The Revolt of the Disenfranchised:

Socio-Cultural Polarization and Its Effect on Civic Culture around the World

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Abstract

Considering the recent success of right-wing populist parties in the United States and across Europe, there has for some years now been talk among scholars (and the wider public) about a worldwide democratic recession. Levitsky and Ziblatt paint a very gloomy picture when they write that democracy is at risk of dying. Others are not as pessimistic, but they still argue that democracy is in a state of serious disrepair. The younger generations appear to be especially unsupportive of democracy's liberal principles and more willing to express support for authoritarian alternatives. What these authors overlook, however, is that the publics of advanced industrial societies have experienced an intergenerational value shift. In fact, populations in industrial democracies have become more liberal overall, but not everyone's mindset is changing at the same speed. It is mainly – but not exclusively – the members of the lower classes that do not keep up. While societies have generally become more liberal, there is increasing alienation between the social classes over these liberal values. Drawing on a more recent trend in social class research with a social cognitive approach, this dissertation contributes to the study of growing anti-democratic tendencies around the world by analyzing the interplay between inequality dynamics and value orientations. The focus lies on investigating the effect socio-cultural polarization (i.e., ideological polarization between social classes) has on civic culture in the mature democracies of the West. The findings suggest that it is not ideological polarization between the social classes that has the greatest negative effect on civic culture, or general civic attitudes and behavior, for that matter. It is the increasing dissent in society about whether the country's elites are still to be trusted with making the right decisions to increase the average citizen's quality of life. This difference in opinion manifests itself in a decline in some civic attitudes.

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I am truly grateful.

It’s a wrap.

Introduction

Democracy is not so much a form of government as a set of principles.
– Woodrow Wilson

Conflict is not always a bad thing. Sometimes, it can even be quite beneficial. Conflict – the active disagreement between people with opposing opinions or principles[1] – prevents stagnation because it challenges the status quo. Thus, productive conflict can be a driver for positive change and progress (cf. Coser, 2001; Deutsch, 1969; Simmel, 1904). It is not a flaw but in fact an important part of the democratic system. In many ways, democracies are conflict management systems (cf. Przeworski, n.d.), where, ideally, conflict is mediated by shared ideals (cf. Hanna, 2017). Tolerating each other's opposing opinions and views and acting respectfully towards others forms the basis of every democratic society. Agreeing to disagree on certain issues or compromising on them, for that matter, is a fundamental aspect of peoples' democratic attitudes (cf. Gibson, 2006, 2013; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Yet even in the most established democracies this convention does not seem to be the guiding principle anymore. The norms of toleration and restraint, the "soft guardrails" (cf. Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018) of liberal democracy, seem to have been weakening and people are coming at each other from opposing points of views with a lot of rage and anger. It is like something is broken inside these societies (cf. Arbatli & Rosenberg, 2021; Draca & Schwarz, 2020).

In *How Democracies Die* Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) focus on the erosion of democratic norms in the United States. However, we can witness similar tendencies in other established liberal democracies. Lately, the degree of polarization seems to have reached a new high in many of them, as has the intensity of conflict, threatening democratic stability (cf. Carothers & O'Donohue, 2019; Somer & McCoy 2018). "Inherent in all democratic systems is the constant threat that the group conflicts which are democracy's lifeblood may solidify to the point where

[1] Meaning taken from the online version of the Cambridge Dictionary.

they threaten to disintegrate the society" (Lipset, 1969, p. 58; cf. Dahl, 1971). Both the attempted storm of the German Reichstag building by angry coronavirus protestors in August 2020 and the successful takeover of the U.S. Capitol building by armed pro-Trump supporters in January 2021 represent the culmination of a conflict that has (in the most literal sense) struck at the heart of democracy. They have exposed the vulnerability of democracy and shaken its foundations, that is, the fundamental principles and ideals that democracy is built upon, to the core (cf. Harris, 2021).

The so-called cultural congruence hypothesis (cf. Almond & Verba, 1963; Eckstein, 1966), probably the most important tenet in political culture research, postulates that a political system must be "consistent with the citizens' value orientations" to remain stable (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 186). For democracies, Almond and Verba (1963, 1989) coined the term *civic culture*, which they describe as a "model of democratic citizenship" (Almond & Verba, 1989, p. 16). Considering the recent success of right-wing populism with its anti-democratic tendencies, it may be wondered whether democracies are in fact slowly dying as Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) claim (cf. Sheafer & Shenav, 2013). In an article published in the *Journal of Democracy* titled "The Democratic Disconnect," Foa and Mounk (2016) warn against the danger of democratic deconsolidation[2]. Referring to Linz and Stepan's (1996) definition of democratic consolidation as the extent to which democracy is the "only game in town" (p. 5), they ask what happens to consolidated democracies when the majority of their citizens no longer believe that democracy is the only legitimate form of government and are open to alternatives (Foa & Mounk, 2017b, p. 9).

In their article, Foa and Mounk (2016) refer to the indisputable decline of important key indicators of democratic legitimacy, such as trust in politicians and political institutions, voter turnout, and party identification, and conclude that "even in some of the richest and most politically stable regions of the world…democracy is in a state of serious disrepair" (Foa & Mounk, 2016, p. 6). Most political scientists, they argue, would not acknowledge these trends as a sign of underlying structural problems of democracies, but instead see it as a sign of the increased political sophistication or maturity of citizens in democracies today who have simply become more critical. Although these scholars admitted that support for particular goverments had

[2] Democracies are consolidated when the norms and procedures of democracy become internalized, so that all actors always abide by the written and unwritten rules of the game. It is the unquestioned and routinized commitment to those rules that reduces uncertainty between competing actors in the political arena. Such a change requires a shift in political culture (Diamond, 1999, p. 65). Democratic deconsolidation is, then, the "uneven, ambivalent, or deteriorating" (Diamond, 1999, p. 72) commitment to the norms and procedures of democracy. See also Norris (2017) and Foa & Mounk (2016).

declined, they generally argued that support for democracy as a system of government had remained stable (Foa & Mounk, 2016, p. 6). Foa and Mounk challenge this view. In their research, they find "deeply concerning" (Foa & Mounk, 2016, p. 7) evidence that

> "citizens in a number of supposedly consolidated democracies in North America and Western Europe have not only grown more critical of their political leaders…they have also become more cynical about the value of democracy as a political system…and more willing to express support for authoritarian alternatives" (Foa & Mounk, 2016, p. 7).

Younger people, specifically, those born after 1980, were particularly less supportive of liberal democracy today and felt more political apathy than older generations, according to the authors (cf. Foa & Mounk, 2016). In a follow-up article titled "The Signs of Deconsolidation" (2017b) they present more evidence for this alleged generation gap: Compared to older people, young people increasingly believe that a democracy is no longer the only legitimate system of government to live under (p. 6; cf. Foa & Mounk, 2017a).

In their responses to Foa's and Mounk's articles, Inglehart (2016), Norris (2017), Voeten (2017) and Alexander and Welzel (2017) agree with Foa and Mounk on their central claim: Support for democracy seems to be in decline, while it looks like support for non-democratic, specifically populist-authoritarian alternatives, is increasing. Furthermore, if this trend continued, it could very likely pose a threat to liberal democracies, because populist-authoritarianism challenges core democratic values (Norris, 2017, p. 14). However, these scholars disagree with Foa and Mounk's explanation for why this phenomenon is happening. According to them, it is not the younger generation that is driving this alarming development. Quite the contrary, in fact:

> "The publics of advanced industrial societies experienced unprecedented levels of existential security, and a large share of them grew up taking survival for granted. This brought an intergenerational value shift from emphasizing economic and physical security above all, toward greater emphasis on free choice…gender equality and tolerance of gays" (Inglehart, 2017, p. 2).

Alexander and Welzel (2017) found that populations in industrial democracies have overall become more liberal, but not everyone's mindset is changing at the same speed. It is mainly – but not exclusively – the members of the lower classes who have not kept up with the speed of change. In fact, the two authors suggest that there is a double marginalization[3] happening. The lower social classes have not only been marginalized in purely economic terms because of the increasingly unequal distribution of wealth in the industrialized democracies of the West (cf. Alvaredo et al., 2018). They have also become more marginalized because of the growing ideological distance between the upper and lower classes. In other words, the system of values that

[3] Throughout this thesis, double marginalization does not refer to the supply chain management concept taught in economics, but the marginalization of the lower social classes in society based on 1) their social circumstances and opportunities and 2) their cultural values.

lower class individuals hold is inconsistent with the system of values they are expected to hold. Even though societies have become more liberal in general, there is increasing alienation between the social classes over these liberal values. While those who do not have to worry about their survival have become increasingly liberal, the shift to new values has been delayed among those affected by economic stagnation, rising inequality and high unemployment, encouraging xenophobia and authoritarianism in Western countries (cf. Inglehart, 2017). In another article published in the *Foreign Affairs Magazine*, Mounk and Foa (2018) themselves admit that "as liberal democracies have become worse at improving their citizens' living standards, populist movements that disavow liberalism are emerging" (Mounk & Foa, 2018, p. 29).

Therefore, this project seeks to further explore an alternative democracy crisis narrative: Deepening economic class division causes corresponding class polarization over conflicting ideological issues. As a result, the already economically marginalized social classes also become ideologically marginalized, as they can no longer relate to the societal mainstream's liberal-progressive agenda. These "left behinds" feel more and more alienated and frustrated. And they become angry and cynical about the democratic system's incapacity and its elites' failure and/or unwillingness to increase the average citizen's quality of life. They then turn away from democracy and flock to populist parties, as they promise to overthrow the democratic status quo and give power back to the people (cf. Alexander & Welzel, 2017). In my dissertation, I call the phenomenon of ideological polarization between social classes "socio-cultural polarization".

Polarization can drive people apart and lead to deep social divisions (cf. Esteban & Ray, 1999). Growing inequality creates value alienation, which leads to feelings of estrangement that manifest themselves in a decline in civic culture or a decline in civic attitudes and behavior. In democracies, which are built on mutual tolerance and respect for other people, polarization can have an especially severe effect by undermining social cohesion, which can eventually lead to democratic breakdown (Levitsky & Ziblat, 2018, p. 11). Deliberation and compromise are important features of the democratic process that would not be possible without general cooperativeness. The rise of populism is often explained with either economic or cultural grievances (cf. Pickel, 2019; Schäfer, 2021). However, I argue that it is not just either-or. Both types of grievances explain the recent success of right-wing populism (and its anti-democratic tendencies) because they weaken important democratic principles like trust and civic engagement.

In investigating this assumption, this project will draw on a more recent trend in social class research emphasizing a social cognitive approach (Kraus et al., 2012, p. 547). It suggests that

social class is not merely a characteristic of the individual but a social context in which a person lives:

> "The material conditions of the individual's life, and how he or she experiences rank in those conditions, creates social class contexts that elicit a coherent set of social cognitive tendencies and guide patterns of thought, feeling, and action" (Kraus et al., 2012, p. 547).

As a contextual factor, economic grievances are critical to explain the emergence of cultural grievance (cf. Carreras et al., 2019). Together with their subjective assessment (i.e., perception) of their status in the social class hierarchy vis-a-vis others, people develop a cultural identity informed by very distinctive social cognitive patterns and elicits different patterns of thought, feeling, and action (cf. Kraus et al., 2011; Kraus et al., 2012). By extending the analysis to the interplay between inequality dynamics and people's value orientations, I contribute to the growing body of literature that explores the interaction of economic and cultural grievances (cf. Ballard-Rosa et al., 2017; Bobo, 2017; Carreras et al., 2019; Cherlin, 2018; Colantone & Stanig, 2018a, 2018b; De Vries, 2018a; Gidron & Hall, 2017, 2020; Jennings & Stoker, 2016; Magni, 2018; Morgan, 2018; Sachweh, 2020).

Using a subjective social class interpretation for my analysis, that is, the interpretation of social class as a cultural identity that influences thought and action through the perception of one's rank vis-à-vis others in society, is a relatively novel approach in the political science context. Social class is more frequently measured using a mix of objective metrics, such as education and income. That said, an individual's perception of their social class rank is related to the objective measures of social class because people use that perception to judge their social position compared to others in society. The objective and subjective approaches to measuring social class are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Rather, they complement each other: "Social class is more than simply how much one has; rather, it is also how much one believes one has relative to others" (Kraus & Stephens, 2012, p. 644; cf. Kraus et al., 2011, 2012). This innovative approach to measuring social class takes into account the social cognitive effects that the perception of a person's rank in society has on them outside of objective resources, and examines the extent to which this perception triggers a stronger feeling of insecurity and a more defensive attitude.

This research project is designed as a quantitative statistical analysis. Its focus lies on investigating the effect that socio-cultural polarization has on civic culture in the mature democracies of the West. The question I am specifically seeking to answer is whether socio-cultural polarization can explain variation in civic culture in the mature democracies of the West. Foa and

Mounk (2016, 2017a, 2017b) are right when they claim that democracies are facing great challenges currently, but the findings of this study support a different explanation for the recent success of right-wing populism. Admittedly, it is not ideological polarization between the social classes that has the greatest negative effect on civic culture, or people's civic attitudes and behavior. Rather, it is the subjective feelings that result from socio-cultural polarization dynamics. Specifically, the increasing dissent among citizens about whether the country's elites are still to be trusted with making the right decisions produces a decline in some civic attitudes.

Chapter Overview

I have organized this dissertation in a way that lets me investigate to what extent which elements of this crisis script are supported by empirical data: The first part (chpts. 1-3) reviews the literature on political culture in general and civic culture in particular, gives an introduction to polarization and establishes the theoretical framework for the study of the relationship between socio-cultural polarization and civic culture. Drawing on inequality research and the theory of general value change, I build a theoretical framework that gives an alternative explanation for the supposed trend of declining support for democracy worldwide. The second part (chpt. 4) outlines the quantitative approach used to measure that relationship both at the country and individual level. It addresses methodological challenges, explains the operationalization of socio-cultural polarization and civic culture, and describes the statistical methods applied to investigate the effect of the interaction of economic and cultural grievances on civic culture. In the third part (chpt. 5), I summarize the results of the study. First, I take a closer look at the distribution of civic culture in mature democracies and explore the relationship between different aspects of civic culture and the values held by people in different social positions. Then, I look at the development of socio-cultural polarization in mature democracies before I test whether socio-cultural polarization can explain variance in civic culture. Finally, in the conclusion, I discuss the results, elaborate on key findings, interpret them and relate them to the literature. I also say a few words about the limitations of this study and suggest a possible research agenda.

PART I

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Culture and Political Stability

Culture is a truly multifaceted concept and, therefore, not easy to comprehend. Joshua Rothman summarized this ambiguity in a few simple words: Culture, he wrote in an article in *The New Yorker*, is a "confusing" word (Rothman, 2014, para. 2). Broadly defined, culture refers to all aspects that are typical of a group's way of life – from the language they speak to the food they eat to the traditions they celebrate[4]. However, I use the word in a much narrower sense, where it only refers to the specific system of beliefs, norms and values of that group of people. By this definition, "a culture is a set of norms and skills that are conducive to survival in a given environment, constituting a survival strategy for a society" (Inglehart, 2018, p. 17). It shapes people's modes of perception, their habitual ways of thinking and, thus, their behavior. It works like a built-in navigation system (cf. Culture 2005; Kim, 2005; Welzel & Inglehart, 2020, p. 298). Following this logic, political culture describes the specific guidelines for political action. It encompasses the political ideals and the operating norms of a political system of a collective group of people such as a nation[5] (Almond & Verba, 1963, pp. 13-14; Pye & Verba, 1965, p. 513, p. 522):

> "Political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system. It encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of a polity. Political culture is thus the manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and subjective dimensions of politics" (Pye, 1992, p. 288; cf. Pickel & Pickel, 2016).

Or, as Almond and Verba (1963) put it, political culture is "the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population" (p. 14). The concept of political culture is related to that of general culture, but it is not the same. It has some autonomy but is nevertheless influenced by the individual's more general beliefs, which are not specifically political. If people feel like they have no control over their lives, this feeling may well translate

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[4] Not considered here is the word's biological meaning, as in "bacterial culture".

[5] Political culture can refer to either elite or mass cultures on the local, regional, or national scale. It can also refer to the subcultures of specific groups like the German Reichsbürger movement. It is always a collective unit, which people recognize as such and to which they are somehow attached to emotionally. Throughout this thesis, I focus on mass cultures at the national scale (Welzel & Inglehart, 2020, p. 298).

into a feeling of political apathy (Almond, 1956, p. 396; Pye, 1972, p. 288; Pye & Verba, 1965, p. 521). Every society has a dominant political culture, that is, the aggregated or collective attitudes and value orientations towards the political system (Pye & Verba, 1965, p. 7; Pickel & Pickel, 2016, p. 543). It manifests itself in the political system by which they are governed (Swedlow, 2013, p. 624; Welzel & Inglehart, 2020, p. 288). In short, "for the individual…political culture provides controlling guidelines for effective political behavior, and for the collectivity it…ensures coherence in the performance of institutions" (Pye & Verba, 1965, p. 7). Political culture connects the individual's behavior (the micro level) with the state and the stability of its institutions (the macro level) (cf. Almond & Verba, 1963; Dachs, 2009; Iwand, 1985; Pateman, 1971; Pickel & Pickel, 2006; Pye, 1972; Pye & Verba, 1965; Salzborn, 2018; Voinea, 2019). In everyday language, political culture often refers to political etiquette (manners) or styles of conducting politics (Pickel & Pickel, 2016, p. 544).

In their landmark political culture study, Almond and Verba (1963) described three ideal types of political culture: a *parochial political culture*, characterized by a public that knows next to nothing about the political system and expects nothing from it; a *subject political culture*, characterized by a public that knows how the political system works but does not see itself as an active part in it; and a *participant political culture*, characterized by a public that knows how the political system works and participates actively in it (pp. 17-19). The three types mainly differ in terms of the public's participation (Salzborn, 2018, p. 53). "In general, a parochial, subject, or participant culture would be most congruent with, respectively, a traditional political structure, a centralized authoritarian structure, and a democratic political structure" (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 21). However, there is neither homogeneity nor uniformity in political culture. Instead, most political cultures combine the three different ideal cultures in various proportions (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 20-26; Almond & Verba, 1980, p. 406; Rustow, 1970, p. 345; cf. Pye & Verba, 1965). As much as political systems differ across the world, so do political cultures. In fact, political culture is one established approach to explaining different institutional performances[6] (Putnam, 1993, pp. 9-12, cf. White, 1979). Table 1 gives an overview of milestone studies in empirical and comparative political culture research from antiquity to the present.

[6] Others focusing, for example, on institutional design or the socio-economic factors (cf. Putnam, 1993; Inglehart & Welzel, 2009).

Recent			Welzel (2013): emancipative values	Dalton & Welzel (2014): civic culture transformed	Ingelhart & Norris (2018): cultural backlash
			Inglehart & Norris (2003): traditional–secular/rational values	Inglehart & Welzel (2005): human empowerment	Dalton (2008): engaged citizenship
2000s			Bratton & Mattes (2001): intrinsic and instrumental support for democracy	Rose, Shin & Munro (2001): idealistic and realistic support for democracy	Putnam (2000): social capital decline
Late 1990s	Huntington (1996): clash of civilizations	Inglehart (1997): world cultural map	Verba et al. (1995): civic voluntarism	Klingemann (1998): dissatisfied democrats	Norris (1999): critical citizens
Late 1980s/ early 1990s		Flanagan (1987): authoritarian–libertarian values	Dalton et al. (1987): old and new politics	Inglehart (1990): elite-challenging publics	Putnam (1993): civic community, civic trust, social capital
1970s/ early 1980s		Sniderman (1975): personality and democracy	Inglehart (1977): materialist–postmaterialist values	Barnes & Kaase (1979): unconventional political participation	Almond & Verba (1980): the civic culture revisited
1960s	Almond & Verba (1963): the civic culture	Pye & Verba (1965): political culture and political development	Easton (1965): specific and diffuse support	Eckstein (1966): authority orientations, congruence theory	Inkeles (1969): individual modernity
Modern Classics		Adorno *et al*. (1950): authoritarian personality	Lasswell (1951): democratic character	Stouffer (1955): political (in)tolerance	Rokeach (1960): the open and closed mind
					Weber (1920): legitimacy beliefs
Classical Classics					Tocqueville (1835): *De la Démocratie en Amérique*
					Montesquieu (1756): *De l'Esprit des Lois*
				Plato (375 BC): *The Republic*	Aristotle (350 BC): *The Politics*, Book IV

Table 1: An overview of milestone studies in comparative political culture research with a focus on civic culture relevant for this project (adapted from Welzel & Inglehart, 2020, p. 299)

The idea that the beliefs of the people are important for regime stability is literally ancient. Circa 350 BC, Aristotle theorized that the given social structures in a polity shape the beliefs and behavior of the people, making certain types of government more likely (cf. Aristotle, 1964, 1999). He observed that the very rich, who had too much of everything, were not willing or able to submit to authority because of their status and, therefore, were most likely to rule despotically. In contrast, the very poor, who had too little of everything, did not know how to rule, only how to be ruled. Thus, he believed that a mostly egalitarian society would be the best foundation for a well-functioning political community (Aristotle, 1999, pp. 95-96). Each government, according to Aristotle, is formed and sustained by a different character: "The democratic type of character creates and sustains democracy; the oligarchical type of character creates and sustains oligarchy" (Baker, Aristotle, p.332). Aristotle, hence, argued for a state education system to make sure citizens developed a character that fits "the constitution of their state" (Baker, Aristotle, p.332). Lasswell (1951) pointed out that when Aristotle wrote of a state's constitution he did not necessarily have "an arrangement of offices" (Lasswell, 1951, p. 465) in mind but more a general way of life, which he believes to come close to the modern idea of culture (Lasswell, 1951, p. 465). Lasswell also reminds his readers that a few years before Aristotle emphasized the importance of education for the stability of governments, Plato had already argued that when "one form of government changes into another[7] [the cause does not lie] in external circumstances, but in the spirit of men whose 'soul-structure' is changing as a result of faulty education" (Lasswell, 1951, p. 467).

What is implied here is that for as long as people's political beliefs and values are congruent with the institutions that govern them, they work as a support structure for the institutions. Where attitudes and institutions match, there is allegiance; institutions are seen as legitimate. Consolidation is, then, the process of achieving this kind of deep and broad legitimacy. A democracy is consolidated when "all significant political actors, at both the elite and mass level, believe that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine" (Diamond, 1999, p. 65). However, where attitudes and institutions do not match, their opposition creates an atmosphere of alienation. Institutions are seen as illegitimate (Almond & Verba, 19653, p. 22). If the political system is not or no longer compatible with the dominant political beliefs and values in society, it is destabilized and might eventually break down (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 22, p. 498; cf. Eckstein, 1961, 1969). It is difficult for an autocratic government to maintain power if it has lost the

[7] Plato identified five different forms of government in *The Politics*: Aristocracy, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny (cf. Plato, n.d.).

support of the people. Often, autocratic regimes resort to violence to break the spirit of the opposition. Just as democratic regimes will not survive long in societies without actual democrats or, in other words, in societies in which the dominant political culture is not democratic and, thus, people do not support democratic principles (Sheafer & Shenav, 2013, pp. 235-236; cf. Bracher, 1955; Lipset, 1959; Inglehart & Welzel, 2003, 2009, 2020; Kirsch & Welzel, 2019; Kruse et al., 2017, 2019; Welzel, 2013; Welzel & Moreno Alvarez, 2014). The assumption that any political regime – from autocracy to democracy – remains stable only as long as people's beliefs and value orientations and the structure of the political institutions are compatible with one another is known as the Congruence Theory (cf. Almond & Verba, 1963; Eckstein, 1969; Pickel, 2013; Sheafer & Shenav, 2013). This is especially true for democracies, which are supposed to be ruled by the people[8]. Democratic governments "cannot survive by repressing mass preferences without corrupting their own principles" (Welzel & Inglehart, 2020, p. 302).

David Easton (1965) looked into the relationship between mass preferences and regime stability and concluded that there were different forms of political support – specific and diffuse political support. Specific political support is direct. It refers to the support people show for certain political authorities and their performances. Diffuse political support is indirect. It refers to the support people show for the "underlying order of political life" (Easton, 1975, p. 436). If diffuse political support for a given political system is strong and widespread in a society, the system remains strong even if specific support for political authorities is very weak. In other words, people can be dissatisfied with the performance of the current government but not question the political system as such; they remain generally convinced of its legitimacy (Easton, 1965, p. 437; Pickel & Pickel, 2016, p. 548; cf. Pickel, 2013). This is especially important in modern democracies, of which representation is an essential feature. Diffuse political support is a "reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will" (Easton, 1965, p. 273; cf. Diamond, 1999). However, high levels of political dissatisfaction over a long time can gradually erode even the strongest underlying support for the political system (Easton, 1975, p. 445). Similarly, Harry Eckstein (1966) argued that for governments to remain stable, their authority patterns had to be congruent with the authority patterns prevailing in society. By authority patterns he meant general attitudes towards authority and how they were manifested in everyday social relations (Eckstein, 1961, p. 5). Every society consists of different social units. The state is the largest, but there are many small ones like families, businesses, associations, etc. To function properly as entities, they,

[8] In reality, democracy is mostly a government of and for the people (through elected officials). Only rarely, democracy is exercised directly by the people like in Switzerland. See Presence Switzerland (2019) for more information.

too, need a governance structure, just like the state does. Their governance structure differ only in scale and complexity (Eckstein, 1961, p. 9; Eckstein, 1997, p. 2). If they are not at least similar to each other, governments will be unstable (Eckstein, 1961, p. 6, pp. 11-12; Eckstein, 1997, p. 2).

Thus, if liberal democracies across the world are indeed becoming unstable, as Foa and Mounk (2016, 2017a, 2017b) claim, there should be a visible change in their political cultures. They should have become noticeably less civic. We should observe a decline in diffuse political support for democracy, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the whole political system. Moreover, we should find similar patterns of decline in civic culture in all liberal democracies. In this chapter, I give an overview of the civic culture concept as the democratic manifestation of political culture, which is central to my analysis.

1.1. Civic Culture: The Values Underlying Democracy

The events of the early 20th century, especially the two World Wars, had created serious doubts about the ultimate triumph of the achievements of the Enlightenment period: political and civil liberty and freedom of thought and speech. It left many wondering not only about the future of democracy in the Western world, which had been thought to be inevitable, but also about what recent events meant for democracy in other parts of the world (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 3; Almond & Verba, 1980, p. 16). Against this backdrop, Almond and Verba set out to investigate the conditions under which democratization is sustainable or, in other words, what makes democracies stable:

> "The development of a stable and effective democratic government depends upon more than the structures of government and politics: it depends upon the orientations that people have to the political process – upon the political culture. Unless the political culture is able to support a democratic system, the chances for the success of that system are slim" (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 498).

Almond and Verba built on previous work by Almond (1956), in which he proposed a new approach to comparing political systems (cf. Iwand, 1985). In a paper he prepared for a conference in 1959 he suggested to not only compare political systems from the outside, i.e., their legal set up, but also to compare what is happening inside them. He claimed that the way in which units of a political system interact differs from one political system to another, as do the ways people think about how these interactions should take place (Almond, 1956, pp. 391-397): "Every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action. I

[9] The paper was officially published in the August 1956 issue of *The Journal of Politics*.

have found it useful to refer to this as the *political culture* [emphasis in original]" (Almond, 1956, p. 396).

Almond and Verba were not the first to argue that people's attitudes toward the political system and the role of the self in the system matter (Almond & Verba, 1989, p.17; Pye & Verba, 1965, p. 514). However, they were the first to provide systematic evidence for it from a comparative study of cross-national survey data (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 245; cf. Halman, 2010). With their acclaimed publication, in which they focus specifically on "the political culture of democracy and of the social structures and processes that sustain it" (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 3), they followed in the footsteps of some of the most important democratic thinkers and intellectuals, especially Montesquieu. The father of the principle of the separation of powers wrote in his classic text *The Spirit of Laws* (orig. De L'Esprit des Lois, 1748) that the nature of a government had to be strictly distinguished from its principle: "One is its particular structure, and the other the human passions which set it in motion" (Montesquieu, 1752, p. 37). According to Montesquieu, the principle of democracy is virtue[10]. It keeps ambition and innate greed under control and lets equality rule (Montesquieu, 1752, p. 37-39). A century later, de Tocqueville (2002) wrote down his experiences with and observations of democracy in America. In *Democracy in America*, he identified three things which, in his opinion, were responsible for the stability of democracy in the young country (from least to most important): fate[11], law[12] and the manners of the people. To him, the manners of the people were "not only…what constitutes the character of social intercourse, but…the various notions and opinions current among men, and…the mass of ideas which constitute their character of mind" (Tocqueville, 2002, p. 330). In his view, the early settlers to the United States established a particularly egalitarian society. He was especially impressed by the American people's passion for organizing and participating in civic associations of all kinds (Tocqueville, 2002, p. 581). These conditions made for a fertile ground in which democracy could take root. Since then, the "customs, manners, and opinions" (Tocqueville, 2002, p. 320) that are favorable to democracy have been passed down from one generation to the next. As these customs, manners, and opinions penetrated peoples' lives, de-

[10] Montesquieu (1752) listed three possible structures of government: republic or democracy, monarchy and tyranny. The principle of a republic or democracy is virtue, that of monarchy is honor and that of tyranny is fear (pp. 37-39).
[11] De Tocqueville took it as fate or good fortune that the Americans had landed on a continent with seemingly limitless resources waiting to be exploited, because prosperity generally benefits the stability of a government.
[12] According to Tocqueville, the laws of the United States at the time were extremely favorable to the division of property.

mocracy grew stronger (Tocqueville, 2002, p. 354). De Tocqueville was convinced that different forms of government could be explained with the presence (or absence) of those civic customs, manners, and opinions in a society (de Tocqueville, 2002, p. 354).

In *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, Weber (1964) comes to a similar conclusion, although he takes a different perspective. He argues that if only enough people believe in the legitimacy of the social order under which they live, it creates shared norms which then, in turn, stabilize that particular social order. The pursuit of self-interests, or opportunism, have the opposite effect, as the breakdown of the Weimar Republic shows (Beetham, 1991, p. 35; Gabriel, 2009, p. 28; Greiffenhagen, 2009, p. 12; Weber, 1964, p. 124; White, 1979, p. 3). The relatively modern institutions of Germany's first democracy lacked legitimacy among the public, especially among the conservative elites but among other parts of the population, too – not because they were ineffective, but because the values they represented were not compatible with those of the German people at that time (Lipset, 1959, p. 87; Lipset, 1969, p. 52; Welzel, 2020, p. 76; cf. Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). With every new crisis, people became more disillusioned and lost what little trust they had in the democratic institutions to begin with – which undermined the Republic's already weak foundations even further. When they eventually gave in and the regime collapsed from the repercussions of the Great Depression, the consequences were devastating. Adolf Hitler was able to consolidate his power and commit some of the most brutal crimes against humanity in history without any real internal opposition.

After the conclusion of the Second World War intellectuals started to ask what had gone wrong (cf. Formisano, 2001; Welzel & Inglehart, 2020). In trying to understand the Holocaust, Adorno and his co-authors (1950) claimed that anti-Semitism was "based more largely upon factors in the subject and in his total situation than upon actual characteristics of Jews" (p. 2). In other words, anti-Semitic behavior has its origin in the personality of the individual who exhibits it. In fact, in *The Authoritarian Personality* he and his co-authors argue that the political ideology of fascism (of which anti-Semitism is one phenomenon) is the manifestation of certain psychological dispositions of the individual (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 5). A person's personality evolves under the influence of their social environment, usually very early in life (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 5). Although people can react to changes in their social environment, their personality is surprisingly resistant to change (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 6). A fascist personality

> "is 'authoritarian' in the sense that it attaches itself to figures of strength and disdains those it deems weak. It tends toward conventionalism, rigidity, and stereotypical thinking; it insists on a stark contrast between in-group and out-group, and it jealously patrols the boundaries between them" (The authoritarian personality, 2020, para. 1).

An authoritarian personality makes individuals more receptive to anti-democratic propaganda, or ready to exhibit anti-democratic tendencies for that matter (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 4). However, individuals with a strong authoritarian personality do not necessarily exhibit anti-democratic behavior unless they are somehow triggered under certain social-historical conditions. The greater the authoritarian potential in a society, the more receptive it is to anti-democratic voices (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 10; cf. The authoritarian personality, 2020). Fortunately, the opposite is also true. The more widely values conducive to democracy are shared in a society, the stronger its foundations (Greenstein, 1968, p. 699; Lasswell, 1951, pp. 473-480). Lasswell identified several attitudes and orientations he claimed were inherently democratic (Welzel, 2007b, p. 187):

> "In his list of democratic character qualities he includes (1) an 'open ego,' by which he means a warm and inclusive attitude toward other human beings; (2) a capacity for sharing values with others; (3) a multivalued rather than a single-valued orientation[13]; (4) trust and confidence in the human environment, and (5) relative freedom from anxiety" (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 11; cf. Lasswell, 1951).

The attributes are listed in reverse order of importance. Only individuals who are free from anxiety have a positive outlook on life and develop positive attitudes towards others (Welzel, 2007b, p. 189).

Rokeach (2015) described the effects of anxiety on people in a similar manner. He claimed that people who feel anxious all the time would often have little self-esteem, be overly pessimistic, intolerant towards diversity and held strong beliefs in authority (pp. 71-80; Welzel, 2007b, p. 189). Rokeach called such individuals closed-minded (Rokrach, 2015, p. 403). As a person becomes more closed-minded, they will become more dogmatic and more intolerant of those whose beliefs differ from his or her own (Rokeach, 2015, p. 62). The opposite of the closed mind is the open mind, which is more willing to reconcile different beliefs and even combine them into new beliefs (cf. Coser, 1960; Rokeach, 2015). As Welzel (2007b) pointed out, there is quite a conceptual overlap between Lasswell's democratic character, Rokeach's concept of closed-mindedness and the authoritarian personality described by Adorno et al. (p. 189).

Lasswell (1951) argued that a broad distribution of the above-mentioned attitudes and orientations among members of a society (i.e., the democratic character is the dominant personality type of the community members) were a necessary precondition for democracy to take root or maintain long-term democratic stability (pp. 473; Welzel, 2020, p. 77). Even though Almond and Verba (1963) acknowledged that there was most likely a relation between the character

[13] In Lasswell's (1951) original writing he lists (2) and (3) together under the subtitle "The Self-System in Democratic Character: Values Multiple and Shared" (pp. 497-502).

qualities Lasswell identified and democratic behavior, they disagreed with Lasswell insofar as they did not think the democratic qualities he identified were specifically political attitudes and orientations. Instead, they thought they represented more "general psychological orientations towards life and people" (Welzel, 2007b, p. 187). They may or may not predispose someone to embrace democracy. In fact, Almond and Verba (1963) argued that people living in non-democratic societies could display these character attributes, too (p. 10).

Hence, in their five country cross-national study, they tried to identify attitudes and orientations specifically towards the political system and the role of the self in that system that sustained democracy (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 13). They found that high levels of trust coincided with democracy. Trust in each other but especially trust in the political elites (i.e., confidence in their abilities to make the right decisions) is very important in a democracy (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 490). Because of it, ordinary citizens do not constantly meddle in the political decision-making, according to Almond and Verba. They are also more likely to entrust elites with power rather than challenge the elites' power (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 484). Almond and Verba observed that, normally, ordinary citizens just let the government do what it likes. They very seldom become active in politics; however, citizens *think* they could influence the government if they wanted to (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 481). Almond and Verba (1963) referred to citizens' confidence in their latent power as their "subjective political competence" (p. 479). They also found that democracies were characterized by a general cooperativeness among people. Without it, conflicts in society could not be managed successfully. Deliberation and compromise are important features of the democratic process that would not be possible without cooperativeness. Therefore, they concluded that an important part of the democratic political culture was a superior principal of solidarity that could override partisanship (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 492; cf. Inglehart, 1988). Almond and Verba (1963) called this specifically democratic political culture *civic culture* and come to the conclusion that,

> "in sum, the most striking characteristic of the civic culture…is its mixed quality…There is political activity, but not so much as to destroy governmental authority; there is involvement and commitment, but they are moderated; there is political cleavage, but it is held in check" (p. 492-493).

Whereas Lasswell (1951) believed that people's attitudes and feelings towards life and each other in general would automatically translate into either pro- or anti-democratic orientations, Almond and Verba (1963) believed that people's satisfaction with the performance of institutions and their commitment to the particular political system were much more important for system stability than their personalities (Welzel, 2007b, p. 187).

Sniderman's (1975) research showed that the two approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Lasswell (1951) had argued that a democratic character generally hardwired a person to adhere to democratic norms and values. Unfortunately, not every person develops a democratic character naturally. Instead, Lasswell (1976) claimed that it "develops only in those who esteem themselves enough to esteem others" (p. 162). That is why Sniderman assessed the relation between different levels of self-esteem and commitment to democratic values; he found that individuals with low self-esteem showed, indeed, "less tolerance, less support for procedural rights, less faith in democracy" (p. 305). In contrast to individuals with high self-esteem, individuals with low self-esteem were less tolerant of diversity, which manifested itself in little appreciation of equality, freedom of speech and assembly – all essential features of modern democracies. Moreover, individuals with low self-esteem seemed to be generally distrustful of political elites and susceptible to extremist politics (Sniderman, 1975, p. 222, p. 305). Almond and Verba (1963) emphasized people's feeling of subjective political competence as an important component of a democratic orientation. Combining the two approaches, one could argue that only individuals with high self-esteem actually feel sufficiently competent to become politically active (Welzel, 2007b, p. 187). Sniderman's research supports such an argument. He found that people with low self-esteem were indeed less attentive to politics and less likely to become active in politics (Sniderman, 1975, p. 307). Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume a connection between Lasswell's potentially general orientations towards life and people with Almond's and Verba's political orientations or regime preferences (Welzel, 2007b, p. 187). "Thus," Welzel (2007b) concludes, "closed beliefs can be equated with authoritarian orientations and open beliefs with democratic orientations" (p. 189).

Commonly, the personality characteristics that I have described here as open-minded or democratic are more widespread in modern than in traditional societies, as Inkeles (1969b) pointed out. They are the traits of the men and women who live in urban-industrial societies.[14] Inkeles (1983) argued that the economic and political modernization starting with the Industrial Revolution also created a model type of person, whose individual psychological attributes differed from people living in pre-industrial or feudal societies (p. 4; cf. Inkeles, 1983). He and his collaborators were interested in the social and cultural aspects of economic development or, in

[14] Actually, Inkeles claimed that these personality characteristics were not inherently democratic. Theoretically, they could also be found in autocracies because they were the result of modernization processes that were not exclusive to democracies. However, the "modern" personality characteristics can be called conducive to democracy at the very least, as the resulting individual behavior he describes in his publications on this topic does reflect the behavior of active democratic citizens today (cf. Inkeles, 1969a, 1969b, 1975, 1983; Inkeles & Smith, 1974).

other words, how participation in modernization processes influences the individual (cf. Inkeles, 1969a). They believed that an increasing level of education and work experience in "complex, rationalized, technocratic, and even bureaucratic organizations" (Inkeles & Smith, 1974, p. 325; cf. Inkeles, 1969a, 1975), especially modern factories, would change people's attitudes, values and behavior accordingly: "Among the qualities we expected under these conditions were: a sense of personal efficacy; openness to new experience; respect for science and technology; acceptance of the necessity for strict scheduling of time; and a positive orientation toward planning ahead" (Inkeles & Smith, 1974, p. 8). Therefore, exposure to a modernizing environment would lead from traditionalism to what Inkeles and his collaborators called "individual modernity" (cf. Inkeles, 1969a, 1969b, 1975, 1983; Smith & Inkeles, 1966; Inkeles & Smith, 1974).

Modern individuals acknowledge the existence of an entity larger than their immediate family or local community. They participate actively in public life, are interested in and try to stay informed about current events; overall, they participate actively in politics (Inkeles, 1969a, p. 210; Inkeles, 1996b, p. 1122; Inkeles, 1983, pp. 290-291; Inkeles & Smith, 1974, pp. 36-39). Inkeles and Smith (1974) found that with increasing individual modernity, voting, membership in public organizations, participation in public actions and political participation and activism also increased (pp. 21-22). The modern person believes that life is what you make it and, therefore, s/he actively seeks to improve it. S/he rejects passivity and has a rather positive outlook on life. The modern person increasingly questions traditional authorities. S/he is independent and makes his own informed decision. The modern person is sensible to new ideas and willing to listen and consider different opinions. S/he generally trusts other people and believes in the value of reciprocity, which is especially important as a basis for cooperation in large communities (Inkeles, 1969a, p. 210; Inkeles, 1983, pp. 290-291; Inkeles & Smith, 1974, pp. 36-39). Inkeles and Smith (1974) found that these orientations were much more common in wealthier countries, because they were usually better developed. Specifically, wealthier countries were more urban, and had more and better equipped schools, a larger industrial sector, a vivid media scene, which made it easier for citizens to keep up with current events (Inkeles & Smith, 1974, p. 308).

The psychological aspect of modernization was also extensively researched by Inglehart (1971, 1977, 1979, 1990, 1997). Based on Inkeles' theory of individual value change as a corollary of socio-economic transformation, Inglehart explored how people's attitudes and orientations change under the influence of modernization. The greatest impact by far was the improvement

of people's basic living conditions. A growing part of the population in Western societies was being born and raised in unprecedentedly secure times – physically and economically (Inglehart, 1977, p. 21-22). The baby boomers, the post-World War II generation, were born into a time of relative affluence and, thus, had completely different formative socialization experiences than their parents. Inglehart noticed that their values had consequently shifted from emphasizing physical security and material well-being towards emphasizing quality of life (Inglehart, 1977, p. 3):

> "The causes and implications of this shift are complex, but the basic principle might be stated very simply: people tend to be more concerned with immediate needs or threats than with things that seem remote or non-threatening. Thus, a desire for beauty may be more or less universal, but hungry people are more likely to seek food than aesthetic satisfaction" (Inglehart, 1977, p. 3).

It is not like physical and economic security did not matter anymore, they just mattered less than before (Inglehart, 1977, p. 3). Drawing on Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs (Figure 1), also known as Maslow's Theory of Motivation, Inglehart (1977) suggested that the change from materialist to postmaterialist values was coupled to the satisfaction of different human needs. He claimed that postmaterialist values could only develop under certain circumstances. Similar to Maslow, Inglehart (1977) argued that individuals whose basic physiological and safety needs were not satisfied did not have the capacity to pursue any higher needs because they were entirely focused on merely trying to survive (p. 22; cf. Inglehart, 1979, 1990, 1997). As Maslow (1943) explains it, "for the man who is extremely and dangerously hungry, no other interests exist but food. He dreams food, he remembers food, he thinks about food" (p. 347). Until those basic physiological and safety needs are satisfied, other needs are simply not as important. Respect is important, but it does not satiate one's hunger (Maslow, 1943, p. 346).

Once those basic needs are satisfied, the desire for other needs grows stronger. Those who no longer have to fear for their existence can now turn their attention to the beautiful things in life. Ultimately, we all strive after self-actualization and a life free of constraints[15] (Inglehart, 1977, p. 22; cf. Maslow, 1943). That is why Inglehart described this phenomenon as a shift from materialist to postmaterialist values: "Materialist values reflect a relatively strong attachment to maintaining order and preserving economic gains. Post-Materialist *[sic]* values emphasize individual self-expression and achieving a more participant, less hierarchical society" (Inglehart, 1977, p. 179; cf. Inglehart, 1971, 1979, 1990, 1997). Postmaterialist values are, thus, the manifestation of the exposure to economic well-being (Silva, Clark & Vieira, 2016, p. 1).[16]

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[15] Flanagan (1979) used the term self-indulgence instead, stressing that people who do not have to worry about their economic and physical security are willing and able to spend all their resources to enjoy themselves (p. 257).

[16] In later publications, Inglehart based his postmaterialist theory firmly on two hypotheses. The first is the scarcity hypothesis, which is comparable to the principle of marginal utility in economic theory and postulates that people's priorities reflect their socio-economic condition; people are especially focused on those things that are in short

Inglehart expected this shift from materialist to postmaterialist values to find expression in the gradual replacement of economic issues by life-style issues on the political agenda (Inglehart, 1977, p. 13, p. 183). He predicted that the trend towards more postmaterialist values in Western societies was not temporary but permanent, because the share of postmaterialists in the populations would continue to grow larger (Inglehart, 1977, pp. 21-23; cf. Inglehart, 1979, 1990, 1997, 2018).



Figure 1: Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, own illustration based on Maslow (1943)

Like Inkeles, Inglehart (1971, 1977, 1979, 1990, 1997, 2018) claimed that with increasing modernization people's political mobilization would increase, too. With the improvement of their socio-economic status, more people would develop a sense of what Almond and Verba called subjective political competence (Inglehart, 1977, p. 297, p. 304; cf. Almond & Verba, 1963). In particular, Inglehart argued that more people than ever before had acquired sufficient political skills to participate in important decision-making processes (Inglehart, 1977, p. 3, p. 293). Political skills were no longer something only the elites possessed, but had become a mass

supply. The second is the socialization hypothesis, which assumes that people's values are shaped by the conditions in which they grew up (Inglehart, 1990, p. 56; cf. Inglehart, 2018). Inglehart still refers to Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs as a complementary concept. He admits that the ordering of human needs becomes somewhat unclear the further we move away from the needs that are directly related to survival (Inglehart, 1990, p. 68). By combining to already existing theories, Inglehart developed a "generational theory" (Scarbrough, 1998, p. 124), which contributed immensely to the study of value change in advanced industrial societies. See Inglehart (2018) for an overview of his "Evolutionary Modernization Theory".

phenomenon, shifting the relative balance of power (Inglehart, 1977, p. 293, p. 298). Inglehart did not only refer to traditional political activities like voting, but also new forms of political action that were far more direct and disruptive to the political process (Inglehart, 1977, p. 293). As Kaase and Marsh (1979) pointed out, the "repertory" (p. 163) of political participation had become increasingly diverse and widespread since *The Civic Culture*.

The new and unconventional forms of political participation were ad-hoc and less formally organized in hierarchical bureaucratic organizations like labor unions. That informality provided more flexibility for issue-oriented actions aimed at effecting specific policy change (Inglehart, 1977, pp. 299-301). This way, mass politics had become more elite-challenging (Inglehart, 1977, p. 293, p. 303 cf. Almond & Verba, 1963). Inglehart found that individuals with postmaterialist values and attitudes were much more apt to carry out unconventional political action like protests than individuals with materialist values and attitudes. Not only because they were usually younger and, therefore, more agile, but they were "relatively likely to be at odds with the type of society in which they live[d]" (Inglehart, 1979, p. 310). Because of their postmaterialist mindset, they were dissatisfied with existing policies that they believed focused too much on purely materialist outcomes (Inglehart, 1979, pp. 310-311, p. 345, p. 377). Expecting the share of postmaterialists in Western societies to grow, Inglehart predicted that the potential for elite-challenging action would only increase in the future (Inglehart, 1977, p. 293).

Similarly, Barnes and Kaase (1979) concluded from their study of mass participation in five Western democracies that the expansion of political participation was not a passing whim. On the contrary, they expected them to become "a lasting characteristic of democratic mass publics" (p. 524) as generational replacement progressed. In *Making Democracy Work*, Putnam (1993) studied the performance of democratic institutions in Italy. He indeed found that institutions that were embedded in a "civic community" (Putnam, 1993, p. 87, p. 115, p. 182) – a community characterized, above all, by the active participation of its citizens in public life – were stronger, more responsive, and generally more effective (Putnam, 1993, p. 115, p. 182; Rice & Sumberg, 1997, p. 99). This active participation manifests itself, for example, in the density of civic engagement, that is, the total number of voluntary associations and the intensity of public participation in them (Putnam, 1993, p. 87).

De Tocqueville emphasized the importance of voluntary associations in *Democracy in America* as places of democratic learning because they teach their members important skills such as cooperation and the meaning of reciprocity. A feeling of solidarity and basic trust in one's fellow human beings are the basis for any kind of voluntary collaboration. Voluntary associations

also teach people that they can actually achieve more if they act collectively. Working successfully together towards a common goal may instill in people a sense of appreciation for cooperation. Overall, members of voluntary associations develop more subjective political competence (cf. Almond & Verba, 1963). Thus, governments in civic communities are usually more responsive because they face a civil society with nearly irresistible power to put pressure on the political elites to effect change (Putnam, 1993, pp. 89-90, p. 182; Putnam, 2000, p. 369). Putnam calls these resources that help people to have effective relationships and form valuable networks "social capital" (Putnam, 1993, p. 167). In fact, a large body of research emphasizes the importance of a strong and vibrant civil society for democratization and the stabilization of democracy, respectively (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 10; Putnam, 2000, pp. 376-377; cf. Inglehart, 1999; Knack, 2002; La Porta et al., 1997; Norris, 2002; Paxton, 2002; Putnam, 1993, 1995, 2000; Rice and Sumberg, 1997; Uslaner, 1999; van Deth 2010; Warren, 2001)[17].

Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 2010) and Welzel (2007a, 2013) elaborated on the link between modernization, cultural change and democracy. They have expanded the traditional political culture theory by blending it with modernization theory and in doing so, they have made political culture theory a theory of human development. Following in the footsteps of Sniderman (1975) and drawing on Lasswell (1951) and Rokeach (2015), Inglehart and Welzel (2005) claim that there are certain non-political attitudes that are favorable to democracy. Starting from the assumption that modernization improves people's socio-economic status and, thereby, liberates them from constraints beyond their control, they argue that modernization really is a tale of human emancipation: "A growing sense of existential autonomy leads people to give priority to humanistic self-expression values that emphasize human emancipation, giving liberty priority over discipline, diversity over conformity, and autonomy over authority" (Inglehart & Welzel, 2010, p. 152). These values reflect core characteristics of liberal democracy. In fact, only liberal democracy guarantees people the freedom to live their lives according to their own choices. Or, as Inglehart and Welzel (2005) put it, liberal democracy really "institutionalizes freedom of action" (p. 8).

