) consisting of military troops, that do not fall under one of the previous categories. This category is also coded when the nature of the operation is not fully clear and does not allow for classification as one of the above categories.

Example: “Takes note of the provisions of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement requesting the African Union to establish a Special Task Force for the protection of the leaders and combatants of the Palipehutu-FNL of Agathon Rwasa, as well as their movement to the assembly

areas and of the request by the Government of Burundi for the AU to take the necessary measures to ensure the security of leaders of the Palipehutu-FNL of Agathon Rwasa, as well as the safety of the corridors through which they will pass; Approves the establishment of the Special Task Force as provided for in the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement and mandates the Chairperson of the Commission to solicit the support of Member States to this effect.” (African Union 2006b)

21 – Fact-Finding Mission

Refers to those missions whose purpose lies in the determination or verification of accusations or reports and that is explicitly framed as a fact-finding mission or endeavor. If such a mission is deployed under the umbrella of a larger peace operation, this is to be coded if the decision is explicit on its deployment.

Example: “Requests the Commission to dispatch a fact-finding mission to the DRC, to examine together with all the concerned actors, problems of security along the borders with CAR and the Sudan, linked, among other aspects, to the movements of population and make recommendations.” (African Union 2007e)

22 Election Observation Mission

Refers to those missions that are deployed to observe the electoral process in a country. This includes the observation of the situation prior, during, and after the election and captures different types of election observation missions, including election monitoring missions.

Example: “Council requests the Commission to swiftly take steps to support the electoral process and to dispatch, as soon as possible, an electoral observation mission to Mali.” (African Union 2013b)

23 Human Rights Observer Mission

Refers to those missions that are deployed to observe the human rights situation in the country and report on possible human rights violations.

Example: “[Council] requests the AU and ECOWAS Commissions to deploy, as quickly as possible, as part of AFISMA and with the support of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR), civilian observers to monitor the human rights situation in the liberated areas.” (African Union 2013c)

24 Other Observer/Fact-Finding Mission

Refers to any other mission with an observation or fact-finding mandate that does not fit into the previous categories. In particular, this includes fact-finding or verification missions that do not explicitly use the term ‘fact-finding’ as well as observer missions with a broader mandate.

Example: “Council further requests the Chairperson of the Commission to take all measures he deems necessary, including the dispatch of an Observer Mission to monitor political, security, social, humanitarian and human rights developments in Togo;” (African Union 2005a)

31 Technical Assistance Mission

Refers to those missions whose primary purpose is the support of a country, organization, or operation in executing a plan or endeavor. This type of mission is not intrusive itself because it merely supports a mission, operation or strategy that is already in place.

Example: “Further requests the Chairperson of the Commission to take the necessary follow-up measures and coordinate the assistance solicited and to set up, with the assistance of AU Member States, a multidisciplinary team of experts that should be based in Bangui to support efforts for socio-economic recovery;” (African Union 2006c)

32 Technical/Needs Assessment Mission

Refers to those missions whose primary purpose lies in assessing the needs or feasibility of a different mission, operation, or strategy. It typically occurs prior to the establishment of another mission that is more substantive and possibly intrusive.

Example: “Requests the AU Commission to undertake post conflict reconstruction and development assessment mission to Darfur, in order to determine what areas of assistance could be offered to the Darfur region to avoid relapse into conflict;” (African Union 2017c)

33 Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Mission

Refers to those missions deployed in times of humanitarian crises with the purpose to provide humanitarian assistance or disaster relief.

Example: “Decides, given the emergency situation caused by the Ebola outbreak, to authorize the immediate deployment of an AU-led Military and Civilian Humanitarian Mission, comprising medical doctors, nurses and other medical and paramedical personnel, as well as military personnel, as required for the effectiveness and protection of the Mission.” (African Union 2014a)

34 Political/Visiting Mission

Used as an umbrella term for those missions that are non-military in nature and neither explicitly framed as mediation missions nor fitting into one of the categories above. It includes, for instance, country visits by organizational delegations.

Example: “Decides to undertake, from 23 to 25 November 2009, a field mission in the Sudan. The Mission shall be led by the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of November 2009 and will comprise the 15 members of the PSC.” (African Union 2009c)

41 Mediation Mission/Delegation

Refers to those missions or delegations that are dispatched for the purpose of mediating between two conflict parties to achieve or contribute to a resolution of a conflict.

Example: “Further decides to dispatch a high level delegation to Burundi to meet with the highest authorities of the Republic of Burundi, as well as with other Burundian stakeholders, to hold consultations on the inclusive Inter-Burundian Dialogue;” (African Union 2016b)

42 Mediation Measures

Refers to those measures with the purpose of mediating between two conflict parties to achieve or contribute to a resolution of a conflict that fall short of the explicit deployment or dispatch of a mediation mission or delegation. It includes, inter alia, the selection of a mediator to deal with a particular conflict. It also includes mediation measures that may entail the dispatch of a delegation or deployment of a mission but do not explicitly mandate them.

Example: “Requests the Commission to support the dialogue between the DRC Government and the M23, in close cooperation with the Chair of the ICGLR;” (African Union 2012a)

43 Special Envoy/Office

Refers to the decision to establish or select a special envoy to deal with a particular situation of concern in a targeted member state. This category requires the explicit mention of the term ‘envoy’. The only exception is the establishment of Liaison Offices, especially if they are opened in the targeted country/-ies and meant to support country-internal processes.

Example: “Requests the Commission to take all the necessary steps to fully support the implementation of the CPA, including through the appointment of a new Special Envoy and the opening of an appropriately staffed African Union Liaison Office in Khartoum, with an office in Juba;” (African Union 2007d)

44 Follow-Up Delegation/Mechanism

Refers to delegations or mechanisms sent or created to follow up with previous actions or decisions. This includes, for instance, measures to ensure that agreements are honored, decisions respected or executed, and previous efforts or gains solidified.

Example: “Requests the Chairperson of the Commission to rapidly establish, with the SADC, the OIF and the United Nations, a Follow-up Mechanism for the implementation of the Charter of the Transition, the Additional Act of Addis Ababa and the Maputo Agreements, as provided for in Article 12 of the Additional Act.” (African Union 2009b)

51 Suspension

Refers to the decision to suspend a member state from participating in the activities of the organization, including the suspension of voting rights.

Example: “Decides to suspend, with immediate effect, the participation of Burkina Faso in all AU activities, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the AU Constitutive Act and of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance;” (African Union 2015f)

52 Targeted Sanctions

Refers to those sanctions that target a specific group of persons, especially through travel bans and asset freezes.

Example: “Decides, in view of the refusal of the military junta to respond immediately and in good faith to the requests of the AU and ECOWAS, to impose, with immediate effect, individual measures, including travel ban and asset freeze, against the leader and members of the junta, as well as against all individuals and entities contributing, in one way or another, to the maintenance of the unconstitutional status quo and impeding AU and ECOWAS efforts.” (African Union 2012b)

53 Embargo

Refers to the decision to not allow or limit the flow of certain goods or materials into a country or region. This includes military blockades as a forceful means to give effect to an embargo.

Example: “Requests the United Nations Security Council, in line with the relevant provisions of the IGAD communiqué, to: (i) take immediate measures, including the imposition of a no fly zone and blockade of sea ports, to prevent the entry of foreign elements into Somalia, as well as flights and shipments carrying weapons and ammunitions to armed groups inside Somalia which are carrying out attacks against the TFG, the civilian population and AMISOM” (African Union 2009a)

54 Prosecution

Refers to actions that lead to, initiate, or foster the prosecution of individuals linked to punishable acts committed in a certain country or region. This includes decisions to involve the International Criminal Court (ICC) or other judicial authorities with supra- or extranational jurisdiction and the issuing of arrest warrants as well as directives to act upon them. I also code the announcement or warning of consequences for perpetrators of violators under this section if the consequences remain unspecified and it cannot be inferred that the consequences consist of targeted sanctions.

Example: “Reiterates the AU’s determination to ensure that the perpetrators of acts of violence and atrocities, as well as all those aggravating the situation through inflammatory statements, are held accountable;” (African Union 2015g)

61 Condemnation

Refers to forceful rhetoric that condemns certain actions with or without explicitly naming the entity that is being condemned. For this category to be coded, the terms ‘condemn’ or ‘condemnation’, or a synonym, must be present so as to eliminate any interpretative act as to what does and does not constitute an act of condemnation. Each act of condemnation is coded separately.