Therefore, modernization sets the course for democratization. Once in motion, this human development sequence makes democratization very likely; sooner or later people will demand institutions that guarantee them the civil and political rights which maximize their choices and

[17] All of these studies confirm a significant relation between social capital and effective democracy; however, some researchers argue that some dimensions of social capital matter more than others or influence democracy differently for that matter. I will further elaborate on this issues in chapter 1.2.

allow them to pursue self-actualization (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 3, pp. 8-9). Where democracy already exists, it becomes stronger and more direct[18,19] (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 15). Welzel (2013) summarized how the process of modernization unleashes its civic power: The emergence of postmaterialist or self-expression values[20] (1) leads people to strive for self-determination, (2) promotes a benign individualism that acknowledges others as equals, which makes it easier to work together, and (3) instills in people a tendency towards political action (Welzel, 2013, p. 10). Compared to preindustrial and industrial societies, in which political participation was either completely limited to the elites or dominated by them, respectively, postindustrial societies today have the most active public participation by far.

Mass participation is by definition a central aspect of democracy. It is, after all, supposed to be the rule by the people. Without mass political participation, "democracy lacks both its legitimacy and its guiding force" (Dalton, 2008, p. 76). Voting is no longer enough for many people. Spontaneous, issue-specific, and elite-challenging forms of civic action have become ever more popular and keep stretching the boundaries of the traditional elite form of democracy causing it to become much more people-centered (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 44). Whereas some people see political participation merely as their *civic duty*, the people who engage in these new kinds of political action think of political participation more in terms of their *civic right* to influence the outcome of politics. Both groups have different beliefs about the role citizens should play in politics. The civic duty approach resembles Almond and Verba's (1963) description of the elite-entrusting citizen, whereas the engaged citizen approach resembles the post-materialist elite-challenging citizen that Inglehart (1979, 1990) described (Dalton, 2008, pp. 85-88).

For a number of reasons, Almond and Verba's (1963) focus in *The Civic Culture* had been on attitudes that would maintain democratic stability (Almond & Verba, 1980, p. 16, p. 407; cf. Halman, 2010). They claimed that the ideal political culture to support a democratic political system was an elite-entrusting political culture: Citizens must be active in politics but not too

[18] In fact, Inglehart and Welzel proved that self-expression values are more strongly linked with democracy than any other common explanatory factor (cf. Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).

[19] It should be mentioned that there has been an ongoing debate about the causal direction of the relationship between mass attitudes and democracy. According to some scholars, such democratic values like postmaterialist or self-expression are not a precondition for democratization nor are they values that strengthen democracy; they are a consequence of living under democratic institutions and being exposed to democratic practices (cf. Rustow, 1970; Barry, 1978; Muller & Seligson, 1994; Jackman & Miller, 1998).

[20] Actually, in *Freedom Rising*, the sequel and theoretical extension to Inglehart and Welzel's (2005) earlier collaboration *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, Welzel (2013) calls these values "emancipative values". He does so mainly because these values motivate people to emancipate themselves from traditional authority and outside constraints. I use the "old" term mostly for reasons of simplification.

active. They believed that to not throw the political system out of balance, citizens had to submit to the government's authority to a certain extent (Almond & Verba, 1980, p. 16; Hooghe, 2011, p. 206). Almond and Verba (1963) did believe that, over time, civic attitudes would become more widespread (Almond & Verba, 1980, p. 399). Like a snowball rolling down a snow-covered hill, which picks up more snow and becomes larger as it rolls on, Almond and Verba (1963) predicted that with every new generation support for democratic institutions would increase because individuals were socialized into their culture, and also reproduced it[21] (pp. 498-500; Chilton, 1988, p. 419; Dalton & Welzel, 2014, p. 104; Iwand, 1985, p. 114; Swedlow, 2013, p. 625). However, in *The Civic Culture Revisited* (1980), Almond and Verba acknowledged that reality looked different from what they had expected. In fact, in many established democracies, trust in democratic institutions like the legislature has actually been declining and mass participation has become more elite-challenging than elite-entrusting, revealing a growing frustration with politics in general and skepticism about its results in particular (Almond & Verba, 1980, p. 399; cf. Crozier et al., 1975; Dalton, 2008, 2017a; Dalton & Welzel, 2014; Miller, 1974; Moss, 2017; Newton & Norris, 1999; Norris, 1999; Nye, 1997; Pharr et al., 2000; Putnam, 2000; Torcal & Montero, 2006).

Norris (1999) reminded her readers that classic theories of political culture posit that the stability of any regime depends on its citizens' legitimacy beliefs. Therefore, if citizens lose trust in their government because they are dissatisfied with its performance, they may start to question its legitimacy and perhaps even democracy itself as a form of government (Norris, 1999, p. 2). Does today's elite-challenging mass participation, thus, pose an existential threat to democracy? Not necessarily. As Klingemann (1998) and Norris (1999) pointed out, "dissatisfied democrats" or "critical citizens" do not automatically have a negative effect on democratic stability. In fact, as Klingemann (1998) puts it, "they may well be the hope for the future of democratic governance" (p. 33), as they increase the pressure on governments for reforms to make them more efficient and responsive (Norris, 1999, p. 3). Drawing on Easton (1965), Klingemann (1998, 2014) and Norris (1999) both argue that political support is multidimensional. People can be critical of the current government but still believe in democracy as the legitimate form of governance.

[21] Almond and Verba (1963) were interested in attitudes favorable to democratic stability. From their comparative study of five democratic nations in the inter-war period (the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Mexico), they concluded that the spread of civic attitudes was almost inevitable, as more and more people would be exposed to the forces that led to the development of those attitudes: education; the democratization of nongovernmental authority systems in the family, the school, and the workplace; general trust in one's fellow citizens (Almond & Verba, 1980, p. 399).

Bratton and Mattes (2001), Rose and Shin (2001) and Mishler and Rose (2001) differentiate between intrinsic/instrumental or idealist/realist support for democracy, respectively. Intrinsic or idealist support for democracy is reminiscent of Easton's (1965) diffuse support for democracy. Bratton and Mattes (2001) put it in a nutshell when they wrote that it "is a commitment to democracy 'for better or worse'; as such, it has the potential to sustain a fragile political regime even in the face of economic downturn or social upheaval" (p. 448). Instrumental or realist support is subject to revocation, depending on how favorably people evaluate the performance of their government (Bratton & Mattes, 2001, p. 448). As Inglehart (1977, 1990) has shown, postmaterialist values make people generally more critical of their government, but not less democratic. Quite the contrary, they demand new and more direct forms of political participation (Norris, 1999, p. 24; cf. Dalton, 2008; Inglehart, 1977, 1990). The protest movements of the 1960s are a good example for the discrepancy between current political structures and the beliefs and expectations of the people. Trust in political authorities may have been declining, but democratic values have become more widespread, which also makes people less susceptible to autocratic forms of government (Norris, 1999, p. 236). Therefore, Norris (1999) claims that this trend will most likely make democracy stronger,

> "if [it] signifies the growth of more critical citizens who are dissatisfied with established authorities and traditional hierarchical institutions, who feel that existing channels for participation fall short of democratic ideals, and who want to improve and reform the institutional mechanisms of representative democracy. Criticism does not necessarily imply disengagement. It can mean the reverse" (Norris, 1999, p. 27).

Thus, scholars started to question Almond and Verba's allegiant model of civic culture and argued that citizens in democracies should be able to articulate their political opinions more freely (Hooghe, 2011, p. 206). The original civic culture model first proposed by Almond and Verba (1963) needs to be adapted (cf. Dalton & Welzel, 2014). Almond and Verba were not wrong when they attributed the emergence of civic culture also to modernization (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 7). However, their concern about democratic stability was misguided. It looks like democracy can tolerate far more direct participation and political activism than Almond and Verba initially thought. The allegiant model of civic culture that they suggested has to be replaced by a more assertive model: "Instead of an allegiant and loyal public, established democracies now have a public of critical citizens" (Dalton & Welzel , 2014, p. 2) because they expect more from their government today than ever before (Dalton & Welzel, 2014, pp. 108-109; cf. Welzel & Moreno Alvarez, 2014).

1.2. Three Approaches to Civic Culture

As the previous chapter shows, many scholars agree that mass attitudes and value orientations influence democratic stability; however, they do not necessarily agree on which mass attitudes and value orientations have the most positive effect or are most important to maintain democratic stability. In the previous chapter, one can identify three different research strands characterized by their respective focus on different aspects of mass culture most conducive to democracy (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 249): a legitimacy approach which emphasizes mass support for the system of governance and confidence in its political institutions; a communitarian approach which stresses communal values such as civic duty, trust and norm conformity; and a human development approach which highlights values that give priority to freedom and choice (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, pp. 247-248). I summarize these approaches briefly below.

The Legitimacy Approach

The legitimacy or system-support approach has its roots in Easton's (1965, 1975) seminal work on political support. To recapitulate, Easton claimed that a political system needs to be seen as legitimate by the public to remain stable. Support for the political system as such and its specific institutions (i.e., diffuse political support) – independent of the output and performance of the political actors – is especially important: People may oppose the current government but still respect democracy because they consider the underlying norms and principles to be legitimate (Thomassen & Ham, 2017, p. 8). Without mass confidence in its institutions, democracy as a system of government does not work; one of its fundamental principles is the idea that people entrust these institutions with the responsibility to represent their interests and the mandate to act on their behalf. If people lose trust in the political institutions, they may eventually lose trust in the political system itself (cf. Rose, 1994). Mass support for democracy and confidence in its specific institutions are, therefore, believed to be the most important indicator of democratic legitimacy among a public by adherents to this approach (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 247; cf. Anderson and Tverdova, 2001; Chanley et al., 2000; Gibson, 1997; Klingemann, 1998; Miller, 1974; Rosenau, 1974; Rose et al., 1998; Newton, 2001; Newton and Norris, 2000).

For example, Chanley et al. (2000) investigated the origins and consequences of trust in government in the United States and came to the conclusion that a negative assessment of the health of the economy, concern about (rising) crime and Congressional misconduct lead to a decline in trust in the government. In turn, low trust in the government lead to less support for government actions in general. Because democracy produces by default winners and losers through the election process, Anderson and Tverdova (2001) studied how people's attitudes towards

political institutions are affected by their status as part of the political majority or minority. The found that usually those that were in the majority had more favorable attitudes towards political institutions like the government. Those that were in the minority were also more concerned about the overall power of the government than those that were in the majority.

Given that advocates of the legitimacy approach argue that confidence in democratic institutions is the most important indicator of a healthy democracy, the notoriously low levels of confidence in institutions in many democracies today has led some scholars to question this argument. Critics of this approach argue that low or little confidence in democratic institutions does not necessarily translate into a legitimacy crisis of democracy. Quite the opposite, actually. Many people in democracies today express high levels of support for democracy but are dissatisfied with and critical of how it is functioning (cf. Klingemann, 1998; Newton, 2001; Norris, 1999; Nye, 1997; Pharr et al., 2000; Torcal & Montero, 2006). High levels of support for democracy are only an appropriate measure of a prodemocratic civic culture if people renounce its nondemocratic alternatives (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 253; cf. Cho, 2014; Klingemann, 1998; Shin, 2015; Svolik, 2019; Welzel, 2013; Welzel & Kirsch 2017; Welzel & Moreno Alvarez, 2014).

The Communitarian Approach

Adherents to the communitarian approach claim that community involvement or civic engagement is most important for effective democracy because it fosters democratic competence and strengthens civil society trough building trusted personal relationships. It is, therefore, also referred to as the social capital approach (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 249). “Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to properties of individuals[22], social capital refers to connections among individuals – the social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” (Putnam, 2000, p. 16; cf. Putnam, 1993, 1995, 2002). Putnam is arguably the most prominent advocate of this approach (Quibria, 2003, p. 23), but he did not invent the concept of social capital. In fact, its first use dates back to the early 20th century, when Hanifan (1916)[23] used it to emphasize the importance of community building – fostering “good-will, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social intercourse among a group of individuals and families” (p. 130) – to improve rural education (Putnam, 2000, p. 16; cf. Hanifan, 1916). What he described as social capital then does not differ much from its current

[22] For an overview of the theories of capital and, thus, the historical foundations of the concept of social capital see the first chapter of Lin (2001).
[23] In *Bowling Alone* (2000), Putnam credits Hanifan (1916) with the invention of the concept or its first known use for that matter (p. 16). To my knowledge, this claim has not been disputed.

meaning[24]. Surprisingly, however, the concept did not become popular in academic debates until much later (cf. Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988, 1990; Putnam, 1993, 1995, 2000).[25]

Bourdieu wrote about "the instrumental value of social capital [for the individual] in deriving economic and social benefits from group membership" (Quibria, 2003, p. 21). Coleman highlighted the importance of social capital for the social and cognitive development of children growing up. For example, he described how different social environments can influence children's academic success in school (Field, 2008, p. 27; cf. Coleman, 1988). Putnam used social capital to explain differences in institutional performances. From his study of regional governments in Italy he concluded that strong governments were associated with high levels of civic engagement among the population (Putnam, 1993, p. 182). Even though Putnam virtually adopted Coleman's definition of social capital (Jackman & Miller, 1998, p. 49; Field, 2008, p. 34), he gave it a more cultural reading and interpreted it "as the embodiment of a spirit of *civicness* [emphasis in original]" (Castiglione et al., 2008, p. 4). Whereas Bourdieu and Coleman consider social capital to be a personal resource[26], Putnam treats it as an aggregate property of society that "can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions" (Putnam, 1993, p. 167; cf. Bhandari & Yasunobu, 2009, p. 487, p. 500; Keele, 2005; Paxton, 2002; Quibria, 2003). For Putnam, the voluntary associations and social networks of civil society and social capital are one and the same (Putnam, 2000, p. 367).

By definition, citizens in a democracy need to actively participate (Putnam, 2000, p. 365). Therefore, adherents to the social capital approach stress the importance of voluntary associations (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 254; cf: Norris, 2002). In a Tocquevillean tradition, Putnam claims that voluntary associations are the places "where social and civic skills are learned" (Putnam, 2000, p. 368). In addition to the written rules of democracy, every community or society shares a set of unwritten rules that "serve as the soft guardrails of democracy" (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018, p. 124). These rules are like a political code of conduct that everyone has to learn. Examples include characteristics like mutual toleration and institutional forbearance (cf.

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[24] There is no single definition of social capital. In fact, there are several definitions, each of which is rooted in different scholarly fields (cf. Edward & Foley, 2001; Healy & Côté, 2001; Adler & Kwon, 2002; Castiglione et al., 2008; Bhandari & Yasunobu, 2009). Here, I use the term in the neo-Tocquevillian tradition of Putnam (1993, 1995, 2000).

[25] The concept was actually invented independently at least six times in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s before Robert Putnam widely popularized it. For a more detailed overview of the history of social capital see Paxton (1999), Putnam (2000, 2002), Woolcock & Narayan (2000), Edward & Foley (2001), Quibria (2003), Domenichini (2007), Castiglione et al. (2008), Field (2008); and Bhandari & Yasunobu (2009).

[26] Coleman (1988, 1990) describes social capital as embedded in social structures and not as part of the individual like Bourdieu does; however, he describes social capital as a resource that is *available to individuals* in certain social contexts (cf. Paxton, 1999; Field, 2008; Bhandari & Yasunobu, 2009).

Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). Voluntary associations are, therefore, often referred to as ”schools for democracy” by adherents of the social capital approach (cf. Jordan & Maloney, 2007; Maloney & Roßteutscher, 2007; Putnam, 2000; Roßteutscher, 2005; Tocqueville, 2002; Warren 2001). Much has been written on the democratic effects of voluntary associations (cf. Dodge & Ospina, 2015; Fung, 2003; Glover et al., 2005; Howard & Gilbert, 2008; Putnam, 1993, 1995, 2000; Richter, 2020; Stekelenburg & Akkerman, 2016).[27] Probably most important,

> “voluntary associations are said to teach trust and social understanding because they allow a variety of people, sometimes with disparate backgrounds and different values, to work together…they help people understand and empathize with others, and create the cross-pressures that are said to result in moderation and tolerance…” (Newton, 2001, p. 206).

The norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from social networks are not only the basis for any kind of collective action, but they are also important for upholding democratic processes such as elections (Putnam, 2000, p. 369). An orderly change of government would practically be impossible without the trust that everyone complies with the democratic rules (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 247; Knack, 2002, p. 774; cf. Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). Inglehart (1999) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005) found that interpersonal trust and democracy are linked: The higher the level of interpersonal (general) trust in a community, the higher the level of democracy. There is, however, a problematic side to social capital, because groups usually develop their own dynamics.[28] If social capital grows within a group, it usually happens at the expenses of those on the outside:

> “Part of the value of being a member of almost any group involves laying claim to resources to which non-members do not have access. Social networks have always involved some kind of trade-off between inclusion and exclusivity. But as the decline in associational life has been very uneven across classes, and as political tensions have come to define group identities and lifestyles, the benefits of social capital for some often look like disadvantages of exclusion for others” (Brown, 2019, paras. 2-3).

Some groups, such as those that base membership on ethnicity or religious affiliation, usually have more – if not only – positive effects for its members. Therefore, a distinction is often made between bonding (exclusive) and bridging (inclusive) social capital (Putnam, 2000, pp. 19-20).[29]

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[27] Voluntary associations play a significant role in providing access to more information, instilling a sense of political agency, improving political skills, boosting political participation, reducing opportunistic behavior, solving collective actions problems by reducing transaction costs and providing insurance against risk and uncertainties, increasing social cohesion, allowing individuals to express their interests and demands on government, increasing government responsiveness and efficiency and protecting themselves from abuses of power by their political leaders. I focus on what has been identified as probably the most important aspect of social capital: generalized trust (cf. Uslaner, 1999; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). For more detailed discussions of the democratic effects of voluntary associations see, for example, Putnam (2000), Warren (2001), Fung (2003) and Bhandari & Yasunobu (2009).

[28] See, for example, Tajfel & Turner (2004).

[29] Studies show that not all voluntary association have the same positive effects (cf. Lee, 2020), if any (cf. Theiss-Morse & Hibbing, 2005). Some researchers claim that voluntary organizations do not enhance political tolerance

The Human Development Approach

The human development approach takes into account that the effect of social capital is not necessarily positive. In fact, social capital sometimes undermines the core principles of democracy by reinforcing exclusive identities, thereby fostering intolerance and repression (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 248; Putnam, 2000, p. 29; cf. Graeff, 2009). The so-called bonding social capital has actually very illiberal qualities: "Although many associational activities in America are clearly and directly supportive of liberal democracy, others are not so clearly or directly supportive, and still others are downright hostile to, and potentially destructive of, liberal democracy" (Gutmann, 1998, pp. 18-19). For this reason, adherents to the human development approach claim that not all forms of social capital are conducive to democracy, but "above all those that are motivated by people's aspiration for human freedom and choice" (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 248). The human development approach is, therefore, also called the emancipative approach because it focuses on the bridging forms of social capital, or those forms that emphasize self-expression. They "give priority to individual liberty over collective discipline, human diversity over group conformity, and civic autonomy over state authority" (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 248), which enable and support much wider networking activities.

Contrary to Almond and Verba's (1963) claim that submission to authority is an important part of the political culture conducive to democracy (i.e., civic culture), adherents to the human development approach argue that it is not a lack of collective discipline, group conformity, and norm obedience that threatens democracy. Rather, they claim that the opposite is true. Collective discipline, group conformity, and norm obedience actually undermine the core principles of liberal democracy. "Democracy requires values that emphasize human self-expression, which is intrinsically directed against discrimination and specifically focused on the liberating elements of democracy" (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 248). Whereas adherents to the legitimacy approach argue that support for the democratic political system and its specific institutions are most important for democracy, adherents to the communitarian approach and the human development approach argue that civic orientations among the populations are most important for democracy. The human development approach focuses specifically on those orientations that emphasize personal and political liberty, protest activities, tolerance of the liberty of others, interpersonal trust and subjective well-being or, in other words, orientations that emphasize human choice (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, pp. 247-248). Inglehart and Welzel (2005)

(cf. Torpe, 2003), promote equality (cf. Schlozman et al., 2013), improve participation (cf. Armingeon, 2007) or foster trust (cf. Zmerli & Newton, 2007).

found that the particular civic orientations that emphasize human self-expression are highly correlated with the quality of a democracy (cf. Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).

2. Tracing Conflict in Society

Conflict is a common feature of democracy. A moderate degree of conflict is even said to have a stabilizing and integrating function (Coser, 2001, p. 154; cf. LeBas, 2018; Mouffe, 2000; Moss, 2017; Simmel, 1964). As a form of government, representative democracy in particular is supposed to manage competing interests and thereby resolve potentially violent tensions peacefully (Lipset, 1959, p. 71; cf. Horvárth, 2018; Przeworski, n.d.). Even a certain degree of polarization is not unusual in a democracy. The mere fact that a democracy is supposed to manage competing interests suggests that there are always some oppositional forces at work (Carothers & O'Donohue, 2019b, pp. 6-7; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018, p. 142). Polarization can also have positive effects, such as increasing mobilization amongst the people. Polarization strengthens party identities and, thus, makes it easier for voters to choose (Somer & McCoy, 2018, pp. 7-8; cf. Carothers & O'Donohue, 2019b; Finseraas & Vernby, 2011; LeBas, 2018; McCoy et al., 2018). However, above a certain degree, polarization starts to have the exact opposite effects:

> "It routinely weakens respect for democratic norms, corrodes basic legislative processes, undermines the nonpartisan stature of the judiciary, and fuels public disaffection with political parties. It exacerbates intolerance and discrimination, diminishes societal trust, and increases violence throughout the society. Moreover, it reinforces and entrenches itself, dragging countries into a downward spiral of anger and division for which there are no easy remedies" (Carothers & O'Donohue, 2019b, p. 2; cf. Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018).

Extreme polarization is the manifestation of deep divisions and severe political tensions. In everyday language it describes the "hardening of group identities or greater antagonism between groups" (LeBas, 2018, p. 62, cf. Esteban & Schneider, 2008; McCoy et al., 2018). Polarization drives people apart and, thereby, reduces shared spaces (LeBas, 2018 p. 62; DellaPosta, 2020, p. 507; cf. Carothers & O'Donohue, 2019b). This process leads to the characteristic perception and description of politics and society in terms of two very polar groups, which is manifested in the "us vs. them" mentality in public discourse (McCoy et al., 2018, p. 18; Somer & McCoy, 2018, pp. 5-6). Esteban and Ray (1999) showed that the level of conflict, in fact, increases with the level of polarization.

The fact that polarization has increased noticeably in most democratic societies is, therefore, a legitimate cause for concern. The causes for increasing polarization are complex (cf. Joachim,

2021). In this chapter I describe two phenomena of mass polarization[30] that have been shaking many liberal democracies: economic polarization and ideological polarization. Economic polarization describes the stratification of society by income and the growing gap between the "haves" and "have nots." Ideological polarization describes the growing gap between what is most commonly referred to as the political left (i.e., liberalism) and the political right (i.e., conservatism). While economic and ideological polarization have been increasing recently, support for democracy seems to have been declining, creating similar challenges and problems across the world (McCoy & Somer, 2018, p. 4). I focus here on the countries that belong to the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development[31] (OECD), because most OECD member countries are advanced industrial and liberal democracies[32] (cf. Dalton, 2004; Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000).

2.1. Economic Polarization: The Growing Class Divide

Robert Shiller, the Yale University Professor of Economic who won a Nobel Prize in 2013[33], describes rising inequality as the most pressing problem we are currently facing (cf. Wilkins, 2013). It is not only the enduring differences in the levels of economic development between the Global North and the Global South[34], but also rising economic inequality within countries that have been cause for growing concern. The gap between the rich and the poor has widened. Since 1980, inequality has risen dramatically in North America and Asia, moderately in Europe and stabilized in other places – including the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa – at extremely high levels. In fact, some of the richest countries in the world today possess the highest levels of inequality (Alvaredo et al., 2018, p. 40; Keeley, 2015, p. 2; cf. Chancel, 2019; Dorling, 2018; International Monetary Fund, 2017; McCarty et al., 2003; OECD, n.d.; Piketty, 2020; Stiglitz,

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[30] Polarization can occur at different levels of society. A distinction is usually made between elite polarization and mass polarization (cf. Carothers & O'Donohue, 2019b).

[31] The OECD has currently 37 members from four world regions: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (Europe); Canada, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and the United States (Americas); Australia, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand (Asia-Pacific); Israel and Turkey (Middle East) (Amadeo, 2021).

[32] See the Appendix for a classification of the 37 OECD countries based on the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Regimes of the World measure (cf. Table 2.1.A). For more information on V-Dem, please see Footnote 61.

[33] Robert Shiller won the Nobel Prize for Economics together with his colleagues Eugene Fama and Lars Peter Hansen, both from the University of Chicago, for their work on the pricing of financial assets.

[34] The two umbrella terms "Global North" and "Global South" are commonly used to differentiate between the rich(er) and poor(er) countries in the world. The Global North usually refers to the economically developed and technologically advanced nations with above-average GDP, which are almost all located in the northern hemisphere (with the exception of Australia and New Zealand) and the Global South usually refers to the economically and technologically dependent nations in the southern hemisphere. However, the use of the respective terms is contested, as the concept they stand for does not accurately reflect reality. Some nations of the Global South actually are located in northern hemisphere and vice versa.

2015). Economic inequality – the unequal distribution of income and wealth between different groups in society – is most commonly measured by the Gini coefficient[35] or, in short, the Gini (Dorling, 2018, p. 2; Jordahl, 2009, p. 326). It measures economic inequality based on how evenly income is distributed among a group of people. If one person of that group received all income and everyone else got nothing – a case of maximum inequality – the Gini would be one. If all income were distributed evenly among the members of that group – a case of maximum equality – the Gini would be zero. Thus, the closer the number is to zero, the lower the level of inequality or, in other words, the more egalitarian the group (cf. Ramazi, 2020).

The Gini stood at 0.29 across the 37 OECD member countries at its low point in the late-1980s. Since then, it has increased by about 10% to 0.32 (Figure 2). Not every nation has followed the same trajectory (Figures 3 and 4). Some nations have experienced a dramatic rise in inequality. For example, inequality has increased by 22% in the United States since 1980. Inequality has increased even in traditionally very egalitarian nations like Sweden. Actually, Sweden, with a 27% increase in inequality has seen a greater percentile increase in inequality than the United States. In absolute terms, inequality is still considerably lower in Sweden than in the United States, though. In Germany, inequality has risen by 14%. In other nations, inequality has risen more moderately, for example in Italy or Spain, where inequality rose by 4%; however, inequality was already relatively high in these two countries in the 1980s. Overall, inequality has increased less in western continental Europe (Alvaredo et al., 2018, p. 71; cf. Atkinson, 1996).

[35] The Gini coefficient is today probably the most widely used measure of inequality and was developed in 1912 by Italian economist and statistician Corrado Gini. He built on earlier work done by American economist Max Lorenz, who came up with the idea to plot total equality as a straight diagonal line in a graph. The difference between this line and the line that is produced by plotting people's actual incomes in the same graph (the Lorenz curve) is the Gini coefficient. In other words, the further the income line deviates from the equality line, the more unequal a society is. Sometimes people use the Gini index instead of the Gini coefficient. It is simply the Gini coefficient multiplied by 100 and written in percentages. It is important to keep in mind that the Gini coefficient does not measure wealth. It does not tell us anything about how big the metaphorical “pie” is, only how evenly the slices are shared among the members of a group (cf. Ramazi, 2020).



Note: Data taken from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) Version 9.0. Graph shows average change in income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient from 1980 to 2018 for Australia, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, South Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States.

Figure 2: Average development of income distribution across 19 of the 37 OECD member countries

In some nations, inequality has decreased. Yet in Chile, Colombia and Mexico, inequality is still extremely high when compared to the other OECD countries. This phenomenon is easy to explain. In Latin America, inequality is a heritage of its colonial past and, thus, historically founded (Fukuyama, 2015, p. 242; Piketty, 2020, p. 22). Figure 3 shows the absolute change in inequality for each OECD member country individually and Figure 4 also displays the percent change. This development stands in stark contrast to the period of increasing equality that followed the three decades after the end of the Second World War, when the second wave of globalization hit the world and brought prosperity to many, especially in the developed countries (Alvaredo et al., 2018, p. 41-42; McCarty et al., 2003, p. 1; cf. Friedman & Laurison, 2019; O'Brien, 2012; The World Bank, 2002)[36]. Inequality *between* countries and also *within* countries decreased as a result of rapid economic growth and the implementation of new redistribution and social protection policies[37] (The World Bank, 2002, pp. 30-31; cf. Chancel, 2019; OXFAM, 2021; Stiglitz, 2015).

[36] The second wave of globalization commonly refers to the years between 1945 and 1989, which were characterized by new trade liberalizations after a period of protectionism mainly as a consequence of the two world wars.
[37] Capital losses and the destruction of physical capital in the two wars also contributed to the reduction of income inequality in the said period (cf. Chancel, 2019)



Note: Data taken from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) Version 9.0. Graph shows absolute change in income inequality from 1980 to 2018 as measured by the Gini coefficient for all 37 OECD countries individually. Deviating dates for Australia (1988-2018), Austria (1980-2015), Belgium (1988-2018), Colombia (1985-2017), Czech Republic (1988-2017), Estonia (1988-2018), Germany (1982-2018), Hungary (1983-2018), Iceland (1983-2018), Italy (1987-2018), South Korea (1980-2017), Netherlands (1988-2018), Norway (1980-2017), Portugal (1980-2017), Slovakia (1980-2017), Sweden (1987-2018), Switzerland (1980-2017) and Turkey (1992-2016).

Figure 3: Change in income inequality in OECD countries, 1980-2018 (or as specified)



Note: Data taken from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) Version 9.0. Graph shows absolute change in income inequality from 1980 to 2018 as measured by the Gini coefficient for all 37 OECD countries individually. Deviating dates for Australia (1988-2018), Austria (1980-2015), Belgium (1988-2018), Colombia (1985-2017), Czech Republic (1988-2017), Estonia (1988-2018), Germany (1982-2018), Hungary (1983-2018), Iceland (1983-2018), Italy (1987-2018), South Korea (1980-2017), Netherlands (1988-2018), Norway (1980-2017), Portugal (1980-2017), Slovakia (1980-2017), Sweden (1987-2018), Switzerland (1980-2017) and Turkey (1992-2016). The marker labels indicate percent increase or decrease.

Figure 4: Absolute and percent change in income inequality in OECD countries, 1980-2018 (or as specified)

It happened just like Simon Kuznets (1955) had predicted it would. In a lecture[38] that was later published in the *American Economic Review* he argued that inequality would automatically decrease with increasing levels of economic development until it bottomed out at an acceptable level (cf. Alderson & Nielsen, 2002; Atkinson, 1997; Kuznets, 1955; Piketty, 2014):

> "The idea was that inequalities increase in the early phases of industrialization, because only a minority is prepared to benefit from the new wealth that industrialization brings. Later, in more advanced phases of development, inequality automatically decreases as a larger and larger fraction of the population partakes of the fruits of economic growth" (Piketty, 2014, p. 2014).

Kuznets' theory was an expression of the prevailing mood of the time – the economic boom years from 1945 to 1975 – which seemed to promise that everyone would benefit from economic growth eventually (Piketty, 2014, p. 11). Unfortunately, this belief was misguided. Inequality did not continue to decline but, instead, started to rise again. Researchers with the World Inequality Lab at the Paris School of Economic found that between 1980 and 2016 incomes grew by over 400% in Europe and North America, two regions that represent most of the population of high-income countries. However, the share of total income growth captured by each income group was highly unequal. Figure 5 plots the total growth rate of each income group to visualize the income inequality dynamics.

Whereas the bottom 50% have seen their incomes grow by a little over 30%, the top 1% have seen their incomes grow by over 100% and the top 0.01% have seen it grow by over 200% during the same time period. The top 1% captured 28% of the total growth – as much as the bottom 81%. The bottom 50% captured 9% of the total growth – less than the top 0.01%, which had captured 14% (Alvaredo et al., 2018, p. 48). Virtually all economic growth has gone to the top (Alvaredo et al., 2018, p. 46; Harris, 2021, p. 225; Keeley, 2015, pp. 56-57; cf. Bartels, 2008; Piketty, 2014; Stiglitz, 2011; tagesschau, 2012b; Van Biesenbroeck, 2015). Why inequality started to rise again at the end of the 1970s and has continued to do so is a question that economists and sociologists have spent considerable effort to try to answer. Different hypotheses have been put forward that can be subsumed under three broad categories: globalization, technological progress and policy shifts (cf. Alderson & Nielsen, 2002; Alvaredo et al., 2018; Atkinson, 1997; Keeley, 2015; McCarty et al., 2003; OECD, n.d.; OECD, 2011; Piketty, 2014; Stiglitz, 2011).

[38] Presidential address delivered at the sixty-seventh annual meeting of the American Economic Association, Detroit, Michigan, December 29, 1954.



Note: Data taken from World Inequality Database (see wir2018.wid.world/methodology.html for data series). Graph shows total income growth by income group in North America and Western Europe, 1980-2016. Total population divided into a hundred groups of equal population size and sorted by each group's income level. The top 1% group is then divided into ten groups, the richest of these groups is also divided into ten groups, and the very top group is again divided into ten groups of equal population size.

Figure 5: Income Growth by Income Group, 1980-2016 (adapted from Alvaredo et al., 2018, p. 48)

Increasing trade integration – the linking of national economies through cross-border exchanges of goods and services – has broken down borders. With the development of new communication and transportation technologies, people around the world are now more connected than at any time before in history, making it easy to participate in and profit from a truly global marketplace. Some of the poorest people in some of the most isolated places in the world have been lifted out of extreme poverty – many have even been lifted out of poverty altogether. Never before have more people belonged to the global middle class (cf. Levitt, 1983; Osterhammel, 2012; Vanham, 2019). A majority of the world population has benefited from globalization and technological progress; however, this success story does not end well for everyone. New laborsaving technologies have put many middle-class, blue-collar workers in the West out of their jobs (Harris, 2021; p. 146; OECD, 2011, p. 24, p. 97):

> "First, a rapid rise in the integration of trade and financial markets generated a relative shift in labor demand in favor of highly skilled workers. Second, technological progress shifted production technologies in both industries and services in favor of skilled labor. These structural changes got underway in the early 1980s and accelerated from the mid-1990s" (OECD, 2011, p. 28).

On top of that, the blue-collar jobs that are left are often at risk of being relocated someplace else, where labor is much cheaper (Van Biesenbroeck, 2015, p. 27; cf. O'Brien, 2012; OECD,

2019; Stiglitz, 2011). At the same time, we have been witnessing “the rise of the super managers” (Alvaredo et al., 2018, p. 69; Piketty, 2014, pp. 315-321)[39]. What sounds a bit like the latest installment in a blockbuster movie franchise actually refers to the unprecedented explosion of incredibly high incomes for top managers of both large financial and non-financial firms (Keenley, 2015, p. 42, p. 57; Piketty, 2014, p. 24; Van Biesenbroeck, 2015, p. 27). It is not totally unreasonable to assume that these top managers are simply much better qualified or more productive than the rest of the population. However, that is not the case. It turns out, that “these top managers by and large have the power to set their own remuneration, in some cases without limit and in many cases without any clear relation to their individual productivity” (Piketty, 2014, p. 24; cf. Chancel, 2019; Inglehart, 2018; Keenley, 2015).

In the industrial economy, evaluation and compensation of individual performance were based on a simple and objective formula: the higher the qualifications and the better the output, the higher the financial reward (Piketty, 2014, pp. 304-305; Reckwitz, 2019, p. 203). Today, individual performance is rated rather subjectively based on how successfully one acts in the market. Competence counts much more than qualification (Keenley, 2015, p. 58; Reckwitz, 2019, p. 212; Reich, 2010, pp. vi-viii). Eckstein (1996) points out that, “the ideal market-actor is egocentrically absorbed in personal optimizing, in competition with and often at the expense of others” (p. 9), which directly contradicts democratic values. Labor productivity has actually increased in several OECD countries since the late 1970s; however, median incomes have stagnated (cf. OECD, 2018b; Van Biesenbroeck, 2015; Williams, 2017). In the United States, for example, productivity rose by 70% in the years between 1979 and 2018. In contrast, hourly wages for workers only increased by 12% in the same period (cf. Economic Policy Institute, 2019; Gould, 2020; Mishel, Gould, Bivens, 2015). US Vice President Kamala Harris (2021) writes that, adjusted for inflation, the federal minimum wage is actually lower today than in the late 1960s, when Martin Luther King Jr. already called it a “starvation wage” (p. 216).

Many people are working harder, but it does not pay off for them (Harris, 2019, pp. 221-222).[40] This development is often justified with the argument that those at the top contribute more to society and, thus, add more value to it. This line of argument is disputable, though. Much depends on the set evaluation criteria. Can we assert that a hedge funds manager contributes more

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[39] This development is especially strong in the English-speaking countries, very high incomes in continental Europe have also increased but not as significantly (Piketty, 2014, pp. 315-321)

[40] The mainstream opinion in public debate is that wages have been decoupled from productivity. However, there are voices that argue the exact opposite, namely that the link between wages and productivity is still strong (cf. Strain, 2019)

to society than, for example, a cancer researcher, and is, therefore more valuable to it? Financially? Maybe. Morally? Probably not (cf. Chancel, 2019; Stiglitz, 2011). The situation is further aggravated by the decline of unions. Since the 1980s, union membership rates have been falling, and unions have lost a lot of their collective bargaining power to centralize wages. The increased decentralization has led to a more unequal distribution of wages. Moreover, incentive pay schemes and profit-sharing arrangements undermine already negotiated wage scales (McCarty et al., 2003, p. 2; OECD, 2011, pp. 32-33, p. 105., p. 119; cf. Harris, 2021; Inglehart, 2018; Stiglitz, 2011; Wallerstein & Western, 2000). Today, "the wage difference is not only increasing between entrepreneurs and employees…between workers performing non-routine and routine tasks, [but also] for observationally similar workers, even between workers employed at the same firm" (Van Biesebroeck, 2015, p. 27).

Because the dynamics of rising inequality differ considerably from one world region to another, globalization and new technology trends are not seen as the only forces behind growing inequality (Alvaredo et al., 2018, p. 42; cf. Chancel, 2019). Therefore, it is often argued that policy shifts, especially in the area of taxation and finance, are another serious cause for increasing inequality (Piketty, 2014, p. 20; Piketty, 2020, p. 33; cf. International Monetary Fund, 2017)[41]. The rules of the global marketplace have been tailored to the needs of the businesses that compete in it and not the workers; in fact, it undermines them (cf. Betzelt & Bode, 2017; Stiglitz, 2011). The regulatory reforms that have been implemented to strengthen competition for goods and services have made labor markets more flexible, for example by loosening employment protection legislation for workers with temporary contracts. Some have made it cheaper to employ low-skilled workers by reducing taxes on labor for low-income workers. A number of countries also have cut unemployment benefits (Keenley, 2015, p. 54; OECD, 2011, p. 30; p. 119). This has led to a shift in the share of national income from labor towards capital.

Today, most of the income generated does not end up in the pockets of the workers but in the pockets of business owners (Keenley, 2015, pp. 46-47). Furthermore, slower economic growth rates in combination with lower tax rates on capital gains have disproportionally benefited the already rich. Even when average incomes stagnate, the earnings from capital may still be high. It only takes a small share of a fortune to make that fortune grow even more in the right environment. Recent waves of privatizations of national wealth have amplified this phenomenon (Keenley, 2015, p. 59; Piketty, 2014, pp. 25-26, pp. 183-187; cf. Chancel, 2019). For example,

[41] Even among the rich, calls for more vertical equity are growing louder. For example, the taxmenow.eu initiative that was started by 30+ millionaires from Germany and Austria demands higher taxation of fortunes running into millions (cf. tagesschau, 2021a).

the top tax rate fell from 66% in 1981 to 41% in 2008 on average across all OECD countries. Property and inheritance tax rates have also gone down. At the same time, the labor income tax of the middle class increased. This has played into the hands of the already wealthy. The argument that is usually made to support such measures is that cutting taxes encourages growth; however, the evidence for this is mixed at best (Keenley, 2015, p. 60-61; cf. Chancel, 2019). This condition "automatically generates arbitrary and unsustainable inequalities that radically undermine the meritocratic values on which democratic societies are based" (Piketty, 2014, p. 1; cf. OECD, 2011; Stiglitz, 2011).

Social changes are sometimes identified as another reason for rising inequality (cf. Keeley, 2015; Stiglitz, 2011), for example changes in family structures. A higher martial age and higher divorces rates are responsible for more single-person and, thus, single-income households, especially more female-led ones (Keenley, 2015, p. 52). Previously underrepresented, we have seen an increasing participation of women in the workforce; however, women do not only work part-time more often than men, but they also tend to earn less, due to a persistent wage gap (Bartels, 2008, p. 9; OECD, 2011, p. 32). Another reason is that people nowadays tend to marry people from similar social backgrounds, which relates indirectly to the increasing participation of women in the workforce. Many women now have qualifications and careers similar to their husband's. A lawyer who might have married the paralegal not so long ago is today far more likely to marry another lawyer (Keenley, 2015, p. 42, pp. 51-53).

All these factors have affected the distribution of income and, thus, contributed to increasing inequality. As the digital economy grows, the consequences of what is widely referred to as "deindustrialization" – the processes of economic and social change that accompany the decline of share in manufacturing employment – become more and more real every day (cf. Beramendi et al., 2015b; O'Brien, 2012; OECD, 2011, 2018b; Rowthorn & Ramaswamy, 1997). Even if technological progress and globalization have made our lives a great deal more comfortable and convenient, many now seem to have had enough: "There is growing social cohesion among protestors worldwide because the vast majority of people in a majority of rich countries are now suffering as a result of growing inequalities" (Dorling, 2014, p. 3; cf. Vanham, 2019). Societies have become wealthier on average, but that additional wealth has mostly gone to the top (Piketty, 2014, p. 314; cf. Clement, 2021; Friedman & Savage, 2017; Inglehart, 2018), and it stays there. It does not trickle down (cf. Dorling, 2014). Social upward mobility is very limited, and the fear of social decline is all too real for many (Nachtwey, 2018, p. 135; cf. Betzelt & Bode, 2017; OECD, 2019; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009).

A middle-class lifestyle has become hard to maintain (Harris, 2021, p. 219). In fact, the middle class shows signs of disintegration (Reckwitz, 2019, p. 282). In the eroding industrial society, the old middle class has split into a lower middle class with only very limited resources and an upper middle class with at least sufficient resources (Nachtwey, 2018, p. 151; Reckwitz, 2019, p. 277; OECD, 2019, p. 69). Whereas one's level of education did not really matter to reach a middle-class lifestyle before, a high degree of education is now a requirement to enter the new upper middle class. The members of the old non-academic middle class now belong to the new lower middle class. Some of the former middle-income households managed to move out of the old middle class into the new upper middle class; however, the majority of the former middle-income households moved down into the lower class. Their working conditions are often precarious (Reckwitz, 2019, pp. 278-279). Instead of capturing people's social and economic experiences with the class scheme, Kitschelt and Rehm (2019; Kitschelt, personal communication, August 27, 2019[42]) divided people into four groups based on their education and income: low-education/low-income (the working class), low-education/high-income (the petty bourgeoisie or lower middle class, but also the shrinking groups of skilled and often unionized manual and clerical /workers with high incomes), high-education/low-income (the socio-cultural professionals) and high-education/high-income group (the professionals). Figure 6 shows the development of these education/income groups and documents the "upskilling" of the labor force.

The low-education/low-income group has shrunk by about 20% and the low-education/high-income group was cut in half, from about 14% to 6%. The high-education/high-income group has become slightly larger, whereas the high-education/low-income group, which practically did not exist a few decades ago, today constitutes about 40% of the labor force. While a middle-class lifestyle has become much more expensive than it used to be 30 years ago, especially because of the rise in housing prices, middle incomes have mostly stagnated. (OECD, 2019, p. 14; cf. Reckwitz, 2019). The size of the middle class has shrunk by an average of 1% every ten years (OECD, 2019, p. 48, p. 69). Those at the bottom and in the middle of the middle-income group have been disproportionately affected by social decline (OECD, 2019, p. 69; cf. OECD, 2018a).

[42] This reference refers to an email conversation between Herbert Kitschelt and Christian Welzel and colleagues from the Center for the Study of Democracy at Leuphana Universität Lüneburg (and into which I was CC'd). To an email sent on August 27, 2019, Herbert Kitschelt had attached a paper titled "Partisan Realignment in Rich Democracies. The Socio-Economic Reconfiguration of Partisan Support in Knowledge Societies" that he had been working on with Philip Rehm and was going to present at the 2019 American Association of Political Science's annual meeting. It is an extension of Kitschelt & Rehm (2019) to a cross-national 23-country analysis.



Figure 6: Share of education/income groups in labor force in percent (adapted from Kitschelt & Rehm, 2019)

Furthermore, all the people in the middle are losing ground relative to the people at the top (Harris, 2021, p. 225; OECD, 2011, p. 104; cf. Dallinger, 2013; Stiglitz, 2015). Compared to the upper class, the middle class has been getting poorer; virtually all added wealth created since the 1980s has gone to those who were already rich (Nachtwey, 2018, p. 161, p. 172, p. 224; cf. Stiglitz, 2015). This development has led to growing frustrations and "the emergence of new forms of nationalism, isolationism, populism and protectionism…A rising sense of vulnerability, uncertainty, and anxiety has translated into increasing distrust towards global integration and public institutions" (OECD, 2019, p. 27) among the members of the middle classes. It is the middle class, though, which is commonly thought of as a pillar of stability in democracies (Inglehart, 1990, p. 46; OECD, 2019, p. 28; cf. Aristotle, 1999; Galston, 2019). Figure 7 shows the development of income inequality between different groups in society.

Ratio of Average Income of Top 10% and Bottom 50%



Note: Data are from the World Inequality Database (WID) accessed through the STATA WID Tool (https://wid.world/codes-dictionary#how-to-access). Graph shows average change in the 90/50 income ratio across all OECD countries (left) and for each region seperately (right) from 1980 to 2019. The 90/50 income ratio represents how many times larger the average income at the 90th percentile is compared with the average income at the 50th percentile. It compares how the middle class is doing relative to the richest.

Figure 7: Development of 90/10 income ratio across OECD countries (left) and regions (right) since 1980

We see that the top 10% of the population today earns, on average, across all OECD members countries almost eleven times more than the bottom 50% of the population (left). The right graph shows the development for each OECD region separately. Figure 8 zooms in even closer and shows the development of the 90/50 income ratio for several OECD countries individually. In the United States, the top 10% of the population now earn over 15 times more than the bottom 50%. The number has almost doubled since 1980. In Germany, the development has not been as stark, but the top 10% of the labor force earn ten times more than the bottom 50%. Finally, Figure 9 shows the distribution of income by quintiles in 2018. Each quintile represents 20% of the population. The income across these same size groups is distributed very unevenly. The bottom 20% earn only a tiny fraction of the national income, whereas the top 20% earn almost half of it. Friedman and Savage (2017) warn “that this kind of polarising *[sic]* (at the extremes) and yet also fuzzy (in the middle) class structure is driving political divisions in an ever-intensifying way” (p.35).



Note: Data are from the World Inequality Database (WID) accessed through the STATA WID Tool (https://wid.world/codes-dictionary#how-to-access). Graph shows average change in the 90/50 income ratio across several OECD countries from 1980 to 2019. The 90/50 income ratio represents how many times larger the average income at the 90th percentile is compared with the average income at the 50th percentile. It compares how the middle class is doing relative to the richest.

Figure 8: Development of 90/50 income ratio across several OECD countries since 1980



Note: Data are from the World Income Inequality Database (WIID) retrieved from the United Nations University website (https://www.wider.unu.edu/database/wiid). Graph shows percentage share of income that accrues to subgroups of population by quintiles for 33 of the 34 OECD countries (Latvia, New Zealand, Portugal and Turkey are missing) for 2018. For example, if the population was 100 and those 100 people were ranked by income, the share of the lowest quintile represents the sum of incomes of the poorest 20 people (income share held by lowest 20%), as a proportion of total income.

Figure 9: Income shares by population quintiles (20%) for 2018

This development of economic polarization can have serious consequences for democracy for several reasons: A society in which most citizens are not doing too well is at risk of losing its social cohesion (Dorling, 2018, p. 2). Yet the possibility for collective action is fundamental to a functioning democracy (cf. Dahl, 1996). Increasing inequality results in shrinking opportunities for the majority compared to infinite opportunities for a few (cf. Stiglitz, 2011; OECD, 2018a; Chancel, 2019). As a system of government, democracy requires citizens to participate actively to function properly, but rising inequality has led to an imbalanced influence on political processes and decision-making. It often leads to political apathy, especially among the poor (cf. Anderson & Beramendi, 2008; Dalton, 2020; Hill et al., 1995; Schäfer, 2013). Hence, those with a lot of money usually have an advantage over those with only a little or none (Nachtwey, 2018, p. 91; cf. Dalton, 2017b; Lindberg, 2019). Research has, in fact, shown that there is a link between citizen's social-economic status and their political and electoral participation[43]. The higher the social-economic status, the higher political participation[44] (cf. Dalton, 2020; Lehmann et al., 2018; Solt, 2008, 2010). Merkel (2018a) points out that

> "one of the greatest challenges facing current democracies is the erosion of the principle of political equality. The socioeconomic *[sic]* inequality that has been growing for over three decades in the societies of the OECD world has continuously translated into political inequality. In recent decades, voter turnout has declined moderately in Western Europe and dramatically in Eastern Europe. It is mainly lower-class voters who stay away from the ballot box" (p. 351).

Socio-economic inequality translates into political inequality because low voter participation among the poor leads to a class bias in favor of the rich. This ultimately shapes government actions as parties orient themselves towards serving the interests of voters more than those of non-voters (cf. Elsässer et al., 2017; Helms, 2017; Gilens, 2005). The representation gap soon becomes a positive feedback loop: A lack of government response can lead to dissatisfaction and cynicism with democracy among the less privileged (Beramendi et al., 2015a, p. 381). They may start to think elections do not matter because they will not be heard anyway, and decide against voting in the next election. Thus, the representation gap between the rich and the poor will only become wider over time. The chances of their interests being represented in the next election cycle decreases as they collectively cease participating in democratic opportunities (Weßels, 2018, p. 62; cf. Dalton, 2017b).

Most OECD democracies are a long way from actual equality in participation and representation. Merkel (2018a) notes that "undoubtedly, this is the most serious of the broken promises

[43] For a short overview of some of the ways socio-economic status influences participation see Dalton (2021)

[44] This is not only true for voting. Today, the methods of political participation have become increasingly diverse, less formally organized and more direct. However, these forms of political action are also disproportionately occurring among the more privileged members of a society (cf. Dalton, 2020).

of democracy" (p. 365). In his first inaugural address, Thomas Jefferson (2006), a Founding Father and the third president of the United States of America, expressed his conviction that democracy was the only form of government, "where every man, at the call of the law, would fly to the standard of the law, and would meet invasions of the public order as his own personal concern." In other words, political participation stabilizes democracies because it makes people care about their government's fate (Richter, 2020, p. 31). Full, effective and equal participation and representation are the most basic rights of democratic citizens (cf. Dahl, 1996). Socio-economic inequality challenges and undermines these rights (Merkel, 2018c, p. 267). Merkel (2015) has pointedly described inequality as the disease of democracy. The less socio-economic inequality there is, the better the quality of democracy, because political inequality will also be much lower (Merkel, 2018b, p. 351).

2.2. Ideological Polarization: A Side Effect of Modernization

In an op-ed for CNN, John Avlon (2019) dramatically stated that polarization has poisoned America. In fact, he wrote that it was killing the country because it threatens the very foundation on which it was built: social cohesion. Research does indeed show that Americans are severely ideologically[45] divided (cf. Boxell et al., 2020; Carothers, 2019; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; Moss, 2017). Exit polls from the 2018 midterm elections reveal that 76% of American voters also believe that the ideological division in their country has become stronger (cf. Cillizza, 2018). The nation's famous motto[46], "E Pluribus Unum" (Engl.: Out of many, one), no longer seems to be the guiding principle for communal life. Almost 90% of Americans now say that polarization is threatening life as they know it (cf. Avlon, 2019). A month before the last presidential election, 80% of registered voters from both political camps said that the differences between them were not just about the right policies, but about core American values. 90% of registered voters believed that it would harm the United States if the other side won (cf. Dimock & Wike, 2020). This kind of deep-seated or pre-existing ideological division forms the basis for voter identification in the first place.

Most of the literature on polarization in democracies focuses on the United States precisely because it is so severe. But it is certainly not a phenomenon that is exclusive to America

[45] I define ideology as an individual's specific set of interrelated opinions, attitudes and values that organizes, motivates, and gives meaning to political behavior. Hence, ideology helps to explain why people do what they do (cf. Jost, 2006).

[46] "E Pluribus Unum" was officially the nation's motto until 1956, when the United States Congress replaced it with "In God We Trust". The Latin phrase does, however, still grace the seal of the United States (a bold eagle with thirteen arrows and an olive branch in its talons) and remains probably the most catchy summary of the essence of American democracy (Moss, 2017, p. 1).

(McCoy et al., 2018, p. 18; cf. Carothers & O'Donohue, 2019b; Somer & McCoy, 2018). Almost all democracies are vulnerable to it (Carothers & O'Donohue, 2019a, p. 283). However, in the United States, it has become so extreme that it is mainly responsible for its recent phase of democratic dysfunction (cf. Carothers, 2019; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). Ideological polarization grows out of societal divisions. It is usually driven by "divergent sets of values and worldviews, or 'core beliefs'. These core beliefs shape the ways that individuals interpret the world around them at the most fundamental level" (Hawkins et al., 2018, p. 5). Ideological polarization is, therefore, also referred to as belief polarization (cf. Talisse, 2019). Polarization is both a state and a process – it describes the extent to which opinions on an issue are opposed and the increase in such opposition over time (DiMaggio et al., 1996, p. 693). In the OECD democracies, ideological polarization has been accelerated by the radical socio-cultural change of recent decades, and even though most have undergone similar changes, they have not been affected by ideological polarization in the same way (Carothers, 2019, p. 68; cf. Carothers & O'Donohue, 2019b; Devlin & Mordecai, 2019; Dimock & Wike, 2020).

Like Inglehart (1977) predicted, the trend towards more postmaterialist values in Western societies was not temporary but decidedly permanent (cf. chpt. 1.1.). The end of World War II coincided with a period of unprecedented economic and physical security, which, in turn, set off a process of lasting value change. Figure 10 shows the rise of liberal values in the domain of sexuality norms over time from the mid-1990s until most recently and across generations in the OECD countries. The average support of these values is significantly higher today than it was 30 years ago. The formative experiences of younger birth cohorts, especially in the post-war era, differed significantly from those of older cohorts (Inglehart, 1990, p. 66; Inglehart, 1997), and intergenerational value change seemed "to reflect a transformation of basic world views" (p. 21) with an increasing emphasis on belonging, self-expression, and the quality of life (Inglehart, 1990, p. 66; cf. Flanagan & Lee, 2003).

> "Thus, traditional values and norms remain widespread among older generations; but new orientations have penetrated younger groups to an increasing degree. As younger generations gradually replace older ones in the adult population, the prevailing worldview in these societies is being transformed" (Inglehart, 1990, p. 3).



Note: Data are from joint EVS/WVS rounds 3 and 7, pooling samples from all available OECD member countries, weighting each sample to an equal N of 1,000 per round. Vertical axis measures for respondents of the same birth cohort their average endorsement of abortion, divorce and homosexuality as tolerable choices on a scale ranging from 0 to 1, as explained in Footnote 47 (pooled N = 54,373).

Figure 10: The Rise of Liberal Values (adapted from Alexander & Welzel, 2017, p. 4)[47]

This development has significantly shifted the balance between conservatism and progressivism (Inglehart & Norris, 2017, p. 45). The new norms and values emphasize environmental protection, sexual liberalization, gender equality, respect for the rights of minority groups and cosmopolitanism, among others. As anticipated by Inglehart (1977), this development has manifested itself in the gradual replacement of class politics by cultural politics (pp. 12-13). For the longest time, ideological conflict in advanced industrial democracies was perceived to be essentially about redistribution issues, often expressed on a bipolar left-right dimension. It mirrored the social class conflict "over the ownership of the means of production and the distribution of income" (Inglehart, 1984, p. 25; cf. Flanagan & Lee, 2003). In a nutshell, those on the left fought for social security and market regulation by the state; those on the right fought for the free-market and minimal state intervention (Inglehart, 1984, p. 25; Inglehart, 1990, p. 8, p. 289; Kitschelt, 2004, p. 2).

However, with the emergence of the value conflict, the one-dimensional ideological space no longer adequately captured the issues dividing people (Dalton et al., 1984, p. 453; Deegan-

[47] The EWS/WVS asks people about the acceptability of a list of lifestyle issues, including "homosexuality," "abortion" and "divorce" (Q182, Q184 and Q185 of EVS/WVS round 7 questionnaire) using a ten-point scale from "never" to "always justifiable." I recoded these scales into a range from 0 (never justifiable) to 1 (always justifiable), with decimal fractions of 1 indicating intermediate positions. Then I averaged each respondent's position over the three items. Country-level scores are population averages on this 0-to-1 scale.

Krause, 2009, p. 16; McCoy et al., 2018, p. 17; cf. Inglehart, 1984; Kitschelt & Hellemans, 1990). The cultural conflict cuts across the conventional left-right axis, effectively transforming the one-dimensional ideological spectrum into a two dimensional ideological space[48] (Figure 11). The "old" economic conflict about redistribution issues like appropriate tax rates or the scope of social welfare benefits has not become obsolete, but it has become decisively less important. Ideological polarization now happens mainly along the "new" cultural dimension, which represents materialist values on the one end and postmaterialist values on the other end (Inglehart, 1984, pp. 25-26; cf. Inglehart, 2018; Kitschelt, personal communication, August 27, 2019). Materialists continue to emphasize traditional values such as "cultural homogeneity, a particular form of family organization and its corresponding sexual code" (Kitschelt, 2004, p. 2). In contrast, postmaterialists emphasize libertarian values; they attach great importance to the well-being of their social environment, which they express in their respect for nature and tolerance for the individual and its life-style choices (Flanagan & Lee, 2003, p. 236; Kitschelt, 2004, p. 2). Postmaterialist values find expression in the idea of environmentalism, support of cultural diversity, and the feminist movement, among others (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002, p. 976; Inglehart, 1984, p. 28).



Figure 11: The ideological space today (adapted from Inglehart (1984) and Kitschelt (1992, 1994))

48 Not to be confused with the two-dimensional cleavage structure (cf. Box I).

Box I: Lipset and Rokkan's Cleavage Concept

The political cleavage concept goes back to Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967). Studying party system formation in European democracies, Lipset and Rokkan found that each nation's party system could be explained by certain conflict dimensions that could be traced back through a country's evolutionary history. Over time, these conflict dimensions had become deep-rooted in a society's social structure, so-called cleavages (Bornschier, 2009, p. 1; Lacewell & Merkel, 2013, p. 80; cf. Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Pickel, 2018; Siavelis, 1997; Torcal & Montero, 1997; cf. Dalton, 1996). The two authors identified four historical cleavages stemming from the national and industrial revolutions that structured the European political space: center/periphery, church/state, rural/urban and labor/capital, which could be subsumed under an economic and a cross-cutting religious dimension (Kriesi et al., 2008, p. 11; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 14). These two dimensions created a policy space in which political parties would locate themselves according to the sides they took in the conflicts.

There is an ongoing debate about whether the new cultural conflict dimension constitutes a new cleavage (cf. Dalton et al., 1984; Deegan-Krause, 2006; Kriesi, 1998; Kriesi, 2010). It seems to be widely accepted by now that a cleavage is characterized by three component elements, a social-structural, an ideological /normative and a behavioral/organizational (Kriesi, 2010, p. 673). "It implies that social divisions and their ideological expressions are not translated into politics as a matter of course but are decisively shaped by their political articulation" (Kriesi, 2010, p. 674; cf. Bartolini and Mair, 2007; Grande & Kriesi, 2012). A necessary condition for the emergence of a new cleavage is, then, a shared understanding of group identity, that is people have to perceive the conflict as being essentially an inter-group conflict, where mobilization and collective action is formed around perceived grievances vis-à-vis the outgroup (Bornschier, 2010, pp. 57-58).

Following Dalton (2018), Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995), Kriesi et al. (2008) and Kitschelt (1994, 1995a, 1995b), I treat the new cultural conflict dimension as an issue-specific division of society, assuming the conflicts in society today are based on value oppositions and lead to social conflicts and not the other way around (Knutsen & Scarbrough, 1995, pp. 495-497). In other words, these conflicts do not stem from social group competition but ideological or principled positions on enduring political interests (that is not to say that they cannot be tied to certain social groups) (Dalton, 2018, pp. 28-29). The ideological movements of the 1960s and 1980s transformed the "old" cultural dimension from a dimension mainly defined by religious conflicts into one featuring two groups: one opposing culturally liberal values, and the other opposing traditional (authoritarian) values. "It is crucial that the mobilization of these new social movements did not add any fundamentally new dimension to the political space…The political space remained two-dimensional…What changed was the meaning of the conflicts associated with these two dimensions" (Kriesi et al., 2008, p. 13).

For Kriesi et al. (2006) the process of globalisation constitutes a "critical juncture" that will most likely result in a new structural cleavage. Accordingly, Kriesi (2010) makes a case for a "cleavage-like" (Enyedi, 2008, p. 288) new conflict dimension, arguing that it is not unreasonable to believe that social groups are today less characterized by their socio-structural composition than their member's value orientations (Kriesi, 2010, p. 678). For a recent overview of the state of cleavage resarch see Deegan-Krause (2009).

Ideological conflict is, thus, no longer based primarily on redistribution issues but has become more and more polarized along the lines of different sets of core beliefs, mirroring the new cultural conflict dimension which "is only loosely related to conflict over ownership of the means of production and to traditional social class conflict" (Inglehart, 1984, p. 25). Society has successfully been repolarized, so to speak (cf. Dalton et al., 1984; Inglehart, 1971, 1984, 1990; Inglehart & Abramson, 1994). The changing nature of ideological conflict in advanced industrial democracies manifested itself for the first time in the new social movements that emerged in Northwest Europe in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The first wave of mobilization gave rise to the New Politics agenda and promoted the cultural liberalism of the postmaterialists. It marked the beginning of the emergence of the so called New Left parties such as the Greens, and other left-libertarian groups.

The second wave of mobilization, which started in the 1980s, is considered by many as a counter movement of social conservatives to the cultural liberalism propagated by the New Left and is, therefore, often referred to as the New Right (cf. Bornschier, 2010a; Dalton, 2018; Dalton et al., 1984; Ignazi, 2003; Inglehart, 2018; Inglehart & Norris, 2017). The traditionalist movement challenged the societal change linked to the New Politics agenda. It produced parties such as the Front National in France (Bornschier & Kriesi, 2013, pp. 3-4; Kriesi, personal communication, May 9, 2020[49]; cf. Dalton, 1996; Flanagan & Lee, 2003; Inglehart & Norris, 2017). However, Kriesi (Kriesi, personal communication, May 9, 2020) went one step further by asserting the existence of an additional dimension to the New Right. He interpreted the New Right movement not only as a cultural backlash but a conglomerate of the "losers" of the diverse processes of modernization and accelerating globalization:

> "The 'losers' of globalization are people whose life chances were traditionally protected by national boundaries. They perceive the weakening of these boundaries as a threat for their social status and their social security. Their life chances and action spaces are being reduced. The 'winners,' on the other hand, include people who benefit from the new opportunities resulting from globalization, and whose life chances are enhanced" (Kriesi & Lachat, 2004, p. 2).

The winners of globalization are typically high-skilled and work in sectors open to international competition. They are, thus, usually very cosmopolitan-oriented individuals. Increasing levels of education have accelerated the process of value change towards more cultural liberalism because education "contributes to cultural tolerance and openness; it provides the language

[49] This reference refers to an email conversation between Hanspeter Kriesi and several researchers associated with the Laboratory for Comparative Social Research at the National Research University Higher School of Economics in Russia (and into which I was CC'd). To an email sent on May 9, 2020, Hanspeter Kriesi had attached a paper titled "Social-cultural liberalism and conservatism in Europe and in Russia" that he had presented in St. Petersburg the year before.

skills which give access to other cultures" (Kriesi et al., 2008, p. 7). The losers of globalization are typically much less qualified and work in traditionally protected sectors. They are often very communitarian-oriented individuals, that is they identify strongly with their national community (Kriesi & Lachat, 2004, p. 4). From the start, the New Right movement has fed off of the (real or potential) losers' fear of increasing cultural diversity, which they perceive as a threat to their traditional way of life. It is often the lowest common denominator of mobilization for these people, given their different economic interests (Grande & Kriesi, 2012, p. 4). It manifests itself in xenophobic forces like the mobilization against outsiders in defense of the unity and purity of the national culture and the often fierce critique of political elites for not responding to the outside threat adequately (Grande & Kriesi, 2012, p. 12, p. 14; Inglehart & Norris, 2017, p. 51; cf. Bonschier & Kriesi, 2013; Kriesi, personal communication, May 9, 2020; Kriesi & Lachat, 2004).

Kriesi's winners and losers of globalization are very similar to Inglehart's postmaterialist and materialists, although Kriesi has referred to this new cultural conflict dimension as integration vs. demarcation (cf. Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). In fact, it has been given many different labels over the years: postmaterialist vs. materialist (cf. Inglehart, 1990), new politics vs. old politics (cf. Müller-Rommel, 1989), libertarian vs. authoritarian (cf. Kitschelt, 1994, 1995b), integration vs. demarcation (cf. Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008), green/alternative/libertarian vs. traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (cf. Hooghe et al. 2002), libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian (cf. Bornschier, 2010b) and cosmopolitanism vs. communitarianism (cf. De Wilde et al. 2019; Lacewell & Merkel, 2013; Merkel, 2017; Zürn & de Wilde 2016), cosmopolitanism vs. parochialism (cf. De Vries, 2018b) or transnational cleavage (cf. Hooghe & Marks, 2018). The different labels may highlight different aspects of the new value conflict, but they do not change its overall meaning. At its core, it represents the cultural division "related to modernization processes in affluent democracies" (Dalton, 2018, p. 44) between those members of society with a preference for individual freedom and openness to change and those with a preference for conformity and the resistance to change. Or, in other words, those that envision a more equal society in the future and those that want to turn the clock back (Graham et al., 2009, pp. 1029-1030; cf. Bornschier, 2010a; Dalton, 2018; Haidt, 2013).

With the emergence of the value conflict the meaning of the traditional left-right dimension has changed; in fact, its meaning has pluralized. Traditionally, the left-right dimension quite accurately represented the conflict between those in favor of redistribution and those in favor of a free market. Today, it also represents the conflict between cultural liberals who support change

and cultural conservatives who oppose it (cf. Jost, 2006; Kitschelt & Hellemans, 1990). Dalton (2018) points out,

> "democratic politics is a means to resolve competing social interests, and [Seymour] Lipset and [Stein] Rokkan tracked these interests back to the social structure. For instance, the shared interests of the working class arose because of their common work experience and their competition with the interests of the middle class and bourgeoisie" (pp. 10-11).

Following Lipset and Rokkan (1967), political competition, then, is defined as competition between a different groups that represent certain interests, for example labor unions versus employer's associations (cf. Box I). However, group alignments have become more fluid and less institutionalized (Dalton, 2018, p. 11, p. 30). "These informal networks are becoming denser and denser, and can fulfill the theoretical requirements of defining interests and recognition of these interests that was part of the foundation of tradition, group-based social cleavages" (Dalton, 2018, p. 67). It is somewhat paradoxical, actually: People on the left now typically support maximum individual freedom in the cultural sphere but want to limit it in the economic sphere; people on the right support maximum individual freedom in the economic sphere and want to limit it in the cultural sphere (Caprara & Vecchione, 2018, p. 52; cf. Evans & Carl, 2017). Therefore, Dalton (2018) argues that today, political competition is much better described as competition over different sets of values or worldviews (p. 11) and less over group-based interests.

That economic issues are not real position issues anymore becomes apparent when taking into account the decline of social class voting and the concomitant changes in political partisanship. The lower classes, which used to vote mainly for parties on the left because of their redistributive programs, now mainly vote for parties on the right in defense of their traditional way of life. The middle classes, which mainly used to support the parties on the right for their laissez-faire economic programs, now mainly vote for the parties on the left in support of progressive change. The social bases of the two poles have changed (Flanagan & Lee, 2003, p. 251; Inglehart, 1977, p. 183; Inglehart, 1984, pp. 25-28; Inglehart, 1990, p. 289; Inglehart & Flanagan, 1984, p. 1298; Lipset, 1960, pp. 223-224; cf. De Vries, 2018b; Franklin, 1992; Kitschelt & Rehm, 2019; Kriesi & Schulte-Cloos, 2020). Political preference formation de-coupled from social structure and is now primarily shaped by identity (Bonschier & Kriesi, 2013, p. 1). "If there is any conventional 'class effect' in political preference formation it operates in the realm of socio-cultural libertarian-authoritarian preferences, not that of distributive relations" (Kitschelt, 2004, p. 4).

Members of the lower classes tend to be more authoritarian than members of the middle classes. However, this is only half the story. Kriesi (1989, 1998) found that those members of the middle

class employed "in hierarchical settings developed or retained more authoritarian values" (Bonschier & Kriesi, 2013, p. 4) than so-called social-cultural professionals[50]. Arguably, voters have been increasingly voting against their material self-interest in favor of their values (Bartels, 2014; pp. 198-199; Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009, p. 1029; Isenberg, 2017, p. 313; cf. Johnston et al., 2017). In her book *White Trash. The 400-Year Untold History of Class in America,* Nancy Isenberg writes that the who vote against their collective self-interest are also the ones who believe that "East Coast college professors brainwash the young and that Hollywood liberals make fun of them and have nothing in common with them and hate America and wish to impose an abhorrent, godless lifestyle" (Isenberg, 2017, p. 313). Figure 12 shows how the different socio-economic groups are spread out across the political economy space. Even though its meaning has become more complex, the left-right terminology is still commonly used for describing people's issue positions on one or the other side of the divide (Dalton & Berning, n.d., p. 4; Inglehart, 1990, pp. 292-293; cf. Ignazi, 2003).



Figure 12: Socio-economic groups in the political economy space (adapted from Beramendi et al., 2015b, p. 23)

[50] Because they are often at the top of hierarchic authority structures, business owners and managers are often more conservative in their cultural attitudes and values. White-collar workers seems to take a middle position on the cultural dimension (Dalton, 2018, p. 53).

This is the ideal breeding ground for polarization. According to McCoy and Somer (2018), the process of polarization "simplifies the normal complexity of politics and social relations…by aligning otherwise unrelated divisions [and] emasculating cross-cutting cleavages" (p. 5). In the worst case, polarization divides "society and politics into two separate, opposing, and unyielding blocks" (McCoy & Somer, 2018, p. 5). The deeper ideological polarization becomes, the greater the chance that people's differences get ingrained in their social identities, and the higher the risk of "irreconcilable opposition between camps that question or even deny each other's legitimacy" (McCoy et al., 2018, p. 19; cf. Carothers & O'Donohue, 2019a; Gentzkow, 2016). During the process of polarization, a society is segmented into different groups based on their positions take on conflicting issues. These groups work like echo chambers: "Social interactions, when conducted only within a seemingly homogeneous group, can actually increase the distance between groups that are at conflict in society" (McCoy et al., 2018, p. 24). The communication within the groups usually only corroborate their member's beliefs (Kriesi, 2010, pp. 678-679; Talisse, 2019, p. 97, p. 110).

Over time, within-group differences become more and more suppressed, making people's belief systems even more rigid (McCoy et al., 2018, p. 18). The identification with fellow ingroup members becomes greater, while the assessment of opposing groups, their members and their beliefs becomes more negative and the ideological abyss between them widens (Talisse, 2019, p. 118; McCoy et al., 2018, p. 24). Eventually, people will come to think of the other group's members as alien and "prone to conclude that their ideas, arguments, and criticisms are wholly without merit and thus not worth engaging, and…might even actively avoid contact with them" (Talisse, 2019, p. 118). The strong and often extreme conviction in one's own beliefs has nothing to do with reason but everything to do with defending one's social identity (Talisse, 2019, p. 123).[51]

> "This is the fundamental problem posed by polarization. Belief polarization directly attacks our capacities to properly enact democratic citizenship, dissolving our abilities to treat our fellow citizens as our political equals. Moreover, belief polarization is part of a larger dynamic by which partisan divisions expand and extremity intensifies, all within a structure of self-perpetuating social dysfunction" (Talisse, 2019, p. 123).

Arguably, this pattern vindicates John Avlon (2019) assessment that polarization is eroding the very foundation on which (American) democracy was built: social cohesion (McCoy et al.,

[51] Social Identity Theory starts from the assumption that individuals define their own identities based on their social group memberships, because they provide a sense of belonging. Individuals usually strive to bolster their self-esteem and tend to view the ingroup with a positive bias or, in other words, exaggerate the positive qualities of the ingroup and exaggerate the negative qualities of outgroups. Research has shown that this can lead to stereotyping, prejudices and discrimination (cf. Brown, 2000; Taijfel & Turner, 2004).

2018, p. 17). People are losing common ground because they are growing apart. It was not unusual in the past for people to hold mixed views on issues – liberal on some and conservative on others; today, it is often either-or (Gentzkow, 2016, p. 12). This can be extremely dangerous because "once political elites and their followers no longer believe that political opponents are legitimate and deserve equal respect, or are even acceptable as family and friends, they become less likely to adhere to democratic rules in the struggle for power" (Lührmann et al., 2019, p. 19).

As a consequence of the cultural shift towards a more liberal and open society in Western democracies, a growing number of people has experienced the erosion of their social identities. Traditional norms and values that were dominant in the mid-twentieth century, and which used to provide the basis for identity formation, have gradually been replaced. The older generations have been experiencing a growing disconnect between their core beliefs and those that are now widespread among the younger generations (Flanagan & Lee, 2003, p. 236; Inglehart, 2021, p. 7, pp. 164-165; Inglehart & Norris, 2017, pp. 33-34, p. 88). "The once-dominant cultural majority has gradually become a minority, endorsing views and norms that were considered normal during earlier eras but are no longer widely respected by the rest of society" (Inglehart & Norris, 2017, p. 87). For those who do not share the mainstream values of society anymore, the consequence is often social alienation (cf. Crossman, 2019). Going through the experience that their traditional lifestyles are being devalued and their core values and beliefs suddenly inferior or, in other words, facing potential loss of status, may be extremely upsetting for some and, in turn, may cause anger and resentment (Inglehart & Norris, 2017, p. 123; Rokeach, 2015, pp. 40-42). In fact, research has shown that this may contribute to a polarization or even lead to a radicalization of intergroup attitudes and evoke corresponding behavior (cf. Simon & Grabow, 2014).

People's anger is usually directed both upwards against the elites for their perceived inaction and downwards against lower status groups, typically against immigrants and ethnic minorities who are seen as a threat to the Western lifestyle and Western traditions in general (Inglehart & Norris, 2017, p. 123). Ideological conflicts are usually "notoriously intractable" (Bendersky, 2014, p. 163) because they are deeply personal. They often involve peoples' core moral values "over which compromise threatens people's self-images and social identities" (Bendersky, 2014, p. 163) and "to question these values is to question the identity and worth of those who believe them" (Dalton, 2018, p. 219; cf. Atran & Axelrod, 2008). Research shows that if attitudes on issues are rooted in high moral convictions, the dismissal of diverging attitudes is high

and the negative reactions stronger, that is, the intolerance higher, than if attitudes on issues are rooted in low moral convictions (cf. Skitka et al., 2005). Increasing polarization jeopardizes an essential democratic trait: tolerance. People with strong in-group loyalties tend to develop strong out-group antipathies, often leading to an unwillingness to put up with what they perceive as dissidents (cf. Gibson & Gouws, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 2004). However, tolerance is crucial in a liberal democracy where individual rights and freedoms are supposed to be recognized and protected. Tolerating other people's views and opinions even if one disagrees with them, is key to a stable and peaceful coexistence in a pluralistic society.

3. Linking Civic Culture and Socio-Cultural Polarization

The current public and scholarly debate suggests that Western-style liberal democracy is in crisis (cf. Diamond, 2020; Foa & Mounk, 2016; Foa & Mounk, 2017a; Foa & Mounk, 2017b; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; Lindberg & Steenekamp, 2017; Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019; Mechkova et al., 2017; Mounk, 2018)[52]. There are undeniable symptoms of distress and signs of corrosion. For example, the recent upsurge of support for authoritarian populist leaders in the West like former U.S. President Donald Trump, a xenophobic and racist demagogue with no respect for liberal democratic norms, and others with similar attitudes, like France's 2017 presidential candidate Marine Le Pen or Italy's former Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini. Also, the electoral success of right-wing populist parties with anti-democratic tendencies in Europe has been notable: "Nationalism has always been a feature across Europe's political spectrum but there has been a recent boom in voter support for right-wing and populist parties" (BBC, 2019b). In Germany, the *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) entered parliament for the first time after the 2017 federal election, in which they won almost 13% of the vote[53], becoming the largest opposition party in the Bundestag. In Spain, *Vox* became the third most voted party in the November 2019 general election. Specifically, *Vox* won 52 seats. Double the number of seats they had held after the previous election. In Hungary, Orban's ruling *Fidesz* party has pulled the country so far to the right that it can no longer be characterized as a democracy but an electoral autocracy (Lührmann et al., 2020, p. 6). Poland under Kaczyński's *PiS* party is, unfortunately, on a similar trajectory. Their success makes the danger of democratic deconsolidation appear all too real.

[52] For a short overview of the crisis of democracy debates see Merkel (2018a).
[53] In the 2021 federal election, the AfD lost 11 seats but still won over ten percent of the national vote.

Figure 13 shows that since the early 2000s, the previously constant increase in democracy across the 37 OECD member countries continued on a much flatter slope until it leveled off and then turned into a slight but recognizable decline in the early 2010s. As Brunkert et al. (2019) point out, this development corresponds with recent concerns in the West about the increase in right-wing populism and its anti-democratic tendencies I described in the previous paragraph (pp. 429-430). However, despite the recent backsliding, the democratic standard in the West is still exceptionally high; in fact, no other world region comes even remotely close to it (Brunkert et al., 2019, p. 429). Culture zones[54] are spaces in which nations with similar historic developments, including political regimes, and identities cluster together. The data does not indicate an overall strong decline in democratic standards in the West, but it does show some deterioration of Western countries' democratic qualities (Brunkert et al., 2019, p. 437; Krause & Merkel, 2018, p. 36; Putnam et al., 2000, p. 7).[55]



Figure 13: The centennial democratic trend (adapted from Brunkert et al., 2019)

[54] See Inglehart & Welzel (2005) and Welzel (2013) for a detailed description of the concept. For a brief overview see, for example, Brunkert et al. (2019).

[55] For the sake of completeness, I want to point out that when Welzel (2021b) looked at the WVS's complete country coverage and temporal scope, he found that over the past two decades, mass support for democracy declined in fifteen countries but increased in 27. On average across the globe, mass support for democracy has remained stable at 75 percent of the public.

The political culture approach posits that for democracies to remain stable, it requires supportive attitudes and norms among citizens (cf. Almond & Verba, 1963; Easton, 1965, 1975; Eckstein, 1961, 1966, 1969). Thus, one can argue that democracy will be safe as long as a majority of citizens holds democratic values (Kriesi, 2020, p. 241). To reiterate, Foa and Mounk (2016, 2017a, 2017b) claim that in particular younger citizens in the West have become fed up with liberal democracy, and are, therefore, more prone to support authoritarian alternatives. However, the continous intergenerational shift from materialist to postmaterialist or self-expressive values contradicts this argument. It has actually made younger age groups more democratic in their attitudes (cf. Alexander & Welzel, 2017; Inglehart, 1971; Inglehart, 1990; Inglehart 1997; Norris, 2017). Therefore, it is very likely that the recent democratic recession is only temporary (cf. Brunkert et al., 2018). Contrary to what Foa and Mounk (2016, 2017a, 2017b) and others (cf. Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019; Mechkova et al., 2017; Mounk, 2018) in the deconsolidation camp[56] claim, I do not believe that the support for liberal democracy is crumbling among the younger generations. Instead, I believe that the dynamic of the interplay between economic and ideological polarization, both of which I describe in the previous chapter, weakens some of the core principles of democracy, which manifests itself in the recent success of right-wing populism.

Inglehart (1971, 1977) predicted that the change toward more liberal and equal societies would continue but that this trend would not be uninterrupted: “Undoubtedly there will be counter-trends that will slow the process of change and even reverse it for given periods of time” (Inglehart, 1977, p. 4). He argued that the improving socio-economic conditions and unprecedentedly high level of economic security after the Second World War would encourage the spread of postmaterialist values, emphasizing issues such as environmentalism, gender equality, and cultural diversity. However, he expected there to be temporary set-backs reflecting socio-economic developments that directly affects people’s sense of existential security (Inglehart, 2017, p. 10). In short, periods of prosperity will promote postmaterialist values and periods of scarcity will promote materialist values (Inglehart, 1977, p. 79): “Insecurity encourages an authoritarian xenophobic reaction in which people close ranks behind strong leaders, with strong in group solidarity, rejection of outsiders, and rigid conformity to group norms” (Inglehart & Norris, 2017, p. 443). Previous research has indeed shown that the experience of economic hardship and the threat of social decline seem to spur nativist and nationalist attitudes (cf. Beltz, 2017; Higham, 1955; Hilmer et al., 2017; Kriesi & Pappas, 2015; Roubini, 2014; Shirer, 1960;

[56] Welzel (2021a) writes of a revisionist camp of scholars that challenges the democratic deconsolidation thesis.

Quillian, 1995). People's attitudes, then, reflect their subjective sense of economic (in-)security (Inglehart, 2018, p. 15). Table 2 shows the two contrasting value systems.

	Survival is seen as…	
	Insecure	**Secure**
Politics	Need for strong leaders Order Xenophobia/fundamentalism	De-emphasis on political authority Self-expression, participation Exotic/new are stimulating
Economics	Priority to economic growth Achievement motivation Individual vs. state ownership	Quality of life has top priority Subjective well-being Diminishing authority of both private and state ownership
Sexual/Family Norms	Maximize reproduction – but only in two-parent heterosexual family	Individual sexual gratification Individual self-expression
Religion	Emphasis on higher power Absolute rules Emphasis on predictability	Diminishing religious authority Flexible rules, situational ethics Emphasis on meaning and purpose of life

Table 2: Security and Insecurity: The Contrasting Value Systems (adapted from Inglehart, 1997, p. 43)

The rise of populism is often explained with either economic (cf. Pastor & Veronesi, 2018; Voorheis, et al., 2015) or cultural grievances (cf. Norris & Inglehart, 2017, 2019). However, I argue that it is not just either-or; they both explain the recent success of right-wing populism with its anti-democratic tendencies in the mature democracies of the West (cf. Ausserladscheider, 2019; Carreras et al., 2019; Gidron & Hall, 2017, 2020; Pickel, 2019; Sachweh, 2020; Stewart et al., 2020). *It is the combination of the two that matters, because economic grievances strongly shape cultural attitudes.* As Carreras et al. (2019) demonstrate, "economic and cultural explanations can be distinguished for analytical purposes, but it is important to incorporate the interplay between economic and cultural factors in theoretical accounts of political events of such magnitude as the Brexit referendum and the Trump election" (p. 1415). As a contextual factor, economic grievances are critical to explain the emergence of cultural grievances (cf. Carreras et al., 2019). With the rapid economic development after World War II and the resulting social changes, many thought that the importance of social class identities would weaken or even disappear as cultural identities became stronger. However, contrary to those predictions, scholastic findings suggest that people still place themselves in class categories based on their income (cf. Anderson & Curtis, 2012). The vast economic growth of the past decades in advanced industrial democracies has been accompanied by a growing separation of the very rich from everyone else. If inequality continues to rise, class identities may even become more polarized than they are now (Anderson & Curtis, 2012, p. 139).

As Schweisguth (1998) points out, the "decline [of the role of social class] is not synonymous with disappearance…so people's social position may still be a tangible influence on their…attitudes" (p. 332). Lower-class individuals often develop a more contextual mindset "characterized by a sense that one's actions are chronically influenced by external forces outside of individual control and influence" (Kraus et al., 2012, p. 549). For example, manual workers are said to hold conservative cultural values and less tolerant because of their low class position and the social authority relationships in their occupation and life experiences (Dalton, 2018, p. 53; cf. Katnik, 2002). Given their lives' constraints (i.e., the low level of autonomy and self-direction), members of the lower classes tend to be more cautious and dutiful than upper-class individuals. They also tend to have a greater need for order (Gelfand et al., 2011, p. 6). Members of the upper classes usually enjoy (financial) independence and feel much fewer external constraints on their lives. As a result, they develop a more egoistic (also: solipsistic) mindset (Kraus et al., 2012, p. 549; cf. Kraus & Stephens, 2012; Kraus et al., 2011). Since all their basic needs are met, they can focus on various social and cultural experiences (Kitschelt & Rehm, 2004, p. 4). Put simply, because they are exposed to different socio-economic conditions, members of different social classes essentially come to see the world differently; they develop different concepts of social reality (cf. Friedman & Savage, 2017). These different mindsets lead to different thinking and, ultimately, to different behavior (cf. Bourdieu, 1984). Figure 14 shows a conceptual model illustrating the characteristics of social class contexts and the expression of solipsistic and contextualist social cognition tendencies.



Figure 14: Conceptual model illustrating the characteristics of social class contexts and the expression of solipsistic and contextualist social cognition tendencies (Kraus et al., 2012, p. 4)

Highly educated socio-cultural professionals tend to be especially strong advocates for liberal cultural positions (Dalton, 2018, p. 53; cf. Bonschier & Kriesi, 2013; Kriesi 1989, 1998; Teney & Helbig, 2014). That phenomenon also has something to do with education. Education is the most reliable indicator for postmaterialist values; the more educated people are, the more tolerant, the more they are accepting of diversity and open to change. Usually, these professionals also have better and higher-paid jobs that secure them financially. Higher social status individuals generally benefit most economically from globalization (Dalton, 2018, pp. 53-54). In a study on radical-right and right-wing populist attitudes in Germany, Klein and Müller (2016) found that the majority of individuals who said they would take part in anti-immigration demonstrations tended to have a medium education level and a low income; in contrast, individuals who said they would take part in anti-racism demonstrations were mostly highly educated and had a high income. Even though all respondents evaluated the overall economic situation in Germany rather positive, those individuals who said they would take part in anti-immigration demonstrations assessed their own economic situation somewhat worse than those who said they would not take part in anti-immigration demonstrations. When asked how they assessed their own economic situation compared to that of immigrants living in Germany, they thought their own economic situation was much worse. Whereas those who said they would take part in anti-racism demonstrations assessed their own economic situation much better than that of immigrants in Germany (Klein & Müller, 2016, p. 198).

Whereas members of the lower class are often more communally oriented and more reactive to social threats, members of the upper class have an increased sense of personal freedom and feeling of control (cf. Kraus et al., 2011, 2012: Kraus & Stepehens, 2012). As a result, they also have different socio-economic and socio-cultural interests (Merkel, 2018b, p. 351). Jost (2006) and colleagues (Jost et al., 2003, 2008) show that motivational differences matter. Specifically, they show that individuals with heightened needs for security are considerably more likely to identify as conservatives. Thus, people's social class backgrounds influence their issue orientations, or, in other words, people's social class background determine their positions on the materialist-postmaterialist dimension (Kitschelt, 1994, p. 18; cf. Friedman & Laurison, 2019; Nový et al., 2017). Alexander & Welzel (2017) find that populations in mature democracies have turned more liberal; however, not everyone's mindset is changing at the same speed (p.

11). The lower classes do not keep up with the upper classes. Figure 15 shows how there has been increasing ideological polarization between the social classes.[57]



Figure 15: Growing class polarization in Western democracies (adapted from Alexander & Welzel, 2017, p. 11)

Class is a social context as much as it is an economic construct. It is a lifestyle and an attitude: "Members of [a] class tend to be defined more by their values, expectations, and aspirations than their income level, although income may constrain the manner in which some of their aspirations can be realized" (Institute for Research on Poverty, 2010, pp. 18-19; cf. Bourdieu, 1990; cf. Friedman, 2016; Kraus & Stephens, 2012; Kraus et al., 2011, 2012). Inequality means more than just the unequal distribution of money or someone's level of economic well-being; it is also a culture that divides groups (Piketty, 2020, p. 721; Savage et al., 2013, p. 223; cf. Côté et al., 2017; Dorling, 2014; Jarness & Friedman, 2017; Ridgeway, 2014; Williams, 2017). Hochschild (2016) describes how increasing social distance can turn into a cultural barrier when people lose touch with one another, both figuratively and literally (cf. Smeeding, 2005). Cul-

[57] The EWS/WVS asks people to indicate their confidence in a list of institutions on four-point scales from 1 ("a great deal") to 4 ("none at all"). The relevant representative institutions include "the government," "political parties" and "parliament (Q71, Q72 and Q73 of the EWS/WVS round 7 questionnaire). I recoded these scales into a range from 0 (full confidence) to 1 (no confidence at all), with decimal fractions of 1 indicating intermediate positions. Then I averaged each respondent's position over the three items. Country-level scores are population averages on this 0-to-1 scale.

tural practices – food consumption, taste in art and music, language, dress, and norms for expressing the self or adjusting to others – are one aspect of the social order that reflects broader patterns of inequality (cf. O'Brien et al., 2017; Manstead, 2018; Stephens et al., 2007). The different lifestyles may be the strongest barriers between the classes, as "the (often unintended) consequences of people's choices of friends, spouses and neighbourhoods *[sic]* include group formation, symbolic boundaries and social exclusion" (Jarness & Friedman, 2017, p.1).

By extending the analysis to the interplay between inequality dynamics and people's value orientations, I contribute to the growing body of literature that explores the interaction of economic and cultural grievances (cf. Ballard-Rosa et al., 2017; Bobo, 2017; Carreras et al., 2019; Cherlin, 2018; Colantone & Stanig, 2018a, 2018b; De Vries, 2018a; Gidron & Hall, 2017, 2020; Jennings & Stoker, 2016; Magni, 2018; Morgan, 2018; Sachweh, 2020). In doing so, I hope to better understand the increasing success of right-wing populism with its anti-democratic tendencies. I do not believe that overall public support for democracy is crumbling among the young age groups, as the advocates of the deconsolidation thesis claim. I believe that growing socio-cultural polarization is the real force that is threatening democracy. As I have shown, growing inequality can create value alienation, which can lead to feelings of estrangement that manifest themselves in a decline in civic culture or civic attitudes and behavior.

Lipset (1959) already warned of the potential danger of accumulated grievances. He wrote that they would make "for a political atmosphere characterized by bitterness and frustration rather than by tolerance and compromise. Men and parties come to differ with each other, not simply on ways of settling current problems, but rather by fundamental and opposed *weltanschauungen* [emphasis in original]" (p. 92). Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) put it even more bluntly when they write that "if one thing is clear from studying [regime] breakdowns throughout history, it's that extreme polarization can kill democracies" (p. 11). Thus, the question I am specifically seeking to answer is whether socio-cultural polarization can explain variation in civic culture in the established democracies. This question not only presupposes that social-cultural polarization has in fact increased as civic culture has decreased but also that there is a link between the two phenomena.

The explanatory model (Figure 16) shows the hypothesized relationship between socio-cultural polarization and civic culture. I expect socio-cultural polarization to have an overall significant negative effect on civic culture at the country level ($H1_a$). I also expected the negative effect of polarization on a society's civic culture to depend on the extent of polarization. In other words, the higher polarization, the greater its negative effect on civic culture ($H1_b$).



Figure 16: Explanatory model of the hypothesized relationship between socio-cultural polarization and civic culture

H1$_a$: Socio-cultural polarization decreases civic culture at the country level.

H1$_b$: The higher socio-cultural polarization, the greater the negative effect on civic culture.

I am also interested in whether an individual's social class background matters in a polarized environment. I expect the effect socio-cultural polarization at the country level has on an individual's civic attitudes and behavior to depend on their social background. Figure 17 shows the hypothesized relationship between socio-cultural polarization and individual civic attitudes under the moderating effect of social class:



Figure 17: Explanatory model of the hypothesized relationship between socio-cultural polarization at the country level and individual-level civic culture under the moderating effect of social class

H2: In a polarized environment, members of the lower classes become notably less civic in their attitudes and their behavior than members of the upper classes.

I believe that in a polarized environment, members of the lower classes become notably less civic in their attitudes and their behavior than members of the upper classes, because lower class individuals feel disproportionally more marginalized as a result of socio-cultural polarization dynamics.

PART II

DATA AND METHODS

4. Measuring the Effect of Socio-Cultural Polarization on Civic Culture

To understand what has led to the recent success of right-wing populism with its anti-democratic tendencies in the mature democracies of the West, I follow a quantitative approach. The basic statistical evidence presented in the previous chapter suggests that increasing socio-cultural polarization may be a reason why some people are more ready to support authoritarian alternatives. Before I get to the results of the statistical analysis, this chapter first addresses methodological challenges analyzing time-series-cross-section (TSCS) data. Then, it explains the operationalization of the key concepts, socio-cultural polarization and civic culture and, finally, describes the statistical methods applied to investigate the effect of the interaction of economic and cultural grievances on civic culture.

4.1. Methodological Issues

Combining cross-sectional and time-series data is a powerful analytical strategy to analyze data that vary over two dimensions – time and space[58]. TSCS data consists of repeated observations (in a regular time interval) of the same unit like countries (cf. Beck, 2001; Fortin-Rittberger, 2015; Kittel, 2005). The analysis of TSCS data has significant advantages over the separate analysis of either time-series or cross-sectional data. In fact, since most theories in the social sciences deal with predictions over space and time, it is only consequential to use data that stores this kind of information. TSCS data stores more information[59] and, thus, would allow me to use more complex statistical methods to perform more powerful hypothesis tests with more precise estimates. Using TSCS data allows me to study the effect of socio-cultural polarization on civic culture both over the years and across countries simultaneously, which otherwise would not be possible (cf. Adolph et al., 2005; Fortin-Rittberger, 2015; Troeger, 2019). Although the advantages of using TSCS data for answering more complex research questions are undeniable,

[58] TSCS data are often referred to as being "pooled", because they combine *N* spatial units and *T* time periods and produce a set of $N \times T = NT$ observations. The units of analysis are, thus, either "place-time" or "time-place" (cf. Kittel, 2005; Podestà, 2002).

[59] Increasing the number of observations, automatically increases the degrees of freedoms in a data set, which leads to more precise estimates (cf. Hicks, 1994)

the two-dimensional character of this type of data is problematic because it combines the disadvantages of both time-series and cross-sectional data, and, therefore, requires model specifications that take these disadvantages into account (cf. Troeger, 2019).

There are a number of methodical issues that need to be dealt with to get the most robust results when working with TSCS data in statistical analysis, especially with ordinary least square (OLS) regression (cf. Adolph et al., 2005; Katz, 1996; Fortin-Rittberger, 2015; Hicks, 1994; Podestà, 2002; Troeger, 2019). Because of its grouped structure, a common problem with TSCS data is the presence of **unit heterogeneity**. It means that some units in the data set are more alike than others, which violates the assumption that all units are fitted by the same model. Units differ from each other in ways that the observed independent variables cannot explain, that is in ways not accounted for by the researcher. In other words, there are important unit-specific omitted variables which remain constant over time. As a result, units in pooled data cannot be treated completely independent from each other, which is standard in OLS. Therefore, heterogeneity increases the likelihood that the assumption of independent errors is violated. Ignoring unit heterogeneity may result in biased estimators. In the worst case, unit heterogeneity distorts the estimators in such a way that the researcher is led to wrong conclusions (Adolph et al., 2005, p. 9; Fortin-Rittberger, 2015, p. 394; Wenzelburger et al., 2014, pp. 124-125; Wilson & Butler, 2007, p. 104).

Another potential problem with this kind of grouped data structure is **panel heteroscedasticity**, which means that the error term can have unit-specific variances. In other words, errors display constant variance within units, but might vary from unit to unit or within subsets of units. This is often the case when units display higher values and higher variance on certain variables and the model does not fit all units with the same accuracy. For example, the unemployment rate in the United States is both much higher and more volatile than the unemployment rate in Switzerland (Beck & Katz, 1995, p. 636; Fortin-Rittberger, 2015, p. 397; cf. Troeger, 2019). The error variance, then, depends on certain unit-specific characteristics or on the value of single dependent variables. Panel heteroscedasticity leads to inefficient regression estimations, which means the standard errors and confidence intervals of the regression coefficients are most likely incorrect (Beck & Katz, 1995, p. 636; Fortin-Rittberger, 2015, p. 397; Troeger, 2019, pp. 3-4; Urban & Mayerl, 2018, pp. 252-253; Wenzelburger et al., 2014, p. 137).

TSCS data can also suffer from **contemporaneous or cross-sectional correlation**, which is when the error term of unit i is correlated to that of unit j in the same year or the error term of

one unit *i* is correlated with the error term of unit *j* in different years. Contemporaneous correlations are usually the result of some unobserved features of one unit that are linked to another unit. Good examples include global events like the 2008 Financial Crisis, which sent similar economic shock waves through many countries. Yet even a more isolated event, such as an economic downturn in one country, may well influence the health of the economy in another country. However, these contemporaneous correlations may also be unit-specific. For example, the error terms of different economic key figures in one country may be related but remain independent of the error terms of the same key economic figures in other units. Like panel heteroscedasticity, contemporaneous or cross-sectional correlation heteroscedasticity leads to inefficient regression estimations (Beck & Katz, 1995, p. 636; Troeger, 2019, pp. 3-4; Wenzelburger et al., 2014, pp. 137-138).

Pooled TSCS data may also suffer from **temporal dependence**, often referred to as autocorrelation. When cases are not independent along the time dimension within units, data are said to be serially dependent or autocorrelated. To a certain extent, autocorrelation is to be expected in the data. The good economic situation today critically depends on the economic situation last year. My level of happiness this year critically depends on my level of happiness last year. Usually, analysts assume first-order autocorrelation, which occurs when consecutive residuals are correlated. Sometimes, autocorrelation is lagged by several observations. Although this dependency as such is meaningful, autocorrelation will lead to estimation errors because the standard deviation and the confidence intervals will not be calculated correctly. Researchers try to account for this specific correlation structure of TSCS data by employing dynamic regression models (Beck & Katz, 1995, p. 636; Fortin-Rittberger, 2015, pp. 392-394; Kittel, 2005, p. 103; Urban & Mayerl, 2018, pp. 284-285; Wenzelburger et al., 2014, pp. 131-134).

Last but not least, the data set may also display **selection bias** induced by the researcher (cf. King et al., 1995; Ebbinghaus, 2005). In this case, the estimated effects may be biased because of inadequate selection of the independent and dependent variables rather than due to actual causality. The commonly accepted standard method to avoid selection bias is still random sampling. Acknowledging the problems with random sampling in statistical macro-level analysis (cf. Ebbinghaus, 2005), I continue by explaining in detail the process of selecting the observations and cases included in this study to the best of my belief.