Example: “Expresses its deep concern over the continued presence of ex- FAR/Interahamwé, the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) and other armed groups in the East of the DRC, strongly condemns their destabilizing activities in the region, as well as the terrible acts they commit against the civilian population.” (African Union 2007e)

62 Behavioral Demand

Refers to those demands that are a) clearly expressed (especially by the term ‘demand’) and b) refer to *concrete* and explicit behavior that is supposed to be put in place or stopped. Behavioral demands target conflict parties. Demands at subordinate actors or other IOs such as the AU Commission or the UNSC are coded as (internal or external) requests with the corresponding institutional response category (or not at all if no corresponding category exists).

Example: “Demands the immediate and unconditional release of the President of the Transition, Mr. Michel Kafando, the Prime Minister, Mr. Yacouba Isaac Zida, and other members of the Government;” (African Union 2015f)

63 Discretionary Mandate

Refers to those instances in which the Council requests or allows another entity to use ‘all necessary/appropriate means’ to achieve an objective or task. This excludes such instances in which ‘all necessary/appropriate means’ are merely requested in the context of raising support for an institutional response. Hence, the envisioned measures must in some way reach, or potentially reach, directly into the sphere of member states and not be merely directed at external/third-party entities. Moreover, this excludes the coding of any such expression in which codable examples of means are given – in this case, only the suggested institutional response is taken (e.g., “Requests the Commission to take all the necessary steps to fully support the implementation of the CPA, including through the appointment of a new Special Envoy and the opening of an appropriately staffed African Union Liaison Office in Khartoum, with an office in Juba” (African Union 2007d) is only coded as 43).

Example: “REITERATES its determination to take all necessary steps to assist in the effective establishment of the new institutional framework of the Comoros, as provided for in the Fomboni and Beit Salam Agreements of February 2001 and December 2003, respectively, including the restoration of the authority of the Government of the Union in Anjouan.” (African Union 2007c)

64 Terrorist Declaration

Refers to those instances in which a particular group is declared a terrorist group. It also includes instances in which a group, government, or state is declared a rogue actor, especially when this implies tangible consequences for their ability to act in certain ways or operate through certain channels, as is the case with a formal terrorist declaration.

Example: “Decides, in line with the relevant AU instruments, to declare the LRA a terrorist group, and requests the UN Security Council to do the same;” (African Union 2011)

71 Formalized Third-Party Cooperation

Refers to any kind of effort to establish formal channels for the cooperation with third parties to solve a security issue on the continent. This includes the establishment of international contact groups (ICGs), workshops, or conferences. The opening of Liaison Offices is included when their primary purpose lies in the cooperation with third parties – when in doubt, however, Liaison Offices are coded under 43.

Example: “Decides to step up its efforts in support of Libya and its people, as well as of the region, emphasizing the need for Africa to play a crucial role in the ongoing process. In this respect, Council agrees to establish, in close coordination with and with the support of the UN, an International Contact Group for Libya (ICG-L), comprising all of Libya’s neighbors, as well as the relevant multilateral and bilateral partners, in order to facilitate a coordinated and harmonized international engagement, in support of the efforts of the neighbors of Libya. Council requests the Chairperson of the Commission to take immediate steps for the early convening of the ICG-L.” (African Union 2014d)

72 Road Map

Refers to instances of deciding upon so-called ‘Road Maps’ that contain explicit actionable recommendations for resolving a crisis or conflict, developed and endorsed by a third-party actor and directed at conflict, internal, as well as external parties.

Example: “Decides in light of the above to adopt the Roadmap outlined below, for implementation by both Sudan and South Sudan, in order to ease the current tension, facilitate the resumption of negotiations on post-secession relations and the normalization of their relations;” (African Union 2012c)

73 Authoritative Decision

Refers to instances in which the PSC decides or adjudicates on matters that normally fall within the sovereign sphere of the targeted state. Such decisions or adjudications must be specific and not merely generic, and clearly signal to the target and others what is expected. This includes, for instance, explicit expectations of military movements, stipulated power-sharing or power-

transitioning agreements, declaring government administrations or their decisions illegitimate, and rendering verdicts on elections and its outcomes.

Example: “Declares null and void all measures of constitutional, institutional and legislative nature taken by the military authorities and that followed the coup d’Etat of 6 August, 2008;” (African Union 2008b)

74 Other

Refers to any institutional response decided upon that does not fit into one of the previous categories but is nonetheless to some degree substantive and/or intrusive. Thus, this excludes any institutional response that does not require the use of considerable resources, dispatch delegations or troops, or reach directly into the sovereign sphere of the target state. This includes humanitarian assistance without the dispatch of a mission.

Example I: “Decides to establish a mechanism of naming and shaming of suppliers, financiers, facilitators, transit points and recipients of illicit weapons, with a view to stemming the phenomenon of the illicit proliferation of these weapons [...]. In this regard, Council requests the AU Commission, in close cooperation with the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) and the Committee of Intelligence and Security Service of Africa (CISSA), to develop a draft mechanism and to be submitted to Council for consideration.” (African Union 2018)

Example II: “Taking into account the strategic role of the AU, which is a Guarantor to the PAPR, in the efforts to restore peace in the CAR, authorizes the AU Commission to deploy support, especially financial resources as sourced from the EU [...]” (African Union 2019b)

Part II: Corresponding Codebook for Article 2

This part deals with the coding undertaken for the second article of the thesis. The Codebook focuses on coercive responses by the PSC and its content, and introduces the sampling procedure as well as the different coding categories and corresponding coding rules.

II.1 Sampling

The sampling of relevant institutional responses draws on the coding of institutional responses as outlined in Part I. Article 2 focuses on coercive interventions, which it defines as those interventions that seek to alter the behavior of targeted groups through the application of pressure or the use of force. Hence, I consider three broader categories to be coercive in the context of this article: 1) military operations, 2) sanctions, and 3) forceful rhetoric.

Consequently, I filtered for statements coded under the following institutional response categories (see Part I):

1. Military Operations

- 11 Peace Operation
- 12 Military Intervention
- 13 Military Observer Mission
- 14 Other Military Mission

2. Sanctions

- 51 Suspension
- 52 Targeted Sanctions
- 53 Embargo
- 54 Prosecution

3. Forceful Rhetoric

- 61 Condemnation
- 62 Behavioral Demand

With respect to ‘Decision-Type II’ (see Part I), the sample includes the threat (coded as consideration) and support (coded as strengthening) (→ especially relevant for sanctions) as well as the continuation/renewal (coded as extension) (→ especially relevant for military operations) of the above institutional response types. With respect to ‘Decision-Type I’ (see Part I), it includes not only decisions but also internal as well as external requests for the above institutional response types.

II.2 Coding Categories

Coding categories are subsumed under two core and two auxiliary themes: 1) target, 2) action, 3) reason, and 4) context. The first three themes are coded exclusively based on the content of the statement, whereas coding for the fourth theme is supported by context knowledge of the coder.

To identify more easily and reliably what categories to code under each theme on the basis of the content of the statement, we can translate statements into a consistent grammar as follows:

For 51-54, 61: We condemn/sanction ACTOR for (not) doing ACTION because REASON.

For 62: We demand of ACTOR to (not) do ACTION because REASON.

→ Actor = Target

Whereas Target and Action are necessary components, Reason is optional (indicated by the used language, e.g., ‘condemns attacks *which have caused* suffering’, ‘condemns coup d’état *because it threatens* national stability’, ‘condemns the violation of peace agreements *with their implications for* stability in the region’, ‘condemns the violations of cease fire agreements *as a step towards* escalation’ – i.e., besides the action itself that is being condemned, there must be an additional part of the statement that links the action to its consequences or implications);

For 11-14, which includes consideration of the broader mandate, a consistent grammar is more difficult to apply but can be conceived of as following this basic logic:

– We deploy mission to address ACTION in furtherance of GOAL – and in doing so target ACTOR.

→ Goal = Reason

II.2.1 Target

Target refers to the entity (actor, group, individual) at whom the coercive response is directed, that is, whose actions are met with a coercive response.

11 Government

Refers to the (de jure) incumbent governments.