4.2. Data

In this section, I describe the indicators and data sources used to operationalize the variable to be explained, civic culture, and the suggested main explanatory factor, socio-cultural polarization, as well as some other potential explanatory and controlling factors to increase the validity of the statistical results. The main data source I use for my analysis is the World Values Survey (WVS). This cross-national survey, with over 600 indicators, has been conducted globally in consecutive waves every five years since 1981. By now, the WVS offers time-series data for the last 40 years, covering 120 countries and representing nearly 95% of the world population. With over 30,000 publications citing the WVS, the data has been widely used in research investigating human beliefs and values (cf. World Values Survey Association, 2020). I merge waves 1-7 of the WVS into one large times-series cross-sectional data set, covering the years from 1981-2020.[60]

Case Selection

I am interested in the effect socio-cultural polarization has on civic culture, specifically in the advanced industrial democracies of the West. Therefore, I build my sample on a set of large and continuously democratic OECD member countries, which, according to Dalton (2004) and Dalton and Wattenberg (2000), provide the most reasonable approximation of advanced industrial democracies. My core sample consists of Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States.[61] I have sufficient WVS data for this set of countries to perform my analysis and I am likely to identify other empirical data sources for them because of their mostly advanced state of social science research (Dalton, 2004; Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000).

The number of time periods analyzed in political science studies usually varies between 10 and 40 (Adolph et al., 2005, p. 4). It has been suggested that T be at least ≥ 10 for using TSCS methods (Fortin-Rittberger, 2015, p. 389). If T is smaller, it is generally possible to compensate

[60] The WVS time-series data set for the period 1981-2020 combines WVS surveys completed in waves 1 (1981-1983), 2 (1990-1992), 3 (1995-1998), 4 (2000-2004), 5 (2005-2008), 6 (2010-2014) and 7 (2017-2020). There are, however, important variables missing from wave 7 of the longitudinal data set, for example respondents' educational background, which is why I decided to substitute it with the single (and complete) wave 7 data set that is also available to download from the WVS website.

[61] Dalton (2004) and Dalton & Wattenberg (2000) exclude Spain from their analysis because the country does not have the same democratic tradition than other OECD member countries. They argue that because Spain's democratic transition only happened relatively recently, it does not fulfill all the criteria of an advanced industrial democracy. I, however, keep Spain in my sample because it is one of the "oldest" democracies in the WVS (see the Appendix for a classification of my entire country sample based on the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem))

for a small *T* by including a larg(er) *N*, thereby increasing estimation performance of the model (Hecht & Zitzmann, 2021; Schultzberg & Muthén, 2018). In this case, when $N > T$, the data set is considered cross-sectional dominant (Fortin-Rittberger, 2015, p. 388). Because not all of the selected countries were surveyed across all seven waves of the WVS, I add more countries to my sample to increase the number of observations and, thus, ensure the overall estimation performance of my model. However, I only include countries above a certain quality standard on the V-Dem[62] "Regimes of the World Index" (RoW).

V-Dem's RoW measure classifies political regimes based on the *de facto* implementation of democratic institutions and categorizes them into four different types: a) closed autocracies, in which no multiparty elections for the chief executive or the legislature are held; b) electoral autocracies, in which *de jure* multiparty elections for the chief executive and the legislature are held, but elections are not free and fair or *de facto* multiparty; c) electoral democracies, in which *de facto* free and fair multiparty elections are held, but either access to justice or transparent law enforcement or liberal democratic principles like respect for personal liberties, the rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive are not always guaranteed; and d) liberal democracies, in which *de facto* free and fair multiparty elections are held and access to justice, transparent law enforcement and liberal democratic principles, such as respect for personal liberties, the rule of law, and judicial and legislative constraints on the executive, are guaranteed.[63] Data are available from 1900 to 2020 (cf. Lührmann et al., 2018; Lührmann et al., 2020).

Some countries may have been democratic the first time they were included in the WVS and have since become autocratic like Hungary[64], while others may have been autocratic the first time they were included in the WVS and have become democratic since then. Hence, by randomly dropping all closed and electoral autocracies from the data set, I would potentially lose important observations. A basic and probably the most obvious rule of random sampling is to allow for variation in the dependent variable (cf. King et al., 1995). In this case, regime change

[62] V-Dem is a new approach to conceptualizing and measuring democracy. The V-Dem project provides a multidimensional and disaggregated data set which reflects the complexity of the concept of democracy as a system of rule that goes beyond the simple presence of elections. The V-Dem project distinguishes between five high-level principles of democracy: electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian, and collects data to measure these principles. The V-Dem Institute at the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, also publishes a Democracy Report every year with an overview of the democratic quality of 179 countries (2021). For more info on the V-Dem project see www.v-dem.net/en/.

[63] For more information on the V-Dem RoW measure see also the latest Codebook of V-Dem v11.1 available at https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/reference-material-v11/.

[64] For example, Hungary was an autocracy the first time it was surveyed in 1982, then a democracy from 1994 and 2005 (see Table 4.2.A in the Appendix)

suggests varying levels of civic culture (cf. chpt. 1.1.) and I want to account for this variation (cf. Pickel & Pickel, 2016, p. 555).[65] Therefore, I decided to keep all countries that were surveyed at least twice over the years and were democratic in the majority of the observations (50%+). Including both electoral and liberal democracies in my analysis increases statistical power for two reasons. First, I end up with a larger *N.* Second, I can expect more variation in my dependent variable.

This approach leaves me with the following 46 countries for my analysis: Argentina, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom[66], United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. With this sample, I hope to maximize the coverage of space and time to provides a comprehensive overview of the state and dynamic of democratic culture among the world's most established democracies.

For the more detailed descriptive part of my analysis, I pick one established democracy from almost every major world region: Argentina (Latin America), Australia (Oceania), Germany (Central Europe), Japan (Asia), Poland (Eastern Europe), South Africa (Sub-Saharan Arica), South Korea (Asia), Spain (Southern Europe), Sweden (Northern Europe) and the United States (North America). Eight of the ten countries belong to my core sample of advanced industrial democracies. These countries were also most frequently surveyed in the different world regions over time. If there were other countries from the same region which were surveyed the exact same number of times, they were usually more often classified as a democracy by V-Dem's RoW measure. I make one notable exception: Japan and South Korea are both located in the same region and were both surveyed across all waves of the WVS. The obvious choice would have been Japan because it has the longer democratic tradition. But since their democratic systems differ – Japan is a representative monarchy with a parliamentary democratic system and South Korea is a presidential democracy - I include them both. Overall, these nations offer

[65] Admittedly, this does not mean that some country's state as autocracies is not included in the analysis and could potentially affect the results. To specifically account for the fact that not all countries have the same degree of democratic experience, I include "Democratic Tradition" as a control variable (cf. p. 93ff).

[66] Unfortunately, I had to exclude the United Kingdom from the analysis because of insufficient observations.

substantial variation in their party systems, electoral experiences, and other political factors (Dalton, 2004; Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000).

The Dependent Variable: Civic Culture

To recapitulate, most scholars agree that mass attitudes and value orientations influence democratic stability, but that is usually where the agreement ends. Which mass attitudes and value orientations have the most positive effect or are most important to maintain democratic stability is a matter of ongoing debate. In chapter 1.2., I describe three different approaches to measuring civic culture, each focusing on different aspects of mass culture most conducive to democracy: a legitimacy approach, a communitarian approach and a human development approach. Thus, to measure civic culture, I operationalize each of them to ensure measurement validity

The Legitimacy Approach

The legitimacy approach (or system-support approach) claims that it is the support for the political system which is especially important for a democracy to remain stable. Mass support for democracy by citizens is, therefore, believed to be the most important indicator of democratic legitimacy. However, high levels of support for democracy are only an appropriate measure of a pro-democratic civic culture if people renounce its nondemocratic alternatives. Therefore, I do not only examine people's support for democracy but also their rejection (or support) of anti-democratic alternatives (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 253).

The WVS asks respondents about their regime preference. Specifically, it describes various political systems to respondents and asks them whether they think these types of political systems are good or bad ways of governing their country on a four-point scale from 1 ("very good") to 4 ("very bad"). The alternatives are a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, and a democratic political system[67]. I reverse the polarity of both scales and standardize[68] them into a 0-1 range (4 = 0, 3 = 0.33, 2 = 0.66, 1 = 1) with larger numbers indicating more support for democracy. To measure a respondent's preference for a democratic

[67] There are in fact more alternative answer options to this question in the WVS. For example, I could have used item Q237 ("having the army rule") instead of Q238 ("having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections") to measure authoritarian regime preferences. I would argue, however, that the strong ruler item is more general; it includes the possibility of an army general being the strong leader (cf. Welzel & Kirsch, 2017).

[68] Rescaling the scores makes sense for multiple reasons. First, a value of 0 represents the total absence of a given property or non-occurrence of an event, whereas a value of 1 suggests the exact opposite. Second, decimal fractions of 1 for intermediate positions are easily interpretable. For example, 0.25 and 0.33 suggest that it is mostly but not completely absent, 0.50 that it is halfway between, 0.66 and 0.75 that it is mostly but not completely present. Third, in regression analyses, coefficients are easily interpretable when all variables are normalized in a 0–1 range.

political system over an autocratic one, I subtract their approval for a strong leader from their approval of a democratic political system. The resulting index ranges from a theoretical minimum of -1 to +1. I then standardize the score range of the measure, assigning each the same theoretical minimum (0), indicating maximum support for authoritarian rule and minimum support for democratic rule and maximum (1), indicating maximum support for democratic rule and minimum support for authoritarian rule. A score of 0.5 indicates equal preferences for democracy and authoritarian rule. At the country level, I use each sample's population mean on this index (Welzel & Kirsch, 2017, p. 30). In doing this, I calculate people's net preference for democracy (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 253). As Inglehart and Welzel (2005) point out,

> "Measuring regime preferences in this way is important because some people do not have a clear understanding of democracy, expressing strong support for both democratic and nondemocratic forms of government. In such cases, the individual's support for democracy is offset by their support for authoritarian regimes, indicating that they have mixed views. By contrast, other people express strong support for democracy *and* [emphasis in original] strong rejection of authoritarian forms of government, showing a strong net preference for democracy" (p. 253).

The Communitarian Approach

Adherents to the communitarian or social capital approach claim that community involvement or civic engagement is most important for effective democracy because it fosters democratic competence and strengthens civil society trough building trusted personal relationships. The norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from people's social networks are important for maintaining all forms of collective action and upholding democratic processes because they reduce the risk of defection (van Deth, 2008, p. 155-156; cf. Fukuyama, 1999a).

However, measuring social capital "is not a trivial task" (Fukuyama, 1999b, p. 27). In fact, the concept is one of the most contested in the social sciences (cf. Castiglione, 2008; Castiglione et al., 2008; van Deth, 2008). Because there are many definitions of social capital, the operationalization and measurement of the concept has not been very stringent, despite an abundance of research on the topic (cf. Bhandari & Yasunobu, 2009; Castiglione, 2008; Fukuyama, 1999a). Fukuyama (1999a) calls it one of the concept's "greatest weaknesses" (para. 20). Although some even argue that social capital cannot be measured at all, the least common denominator among researchers is the acknowledgment that social capital comprises both a structural component (social network types) and a cultural component, the latter of which typically encompasses the level of trust and the norms of reciprocity (van Deth, 2008, p. 151; cf. Roberts & Roche, 2001). This distinction is mainly based on Putnam's (1993) and Fukuyama's (1995; 1999b) works (cf. Roberts & Roche, 2001). A further distinction is often made between social capital as an individual or a collective resource (van Deth, 2008, pp. 155; cf. Kruse 2019). Since

I am interested in the national civic culture, I focus on the collective meaning of social capital using aggregated micro-level data. The unit of analysis is, thus, the nation state (cf. Kruse, 2019).

The two indicators most commonly used to measure social capital are community involvement and trust (Bhandari & Yasunobu, 2009, p. 489; van Deth, 2008, p. 155-156; Welzel et al., 2005, p. 1; cf. Fukuyama, 1999a; Kruse, 2019). Measuring trust is relatively straightforward because the WVS asks respondents if they think that most people can be trusted on a two-point scale from 1 ("most people can be trusted") to 2 ("must be very careful"). First, I reverse the scale and standardize them in a 0-1 range (2 = 0, 1 = 1). Then, I average the scores by country. The variable measures the share of the population that answered that most people can be trusted.[69]

Measuring community involvement is more difficult. It is usually measured by focusing on membership in voluntary associations. Putnam (1993) argues that especially active membership in leisure groups fosters civicness and democratic spirit. The more participation in community life, the better. However, thirty years earlier, Almond and Verba (1963) already found that even passive members of voluntary organizations show higher democratic competency compared to nonmembers (pp. 318-319). Wollebæk and Selle (2003) even claim that the "difference between active and passive members is absent or negligible" (p. 67); it is the number of memberships that really makes the difference (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 320; cf. Kruse, 2019; Wollebæk & Selle 2003). "Those who belong to an organization show higher political competence than those who are members of no organization, but the members of more than one organization show even higher competence than those whose affiliation is limited to one" (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 320). In fact, the scope of community involvement seems to have a far more positive effect on trust and civic orientation than the intensity of involvement (Wollebæk & Selle 2003, p. 84.) If people are members in multiple organizations, the chances are higher that they interact with others who come from widely different backgrounds and have different goals and preferences In turn, this exposure allows them to learn how to negotiate and compromise (Wollebæk and Selle 2003, p. 71). Thus, there is good reason to distinguish between the intensity of people's organizational involvement (active vs. passive membership) and the total number of their memberships (cf. Kruse, 2019).

[69] Generalized trust in others is an essential feature of a democratic political culture because it makes cooperation between unfamiliar people possible. It is a civic phenomenon. However, the phrasing of the question in the WVS is relatively vague, leaving room for respondent's individual interpretation. Who are "most people"? Delhey et al. (2011) show that across countries respondents understand the phrase "most people" to include unfamiliar others and not only a small circle of familiar others.

The WVS asks respondents to indicate whether they are an active or passive member of the following organizations: a church or religious organization; a sport or recreational organization; an art, music or educational organization; a labor union; a political party; an environmental organization; a professional organization; or a charity organization[70]. These associations can be sorted into to two groups according to their purpose. Whereas political parties, labor unions and professional organizations represent and lobby for a specific group interest, environmental, cultural or charity organizations represent and lobby for issues that concern everyone. "The two types of associations tend to reflect the difference between representing utilitarian group interests and general sociotropic ideals" (Welzel et al., 2005, p. 126)[71]. Factor analyses shows that memberships in sociotropic associations form one cluster, while memberships in utilitarian associations form another (Welzel et al., 2005, p. 126).

Thus, to measure community involvement, I construct two types of variables. The first one adds respondents' total number of active and passive memberships in utilitarian and sociotropic organizations, respectively. This generates two variables with scores ranging from 0-3 for active and passive memberships in utilitarian organizations and two variables from 0-5 for active and passive memberships in sociotropic organizations. I standardize the score range of each measure, assigning them both the same theoretical minimum (0) and maximum (1). I then average the scores by country to get an average number of memberships per citizen. I construct another set of variables measuring the percentage of the population that are either an active (volunteering) or a passive (belonging) member in at least one utilitarian or sociotropic organization. This yields another four variables to measure the scope and intensity of people's involvement in their communities (cf. Kruse, 2019; Welzel & Inglehart, 2005).[72]

The Human Development Approach

With this approach, the focus is on self-expressive values as the driving force behind civic culture. These values give priority to individual liberty, human diversity and civic autonomy and are, thus, an essential feature of a democratic political culture that is non-discriminatory, inclusive and always seeking compromise and collaborative action (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005,

[70] There are a few more alternatives, but they were not included regularly in the survey.
[71] Utilitarian and sociotropic organizations are also known as "Olson-groups" and "Putnam-groups", respectively (cf. Rossteutscher & van Deth, 2002; Beugelsdijk & van Schaik, 2001).
[72] I mainly use the percentage of the population variable when I want to make an inference at the country level, and I use the average number of memberships per citizen variable when I want to make an inference at the individual level.

p. 248). Therefore, the human development approach aims at measuring people's liberty aspirations in the form of non-institutionalized political action (i.e., civilian protest activities), subjective well-being and individual liberty.

As Welzel et al. (2005) point out, "The emphasis placed on membership in voluntary associations shows a fixation on institutionalized forms of community involvement. Participation in non-institutionalized forms of community involvement, such as boycotts, strikes, demonstrations and petitions, plays a minor role." (p. 122). These elite-challenging protest activities are different from membership in voluntary organizations in that they are more situation-specific and short-term. Therefore, boycotts, strikes, demonstrations and petitions may even be a more direct and valuable measure of the existence and effectiveness of a democratic political culture (Welzel et al., 2005, p. 124). In fact, the authors find that "elite-challenging action is more closely linked with aspects of civic-mindedness than is association membership" (Welzel et al., 2005, p. 140; cf. Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).

Following Welzel et al. (2005) and Welzel (2013), I construct another variable that is supposed to measure community involvement. Specifically, I create an index of social movement activity. The WVS asks respondents to indicate if they have already participated or would consider participating in any elite-challenging action. The alternatives are signing a petition, joining a boycott or attending peaceful demonstrations[73]. It is calculated by first recoding respondents' answers to the question regarding the likelihood that they will sign a petition, join in boycotts, or attend lawful demonstrations. Respondents who answer that they *might* want to participate in any of those activities in the future show a certain readiness for non-radical mass action even though they have not done it yet. This should weigh more heavily than an outright refusal to participate in any of those activities in the future but not as much as past participation. I code "have done", "might do" and "would never do" as 1, 0.5, and 0, respectively, for each activity. I then summarize each respondent's answers. Averaging the scores over the population produces a meaningful social movement activity index with a scale range from 0-1 for all activities, including anticipated or previous participation in elite-challenging action, (cf. Welzel, 2013, pp. 224-225; Kruse, 2019; Welzel et al., 2005).

[73] There are in fact two more alternatives: joining strikes and occupying buildings. However, they are radical actions and sometimes even violent. Participation rates in these activities are also much lower than in the other activities. Finally, yet importantly, joining strikes and occupying buildings are much weaker correlated to the other activities than they are correlated with each other. Therefore, it makes sense to keep them separate (Welzel et al., 2005, p 126)

	Civic Culture		
Approach	**Code**	**Question**	**Scale**
Legitimacy		*I 'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?*	1-4
	Q235	Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections	
	Q238	Having a democratic political system	
Communitarian	Q57	*Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?*	
		Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations. For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization?	1-3
	Q94	Church or religious organization	
	Q95	Sport or recreational organization, football/baseball/rugby team	
	Q96	Art, music or educational organization	
	Q97	Labor Union	
	Q98	Political party	
	Q99	Environmental organization	
	Q100	Professional association	
	Q101	Humanitarian or charitable organization	
Human Development	Q48	*Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means "no choice at all" and 10 means "a great deal of choice" to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.*	1-10
	Q49	*All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Using this card on which 1 means you are "completely dissatisfied" and 10 means you are "completely satisfied" where would you put your satisfaction with your life as a whole?*	1-10
		Now I would like you to look at this card. I am going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it.	1-3
	Q209	Signing a petition	
	Q210	Joining in boycotts	
	Q211	Attending peaceful demonstrations	

Table 3: Overview of civic culture variable indicators (the third column reports the original coding of the questions in the WVS round 7 questionnaire)

Subjective well-being and individual liberty stand for the postmaterialist emphasis on freedom of expression and freedom of choice for oneself and others that are most relevant to democracy when survival is sufficiently secure (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 259). I use people's life satisfaction as a proxy for their subjective well-being. The WVS asks respondents how satisfied they are with their lives these days on a ten-point scale, with 1 being "completely dissatisfied" and 10 being "completely satisfied". I recode the respondent's answers into a range from 0

("completely dissatisfied") to 1 ("completely satisfied"), with decimal fractions of 1 indicating intermediate positions. As a proxy for individual liberty, I use a question in the WVS that asks respondents to indicate how much freedom of choice and control they have over their lives on a ten-point scale, with 1 representing "no choice at all" and 10 representing "a great deal of choice". As with life satisfaction, I recode the respondents' answers into a range from 0 ("no choice at all") to 1 ("a great deal of choice"), with decimal fractions of 1 indicating intermediate positions. Table 3 summarizes the information on the operationalization of the dependent variable civic culture.

The Independent Variable: Socio-Cultural Polarization

I quantify socio-cultural polarization by measuring class polarization on six issue dimensions: deregulation vs. intervention, security vs. liberty, patriarchalism vs. emancipation, nativism vs. cosmopolitanism, anti-vs. pro-establishment and economy vs. ecology. Underlying four of these issue dimensions (security vs. liberty, patriarchalism vs. emancipation, nativism vs. cosmopolitanism and economy vs. ecology) is a fundamental set of normative beliefs about how the world ought to be. A growing sense of existential autonomy has led many people to give priority to humanistic self-expression values that emphasize human emancipation, and which also prioritize liberty over discipline, diversity over conformity, and autonomy over authority. In other words, each of these four dimensions juxtaposes materialist and postmaterialist values. The security vs. liberty dimension revolves around people's views on order. The patriarchalism vs. emancipation dimension deals with people's views on conformity. The nativism vs. cosmopolitanism dimension concerns people's view on diversity. Finally, the economy vs. ecology dimension captures people's views on aesthetics and quality of life. In other words, I am measuring the ideological polarization between the different social classes in society. With the deregulation vs. intervention issue dimension, I also include the "old" economic ideological conflict dimension about redistribution issues.

With the sixth dimension, anti- vs. pro-establishment, I include a central conflict that has emerged in many mature democracies of the West and which has, in a way, epitomized the populist success. Arguably, citizens in established democracies have generally become more critical with established authorities and traditional hierarchical institutions. Therefore, it would also make sense to reverse the "poles" of the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimension. In other words, I would expect anti-establishment attitudes to be prevalent in a postmodern society in which self-expressive values are widespread among people. I could, thus, treat this dimension

as one of the materialist vs. postmaterialist issue dimensions that is based on the theoretical assumption of a cognitive mobilization, meaning that societal modernization triggered critical views toward political authorities (Droste, 2021, p. 290; cf. Dalton & Welzel, 2014; Inglehart, 1977).

That said, the anti-elitism propagated by right-wing populist parties is linked with strong anti-democratic tendencies. I would argue that anti-elitism is less a critical evaluation of authorities than a sweeping denigration against the political elite,[74] one which opposes them holding any legitimate position in society and which presents them as a homogeneous, corrupt group opposed to the pure and good people (cf. Droste, 2021). With their trenchant observation, Pickel and Pickel (2017) encapsulated this view perfectly: Many "critical citizens" seem to have turned into "enraged citizens" (Ger.: "Wutbürger") and visibly distanced themselves from the establishment (p. 520). As a concept, anti-elitism refers to the belief that certain people are self-serving and lack moral integrity. It can arise for many reasons and stem from many sources, including the feeling of being economically disadvantaged and culturally left behind (cf. Diamond, 2020; Droste, 2021).[75] In fact, one dimension of anti-elitism clearly captures "feelings of marginalization relative to wealth and political power" (Oliver & Rahn, 2016, p. 196). This issue dimension, therefore, does not so much relate ideological polarization between the social classes as it captures the subjective feelings that result from socio-cultural polarization dynamics. To measure social class polarization on the six issue dimensions, I first need to construct direct measures of people's positions on these issue dimensions.

Building the Issue Dimensions

I construct these six measures applying compository logic (cf. Welzel, 2013). Using compository logic (instead of dimensional logic) allows me to construct indices out of a set of items in the WVS that I have identified from scientific literature[76]. I combine these items not because they overlap empirically but because they complement each other conceptually. Together, these items have more explanatory power than any of them has on its own. It is an additive approach

[74] Usually, the denigrating is not limited to the political elite alone; anti-elite sentiments also often include the economic, cultural, academic and media elite of a country.

[75] I analyzed the six dimensions using principal component analysis with varimax (orthogonal) rotation. The analysis retained two factors. The security vs. liberty, patriarchalism vs. emancipation, nativism vs. cosmopolitanism and economy vs. ecology issue dimensions load relatively high on one factor (Eigenvalue: 1.05); the anti-vs. pro-establishment issue dimension loads relatively high on the other factor (Eigenvalue: 1.04). The deregulation vs. intervention issue dimension does not load high on either of the two retained factors, suggesting a third factor, which does also make sense theoretically. Please see the Appendix for a correlation table (Table 4.2.A) and the results of the factor analysis (Table 4.2.B).

[76] In dimensional logic, such construction would not be possible because items are included on strictly empirical grounds. Measurement quality increases with internal scale reliability (Welzel, 2013, pp. 59-64).

to index formation, which is also why each item is given equal weight. The single items are only moderately correlated, if at all.[77] Their unique variation is treated as complementary and interpreted as each item's individual contribution to the construct (Welzel, 2013, pp. 59-64). I describe the index construction process below. Table 4 (pp. 81-82) summarizes the information.

The WVS asks respondents to tell their views on different aspects of state intervention. Specifically, whether they think that incomes should be made more equal, whether the government should increase the ownership of business and industry and whether the government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for. To calculate an overall **deregulation vs. intervention** index score from the single items, I recode the items in such a way that the lowest score of each item reflects the least progressive (or most conservative) position and the highest score of each item reflects the most progressive (or least conservative) position on the issue. Then, I standardize the score range of all items, assigning each the same theoretical minimum (0) and maximum (1), with decimal fractions of 1 indicating intermediate positions. Finally, I summarize and average the items to obtain an overall index score. Taking the arithmetical mean of the items ensures that I do not lose any information and removes the measurement errors that are specific to each item (Welzel, 2013, pp. 59-64).

Constructing the **liberty vs. security** index takes a bit more effort. Similar to the regime preference variable, I measure respondents' position on the liberty vs. security dimension by subtracting their liberty aspirations from their need for security. The WVS asks respondents what they think their country's two major goals should be for the next ten years. The choices are: (1) achieving a high level of economic growth; (2) making sure this country has strong defense forces; (3) seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities; and (4) trying to make cities and countryside more beautiful. I code "seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities" as 1 if respondents answer that this should be their country's first goal and 0.5 if respondents answer that this should be their country's second goal. The WVS also asks respondents what they think the two most important things are: (1) maintaining order in the nation; (2) giving people more say in important government decisions; (3) fighting rising prices; or (4) protecting freedom of speech. I code respondents' answers as 1 if they say that "giving people more say in important government decisions" and "protecting freedom of speech" are the two most important things. If respondents think either of these two alternatives is most important but the second most important thing is either "maintaining order in the nation" or "fighting rising prices", I code their

[77] See Tables 4.2.C-4.2.G in the Appendix for correlation matrices.

answers 0.66, and I code their answer as 0.33 if they say it the other way around. If they say that both “giving people more say in important government decisions” and “protecting freedom of speech” are not important at all, I code their answer as 0. I summarize the answers and average the score over the two items to get an overall liberty aspirations index. Higher numbers mean more liberty aspirations.

I do the same thing to create an overall need for security index. If respondents say that “making sure this country has strong defense forces” should be their country’s first goal, I code their answer 1, and I code their answer as 0.5 if they answer that this aim should be their country’s second goal. If respondents say that “maintaining order in the nation” is the most important goal, I code their answers as 1, and I code it as 0.5 if they say it is the second most important thing. The WVS also asks respondents if they think the fight against crime is more important than a stable economy; progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society; and progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money. If they say it is, I code their answers 1 and 0.5 if they think it is the second most important thing after any of the other alternatives. Again, I summarize the answers and average the score over the two items to get an overall need for security index. Higher numbers mean a greater need for security. Finally, I subtract respondents’ need for security from their liberty aspirations to get a liberty vs. security index.

The WVS asks respondents whether they think homosexuality, abortion or divorce are always justified on a ten-point scale from 1 “never justified” to 10 “always justified”. I standardize the score range of the measure, assigning each the same theoretical minimum (0) and maximum (1). I then summarize and average the items to get an overall **patriarchalism vs. emancipation** index score. To create the **nativism vs. cosmopolitanism** index, I use two items in the WVS which ask respondents how they feel about migration. One asks if respondents agree or disagree with the statement that “when jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of this country over immigrants” on a three-point scale from 1 “agree” to 3 “disagree”. The other asks respondents how they feel about foreigners coming to work in their country and what they think the government should do. The alternatives are: (1) let anyone come who wants to; (2) let people come as long as there are jobs available; (3) place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here; and (4) prohibit people coming here from other countries. I reverse the polarity of both scales and standardize them into a 0-1 range, with decimal fractions of 1 indicating intermediate positions. Larger numbers indicate more openness to migration. Then, I summarize and average the items to get an overall nativism vs. cosmopolitanism index score.

To construct an **anti- vs. pro-establishment** index, I use an item in the WVS that asks respondents to indicate how much confidence they have in a number of institutions, including the armed forces, the police, the courts, the government, political parties, parliament and the civil service on a four-point scale from 1 "a great deal of confidence" to 4 "none at all." I reverse the polarity of all scales and standardize them into a 0-1 range, with decimal fractions of 1 indicating intermediate positions. Larger numbers indicate more confidence in institutions. Then, I summarize and average the items to get an overall anti- vs. pro-establishment index score.

Last but not least, I construct the **economy vs. ecology** index[78] from an item in the WVS that asks respondents which of the following statements about environment and economic growth comes closest to their views: (1) protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs; (2) economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent; or (3) other answer. I first drop the third alternative and then standardize the new two-point scale in a 0-1 range (2 = 0, 1 = 1). Finally, I reverse the scale so that higher values indicate a preference for environmental protection over economic growth at the individual- and country level.

[78] I am aware that strictly speaking the economy vs. ecology index is not actually an index, since an index is a composite statistic or, in other words, a measure that is constructed by averaging a number of indicators. As aggregate measures they are often used to simplify complex measurement constructs and to measure multi-dimensional concepts which cannot be measured by a single indicator (cf. Farrugia, 2007)

		Issue Dimensions	
Dimension	**Code**	**Question**	**Scale**
Deregulation vs. Intervention		*Now I would like to tell you your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.*	1-10
	Q106	Incomes should be made more equal vs. There should be greater incentives for individual effort	
	Q107	Private ownership of business and industry should be increased vs. Government ownership of business and industry should be increased	
	Q108	Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for vs. People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves	
Security vs. Liberty		*People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority.*	1-2
	Q152 Q153	*Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important?* *And which would be the next most important?* 1. A high level of economic growth 2. Making sure this country has strong defense forces 3. Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities 4. Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful	
	Q154 Q155	*If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important?* *And which would be the next most important?* 1. Maintaining order in the nation 2. Giving people more say in important government decisions 3. Fighting rising prices 4. Protecting freedom of speech	1-2
	Q156 Q157	*Here is another list. In your opinion, which one of these is most important?* *And what would be the next most important?* 1. A stable economy 2. Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society 3. Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money 4. The fight against crime	1-2

		Issue Dimensions (continued)	
Dimension	**Code**	**Question**	**Scale**
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation		*Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card.*	1-10
	Q182	Homosexuality	
	Q184	Abortion	
	Q185	Divorce	
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	Q34	*How would you feel about the following statements? Do you agree or disagree with them?*	1-5
		When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of this country over immigrants	
	Q130	*How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do?*	1-4
		1. Let anyone come who wants to 2. Let people come as long as there are jobs available 3. Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here 4. Prohibit people coming here from other countries	
Anti-Establishment vs. Pro-Establishment		*I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?*	1-4
	Q65	The armed forces	
	Q69	The police	
	Q70	The courts	
	Q71	The government	
	Q72	Political parties	
	Q73	Parliament	
	Q74	The civil service	
Economy vs. Ecology	Q111	*Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view?*	1-3
		1. Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs. 2. Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent. 3. Other answer	

Table 4: Overview of issue dimension indicators (the fourth column reports the original coding of the questions in the WVS round 7 questionnaire)

Creating the Socio-Cultural Polarization Measure

Even though the notion of polarization has a long tradition in social science research, there currently exists no standardized way of measuring it (Esteban & Ray, 2005, p. 2). What seems to be widely accepted is that polarization describes some spatial separation or distance between at least two or more groups in a distribution and how much it spreads out from its center (Esteban & Ray, 2010, p. 2; Gigliarano & Mosler, 2009, p. 436; cf. Zhang & Kanbur, 2001). With growing social conflict and political instability, social scientists have become increasingly interested in measures of polarization in recent years (cf. Alesina & Spolaore, 1997; Chakravarty & Majumder, 2001; Duclos et al., 2004; Esteban et al., 2007; Esteban & Ray, 1994, 2005; Foster & Wolfson, 1992; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2002, 2005a, 200b; Rodriguez & Salas, 2002; Quah, 1997; Wang & Tsui, 2000; Wolfson, 1994, 1997; Zhang & Kanbur, 2001). The concept captures conflict phenomena that cannot be appropriately described, much less predicted by traditional inequality measures, for example the disappearance of the middle class (Esteban & Ray, 2010, p. 1; Permanyer, 2008, p. 2; Zhang & Kanbur, 2001, p. 87). In fact, both inequality and fractionalization indices “fail to account for the fundamental role of deep social cleavages” (Esteban & Ray, 2010, p. 1; cf. Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005a, 2005b). They can even lead researchers to draw wrong conclusions (Zhang & Kanbur, 2001, p. 87). Consider these two diagrams:



Figure 18: Diagrams to illustrate polarization example (adapted form Esteban & Ray, 1994, p. 824)

Assume a society divided into ten different groups based on people's incomes (Figure 18a). Individuals drawn from the same groups all have a very similar income that differs meaningfully from the income of the individuals in the other groups. In other words, there is homogeneity within these ten groups and, at the same time, heterogeneity across them (Esteban & Ray, 1994, p. 824). Now, suppose the same imaginary society is divided into only two income groups (Figure 18b). One group consists of all the poor people and the other of all the rich people that live in that society. Is the polarization greater in the diagram on the left or on the right? I argue that polarization is higher in the diagram on the right, because even though the two groups may not be as homogeneous anymore in terms of people's incomes, heterogeneity across them is much greater. The differences between the groups become much more pronounced when the population is distributed equally over only two instead of ten values of income (cf. Duclos et al., 2004; Esteban & Ray, 1994).

To give you another example, you can think of the groups not as income groups but opinion groups. Each group represents an attitude towards a certain political issue on a left-right dimension, such as whether the government should make incomes more equal or not. The distribution in the diagram on the right (Figure 18b) does not give much room for compromise on that issue, making conflict more likely. People are either for or against some form of state intervention. The distribution on the left (Figure 18a) suggests that the public's opinion is fuzzy and, therefore, it should be much easier to negotiate a policy solution to our free market vs. state intervention-related problem because there is more common ground to begin with. Any inequality measure that is based on the Lorenz order,[79] like the Gini (cf. chpt. 2.1.), would suggest that the opposite is true, that inequality has decreased in Figure 18b relative to the distribution in Figure 18a (Esteban & Ray, 1994, p. 825; Zhang & Kabur, 2001, p. 87, 96). That is because inequality measures based on the Lorenz order essentially only measure the spread of a distribution, emphasizing the deviation from the global mean and completely ignore the clustering around local means (Zhang & Kanbur, 2001, p. 86). But

> "there are a number of social and economic phenomena for which the knowledge of the degree of clustering or polarization can be more telling than a measure of inequality. Quite apart from the distribution of income, wealth, or growth rates...there are issues of social class or significant problems concerning racial, religious, tribal, and nationalistic conflicts, which clearly have more to do with the clustering of attributes than with the inequality of their distribution over the population" (Esteban & Ray, 1994, p. 822).

Thus, there is by now fairly wide agreement that polarization is different from inequality and that a society characterized by polarization is more likely to exhibit social tension, civic unrest

[79] In very simplified terms, the Lorenz order says that inequality increases as the results of the mathematical function describing the Lorenz curve become smaller. See Kleiber (2017) for more details.

and political turmoil (Aleskerov & Oleynik, 2016, p. 4; Duclos et al., 2004, p. 1737; Esteban & Ray, 1994, p. 820; Gigliarano & Mosler, 2009, p. 435; cf. Chakravarty & Majumder, 2001; Horowitz, 1985). Staning (2011) stresses that the concept of polarization in political science captures "the distribution of power rather than of resources" (p. 5). That is also why group size matters. It says something about the relative strength of the groups and their potential power to influence the direction a society is moving into (Staning, 2011, p. 6).

Still, polarization is hard to measure because it cannot be measured directly (Arbatli & Rosenberg, 2021, p. 289). Most of the polarization measures that have been proposed so far are unidimensional or univariate, which means that they only consider one attribute, like income, to measure polarization (cf. Esteban & Ray, 2004; Gigliarano & Mosler, 2009; Permanyer, 2008). However, to capture the interplay between inequality dynamics and people's value orientations, I need a multidimensional measure that allows me to include more than just one attribute into the calculation (Duclas et al., 2004, 1759; Esteban & Ray, 2010, p. 2). Zhang and Kanbur (2001) offer such a multidimensional polarization measure (cf. Esteban & Ray, 2010). Conceptually, it is based on the idea that polarization is the result of increasing within-group identification and between-group alienation (Duclos et al., 2004, p. 1737; cf. Esteban and Ray, 1994, 1997). Mathematically, Zhang and Kanbur's (2001) polarization measure is based on the entropy index developed by Dutch econometrician Henri Theil to measure inequality (cf. Conceição & Ferreira, 2000; Esteban & Ray, 2010)[80].

However, Zhang and Kanbur's (2001) measure has some limitations because it is modelled after the Theil Inequality Index, which makes it impractical for use in this analysis. The three biggest shortcomings of the Theil Inequality Index that Zhang and Kanbur's (2001) polarization measure inherited are: first, it is a relatively arbitrary measure and not very intuitive; second, it was designed for infinite intervals; and third, because the Theil Inequality Index was originally developed to measure economic inequality, it assumes a diminishing marginal utility. I develop my own polarization measure to account for these shortcomings using Esteban and Ray's (1994, 1997) *identification-alienation* framework *(*cf. Duclos et al., 2004). It is based on the assumption that polarization increases as the subgroups of a population become more equal in size, more homogeneous within and more distant from each other. Two very homogeneous groups of roughly the same size positioned at opposite ends of a spectrum are maximally polarized.

[80] For an introduction to the Theil Inequality Index see Conceição & Ferreira (2000) or Cowell (2003).

With more groups, polarization decreases (Aleskerov & Oleynik, p. 5; Gigliarano & Mosler, 2009, pp. 437-438; cf. Esteban & Ray, 1994). Let's break this down:

Assume that a population is divided into *N* groups based on a certain attribute, here that group-defining attribute is social class[81]. Suppose that these N groups are spread across a certain issue dimension, say, deregulation vs. intervention, according to their position on this issue. Let *K* be the number of people in group *i* and μ_i be the mean position on the free market vs. state intervention dimension within the ith group. x_j denotes each group member's position on that issue dimension. *Identification* is given by:

$$\frac{1}{\sum_{j=1}^{K} \frac{\frac{|\mu_i - x_j|}{K}}{0.5}}$$

$$= \frac{0.5}{\sum_{j=1}^{K} \frac{|\mu_i - x_i|}{K}}$$

To calculate identification for each country by wave[82], I first subtract each group member's individual position on the free market vs. state intervention dimension from the group's mean position on that same issue. Then, I divide the result by the number of people in group *i* to obtain the average deviation of the group member's individual position on the issue from the group's mean position on the issue (i.e., the weighted mean). I standardize the score by dividing it by the theoretical maximum distance of 0.5. To make the score more intuitively interpretable, I reverse the scale, so that lower values reflect more homogeneity and less polarization within the groups. In other words, a group with a high identification score is made up of individuals that identify very strongly with the average position of the group on an issue dimension

[81] See Box II: A Brief Note on Social Class

[82] "Wave" refers to my data set's time unit *T*. The WVS has been conducted globally in consecutive waves every five years starting in 1981.

Alienation is given by:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{N} \frac{|\mu - \mu_i| \cdot \pi}{0.5}$$

μ denotes a country's population mean position on the deregulation vs. intervention dimension and π_i the population share of the population in group i. To calculate alienation for each country by wave, I first subtract each group's mean position on the deregulation vs. intervention dimension from the country's population mean position on that same issue and then multiply the result with the share of the population in group i. This way, I not only make sure that I account for the fact that larger groups contribute more to overall polarization than smaller groups, but also for the fact that my polarization measure is not invariant towards the middle group's positions. I standardize the score by dividing it by the theoretical maximum distance of 0.5. In other words, alienation measures the extent to which a specific group deviates from a country's average position on an issue dimension weighted by the size of the group.

The product of the identification and alienation scores yields a scalar polarization index that captures the average distance between the groups' positions on the free market vs. state intervention dimension in relation to the formation of opinions within the groups. Specifically, if people's opinions converge so that the sense of group identity becomes stronger and the groups more distinct (i.e., the more tightly they all cluster around the group's mean), the ideological distance between groups grows and polarization increases (identification sub-index). Similarly, if the groups move ideologically further away from each other (i.e., the further apart the group's means are from each other), polarization increases as well (alienation sub-index). Combining both sub-indices by multiplication (also known as the weakest link approach) implies that the resulting polarization index produces high values if both identification and alienation are high; lower values in either of the two sub-indices lead the polarization index to assume lower values.

Box II: A Brief Note on Social Class

The study of class identity and awareness has a long tradition. To summarize it briefly, most people today believe that social classes exist, understand class labels and can place themselves in class categories (cf. Anderson & Curtis, 2012). However, there is an ongoing debate over whether or not subjective social class measures are in fact reliable. For example, Evans and Kelly (2004) study 21 countries and find that in all of them people tend to identify as members of the middle class regardless of their objective social class position. As a general rule, economic prosperity is positively related to class identity: People in rich societies place themselves higher in the social hierarchy than people in poor countries (Anderson & Curtis, 2012, p. 130; Evans & Kelly, 2004, p. 28). But this relationship only holds when income inequality is not considered. Even if, on average, people tend to be richer in wealthy countries, they correctly place themselves in class categories based on their income (cf. Anderson & Curtis, 2012, p. 139). In societies with great income inequality, the differences between the social classes are highly visible, especially in terms of their material resources. "Simply put, low income earners are more likely to see themselves at the bottom of class structure when their position is more obvious" (Anderson & Curtis, 2012, p. 128). Similarly, Alexander and Welzel (2017) find that people's self-reported social class membership and the objective indicators of their socio-economic status like education and income corresponded well. Therefore, if not otherwise specified, I always refer to subjective social class. The WVS asks respondents to indicate which social class they think they belong to: the lower class, the working class, the lower middle class, the upper middle class or the upper class. For robustness checks, I also construct a measure of objective social class based on respondents' education and income (cf. Figure 15). Education is measured low vs. high, where high education is college degree or higher and income is also measured low vs. high, where high income is the top-tertile. The WVS measures respondents' household income on a ten-point scale from 1 representing the "lowest group" to 10 representing the "highest" group, which means that the measure is not based on people's actual income, but on their relative positions in the distribution of household incomes.

We can write the polarization index as:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{N} \frac{|\mu - \mu_i| \cdot \pi}{0.5} \cdot \frac{0.5}{\sum_{j=1}^{K} \frac{|\mu_i - x_i|}{K}}$$

$$= \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} |\mu - \mu_i| \cdot \pi}{\sum_{j=1}^{K} \frac{|\mu_i - x_i|}{K}}$$

This polarization measure also takes into account within-group inequalities. The person with the most liberal opinion on the free market vs. state intervention dimension in an overall conservative-leaning group could well be more liberal than the most conservative in an overall left-

leaning group, which would then also decrease polarization (Esteban & Ray, 2010, pp. 23-24; Zhang and Kabur, 2001, p. 96; Pemanyer, 2008, p. 4)

I created a set of graphs to support my decision to go with a more elaborate polarization measure. Consider the following figure (Figure 19), which combines three graphs. In each of the graphs, I plot two of the six issue dimensions against each other, thereby creating a two-dimensional value space (cf. Alexander & Welzel, 2017). Imagine a grid overlay with four quadrants. The quadrant on the lower left demarcates the most conservative attitude possible, indicating conservative positions on both issue dimensions; the quadrant on the upper right demarcates the most progressive attitude, indicating progressive positions on both issue dimensions. The graphs pool people into their subjective social class and show each class's mean position in the two-dimensional space. The social classes are depicted by the round markers (bubbles) whose size represents the proportional group share in the combined populations of Argentina, Australia, Germany, Japan, South Korea and the United States[83]. The arrows indicate the direction in which the social classes moved from 1995 to 2017. Put another way, they show the shift in the group's mean attitudes over those 22 years (cf. Alexander & Welzel, 2017).

In the graph on the left and the one in the middle, the predominant shift across all social classes is from conservative to progressive values, reflecting the general emancipatory trend typical of all post-industrial societies. What is noticeable, though, is that even though the direction of the shift is the same for all social classes, they do not all move at the same speed. Even members of the lower classes seem to have become more progressive in the 22 years between 1995 and 2017, but they are still lagging behind the upper classes. In absolute terms, the lower classes have turned more progressive. Relative to the other social classes, however, the lower classes have become more conservative.

Take a look at the first graph that plots the nativism vs. cosmopolitanism and anti- vs- pro-establishment issue dimension against each other. In 1995, the lower class's position on the nativism vs. cosmopolitanism dimension was .31 and its position on the anti- vs- pro-establishment dimension was .39. The upper middle class's position on these dimension was .44 and .47, respectively. In 2017, the lower class's position on the nativism vs. cosmopolitanism dimension was .38 and its position on the anti- vs- pro-establishment dimension was .41. The upper middle class's position on these dimension was .51 and .52, respectively. The ideological

[83] I do not have sufficient data for Poland, South Africa, Spain and Sweden to include them in this illustration.



Figure 19: Ideological polarization between the social classes in democracies around the world in the period from 1995 to 2017 (adapted from Alexander & Welzel, 2017, p. 11)

distance on the nativism vs. cosmopolitanism dimension is the same, however, the distance on the anti- vs- pro-establishment dimension was .08 and is now .11. Similarly, the ideological difference between the working class and the upper middle class on the patriarchalism vs. emancipation dimension was .04 and is now .08. In the graph on the right, the predominant shift across all social classes is towards illiberalism. Yet even though the direction of the shift is the same for all social classes, the upper middle class is still relatively more liberal compared to the other social classes.

What these three plots show is basically alienation between groups. These graphs tell everything about how the groups are spread across the two-dimensional space, but they say nothing about identification within groups.[84] Identification with groups is important, however, because the ideological distance between groups grows and polarization increases as the sense of group identity becomes stronger. Similarly, if the groups move ideologically further away from each other, polarization increases as well. Therefore, instead of measuring socio-cultural polarization only based on the ideological difference between the social classes, I use a measure that captures the average distance between a groups' positions on the issue dimensions in relation to the formation of opinions within the groups. This measure should give a more accurate picture of socio-cultural polarization in democracies around the world.

Control Variables

In testing the impact of socio-cultural polarization on civic culture, the analysis controls for other potential factors for democratic recession, including socio-economic, cultural and institutional factors. Controlling for other potential determinants increases the robustness of the statistical models and validity of the results. Table 5 (p. 93) summarizes the information. It also includes information on some additional demographic factors.

Socio-Economic Factors

Modernization and increasing (financial) security in the three decades after the Second World War has led to a shift from materialist to postmaterialist values – from a relatively strong attachment to maintaining order and preserving economic gains to an emphasis on individual self-expression and achieving a more participant, less hierarchical society (Inglehart, 1977, p. 179; cf. Inglehart, 1971, 1979, 1990, 1997). Rising education levels have had a reinforcing

[84] I could work with the standard deviation because it measures the dispersion of the data in relation to its mean. A low standard deviation indicates that the data are clustered around the mean and a high standard deviation indicates that the data are more spread out.

effect: People who are more educated are more independent and tolerant (Dalton, 2018, pp. 53-54; cf. Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). To account for the potential effect of higher socio-economic development, I include the Human Development Index (HDI) as a control variable. It is a composite index combining three key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and having a decent standard of living[85]. The summary measure establishes values on a scale of 0 to 1. In 2019, Norway was the most developed country in the world with an HDI score of 0.957; the least developed country was Niger with an HDI score of 0.394 (cf. United Nations Development Programme, 2020). The United Nations Development Programme publishes the HDI annually in the Human Development Report.

Cultural Factors

Active participation is an integral part of the democratic civic culture (cf. Putnam, 1993). "It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives" (Coppedge et al., 2021, p. 44). I include V-Dem's participatory democracy index to account for a national culture's emphasis on achieving the ideal of participatory democracy, which encourages active participation by citizens in all political processes. In a participatory democratic environment, suffrage is taken for granted and engagement in civil society organizations or sub-national elected bodies is emphasized. Direct rule by citizens is preferred whenever practicable. In this kind of enabling environment, political and civil society organizations can operate freely. Moreover, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance (Coppedge et al., 2021, pp. 43-44). People are empowered to become actively involved in their communities. The more active the people, the healthier the democracy.

Institutional Factors

Having an active civil society does not depend solely on how participatory a national culture is. From an institutional learning perspective, democratic traditions should have a strong positive effect on people's orientation towards democracy (Welzel & Moreno Alvarez, 2014, p. 70). "When generation after generation grows up under democratic practices, socialization mechanisms mature to the point at which democratic norms become firmly encultured in most people's minds" (Welzel & Kirsch, 2017, p. 5). History has proven repeatedly that the establishment of

[85] The health dimension is measured in life expectancy at birth; the knowledge dimension is measured in mean years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and more and expected years of schooling for children of school entering age; the standard of living dimension is measured in gross national income per capita. For a more detailed description of the index construction, see United Nations Development Programme (n.d.).

well-functioning liberal democracies takes time, and the legacies of authoritarian regimes affect citizens' values and attitudes long after their country democratized. Living in a functioning liberal democracy and, more importantly, participating in democratic decision-making helps people understand and internalize the rules of procedural democracy[86] (cf. Heyne, 2018; Welzel & Kirsch, 2017). Conversely, authoritarian values prevail in countries with little or no democratic tradition (Welzel & Kirsch, 2017, p. 4). I measure democratic tradition with Gerring et al.'s Democratic Stock Index (cf. Gerring et al., 2005). The index captures not only how democratic (or non-democratic) a country is, but also includes a time aspect. By measuring democracy as a stock variable instead of a level variable, the index measures the accumulation of democratic experience (Gerring et al., 2005, p. 339).

	Controls		
Factors	**Name**	**Source**	**Scale**
Socio-Economic	Human Development Index	United Nations Development Programme	0-1
Cultural	Participatory Environment	Gerring et al. / Varieties of Democracy	0-1
Institutional	Democratic Tradition	Varieties of Democracy	0-1
Demographic	Age	World Values Survey	13-103
	Sex	World Values Survey	1-2
	Education Level[87]	World Values Survey	0-8
	Employment Status	World Values Survey	1-8

Table 5: Overview of control variables (the fourth column reports the original coding of the questions)

4.3. Models and Estimation Methods

I have mentioned the significant advantages that the analysis of TSCS data has over the analysis of either time series or cross-sectional data (cf. chpt. 4.1.). However, the two-dimensional character of this type of data is also problematic. There are a number of methodical issues that need to be dealt with, but unfortunately, "there is no 'one-size-fits-all' technique for TSCS data" (Adolph et al., 2005, p. 2; cf. Raffalovich & Chung, 2014). Therefore, I apply different estimation techniques and model specifications, respectively, that take these issues into account (cf. Troeger, 2019). Accounting for methodological challenges ensures the robustness of results. In

[86] If the institutional quality in young democracies is high, this effect can also occur in young democracies (cf. Heyne, 2018).

[87] For reasons of data compatibility (i.e., merging data), I recode the item into a four-point scale variable with a 0-1 range (0 = "no or only primary education", 0.33 = "incomplete secondary education", 0.66 = "complete secondary education" and 1 = "some or complete higher education".

this subchapter, I describe the statistical models that I use to estimate the effect of socio-cultural polarization on civic culture.

Makro-Level Modelling

The first model I employ is a standard multivariate OLS regression. However, the Gauss-Markov assumptions (the full ideal conditions of OLS) are rarely met in TSCS data. For example, it assumes that the variance of errors is constant for all observations or, in other words, that the variance does not change for each observation or for a group of observations. However, the clustered structure of TSCS data violates this basic condition (cf. Raffalovich & Chung, 2014; Podestà, 2002). Since the error term in time-series-cross-sectional models is likely to be correlated within countries, I run a multivariate OLS regression with robust standard errors to account for heteroscedasticity (Kruse, 2019, p. 112; Wenzelburger et al., 2014, p. 30; cf. Wooldridge, 2013). There is another way to address heteroscedasticity in TSCS data. After Beck and Katz (1995, 2004), the most commonly employed model specification to account for heteroscedasticity in TSCS data is specifying panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). PCSEs have the advantage of not only correcting the OLS standard errors for heteroscedasticity but also for contemporaneous correlation of the errors (Wenzelburger et al., 2014, p. 137; cf. Beck & Katz, 1995, 2004). Therefore, the second model I use is a PCSE model.

With pooled TSCS data, unit heterogeneity is often a big problem. To reiterate, unit heterogeneity means that there are some unobserved unit-specific time invariant characteristics that have an effect on the dependent variable. In other words, "they offer different initial conditions which might bias the estimated coefficients" (Troeger, 2019, p. 11). To address unit heterogeneity, most of the literature suggests including so-called fixed effects (cf. Beck & Katz, 1996; Cameron and Trivedi, 2009; Fortin-Rittberger, 2015; Green et al., 2001; Raffalovich & Chung, 2014; Wenzelburger et al., 2014). Fixed effects account for any differences between countries that are constant over time and ignored by the researcher. It is a relatively quick and easy fix to the problem of unit heterogeneity, yet there is also a problem with this approach. Fixed effects do absorb the heterogeneity of the units and also mitigate omitted variable bias in a model that is not correctly specified, but they also suppress the impact of variables that change slowly (cf. Beck & Katz, 2004; cf. Kurse, 2019). In other words, "fixed effects transformation eliminates the unit-specific effects, but also time invariant variables that might be of theoretical interest" (Troeger, 2019, p.12). Therefore, in order to not lose the predictive power of slowly changing or stable variables of interest, researchers must weigh the gains from including fixed effects against their costs (Beck, 2001, p. 285; Beck & Katz, 2004, p. 5). The debate over when fixed

effects should be used, if at all, is ongoing (Adolph et al., 2005, p. 9; cf. Beck & Katz, 2004; Green et al., 2001; Wilson & Butler, 2004, Plümper et al., 2005).

Because my country sample is relatively homogeneous (it includes only the advanced industrial democracies of the West, cf. chpt. 4.2.), I argue that the country sample is homogeneous enough to do without fixed effects model specifications because the country-specific characteristics are essentially negatable (Wenzelburger et al., 2014, p. 129). Including country-fixed effects in my model would eliminate minor unobserved differences within countries. Yet, as Welzel et al. (2016) put it, "including the countries' democratic tradition among the predictors in a prediction of democracy already takes care of" (p.464) the problem of these unobserved differences between the sampled countries. I do, however, include wave dummies in both my models to control for time-specific fixed effects. Specifically, I include a dummy variable for each wave to account for any variation in my data that could potentially be attributed to some unobserved events that took place during that survey wave. Including period fixed effects is quite common for short (i.e., cross-sectional dominant) data sets where $N > T$ (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009, p. 232).

Last but not least, the temporal dynamic of the data structure has to be addressed. Autocorrelation – when the error term in t is dependent on the error term in t_{-1} – is a common problem with TSCS data (Troeger, 2019, p. 5). Researchers can choose between multiple dynamic model specifications when using TSCS data (Wilson & Butler, 2007, pp. 106-107; cf. Beck & Katz, 2011). Probably the simplest way to model temporal dynamics is the addition of a lagged dependent variable (LDV) as another predictor variable (cf. Beck & Katz, 1995, 1996, 2004). Including an LDV usually neutralizes the autocorrelation in the error term because the dependent variable is then partly explained by its previous value (Wenzelburger et al., 2014, p. 135; Fortin-Rittberger, 2015, p. 392). The problem with this approach is that the LDV *de facto* absorbs most of the variance of the dependent variable (Huber & Stevens, 2001, pp. 59-60). In fact, the estimated coefficients for the independent variables lose significance and become unstable because the LDV introduces multicollinearity into the model (Wenzelburger et al., 2014, p. 135; Kittel, 2005, p. 105; cf. Achen 2000). Another problem with adding an LDV is that it reduces the number of observations available to calculate estimates along the time dimension. Thus, including an LDV is not recommended where T is small (Fortin-Rittberger, 2015, p. 393).

That is why some researchers prefer to correct for autocorrelation using other model specifications (cf. Achen, 2000). Usually, these other methods assume AR(1)[88] autocorrelation which then gets modeled in the error term (Wenzelburger et al., 2014, p. 135; cf. Urban & Mayerl, 2018). For practical reasons, Kittel suggests ignoring autocorrelation in the data if $p < 0.3$, because the estimation error will be small (Kittel, 2005, pp. 103-104; Wenzelburger et al., 2014, p. 134). A test for autocorrelation in my data has revealed that it is in fact negligible. Running both a model with and without correcting for autocorrelation in the error term yields almost the same results.

Cross-Level Modelling

Although both socio-cultural polarization and civic culture are country-level phenomena, they are operationalized from individual-level data. This is a common practice in social science research when a two-stage sample is needed on account of the fact that the variables of interest are not directly observable at the macro level. Then, the variables are defined as aggregates of micro-level variables (cf. Snijders & Boskar, 1999). Unfortunately, aggregating individual level data for macro-level analysis often creates unwanted side effects (Wenzelburger et al., 2014, p. 94). Most importantly, aggregated data are only interpretable at the particular aggregate level; the researcher cannot make inferences about the micro-level from macro-level data. Thinking that the observed relationship at the macro level necessarily holds at the micro level is called *ecological fallacy*[89]. In fact, the aggregated variables and individual-level variables may be complete opposite to one another (Gschwend, 2006, p. 227; Wenzelburger et al., 2014, p. 17, pp. 94-95; cf. Coleman, 1990; Snijders & Boskar, 1999; Robinson 1950).

Analyzing aggregated data allows me to make an inference about the effect a country's degree of socio-cultural polarization has on a country's civic culture. However, I cannot deduce from that analysis whether socio-cultural polarization affects everyone in the same way or if it does, in fact, have a greater (and more negative) effect on the underprivileged members of society. To answer this question, I need to estimate a multilevel model that can estimate the cross-level relationships between socio-cultural polarization at the country level and the civic culture variables at the individual level under the moderating effect of social class.

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[88] An AR(1) model is a linear model that predicts the present value of a time series using the immediately prior value in time.

[89] Coleman (1990) illustrated such multilevel systems and the problems related to explaining system behavior based on actions and orientations at a level below (pp. 6-10). His models are often referred to as "Coleman's boat" or, in the German-speaking world, "Coleman's bathtub".

I specify a multilevel linear regression model (also known as linear multilevel mixed effects model) that fits the two-level structure of the data and contains both fixed effects and random effects, thereby creating a generalization of standard linear regression for grouped data. In particular, I estimate a simple random-intercept (multilevel) model fit by maximum likelihood with an interaction term. In other words, I assume a different (or random) intercept for each country but a constant coefficient or a fixed regression slope (Wenzelburger et al., 2014, p. 103)[90]. The fixed effects are similar to standard regression coefficients and are estimated directly. The random effects are not directly estimated but are summarized according to their estimated variances and covariances. I assume an unstructured covariance structure, which mean that I allow for all variances and covariances to be distinct (Stata, n.d.).

I include an interaction affect to test the conditional hypothesis that socio-cultural polarization affects people's civic attitudes differently depending on their position in the social hierarchy. Two explanatory variables, say, *x* and *z,* are said to interact with each other, when their joint effect on the outcome variable *y* is stronger than the sum of their separate effects (Cohen & Cohen, 1983, p. 302; Cohen et. al., 2003, p. 255). The joint effect can also be described as a conditional effect when the relationship between *x* and *y* depends on different values of *z* (Cohen & Cohen, 1983, p. 304; Cohen et. al., 2003, p. 255)[91]. There are three kinds of possible interaction effects: 1) synergetic or enhancing interactions, in which both *x* and *z* affect *y* in the same direction and their combined effect is stronger than the sum of *x* and *z* would predict; 2) interference or antagonistic interactions, in which both *x* and *z* affect *y* in the same direction, but their joint effect affects *y* in the opposite direction; and 3) buffering interactions, in which *x* and *z* affect *y* in different directions and their combined effect mitigates their separate effects (Cohen et al., 2003, p. 285-286).

I expect the interaction affect between socio-cultural polarization and social status on civic attitudes to be buffering. The assumption is that the overall negative impact of socio-cultural

[90] It has been argued that multilevel models involving cross-level interactions should always include random slopes on the lower-level components of those interactions because omitting the random slope term may result in wrong interpretation of the results. Not including a random slope term will not usually introduce systematic bias into coefficient estimates, but it will lead to overly optimistic statistical inference for the cross-level interaction term and the coefficient of the lower-level variable involved in the interaction. All other coefficient estimates and their standard errors, including the main effect of the contextual predictor involved in the cross-level interaction and any additional lower- and upper-level predictors, should largely remain unaffected (cf. Heisig & Schaeffer, 2019). I would argue that, by including an interaction effect, I am already specifying a random slope, which means nothing else than that the slope (positive or negative) of the relationship between two variables varies depending on some context factor. In this case, the context factor I am specifying is socio-cultural polarization. In short, I assume the individual effect of social class to vary depending on the level of socio-cultural polarization in the different countries in my model.

[91] This conditional relationship is symmetrical, meaning that the relationship between *v* and *y* depends on different values of *u* (Cohen & Cohen, 1983, p. 304).

polarization on civic attitudes is weakened by high social status. I illustrate the results of the random-intercept model (with interaction effect) using a number of marginal effect plots because "it is extremely difficult and often impossible to evaluate conditional hypotheses using only the information provided in traditional results tables" (Brambor et al., 2006, p. 76). Traditional results tables often convey very little information beyond the model parameters. The information the researcher is after – the marginal effect of x on y for substantively meaningful values of the conditioning variable z – cannot always be deduced from the table (Brambor et al., 2006, p. 74). I use the Johnson-Neyman (J-N) technique, which displays how the conditional, marginal effect of x changes across the entire range of a moderating variable (cf. Brambor et al., 2006; Bauer & Curran, 2005; Kruse, 2019). Figure 20 is an example of such a marginal effects plot.



Figure 20: Simplified illustration of marginal effects plot (adapted from Brambor et al., 2006, p. 76)

The solid sloping line (red) indicates how the marginal effect of an explanatory variable u on the outcome variable y changes under the moderating effect of z. The 95% confidence intervals around the line allow me to determine the conditions under which u has a statistically significant effect on y, which is whenever the upper and lower bounds of the confidence intervals are both above (or below) the zero line (Brambor et al., 2006, pp. 75-76). Thus, I can use a simple figure to illustrate the marginal effect of x and the corresponding standard errors across a substantively meaningful range of z (Brambor et al., 2006, p. 74). The added histogram of the frequency

distribution of the moderating variable allows me to evaluate whether or not a meaningful number of observations fall within the range for which the marginal effect is statistically significant. "The point is that simply having a significant marginal effect across some values of the modifying variable is not particularly interesting if real-world observations rarely fall within this range" (Brambor et al., 2006, pp. 76).

As is the case with a simple linear regression model, the y-intercept in a random-intercept model represents the value the dependent variable takes if the values of the independent variables equal zero. However, if zero is not a meaningful value for an independent variable, the y-intercept has no meaningful interpretation either. Social status is such an independent variable. Everyone has a social status or belongs to a social class. There is no such thing as "zero" social status. Therefore, to make a meaningful interpretation of the y-intercept possible, the main explanatory variable and the interaction term are grand mean centered and group mean centered, respectively, (= 0) by subtracting the respective variables' means from every score. Specifically, grand mean centering subtracts the mean of the explanatory variable using the mean from the full sample (i.e., I subtract the mean socio-cultural polarization score across all countries in the sample from the country-specific socio-cultural polarization value); group mean centering subtracts the individual's group mean from the individual's score (i.e., I subtract the mean social status position across all individuals from every individual's specific social status position). The y-intercept then represents the value of y when x is at its mean (Wenzelburger et al., 2014, pp. 103-104).

PART III

STATISTICAL EVIDENCE

5. Testing the Relationship between Socio-Cultural Polarization and Civic Culture

Foa and Mounk (2016) believe that democracy "is in a state of serious disrepair" (p. 6). Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) paint an even bleaker picture when they claim that the intense polarization many democracies are currently experiencing could destroy them before long (p. 11). It is true that support for democracy seems to be in decline, while support for non-democratic, especially populist-authoritarian alternatives seems to be increasing. It is also true that if this trend continues, it can very well pose a threat to democracies (Norris, 2017, p. 14). Foa & Mounk (2016, 2017a, 2017b) try to convince their readers that a growing number of young citizens in the established democracies of the West no longer think that their current system of government is the only legitimate form of government, hence the support for right-wing populists. This chapter investigates another possible explanation for the recent upsurge of anti-democratic tendencies: socio-cultural polarization.

To this end, I first track and describe changes in civic culture in the mature democracies of the West from the early 1980s until the present. Then, I explore the relationship between different aspects of civic culture and the values held by people in different social positions. I also take a closer look at the development of socio-cultural polarization. Finally, I test whether socio-cultural polarization can in fact explain variance in civic culture. The results are mixed and suggest that socio-cultural polarization does not affect all aspects of civic culture equally. To better understand this relationship, specifically the conditions under which it applies, I examine how socio-cultural polarization affects the average citizen's civic attitudes and behavior under the moderating effect of social class. In other words, I test whether individuals who occupy different positions in the social hierarchy are affected differently by socio-cultural polarization. For the convenience of the reader, many of the results are visualized to allow for a better review and interpretation.

5.1. Civic Culture in Democracies around the World

To start, let us take a look at the level of civic culture in the entire sample of countries. Table 6 shows sample country means for all nine identified civic culture variables[92] over the last 40 years (1981-2020).[93] Because there are only democracies in the sample, I expect the values to be fairly evenly distributed across the entire sample with only moderate deviation, taking into account that some countries have been democratic longer[94] than others and that they are also located in different world regions[95]. In all 44 countries, people prefer a democratic political system over an autocratic one. This is not particularly surprising given that the sample consists only of democracies and that there is widespread popular support for democracy even in countries that are outright autocratic (Kruse et al., 2017, 2019; Welzel & Kirsch, 2017). As a reminder, a score of 0 indicates maximum support for authoritarian and a score of 1 indicates maximum support for democratic rule. A score of .5 indicates equal preferences for democracy and authoritarian rule. The Philippines have the lowest mean preference for democracy score (.55), which is very close to equal preference for both a democratic and an autocratic political system; Ghana has the highest mean preference for democracy score (.85). The sub-Saharan country is a bit of an outlier, though. If I sort the countries by their democratic experience (in descending order), a vague pattern emerges: The countries in Northern and Central Europe, Northern America and Oceania – the ones with the highest democratic experience – have the most preference for democracy. As the democratic experience decreases, so, it seems, does the preference for democracy.

There is a far greater variation in trust. Whereas 70% of the Norwegian population think most people can be trusted, only 4% of the Trinidadians and Tobagonians think that. Trust seems particularly low in North Africa and most of Latin America (with a few exceptions). In Eastern Europe, people do not seem to be very trusting either. As with preference for democracy, the countries with the longest democratic experience are the most trusting. There is actually quite a trust gap between the people in Northern and Central Europe, Northern America, Oceania and everywhere else. One possible explanation for this gap in trust is the higher quality of these countries' institutions, such as their legal systems (cf. Chung & Kwon, 2021; Martinangeli et al., 2020). Another possible explanation is the higher level of ethnic/racial diversity in these

[92] This table does not include country averages for active and passive memberships in either utilitarian or sociotropic organizations. I opted to show only the total share of the population that either volunteers in or belongs to at least one utilitarian or sociotropic organization due to space limitations. The data is included in the appendix (Table 5.1.A).

[93] Based on WVS rounds 1 to 7. Mean calculated from all available country-year observations.

[94] See the Appendix (Table 5.1.B) for a version of Table 6 with countries sorted by their democratic experience.

[95] See the Appendix (Table 5.1.C) for a version of Table 6 with countries sorted by region.

Country Means of Civic Culture Indicators

	Preference for Democracy	Trust (%)	Volunteering Utilitarian Organizations (%)	Belonging Utilitarian Organizations (%)	Volunteering Sociotropic Organizations (%)	Belonging Sociotropic Organizations (%)	Life Control	Life Satisfaction	Social Movement Activity
Argentina	0.70	0.21	0.07	0.12	0.25	0.25	0.71	0.70	0.24
Australia	0.78	0.49	0.25	0.26	0.58	0.50	0.73	0.73	0.49
Bosnia & Herzegovina	0.68	0.22	0.21	0.38	0.33	0.45	0.56	0.51	0.29
Brazil	0.57	0.06	0.15	0.14	0.55	0.35	0.73	0.72	0.35
Bulgaria	0.56	0.25	0.07	0.10	0.04	0.06	0.50	0.44	0.17
Canada	0.77	0.45	0.28	0.22	0.57	0.42	0.73	0.76	0.48
Chile	0.68	0.18	0.09	0.16	0.41	0.34	0.69	0.69	0.22
Colombia	0.61	0.08	0.13	0.17	0.53	0.34	0.78	0.81	0.28
Cyprus	0.71	0.10	0.17	0.21	0.26	0.28	0.69	0.67	0.32
Czech Republic	0.77	0.29	0.09	0.19	0.19	0.26	0.58	0.60	0.23
Ecuador	0.56	0.07	0.11	0.10	0.35	0.32	0.75	0.76	0.15
Estonia	0.68	0.31	0.04	0.14	0.15	0.22	0.57	0.51	0.22
Finland	0.71	0.55	0.11	0.50	0.36	0.77	0.73	0.76	0.35
Georgia	0.62	0.15	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.09	0.59	0.45	0.17
Germany	0.82	0.39	0.11	0.16	0.41	0.43	0.66	0.69	0.45
Ghana	0.85	0.07	0.23	0.39	0.77	0.49	0.70	0.59	0.14
Guatemala	0.56	0.17	0.15	0.24	0.61	0.60	0.73	0.75	0.19
Hungary	0.76	0.28	0.10	0.06	0.16	0.12	0.59	0.58	0.19
India	0.61	0.31	0.21	0.35	0.29	0.41	0.61	0.57	0.30
Indonesia	0.69	0.33	0.22	0.22	0.59	0.50	0.72	0.68	0.14
Japan	0.72	0.40	0.08	0.17	0.23	0.19	0.53	0.63	0.32
Mexico	0.58	0.20	0.18	0.20	0.50	0.46	0.77	0.78	0.22
Moldova	0.56	0.18	0.10	0.26	0.23	0.31	0.58	0.40	0.19
Netherlands	0.70	0.56	0.06	0.23	0.49	0.42	0.64	0.73	0.35
New Zealand	0.82	0.54	0.23	0.29	0.62	0.52	0.76	0.74	0.52
Norway	0.84	0.70	0.20	0.46	0.45	0.52	0.72	0.76	0.52
Peru	0.65	0.07	0.10	0.09	0.38	0.34	0.70	0.66	0.25
Philippines	0.55	0.06	0.16	0.15	0.41	0.33	0.66	0.67	0.14

Poland	0.68	0.24	0.06	0.10	0.21	0.17	0.62	0.64	0.23
Romania	0.59	0.14	0.10	0.10	0.15	0.16	0.71	0.57	0.18
Serbia	0.70	0.20	0.07	0.23	0.15	0.29	0.59	0.55	0.30
Slovenia	0.72	0.18	0.12	0.22	0.30	0.31	0.71	0.67	0.28
South Africa	0.67	0.22	0.19	0.41	0.66	0.56	0.67	0.63	0.25
South Korea	0.61	0.32	0.05	0.14	0.31	0.50	0.64	0.59	0.33
Spain	0.74	0.27	0.06	0.08	0.24	0.23	0.64	0.66	0.29
Sweden	0.82	0.63	0.18	0.53	0.45	0.60	0.72	0.75	0.54
Switzerland	0.78	0.44	0.20	0.24	0.56	0.53	0.71	0.79	0.41
Taiwan	0.59	0.31	0.12	0.30	0.29	0.41	0.71	0.64	0.18
Trinidad & Tobago	0.76	0.04	0.13	0.20	0.55	0.49	0.78	0.71	0.31
Tunisia	0.68	0.15	0.02	0.06	0.06	0.09	0.60	0.51	0.14
Turkey	0.63	0.11	0.06	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.59	0.62	0.20
Ukraine	0.55	0.29	0.05	0.21	0.11	0.19	0.56	0.49	0.17
United States	0.72	0.40	0.29	0.39	0.53	0.48	0.74	0.72	0.48
Uruguay	0.70	0.22	0.08	0.10	0.27	0.25	0.72	0.71	0.22
Venezuela	0.69	0.15	0.13	0.15	0.40	0.35	0.79	0.68	0.19

Table 6: Table reports country means of civic culture indicators over the period from 1981 to 2020. Data are from WVS rounds 1-7. Country list is sorted in alphabetical order.

societies. For trust has been found to be lower in more racially heterogeneous communities, which could explain the lower average trust levels in Latin America and the Caribbean. The deep-seated religious (catholic) tradition in the region may only add to that, as trust is generally lower in countries with dominant hierarchical religions (cf. Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000; Bjørnskov, 2007; La Porta et al., 1997). The larger but still relatively small population shares in Eastern Europe (compared to those countries of Northern and Central Europe) that say most people can be trusted is most likely a consequence of their communist past (cf. Bjørnskov, 2007; Paldam & Svendsen, 2000). Southern Europe's relatively low trust levels are sometimes attributed to its weak economic performance (cf. Bowels, 2014). In Asia, people are, on average, quite trusting (Public Affairs Asia, n.d.). The one exception is the Philippines, which has been troubled by conflict for decades.

What is interesting about membership in organizations is that volunteering in and belonging to sociotropic organizations seems to be more common than volunteering in and belonging to utilitarian organizations. In other words, it is more popular to be a member in environmental, cultural or charity organizations than it is to be a member in political parties, labor unions or professional organizations. Again, the populations of the countries with the most democratic experience in Northern and Central Europe, Northern America and Oceania are the ones that seem to be most involved in their communities. 77% of the Finnish population belongs to at least one sociotropic organization. In Bulgaria, only 6% of the population belong to one. What is noticeable, though, is that community involvement is also quite high in places with comparably less democratic experience. The lack in experience seems to be compensated by pre-colonial traditions of (tribe-based) communalism and voluntarism. This is the case, for example, in sub-Saharan Africa, where religious traditions dictate community engagement. On average, around 70 percent of the population in African countries belong to religious organizations (cf. Kruse, 2019). However, many also report other organizational memberships. In contrast, in the Middle East and North Africa region, community engagement is rather low and "mostly characterized as ineffective, undemocratic, elitist and dominated by patronage relations" (Kruse, 2019, p. 121).

As in sub-Saharan Africa, religion plays a big role in everyday life in Latin America and the Caribbean. Here, religious organizations often complement government in the delivery of public services (cf. Roitter 2010). It is similar in Asia, where churches are not only places to worship but also to socialize. In places where the government does not exercise excessive control over civil society, utilitarian organizations, like community welfare organizations, trade unions

and business associations, play an important role in public life for mobilizing political action (Weiss 2010, p. 297, p. 298; cf. Alagappa, 2004). Compared to the other world regions, community involvement is low in Eastern Europe. Not many people report memberships of any kind in any organization. This is also considered one of the enduring legacies of communist rule, under which participation in state-controlled organizations was mandatory. This is one reason why many citizens in the post-communist democracies today have a lasting aversion to public activities (cf. Howard, 2003).

Interestingly, Eastern Europe is also where people feel less in control of and satisfied with their lives. Remember that a score of 0 indicates no control over and satisfaction with one's life and a score of 1 indicates maximum control over and satisfaction with one's life. From a theoretical perspective (cf. chpt. 1.1.), it is not surprising that the scores are, on average, relatively high across the entire sample. People that live in established democracies tend, on average, to be more satisfied with their lives (cf. Loubser & Steenekamp, 2016). Lower scores in Eastern Europe do correspond with widespread pessimism about the overall benefits of democracy in this region (cf. Gehrke, 2020; Wike et al., 2019). Generally speaking, subjective material well-being seems to be an important factor in determining people's life satisfaction (cf. Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2013; Zhou & Xie, 2016). People in richer countries tend to be more satisfied with life than people in poorer countries, which would also explain the low life satisfaction scores in Tunisia and India. Health is another important factor that determines people's life satisfaction. People that live in countries in which the life expectancy at birth is lower (like in Eastern Europe[96]), people tend to report higher life satisfaction. Practically the same goes for control over life (cf. Mirowsky, 1997). Unsurprisingly, Social Movement Activity is also highest in the counties that have the highest democratic stock. They are the most liberal countries; they therefore provide the most enabling environment for elite-challenging action[97]. What is more, if we assume that self-expression values are widespread in democracies, we can also assume that citizens have internalized hard evaluation standards to assess the democratic quality of the institutions under which they live, which makes them disproportionately more critical in rating the quality of democracy in their society (cf. Inglehart, 1998; Norris, 1999).

[96] See, for example, https://www.statista.com/statistics/274514/life-expectancy-in-europe/.
[97] Compare Table 2A in the Appendix for list of country classification.

Tracking Changes in Civic Culture

Now that I have established that the countries in the sample are, in fact, largely comparable (I do want some variation), I continue the in-depth analysis with only ten of them, representing many of the world's regions: Argentina, Australia, Germany, Japan, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and the United States. First, let us take a closer look at the changes in civic culture in these countries since the early 1980s, starting with people's preference for democracy over autocracy (Figure 21).



Figure 21: Preference for democracy over autocracy at the country level (1981-2020)

Comparing the country-wide mean scores of democracy preference suggests non-uniform changes. In Argentina, scores fluctuated up and down until recently, when the score dropped for the second time in a row. It now stands at .65, which implies that Argentinians are now more indifferent about their preference than at any time since at least the early 1990s. This drop coincides with several corruption scandals revolving around Argentina's former president (2007-2015) Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. In 2019, Kirchner faced 12 charges of bribery, embezzlement and money laundering from her time in office (cf. BBC, 2019a; Tegel, 2019). In Australia, the preference for democracy over autocracy steadily increased from .74 in 1994[98] to

[98] I either refer to the respective rounds of the WVS using the first survey year like I do here, or I use an approximation. 1994 then becomes the mid-1990s.

.79 in 2010. Since then, there has been a very small decrease in the preference for democracy. Germans have the highest average preference for democracy over autocracy. It has steadily increased since 2005 and now stands at .83. In Japan, people's preference for democracy preference has, following a slump in 2010 increased again and now stands at .73. Poland's mean preference for democracy score has increased (.68), while South Korea's score has gradually decreased from .70 in 1994 to .51 in 2017, indicating that Koreans today do not have a clear preference. The most recent drop in preference may be due to the presidential corruption scandal that broke in 2016 and ended with the first female president Park Geun-hye losing her immunity and being charged with bribery, abusing state power and leaking state secrets (cf. BBC, 2018; Griffiths, 2017). Spain and Sweden almost have an identical score pattern. That said, Spain's overall preference for democracy score is lower (.70) than Sweden's (.81). Contrary to what someone might expect, given the host of disconcerting news coming from the United States, the country's means preference for democracy score has been relatively stable since the late 1990s and now stands at .70. In contrast, South Africa's preference for democracy score has plummeted very visibly. In 2010, it stood at .55, which implies that South Africans do not have a clear preference for democracy over autocracy. The 2008 Financial Crisis intensified unresolved tensions between the distribution of economic and political power in the country resulting in mounting anger and increasing pressure on its political institutions (cf. Levy et al., 2021).

Before I move on to describe the changes in trust, I want to bring something to your attention that we cannot see by simply looking at the country mean scores. If I group respondents according to their self-reported social class (for each country and wave separately) and then look at the different *group's mean* preference for democracy over time instead of the whole *country's mean* preference for democracy over time, a pattern begins to emerge (Figure 22). It seems that the lower social classes have a lower than average preference for democracy, whereas the upper social classes have a higher than average preference for democracy.[99] Let us take a closer look at Germany. The country's mean preference for democracy over autocracy has steadily increased since 2005, but that overall positive development disguises the fact that the lower class and the working class had a much higher preference for democracy in 2010 than they have now. The lower middle class has about the same preference for democracy now than it had then, and the upper middle class and upper class now have a much higher preference for democracy than

[99] The upper class sometimes has a considerably lower preference for democracy over autocracy than one would expect given the stacked pattern. This could be because the upper class has actually less preference for democracy, or it could be because in most countries the number of observations is relatively small compared to the other classes.

ten years ago. The bars rise up like organ pipes. This overall stacked pattern does not hold across all countries, but it is worth looking out for.[100]



Note: Data are from WVS rounds 1 to 7. Graph shows the mean preference for democracy over autocracy by subjective social class for each country individually from the early 1980s to most recently. Empty colunmns mean no observations for that particular year.

Figure 22: Preference for democracy over autocracy by subjective social class (1981-2020)

Like with preference for democracy, there is no uniform change pattern recognizable with trust, much less a uniform pattern of decline (Table 23). In Argentina, the change in the degree of trust is almost U-shaped. Trust was lowest in Argentina in 1999, when only about 16% of the population said that most people could be trusted. Overall, this share has become larger since then, but it seems quite volatile. Today, only about one fifth (21%) of the Argentinian population think that most people can be trusted. Australians are a lot more trusting in comparison. The share of the Australian population with general trust in others has increased from 40% in 1994, when it was at its lowest, to approximately 54% today. Germans also seem to have become more trusting over the years. In 1994, shortly after unification, only about one third of the German population (33%) thought that most people could be trusted; today, almost half (46%) of the population thinks that. In Japan, general trust was highest in 1999, when 43% of the population said that most people could be trusted. Since then, the share of the population that

[100] For the sake of completeness, I include the group-level graphs based on the *objective social class* measure in the Appendix (Figures 5.1.F-5.1.N).



Note: Graph shows share of population that says most people can be trusted. Change shown from the early 1980s to most recently. Empty colunms mean no observations for that particular year.

Figure 23: Trust in most people at the country level (1981-2020)

thinks most people can be trusted has declined by approximately 8%. In 1989, over one third (35%) of the Polish population said that most people could be trusted. In 2010, it was only about one fifth of the population, arguably a result of Poland's post-communist problems. Similar to Argentina, trust in South Korea has changed in almost a U-shaped pattern. Trust was highest among Koreans in the early 1980s (38%). It reached its low point in 1999 (27%). Since then, trust has become more widespread again; today, one third of the South Korean population (33%) thinks that most people can be trusted. Trust was highest in Spain in 1999, when 34% of the Spanish population said that most people could be trusted. In 2010, it was at its lowest (about 20%). The rather steep decline in trust among the Spanish population in the mid-2000 may be a consequence of the global financial crisis, which hit Spain extremely hard (cf. Hill, 2013). Sweden is the most trusting country. In 2005, when trust was most widespread, 68% of the Swedish population said that most people could be trusted. This share has shrunk a little bit since then (it is now 65%), but it is still quite large. In the United States, trust has stayed relatively stable in the population since the mid-1990s. Quite noticeably, even in the aftermath of 9/11, Americans did not lose more trust than they already had. South Africans are not very trusting people overall. Only about 24% of the population said that most people could be trusted

the last time the country was surveyed in 2010. The slump in the mid-1990s may be due to the country's post-Apartheid struggles (cf. Beaudet, 1993).

Before I move on to community engagement, I take another look at the group level (Figure 24). I am interested in the groups of people who are more likely to say that other people can be trusted. Take Australia, for example. Today, 54% of Australians think most people can be trusted. What that number does not reveal, however, is that of that total 54%, only about 1% of Australians are from the lower class, 22% are from the working class, 32% are from the lower middle class, 43% are from the upper middle class and another 1% are from the upper class[101]. This implies that the members of the lower and working classes, as well as members of the upper class, are considerably less trusting than the members of the middle classes. I find similarly stacked patterns in Germany, Sweden and the United States. It seems that, on average, the members of the middle classes are more trusting than the rest of the population – and in some instances have become less trusting compared to the rest of the population.



Note: Graph shows share of population that says most people can be trusted by subjective social class. Change shown from the early 1980s to most recently. Empty colunmns mean no observations for that particular year.

Figure 24: Trust in most people by subjective social class (1981-2020)

[101] This number only adds up to 99% and not 100% because of rounding error.

When I compare both the shares of the populations with an active (volunteering) and a passive (belonging) membership in at least one utilitarian organization over the years, I can confirm what Table 6 (pp. 102-103) already suggests: More people belong to organizations like political parties, labor unions and professional associations than are actively participating in them (Figure 25). In Argentina, membership rates in utilitarian organizations have historically been low; they peaked in the mid-1990s, when about 9% of the population volunteered in at least sociotropic organization and about 12% belonged to one. Both numbers have become smaller,



Figure 25: Active and passive membership in utilitarian organizations at the country level (1981-2020)

but with around 6% and 11%, respectively, membership rates have been quite stable there since the mid-2000s. It is similar in Australia, where around one fourth of the population has continually been both volunteering in and belonging to at least one utilitarian organization. In 2017, 24% of the Australian population was an active member in a utilitarian organization; 26% of the population said they were a passive member. In Germany, volunteering seems to be more popular now than ever before. Since the mid-2000s, both active and passive membership rates have gradually increased. Then, starting – a few years ago volunteering suddenly became a lot more popular in Germany. About 14% of the population is now an active member in at least

one utilitarian organization (+6%) and 11% is a passive member in at least one utilitarian organization (-4%).

In Japan, both active and passive membership rates have gradually declined since the mid-1990s, when about 20% of the population belonged to a utilitarian organization; today, that share has shrunk to less than 14%. Volunteering has never really been popular in Japan. When membership rates peaked in the mid-1990s, less than 10% of the Japanese where active members in utilitarian organizations; nowadays, it is less than 6%. However, this downward trend seems to have been stopped at least temporarily. In South Korea, membership rates are currently at a low point. Like in Japan, they were highest in the mid-1990s. Today, less than 3% of South Koreans volunteer in a political party, labor union or any other professional organization. The share of the population that belongs to at least one utilitarian organization (7%) is not much larger. In Spain, membership in utilitarian organizations does not seem popular at all. Less than 6% of the population belonged to a utilitarian organization in 2010; even fewer people, about 5% of the population, said they were volunteering. In Sweden, the share of the population that is an active member in a utilitarian organization has been quite stable, fluctuating between 16% and 20% since the mid-1990s. Passive membership rates have been historically very high, only recently the share of the population that says it belongs to a utilitarian organization has fallen below 50% (44%).

Civic engagement is deeply ingrained in US-American culture (cf. Tocqueville, 2002). Therefore, it is not surprising that membership rates are among the highest of any country. Actually, the share of the population that is an active member (35%) and the share of the population being a passive (41%) member in at least one utilitarian organization have recently both increased. This is also true for South Africa, where even more people are a passive member in a political party, labor union or other professional organization (47%). Volunteering in utilitarian organization is a little bit less popular (21%) in South Africa than in the United States, though.

What I want to do now is look at average membership at the group level (Figures 5.1.A-5.1.B[102]). Remember that I constructed another community involvement measure by adding respondents' total number of active and passive memberships? This generated two variables with scores ranging from 0-3 for active and passive memberships in utilitarian organizations and two variables from 0-5 for active and passive memberships in sociotropic organizations.

[102] See in the Appendix.

Here, I use the unstandardized versions of the variables because there are more easily interpretable. Comparing the numbers, two things become apparent. One, there seems to be a correlation between the percentage of the population that is a member in at least one utilitarian organization and the average number of memberships in the society. In countries where more people report to volunteer in or belong to a political party, labor union or any other professional organization, people are, on average, more often an active or passive member in a utilitarian organization than in countries where the share of the population that is either an active or passive member is smaller. The most obvious explanation would be that in countries like the United States, where many people report to be a member in at least one utilitarian organization, the chances are high that these people are actually a member in multiple utilitarian organizations because community engagement is such an integral part of U.S. culture.

Second, the average number of both active and passive memberships in utilitarian organizations seems to depend on the social background. In 2010, Americans who identified as lower class belonged, on average, to .36 utilitarian organizations; Americans who identified as working class had, on average, .41 passive memberships in utilitarian organizations; Americans who identified as lower middle class belonged, on average, to .55 utilitarian organizations; Americans who identified as upper middle class had, on average, .64 passive memberships in utilitarian organizations; and Americans who identified as upper class belonged to, on average, .77 utilitarian organizations. Again, this pattern is not consistent across all countries across all years, but the general trend seems to be that the upper classes are more involved in their communities than the lower classes, which makes sense, given the poor have fewer resources (cf. Welzel & Inglehart, 2018). Overall, the average number of both active and passive memberships in utilitarian organizations has not declined markedly in any of the social classes. The numbers are rather volatile.

I now turn to membership in sociotropic organizations, that is, active (volunteering) and passive (belonging) membership in religious, recreational or educational organizations (Figure 26). Corresponding with Table 6 (pp. 102-103), in all countries, the overall shares of the population volunteering in or belonging to sociotropic organizations are much larger than the shares of the population volunteering in or belonging to utilitarian organizations. Like membership rates in utilitarian organizations, membership rates in sociotropic organizations do not seem to be in general decline. In Argentina, about 25% of the population reported they were volunteering in sociotropic organizations recently, which is 5% less than 2010. The share of the population that

belongs to a sociotropic organizations has shrunk a little from 30% in 2005 to 28% today. Membership rates in Australia have been relatively stable. Since the mid-1990s, about half the Australian population has belonged to a sociotropic organization at any given time. Volunteering in sociotropic organization is even more popular in Australia, although the share of the population that is an active member in at least one sociotropic organization has shrunk by 3% between 2010 and 2017 and now stands at 55%. While still a large share, it is a change of -10% compared to the mid-1990s.

At about 50%, the share of the population in Germany that says it belongs to at least one sociotropic organization is now larger than ever. The share of the population that volunteers in at least one sociotropic organization on a regular basis was largest in 1994 at almost 45%; it plummeted in the early 2000s but has since recovered. Today, about 42% of Germans report that they regularly volunteer in at least one sociotropic organization. What is interesting about Japan is that the graph looks almost like an inverted version of the one in Figure 25. Volunteering in sociotropic organizations seems to be very popular compared to volunteering in utilitarian organizations. Nonetheless since the mind-2000s, volunteering in religious organizations, sport and recreational organizations or educational organizations has declined by about 10%. Today, 19% of the population is still volunteering regularly. Passive membership rates have also declined. Today, the share of the population that reports membership in at least one sociotropic organization has decreased 5% compared to the mid-2000s. In contrast, both active and passive memberships in sociotropic organizations seem to have become more widespread in Poland. Unfortunately, there is not enough data to make out a clear trend.

The graph that plots the South Korean data looks almost like a copy of the one in Figure 25. The only thing different are the highs of the bars and the numbers on the y-axis, the pattern is almost the same. Like membership in utilitarian organizations, membership in sociotropic organizations was highest in South Korea in the mid-1990s. Since then, both volunteering in and belonging to sociotropic organizations has become less popular. 17% of the population is still an active member, 31% of the population is still a passive member. The graph that plots the data for Spain also looks quite similar to the one in Figure 25. It is not quite inverted, but close to it. Membership rates were highest in the mid-1990s. Since then, both rates have shrunk. Volunteering seems more popular in Spain still, but the bars are practically equally high (18%). In Sweden, membership rates peaked in the mid-2000s, when about 46% of the population said they were volunteering and just short of 70% said they belonged to at least one sociotropic organization. In 2010, that last share had shrunk by about 10%. The slump in volunteering was



Figure 26: Active and passive membership in sociotropic organizations at the country level (1981-2020)

not quite as pronounced. In the mid-1990s, volunteering was apparently very popular in the United States, when over 70% of the population was an active member in at least one sociotropic organization. Belonging was also popular but not quite as popular. About 50% reported a passive membership in at least one sociotropic organization. Since then, the shares have almost converged at a lower level. Relatively speaking, volunteering has become much less popular, though. About 20% less people volunteer today; the share of passive memberships has only shrunk by about 1-2% percent. Belonging to sociotropic organizations, like belonging to utilitarian organizations, seems to become more widespread in South Africa. However, volunteering seems to lose its appeal. Between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s, the share of the population that said they were volunteering shrunk by about 10%, from 73% to 63%. That downward trend seems to have been stopped, though. Between the mid-2000s and the late 2000s that number has not declined markedly.

Looking at the average share of active and passive memberships in sociotropic organizations at the group level, I find similar patterns to those described for the share of active and passive memberships in utilitarian organizations at the group level (Figure 5.1.C-5.1.D[103]). There seems

[103] See in the Appendix.

to be a relationship between the size of the share of the population that reports being either an active or a passive member in at least one sociotropic organization and the average number of memberships in the society. The greater the share of the population that reports to be either an active or passive member in at least one sociotropic organization, the higher the chance that people have multiple memberships. Like with membership in utilitarian organizations, the number of both active and passive memberships in sociotropic organizations seems to depend on people's social backgrounds. The number of average memberships becomes greater as you move up the social ladder.

The next civic culture variable I want to take a closer look at is control, which I use as a proxy for individual liberty (Figure 27). A value of 0 means "no choice at all" and a value of 1 means "a great deal of choice." Decimal fractions of 0.1 indicate intermediate positions. At first glance, it seems that people feel that they have been in relative control over their lives and that this feeling has been a markedly stable one. In Argentina, people felt most in control over their lives in the mid-2000s (.76). The early 2010s saw a bit of a recession, but now that feeling is almost as strong as it was before (.75). Australians today feel a little bit less in control than they did in the early 2010s, when that feeling was strongest (.76). However, with a value of .74, Australians



Figure 27: Feeling of control over own life at the country level (1981-2020)

are still one of the surveyed peoples that feel most in control. Germans felt less in control over their lives in the mid-2000s (.64) than they did right after unification in the mid-1990s (.66), but the feeling has recently grown stronger. Today, Germans feel more in control than ever before (.68).

Japanese people felt more and more in control over their lives until the early 2010s, when that positive trend temporarily reversed. However, today, the population, on average, feels about as much in control as they did in the late 2000s (.56). In Poland, the feeling of control peaked in the early 2010s (.63). It had gradually become stronger since the late 1980s. While the Polish felt least in control over their lives in the late 1980s, South Koreans actually felt most in control (.73). Since then, the value has dropped by almost ten points; it was at its lowest in South Korea in the early 2010s (.64). South Koreans seem to have gained some of that control back, though (.66). In Spain, people felt more in control over their lives in 2010 than ever before (.66). The Swedish felt most in control in the mid-2000s (.76); in 2010, the average value dropped by about 2 points (.74). It seems that in the United States, people have felt a relatively stable amount of control over their lives for the past 15 to 20 years, with a value fluctuating around .75. South Africa looks like the country where the feeling of control is the most volatile. It was strongest in the early 2000s (.76). In 2010, it was down to .69.



Note: Graph shows mean level of people's feeling of control over their lives by subjective social class. Change shown from the early 1980s to most recently. Empty colunms mean no observations for that particular year.

Figure 28: Feeling of control over own life by subjective social class (1981-2020)

Inspecting the group-level data (Figure 28), I find the same stacked pattern I found in Figures 22 and 24. The pattern is much more obvious with control than it was with preference for democracy and trust. It looks like the lower social classes feel that they have less than average control over their lives, whereas the upper social classes feel they have more than average control over their lives. Again, the bars rise up like organ pipes. Irregularities in the pattern do exist, though. They imply, for example, that members of a social class sometimes feel considerably less in control over their lives (i.e., the bars are noticeably smaller and the gap between it and the next one larger than the gap between the other bars) or more in control over their lives (i.e., the bars are noticeably larger and the gap between it and the next one larger than the gap between the other bars) than the rest of the population.

The figure below (Figure 29), which shows mean life satisfaction values for all ten countries, almost looks like a copy of the previous one, which shows the average feeling of control over life in the population (Figure 28). The two variables seem to move in unison. I use people's life satisfaction as a proxy for their subjective well-being. A value of 0 means "completely dissatisfied" and a value of 1 means "completely satisfied." Decimal fractions of 0.1 indicate intermediate positions. Because the change patterns are so similar, I focus on what is different. While



Note: Graph shows for each country separately the changes in people's life satisfaction. The bars represent country means. Change shown from the early 1980s to most recently. Empty colunms mean no observations for that particular year.

Figure 29: Life satisfaction at the country level (1981-2020)

Australians felt most in control over their lives in the early 2010s, their life satisfaction was highest in the early 1980s (.77). Since then, it gradually declined until the early 2010s, at which point the negative trend stopped and reversed. Life satisfaction now stands at .73. Unlike the feeling of control, overall life satisfaction has continually declined in Japan. It was highest in the mid-2000s (.67) and has since decreased to .64. In Spain, where people felt more in control over their lives in the early 2010s than ever before, life satisfaction has actually been at its second lowest point (.64) since the early 1980s. In the United Sates, life satisfaction was high during the 1980s and 1990s, even when the feeling of control was not quite as strong. However, since the early 2000s, both life satisfaction and the feeling of control seem to be connected.

Figure 30 shows how satisfied each group is with life in general. The plots look very similar to the ones showing the groups' feelings of control over life (Figure 28), which is why I will not describe it in great detail. I show this figure here because it solidify my point. If you consider overall life satisfaction in Germany (Figure 29), the plot clearly indicates that it has increased since the mid-2000s. But if you consider life satisfaction at the group level, the plot clearly shows that the classes have not become equally more satisfied. Even though overall life satisfaction has increased, members of the lower class are considerably less satisfied today than



Figure 30: Life satisfaction by subjective social class (1981-2020)

members of the other classes. Similarly, in Spain, Sweden and the United States, where overall life satisfaction has decreased, the members of the lower class (and working class) are now considerably less satisfied.

Now, let us look at social movement activity (Figure 31). There is some interesting variation in social movement activity both within and across countries. With the index of social movement activity, I measure the anticipated and practiced participation in elite-challenging action, with a scale range from 0-1. In Argentina, overall social movement activity is rather low. It was highest in the mid- 2000s (.27) but has since leveled off at approximately .25. Australia is among the countries with the highest social movement activity. Recently, it reached its highest level with .55. Similar in Germany, where social movement activity reached a new high in 2017 (.50). Japan saw the highest social movement activity in the late 1990s and early 2000s. After a strong decline in the following years, social movement activity in Japan recently increased again (.31). Like in Germany, social movement activity in Poland was at a record high at the time of last observation. In South Korea, social movement activity has declined by .13 since the early 2000s and now stands at .27. Both Spain and Sweden have also seen a decline in social movement activity. In Spain, social movement activity peaked in the mid-2000s (.34). The following years saw a slight decrease (.31). Similarly, in Spain, social movement activity peaked



Note: Graph shows mean level of social movement activity in population for each country separately. Change shown from the early 1980s to most recently. Empty columns mean no observations for that particular year.

Figure 31: Social movement activity at the country level (1981-2020)

in the early 2000s (.65) and then decreased by about .12 in 2010, when it stood at .52. Sweden is still the country with the highest average social movement activity, though. Americans are also quite active. Like in Sweden, social movement activity peaked there in the early 2000s (.55). After that, it markedly declined until most recently, when social movement activity increased again (.50). In South Africa, social movement activity peaked in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which coincides with the end of Apartheid. The negotiations to end Apartheid in South Africa took place from May 1990 to April 1994, when Nelson Mandela was elected as South Africa's first black president (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). Since then, it has fluctuated, and stood at .22 in 2010.