It includes references to individual government elements, including individual political leaders, except for the military which is coded separately (13). It also includes demands directed at ‘countries in the region’ unless it can be inferred that they focus on countries that are not members of the AU (coded as 41). It excludes de facto governments in the context of UCGs, which are coded as 12.

Example: “Council also strongly condemns the inflammatory statements made by Burundian political leaders, which have the potential of aggravating the current tension and creating conditions conducive to violence of untold consequences for Burundi and the region;” (African Union 2015b)

12 De Facto Authorities

Refers to regimes, groups or individuals that have taken control of the government but are not recognized as the legitimate (‘de jure’) government.

It includes de facto authorities below the federal level (e.g., the case of the Anjouanese authorities in the Comoros). ‘Transitional authorities’ are also coded under this section. If statements refer to the ‘perpetrators of the coup d’état and its civilian supporters’, this is still only coded as 12. References to ‘the perpetrators of the coup’ are coded under this category (and not under 13, even if the coder knows that it was a military coup). However, direct references to the military in this context are still coded as 13.

Example: “Confirms the suspension of de facto authorities in Togo and their representatives from participation in the activities of all the organs of the African Union until such a time when constitutional legality is restored in the country and requests the Commission to ensure the scrupulous implementation of this measure;” (African Union 2005b)

13 Military

Refers to the military, or elements of the military (incl. references to ‘paramilitary’ organizations), irrespective of whether their affiliation is with a de jure or de facto incumbent government.

This is also coded when a response targets ‘dissidents’ of the military (e.g., African Union 2007e). In case the military or parts thereof are mentioned as the de facto government (e.g., ‘the military authorities’), this is coded under 12.

Example: “Demands the Malian defence and security forces to respect the country’s Constitution, uphold their professionalism, stick to their constitutional mandate and to unconditionally return to the barracks, as well as to refrain from interfering in the country’s political processes.” (African Union 2020a)

14 Peacekeepers

Refers to peacekeepers or other personnel of multilateral missions.

Example: “Council expressed deep concern at the allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse and other violations of human rights committed by elements of the international forces in the CAR. Council strongly condemned these unacceptable and vile acts, and stressed the need and urgency to investigate on this issue. Council urged all the troop and police contributing countries whose nationals are reported to be involved in the commission of such acts to expeditiously carry out the required investigations and to take, as appropriate, exemplary sanctions.” (African Union 2015e)

21 Conflict Parties (Government)

Refers to the warring parties, at least one of which must be the government or a government-affiliated group that is explicitly described as such (this includes the concept of paramilitaries).

Important for coding this category is the presence of at least two parties who are both targeted by the coercive response. A reference to the government is assumed in interstate conflicts when the name of at least one country is generically mentioned.

Example: “Strongly condemns all violations of human rights and acts of violence committed in Burundi both by the security forces and by militias and other illegal armed groups, and expresses its determination to ensure that the perpetrators of these abuses are held accountable for their acts, including before relevant international jurisdictions;” (African Union 2015a)

22 Conflict Parties (Other)

Refers to the warring parties, none of which are explicitly governmental.

What matters is the language of the PSC, not the knowledge of the coder (e.g., the Janjaweed in Darfur are coded as a conflict party under this section unless their affiliation with the Sudanese government is acknowledged by the PSC). This also includes references to ‘signatories’ of agreements.

Example: “Demands that all concerned CAR stakeholders, including the leaders of former Seleka and the anti-Balaka group and officials of the regime of former President François Bozizé, to unequivocally call on their supporters to put to an immediate end to attacks against civilians and any other action that may undermine efforts aimed at restoring peace, security and stability in the CAR and to promote reconciliation.” (African Union 2014b)

31 Armed Groups (Unspecific)

Refers to armed groups, including terrorist or criminal groups, which are generically mentioned.

If both an unspecific and a specific reference to armed groups is present, this is not coded as 31 but as 32.

Example: “Reiterates AU’s strong condemnation of the attacks perpetrated by an alliance of armed terrorist and criminal groups against the city of Konna, in the Mopti area, on 10 January 2013.” (African Union 2013c)

32 Armed Groups (Specific)

Refers to armed groups, including terrorist or criminal groups, which are mentioned by name.

Usually, this is indicated by capitalization of the target’s name and/or the use of an acronym. If both an unspecific and a specific reference to armed groups is present, this is coded as 32.

Example: “Reaffirms AU’s commitment to the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the DRC and its total rejection of the recourse to armed rebellion to further political claims. In this regard, Council, once again, condemns the M23 for having re-launched the armed rebellion in the eastern part of the DRC, causing a serious humanitarian crisis and threatening to destabilize the entire region;” (African Union 2012a)

39 Armed Groups including External Actors (unspecific)

Refers to armed groups, while highlighting that this (also) includes foreign elements.

Example: “Strongly condemns the aggression perpetrated against the TFG of Somalia and the civilian population in Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia by armed groups, including foreign elements, bent on undermining the peace and reconciliation process, as well as regional stability.” (African Union 2009a)

41 External Actors

Refers to any actor, group or entity that is not located in the territory where the respective conflict or crisis takes place.

Usually, this is indicated by using the term ‘external’ or ‘foreign’ or by mentioning another country’s or region’s name (e.g. ‘European countries’). It is *not* distinguished whether the external actor is further specified or not. This excludes instances in which another African government is targeted, which is coded under 11. This also excludes interstate conflicts in which both conflict parties are mentioned, which is coded under 21.

Example: “Council strongly condemned non-African states sponsoring and promote the influx of arms into Africa, including in cases of existing armed embargoes, leading to the further escalation of existing conflicts.” (African Union 2021b)

51 All Actors

Refers to instances in which the coercive response targets ‘all’ actors, groups, parties, or entities.

For this to be coded, the terms ‘all’, ‘any’, ‘every’, or ‘whoever’ must be used in reference to the target (e.g., ‘all conflict parties’, ‘any/every group that resorts to violence’).

Example: “Council reaffirms the strong condemnation by the AU of all acts of violence, committed by whomsoever, as well as of human rights abuses, including killings, extra-judicial executions, violations of the physical integrity of persons, acts of torture and other cruel,

inhuman and/or degrading treatment, arbitrary arrests and illegal detentions, violations of the freedom of the press and freedom of expression and the prevalence of impunity.” (African Union 2015b)

52 Undefined Elements

Refers to instances in which the target is described as ‘elements’ or ‘those who do [action]’ but remain otherwise entirely undefined.

Example: “Council reiterated its strong condemnation of the threats and/or acts of violence perpetrated by those elements seeking to undermine the political process, hinder the operations of AMISOM and undermine regional peace and stability.” (African Union 2008a)

53 Unspecific

Refers to instances in which the target is not mentioned in any way.

Example: “Council strongly condemns all attempts to demonize AMISOM and the TCCs;” (African Union 2009a)

59 Other

Includes any other actor not that does not fit into a previous category.

Example: “In this context, Council condemns human traffickers that are sending thousands of African and other migrants on a perilous crossing of the waters of the Mediterranean Sea.” (African Union 2016c)

Table A1.3. Overview ‘Target’ Categories

1 Government (Recognized) 11 Government 2 Government (Rogue) 12 De Facto Authorities 13 Military	4. Armed Opponents 31 Armed Groups (Unspecific) 32 Armed Groups (Specific) 39 <i>Armed Groups incl External Actors (Unspecific)</i>	6. Not Clearly Specified 51 All Actors 52 Undefined Elements 53 Unspecific
3 Conflict Parties (Equally) 22 Conflict Parties (General) 3.1 (Government explicit) 21 Conflict Parties (Gov)	5. External Actors 41 External Actors	7. Residual/Other 14 Peacekeepers 59 Other

Note: Structured along different themes that facilitate interpretation but lead to different ordering.

II.2.2 Action

Action refers to the action or behavior taken or exhibited by the target of a coercive response, which is identified as the trigger for the coercive response.

11 Attack (Civilians)

Attacks refer to instances of one-sided violence that injure or kill civilians or attempt to do so.

Civilians include humanitarian workers except when they are (explicitly) part of multilateral political or military missions (12). It also includes the obstruction to humanitarian assistance to

populations in need unless this is framed under human rights or humanitarian law (21). If not further specified, this is the default category. If various types of attacks are highlighted in the same statement, this category is coded. It includes references to ‘atrocities’ committed against the civilian population. Acts of terrorism are also assumed to target civilians unless otherwise specified. An attack on civilians is coded as a violation of human rights if it is explicitly subsumed under this category in the statement. This also includes lack of effort to stop attacks against civilians, even if the targeted actor is not the one carrying out the attack.