The combined graph that plots social movement activity at the group level shows the same overall stacked pattern (albeit not as constant across all countries). That is why I do not describe it here in more detail either but instead include it in the Appendix (Figure 5.1.E). To sum up, contrary to what Foa and Mounk (2016, 2017a, 2017b) and others (cf. Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019; Mechkova et al., 2017; Mounk, 2018) in the deconsolidation camp claim, there does not seem to be an overall decline in the cultural basis of democracy in the mature democracies of the West. In fact, depending on the indicators you consider, civic culture even seems to have increased – at least at the country level. It is somewhat disconcerting, though, that civicness seems to depend largely on someone's social background. At the group level, I find a stacked pattern of distribution and evidence which suggests that lower class individuals exhibit generally less civic attitudes and behavior than upper class individuals. There is even evidence suggesting that while overall a country has become more civic, members of the lower classes have become less civic.

Linking Civic Culture and Values

I argue that variation in civic culture is due to socio-cultural polarization, which is the polarization between people with similar social backgrounds over certain values (i.e., ideological polarization between the social classes). However, it seems too easy to ascribe the recent success of right-wing populism and growing anti-democratic tendencies to an overall deterioration of civic culture in the mature democracies of the West when civic culture is not really declining everywhere. In fact, instead of being in decline, civic culture seems to be stronger than ever in some of these countries, or at least some important aspects of civic culture. However, whereas this may be true at the country level, I have shown that this trend may not be true at the group level. In other words, not everyone is equally civic or uncivic. The lower a person's position in the social hierarchy, the less civic that person seems to be. This is why I want to take a closer

look at the relation between civic culture and people's values before I move on to examine country-level socio-cultural polarization. The literature and the preliminary evidence presented in chapters 1-3 suggest that lower class individuals often hold more conservative values. Using the evidence presented in the previous section, I want to find out if the ones with the more conservative values are also the ones that are the least civic. In other words, is there are relationship between how a person views the world and how civic s/he is? I first look at correlational evidence from all countries in my sample to get an idea of the overall effect direction. Then, I examine the evidence in more detail for the selected ten countries.

Table 7 shows correlational evidence for the relationship between people's values and civic culture for all the countries in my sample. Each correlation is based on more than 25.000 observations. The interpretation is pretty straightforward. All but one issue dimension correlate positively with civic culture and the effect is highly significant at the 1% level. It means that I can be 99,9% certain that the more progressive people are, the more civic they seem to be, even though the size of the effects vary. This is true across all countries in the entire sample. The one exception is the intervention vs. deregulation value pair, which correlates negatively with civic culture. The effect is also highly significant at the 1% level. It means that a more progressive attitude towards state intervention is associated with less preference for democracy, trust, community involvement, etc.

To better understand the relationship between people's values and civic culture, I also calculate the correlation effects for the ten countries separately and at three different measurement time points in the 1990s, the 2000s and 2010s, using WVS waves 3, 5 and 7. I want to know whether the observed pattern in Table 7 holds over time and across countries, and, if it does not, I want to know how the correlations change, particularly how the size and strength of the effects change over time. I summarize my findings here; the correlational tables are included in the Appendix (Tables 5.1.D-5.1.L). At first glance, the data seem to confirm the results shown in Table 7: A more progressive attitude towards state intervention is negatively associated with civic culture. This relationship is strongest between deregulation vs. intervention and life satisfaction, and weakest between deregulation vs. intervention and general trust. However, when taking a closer look at the data, I noticed two things. First, over time, the effects become smaller and in some countries they even change direction, in which case more progressive attitudes towards redistribution are associated with more civic-mindedness. Second, the effect loses its

	Civic Culture								
	Democracy Preference	**General Trust**	**Volunteering in Utilitarian Organizations**	**Belonging to Utilitarian Organizations**	**Volunteering in Sociotropic Organizations**	**Belonging to Sociotropic Organizations**	**Life Control**	**Life Satisfaction**	**Social Movement Activity**
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.06***	-0.05***	-0.14***	-0.10***	-0.13***	-0.12***	-0.10***	-0.12***	-0.07***
Security vs. Liberty	0.14***	0.10***	0.07***	0.02***	0.14***	0.13***	0.04***	0.07***	0.23***
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	0.19***	0.18***	0.09***	0.14***	0.09***	0.14***	0.03***	0.05***	0.30***
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.12***	0.17***	0.09***	0.10***	0.05***	0.08***	0.04***	0.07***	0.19***
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	0.07***	0.14***	0.15***	0.17***	0.07***	0.10***	0.03***	0.08***	0.02***
Economy vs. Ecology	0.07***	0.05***	0.02***	-0.03***	0.02***	0.02***	0.05***	0.07***	0.10***
Observations	254370	256439	256259	256259	256253	256253	255867	256675	256002

Table 7: Correlation matrix showing the relationship between the six issue dimensions and civic culture indicators (* p<0.05 **<0.01 *** <0.001)

significance. At the last point of observation, it is almost non-significant everywhere, so there is no relationship any longer.

A few other things that I want to point out: The patriarchalism vs. emancipation issue dimension correlates negatively with volunteering in sociotropic organizations surprisingly often, given that Table 7 indicates a positive relationship. Similarly, the findings indicate a negative relationship between the security vs. liberty issue dimension and life control as well as life satisfaction in some countries. Social movement activity used to be significantly negatively correlated with the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimension in six out of the ten countries, however, that negative effect is only still significant in two countries today. Finally, the correlational evidence does not only suggest that more progressive values are usually associated with more civic-mindedness. Larger and highly significant coefficients also suggest that this association is stronger today than it was 30 years ago, at least for some aspects of civic culture, like preference for democracy, trust in other people and social movement activity.

The correlational evidence presented here so far is not at all conclusive, but I would argue that the most logical inference is that progressive people are, in fact, more civic-minded than conservative people. That would explain why the lower classes seem to be, on average, less civic (cf. Figures 22, 24, 28 and 30), since the underprivileged often have more conservative values (cf. chpt. 3.). To see if this is a valid inference, I group people into their self-reported social classes before I calculate the correlation effects again so that they are not based on individual-level data but group-level data. I plot the data in a graph with the issue dimensions on the x-axis and the civic culture variables on the y-axis. The colored markers represent the different social classes. The country name next to each marker tells me where that particular group is from. Take Figure 32, for example. The light blue markers give me the lower class's mean position on the respective issue dimension and its mean preference for democracy for each of the ten countries. Countries appear multiple times at different times of observation. Figure 32 confirms the previous results insofar as it suggests that on all but one issue dimension (deregulation vs. intervention) a more progressive mean group position (more to the right on the x-axis) is associated with a greater preference for democracy. The correlation coefficients[104] are positive and significant at the 5% level. Given the previous correlation results, the negative relationship between preference for state intervention and preference for democracy is not surprising. A higher mean preference for intervention is associated with a lower mean preference for

[104] Correlations are based on a minimum of 153 observations and a maximum of 202 observations.

democracy. But the coefficient, even though significant, is relatively small. We saw earlier that the relationship has become weaker over time.



Note: Data are from WVS rounds 1 to 7. Graph shows relationship between people's preferences for democracy over autocracy and their values by grouping people into social classes and contrasting the groups' average preference for democracy over autocracy and their mean position on the respecitve issue dimension in ten different countries (Argenina, Australia, Germany, Japan, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and the United States) over the period from the early 1980s to most recently.

Figure 32: The relationship between preference for democracy and people's values

This basic correlation pattern is replicated in all the other combined graphs, not all of which are shown here[105]. However, the relationships are not always very linear. Take a look at this next figure that combines the correlational evidence for volunteering in sociotropic organizations (Figure 33). In at least four of the plots, it would be hard to identify any relationship at all without the fitted line because the markers are so spread out. The very low correlation coefficients confirm that there is almost no correlation between the patriarchalism vs. emancipation and economy vs. ecology dimensions and the average number of active memberships in sociotropic organizations. There must be reasons for the lower average number of active memberships among the members of the lower classes other than values.

[105] You will find those which are not included here in the Appendix (Figures 5.1.O-5.1.T).

The Relationship between Volunteering in Sociotropic Organizations and People's Values



Note: Data are from WVS rounds 1 to 7. Graph shows relationship between people's active memberships in sociotropic organizations and their values by grouping people into social classes and contrasting the group's average number of active membershipsin in sociotropic organizations and their mean position on the respective issue dimension in ten countries (Argenina, Australia, Germany, Japan, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and the United States) over the period from the early 1980s to most recently.

Figure 33: The relationship between active membership in sociotropic organizations and people's values

In stark contrast, the relationships between the value dimensions and the human development variables (life control, life satisfaction and social movement activity) are much more obvious. Take a look at Figure 34, which combines the correlational evidence for life satisfaction. The differently colored markers are clustered really close to each other, especially so in the plot at the top left. The correlation coefficient is negative (-.522) and significant at the 5% level. You can see really well how the majority of the lower class, (the light blue markers), is clustered closely together towards the right of the x-axis and rather towards the bottom of the y-axis, indicating greater preference for intervention and lower life satisfaction. The working class (the cranberry colored markers) are clustered together a little bit to the left of the light blue markers and a little higher on the y-axis, indicating a little less preference for intervention and a little more life satisfaction. The other classes line up perfectly, each a little bit further to the left on the x-axis and higher on the y-axis than the one before.

The Relationship between People's Satisfaction with their Lives and their Values



Note: Data are from WVS rounds 1 to 7. Graph shows relationship between people's satisfaction with their lives and their values by grouping people into social classes and contrasting the groups' average life satisfaction and their mean position on the respective issue dimension in in ten countries (Argenina, Australia, Germany, Japan, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and the United States) over the period from the early 1980s to most recently.

Figure 34: The relationship between life satisfaction and people's values

To sum up the correlational evidence, it seems that overall, more progressive values are associated with greater civic-mindedness at the individual level. This implies that individuals with more progressive attitudes towards a number of conflicting issues are more civic-minded, meaning that they exhibit, on average, more civic attitudes or more civic behavior. There is one notable exception, though. More progressive attitudes on the deregulation vs. state intervention issue dimension are almost always associated with less civic attitudes or less civic behavior. Considering these findings together with the evidence from the group level, it is reasonable to assume that, on average, the more civic-minded individuals belong to the upper social classes and the less civic-minded people belong to the lower social classes.

5.2. Tracking Changes in Socio-Cultural Polarization

I define socio-cultural polarization as the polarization between people with similar social backgrounds over certain issues. The six issue dimensions represent people's beliefs about how the world ought to be. They contrast postmaterialist values, on the one end, which emphasize liberty, diversity and autonomy, and materialist values, on the other end, which prioritize discipline, conformity and authority. With the polarization measure I constructed, I want to capture the interplay between inequality dynamics and people's value orientations. Conceptually, it is

based on the idea that polarization is the result of increasing within-group identification and between-group alienation. In other words, if group identities become stronger, polarization increases because the groups become more distinct. Similarly, if the groups grow ideologically further apart from each other, polarization increases as well. This polarization measure also takes into account within-group inequalities that could potentially decrease polarization. The groups I refer to here are social classes, which divide individuals into groups based on their social and economic status in a population. A high index score means both identification and alienation are high or, in other words, greater polarization. Lower scores mean less polarization.

Table 8 shows each country's polarization index score on the deregulation vs. intervention issue dimension for WVS rounds 3-7. At first glance, it looks like polarization has decreased in most countries. To make it easier to track any change over time, I have prepared a set of figures which plot the index scores for each country by connecting them with straight lines.[106, 107] Figure 35 shows the changes on the deregulation vs. intervention issue dimension. My first impression was right. In most countries, polarization on the deregulation vs. intervention issue dimension has indeed decreased. The steepest drop in polarization has occurred in Germany, where the score was .35 in 1994 and now is .06. South Africa was on a similar trajectory with polarization decreasing from .34 in 1995 to .13 in 2010. In Poland, polarization was also relatively high in the mid-1990s (.30). After decreasing for about 15 years straight, it increased

	Deregulation vs. Intervention				
	1994-1998	**1999-2004**	**2005-2009**	**2010-2014**	**2017-2020**
Argentina	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.16	0.09
Australia	0.10	--	0.15	0.19	0.05
Germany	0.35	--	0.25	0.25	0.06
Japan	0.16	0.14	0.23	0.16	0.10
Poland	0.30	--	0.16	0.18	--
South Africa	0.34	0.3	0.21	0.13	--
South Korea	0.07	--	0.09	0.19	0.03
Spain	0.15	0.08	0.11	0.07	--
Sweden	0.27	--	0.36	0.36	--
United States	0.06	0.11	0.27	0.16	0.05

Table 8: Socio-cultural polarization index scores for the deregulation vs. intervention issue dimension (no observations for WVS rounds 1 and 2)

[106] I include the tables with the index scores for the other dimensions in the Appendix (Tables 5.2.A-5.2.E).
[107] For the sake of completeness, I also include the line plots for objective class polarization in the Appendix (Figures 5.2.A-5.2.F)

again in 2010 (.18). In Japan and the United States, polarization was strongest in the mid-2000s but has since fallen. In fact, there has never been less polarization over the issue of redistribution in either of these two countries. Likewise, in Argentina, Australia and South Korea, polarization is at an historic low. Spain had the overall lowest polarization rate over the years (at least until 2010). Only in Sweden has polarization on this issue dimension increased, from .27 in 1994 to .36 in 2010.



Figure 35: Socio-cultural polarization on the deregulation vs. intervention issue dimension in the period from 1994-2020

Next, I look at social class polarization on the patriarchalism vs. emancipation issue dimension. Figure 36 shows that in some countries, polarization on the patriarchalism vs. emancipation issue dimension has recently been increasing. For example, in Argentina, the polarization score was .12 in the mid-1990s and is now .15. In Australia, polarization has decreased by .09 points since 2010, but Australia still has one of the highest polarization scores (.14). Only in Poland (.26) was polarization higher in 2010 than in Australia. Currently, it is highest in Germany (.21), where it has increased by .10 points since 2010. Like Poland, South Africa was on a rising trajectory in 2010. Polarization had never been greater (.10) there before. In Japan, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and the United States, polarization over issues like abortion, divorce and homosexuality has been decreasing. It is currently lowest in Japan (.02).



Figure 36: Socio-cultural polarization on the patriarchalism vs. emancipation issue dimension in the period from 1994-2020

To sum up, Figure 35 tells us that in most countries, people across different social and economic backgrounds have never been more in agreement about issues of state intervention. Figure 36 tells us that in some countries, polarization over issues like abortion, divorce and homosexuality, has recently been rising. That is important information, but neither figure tells us anything about the classes' positions on the issue dimensions. Given the general emancipatory trend in post-industrial societies, I would assume a predominant shift across all social classes from deregulation to intervention and from patriarchalism to emancipation. As it turns out, this is true for most but not all countries.

Figure 37 should look familiar. Even though the graphs do not accurately depict socio-cultural polarization (because they include no information on within-group identification only between-group alienation), they do show the shift in the different group's mean attitudes over time[108], here specifically on the deregulation vs. intervention and patriarchalism vs. emancipation issue dimensions. As you can see, in Argentina, Australia, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the United States, the predominant shift has in fact been from deregulation to intervention and from patriarchalism to emancipation. The arrows point to the right and also upwards. In Japan and South

[108] The plots show the overall long-term trend and ignore potential short-term developments.

Korea, the predominant shift has been from patriarchalism to emancipation and from intervention to deregulation. The arrows point upwards, but to the left and not to the right as in the other plots. In South Africa, the social classes have all moved towards greater emancipation. On the deregulation vs. intervention issue dimension, they have converged somewhere in the middle,



Note: Arrows show shift from where to where the social classes have moved over the period from 1994 to 2010 (Poland, South Africa, Spain, Sweden) and from 1995 to 2017 (Argentina, Australia, Germany, Japan, South Korea, United States), respectively. The social classes are depicted by the round markers whose size refelcts the share of the respective class in the population. The numbers indicate the size of the respective social class in percent of the total population. Upper class is not shown, because of small size (≤1%).

Figure 37: Ideological polarization between the social classes in democracies around the world in the period from 1994 to 2017

but coming from different directions. The lower classes have moved more towards greater deregulation in South Africa and the upper classes more towards greater intervention. In Germany,

the predominant shift has been towards more deregulation and toward more emancipation, but the pattern is not as clear as in the other countries.

Let us look at social class polarization on the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimension next (Figure 38). Most notably, class polarization on this dimension has increased in almost all countries since 2010. In fact, in Argentina, Australia, South Korea, and the United States, the classes' attitudes towards the country's elites have never been more divergent than today. The United States have seen the greatest increase from .06 in the mid-1990s to .20 today. In Germany and Japan, polarization was highest in the 2005; even though both countries saw a decline in polarization in 2010, it has recently grown again. Sweden was on a similar trajectory. Polarization



Note: Graph shows changes in socio-cultural polarization over the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimension since the mid-1990s. A gap in the line means that there are no observations for that particular year.

Figure 38: Socio-cultural polarization on the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimension in the period from 1994-2020

on the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimension was lowest there in 2005 (.11), but the country saw a steep rise in polarization between then and 2010 (+14). In contrast, Spain saw a .01 decline in that same time period. South Africa saw the most marked decline in polarization on the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimension, falling from .33 in the mid-1990s to .05 in 2010. In Poland, class polarization was already low in the mid-1990s (.09), but it fell by another .04 points between then and 2010 (.05).



Figure 39: Socio-cultural polarization on the nativism vs. cosmopolitanism issue dimension in the period from 1994-2020

Let us look at the nativism vs. cosmopolitanism issue dimension (Figure 39). Germany's polarization score was notably high in 1994 (.27). It has since decreased but it is still relatively high (.17) compared to the other country's polarization scores. The only country with a similar polarization score is Australia (.18), where it has increased by .07 points since 2005. In the United States, social class polarization over issues of immigration has also increased in recent years, albeit only slightly. Polarization was at its lowest there in 1999 with a score of .07; now the score is .09. Overall, polarization has decreased in America since the mid-1990s (-.03). In Argentina, polarization on the nativism vs. cosmopolitanism issue dimension was highest in 1999 (.16). It has since decreased and is now at a historic low (.03). Likewise, in Japan and South Korea, polarization was highest in 2005 when both countries had a polarization score of .12. Since then, polarization has decreased by .04 and .06 points, respectively. For Spain and Sweden, I can report only that polarization was on a rising trajectory up until 2005. Similarly, for Poland and South Africa, I can report only that polarization was on a falling trajectory up until 2005.



Note: Arrows show shift from where to where the social classes have moved over the period from 1994 to 2005 (Poland, South Africa, Spain, Sweden) and from 1995 to 2017 (Argentina, Australia, Germany, Japan, South Korea, United States), respectively. The social classes are depicted by the round markers whose size refelcts the share of the respective class in the population. The numbers indicate the size of the respective social class in percent of the total population. Upper class is not shown, because of small size (≤1%).

Figure 40: Socio-cultural polarization around the world in the period from 1994 to 2017

Again, Figure 40 gives you some context to the socio-cultural polarization scores I just reported. For example, the polarization scores for the United States suggest that class polarization on the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimension has increased, while it has decreased slightly on the nativism vs. cosmopolitanism issue dimension. It you take a look at the plot at the bottom left of Figure 40, you see that the arrows point to the left, which indicates a shift towards greater anti-establishment attitudes across the social classes, but the gaps between the markers on the x-axis are now much wider than they were before. The lower classes are now considerably more anti-establishment in their attitudes than the upper classes. The opposite is true for the markers on the y-axis. The ideological difference between the classes is now much smaller. It is more

difficult to discern an overall trend with these two dimensions compared to the previous ones. At first glance, all ten plots seem chaotic. But I would still argue that the overall direction of change is towards greater emancipation because in most countries, the arrows point in the post-materialist direction on at least one of the two issue dimensions.

Let us now turn to class polarization on the economy vs. ecology issue dimension (Figure 41). It has notably decreased in all but two countries, Australia and Germany. There, class polarization over issues concerning the environment and economic growth has never been higher. In Australia, polarization was .05 in 1995 and is now .12. In Germany, the polarization score was .13 in 1995 and is now .15. In the United States, polarization was lowest in the late 2000s (.01). Since then, polarization has risen a little bit (.02). In South Korea, polarization has steadily fallen since the mid-1990s and has never been lower (.05). In Japan, class polarization on the economy vs. ecology issue dimension was lowest in 2005 (.02). It rose to a historic high in 2010 (.07) and is now almost as low again as it was before (.03). Poland, South Africa, Spain and Sweden were all on a downward trajectory in 2010 when they were last surveyed.



Figure 41: Socio-cultural polarization on the economy vs. ecology issue dimension in the period from 1994-2020

Finally, let us take a look at polarization on the security vs. liberty issue dimension (Figure 42). In the mid-1990s, Germany (.17) was the most polarized country, followed by Spain (.14). In Germany, polarization was at its lowest (.06) in 2010 but has since risen by .03 points. In Spain,

polarization was at its lowest in the mid-2000s (.03). It was on a rising trajectory in 2010 (.05). In Argentina, class polarization on this issue dimension was highest in the early 2000s (.18). It fell until 2010 (.05) and then started to rise again. The country's polarization score now is .06. Australia is now more polarized over these issues than ever before (.10). Polarization has also never been higher in Japan (.13). In Japan, polarization increased by .08 points between 2010 (when polarization was at its lowest) and 2017. In Poland and South Africa, polarization was relatively stable until 2010. South Korea was most polarized in 2010 (.11). Since then, polarization has fallen by .04 points. Sweden was not very polarized in the early 2000s (.03) but then saw a continuous rise in polarization up until 2010 (.11). The United States was most polarized on this issue dimension in the early 2000s (.10). Today, it is about as polarized as it was back in the mid-1990s (.05).



Figure 42: Socio-cultural polarization on the security vs. liberty issue dimension in the period from 1994-2020

Figure 43 shows again how we can understand the socio-cultural polarization scores. For example, in Germany, class polarization on the economy vs. ecology dimension has risen (Figure 41). If you take a closer look at the plot at the top right of Figure 43, you see that the social classes have moved in the direction of postmaterialism on both issue dimensions by moving towards greater liberty and ecology. But they have done so at different speeds, which is one possible reason for the rise in polarization.



Note: Arrows show shift from where to where the social classes have moved over the period from 1994 to 2010 (Poland, South Africa, Spain, Sweden) and from 1995 to 2017 (Argentina, Australia, Germany, Japan, South Korea, United States), respectively. The social classes are depicted by the round markers whose size refelcts the share of the respective class in the population. The numbers indicate the size of the respective social class in percent of the total population. Upper class is not shown, because of small size (≤1%).

Figure 43: Socio-cultural polarization around the world in the period from 1994 to 2017

To sum up, it seems that some issues hold more potential for social class conflict than others. Class polarization has mostly decreased on the deregulation vs. intervention and economy vs. ecology issue dimensions, indicating that in a majority of countries, the social classes are very much in agreement about issues concerning state intervention as well as the environment and economic growth, respectively. In contrast, class polarization on the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimension has recently increased in many countries, indicating that the classes' attitudes towards authority have diverged. The results also suggest that the issue dimensions also do not seem to hold the same potential for social class conflict in every country. Class polarization on

the patriarchalism vs. emancipation and nativism vs. cosmopolitanism issue dimensions has decreased in most countries recently but also increased in some. Similarly, class polarization on the security vs. liberty issue dimension has risen in most countries but also fallen in others. Figures 37, 40 and 43 confirm what Figure 19 (p. 90) already suggested: The predominant shift across all countries has, in fact, been towards more liberal (i.e., postmaterialist) values. But it looks like this shift is more consistent on some issue dimension than on others, most notably so on the deregulation vs. intervention dimension. It has been least consistent on the anti- vs. pro-establishment and economy vs. ecology issue dimensions.

5.3. Socio-Cultural Polarization and Civic Culture

Does socio-cultural polarization explain changes in civic culture? I run both a multivariate OLS regression with robust standard errors and multivariate regression with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) to answer this question. By including wave dummies in both my models, I control for time-specific fixed effects. The two models estimate identical regression coefficients, but the PCSE model accounts for the greater inaccuracy and uncertainty of TSCS data with higher standard errors. Therefore, I only report the results of the PCSE regressions here to save space and include the results of the OLS regressions in the Appendix (Tables 5.3.A-5.3.I). Each aspect of the dependent variable civic culture is regressed on socio-cultural polarization and the identified control variables. To check the robustness of the results, I run a second set of regression using a version of the socio-cultural polarization measure that is based on objective social class instead of self-reported social class membership.

Let us first take a look at the results of the regression analysis testing if socio-cultural polarization significantly predicts preference for democracy (Table 9). I find that only class polarization on the anti- vs. pro-establishment and economy vs. ecology issue dimensions are statistically significant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. Holding all other variables constant, class polarization on the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimension significantly increases preference for democracy. Specifically, a one-point increase in class polarization on that dimension increases preference for democracy by .23 ($p<0.05$). Similarly, if class polarization on the economy vs. ecology issue dimension increases by one point, it increases preference for democracy by .29 ($p<0.1$). These results somewhat contradict Foa and Mounk's claim that people no longer see democracy as the legitimate form of government. Instead of questioning democracy, they demand more of it when times are hard. It is also notable that experience with democracy and a participatory democratic environment are stable predictors of democratic preference. Both a

longer democratic tradition and a more participatory culture increase the preference for democracy significantly (p<0.01).

	Democracy Preference					
	PCSE Model					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	0.04 (0.084)					
Security vs. Liberty		-0.16 (0.184)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			0.04 (0.099)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				0.21 (0.133)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					0.23** (0.105)	
Economy vs. Ecology						0.29* (0.151)
Human Development	0.18* (0.104)	0.20** (0.100)	0.19* (0.107)	0.21** (0.100)	0.18 (0.125)	0.19* (0.106)
Democratic Tradition	0.08*** (0.023)	0.08*** (0.023)	0.08*** (0.023)	0.09*** (0.026)	0.07*** (0.026)	0.09*** (0.024)
Participatory Culture	0.19*** (0.055)	0.19*** (0.054)	0.20*** (0.054)	0.16*** (0.063)	0.17*** (0.057)	0.19*** (0.053)
Constant	0.41*** (0.069)	0.42*** (0.071)	0.40*** (0.068)	0.38*** (0.069)	0.41*** (0.076)	0.39*** (0.069)
Observations	129	129	127	98	114	128
R-squared	0.46	0.47	0.47	0.53	0.48	0.49
Countries	42	42	42	41	42	42
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 9: Table shows PCSE estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Trust also seems to increase when socio-cultural polarization rises (Table 10). Specifically, class polarization on the deregulation vs. intervention, patriarchalism vs. emancipation and anti- vs. pro- establishment issue dimensions significantly predict trust. If class polarization over issues of state intervention rises by one point, trust increases by .52 (p<0.01); if class polarization over issues of abortion, divorce or homosexuality rises by one point, trust increases by .40 (p<0.05); and if class polarization over issues of authority rises by one point, trust increases by .66 (p<0.01). As general trust is said to be the basis of trust, reciprocity and social connectedness in general, this is actually good news. Whereas a participatory democratic culture is a

stable predictor of democratic preference, it is not a stable predictor of trust. Instead, human development is. Modernization changes people's mindsets and makes them more trusting and cooperative through education and also by increasing financial security. Similarly, a longer democratic tradition with a functioning rule of law system instills a sense of community in people and reduces the risk of cooperation (cf. Delhey et al., 2011).

	General Trust					
	PCSE Model					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	0.52***					
	(0.131)					
Security vs. Liberty		0.27				
		(0.312)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			0.40**			
			(0.170)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				0.12		
				(0.195)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					0.66***	
					(0.249)	
Economy vs. Ecology						0.01
						(0.301)
Human Development	0.58***	0.65***	0.59***	0.56***	0.73***	0.66***
	(0.155)	(0.170)	(0.169)	(0.212)	(0.184)	(0.173)
Democratic Tradition	0.25***	0.26***	0.26***	0.25***	0.20***	0.26***
	(0.044)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.050)
Participatory Culture	0.01	0.04	0.05	0.05	-0.01	0.03
	(0.082)	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.100)	(0.086)	(0.090)
Constant	-0.39***	-0.38***	-0.36***	-0.30**	-0.43***	-0.36***
	(0.093)	(0.106)	(0.100)	(0.124)	(0.108)	(0.104)
Observations	129	129	127	98	114	128
R-squared	0.57	0.54	0.55	0.52	0.62	0.54
Countries	42	42	42	41	42	42
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 10: Table shows PCSE estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results of the regression analyses testing if socio-cultural polarization significantly predicts membership in utilitarian organizations like political parties, labor unions and professional associations are somewhat interesting (Table 11). The results suggest that a one-point increase in class polarization on the deregulation vs. intervention issue dimension decreases the share of the population that is an active member in at least one of those organizations by 15% (p<0.1).

Conversely, passive membership in utilitarian organizations increases by 43% (p<0.01) when class polarization on the deregulation vs. intervention issue dimension rises. A one-point increase in class polarization on the security vs. liberty issue dimension even shrinks the share of active members in utilitarian organizations by 36% (p<0.5). A one-point rise in class polarization on the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimension reduces the share of the population that volunteers in at least one utilitarian organization by 21% (p<0.1), but it increases passive membership by 43% (p<0.1).

Whereas a rise in class polarization on the deregulation vs. intervention, security vs. liberty and anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimensions negatively predicts volunteering in utilitarian organizations, a one-point increase in class polarization on the patriarchalism vs. emancipation issue dimension increases active membership in utilitarian organization by 18% (p<0.1). It seems that polarization over issues like abortion, divorce and homosexuality motivate people to join specific-interest groups. Arguably, issues that concern group conformity often involve peoples' moral values over which compromise threatens people's core identities. Research has shown that the dismissal of diverging attitudes and the consequent negative reactions are especially strong when it comes to high moral convictions (cf. Skitka et al., 2005), which could explain why a rise in class polarization over these specific issues mobilizes people much more than increasing class polarization on the other issue dimensions does.

Interestingly, human development negatively predicts both active and passive membership in utilitarian organizations, but that negative influence is much stronger on volunteering than on belonging. A longer democratic tradition positively influences both active and passive membership in organizations. The relationship is highly significant (p<0.01). The same is true for both volunteering in and belonging to sociotropic organizations (Table 12). In fact, democratic tradition is the most powerful predictor of active and passive membership in sociotropic organizations like environmental, cultural or charity organizations. Class polarization only significantly predicts active deregulation vs. intervention issue dimension. A one-point increase in class polarization is associated with a 44% (p<0.05) decrease in the share of the population that is an active member in at least one sociotropic organization.

	Volunteering in Utilitarian Organizations						Belonging to Utilitarian Organizations					
	PCSE Model						PCSE Model					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.15*						0.43***					
	(0.080)						(0.145)					
Security vs. Liberty		-0.36**						-0.34				
		(0.164)						(0.276)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			0.18*						0.26			
			(0.096)						(0.158)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				0.00						-0.09		
				(0.123)						(0.182)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					-0.21*						0.43*	
					(0.113)						(0.223)	
Economy vs. Ecology						-0.12						-0.21
						(0.165)						(0.262)
Human Development	-0.24***	-0.25***	-0.30***	-0.25**	-0.26***	-0.27***	-0.41*	-0.30	-0.38*	-0.28	-0.34*	-0.32
	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.093)	(0.110)	(0.093)	(0.089)	(0.224)	(0.201)	(0.211)	(0.264)	(0.199)	(0.206)
Democratic Tradition	0.20***	0.19***	0.21***	0.21***	0.22***	0.20***	0.36***	0.34***	0.36***	0.35***	0.30***	0.35***
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.057)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Participatory Culture	0.06	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.05	-0.06	-0.07	-0.04	-0.10	-0.04	-0.05
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.072)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.094)	(0.103)	(0.097)	(0.123)	(0.099)	(0.102)
Constant	0.22***	0.25***	0.23***	0.22***	0.22***	0.23***	0.31**	0.36***	0.35***	0.34**	0.32***	0.36***
	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.062)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.127)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.158)	(0.116)	(0.119)
Observations	115	114	113	83	115	113	115	114	113	83	115	113
R-squared	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.37	0.39	0.37	0.45	0.42	0.42	0.40	0.42	0.41
Countries	42	42	42	41	42	42	42	42	42	41	42	42
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 11: Table shows PCSE estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

	Volunteering in Sociotropic Organizations						Belonging to Sociotropic Organizations					
	PCSE Model						PCSE Model					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.44**						-0.02					
	(0.189)						(0.194)					
Security vs. Liberty		-0.74						-0.54				
		(0.452)						(0.373)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			-0.07						-0.09			
			(0.267)						(0.258)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				-0.33						-0.34		
				(0.305)						(0.307)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					-0.22						0.14	
					(0.304)						(0.241)	
Economy vs. Ecology						-0.25						-0.27
						(0.413)						(0.375)
Human Development	-0.69**	-0.73**	-0.79**	-0.70*	-0.77**	-0.77**	-0.31	-0.29	-0.35	-0.25	-0.33	-0.31
	(0.328)	(0.321)	(0.350)	(0.372)	(0.339)	(0.331)	(0.245)	(0.228)	(0.249)	(0.292)	(0.234)	(0.236)
Democratic Tradition	0.40***	0.38***	0.42***	0.39***	0.43***	0.40***	0.35***	0.34***	0.36***	0.33***	0.34***	0.35***
	(0.067)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.084)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.077)	(0.061)	(0.062)
Participatory Culture	0.37**	0.33*	0.32*	0.36*	0.35**	0.36**	0.18	0.14	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.17
	(0.178)	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.196)	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.151)	(0.153)	(0.151)	(0.181)	(0.151)	(0.153)
Constant	0.57***	0.60***	0.60***	0.54**	0.56***	0.57***	0.35***	0.40***	0.40***	0.35**	0.35***	0.38***
	(0.183)	(0.192)	(0.194)	(0.217)	(0.194)	(0.190)	(0.131)	(0.134)	(0.130)	(0.162)	(0.130)	(0.132)
Observations	114	113	112	82	114	112	114	113	112	82	114	112
R-squared	0.33	0.32	0.31	0.33	0.31	0.30	0.30	0.32	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.31
Countries	42	42	42	41	42	42	42	42	42	41	42	42
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 12: Table shows PCSE estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Looking at the results of the regression analyses testing if socio-cultural polarization predicts how much people feel in control over their lives (Table 13), I find that an increase in class polarization on either the deregulation vs. intervention or anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimensions is a powerful predictor of people's feeling of control over their lives at the country level. The estimated regression coefficients are both highly significant (p<0.01). With a one-point increase in class polarization on the deregulation vs. intervention issue dimension, the overall feeling of control decreases by .27. When class polarization on the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue rises by one point, the feeling of control decreases by .33. What is notable, though, is that these six regression models seem to explain far less variance in the dependent variable than the others.

	Life Control					
	PCSE Model					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.27*** (0.087)					
Security vs. Liberty		-0.09 (0.202)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			0.11 (0.154)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				-0.10 (0.159)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					-0.33*** (0.116)	
Economy vs. Ecology						-0.21 (0.192)
Human Development	-0.06 (0.094)	-0.08 (0.100)	-0.12 (0.114)	-0.05 (0.121)	-0.17* (0.098)	-0.08 (0.096)
Democratic Tradition	0.06* (0.031)	0.05 (0.034)	0.07** (0.033)	0.04 (0.039)	0.12*** (0.033)	0.05 (0.032)
Participatory Culture	0.17** (0.070)	0.17** (0.071)	0.12* (0.066)	0.19** (0.082)	0.16** (0.070)	0.18** (0.072)
Constant	0.62*** (0.053)	0.59*** (0.056)	0.63*** (0.060)	0.56*** (0.066)	0.66*** (0.056)	0.60*** (0.055)
Observations	128	128	126	97	113	127
R-squared	0.22	0.19	0.15	0.21	0.26	0.19
Countries	42	42	42	41	42	42
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 13: Table shows PCSE estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Socio-cultural polarization is also a powerful predictor of how satisfied people are with their lives (Table 14). Democratic tradition and a participatory culture both have a positive influence on peoples' life satisfaction, a one-point increase in class polarization on the deregulation vs. intervention issue dimension decreases life satisfaction at the country level by .38 (p<0.01). A one-point increase on the nativism vs. cosmopolitanism issue dimension also decreases life satisfaction at the country level by .38 (p<0.05). Increasing class polarization on the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimension decreases life satisfaction by .44 (p<0.01) and a rise in class polarization on the economy vs. ecology issue dimension decreases life satisfaction by .45 (p<0.05).

	Life Satisfaction					
	PCSE Model					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.38*** (0.090)					
Security vs. Liberty		-0.07 (0.257)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			-0.09 (0.173)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				-0.38** (0.183)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					-0.44*** (0.143)	
Economy vs. Ecology						-0.45** (0.199)
Human Development	0.08 (0.103)	0.04 (0.109)	0.05 (0.116)	0.10 (0.131)	-0.05 (0.110)	0.04 (0.101)
Democratic Tradition	0.10*** (0.032)	0.10*** (0.036)	0.11*** (0.036)	0.07* (0.044)	0.19*** (0.036)	0.09*** (0.034)
Participatory Culture	0.25*** (0.086)	0.24*** (0.087)	0.21** (0.093)	0.31*** (0.099)	0.23*** (0.086)	0.26*** (0.088)
Constant	0.46*** (0.059)	0.41*** (0.061)	0.43*** (0.065)	0.38*** (0.072)	0.49*** (0.064)	0.44*** (0.060)
Observations	129	129	127	98	114	128
R-squared	0.39	0.35	0.32	0.42	0.41	0.37
Countries	42	42	42	41	42	42
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 14: Table shows PCSE estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results of the regression analysis testing if socio-cultural polarization predicts social movement activity show that the only significant ($p<0.05$) regression estimation coefficient is class polarization on the patriarchalism vs. emancipation issue dimension (Table 15). A one-point increase in polarization increases social movement activity in a country by .26. It is not at all surprising given how personal the issues at the heart of this dimension are. In a way, this result corresponds with the positive relationship between class polarization on the patriarchalism vs. emancipation issue dimension and volunteering in utilitarian organizations.

	Social Movement Activity					
	PCSE Model					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	0.03 (0.082)					
Security vs. Liberty		-0.12 (0.165)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			0.26** (0.102)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				0.10 (0.145)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					-0.14 (0.102)	
Economy vs. Ecology						-0.04 (0.168)
Human Development	0.36*** (0.080)	0.39*** (0.085)	0.35*** (0.082)	0.37*** (0.099)	0.40*** (0.090)	0.38*** (0.083)
Democratic Tradition	0.27*** (0.025)	0.27*** (0.026)	0.28*** (0.025)	0.29*** (0.028)	0.27*** (0.028)	0.27*** (0.025)
Participatory Culture	0.12* (0.070)	0.12* (0.070)	0.13* (0.070)	0.09 (0.081)	0.11 (0.073)	0.12* (0.071)
Constant	-0.16*** (0.043)	-0.16*** (0.045)	-0.18*** (0.041)	-0.16*** (0.053)	-0.16*** (0.047)	-0.17*** (0.046)
Observations	130	130	128	99	115	129
R-squared	0.74	0.74	0.75	0.73	0.73	0.74
Countries	42	42	42	41	42	42
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 15: Table shows PCSE estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Robustness Check

To check the robustness of my results, I ran a second set of regression that uses a different version of the socio-cultural polarization measure; one that is calculated with an objective social class measure based on respondents' education and income instead of self-reported social class (hereafter: objective class polarization). The results are reported in this section[109]. Table 16 shows the results of the regression analysis testing if objective class polarization at the country level significantly predicts a society's preference for democracy. I find that objective class

	Democracy Preference					
	PCSE Model					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.03 (0.059)					
Security vs. Liberty		0.02 (0.056)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			-0.02 (0.051)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				0.04 (0.065)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					0.03 (0.056)	
Economy vs. Ecology						0.07 (0.059)
Human Development	0.18* (0.102)	0.17 (0.103)	0.18* (0.103)	0.21** (0.102)	0.16 (0.130)	0.16 (0.105)
Democratic Tradition	0.10*** (0.023)	0.10*** (0.023)	0.09*** (0.023)	0.09*** (0.027)	0.10*** (0.025)	0.09*** (0.023)
Participatory Culture	0.17*** (0.054)	0.18*** (0.056)	0.18*** (0.055)	0.15** (0.062)	0.16*** (0.059)	0.19*** (0.055)
Constant	0.43*** (0.065)	0.43*** (0.065)	0.42*** (0.064)	0.41*** (0.063)	0.43*** (0.079)	0.43*** (0.064)
Observations	128	128	127	96	112	128
R-squared	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.53	0.46	0.48
Countries	43	43	43	42	42	43
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 16: Table shows PCSE estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[109] You can find the results of the OLS regressions in the Appendix (Tables 5.3.J-5.3.R).

polarization has no effect on preference for democracy on any of the dimensions. In contrast, polarization calculated based on the subjective social class measure had a significantly positive effect on preference for democracy on the anti- vs. pro-establishment and economy vs. ecology issue dimensions. The results suggest that the most robust predictors of preference for democracy are in fact experience with democracy and a participatory democratic environment. Both a longer democratic tradition and a more participatory culture increase the preference for democracy significantly ($p<0.01$).

	General Trust					
	PCSE Model					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	0.12 (0.104)					
Security vs. Liberty		0.06 (0.108)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			0.10 (0.071)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				0.05 (0.153)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					0.21** (0.087)	
Economy vs. Ecology						0.05 (0.115)
Human Development	0.58*** (0.159)	0.60*** (0.156)	0.57*** (0.156)	0.53** (0.206)	0.74*** (0.172)	0.63*** (0.168)
Democratic Tradition	0.26*** (0.046)	0.27*** (0.046)	0.26*** (0.045)	0.24*** (0.053)	0.24*** (0.046)	0.25*** (0.047)
Participatory Culture	0.07 (0.091)	0.04 (0.090)	0.06 (0.092)	0.06 (0.110)	0.05 (0.095)	0.04 (0.095)
Constant	-0.24** (0.097)	-0.25*** (0.095)	-0.23** (0.095)	-0.26** (0.116)	-0.13 (0.164)	-0.33*** (0.097)
Observations	133	133	132	96	113	128
R-squared	0.52	0.53	0.53	0.52	0.60	0.54
Countries	43	43	43	42	42	43
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 17: Table shows PCSE estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

The regression results reported in the previous section indicated that trust increases significantly when class polarization on the deregulation vs. intervention, patriarchalism vs. emancipation

and anti- vs. pro- establishment issue dimensions rises. Using objective class polarization in the regression instead, I find that only polarization on the anti- vs. pro- establishment issue dimension significantly predicts trust (Table 17). Specifically, if class polarization on the anti- vs. pro- establishment issue dimension rises by one point, trust increases by .21 (p<0.05). The most reliable predictors of trust seem to be modernization and a longer democratic tradition.

Testing the relationship between objective class polarization and membership in utilitarian organizations, I find that volunteering in utilitarian organizations (active membership in organizations like political parties, labor unions and professional associations) increases when class polarization rises (Table 18). Specifically, a one-point increase in objective class polarization on the patriarchalism vs. emancipation issue dimension increases the share of the population that is an active member in at least one utilitarian organization by 10% (p<0.1); a one-point rise in objective class polarization on the nativism vs. cosmopolitanism and economy vs. ecology issue dimensions increases the share of the population that volunteers in at least one utilitarian organization by 13% (p<0.1) and 11% (p<0.1), respectively. The share of the population that belongs to at least one utilitarian organization also increases with greater objective class polarization. The increase is highly significant (p<0.01) when objective class polarization rises on the patriarchalism vs. emancipation (+22%) and anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimensions (+35%). A rise in objective class polarization on the nativism vs. cosmopolitanism and deregulation vs. intervention issue dimensions also increases passive membership in utilitarian organizations by 28% (p<0.05) and 17% (p<0.1), respectively.

Volunteering in and belonging to sociotropic organization (religious organizations, sport and recreational organizations or educational organizations) also increases when objective class polarization is greater (Table 19). A one-point rise in objective class polarization on the security vs. liberty issue dimension increases the share of the population that is an active member in at least one sociotropic organization by 31% (p<0.05). Interestingly, greater objective class polarization on all issue dimensions significantly increases passive membership rates. A one-point increase in polarization on any of the six issue dimension increases the share of the population that belongs to at least one sociotropic organization by at least 22%. By far the greatest increase (50%) causes objective class polarization on the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimension (p<0.01). In the previous section, the results suggested that socio-cultural polarization did not have an effect on passive membership shares at all.

	Volunteering in Utilitarian Organizations						Belonging to Utilitarian Organizations					
	PCSE Model						PCSE Model					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.01						0.17*					
	(0.049)						(0.098)					
Security vs. Liberty		0.08						0.11				
		(0.059)						(0.106)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			0.10***						0.22***			
			(0.037)						(0.082)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				0.13*						0.28**		
				(0.075)						(0.113)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					0.07						0.35***	
					(0.053)						(0.115)	
Economy vs. Ecology						0.11*						0.18
						(0.063)						(0.126)
Human Development	-0.25***	-0.29***	-0.31***	-0.28**	-0.28***	-0.28***	-0.35*	-0.37*	-0.44**	-0.42	-0.42**	-0.37*
	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.113)	(0.094)	(0.091)	(0.205)	(0.205)	(0.208)	(0.269)	(0.205)	(0.208)
Democratic Tradition	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***	0.19***	0.19***	0.34***	0.35***	0.34***	0.35***	0.32***	0.34***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.057)	(0.044)	(0.047)
Participatory Culture	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.02	0.06	0.05	0.01	-0.05	0.02	-0.08	0.07	-0.02
	(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.080)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.102)	(0.105)	(0.101)	(0.125)	(0.105)	(0.103)
Constant	0.22***	0.23***	0.23***	0.23***	0.22***	0.23***	0.30**	0.36***	0.36***	0.40**	0.33***	0.35***
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.062)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.122)	(0.159)	(0.118)	(0.123)
Observations	112	111	111	79	113	111	112	111	111	79	113	111
R-squared	0.35	0.36	0.37	0.37	0.35	0.36	0.41	0.42	0.43	0.45	0.44	0.41
Countries	42	42	42	41	42	42	42	42	42	41	42	42
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 18: Table shows PCSE estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

	Volunteering in Sociotropic Organizations						Belonging to Sociotropic Organizations					
	PCSE Model						PCSE Model					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.02						0.22**					
	(0.132)						(0.110)					
Security vs. Liberty		0.31**						0.41***				
		(0.128)						(0.126)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			0.13						0.31***			
			(0.096)						(0.092)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				0.05						0.39**		
				(0.177)						(0.174)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					0.10						0.50***	
					(0.123)						(0.129)	
Economy vs. Ecology						0.24						0.34**
						(0.149)						(0.137)
Human Development	-0.74**	-0.82**	-0.81**	-0.73*	-0.77**	-0.78**	-0.35	-0.42*	-0.47**	-0.43	-0.45*	-0.37
	(0.335)	(0.331)	(0.351)	(0.394)	(0.345)	(0.336)	(0.231)	(0.227)	(0.235)	(0.293)	(0.229)	(0.234)
Democratic Tradition	0.38***	0.38***	0.40***	0.38***	0.38***	0.37***	0.34***	0.34***	0.35***	0.32***	0.32***	0.33***
	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.090)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.079)	(0.059)	(0.063)
Participatory Culture	0.34*	0.41**	0.34*	0.33	0.36*	0.39**	0.21	0.24	0.22	0.22	0.30*	0.21
	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.192)	(0.225)	(0.198)	(0.193)	(0.155)	(0.158)	(0.150)	(0.188)	(0.159)	(0.157)
Constant	0.57***	0.54***	0.59***	0.55**	0.56***	0.55***	0.33**	0.36***	0.42***	0.40**	0.36***	0.37***
	(0.194)	(0.197)	(0.198)	(0.226)	(0.191)	(0.193)	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.131)	(0.166)	(0.126)	(0.133)
Observations	111	110	110	78	112	110	111	110	110	78	112	110
R-squared	0.28	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.29	0.32	0.36	0.36	0.34	0.38	0.33
Countries	42	42	42	41	42	42	42	42	42	41	42	42
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 19: Table shows PCSE estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In contrast to the results reported in the previous section, objective class polarization does not seem to reduce the feeling life control at the country level (Table 20). On the contrary, a one-point rise in objective class polarization on the security vs. liberty issue dimension apparently increases people's feeling of control by .16 (p<0.01). The low R-squared values indicate that the independent variables, including objective class polarization on the security vs. liberty issue dimension, only explain between 10% and 19% of the variation in life control (regardless of their significance). That amount is even less than the models in the previous section explained of the variation in life control.

	Life Control					
	PCSE Model					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.09 (0.058)					
Security vs. Liberty		0.16*** (0.058)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			0.00 (0.044)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				0.01 (0.079)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					-0.01 (0.057)	
Economy vs. Ecology						0.06 (0.074)
Human Development	-0.01 (0.089)	-0.06 (0.090)	-0.05 (0.096)	-0.05 (0.124)	-0.18* (0.098)	-0.10 (0.101)
Democratic Tradition	0.05 (0.032)	0.03 (0.032)	0.05* (0.032)	0.04 (0.040)	0.08** (0.034)	0.04 (0.034)
Participatory Culture	0.09 (0.072)	0.17** (0.068)	0.08 (0.064)	0.19** (0.091)	0.14* (0.080)	0.17** (0.078)
Constant	0.63*** (0.053)	0.63*** (0.052)	0.65*** (0.057)	0.56*** (0.066)	0.56*** (0.080)	0.60*** (0.056)
Observations	131	131	130	95	112	127
R-squared	0.14	0.18	0.10	0.18	0.19	0.15
Countries	43	43	43	42	42	43
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table20: Table shows PCSE estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Testing the relationship between objective class polarization and life satisfaction, I find that it is significantly negative on three of the six issue dimensions (Table 21). A one-point rise in

objective class polarization on the deregulation vs. intervention issue dimension decreases life satisfaction at the country level by .21 (p<0.01). When objective class polarization on the patriarchalism vs. emancipation issue dimension rises, life satisfaction decreases by .10 (p<0.1).