Example: “Recalls its previous decisions relating to the repeated pattern of targeted violence against civilians, in general, and women, in particular. In this respect, Council condemns in the strongest terms the ongoing use of sexual violence as a means of waging war in the eastern part of the DRC. Council demands that the perpetrators desist from their heinous acts. Council stresses that the perpetrators of these crimes shall be held accountable for their acts.” (African Union 2012a)

12 Attack (Personnel)

This refers to attacks (see definition above) against civilian or military personnel of multilateral missions.

Specifically, this includes attacks against peacekeeping missions. This also includes attacks or lootings of buildings or offices belonging to international organizations.

Example: “Condemns the attacks on the African Embassies and the United Nations (UN) compound, which led to the death of four peacekeepers and the injuring of several others, as well as the destruction of UN property and material.” (African Union 2016d)

13 Attack (State & Infrastructure)

This refers to attacks (see definition above) against infrastructure, civilian or military, and against ‘the state’ (or a (capital) city) unless further specified.

This excludes purely soft infrastructure in the context of terrorist attacks, e.g., shopping malls, which is coded under 11. It includes assassinations of political or military leaders. For this category to be coded, the ‘attack’ must be highlighted, or it must be clear that one sovereign state attacks or otherwise militarily infringes (e.g., through occupation) on another. If it concerns fighting the state more generally, this is to be coded as armed rebellion (33) unless the fighting occurs between two sovereign states. If one state attacks another, this is coded under this category (and not as external interference).

Example: “Council condemns the shelling on the territory of Rwanda.” (African Union 2013d)

14 Violence

This refers to violence more broadly (usually without reference to a victim).

It is only coded in cases in which the violence is not presented as one-sided (e.g., depiction of a victim and a perpetrator, which constitutes an attack (11-13); ‘violence against civilians’ is also coded as an attack (11) as it indicates that the violence is one-sided). It includes ‘military operations’ unless it is presented as one-sided aggression towards the government, in which case it would be coded as armed rebellion (33). It also includes references to ‘fighting’. Only an attack

is coded if it is part of a statement that also refers to violence more generally, to use the more specific reference. If a statement references violence more generally and then emphasizes its implications for civilians, this is coded under this category in addition to coding a reason (here: civilian suffering) separately. Demands to end armed rebellion are coded as 33, whereas demands to end violence more generally are coded here.

Example: “Stresses AU’s deep concern at the prevailing humanitarian and security situation in the country and strongly condemns all acts of violence.” (African Union 2016c)

21 Violation (Human Rights)

Violations are instances in which an actor does not adhere to agreed-upon standards of behavior. Human rights violations, as conceptualized in this Codebook, are those violations that negatively affect a group of people, especially civilians, due to being subjected to illegitimately used force or coercion.

I include instances of forced military subscription, the use of child soldiers, mistreatment of migrants, and violence against demonstrators. Mostly, statements either refer to ‘human rights’ generically or specific rights and/or are phrased as a ‘violation’ (implying an agreed-upon standard). If this is not the case and there is doubt in the context of civilians, it is coded as 11 (e.g., “the terrible acts they commit against the civilian population” (African Union 2007e) is coded as an attack on civilians due to absence of a clear link to human rights). Demands can either refer to the end of violation or the adherence to human rights. It also includes lack of effort to stop human rights violations against civilians, even if the targeted actor is not the one carrying out the violation directly.

Example: “Strongly condemns all violations of human rights and acts of violence committed in Burundi both by the security forces and by militias and other illegal armed groups, and expresses its determination to ensure that the perpetrators of these abuses are held accountable for their acts, including before relevant international jurisdictions;” (African Union 2015a)

22 Violation (Agreements)

For a definition of ‘violation’, see above. Agreements refer to agreed-upon standards of behavior among conflict parties or other parties bound by these standards.

This category includes violations of the terms of peace agreements (esp. internal (conflict) parties) and the non-adherence to the terms of embargos or sanctions (esp. external parties). In terms of demands, this includes demands to adhere to, join, or consider oneself to be bound by agreements. Obstruction (23) is coded when demands to resolve a conflict are not framed in the context of specific agreements. Demands can either refer to the end of violation or the adherence to, as well as joining of, agreements. Agreements include both existing agreements as well as those still to be negotiated.

Example: “Demands that the armed belligerents immediately and fully respect the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and end, once for all, all acts of violence, and agrees, should this become necessary, to deploy an African force to bring the ongoing tragedy in South Sudan to a definite end;” (African Union 2015c)

23 Obstruction

Obstruction is coded in instances in which a targeted entity is subject to coercive responses for actions undermining or obstructing efforts to peacefully resolve a conflict or crisis.

This includes rejections of conflict resolution efforts or agreements. This excludes calls to armed rebellion, which are coded as 33. If both violating and undermining agreements are mentioned separately in the same statement, 22 is coded as the more direct violation. This also excludes obstructions to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, which are coded as 11 (or in some cases 21) as it immediately affects civilians and is also not primarily about conflict resolution. This includes demands to join or engage in the peace process (unless framed in terms of specific agreements). This excludes, however, demands to end violence (coded as 14) as well as to end armed rebellion (coded as 33). This includes peace spoilers unless they are explicitly noted as external actors, in which case it is coded as 41.

Example: “Decides, in support of the efforts to find an early and consensual solution to the crisis facing Burundi, to impose targeted sanctions, including travel ban and asset freeze, against all the Burundian stakeholders whose actions and statements contribute to the perpetuation of violence and impede the search for a solution [...]” (African Union 2015a)

31 Unconstitutional Change of Government

Refers to unconstitutional changes of government, including and most notably military coups.

This includes attempted UCGs. This includes demands to return to constitutional order if framed in the context of UCGs (otherwise 32 is coded). If obstruction or undermining, or the violation of agreements, is mentioned explicitly as it concerns the return to constitutional order, this is coded under this category (and not as 23 or 22, respectively).

Example: “Reiterates its firm condemnation of the coup d’Etat and all other measures taken by its authors to consolidate the situation created by this coup d’Etat and reiterates the legitimacy of the constitutional order represented by the institutions democratically elected during the legislative and presidential elections held in November 2006 and March 2007, respectively;” (African Union 2008b)

32 Unconstitutional Behavior

This category captures behavior below and beyond the level of UCGs which violates constitutionality principles.

This includes, for instance, abuse of power (e.g., illegitimately appointing a new PM, wrongful imprisonment of political opponents, but also the harassment or intimidation of political figures). This also includes unilateral actions in national settings, especially from transitional or de facto authorities, including unconstitutional interference by the military in political affairs. If different forms of unconstitutional behavior are condemned alongside the UCG, only the UCG (31) is coded.

Example: “Condemns the actions of 12 April 2021 by the House of People, which extended the mandate of the President and the Parliament, as effectively delaying the elections, thereby undermining unity and stability of the country, the nascent democratic and constitutional processes, which also threaten the relative peace and security, as well as the important gains that

Somalia has made over the years with the support of the AU and other partners with huge sacrifices;” (African Union 2021a)

33 Armed Rebellion

Armed rebellion refers to militaristic attempts by non-state actors at changing power in a country.

This includes calls to armed rebellion, the overthrow of the government, and the incitement of violence by rebel groups that are declared as such. It also includes ‘(military) offenses’ by non-government actors such as rebel groups. It includes references to (armed) incursions unless otherwise specified.

Example: “Welcomes the press release issued by the Chairperson of the Commission on 22 March 2013, and strongly condemns the resumption by the Seleka group of its armed rebellion, in total violation of the Libreville Agreements concluded under the auspices of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), with the support of the AU and the rest of the international community. [...] Council demands that the Seleka group put an immediate halt to its attacks, and calls on all concerned to fully comply with their obligations under the Libreville Agreements and settle their differences through dialogue;” (African Union 2013e)

41 External Interference

Captures instances in which entities that are not immediate parties to a conflict, usually from outside the conflict state’s territory, are subject to coercive responses due to being engaged in said conflict or crisis situation without authorization and against the expectations of the PSC.

This includes references to peace spoilers if they are explicitly identified as external actors. For demands, this includes the end of external interference and any infringement of sovereignty – unless it is a direct attack on a state coded as 13 – by other governments. This is unless it is done indirectly and through intermediaries which are coded as illegitimate support (42) – such as, for example, inexistent or insufficient efforts to prevent their territory from being used by armed groups to pursue their rebellion or terrorist activity.

Example: “Reaffirms its commitment to respect the sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity of the FGS and strongly condemns the external interference in the domestic affairs of Somalia which undermines the peace process and weakens the achievements gained in the country;” (African Union 2019c)

42 Illegitimate Support

Refers to situations in which an entity, usually from the outside, supports one conflict party without the consent and approval of the recognized sovereign or the international community, and especially the PSC.

Such support can include the provision of shelter or financial means to armed rebels, terrorist organizations, or criminal networks, as well as the provision of weapons. Inexistent or insufficient efforts to prevent their territory from being used by armed groups to pursue their rebellion or terrorist activity are coded under this category. Generally, this refers more generally to violations of principles of friendly relations among states below the threshold of an attack against the state if the rebelling, attacking or interfering actor is not the government itself but a harbored group.

Example: “Expresses deep concern over the source of funding and support for the activities of Al-Shabaab in Somalia and in neighbouring countries; in this regard, Council strongly condemns those who fund or support the activities of the Al-Shabaab terrorist group in a way that undermines the peace and stabilization process in Somalia and warns that Council will proceed to naming and shaming those involved;” (African Union 2019c)

51 Non-Specified

Refers to actions that remain unspecified (e.g., ‘any action that threatens peace’).

This category is only coded when neither specifications nor examples are provided. If examples are provided (e.g., ‘any action that threatens peace, such as violent attacks’), this is coded for the respective category under which the example falls.

Example: “Council also condemned the actions of the other negative forces operating in the region, including the FDLR.” (African Union 2012d)

52 Other

Residual category that covers any action or behavior that does not fit into one of the previously outlined categories.

It includes references to ‘aggression’ that are not framed as attacks or violence. This also includes incitement.

Example: “Council stresses that under no circumstances should refugee camps be used as places of recruitment or planning for illegal activities and radicalization leading to terrorist activities. In this regard, Council strongly condemns the use of refugee camps for such acts and warns those responsible that they will be accountable in accordance with the relevant provisions of both International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law.” (African Union 2015d)

(Primarily for Behavioral Demands)

91 Troop Withdrawal

Refers to demands to withdraw troops or personnel from certain areas or cease provocative military activities.

It can also refer to condemnations or sanctions for occupying certain areas, including civilian buildings.

Example: “Demands that all military and security personnel illegally occupying the 25 civilian buildings immediately vacate these premises without preconditions and warns that such actions constitute violations of international law and continued defiance of this warning will lead to instituting of sanctions on all those responsible;” (African Union 2020b)

92 Disarmament

Refers to demands that a group joins the process of disarmament or generally lays down weapons, unless this is explicitly framed as a stop to armed rebellion.

This also includes other stages of the disarmament process, such as reintegration (e.g., into the army, into society).

Example: “Council recalled its earlier decisions on the urgency of neutralizing the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), and demanded that the FDLR implement without delay the voluntary disarmament process they have announced.” (African Union 2014c)

Table A1.4. Overview ‘Action’ Categories

1 Violence (vs. Civilians) 11 Attack (Civilians) 21 Violation (Human Rights) 2 Violence (vs. State) 13 Attack (State) 33 Armed Rebellion 3 Violence (Other) 12 Attack (Personnel) 14 Violence	5 Constitutional/Democratic Violations 31 UCG 32 Unconstitutional Behavior	7 Unspecific 51 Non-Specified 8 Other 52 Other
4 Violations/Obstruction 22 Violation (Agreement) 23 Obstruction	6 External Actions 41 External interference 42 Illegitimate Support	9 End Combat 91 Troop Withdrawal 92 Disarmament

Note: Structured along different themes that facilitate interpretation but lead to different ordering.

II.2.3 Reason

Reason refers to the justification provided by the PSC as to why a specific action is a cause for concern. The reason goes beyond the action by highlighting the negative implications of the action (e.g., unconstitutional changes of governments threaten regional stability). Unlike target and action, the reason is not a necessary component of coercive responses. This is not to say that when not coded, a response is without reason but, rather, that the reason is not made explicit (and sometimes, the reason may already be implied in the action that triggers the coercive response). In some cases, a statement may not have an explicit justificatory link but describe actions in ways that imply a reason (e.g., if adding a simple ‘which’ suffices to make it explicit) through focusing on their implications rather than their nature, which makes it to be coded (e.g., “their destabilizing activities in the region” (African Union 2007e) is to be read as ‘activities which destabilize the region’ (action: non-specified, reason: regional instability); however, “the terrible acts they commit against the civilian population” (ibid.) cannot be translated in the same way as it does not focus on the implications but rather specifies the nature of the action (action: attack (civilians); reason: no reason).

o No Reason

No reason is provided in the statement, identified based on the language and structure of the statement.

Example: “Demands the return to constitutional legality, which entails the resignation of Mr. Faure Gnassingbé and the respect of the provisions of the Togolese Constitution regarding the succession of power;” (African Union 2005b)

1 Civilian Suffering

For this category to be coded, it must be highlighted that the actions of a target have, or threaten to have, negative impacts on the civilian population.

This includes, for example, deaths, famine, and insecurity but also any mentions of adverse effects on civilian populations that are not further specified. It also includes exacerbation of the spread of diseases. It excludes, however, references to the displacement of civilians which is coded under 2. If in doubt, it is assumed that references to suffering more generally or to ‘people’ refer to civilians.

Example: “Council also strongly condemned the intercommunal violence, *which cause many civilian victims in the Kidal region* and expressed its determination, in close cooperation with the international community, to take measures against the signatory movements of the Agreement, which continue to violate the cease-fire.” (my emphasis) (African Union 2017d)

2 Displacement

For this category to be coded, it must be highlighted that the actions of a target have led, or threaten to lead, to displacement.

This includes internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. This category is separate from the ‘civilian suffering’ category to acknowledge the implications of displacement not only for civilians but also for the countries and regions which host refugees/IDPs or experience increased uncontrolled cross-border movement.

Example: “Council further condemns all negative forces, including the Mai-Mai, the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR), the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), *latest action of the latter having led to continuing massive internal displacements and flow of refugees;*” (my emphasis) (African Union 2013d)

3. Escalation

For this category to be coded, it must be highlighted that the actions of a target have led, or threaten to lead, to escalation of a conflict or crisis, or otherwise contribute to its non-resolution.

This is the default category for conflict escalation unless it is explicitly noted that the PSC is concerned about the implications of the escalation for national or regional stability.

Example: “Reiterates its strong condemnation of external interference in the domestic affairs of Libya as manifested by continued supply of arms in violation of the UN arms embargo, *which is undermining efforts to urgently resolve the crisis in Libya;*” (my emphasis) (African Union 2020c)

4 National Instability

For this category to be coded, it must be highlighted that the actions of a target have led, or threaten to lead, to national instability. National instability is coded when the effects of an action are referenced with a view to what it does to the conflict country in question.

This includes ‘violence which resulted in the loss of lives and destruction of property’ unless it is specifically linked to civilian lives and property. It also includes UCGs unless it is framed as a violation of relevant agreements or protocols (this is then coded as a normative violation (7)). It is subsidiary to the conflict escalation/non-resolution category unless the escalation of the conflict is explicitly connected to national instability as the ultimate reason for concern. National

instability is only coded if it refers to one particular instead of multiple states (otherwise it is regional instability (5)), or if national instability is highlighted and only then linked to implications for the broader region (in this case, both national and regional instability is coded). References to instability or destabilization, without further specification or reference to other states or the broader region, are coded as under this category.

Example: “Recalls the strong condemnation by the AU of the coup d’état which took place in Mali on 22 March 2012, as well as the need to restore constitutional order and ensure the resumption of the normal functioning of the republican institutions. Council notes that *this coup d’état, which constitutes a serious setback for Mali and Africa, has severely weakened Mali and undermined its national cohesion at a time when the country is facing rebellion by armed groups in the northern part of its national territory;*” (my emphasis) (African Union 2012b)

5 Regional Instability

For this category to be coded, it must be highlighted that the actions of a target have led, or threaten to lead, to regional instability. Regional instability is coded when the effects on an action are referenced with a view to what it does for the broader region or neighboring states.