	Life Satisfaction					
	PCSE Model					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.21***					
	(0.077)					
Security vs. Liberty		0.10				
		(0.058)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			-0.10*			
			(0.061)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				-0.16**		
				(0.083)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					-0.10	
					(0.075)	
Economy vs. Ecology						-0.06
						(0.086)
Human Development	0.06	0.01	0.05	0.07	-0.05	0.02
	(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.107)	(0.142)	(0.109)	(0.118)
Democratic Tradition	0.10***	0.09**	0.11***	0.09**	0.15***	0.10***
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Participatory Culture	0.16*	0.26***	0.17*	0.27**	0.18*	0.22**
	(0.088)	(0.084)	(0.089)	(0.108)	(0.099)	(0.096)
Constant	0.51***	0.50***	0.51***	0.39***	0.49***	0.44***
	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.060)	(0.080)	(0.093)	(0.067)
Observations	133	133	132	96	113	128
R-squared	0.31	0.32	0.28	0.36	0.33	0.30
Countries	43	43	43	42	42	43
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 21: Table shows PCSE estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A one-point rise in objective class polarization on the nativism vs. cosmopolitanism issue dimension decreases life satisfaction in a society by .16 (p<0.05). The overall direction of the relationship between objective class polarization and life satisfaction is the same as in the previous section (with “subjective” class polarization). However, only class polarization in the deregulation vs. intervention and the nativism vs. cosmopolitanism issue dimensions are significant each time.

Testing the relationship between objective class polarization and social movement activity, I find that it is significantly positive on the security vs. liberty issue dimension, the patriarchalism vs. emancipation issue dimension and the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimension (Table 22). With the other socio-cultural polarization measure it was only polarization on the patriarchalism vs. emancipation issue dimension that had a significantly positive effect. With objective class polarization the effect is a bit weaker (.17, p<0.05). A one-point increase in class

	Social Movement Activity					
	PCSE Model					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	0.02 (0.060)					
Security vs. Liberty		0.14* (0.071)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			0.17** (0.077)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				0.14 (0.093)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					0.20** (0.095)	
Economy vs. Ecology						0.17 (0.121)
Human Development	0.38*** (0.073)	0.36*** (0.074)	0.34*** (0.073)	0.36*** (0.098)	0.33*** (0.083)	0.36*** (0.080)
Democratic Tradition	0.26*** (0.025)	0.26*** (0.025)	0.26*** (0.024)	0.27*** (0.030)	0.25*** (0.026)	0.25*** (0.027)
Participatory Culture	0.13** (0.066)	0.16** (0.065)	0.18*** (0.064)	0.10 (0.079)	0.16** (0.071)	0.15** (0.068)
Constant	-0.06 (0.043)	-0.06 (0.043)	-0.05 (0.044)	-0.15*** (0.051)	-0.02 (0.052)	-0.17*** (0.042)
Observations	134	134	133	97	114	129
R-squared	0.73	0.74	0.75	0.74	0.74	0.75
Countries	43	43	43	42	42	43
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 22: Table shows PCSE estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

polarization on the security vs. liberty issue dimension increases social movement activity by .14 (p<0.1) and class polarization on the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimension increases social movement activity by .20 (p<0.1).

5.4. Civic Culture in a Polarized Environment

To determine how socio-cultural polarization affects individuals' civic attitudes and behavior, I run a number of multilevel models. To reiterate, I expect the effect of socio-cultural polarization on an individual's civic attitudes and behavior to depend on that person's social background. In particular, I believe that the effect of socio-cultural polarization is much stronger on lower social class individuals. In other words, in a polarized environment, members of the lower classes become notably less civic in their attitudes and their behavior than members of the upper classes because lower class individuals feel disproportionately more marginalized and threatened in their social status as a result of socio-cultural polarization.

Let us first look at the results for preference for democracy (Table 23). The regression output shows that the cross-level interaction coefficient is significant on all six dimensions, which suggest that social class has a substantial influence on the effect socio-cultural polarization has on an individual's civic attitudes and behavior. How can we interpret these results? Consider the nativism vs. cosmopolitanism issue dimension. The cross-level interaction coefficient is highly significant ($p<0.01$) and positive (.62). The country-level variable socio-cultural polarization is also highly significant ($p<0.05$) and positive (.06); the individual-level variable social class is not significant, which indicates the (non-)effect of social class when there is no socio-cultural polarization. The cross-level interaction coefficient indicates that with rising class polarization, each step up on the social hierarchy ladder has a positive effect on preference for democracy. In other words, in a society that becomes more and more polarized over issues of diversity, upper class individuals have a higher preference for democracy than lower class individuals. Conversely, the positive effect of social class on preference for democracy, – that is, a higher preference for democracy among upper class individuals than lower class individuals – is stronger when polarization on the nativism vs. cosmopolitanism issue dimension is higher. The interpretation of the effect is practically the same on the security vs. liberty and patriarchalism vs. emancipation issue dimensions. That said, the country-level effect by itself is significantly negative on both these dimensions.

	DEMOCRACY PREFERENCE											
	Deregulation vs. Intervention		Security vs. Liberty		Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation		Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism		Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment		Economy vs. Ecology	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL												
Social Class	0.01**	0.00**	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.00	0.00	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	0.09***	0.09***	0.08***	0.09***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.09***	0.08***	0.08***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Sex	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***
Level	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Employment	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***
Status	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
CROSS-LEVEL												
Class Polarization*		-0.06**		0.45***		0.57***		0.62***		-0.21***		-0.50***
Social Class		(0.026)		(0.067)		(0.047)		(0.055)		(0.034)		(0.063)
COUNTRY-LEVEL												
Class	-0.02	-0.01	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.05**	-0.05***	0.07***	0.06***	0.12***	0.12***	0.29***	0.30***
Polarization	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Human	-0.07*	-0.07**	-0.10**	-0.09**	0.02	0.02	-0.19***	-0.18***	-0.20***	-0.21***	-0.18***	-0.18***
Development	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Democratic	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***
Tradition	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Participatory	-0.16***	-0.16***	-0.17***	-0.17***	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.20***	-0.20***	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.16***	-0.16***
Culture	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Constant	0.82***	0.82***	0.84***	0.84***	0.74***	0.75***	0.91***	0.91***	0.89***	0.90***	0.87***	0.88***
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	157,117	157,117	152,478	152,478	152,622	152,622	113,528	113,528	138,221	138,221	151,618	151,618
Groups	42	42	42	42	42	42	41	41	42	42	42	42
chi2	12817	12817	12613	12521	12785	12651	8226	8013	11649	11668	11931	11964
Observations	157117	157117	152478	152478	152622	152622	113528	113528	138221	138221	151618	151618
Log-Likelihood	22594	22596	21581	21603	22014	22089	15951	16016	20158	20177	21619	21651
sd Random Intercept	0.171	0.171	0.164	0.164	0.165	0.165	0.167	0.167	0.148	0.148	0.134	0.134
sd Residual	0.209	0.209	0.210	0.210	0.209	0.209	0.210	0.210	0.209	0.209	0.210	0.210

Table 23: Table shows moderating effect of social class. Random intercept model with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

However, on the deregulation vs. intervention, anti- vs. pro-establishment and economy vs. ecology issue dimensions, the effect is reversed. Take the economy vs. ecology issue dimension. The cross-level interaction coefficient is highly significant ($p<0.01$) and negative (-.50). The country-level variable socio-cultural polarization is highly significant ($p<0.05$) and positive (.30); the individual-level variable social class is also highly significant ($p<0.01$) and positive (-.01). Now, the cross-level interaction coefficient indicates that with rising class polarization, each step up on the social hierarchy ladder has a negative effect on preference for democracy. In a society that is increasingly polarized over issues of aesthetics and quality of life, upper class individuals have a higher preference for democracy than lower class individuals. The interpretation of the effect is practically the same on the security vs. liberty and patriarchalism vs. emancipation issue dimensions.

Figure 44 visualizes how the marginal effect of class polarization on the different issue dimensions on preference for democracy changes under the moderating effect of social class. Take a look at the plot at the top left. The solid sloping line (black) indicates that the effect of polarization on the deregulation vs. intervention issue dimension with regards to people's preference for democracy is negative. This means that, in a society polarized over issues of state intervention, people's preference for democracy decreases as they become wealthier. The regression table already hinted at that interpretation. What the regression table did not reveal is that the effect is only significant for the upper middle and upper classes. That is what the confidence intervals (bluish-gray area) tell us. Only when the upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence intervals are both above or below the zero line is the effect significant. Conversely, both the negative effect of class polarization on the anti- vs. pro-establishment and the economy vs. ecology issue dimensions with regards to preference for democracy is only significant for the lower, working, lower middle and upper middle classes. It is not relevant for the upper class. On the security vs. liberty, patriarchalism vs. emancipation and nativism vs. cosmopolitanism issue dimensions, the positive effect of class on preference for democracy is significant across all social classes. Rising polarization on these three issue dimension reduces the lower classes' preference for democracy significantly. In fact, greater polarization decreases the preference for democracy among lower class individuals while it increases the preference for democracy among upper class individuals.



Figure 44: Marginal effect of socio-cultural polarization on democracy preference under the moderating effect of social class[110]

Now, let us take a look at the results for trust. The regression table (Table 24) shows a significant positive effect of class polarization on the deregulation vs. intervention (p<0.05), patriarchalism vs. emancipation (p<0.01), nativism vs. cosmopolitanism (p<0.01) and anti- vs. pro-establishment (p<0.01) issue dimensions. With increasing class polarization on these dimensions at the country level, each step up the ladder of social hierarchy has a positive effect on

[110] In this and the following figures, the margins plots are arranged from top left to bottom right: deregulation vs. intervention, security vs. liberty, patriarchalism vs. emancipation, nativism vs. cosmopolitanism, anti- vs. pro-establishment and economy vs. ecology. The histogram shows the frequency distribution of the moderating variable subjective social class (in %).

	General Trust											
	Deregulation vs. Intervention		Security vs. Liberty		Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation		Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism		Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment		Economy vs. Ecology	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL												
Social Class	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.09***	0.09***	0.08***	0.08***	0.10***	0.10***	0.08***	0.08***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age	0.07***	0.07***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***	0.06***	0.06***	0.07***	0.07***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Sex	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.00*	-0.00**	-0.01***	-0.01**	-0.00**	-0.00**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	0.08***	0.08***	0.09***	0.09***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.09***	0.09***
Level	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Employment	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.02***	-0.03***
Status	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
CROSS-LEVEL												
Class Polarization*		0.10**		-0.13		0.61***		0.76***		0.88***		-0.05
Social Class		(0.047)		(0.122)		(0.085)		(0.100)		(0.064)		(0.119)
COUNTRY-LEVEL												
Class	-0.03	-0.03	0.27***	0.27***	-0.08**	-0.08**	-0.24***	-0.24***	-0.16***	-0.14***	-0.31***	-0.31***
Polarization	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Human	-0.53***	-0.53***	-0.43***	-0.43***	-0.58***	-0.59***	-0.20**	-0.19**	-0.45***	-0.39***	-0.29***	-0.30***
Development	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Democratic	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***
Tradition	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Participatory	-0.10***	-0.10***	-0.03	-0.03	-0.11***	-0.11***	0.07**	0.08***	-0.10***	-0.10***	-0.04	-0.04
Culture	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Constant	0.79***	0.79***	0.69***	0.70***	0.83***	0.84***	0.53***	0.52***	0.73***	0.68***	0.63***	0.63***
	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.092)	(0.090)	(0.099)	(0.099)
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	168,651	168,651	163,649	163,649	163,653	163,653	121,518	121,518	147,670	147,670	162,691	162,691
Groups	42	42	42	42	42	42	41	41	42	42	42	42
chi2	8333	8322	9052	9047	8886	8856	6465	6473	7576	7410	8809	8804
Observations	168651	168651	163649	163649	163653	163653	121518	121518	147670	147670	162691	162691
Log-Likelihood	-83430	-83428	-82173	-82172	-82093	-82067	-62294	-62265	-72068	-71974	-82077	-82077
sd Random Intercept	0.455	0.455	0.492	0.492	0.465	0.465	0.608	0.608	0.428	0.428	0.530	0.530
sd Residual	168651	168651	163649	163649	163653	163653	121518	121518	147670	147670	162691	162691

Table 24: Table shows moderating effect of social class. Random intercept model with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

trust at the individual level. In other words, upper class individuals are more trusting than lower class individuals in a polarized environment. Yet whereas the individual-level effect of social class is always positive and significant, the country-level effect of socio-cultural polarization is significant and negative for three out of the four issue dimensions. On the patriarchalism vs. emancipation, nativism vs. cosmopolitanism and anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimensions, class polarization has a negative effect on how trusting people are, meaning that rising socio-cultural polarization makes people, on average, less trusting. Here, the cross-level interaction affect demonstrates the moderating effect of social class really well.

Figure 45[111] visualizes how social class moderates the effect of socio-cultural polarization on trust. I find that the relatively weak effect on the deregulation vs. intervention issue dimension is only significant for the lower classes when both the upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence intervals are both below the zero line. On the other three dimensions, the effect is



Figure 45: Marginal effect of socio-cultural polarization on trust under the moderating effect of social class

[111] From now on, I only show the margins plots for the significant cross-level interaction effects and include a figure with all plots in the Appendix (5.4.A-5.4.F) for the sake of completeness.

highly significant across all social classes. The average effect of socio-cultural polarization at the country level on people's trust in others is negative. We see that the moderating effect of social class turns positive approximately in the middle of the social hierarchy. The lower, working and lower middle classes are less trusting than the upper middle and upper classes when socio-cultural polarization increases in society.

Now, let us look at the output for average active membership in utilitarian organizations (Table 25). The cross-level interaction effect is only significant on the security vs. liberty and anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimensions. It is significantly negative ($p<0.01$) on the security vs. liberty issue dimension and significantly positive ($p<0.01$) on the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimension. The positive effect is relatively weak, though (.08). The negative effect on the security vs. liberty issue dimension tells us that with rising class polarization over issues of order and safety, the average number of active membership in utilitarian organizations decreases as people become wealthier. Conversely, the negative effect on the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimension tells us that with rising class polarization over issues of authority, the average number of active memberships in utilitarian organizations increases as people become wealthier. Again, under the moderating effect of social class, the direction of the effect of social-cultural polarization changes its direction. The country-level effect by itself is significantly negative. However, if you take a look at the corresponding margins plot (Figure 46), you will see that the cross-level interaction effect is not significant across all social classes.

	AVERAGE ACTIVE MEMBERSHIPS IN UTILITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS											
	Deregulation vs. Intervention		Security vs. Liberty		Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation		Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism		Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment		Economy vs. Ecology	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL												
Social Class	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.02***	0.02***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Sex	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
Level	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Employment	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***
Status	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
CROSS-LEVEL												
Class Polarization*		-0.00		-0.26***		0.02		-0.06		0.08***		0.06
Social Class		(0.018)		(0.050)		(0.033)		(0.039)		(0.023)		(0.045)
COUNTRY-LEVEL												
Class	-0.10***	-0.10***	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.16***	-0.16***
Polarization	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Human	0.07***	0.07***	0.04	0.04	0.19***	0.19***	0.14***	0.14***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***
Development	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Democratic	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00*	-0.00**	-0.00**	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
Tradition	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Participatory	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.04***	-0.04***
Culture	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Constant	0.03	0.03	0.04**	0.04**	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.03	-0.03	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	153,699	153,699	147,848	147,848	150,601	150,601	105,135	105,135	153,699	153,699	146,885	146,885
Groups	42	42	42	42	42	42	41	41	42	42	42	42
chi2	4160	4159	4034	4010	4368	4368	2988	2986	4285	4295	4194	4190
Observations	153699	153699	147848	147848	150601	150601	105135	105135	153699	153699	146885	146885
Log-Likelihood	72382	72382	69064	69078	70672	70672	47765	47766	72331	72336	68568	68569
sd Random Intercept	0.0334	0.0334	0.0311	0.0311	0.0425	0.0425	0.0381	0.0381	0.0349	0.0349	0.0351	0.0351
sd Residual	0.151	0.151	0.152	0.152	0.151	0.151	0.153	0.153	0.151	0.151	0.152	0.152

Table 25: Table shows moderating effect of social class. Random intercept model with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



Figure 46: Marginal effect of socio-cultural polarization on volunteering in utilitarian organizations under the moderating effect of social class

Next up is a chart showing the average number of passive memberships in utilitarian organizations (Table 26). The regression output shows significant cross-level interaction effects on the nativism vs. cosmopolitan and economy vs. ecology issue dimensions. On the nativism vs. cosmopolitanism issue dimension, the effect is significantly positive, meaning that upper class individuals become more engaged than lower class individuals on this issue as class polarization increases. This particular effect is interesting because the country-level effect by itself is not significant, which suggests that its effect depends on a person's position in the social hierarchy. Conversely, class polarization on the economy vs. ecology issue dimension is significantly negative (p<0.01) on its own already. Social class weakens the effect. The estimation coefficient of the cross-level interaction is still highly significant (p<0.01), but it is less strong (-.45 → -.23).

	AVERAGE PASSIVE MEMBERSHIPS IN UTILITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS											
	Deregulation vs. Intervention		Security vs. Liberty		Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation		Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism		Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment		Economy vs. Ecology	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL												
Social Class	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.01***	0.01***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.07*	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.041)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Sex	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.07*	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.041)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education Level	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.07*	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.041)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Employment Status	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	0.07*	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.041)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
CROSS-LEVEL												
Class Polarization* Social Class		-0.01		-0.05		-0.01		0.16***		0.01		-0.23***
		(0.025)		(0.070)		(0.047)		(0.055)		(0.032)		(0.063)
COUNTRY-LEVEL												
Class Polarization	-0.24***	-0.24***	-0.16***	-0.16***	0.03	0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.25***	-0.25***	-0.45***	-0.45***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Human Development	-0.00	-0.00	-0.10***	-0.10***	0.12***	0.12***	0.13***	0.13***	0.14***	0.14***	0.04	0.04
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Democratic Tradition	-0.00***	-0.00***	0.00	0.00	-0.00***	-0.00***	0.00	0.00	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Participatory Culture	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.12***	-0.12***	-0.02*	-0.02*	-0.20***	-0.20***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.13***	-0.13***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Constant	0.20***	0.20***	0.23***	0.23***	0.07*	0.07*	0.10***	0.10***	0.07*	0.07*	0.16***	0.16***
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	153,699	153,699	147,848	147,848	150,601	150,601	105,135	105,135	153,699	153,699	146,885	146,885
Groups	42	42	42	42	42	42	41	41	42	42	42	42
chi2	7079	7073	6166	6163	6455	6456	4495	4486	6975	6975	6598	6488
Observations	-42397	-42397	-37184	-37184	-38959	-38959	-25734	-25734	-42358	-42358	-37982	-37982
Log-Likelihood	-42238	-42238	-37026	-37026	-38800	-38800	-25590	-25590	-42199	-42199	-37824	-37824
sd Random Intercept	153699	153699	147848	147848	150601	150601	105135	105135	153699	153699	146885	146885
sd Residual	21214	21214	18608	18608	19495	19495	12878	12882	21195	21195	19001	19007

Table 26: Table shows moderating effect of social class. Random intercept model with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 47 visualizes these cross-level interaction effects. The confidence interval of the cross-level interaction effect on the nativism vs. cosmopolitanism issue dimension suggest that it is not statistically significant across all social classes. The upper and lower bounds of the confidence intervals are only (barely) both above and below the zero line at the bottom and the top of the social hierarchy, respectively. On the economy vs. ecology issue dimension, the effect is significant across all social classes. The upper and lower bounds of the confidence intervals are both below the zero line.



Figure 47: Marginal effect of socio-cultural polarization on belonging to utilitarian organizations under the moderating effect of social class

Studying the regression output for average active membership in sociotropic organizations, I find that the significant negative cross-level interaction effect on the security vs. liberty dimension is the same as for the average number of active memberships in utilitarian organizations (Table 27). Rising class polarization on this dimension decreases the average number of active memberships in sociotropic organizations as you move up the social hierarchy. Interestingly, the country-level effect by itself is significantly positive (.09), meaning that, on average, with rising class polarization on this dimension, the average number of passive memberships in utilitarian organizations increases. Yet the effect reverses under the moderating effect of social class, just as it did with regards to the anti- vs. pro-establishment and economy vs. ecology issue dimensions. The cross-level interaction effect is significantly positive, while the country-level effect is significantly negative. On average, class polarization at the country level on both these dimensions decreases the average number of memberships at the individual level. Under the moderating effect of social class, the effect turns significantly positive, meaning that with rising class polarization on these two dimensions, lower class individuals become less engaged

	AVERAGE ACTIVE MEMBERSHIPS IN SOCIOTROPIC ORGANIZATIONS											
	Deregulation vs. Intervention		Security vs. Liberty		Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation		Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism		Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment		Economy vs. Ecology	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL												
Social Class	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	0.01***	0.15***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
	(0.003)	(0.020)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Sex	0.00	0.01***	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.04***	0.00	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
Level	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Employment	0.00	0.04***	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Status	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
CROSS-LEVEL												
Class Polarization*		0.00		-0.26***		0.05		-0.05		0.29***		0.28***
Social Class		(0.001)		(0.055)		(0.037)		(0.043)		(0.025)		(0.050)
COUNTRY-LEVEL												
Class	-0.06***	-0.07***	0.09***	0.09***	-0.03**	-0.03**	0.06***	0.07***	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.04**	-0.04**
Polarization	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Human	0.42***	0.42***	0.34***	0.34***	0.61***	0.61***	0.49***	0.49***	0.44***	0.45***	0.35***	0.36***
Development	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Democratic	-0.00***	-0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	0.00**	0.00**
Tradition	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Participatory	0.01	0.01	-0.05***	-0.05***	0.01	0.01	-0.10***	-0.10***	0.02*	0.02**	-0.05***	-0.05***
Culture	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Constant	-0.20***	-0.20***	-0.15***	-0.14***	-0.34***	-0.34***	-0.23***	-0.23***	-0.22***	-0.23***	-0.15***	-0.15***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	154,110	154,110	148,259	148,259	151,003	151,003	105,408	105,408	154,110	154,110	147,296	147,296
Groups	42	42	42	42	42	42	41	41	42	42	42	42
chi2	15126	15083	16007	16012	15544	15514	12111	12098	16020	16061	16481	16498
Observations	154110	154110	148259	148259	151003	151003	105408	105408	154110	154110	147296	147296
Log-Likelihood	56536	56564	54358	54369	54992	54993	37838	37838	56522	56587	54177	54192
sd Random Intercept	0.0951	0.0951	0.0812	0.0812	0.110	0.110	0.100	0.100	0.0938	0.0938	0.0797	0.0797
sd Residual	0.167	0.167	0.168	0.168	0.168	0.168	0.169	0.169	0.167	0.167	0.167	0.167

Table 27: Table shows moderating effect of social class. Random intercept model with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

compared to upper class individuals. Figure 48 visualizes these cross-level interaction effects. It is notable that the negative cross-level interaction effect on the security vs. liberty issue dimension is not statistically significant across all social classes. On the other two dimensions, class polarization exhibits the strongest negative effect on the average number of active memberships in sociotropic organizations in the lower class. As you proceed up the social ladder, it affects the average number of active memberships in sociotropic organizations a little bit less until the effect becomes positive (i.e., an increase in average memberships) for the upper middle and upper classes.



Note: Graph shows marginal effect of country-level socio-cultural polarization over different issues on number of active memberships in sociotropic organizations at the individual level under the moderating influence of social class.

Figure 48: Marginal effect of socio-cultural polarization on volunteering in sociotropic organizations under the moderating effect of social class

Looking at the results for average passive membership in sociotropic organizations (Table 28), I find that the cross-level interaction effect is positively significant on all six issue dimensions, meaning that in an increasingly polarized society, the number of average passive memberships in sociotropic organization increases the further up the social hierarchy you move. In fact, on the deregulation vs. intervention, security vs. liberty, anti- vs. pro-establishment and economy vs. ecology issue dimensions, the country-level effect is significantly negative, however it turns

	AVERAGE PASSIVE MEMBERSHIPS IN SOCIOTROPIC ORGABIZATIONS											
	Deregulation vs. Intervention		Security vs. Liberty		Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation		Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism		Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment		Economy vs. Ecology	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL												
Social Class	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.02***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Sex	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education Level	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Employment Status	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
CROSS-LEVEL												
Class Polarization* Social Class		0.06***		0.21***		0.07*		0.14***		0.08***		0.27***
		(0.023)		(0.064)		(0.043)		(0.050)		(0.029)		(0.057)
COUNTRY-LEVEL												
Class Polarization	-0.33***	-0.33***	-0.08***	-0.09***	0.08***	0.08***	0.00	0.00	-0.25***	-0.25***	-0.39***	-0.39***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Human Development	-0.07**	-0.07**	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.06	-0.06	0.12***	0.12***	0.06*	0.07*	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Democratic Tradition	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Participatory Culture	-0.12***	-0.12***	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.24***	-0.24***	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.15***	-0.15***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Constant	0.32***	0.32***	0.31***	0.30***	0.24***	0.24***	0.15***	0.15***	0.17***	0.17***	0.25***	0.25***
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	154,110	154,110	148,259	148,259	151,003	151,003	105,408	105,408	154,110	154,110	147,296	147,296
Groups	42	42	42	42	42	42	41	41	42	42	42	42
chi2	9714	9719	8477	8461	8277	8277	6203	6208	9289	9296	8870	8893
Observations	154110	154110	148259	148259	151003	151003	105408	105408	154110	154110	147296	147296
Log-Likelihood	35871	35875	32685	32691	33578	33576	22714	22710	35637	35641	32989	33000
sd Random Intercept	0.222	0.222	0.0886	0.0886	0.188	0.188	0.0744	0.0744	0.194	0.194	0.133	0.133
sd Residual	0.192	0.192	0.194	0.194	0.194	0.194	0.195	0.195	0.192	0.192	0.193	0.193

Table 28: Table shows moderating effect of social class. Random intercept model with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

positive when it interacts with social class. This means that, on average, class polarization on these issue dimensions decreases a person’s number of passive memberships in sociotropic organizations, but the interaction effect tells us that lower class individuals are quitting these organizations more frequently than upper class individuals. When socio-cultural polarization rises, the number of average memberships per person is a little bit higher in each of the social classes. The same is true for class polarization on the patriarchalism vs. emancipation and nativism vs. cosmopolitanism issue dimensions. The difference is that the average country-level effect is already positive. The individual-level effect of social class is significantly positive across all dimensions. Figure 49 illustrates the effects again.

Marginal Effect of Socio-Cultural Polarization on Belonging to Sociotropic Organizations



Note: Graph shows marginal effect of country-level socio-cultural polarization over different issues on number of active memberships in sociotropic organizations at the individual level under the moderating influence of social class.

Figure 49: Marginal effect of socio-cultural polarization on belonging to sociotropic organizations under the moderating effect of social class

Next, let us take a look at the regression results and the corresponding margins plots for life control. The regression output (Table 29) shows that the cross-level interaction coefficient is significantly positive ($p<0.01$) across all six dimensions, indicating that with rising socio-cultural polarization, people feel more in control of their lives as their position increases within the social hierarchy. In other words, the higher people are positioned in the social hierarchy, the greater their feeling of control over life is. It is also notable that on the security vs. liberty, nativism vs. cosmopolitanism and economy vs. ecology issue dimensions, the interaction strengthens the effect, whereas on the patriarchalism vs. emancipation and anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimensions, the interaction with social class weakens the effect. Interestingly, the country-level effect of class polarization on the average person's feeling of control over their life is significantly positive ($p<0.01$) for five out of the six issue dimension, meaning that, on average, greater socio-cultural polarization increases people's feeling of control. It is only negative on the deregulation vs. intervention issue dimension, indicating that the interaction with social class reverses the effect of class polarization on the average person's feeling of control over their life on this issue dimension.

If you take a look at the visualization of these effects (Figure 50), you will see that on the security vs. liberty, anti- vs. pro-establishment and economy vs. ecology issue dimensions, the effect does not seem to be significant across all social classes. The upper and lower bounds of the confidence intervals are not both below the zero line at the bottom of the social hierarchy. What is interesting is that the effect of class polarization on the deregulation vs. intervention issue dimension on a person's feeling of control over their life is significantly negative for the lower and working classes and only turns significantly positive for people in the middle classes and the upper class.

	LIFE CONTROL											
	Deregulation vs. Intervention		Security vs. Liberty		Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation		Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism		Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment		Economy vs. Ecology	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL												
Social Class	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Sex	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
Level	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Employment	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
Status	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
CROSS-LEVEL												
Class Polarization*		0.48***		0.36***		0.16***		0.25***		0.47***		0.72***
Social Class		(0.028)		(0.073)		(0.050)		(0.037)		(0.061)		(0.069)
COUNTRY-LEVEL												
Class	-0.04***	-0.05***	0.11***	0.11***	0.20***	0.20***	0.09***	0.09***	0.08***	0.52***	0.28***	0.28***
Polarization	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.045)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Human	0.52***	0.54***	0.54***	0.54***	-0.26***	-0.27***	0.25***	0.26***	0.51***	0.00	0.45***	0.45***
Development	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.000)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Democratic	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00	0.10***	0.00**	0.00**
Tradition	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.018)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Participatory	0.06***	0.06***	0.08***	0.08***	0.12***	0.12***	0.08***	0.08***	0.09***		0.09***	0.09***
Culture	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.018)		(0.015)	(0.015)
Constant	0.22***	0.21***	0.19***	0.19***	0.73***	0.73***	0.39***	0.38***	0.21***	0.20***	0.24***	0.24***
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	168,532	168,532	166,400	166,400	163,524	163,524	147,549	147,549	123,934	123,934	165,443	165,443
Groups	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	41	41	42	42
chi2	11928	11768	12129	12153	12269	12243	10024	10026	8570	8564	11965	11979
Observations	168532	168532	166400	166400	163524	163524	147549	147549	123934	123934	165443	165443
Log-Likelihood	-471.8	-325.8	-443.5	-431.4	3138	3143	1580	1603	-2701	-2671	-435.8	-381.8
sd Random Intercept	0.0915	0.0915	0.0953	0.0953	0.109	0.109	0.0928	0.0928	0.0928	0.0928	0.0949	0.0949
sd Residual	0.242	0.242	0.242	0.242	0.237	0.237	0.239	0.239	0.247	0.247	0.242	0.242

Table 29: Table shows moderating effect of social class. Random intercept model with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1



Figure 50: Marginal effect of socio-cultural polarization on life control under the moderating effect of social class

The regression output for life satisfaction shows that the cross-level interaction effect is positively significant ($p<0.01$) on four of the six issue dimensions. When class polarization on the deregulation vs. intervention issue dimension rises, moving one step up the social ladder increases the average person's life satisfaction by .64 points. Like with life control, the interaction with social class reverses the effect of class polarization on this issue dimension. The country-level effect of class polarization on the average person's life satisfaction is significantly ($p<0.01$) negative. On the nativism vs. cosmopolitanism issue dimension, the effect of rising class polarization on the average person's life satisfaction increases when it is interacted with

	LIFE SATISFACTION											
	Deregulation vs. Intervention		Security vs. Liberty		Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation		Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism		Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment		Economy vs. Ecology	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL												
Social Class	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***	0.12***	0.12***	0.01	0.03*	0.20***	0.20***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Sex	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.02***	0.02***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
Level	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Employment	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
Status	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
CROSS-LEVEL												
Class Polarization*		0.64***		0.08		-0.08		0.34***		0.45***		0.98***
Social Class		(0.027)		(0.070)		(0.048)		(0.058)		(0.035)		(0.066)
COUNTRY-LEVEL												
Class	-0.14***	-0.14***	0.09***	0.09***	0.22***	0.22***	0.21***	0.21***	0.20***	0.19***	0.17***	0.17***
Polarization	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Human	0.24***	0.26***	0.32***	0.32***	-0.07	-0.07	0.19***	0.19***	0.04	0.06	0.26***	0.27***
Development	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Democratic	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***
Tradition	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Participatory	0.04***	0.04***	0.09***	0.09***	0.11***	0.11***	0.09***	0.10***	0.08***	0.08***	0.09***	0.09***
Culture	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Constant	0.34***	0.32***	0.24***	0.24***	0.48***	0.48***	0.32***	0.32***	0.41***	0.39***	0.27***	0.27***
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	173,479	173,479	168,482	168,482	168,452	168,452	125,695	125,695	152,119	152,119	167,520	167,520
Groups	42	42	42	42	42	42	41	41	42	42	42	42
chi2	18458	18014	16300	16287	21178	21176	11499	11499	16585	16576	15829	15783
Observations	173479	173479	168482	168482	168452	168452	125695	125695	152119	152119	167520	167520
Log-Likelihood	5549	5832	5169	5169	6811	6812	2430	2446	6825	6906	5145	5254
sd Random Intercept	0.173	0.173	0.184	0.184	0.248	0.248	0.204	0.204	0.252	0.252	0.192	0.192
sd Residual	0.234	0.234	0.234	0.234	0.232	0.232	0.237	0.237	0.231	0.231	0.234	0.234

Table 30: Table shows moderating effect of social class. Random intercept model with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

social class. The individual effect increases people's life satisfaction, on average, by .21 points. But moving up one class position increases average life satisfaction by.34. Similarly, a better social class position makes people more satisfied with their lives when class polarization increases on the anti- vs. pro-establishment (+.45) and economy vs. ecology issue dimensions (+.98) points.

Figure 51 visualizes the significant cross-level interaction effects. Again, it shows that the effect of class polarization on the deregulation vs. intervention issue dimension on a person's life satisfaction is significantly negative for the lower, working and lower middle classes; it only turns significantly positive for people in the upper middle and upper classes. Similarly, class polarization on the anti- vs. pro-establishment and economy vs. ecology issue dimensions still has a significantly negative effect on the lower and working classes' life satisfaction and only turns positive towards the middle of the social hierarchy.



Note: Graph shows marginal effect of country-level socio-cultural polarization over different issues on life satisfaction at the individual level under the moderating influence of social class.

Figure 51: Marginal effect of socio-cultural polarization on life satisfaction under the moderating effect of social class

Finally, let us look at the regression output for social movement activity (Table 31). The cross-level interaction effect is significant ($p<0.01$) on the security vs. liberty, patriarchalism vs. emancipation, nativism vs. cosmopolitanism and anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimensions.

	SOCIAL MOVEMENT ACTIVITY											
	Deregulation vs. Intervention		Security vs. Liberty		Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation		Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism		Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment		Economy vs. Ecology	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL												
Social Class	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Sex	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.16***	0.16***	0.15***	0.15***	0.16***	0.15***	0.16***	0.15***	0.16***	0.16***	0.15***	0.15***
Level	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Employment	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***
Status	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
CROSS-LEVEL												
Class Polarization*		-0.04		0.38***		0.47***		0.51***		-0.10***		0.08
Social Class		(0.028)		(0.074)		(0.051)		(0.060)		(0.037)		(0.069)
COUNTRY-LEVEL												
Class	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.11***	-0.11***	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.13***	-0.13***
Polarization	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Human	-0.04	-0.05	-0.06	-0.06	0.25***	0.24***	-0.11**	-0.10**	-0.07	-0.07	-0.01	-0.01
Development	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Democratic	-0.00***	-0.00***	0.00**	0.00**	-0.00***	-0.00***	0.00	-0.00	-0.00***	-0.00***	0.00*	0.00*
Tradition	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Participatory	-0.00	-0.00	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.01	-0.01	-0.08***	-0.07***	0.03*	0.02	-0.06***	-0.06***
Culture	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Constant	0.30***	0.30***	0.32***	0.31***	0.11**	0.11**	0.38***	0.38***	0.33***	0.34***	0.29***	0.29***
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	171,623	171,623	166,703	166,703	166,620	166,620	124,634	124,634	150,708	150,708	165,773	165,773
Groups	42	42	42	42	42	42	41	41	42	42	42	42
chi2	8057	8049	8611	8612	8007	7923	6340	6300	7650	7655	8563	8539
Observations	171623	171623	166703	166703	166620	166620	124634	124634	150708	150708	165773	165773
Log-Likelihood	-687.2	-686.2	-861	-848	-701.4	-659.4	-940.8	-904.5	-732.8	-729	-819.6	-819
sd Random Intercept	0.150	0.150	0.105	0.105	0.161	0.161	0.131	0.131	0.203	0.203	0.106	0.106
sd Residual	0.243	0.243	0.243	0.243	0.243	0.243	0.243	0.243	0.243	0.243	0.243	0.243

Table 31: Table shows moderating effect of social class. Random intercept model with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

It is significantly positive on the first three of these dimensions and significantly negative on the last of these dimensions. Increasing class polarization on the security vs. liberty dimension has a significantly negative effect on the average person's social movement activity; under the moderating effect of social class, the sign of the regression coefficient changes, indicating that the effect of rising class polarization on this dimension with regards to an individual's social movement activity depends on their social class background. The higher up they are positioned in the social hierarchy, the more active people become. Similarly, when class polarization on the patriarchalism vs. emancipation issue dimension rises, the average person's social movement activity decreases. When I include the integration, I find that people's social movement activity greatly increases with each step up the social hierarchy ladder. On the nativism vs. cosmopolitanism issue dimensions, class polarization only influences people's social movement activity under the moderating effect of social class. Class polarization on its own has no effect on the average person's social movement activity; however, it increases social movement activity by .51 ($p<0.01$) when social class is included as the moderator. Conversely, when social class moderates the effect of class polarization on the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimension, the effect becomes both significant and negative.

Figure 52 visualizes the effect of socio-cultural polarization on social movement activity. It is notable that the confidence interval of the effect on the anti-vs. pro-establishment dimension is too wide for it to be really significant. Similarly, on the security vs. liberty issue dimension, social movement activity increases with every step up the social ladder. However when the effect of class polarization turns positive, it loses its significance. Only on the patriarchalism vs. emancipation and nativism vs. cosmopolitanism issue dimensions does rising class polarization have an effect across all social classes. The effect is negative for the lower classes; it turns positive towards the middle of the social hierarchy. Hence, class polarization decreases social movement activity in the lower class; it decreases it a little less in the working class, and then decreases it even less in the lower middle class. In the upper middle class, class polarization increases social movement activity by a small amount and by a larger amount in the in the upper class.

Marginal Effect of Socio-Cultural Polarization on Social Movement Activity



Note: Graph shows marginal effect of country-level socio-cultural polarization over different issues on social movement activity at the individual level under the moderating influence of social class.

Figure 52: Marginal effect of socio-cultural polarization on social movement activity under the moderating effect of social class

Conclusion

We must reinforce our democratic institutions to deliver real results and install trust.
– Kamala Harris

The so-called cultural congruence hypothesis (cf. Almond & Verba, 1963; Eckstein, 1966) postulates that in order for a political system to remain stable, it must be compatible with people's beliefs and value orientations. For democracies, Almond & Verba (1963, 1989) coined the term civic culture, which they describe as a "model of democratic citizenship" (Almond & Verba, 1989, p. 16). Many scholars agree that mass attitudes and value orientations influence democratic stability; however, they do not necessarily agree on which ones are most important to maintain democratic stability. The literature focuses on three different aspects of mass culture, which I describe briefly in chapter 1.2. Foa and Mounk (2016, 2017a, 2017b) have argued that democracy is in a state of serious disrepair even in some of the richest and most politically stable regions of the world. To make their case, they refer to the decline of important key indicators of democratic legitimacy and conclude that the cultural basis for democracy is eroding.

Considering that Foa and Mounk (2016, 2017a, 2017b) only looked at indicators that emphasize mass support for the system of governance and confidence in its political institutions (i.e., the legitimacy approach), their findings arguably only have limited validity. Choosing indicators from every approach to measure civic culture – the legitimacy approach, the communitarian approach and the human development approach – I come to a somewhat different conclusion: There is no uniform decline in civic culture in the mature democracies of the West, meaning there is no overall decline in the cultural basis of democracy. Depending on which civic culture indicator you consider, I would even go as far as to say that political culture in many countries has become more civic in recent years, not less. It is probably best described as fluctuating.

However, this does not mean that everyone in society is equally civic. I find that individuals' social class background matters. The data suggests that the upper classes are often considerably more civic in their attitudes and behavior compared to the lower classes. There is even some

evidence that, while a country has become more civic overall, members of its lower classes have become less civic. This pattern holds even if I group respondents in objective social classes based on their attained education level and income (Figures 5.1.F-5.1.N in the Appendix) albeit to varying degrees in different countries and indicators. But the trend is clearly visible; individuals with only low education and low income are less civic than individuals with low education and high income, who, in turn, are less civic than individuals with high education and low income and individuals with high education and high income.

Foa and Mounk (2016, 2017a, 2017b) claim that the younger generations have become especially disillusioned with democracy and more open to non-democratic alternatives and more ready to support right-wing populist parties. If you consider who votes for these parties, their claim is questionable. Right-wing populist parties do not have their main support base among Millennials but predominantly among those referred to as Generation X (born in the period between 1965 and 1980) and the second Baby Boomers cohort (born in the period between 1955 and 1964) (cf. Alexander & Welzel, 2017; Kobold & Schmiedel, 2018; Norris & Inglehart, 2019)[112]. That is not to say that the younger generations are not more critical of their government today than their parents and grandparents were at their age. Arguably, people in democracies are generally more critical today and demand new and more direct forms of political participation (cf. Norris, 1999; cf. Dalton, 2008; Inglehart, 1977, 1990; Welzel & Moreno-Alvarez, 2014). Because Foa and Mounk's argument seems incorrect, I have argued instead that what explains the recent success of right-wing populist parties is socio-cultural polarization, which divides society and challenges some of the fundamental principles of democracy. Social-cultural polarization threatens social cohesion because it undermines the possibility for collective action and fosters intergroup aggression and conflict. However, the results of the analysis only partly confirmed this assertion.

For a start, the persistently held – and very generalized – claim that ideological polarization has been rising in the mature democracies of the West is a misperception. The truth is far more complex. It seems that polarization is issue-specific, and some issues hold more potential for conflict than others. On the deregulation vs. intervention and economy vs. ecology issue dimensions, class polarization has generally decreased in the last 10 to 15 years. In contrast, class polarization on the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimension has mostly increased in the same

[112] In a recently published article, Schäfer (2021) replicated Norris and Inglehart's (2019) analysis and found that younger cohorts are, in fact, more likely than older cohorts to vote for authoritarian-populist parties when they are defined in a narrow sense (p. 14), thereby contradicting Norris's and Inglehart's previous findings. I am acknowledging these results but being only a couple of weeks away from submitting this thesis, I will not adapt my line of argument. I hope that researcher will continue to address this important issue and I am curious what they find out.

time period. The results also suggest that issues do not hold the same potential for social class conflict in every democracy I analyzed. While class polarization on the patriarchalism vs. emancipation and nativism vs. cosmopolitanism issue dimensions has decreased in some countries, it has increased in others. Conversely, class polarization on the security vs. liberty issue dimensions has risen in some countries and fallen in others. Therefore, we need to be more specific when we talk about polarization. The kind of polarization that has been rising is between those who believe that they cannot participate equally, that they are not heard, and that their beliefs not equally represented in society – and those who think the opposite is true.

With the regression analyses, I tested the relationship between levels of social-cultural polarization and civic culture at the national level and the individual level. At the country level, I expected the relationship to be significantly negative – I expected higher socio-cultural polarization would lead to a decline in civic culture. However, I find that the negative effect of polarization on civic culture is not as substantial as I had anticipated. Only a small number of coefficients is even significant, and most of them are significantly positive. Thus, the widely held belief that polarization destroys democracy is questionable. In fact, class polarization over certain issues even seems to mobilize people and increase their preference for democracy. This makes them become more civic, not less (cf. Somer & McCoy, 2018, pp. 7-8; cf. Carothers & O'Donohue, 2019b; Finseraas & Vernby, 2011; LeBas, 2018; McCoy et al., 2018). Therefore, I would challenge Foa and Mounk's (2016, 2017a, 2017b) claim that democracy is losing its cultural basis as much too general.

This said, what I think is truly worrisome is that class polarization at the country level, in particular on the deregulation vs. intervention and anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimensions, seems to have a highly significant negative effect on individual liberty (i.e., life control) and subjective well-being (i.e., life satisfaction). Both individual liberty and subjective well-being stand for the postmaterialist emphasis on universal human freedoms, individual choice, and an egalitarian emphasis on equality of opportunity that are relevant to democracy when survival is sufficiently secure (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 259). It does raise a red flag if a society does no longer support core democratic values. Tolerance is crucial in a liberal democracy where individual rights and freedoms are supposed to be recognized and protected. Tolerating other people's views and opinions, even if one disagrees with them, is key to a stable and peaceful coexistence in a pluralistic society.

At the individual level, I expected socio-cultural polarization to have a significantly negative effect on civic attitudes and behavior, but I assumed that the negative effect of socio-cultural

polarization would be much stronger on lower social class individuals. I find that the *average* effect of socio-cultural polarization on individual civic attitudes and behavior is, in fact, mostly negative, meaning that rising socio-cultural polarization decreases civic attitudes and behavior at the individual level. However, when I interact the country-level effect of socio-cultural polarization with social class, I find that it often changes its direction, indicating that someone's position in the social hierarchy matters greatly with regard to their attitudes and behavior. Generally speaking, the better off people are, the more civic they are. A lower social class position implies a significantly negative effect of socio-cultural polarization on individual civic attitudes and behavior, whereas an upper class position implies a significantly positive effect. For example, the data suggest that the effect of class polarization on the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimension is negative for the lower and working class but positive for the lower middle class and all higher classes.

In summarizing my findings, I come to the conclusion that Foa and Mounk (2016, 2017a, 2017b) were not entirely wrong when they claimed that citizens in a number of consolidated democracies have grown more critical of their political leaders and more willing to express support for authoritarian alternatives (Foa & Mounk, 2016, p. 7). However, my results show they are wrong about the source of the recent success of right-wing populism and, more generally, the increasing anti-democratic tendencies in the mature democracies of the West. The results show that class polarization on the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimensions has been rising practically across all mature democracies of the West. There seems to be an increasing disagreement between the social classes as to whether the country's elites are doing a good job. As I have shown, the negative effect of class polarization on the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimensions is especially strong on individual liberty and subjective well-being.

Thus, I argue that it is not the young people who have become more open to non-democratic alternatives, but those who feel economically disadvantaged and culturally left behind. The findings suggest that these people feel they are losing control over their lives and are extremely dissatisfied with the way things are going for them. In other words, they feel that democracy is not working for them. Support for populist parties is not simply issue-based, but also stems from a "deep and diffuse discontent" (Gidron & Hall, 2020, p. 1028) that has been accumulating. My research shows that people who think they have a low social status in society feel disproportionately more disaffected than people who think they have a higher social status in society. This confirms Gidron and Hall's (2020) research in which they found that citizens who felt more socially marginalized, who felt like they were "pushed to the fringes of their national

community and deprived of the roles and respect normally accorded full members of it" (Gidron & Hall, 2020, p. 1028; cf. Sachweh, 2020) were more likely to vote for radical right parties. Of course, these individuals could also be young, but I would argue that blaming the younger generations for the recent success of right-wing populism, as Foa and Mounk do, is only half the story. Interestingly enough, the two authors themselves have now come to that conclusion: In an article published in *The Atlantic*, they write that "Citizens have become steadily disenchanted with their democratic systems. As a result, they are more and more willing to vote for extremist politicians who promise to break with the status quo" (cf. Foa and Mounk, 2020).

In democracies, citizens and their governments are somewhat similar to contract partners in business transactions. Citizens agree to subject to certain norms and rules, and, in turn, the government promises to generate benefits, which improve the quality of people's lives (Stark & Smolka, 2019, p. 84). As long as the government delivers on that promise, citizens generally do not defect. Successful performance builds legitimacy that can reduce shocks or protects the regime in times of crisis, respectively (Dalton, 2010, p. 663; Diamond, 1999, p. 77). Kriesi (2018) points out that especially successful economic performance increases the citizen's satisfaction with their regime *and* their support of democratic principles (p. 68). In other words, satisfaction with governmental performance increases the satisfaction with the way liberal democracy works, and vice versa. (Krisi, 2018, p. 71; cf. Schäfer, 2012). Decades of rising economic inequality in the mature democracies of the West has left many people feeling insecure (cf. Hacker, 2006; Nussbaum, 2018). Most Western countries have experienced vast economic growth in recent decades; however, fewer and fewer people have profited from it. Lately, virtually all of the gains have gone to those at the top and increasing economic inequality has left many with a heightened sense of existential insecurity.

It is often argued that inequality does not matter as long as the whole economy keeps growing and everyone will get richer. But everyone is most certainly not getting richer. In fact, Andersen and Curtis (2012) found that inequality matters most: "Relative to their counterparts in equal societies, the poor tend to be much more likely to see themselves as having a low position in the class hierarchy when national-level income inequality is high" (pp. 139-140). While the cost of living has become more expensive, most people's incomes have stagnated, and their job prospects have become worse. Deindustrialization has generated a relative shift in labor demand in favor of skilled workers with very high analytical, social, and cultural skills. Thus, workers in labor-intense, low-skilled jobs may face higher risks of losing their income if demand for

their services declines in postindustrial societies (cf. Kitschelt, personal communication, August 27, 2019; Kitschelt & Rehm, 2004). And there seems to be a pattern, as Lindberg (2019) notes: "Countries that have seen increasing inequalities have also registered shrinking democratic space in the last ten years or so…or they have growing protest and populist/nationalist movements" (para. 8).

What is more, social welfare benefits have been cut in many countries, leaving only a fragmented and weak safety net for people to rely on in times of need (cf. Inglehart & Norris, 2017). Savage et al. (2015) warn that "contemporary capitalism simultaneously generates massive divisions and economic differentiation, and fundamental inequalities of life chances. Class, therefore, taps a nerve, as an inclusive democratic sensibility confronts the mundane existence of inequality" (p. 1015). Market competition and inequality are an essential feature of capitalism that secures productivity and profits and incentivizes innovation. However, it is hardly compatible with the democratic principle of equal rights and opportunities (Merkel, 2018c, p. 267; cf. Hodgson, 2016). Inequality is associated with a host of negative consequences, including health, specifically mental well-being. For example, the feeling of economic insecurity is triggered by experiencing deteriorating socio-economic conditions (Anderson & Curtis, 2012, p. 139; cf. Buttrick & Oishi, 2017; Hacker, 2006; Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart & Norris, 2017; Maslow, 1943).