It is subsidiary to the conflict escalation/non-resolution category unless the escalation of the conflict is explicitly connected to regional instability as the ultimate reason for concern. If national instability is highlighted for multiple states in the same context, this is then to be coded as regional instability. References to instability or destabilization, without further specification or reference to other states or the broader region, are coded as national instability (4).

Example: “Reiterates AU’s strong condemnation of the armed attacks against the Malian State and the unacceptable and dangerous presence of terrorist and criminal groups in the northern part of the country, *as well as the threat that recourse to armed rebellion poses to the viability of African states and to the democratization processes on the continent.*” (my emphasis) (African Union 2012e)

6 Sovereignty Infringement

For this category to be coded, it must be highlighted that the actions of a target have led, or threaten to lead, to an infringement of a country’s sovereignty.

Such references are coded when either sovereignty or a related norm (non-interference, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders) is explicitly mentioned as the reason for concern.

Example: “Reaffirms its commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of all the States of the region, as well as to the respect for the principles governing the relations of good neighborliness between Member States, as enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the AU. Council demands that all the States of the region scrupulously comply with these principles. *Council, in particular, requests the Sudan and Chad to take the necessary measures in order to prevent and effectively stop the utilization of their territories for the launching of activities undermining the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the other;*” (my emphasis) (African Union 2007b)

7 Norm Violation

For this category to be coded, it must be highlighted that the violation of a norm itself is the reason for the coercive response, unless the norm is further linked to one of the above categories.

Statements to be coded under this category include justifications based on breaches of agreements or protocols.

Example: “Welcomes the press release issued by the Chairperson of the Commission on 22 March 2013, and strongly condemns the resumption by the Seleka group of its armed rebellion, *in total violation of the Libreville Agreements concluded under the auspices of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)*, with the support of the AU and the rest of the international community.” (my emphasis) (African Union 2013e)

9 Other

This category is coded for any reason that does not fit into one of the above outlined categories.

Example: “Council demands that the Burundian parties fully cooperate with the human rights observers and the military experts, *in order to facilitate the effective implementation of their respective mandates;*” (my emphasis) (African Union 2015a)

Table A1.5. Overview ‘Reason’ Categories

1 Civilian Suffering	4 National Instability	7 Norm Violation
2 Displacement	5 Regional Instability	9 Other
3 Escalation/Non-Resolution	6 Sovereignty Infringement	0 No Reason

II.2.4 Context

Context describes the broader crisis context in which a statement is made. The coding is determined by a combination of a) the text of the coded statement itself (e.g., elections are mentioned in the paragraph) and b) (within limits and without relying on subjective interpretations) the coder’s contextual knowledge of the case (e.g., the coder is aware that the violence that is condemned took place around elections), which should be primarily informed by the rest of the communiqué or official document. For this reason, I also chose not to include examples akin to the prior sections, as the process is less strictly bound to the specific statement at hand. Coding multiple context categories for one statement is possible where applicable provided that no coding rule outlined below restricts it.

1 Unconstitutional Change of Government

Describes a situation in which an unconstitutional change of government, often in the form of a military coup, took place.

It is also coded when a coup or attempt to take over power has been unsuccessful but is explicitly framed in terms of UCGs.

2 Election

Describes a situation in which an election has just taken place or is about to take place.

This is only coded if elections are mentioned in the communiqué, or if it is otherwise identifiable that elections are linked to the coercive response (e.g., a terrorist attack in Northern Nigeria with no apparent link to the election in the same year is not coded as an election-context)

3 Rebellion

Describes a situation in which a rebellion or separatist movements are active.

This is only coded if the rebellion is mentioned in the communiqué, or if it is otherwise identifiable that rebellion or separatism are linked to the coercive response. Included are instances in which forces in an autonomous area in a country attack the federal government, in which actions of military dissidents trigger a response, and when attacks aim at the sovereignty of the state. It excludes instances of coups (successful or failed) if directly framed in the context of UCGs (which is coded as 1).

4 Violent Conflict

Describes a situation in which a war or violent conflict takes place.

This is the default category when violence takes place unless it is specified that the violence occurs in a different context (e.g., around elections, as part of terrorist activity).

5 Terrorism

Describes a situation in which there is terrorist activity that is linked to the coercive response.

This is often the case for one-sided attacks, unless it is specified that this is part of another context (e.g., rebellion, UCG).

6 Humanitarian Crisis

Describes a situation in which there is a humanitarian crisis.

This category is coded only when the emphasis is on the humanitarian crisis itself, and not when the focus is on the conflict causing it. For it to be coded, a humanitarian crisis must be declared – either explicitly or through pertinent language (e.g., ‘widespread suffering’) – and not be assessed as such by the coder.

7 External Interference

Describes a situation in which there is (undesired) external interference in a conflict.

This category is coded when external interference is emphasized – in a negative manner – in the communication (e.g., the dispute with the ICC), and is not to be assessed based on the coder’s interpretation of external influence (such as: is there external influence in the crisis in northern Mali? – this is only coded as such if the PSC makes clear that it considers external interference a relevant and problematic or concerning issue).

9 Other

Describes a context that does not fit any of the aforementioned situations or fits one or more of the aforementioned situations but has additional attributes that warrant coding. The latter is to be decided upon by the coder on a case-to-case basis.

Table A1.6. Overview ‘Context’ Categories

1 UCG	4 Violent Conflict	7 External Interference
2 Election	5 Terrorism	9 Other
3 Rebellion	6 Humanitarian Crisis	

Other important context information include the country/-ies and year, both of which were already coded for each institutional response, including the coercive ones, under Part I.

Part III: Corresponding Codebook for Article 3

This part deals with the coding undertaken for the third article of the thesis. It involves two main coding efforts: 1) the coding of the dependent variables, and 2) the coding of the independent and control variables. This part of the Codebook outlines both aspects in separate sections.

The corresponding dataset and Do-File used for the regression analysis with Stata are attached to the thesis (digital) and can also be solicited from the author under niklas.kroesche@gmail.com.

III.1 Dependent Variables

The dependent variable is dichotomized in two different ways: 1) any intervention, and b) resource intervention. In both cases, I rely on the coding work done under Part I of the Codebook. For each country-year with a violent conflict – which constitutes the population of cases considered for the analysis – I looked at the coding results for institutional responses to determine whether an intervention (‘any’ or ‘resource’) was present or not for the respective country-year.

III.1.1 Any Intervention

Variable name: any_int_yn

Variable description: Any Intervention

This dichotomous variable denotes the presence of any intervention in the respective country-year. I code any intervention as present if any institutional response (see Part I) has been coded for that respective year. Excluded are external requests (see ‘Decision-Type I’) as the relevant institutional response in those cases is merely solicited by the PSC. Excluded are also, for obvious reasons, the removal of sanctions and lifting of suspensions, which constitutes the removal of a relevant institutional response. This information, however, is important to understand for which years previously imposed sanctions and suspensions are in place – as sanctions and suspensions are coded until the time they are removed, even if they are not formally repeated, extended, or strengthened in any given country-year.

III.1.2 Resource Intervention

Variable name: *res_int_yn*

Variable description: Resource Intervention

This dichotomous variable denotes the presence of a resource intervention in the respective country-year. I code a resource intervention as present in the following cases: deployment or internal request for deployment of non-military and observer missions, country visits by PSC delegations, measures towards supporting peace operations and other missions of other IOs or bodies (i.e., beyond rhetorical support), and deployment, extension, strengthening, and authorization of peace operations and other military missions. Excluded in this operationalization are responses that can reasonably be expected to require some resources (formalization of third-party cooperation, individual mediation measures, etc.) but do not require mission deployment.

III.2 Identifiers, Independent and Control Variables

III.2.1 Identifiers

Variable name: *id*

Variable description: Identification Number

An identification number is assigned for each observation in the dataset based on the sorting principle in the dataset. The dataset is sorted by the name of the country in alphabetical order (first) and the year in chronological order (second). For the name or abbreviation used for each country in the dataset, see elaboration under *country*.

Variable name: *country*

Variable description: Country Name

This variable denotes the name of the respective country with a violent conflict for the corresponding year. The following names or abbreviations of countries are used in dataset, in alphabetical order: Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo (Rep.), Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, DRC, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zimbabwe.

Variable name: *year*

Variable description: Year

This variable denotes the year in which the corresponding country experienced violent conflict between 2005 and 2019.

III.2.2 Independent Variables

Variable name: *intensity*

Variable description: Conflict Intensity

Conflict intensity denotes the sum of the number of deaths per year and country due to state-based, non-state and one-sided violence, using UCDP's 'best estimate' of deaths.

Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Interactive Map, <https://ucdp.uu.se/> (1 May 2020) (for the corresponding Codebook and introduction, see Sundberg and Melander 2013; Croicu and Sundberg 2016). Retrieved and compiled directly from UCDP's interactive map first on 1 May 2020 and again on 8 October 2020 for the year 2019 (and re-checked for 2018 for updates).

Variable name: *ref_afr*

Variable description: Refugees (in African Countries)

Lists the total number of refugees plus asylum-seekers and other persons of concern to the UNHCR, by country of origin, that are present in other African states in this project's sample (Morocco is included for all years) in a given year.

Source: The data is obtained from the UNHCR and compiled from the dyadic interface (Extracted: 23/02/2022 16:36 UTC; Last Updated: 10-Nov-21; Usage License: <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>; Link: <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=W5mVh5> (last opened on 23 November 2022)). See (UNHCR n.d.).

Note: Numbers for South Sudan (as Country of Origin) in 2011 do not exist yet. The 'UNHCR Global Trends 2011' report writes under Figure 5 with respect to refugees from Sudan: "May include citizens of South Sudan (in absence of separate statistics for both countries)" (UNHCR 2012, 14). Data for South Sudan as Country of Asylum, however, does exist in 2011.

Variable name: *confl_clus*

Variable description: Conflict Cluster

Conflict clusters, according to my conceptualization, are conflicts that are transnational in nature due to taking place on multiple states' territories or involving one state actor operating on another state's territory. It is scored on a four-point ordinal scale (0-3). The score is determined by the number of countries involved as well as the number of conflict deaths for each territory of the cluster based on actor-based information in the UCDP GED Dataset (Sundberg and Melander 2013; Croicu and Sundberg 2016).

In a first step, I identified all listed actors between 2005 and 2019 and compiled them in a spreadsheet. In a second step, I compiled the total number of deaths related to any given actor (i.e., in which the respective actor was listed as either 'Side A' or 'Side B') per year and actor. In a third step, I identified actor-years that involved more than one country (i.e., either events in two or more different countries, or in one country but with events that involve the government of a different country). In a fourth step, I assigned scores to any given country with higher scores depicting greater conflict clusters.

Scoring:

- 1 if two or more countries are involved, either as a location or as actor²⁴, with at least 25 battle-related deaths for each;
- 2 if three or more countries are involved with at least 25 deaths for each, or if two countries are involved with at least 100 deaths for each;
- 3 if three or more countries are involved with at least 100 deaths for each;
- 0 if none of this applies.

The score for each country-year is based on the score for the entire conflict cluster of which it is a part (which requires a minimum threshold of at least 25 battle-related deaths linked to the country for the year) as the conflict cluster – not the individual country – is of primary interest. In case a country is part of more than one conflict cluster in a given year, the conflict cluster with the highest score determines the score for the respective country-year.

Variable name: *election_coup_yn*

Variable description: Election or Coup (yes or no)

This variable indicates whether there was either an election (of a Head of State or Government) or a coup d'état (attempted or successful), or both, present for the country-year. For information on the determination of whether a relevant election was present, see elaboration under *election_hosg* (Section III.2.3). For information on the determination of whether a relevant coup d'état was present, see elaboration under *coup_a_s* (ibid.).

Variable name: *psc_m*

Variable description: PSC Member

Indicates whether the country in question was a member of the PSC for the respective year. In those cases in which composition changes during the year, only the countries that were members of the PSC for the majority of the year are coded as being PSC members for the year (i.e., exactly 15 countries are coded as PSC members in any given year).

Source: Coded based on Decisions and Declarations of the AU Assembly, (usually) titled 'Decision on the Election of the Members of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union'.

Variable name: *psc_hisup*

Variable description: Historical Support by PSC Members

²⁴ When actors and locations diverge but link to the same country, they are added up. Hypothetical example: 25 Deaths (Mali), 15 Deaths (Nigeria, by Government of Niger), 10 Deaths (Niger). This would be scored as '1' because a total of 25 deaths can be linked to Niger: 15 to Niger as an actor, 10 to Niger as a location; this is added up, making it a conflict cluster involving Mali and Niger (but not Nigeria, as only 15 deaths are linked to Nigeria (as a location), which does not reach the minimum threshold of 25 deaths).

Lists the number of PSC members for every year which have in the past provided external support to the country in question during a violent conflict episode (at least 25 battle-related deaths for the year). The support can have either been provided to the government of the country or an opposing actor (e.g., rebel or paramilitary group; military wing of a political party; terrorist actors; or, in cases of interstate conflict, the opposing government). It considers only those years prior to the full operationalization of the PSC (1975 to – including – 2004).

Source: The data is based on the UCDP External Support Dataset (Högbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér 2011).

Variable name: *ref_psc*

Variable description: Refugees (in PSC Member States)

Lists the total number of refugees plus asylum-seekers and other persons of concern to the UNHCR, by country of origin, that are present in a PSC member state (based on the determination made in this project, i.e., the majority of the year is taken) in a given year. The data is obtained from the UNHCR and compiled from the dyadic interface (Extracted: 23/02/2022 16:36 UTC; Last Updated: 10-Nov-21; Usage License: <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>; Link: <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=W5mVh5> (last opened on 23 November 2022)). See (UNHCR n.d.).

Variable name: *sec_napow_confl_yn*

Variable description: Conflict over Secession or National Power

This variable indicates whether the violent conflict for the year in question was about either 1) national power or 2) secession, or both. For information on the determination of whether a conflict involved national power as a relevant conflict item, see elaboration under *napow_confl_yn* (Section III.2.3). For information on the determination of whether a conflict involved secession as a relevant conflict item, see elaboration under *sec_confl_yn* (ibid.).

III.2.3 Control Variables

Variable name: *stapow*

Variable description: State Power Index

Based on population and GDP scales. These two scales are calculated by dividing the total population or GDP, respectively, by the highest respective number scored for the year among African states. The score is then multiplied by 100. Example: Nigeria has the largest population in 2005, and therefore on the population scale it scores 100. A country with half the population would score a 50 for the given year (irrespective of its rank among countries, as the relative share is measured against the highest value). To obtain the 'state power' value, population and GDP scales are simply added up and divided by 2.

In cases in which data for EITHER population OR GDP is not available for a given year and a score cannot be determined on this basis, the empty cells are filled based on the last available score. In other words, it is assumed that the scale remains constant against the highest value (note: this only applies for the scale – the values for population or GDP are not filled in). If data is not available for the first year(s) of the dataset, the cells are filled based on the first observation that is present in the dataset (e.g., if values for 2005 and 2006 are missing, they will be assigned the same value as for 2007). In cases in which BOTH population AND GDP is not available for a given year, the same overall principle applies but in this case the value of reference is that for the overall state power score and not for the two components population and GDP.

Source: World Development Indicators (The World Bank n.d.) (extracted on 11 March 2020 for the years 2005-2018, and on 2 February 2021 for the year 2019).

Variable name: *coup_a_s*

Variable description: Coup d'État (Attempted or Successful)

This variable captures successful and attempted coups. I only include successful as well as attempted but failed coup events (not plotted and alleged ones). The variable is dichotomous, with 0 being coded for country-years with no successful or failed coup attempt, and 1 for those with one.

Source: The variable is based on the 'Coup d'État Events, 1946-2018' dataset from the Center for Systemic Peace (Marshall and Marshall 2019) (extracted on 20 January 2021). For 2019, I added the coup in Sudan and the attempted coup in Ethiopia manually.

Variable name: *election_hosg*

Variable description: Election (Head of State or Government)

This variable denotes whether the country-year in question had an election of a Head of State or Head of Government.

Source: Data obtained from IFES-operated 'Election Guide' (IFES n.d.) (accessed on 20 January 2021).

Variable name: *sadc_or_ecowas*

Variable description: SADC or ECOWAS Membership

Denotes whether the country in question was a member of either the SADC or the ECOWAS.

Variable name: *napow_confl_yn*

Variable description: Conflict over National Power

Denotes whether the violent conflict in a given country-year was about national power.

Source: Variable is based on the ‘conflict items’ classification in the Heidelberg Barometer (HIIK) (HIIK n.d.) (last accessed on 23 March 2022). It defines conflict items as “material or non-material goods which are claimed by the direct conflict actors through constitutive conflict measures”, with ‘national power’ being defined as “control of a state” (HIIK n.d.) (last accessed 18 January 2021). I only coded this conflict item as present when it expressed itself in violence for a given year and country (i.e., conflict intensity 3 or higher in the HIIK dataset – that means a country might experience a violent conflict but not necessarily over national power as a country may experience multiple (types of) conflicts in parallel).

Variable name: *sec_confl_yn*

Variable description: Conflict over Secession

Variable is based on the ‘conflict items’ classification in the Heidelberg Barometer (HIIK). It defines conflict items as “material or non-material goods which are claimed by the direct conflict actors through constitutive conflict measures”, with ‘secession’ being defined as “separation of part of a state’s territory with the aim of creating a new state or the incorporation to an existing state” (HIIK n.d.) (last accessed 18 January 2021). I only coded this conflict item as present when it expressed itself in violence for a given year and country (i.e., conflict intensity 3 or higher in the HIIK dataset – that means a country might experience a violent conflict but not necessarily over secession as a country can experience multiple (types of) conflicts in parallel).

Variable name: *sd_freedom_psc_m*

Variable description: Heterogeneity among PSC Members (Freedom Score)

This variable presents heterogeneity among PSC Members with respect to their level of freedom. I used the total score presented in the data produced by Freedom House (2003-2022 Version, downloaded on 15 November 2022) (Freedom House n.d.) for all 15 members of the PSC each year. Subsequently, I calculated the standard deviation across the 15 members for each year. The *year* variable in the dataset then corresponds to the value of this variable for the respective year.

Variable name: *sd_democracy_psc_m*

Variable description: Heterogeneity among PSC Members (Democracy Score)

This variable presents heterogeneity among PSC Members with respect to their level of democracy. I used the ‘RoW measure with categories for ambiguous cases (v2x_regime_amb)’ produced by the Varieties of Democracy project (V-DEM Data v12, downloaded on 15 November 2022) (Coppedge et al. 2022) for all 15 members of the PSC each year. Subsequently, I calculated the standard deviation across the 15 members for each year. The *year* variable in the dataset then corresponds to the value of this variable for the respective year.

Appendix A2: Controls and Robustness Checks (Article 3)

Table A2. Alternative Model Specifications for Full Models (Controls and Robustness Checks)

VARIABLES	Model A1	Model A1	Model A2	Model A2	Model A3	Model A3	Model A4	Model A4	Model A5	Model A5	Model A6	Model A6	Model A7	Model A7
	Any Int.	Res. Int.	Any Int.	Res. Int.	Any Int.	Res. Int.	Any Int.	Res. Int.	Any Int.	Res. Int.	Any Int.	Res. Int.	Any Int.	Res. Int.
Conflict Intensity (100s)	0.069** (0.029)	0.038* (0.020)	0.060** (0.027)	0.032 (0.020)	0.178*** (0.049)	0.073** (0.032)	0.167*** (0.047)	0.072** (0.031)	0.162*** (0.046)	0.075** (0.031)	0.160*** (0.048)	0.076** (0.032)	0.175*** (0.049)	0.073** (0.031)
Refugees (Africa) (10,000s)	0.050*** (0.018)	0.075*** (0.019)	0.063*** (0.021)	0.088*** (0.022)	0.052** (0.021)	0.088*** (0.023)	0.049** (0.021)	0.080*** (0.022)	0.048** (0.020)	0.081*** (0.021)	0.047** (0.020)	0.080*** (0.022)	0.048** (0.021)	0.081*** (0.022)
Conflict Cluster	0.448*** (0.168)	0.530*** (0.166)	0.503*** (0.172)	0.562*** (0.171)	0.380** (0.185)	0.558*** (0.185)	0.394** (0.189)	0.509*** (0.186)	0.377** (0.183)	0.508*** (0.178)	0.390** (0.185)	0.465*** (0.177)	0.355* (0.182)	0.495*** (0.175)
Electoral/UCG Context	1.014** (0.466)	0.812* (0.468)	1.100** (0.478)	0.882* (0.482)	1.148** (0.508)	0.901* (0.504)	1.135** (0.499)	0.861* (0.491)	1.097** (0.503)	0.778 (0.498)			1.113** (0.496)	0.847* (0.487)
PSC Membership	-1.173*** (0.399)	-0.867** (0.431)	-1.136*** (0.410)	-0.833* (0.443)	-1.243*** (0.439)	-0.934** (0.455)	-1.191*** (0.428)	-0.853* (0.447)	-1.171*** (0.428)	-0.845* (0.453)	-1.191*** (0.437)	-0.883** (0.448)	-1.192*** (0.429)	-0.834* (0.447)
Historical Support (PSC)	-0.637*** (0.215)	-0.576** (0.229)	-0.823*** (0.240)	-0.784*** (0.253)	-0.923*** (0.261)	-0.888*** (0.270)	-0.818*** (0.250)	-0.777*** (0.258)	-0.792*** (0.248)	-0.791*** (0.266)	-0.808*** (0.258)	-0.784*** (0.259)	-0.798*** (0.246)	-0.778*** (0.257)
Refugees (PSC Members) (%)	0.044 (0.045)	0.038 (0.046)	0.048 (0.048)	0.045 (0.048)	0.043 (0.050)	0.040 (0.050)	0.047 (0.050)	0.046 (0.050)	0.049 (0.050)	0.049 (0.049)	0.050 (0.051)	0.047 (0.050)	0.048 (0.050)	0.050 (0.050)
Conflict Item (NP or S)	0.346 (0.422)	0.407 (0.440)	0.414 (0.438)	0.428 (0.458)	0.685 (0.483)	0.531 (0.478)	0.551 (0.472)	0.421 (0.465)	0.565 (0.471)	0.558 (0.468)	0.395 (0.474)	0.433 (0.469)		
State Power	-0.044*** (0.011)	-0.031*** (0.011)	-0.044*** (0.011)	-0.031*** (0.011)	-0.061*** (0.014)	-0.033*** (0.012)	-0.057*** (0.014)	-0.032*** (0.012)	-0.057*** (0.014)	-0.036*** (0.012)	-0.055*** (0.014)	-0.034*** (0.012)	-0.056*** (0.015)	-0.032** (0.013)
Coup (Attempt or Success)											2.984** (1.457)	0.218 (0.818)		
Election (HoS or HoG)											0.733 (0.545)	0.998* (0.538)		
ECOWAS or SADC Member									0.357 (0.417)	0.830* (0.424)				
National Power Conflict													0.548 (0.447)	0.326 (0.436)
Secession Conflict													0.065 (0.635)	0.137 (0.624)
Heterogeneity of PSC (Fre.)					0.143* (0.075)	0.153** (0.076)								
Heterogeneity of PSC (Dem.)							0.438 (0.595)	0.213 (0.612)						
Constant	-0.222 (0.410)	-1.425*** (0.452)	-0.333 (0.430)	-1.475*** (0.474)	-3.205** (1.563)	-4.581*** (1.642)	-1.203 (1.216)	-1.902 (1.262)	-0.555 (0.497)	-1.882*** (0.529)	-0.324 (0.449)	-1.464*** (0.477)	-0.395 (0.446)	-1.464*** (0.481)
Observations	231	231	227	227	226	226	226	226	226	226	226	226	226	226

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Any Int. = Any Intervention; Res. Int. = Resource Intervention

Model A1 = Includes all country-years with a conflict (including interstate conflicts)

Model A2 = Includes statistical outlier (Nigeria 2014)

Model A3 = Controls for heterogeneity among PSC members based on freedom scores

Model A4 = Controls for heterogeneity among PSC members based on democracy scores

Model A5 = Controls for membership in ECOWAS or SADC

Model A6 = Includes coup (attempted or successful) and election year as separate variables

Model A7 = Includes conflict items (national power and secession) as separate variables

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