A lot of people now live in precarious conditions and are socially disadvantaged. Where income differences are bigger, social (i.e., cultural) distances are also bigger, because people are more likely to distinguish themselves along class lines (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009, p. 28; Andersen & Curtis, 2012, p. 139). Economic development shifts people's value priorities towards greater autonomy, freedom of choice, and emancipation, thereby promoting liberal democracy as the only guarantor of the political and civil rights and freedoms that institutionalizes these values (Ceka & Magalhães, 2016, p. 94). If existential security is not guaranteed, people do not seem to care as much about these core democratic values as they care about making ends meet. In the television documentary *Wer beherrscht Deutschland?*[113] (Engl.: Who rules Germany?) a young man from Chorweiler (an underprivileged neighborhood of Cologne, one of Germany's biggest cities) puts it like this: "Equality and issues like that are important…but to us, other things are more important like whether we will be able to pay our rent. Parties ignore this and instead

[113] From minute 4:14 onwards.

focus on issues that are important to…an affluent clientele" (cf. Lorenzen, 2021). Only a minimum of social security allows people to exercise their democratic civil rights and liberties (Stark & Smolka, 2019, p. 89) – and extend them to others.

Interestingly, it is not that the absolute available resources determine whether individuals enjoy the kind of existential security that fosters the values and ideas favorable to liberal democracy. Instead, it is the relative resources available to an individual, as compared to the resources available to those in their relevant social environment (Ceka & Magalhães, 2016, p. 94). What is damaging to democracy is the perceived unfairness, the perception that a few are benefiting while the many are stagnating or suffering (Diamond, 1999, p. 80; cf. Protzer, 2019). The perception of grievances is often a zero sum game. A perceived increase in grievances in one group is often seen as the consequence of decrease in grievances in another group (Griffin et al., 2020, p. 4). Griffin et al. (2020) have demonstrated that protest is very likely in societies where the opportunities of the people at the bottom of the social hierarchy do not measure up to their expectations (p. 14).

Specifically, research has shown that the relative decline in social status or the perceived loss in social status, respectively, correlates with support for far-right politics (cf. Bornschier & Kriesi, 2013; Buttrick & Oishi, 2017; Gest, 2016; Gest et al., 2017). Social mobility (or the lack thereof) is a reliable indicator of right-wing populist success (cf. Protzer, 2019). Friedman & Laurison, 2019; Piff et al., 2018). Figure 53 shows the significant correlation (0.6485*) between the satisfaction with democracy and people's perception of social mobility. In the countries in which, on average, less people believe in the chance of improving their standard of living, people are also less satisfied with democracy. The problem is that the structural barriers that come along with inequality make social mobility extremely difficult for those at the bottom of the social hierarchy. They not only lack the financial resources but also the cultural resources to navigate social class (Kriesi et al., 2008, p. 5; cf. Dorling, 2014; Friedman & Laurison, 2019; Piff et al., 2018).



Figure 53: Perception of social mobility influences satisfaction with democracy

The upper classes set the trends and lifestyle standards. The lifestyles of the lower classes are often considered deficient or even worthless in people's self-perception and the perception of others (Reckwitz, 2019, p. 284). However, our social self is largely based on others' perception of our individual worth. Therefore, it matters how other people see us. It matters so much that human beings are innately driven by the need to preserve and defend the social self. For Germany, Hilmer et al. (2017) found that citizens who overwhelmingly voted for the AfD often felt neglected. Irrespective of their real income, these people ranked themselves low in society and felt like they were worse off than their parents. Thus, it is not so much actual deprivation but a combination of perceived social decline in the past or the threat of social decline in the future (cf. Burgoon et al., 2018). Where people think they stand in relation to others in society is extremely important (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009, p. 25; cf. Buttrick & Oishi, 2017; Kraus et al., 2012; Ridgeway, 2014).

> "In the rich countries, it is now the symbolic importance of wealth and possessions that matters. What purchases say about status and identity is often more important than the goods themselves. Put crudely, second-rate goods are assumed to reflect second-rate people" (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009, p. 30).

Human beings are very alert to potential threats that could hurt their social esteem or diminish their status, especially if they feel that their actions are chronically influenced by external forces outside of individual control and influence. These social-evaluative threats – when the self

could be negatively judged by others – can put a lot of stress on people (cf. Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). That is why they often go along with rising anxiety and a narcissistic defense of an insecure self-image. Right-wing populist parties tap into that anxiety (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009, pp. 38-39; cf. Nussbaum, 2018; Zick & Klein, 2014). "It's *[sic]* hard to disregard social status because it comes so close to defining our worth and how much we are valued. Higher status almost always carries connotations of being better, superior, more successful and more able" (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009, p. 41). In contrast to individuals with high self-esteem, individuals with low self-esteem have been shown to be less tolerant of diversity, which manifests itself in a disregard for equality and the freedoms of speech and assembly – all of which are essential features of modern democracies. Moreover, individuals with low self-esteem seemed to be generally distrustful of political elites and the susceptible to extremist politics (Sniderman, 1975, p. 222, p. 305).

Putnam (2000) points out that those at the bottom of the social hierarchy are a lot less trusting than those at the top, most likely because they are treated with less respect and are frequently faced with discrimination, social exclusion, and the danger of exploitation (cf. Uslaner, 2002, 2005; Uslaner & Brown, 2005). Looking into the historical and contemporary sources of distrust in America, Patterson (1999) found that "anxiety and insecurity are clearly the most powerful forces driving distrust" (p. 190). People's class background not only affects their trust in other people, though. Variables that capture people's socio-economic status such as class, education, and income are also strongly correlated with institutional or system support. The higher their socio-economic status, the higher people's trust in government, the civil service or the police (Ceka & Magalhães, 2020, p. 4; Inglehart, 1990, p. 41; cf. Buttrick & Oishi, 2017). Trust in other people and the political elites (i.e., confidence in their abilities to make the right decisions) is essential to a well-functioning democracy (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 490).

As Inglehart (2021) emphasizes, "security is psychological as well as physical. The collapse of a belief system can reduce people's sense of security as much as war or economic hardship does" (p. 5). Similarly, Charim (2019) writes that the casualization of identities cannot be viewed independently from the casualization of society as a whole (p. 49). Many traditionalists now look back into the past, romanticizing a life that was supposedly simpler and more orderly (Dalton, 2018, p. 221). Their perceived threat to their identity and status in society is not completely irrational. These people have indeed lost out in cultural terms (Dalton, 2018, p. 219). Their anger is directed both upwards against the elites for their perceived inaction and downwards against lower status groups, typically against immigrants and ethnic minorities who are

seen as a threat to the Western lifestyle and Western traditions in general (Inglehart & Norris, 2017, p. 44, p. 51, p. 123). Right-wing populist parties exploit these people's grievances, giving them a chance to express their socially conservative attitudes.

Rapidly advancing social changes and deteriorating economic conditions have left many people in the advanced industrial democracies feeling anxious about the future. Nussbaum (2018) goes as far as to say that these people live in fear of the future because of the uprooting changes in their lives (p. 195). Citizens with a conservative worldview that support redistribution often place high priority on security, certainty, and stability (Federico & Malka 2018; Johnston, 2018; Johnston et al., 2017; Malka & Soto 2015; Malka et al. 2019, 2020). Naturally, insecure people are more open to the populist message: If the government is not looking after their interests anymore, "the answer is to elect a people's government that will sack those who are feathering their own nests, [and] send the immigrants home, or whatever the local remedy happens to be at a particular time" (Canovan, 1999, p. 12). Former U.S. president Donald Trump called it "draining the swamp." He promised to end corruption in Washington, D.C., and to install a government that served ordinary Americans and not special interest groups (cf. The Washington Post, 2020). Because they feel like their interests are not being heard in this political and economic climate, many people have become disillusioned.

This perceived lack of representation can weaken democracy, when increasingly charismatic individuals or non-mainstream political parties fulfill the representative role by appealing to the strong anti-institutionalist impulse of disaffected citizens (Lacewell & Merkel, 2013, p. 81; cf. Droste 2021). Because right-wing populists usually disregard democratic norms and constitutional conventions, they are especially dangerous (Canovan, 1999, p. 10; Spittler, 2018, p. 102). Unsurprisingly, citizens who feel neglected by the mainstream political elite turn toward the radical opposition who challenges the status quo. In fact, research hast shown that higher social class individuals tend to view the status quo as legitimate, whereas lower class individuals are more likely to reject it (cf. Ceka & Magalhães, 2020). After all, it is citizens' democratic right to seek change by voting (Bartels, 2014, p. 216; Dalton, 2018a, p. 11; Kriesi, 2020, p. 257).

Therein lies democracy's ultimate strength: It has the inherent potential for responsiveness and renewal. Przeworski et al. (2001) note that, "people expect democracy to reduce income inequality, and democracies are more likely to survive when they do" (p. 171). However, if citizen's dissatisfaction with the political authorities leads them to harbor a general distrust of democratic institutions, that strength almost becomes a weakness because it also makes democracies vulnerable to anti-democratic challengers (Pharr et al., 2000, pp. 13-14). Still, political

disaffection does not necessarily imply a crisis of democratic legitimacy. Actually, high levels of support for democracy and political disaffection often go together, which the results of this study confirm. Democracy as a form of government is not in a legitimacy crisis, but there seems to be a substantial number of disaffected democrats (cf. Torcal & Montero, 2006; Klingemann 1998; Norris 1999; Pharr et al., 2000). Campbell (2020) recently demonstrated this to be true for Germany.[114] Figure 54 shows that relatively large shares of the populations in the mature democracies of the West seem to be dissatisfied with the current state of democracy.



Figure 54: Divided views on the state of democracy in democracies around the world

The feeling of powerlessness and distrust of the people who feel economically disadvantaged and culturally left behind manifests itself in the mounting support for right-wing populism and, more generally, disruptive political behavior (cf. Brunkert et al., 2018; Charim, 2019; Kriesi, 2020; Nussbaum, 2018; Pharr et al., 2000; Torcal & Montero, 2006). The populist discourse taps into that feeling of disenchantment caused by the gap between promise and performance in democracy[115] (cf. Canovan, 1999) and exploits it. In fact, McCoy, Rahman and Somer (2018) point out that it precisely "serves to link a series of unsatisfied demands and forms a collective

[114] Pickel (2013) already found that while the concept of democracy was widely popular in Germany, many people were not so happy with the effectiveness, transparency and responsiveness of the government (p. 165).

[115] Recent research suggests that the gap between the democratic ideal and reality is largest in more unequal countries (Schäfer, 2013, p. 4).

identity around 'the people,' in opposition to an elite accused of frustrating their interests" (p. 20). Accordingly, populists present themselves as the representatives of "the people." Whereas "the elite" usually includes the established parties, mass media, intellectuals and the upper class, it is not always quite clear what exactly "the people" encompasses. (cf. Mudde, 2004, 2007; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2011, 2013; Rovira Kaltwasser, 2011; Spittler, 2018).

Instead of questioning the overall legitimacy of the regime, citizens who feel the government has failed them over and over might be inclined to support right-wing populist parties to seek improvement (Kitschelt, 2010, p. 663; Somer & McCoy, 2018, p. 6; cf. Perrella, 2005). In fact, Katnik (2002) found that those who are least satisfied with democracy are more tolerant of revolutionaries. Citizen's conception and evaluation of democracy are two separate things (Kriesi, 2018, p. 62; cf. Ferrín & Kriesi). *Actually, people who are dissatisfied with how democracy is functioning in their country might conclude that there is too little democracy and that more – rather than less democracy – is the solution to alleviate their grievances!* This is exactly what populists promise: to give power back the people. How people understand and what they expect from democracy has something to do with their social position:

> "Low-status individuals living under liberal democratic democracies are less likely to see a liberal democratic understanding of 'democracy' as sufficient and complete, and are more likely to espouse more demanding meanings, particularly if they serve to challenge the social and political state of affairs...It is easy to see how understandings of democracy that stress 'social justice,' including protection against poverty and reduction of income of differences, besides (or instead of) liberal democratic rights, may be seen as more desirable for low-status individuals then for high-status ones" (Ceka & Magalhães, 2016, pp. 93-95).

In other words, disaffection more likely invokes demands for social- than for liberal democracy (Kriesi, 2018, pp. 77-78). Against this backdrop, the results of the analysis that suggest that social-cultural polarization actually mobilizes people makes complete sense.

I have shown that ideological polarization is not a threat to democracy, at least not as big as it is often claimed. It can even have positive effects. The vote for radical right-wing populists seems most of all to be motivated by fear and a distinct set of grievances. Individuals who vote for right-wing populists often show deep concerns about both their economic situation and recent cultural developments. They are not only grappling with economic changes that have weakened their income or job security but also shifts in the cultural frameworks that people use to interpret what is most valued in society and their place within it. The disaffection that stems from supposedly inadequate representation in the political system is the reason for the recent electoral success of populist parties (cf. Kriesi, 2020). In other words, those individuals whose social status is at risk tend to vote for right-wing populist parties that promise to exclude per-

ceived freeloaders and/or outsiders, provide jobs and social protection and reverse current cultural trends (Beramendi, et al., 2015a, p. 394; Inglehart, 2021, p. 9; Margalit, 2019, p. 166; cf. Gidron & Hall, 2017).

Their numbers may be too small to affect the average civicness level in a population, but their deteriorating civic attitudes should not be taken lightly. These individuals can still influence election results in favor of right-wing populist parties, especially if anger mobilizes them in disproportionate shares. In essence, the recent success of right-wing populism with its anti-democratic tendencies is really a cry for attention from those who believe that they have been ignored by politics. It is a revolt of the disenfranchised, a reactionary episode reflecting the frustration of certain people who feel economically disadvantaged and culturally left behind. The experience of personal inefficacy nurtures the belief that political elites do not care about the welfare of their citizens. Existing evidence does in fact indicate that the electoral success of right-wing populist parties does not result from a general increase of these attitudes in the populations of the mature democracies but from the mobilization potential of right-wing populist parties. They are successful in remobilizing those who are deeply disaffected with the political elites or the mainstream parties, for that matter had previously abstained from voting (Downes & Wiebrecht, 2020; Leininger & Meijers, 2020; Liddiard, 2019; Schulte-Cloos & Leininger, 2022).

As long as the support for democracy as the legitimate political order remains strong and widespread in the mature democracies of the West, dissatisfaction with its performance poses no imminent danger of deconsolidation. That is not to say that high levels of political dissatisfaction, over a long enough time, can gradually erode even the strongest underlying support for the political system (Eith, 2001, p. 27; Weßels, 2015, p. 94; cf. Easton, 1965, 1975; Pickel, 2013). But as long as about 75% of a population continue to be democratic in their attitudes and behavior, democracy should remain stable, even in times of crises like the ones that we are currently experiencing (cf. Diamond, 1999; Pickel & Pickel, 2016).

To overcome the current crisis of democracy, our democratic societies have to be more inclusive. Material inclusion alone, that is redistribution, will not fix our problems, though. As societies we need to figure out a way to better deal with people's (broken) identities. Identity politics is a central part of the social question because economic exploitation and cultural discrimination are closely related. What we are experiencing is not only the result of a failed social policy but

perhaps even more so the result of neglecting identity and status issues. A double marginalization is happening. It is not only economic but also cultural alienation that disrupt democratic societies around the world (cf. Charim, 2019; Gidron & Hall, 2020). Concretely,

> "it will require *both* [emphasis in original] economic measures aimed at improving the material situation of people disadvantaged by the current technological revolution and a sustained symbolic politics built on national narratives that accord respect to all groups and regions within the national community" (Gidron & Hall, 2020, p. 1049).

Even though I believe that my research gives some important insights into the study of polarization and its effects on democracy, I want to point out some limitations of this study that may have an influence on the generalizability of the results. Particular issues include data availability and measurement issues as well as selection bias. First, the availability of data is always an issue in quantitative research. Even though the WVS covers 120 countries over a span of 39 years, the irregularity with which some of them have been surveyed presented me with a challenge as a researcher. For example, to ensure an adequate sample size, I was not able to measure socio-cultural polarization and civic culture as delta variables (i.e., measuring the changes in polarization and civic culture over time), but only as level variables (i.e., measuring socio-cultural polarization and civic culture at a certain point in time). Thus, I could not directly analyze how change in one variable affects change in the other variable. I had to make that inference by looking at the results of all the descriptive and correlational evidence I collected. Although the combination of TSCS data is a powerful analytical strategy to analyze data that vary over two dimensions (i.e., time and space), the particular structure of the data set also limited me in designing my research.

Second, measurement issues may limit the generalizability of the results. One issue that always comes up in the context of survey research is the transfer of micro-level data to the macro-level by aggregation because of its susceptibility to error (cf. chpt. 4.3.). Moreover, because political culture researchers mostly deal with latent concepts that are not directly measurable, they are sometimes forced to operationalize them by combining multiple indicators (i.e., question items) that measure aspects of these latent concepts into a single index, which has several drawbacks (cf. Greco et al., 2019; Santeramo, 2016). The construction of indices can help to reduce complexity, but sometimes it is difficult to select (suitable) indicators for reasons such as data availability. I chose the issue dimensions and the different indicators I combined to measure them to the best of my knowledge and belief, but I cannot be sure that I did not make some mistake. As a result, measures may lack validity, meaning that they do not accurately measure what they

are supposed to measure, which may distort the results. Future research may address this problem by testing whether the results are robust to changes in the composition of the different issue dimensions or by choosing completely different issue dimensions altogether.

Also, measuring polarization turned out to be quite challenging because it cannot be measured directly. Even though the notion of polarization has a long tradition in social science research, to date there exists no standardized way of measuring it (cf. chpt. 4.2.). I believe that the concept cannot be appropriately described, much less predicted, by traditional inequality measures (such as inequality and fractionalization indices) because it captures the distribution of power rather than of resources. Most of the polarization measures that have been proposed are unidimensional, but to capture the interplay between inequality dynamics and people's value orientations, I needed a multidimensional measure that allowed me to include more than just one attribute into the calculation. I constructed such a multidimensional polarization measure based on the idea that polarization is the result of increasing within-group identification and between-group alienation. Polarization increases as the subgroups of a population become more equal in size, more homogeneous within and more distant from each other. This is also why group size matters. Although I do not by any means claim that this measure is completely accurate, I believe that it addresses some of the shortcomings of traditional polarization measures and is thus a step towards establishing more comprehensive measures of polarization. Future research should continue to address the shortcomings of traditional polarization measures when polarization cannot be adequately captured by just one attribute. This brings me to another limitation: measurement reliability

Even though survey researchers design their survey questionnaires with great care and usually test them before they start the actual data collection process, they can never be entirely sure that the individual questions function the same way everywhere. This is why survey research is often criticized as being prone to measurement error. The meaning of a question may change with translation and introduce variation in participants' understanding of survey questions. Similarly, frequency scales or subjective rating scales may be interpreted differently across countries (cf. Avvisati et al., 2019). As a result, cross-national comparability of the research findings may be limited if the results are based on answers that are not comparable to begin with (cf. Pickel & Pickel, 2006). For example, Delhey et al. (2011) point out that the standard question of general trust in others ("Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?") is only partly a valid measure of trust in others because people in different countries and cultures have a different understanding

of what “most people” actually means. I tried to account for this by including different indicators to measure the same concept (cf. chpt. 4.2.).

Moreover, constructs measured through self-reports like subjective social class are particularly prone to measurement error and, thus, often critiqued as not sufficiently reliable (cf. Avvisati et al., 2019). I cannot be entirely sure that the five answer options given to people (i.e., lower class, working class, lower middle class, upper middle class and upper class) have the same meaning everywhere or evoke the same connotations everywhere. People’s self-assessment of their rank in the social hierarchy may be dependent on a context-specific (i.e., linguistic) usage of the social class labels and broader cultural differences. Although Alexander and Welzel (2017) found that the association of people’s subjective class membership with objective indicators of socio-economic status is remarkably strong when they tested it in seven mature democracies, doubts still remain. For example, it is entirely possible that respondents identify as working class simply because they work for a living, regardless of their subjective position in the social hierarchy (cf. Romero-Vidal, 2021).

To give you another example, a majority of the population in Germany claims to be middle class. In fact, compared to their actual income, Germans show a considerable bias towards the middle, implying that those with a low income overestimate their position and those with high incomes tend to underestimate their relative social class positions. It is a cultural phenomenon. The population has a large affinity to the middle class. Even millionaires think they are middle class (cf. Rickens, 2018). Surveys have shown that Germans tend to think that rich people are always richer than they are because they never think of themselves as wealthy. It is the same in the United State, where a majority describe themselves as middle class. As a result, subjective class identity often does not adequately correspond to people’s objective class position (cf. Bellani et al., 2021; Kelly & Evans, 1995; Sosnaud et al., 2013).

By using both subjective social class identification and objective social status, I hoped to ensure the reliability of my results. Admittedly, tracking changes in socio-cultural polarization in the mature democracies of the West based on the objective class measure (cf. Tables 5.2.A-5.2.F in the Appendix) suggests a slightly more uniform rise in class polarization on all six issue dimension. In hindsight, a stronger focus on objective social rather than subjective social class

could have shed even more light on the link between socio-cultural polarization and civic culture. Even though the second set of regressions I ran for robustness checks does not indicate the need for an overall revision of the results.[116]

This said, even my operationalization of objective social status is not ironclad, as the correct measures continue to be a matter of intense debate. While there is no one-size-fits-all solution to this problem, future research should embrace this challenge, especially given the continued importance of the concepts of social class and social status in the context of the recent success of right-wing populist parties and the rise of anti-democratic tendencies in the mature democracies in the West (cf. Romero-Vidal, 2021). Romero-Vidal (2021) suggests, for example, that testing the strength of the association of people's subjective class membership with objective indicators of their socio-economic status prior to using them in an analysis could help researchers to interpret the results to make better and more generalizable inferences.

Third, it is always a challenge to take into account all potential challenges when modeling TSCS data. I tried to address adequately the methodological challenges potentially arising from unit heterogeneity, panel heteroscedasticity, contemporaneous correlation and temporal dependence with statistical tests and model specifications. However, sometimes those actions unintentionally insert bias into the results, thereby, limiting their generalizability. I also cannot be sure that I have not unknowingly omitted important variables from my analysis. That is why I am not claiming that the only factor responsible for the decline in civic culture is the growing polarization between those who believe that they cannot participate equally, are not heard, and whose beliefs are not equally represented in society, and those people who feel the opposite is true. Actually, I may have even overestimated the effect of class polarization on the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimension by omitting important explanatory variables.

The aim of this study was to explore the effect of socio-cultural polarization on civic culture as a potential explanation for the recent success of right-wing populist parties and growing anti-democratic tendencies in the mature democracies of the West. Although this study does not establish any causal relationship, the results suggest that the root cause of the current crisis of democracy in the established democracies around the world is a growing division in the populations about whether the country's elites can still be trusted with increasing people's quality of

[116] Even when based on the more objective class measure, rising socio-cultural polarization still has a significantly negative effect only on a very limited number of civic culture indicators.

life. Economic grievances lead to value alienation, which, in turn, lead to bigger group hostilities and growing cynicism about the justice of the system. This division negatively affects some important aspects of civic culture, particularly individual liberty and subjective well-being. Therefore, concentrating on what causes polarization on the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimension in the first place seems to be a promising avenue for future research.

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Country	Regime Type
Australia	Liberal Democracy
Austria	Liberal Democracy
Belgium	Liberal Democracy
Canada	Liberal Democracy
Chile	Electoral Democracy
Colombia	Electoral Democracy
Czech Republic	Electoral Democracy
Denmark	Liberal Democracy
Estonia	Liberal Democracy
Finland	Liberal Democracy
France	Liberal Democracy
Germany	Liberal Democracy
Greece	Liberal Democracy
Hungary	Electoral Autocracy
Iceland	Liberal Democracy
Ireland	Liberal Democracy
Israel	Liberal Democracy
Italy	Liberal Democracy
Japan	Liberal Democracy
Latvia	Liberal Democracy
Lithuania	Electoral Democracy
Luxembourg	Liberal Democracy
Mexico	Electoral Democracy
Netherlands	Liberal Democracy
New Zealand	Liberal Democracy
Norway	Liberal Democracy
Poland	Electoral Democracy
Portugal	Electoral Democracy
Slovakia	Electoral Democracy
Slovenia	Electoral Democracy
South Korea	Liberal Democracy
Spain	Liberal Democracy
Sweden	Liberal Democracy
Switzerland	Liberal Democracy
Turkey	Electoral Autocracy
United Kingdom	Liberal Democracy
United States	Liberal Democracy

Table 2.1.A: Classification of OECD countries based on the V-Dem Regime of the World measure (v11.1). It classifies a political regime considering the competitiveness of access to power (polyarchy) as well as liberal principles (cf. Lührmann et al., 2018)

Survey Year	Country	Regime Type
1981-1984	Argentina	Electoral Democracy
1989-1993	Argentina	Electoral Democracy
1994-1998	Argentina	Electoral Democracy
1999-2004	Argentina	Electoral Democracy
2005-2009	Argentina	Electoral Democracy
2010-2014	Argentina	Electoral Democracy
2017-2020	Argentina	Electoral Democracy
1981-1984	Australia	Liberal Democracy
1994-1998	Australia	Liberal Democracy
2005-2009	Australia	Liberal Democracy
2010-2014	Australia	Liberal Democracy
2017-2020	Australia	Liberal Democracy
1994-1998	Bosnia amd Herzegovina	Electoral Democracy
1999-2004	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Electoral Democracy
1989-1993	Brazil	Electoral Democracy
1994-1998	Brazil	Electoral Democracy
2005-2009	Brazil	Electoral Democracy
2010-2014	Brazil	Electoral Democracy
2017-2020	Brazil	Electoral Democracy
1994-1998	Bulgaria	Electoral Democracy
2005-2009	Bulgaria	Electoral Democracy
1981-1984	Canada	Liberal Democracy
1989-1993	Canada	Liberal Democracy
1999-2004	Canada	Liberal Democracy
2005-2009	Canada	Liberal Democracy
1989-1993	Chile	Electoral Democracy
1994-1998	Chile	Liberal Democracy
1999-2004	Chile	Liberal Democracy
2005-2009	Chile	Liberal Democracy
2010-2014	Chile	Liberal Democracy
2017-2020	Chile	Liberal Democracy
1994-1998	Colombia	Electoral Democracy
2005-2009	Colombia	Electoral Democracy
2010-2014	Colombia	Electoral Democracy
2017-2020	Colombia	Electoral Democracy
2005-2009	Cyprus	Liberal Democracy
2010-2014	Cyprus	Liberal Democracy
2017-2020	Cyprus	Liberal Democracy
1989-1993	Czech Rep.	Liberal Democracy
1994-1998	Czech Rep.	Liberal Democracy
2010-2014	Ecuador	Electoral Democracy
2017-2020	Ecuador	Electoral Democracy
1994-1998	Estonia	Liberal Democracy
2010-2014	Estonia	Liberal Democracy
1981-1984	Finland	Liberal Democracy
1994-1998	Finland	Liberal Democracy
2005-2009	Finland	Liberal Democracy
1994-1998	Georgia	Electoral Autocracy
2005-2009	Georgia	Electoral Democracy
2010-2014	Georgia	Electoral Democracy
1994-1998	Germany	Liberal Democracy
2005-2009	Germany	Liberal Democracy
2010-2014	Germany	Liberal Democracy

2017-2020	Germany	Liberal Democracy
2005-2009	Ghana	Liberal Democracy
2010-2014	Ghana	Liberal Democracy
2005-2009	Guatemala	Electoral Democracy
2017-2020	Guatemala	Electoral Democracy
1981-1984	Hungary	Closed Autocracy
1994-1998	Hungary	Liberal Democracy
2005-2009	Hungary	Liberal Democracy
1989-1993	India	Electoral Democracy
1994-1998	India	Electoral Democracy
1999-2004	India	Electoral Democracy
2005-2009	India	Electoral Democracy
2010-2014	India	Electoral Democracy
1999-2004	Indonesia	Electoral Democracy
2005-2009	Indonesia	Electoral Democracy
2017-2020	Indonesia	Electoral Democracy
1981-1984	Japan	Liberal Democracy
1989-1993	Japan	Liberal Democracy
1994-1998	Japan	Liberal Democracy
1999-2004	Japan	Liberal Democracy
2005-2009	Japan	Liberal Democracy
2010-2014	Japan	Liberal Democracy
2017-2020	Japan	Liberal Democracy
1981-1984	Mexico	Electoral Autocracy
1989-1993	Mexico	Electoral Autocracy
1994-1998	Mexico	Electoral Democracy
1999-2004	Mexico	Electoral Democracy
2005-2009	Mexico	Electoral Democracy
2010-2014	Mexico	Electoral Democracy
2017-2020	Mexico	Electoral Democracy
1994-1998	Moldova	Electoral Democracy
1999-2004	Moldova	Electoral Democracy
2005-2009	Moldova	Electoral Autocracy
2005-2009	Netherlands	Liberal Democracy
2010-2014	Netherlands	Liberal Democracy
1994-1998	New Zealand	Liberal Democracy
2005-2009	New Zealand	Liberal Democracy
2010-2014	New Zealand	Liberal Democracy
2017-2020	New Zealand	Liberal Democracy
1994-1998	Norway	Liberal Democracy
2005-2009	Norway	Liberal Democracy
1994-1998	Peru	Electoral Autocracy
1999-2004	Peru	Electoral Democracy
2005-2009	Peru	Electoral Democracy
2010-2014	Peru	Electoral Democracy
2017-2020	Peru	Electoral Democracy
1994-1998	Philippines	Electoral Democracy
1999-2004	Philippines	Electoral Democracy
2010-2014	Philippines	Electoral Democracy
2017-2020	Philippines	Electoral Autocracy
1989-1993	Poland	Electoral Autocracy
1994-1998	Poland	Liberal Democracy
2005-2009	Poland	Liberal Democracy
2010-2014	Poland	Liberal Democracy

1994-1998	Romania	Electoral Democracy
2005-2009	Romania	Electoral Democracy
2010-2014	Romania	Electoral Democracy
2017-2020	Romania	Electoral Democracy
1994-1998	Serbia	Electoral Autocracy
1999-2004	Serbia	Electoral Democracy
2005-2009	Serbia	Electoral Democracy
2017-2020	Serbia	Electoral Autocracy
1994-1998	Slovenia	Liberal Democracy
2005-2009	Slovenia	Liberal Democracy
2010-2014	Slovenia	Liberal Democracy
1981-1984	South Africa	Electoral Autocracy
1989-1993	South Africa	Closed Autocracy
1994-1998	South Africa	Liberal Democracy
1999-2004	South Africa	Liberal Democracy
2005-2009	South Africa	Liberal Democracy
2010-2014	South Africa	Electoral Democracy
1981-1984	South Korea	Electoral Autocracy
1989-1993	South Korea	Electoral Democracy
1994-1998	South Korea	Liberal Democracy
1999-2004	South Korea	Liberal Democracy
2005-2009	South Korea	Liberal Democracy
2010-2014	South Korea	Liberal Democracy
2017-2020	South Korea	Liberal Democracy
1989-1993	Spain	Liberal Democracy
1994-1998	Spain	Liberal Democracy
1999-2004	Spain	Liberal Democracy
2005-2009	Spain	Liberal Democracy
2010-2014	Spain	Liberal Democracy
1981-1984	Sweden	Liberal Democracy
1994-1998	Sweden	Liberal Democracy
1999-2004	Sweden	Liberal Democracy
2005-2009	Sweden	Liberal Democracy
2010-2014	Sweden	Liberal Democracy
1989-1993	Switzerland	Liberal Democracy
1994-1998	Switzerland	Liberal Democracy
2005-2009	Switzerland	Liberal Democracy
1994-1998	Taiwan	Electoral Democracy
2005-2009	Taiwan	Liberal Democracy
2010-2014	Taiwan	Liberal Democracy
2017-2020	Taiwan	Liberal Democracy
2005-2009	Trinidad and Tobago	Electoral Democracy
2010-2014	Trinidad and Tobago	Electoral Democracy
2010-2014	Tunisia	Electoral Democracy
2017-2020	Tunisia	Electoral Democracy
1989-1993	Turkey	Electoral Democracy
1994-1998	Turkey	Electoral Democracy
1999-2004	Turkey	Electoral Democracy
2005-2009	Turkey	Electoral Democracy
2010-2014	Turkey	Electoral Democracy
2017-2020	Turkey	Electoral Autocracy
1994-1998	Ukraine	Electoral Democracy
2005-2009	Ukraine	Electoral Democracy
2010-2014	Ukraine	Electoral Autocracy

2017-2020	Ukraine	Electoral Democracy
1981-1984	United States	Liberal Democracy
1989-1993	United States	Liberal Democracy
1994-1998	United States	Liberal Democracy
1999-2004	United States	Liberal Democracy
2005-2009	United States	Liberal Democracy
2010-2014	United States	Liberal Democracy
2017-2020	United States	Liberal Democracy
1994-1998	Uruguay	Liberal Democracy
2005-2009	Uruguay	Liberal Democracy
2010-2014	Uruguay	Liberal Democracy
1994-1998	Venezuela	Electoral Democracy
1999-2004	Venezuela	Electoral Democracy

Table 4.2.A: Classification of Entire Country Sample based on the V-Dem Regime of the World measure (v11.1). It classifies a political regime considering the competitiveness of access to power (polyarchy) as well as liberal principles (cf. Lührmann et al., 2018)

	Deregulation vs. Intervention	Security vs. Liberty	Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	Economy vs. Ecology
Deregulation vs. Intervention	1.000					
Security vs. Liberty	0.003	1.000				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	-0.046	0.237	1.000			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	-0.040	0.187	0.246	1.000		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	0.002	-0.081	-0.055	0.025	1.000	
Economy vs. Ecology	-0.029	0.105	0.072	0.098	0.004	1.000

Table 4.2.B: Correlation matrix issue dimensions (observations: 82,354)

	Factor1	Factor2	Uniqueness
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	0.6894	-0.1181	0.5108
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.6664	0.1786	0.5239
Security vs. Liberty	0.6369	-0.2800	0.5160
Economy vs. Ecology	0.3881	0.2564	0.7836
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	-0.0768	0.8307	0.3040
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.1646	-0.3957	0.8163

Table 4.2.C: Factor analysis using principal component analysis with varimax (orthogonal) rotation (observations: 82,354); table shows rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances (sorted)

	Income Inequality	Business Ownership	Welfare
Income Inequality	1.000		
Business Ownership	-0.018	1.000	
Welfare	0.154	0.090	1.000

Table 4.2.D: Deregulation vs. Intervention index indicator correlation matrix (observations: 214,931)

	Liberty1	Liberty2	Security1	Security2	Security3
Liberty1	1.000				
Liberty2	0.238	1.000			
Security1	-0.404	-0.092	1.000		
Security2	-0.214	-0.640	0.101	1.000	
Security3	-0.052	-0.139	0.047	0.051	1.000

Table 4.2.E: Security vs. Liberty index indicator correlation matrix (observations: 209,945)

	Homosexuality	Abortion	Divorce
Homosexuality	1.000		
Abortion	0.520	1.000	
Divorce	0.529	0.598	1.000

Table 4.2.F: Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation index indicator correlation matrix (observations: 228,359)

	Jobs for migrants	**Immigration**
Jobs for migrants	1.000	
Immigration	0.194	1.000

Table 4.2.G: Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism index indicator correlation matrix (observations: 147,597)

	Armed forces	**Judicial system**	**Police**	**Parliament**	**Political parties**	**Government**	**Civil service**
Armed forces	1.000						
Judicial system	0.384	1.000					
Police	0.412	0.562	1.000				
Parliament	0.303	0.498	0.422	1.000			
Political parties	0.251	0.422	0.367	0.660	1.000		
Government	0.317	0.503	0.449	0.640	0.563	1.000	
Civil service	0.336	0.476	0.424	0.581	0.485	0.490	1.000

Table 4.2.H: Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment index indicator correlation matrix (observations: 172,766)

	Average Active Membership in Utilitarian Organizations	Average Passive Membership in Utilitarian Organizations	Average Active Membership in Sociotropic Organizations	Average Passive Membership in Sociotropic Organizations
Argentina	0.03	0.06	0.07	0.09
Australia	0.1	0.11	0.19	0.16
Bosnia Herzegovina	0.09	0.21	0.09	0.18
Brazil	0.06	0.06	0.16	0.09
Bulgaria	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.02
Canada	0.12	0.11	0.2	0.14
Chile	0.04	0.11	0.12	0.15
Colombia	0.05	0.11	0.17	0.14
Cyprus	0.07	0.1	0.08	0.09
Czech Rep.	0.03	0.07	0.04	0.07
Ecuador	0.05	0.05	0.11	0.1
Estonia	0.01	0.05	0.04	0.06
Finland	0.04	0.21	0.09	0.23
Georgia	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
Germany	0.04	0.06	0.11	0.12
Ghana	0.09	0.18	0.24	0.16
Guatemala	0.07	0.16	0.21	0.25
Hungary	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.03
India	0.1	0.23	0.11	0.23
Indonesia	0.09	0.1	0.23	0.17
Japan	0.03	0.07	0.06	0.05
Mexico	0.08	0.11	0.17	0.16
Moldova	0.04	0.1	0.06	0.08
Netherlands	0.02	0.09	0.13	0.12
New Zealand	0.09	0.12	0.2	0.16
Norway	0.09	0.21	0.12	0.15
Peru	0.04	0.05	0.11	0.1
Philippines	0.07	0.07	0.14	0.11
Poland	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.07
Romania	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.05
Serbia	0.03	0.1	0.04	0.08
Slovenia	0.05	0.09	0.08	0.09
South Africa	0.09	0.23	0.2	0.23
South Korea	0.02	0.06	0.09	0.17
Spain	0.02	0.05	0.07	0.07
Sweden	0.07	0.22	0.12	0.18
Switzerland	0.08	0.1	0.17	0.18
Taiwan	0.05	0.15	0.09	0.15
Trinidad and Tobago	0.05	0.13	0.18	0.18
Tunisia	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.04
Turkey	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02
Ukraine	0.02	0.08	0.03	0.06
United States	0.12	0.17	0.17	0.15
Uruguay	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.07
Venezuela	0.06	0.09	0.12	0.13

Table 5.1.A: Table reports country means of average membership in two types of organizations over the period from 1981 to 2020. Data are from WVS rounds 1 to 7. Country list is sorted in alphabetical order.

Country Means of Civic Culture Indicators

Country	Preference for Democracy	Trust (%)	Volunteering Utilitarian Organizations (%)	Belonging Utilitarian Organizations (%)	Volunteering Sociotropic Organizations (%)	Belonging Sociotropic Organizations (%)	Life Control	Life Satisfaction	Social Movement Activity
New Zealand	0.82	0.54	0.23	0.29	0.62	0.52	0.76	0.74	0.52
Switzerland	0.78	0.44	0.20	0.24	0.56	0.53	0.71	0.79	0.41
Norway	0.84	0.70	0.20	0.46	0.45	0.52	0.72	0.76	0.52
Australia	0.78	0.49	0.25	0.26	0.58	0.50	0.73	0.73	0.49
Canada	0.77	0.45	0.28	0.22	0.57	0.42	0.73	0.76	0.48
United States	0.72	0.40	0.29	0.39	0.53	0.48	0.74	0.72	0.48
Sweden	0.82	0.63	0.18	0.53	0.45	0.60	0.72	0.75	0.54
Netherlands	0.70	0.56	0.06	0.23	0.49	0.42	0.64	0.73	0.35
Finland	0.71	0.55	0.11	0.50	0.36	0.77	0.73	0.76	0.35
Japan	0.72	0.40	0.08	0.17	0.23	0.19	0.53	0.63	0.32
Germany	0.82	0.39	0.11	0.16	0.41	0.43	0.66	0.69	0.45
India	0.61	0.31	0.21	0.35	0.29	0.41	0.61	0.57	0.30
Cyprus	0.71	0.10	0.17	0.21	0.26	0.28	0.69	0.67	0.32
Trinidad and Tobago	0.76	0.04	0.13	0.20	0.55	0.49	0.78	0.71	0.31
South Africa	0.67	0.22	0.19	0.41	0.66	0.56	0.67	0.63	0.25
Uruguay	0.70	0.22	0.08	0.10	0.27	0.25	0.72	0.71	0.22
Colombia	0.61	0.08	0.13	0.17	0.53	0.34	0.78	0.81	0.28
Chile	0.68	0.18	0.09	0.16	0.41	0.34	0.69	0.69	0.22
Spain	0.74	0.27	0.06	0.08	0.24	0.23	0.64	0.66	0.29
Slovenia	0.72	0.18	0.12	0.22	0.30	0.31	0.71	0.67	0.28
Philippines	0.55	0.06	0.16	0.15	0.41	0.33	0.66	0.67	0.14
Turkey	0.63	0.11	0.06	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.59	0.62	0.20
Moldova	0.56	0.18	0.10	0.26	0.23	0.31	0.58	0.40	0.19
Ecuador	0.56	0.07	0.11	0.10	0.35	0.32	0.75	0.76	0.15
Peru	0.65	0.07	0.10	0.09	0.38	0.34	0.70	0.66	0.25
Ukraine	0.55	0.29	0.05	0.21	0.11	0.19	0.56	0.49	0.17
Venezuela	0.69	0.15	0.13	0.15	0.40	0.35	0.79	0.68	0.19
Georgia	0.62	0.15	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.09	0.59	0.45	0.17
South Korea	0.61	0.32	0.05	0.14	0.31	0.50	0.64	0.59	0.33
Czech Republic	0.77	0.29	0.09	0.19	0.19	0.26	0.58	0.60	0.23

Brazil	0.57	0.06	0.15	0.14	0.55	0.35	0.73	0.72	0.35
Argentina	0.70	0.21	0.07	0.12	0.25	0.25	0.71	0.70	0.24
Estonia	0.68	0.31	0.04	0.14	0.15	0.22	0.57	0.51	0.22
Poland	0.68	0.24	0.06	0.10	0.21	0.17	0.62	0.64	0.23
Guatemala	0.56	0.17	0.15	0.24	0.61	0.60	0.73	0.75	0.19
Taiwan	0.59	0.31	0.12	0.30	0.29	0.41	0.71	0.64	0.18
Hungary	0.76	0.28	0.10	0.06	0.16	0.12	0.59	0.58	0.19
Ghana	0.85	0.07	0.23	0.39	0.77	0.49	0.70	0.59	0.14
Indonesia	0.69	0.33	0.22	0.22	0.59	0.50	0.72	0.68	0.14
Mexico	0.58	0.20	0.18	0.20	0.50	0.46	0.77	0.78	0.22
Bulgaria	0.56	0.25	0.07	0.10	0.04	0.06	0.50	0.44	0.17
Romania	0.59	0.14	0.10	0.10	0.15	0.16	0.71	0.57	0.18
Serbia	0.70	0.20	0.07	0.23	0.15	0.29	0.59	0.55	0.30
Tunisia	0.68	0.15	0.02	0.06	0.06	0.09	0.60	0.51	0.14

Table 5.1.B: Table reports country means of civic culture indicators over the period from 1981 to 2020. Data are from WVS rounds 1 to 7. Country list is sorted by democratic experience (i.e., Gerring et al.'s Democratic Stock Index; values equivalent to WVS 7; no values for Bosnia & Herzegovina)

Country Means of Civic Culture Indicators

Region	Country	Preference for Democracy	Trust (%)	Volunteering Utilitarian Organizations (%)	Belonging Utilitarian Organizations (%)	Volunteering Sociotropic Organizations (%)	Belonging Sociotropic Organizations (%)	Life Control	Life Satisfaction	Social Movement Activity
					The Americas					
North America	Canada	0.77	0.45	0.28	0.22	0.57	0.42	0.73	0.76	0.48
	United St.	0.72	0.40	0.29	0.39	0.53	0.48	0.74	0.72	0.48
Central America	Mexico	0.58	0.20	0.18	0.20	0.50	0.46	0.77	0.78	0.22
	Guatemala	0.56	0.17	0.15	0.24	0.61	0.60	0.73	0.75	0.19
South America	Argentina	0.70	0.21	0.07	0.12	0.25	0.25	0.71	0.70	0.24
	Brazil	0.57	0.06	0.15	0.14	0.55	0.35	0.73	0.72	0.35
	Chile	0.68	0.18	0.09	0.16	0.41	0.34	0.69	0.69	0.22
	Colombia	0.61	0.08	0.13	0.17	0.53	0.34	0.78	0.81	0.28
	Ecuador	0.56	0.07	0.11	0.10	0.35	0.32	0.75	0.76	0.15
	Peru	0.65	0.07	0.10	0.09	0.38	0.34	0.70	0.66	0.25
	Uruguay	0.70	0.22	0.08	0.10	0.27	0.25	0.72	0.71	0.22
	Venezuela	0.69	0.15	0.13	0.15	0.40	0.35	0.79	0.68	0.19
Caribbean	Trinidad & T.	0.76	0.04	0.13	0.20	0.55	0.49	0.78	0.71	0.31
					Europe					
Northern Europe	Finland	0.71	0.55	0.11	0.50	0.36	0.77	0.73	0.76	0.35
	Norway	0.84	0.70	0.20	0.46	0.45	0.52	0.72	0.76	0.52
	Sweden	0.82	0.63	0.18	0.53	0.45	0.60	0.72	0.75	0.54
Central Europe	Switzerland	0.78	0.44	0.20	0.24	0.56	0.53	0.71	0.79	0.41
	Netherlands	0.70	0.56	0.06	0.23	0.49	0.42	0.64	0.73	0.35
	Germany	0.82	0.39	0.11	0.16	0.41	0.43	0.66	0.69	0.45
Southern Europe	Spain	0.74	0.27	0.06	0.08	0.24	0.23	0.64	0.66	0.29
	Cyprus	0.71	0.10	0.17	0.21	0.26	0.28	0.69	0.67	0.32

Eastern Europe	Bulgaria	0.56	0.25	0.07	0.10	0.04	0.06	0.50	0.44	0.17
	Bosnia & H.	0.68	0.22	0.21	0.38	0.33	0.45	0.56	0.51	0.29
	Czech Rep.	0.77	0.29	0.09	0.19	0.19	0.26	0.58	0.60	0.23
	Hungary	0.76	0.28	0.10	0.06	0.16	0.12	0.59	0.58	0.19
	Poland	0.68	0.24	0.06	0.10	0.21	0.17	0.62	0.64	0.23
	Estonia	0.68	0.31	0.04	0.14	0.15	0.22	0.57	0.51	0.22
	Georgia	0.62	0.15	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.09	0.59	0.45	0.17
	Moldova	0.56	0.18	0.10	0.26	0.23	0.31	0.58	0.40	0.19
	Romania	0.59	0.14	0.10	0.10	0.15	0.16	0.71	0.57	0.18
	Serbia	0.70	0.20	0.07	0.23	0.15	0.29	0.59	0.55	0.30
	Slovenia	0.72	0.18	0.12	0.22	0.30	0.31	0.71	0.67	0.28
	Ukraine	0.55	0.29	0.05	0.21	0.11	0.19	0.56	0.49	0.17
						The Middle East				
Middle East	Turkey	0.63	0.11	0.06	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.59	0.62	0.20
						Africa				
North Africa	Tunisia	0.68	0.15	0.02	0.06	0.06	0.09	0.60	0.51	0.14
Sub-Saharan Africa	Ghana	0.85	0.07	0.23	0.39	0.77	0.49	0.70	0.59	0.14
	South Africa	0.67	0.22	0.19	0.41	0.66	0.56	0.67	0.63	0.25
						Asia				
East Asia	South Korea	0.61	0.32	0.05	0.14	0.31	0.50	0.64	0.59	0.33
	Japan	0.72	0.40	0.08	0.17	0.23	0.19	0.53	0.63	0.32
	Taiwan	0.59	0.31	0.12	0.30	0.29	0.41	0.71	0.64	0.18
South Asia	India	0.61	0.31	0.21	0.35	0.29	0.41	0.61	0.57	0.30
Southeast Asia	Indonesia	0.69	0.33	0.22	0.22	0.59	0.50	0.72	0.68	0.14
	Philippines	0.55	0.06	0.16	0.15	0.41	0.33	0.66	0.67	0.14
						Oceania				
Oceania	Australia	0.78	0.49	0.25	0.26	0.58	0.50	0.73	0.73	0.49
	New Zealand	0.82	0.54	0.23	0.29	0.62	0.52	0.76	0.74	0.52

Table 5.1.C: Table reports country means of civic culture indicators over the period from 1981 to 2020. Data are from WVS rounds 1 to 7. Country list is sorted by geographic region



Figure 5.1.A: Average active membership in utilitarian organizations by subjective social class (1981-2020)



Figure 5.1.B: Average passive membership in utilitarian organizations by subjective social class (1981-2020)



Figure 5.1.C: Average active membership in sociotropic organizations by subjective social class (1981-2020)



Figure 5.1.D: Average passive membership in sociotropic organizations by subjective social class (1981-2020)



Figure 5.1.E: Social movement activity by subjective social class (1981-2020)

Preference for Democracy over Autocracy by Objective Social Class



Note: Graph shows the mean preference for democracy over autocracy by objective social class. Change shown from the early 1980s to most recently. Empty colunms mean no observations for that particular year.

Figure 5.1.F: Preference for democracy over autocracy by objective social class (1981-2020)

General Trust in People by Objective Social Class



Note: Graph shows share of population that says most people can be trusted by objective social class. Change shown from the early 1980s to most recently. Empty colunms mean no observations for that particular year.

Figure 5.1.G: Trust in most people by objective social class (1981-2020)



Figure 5.1.H: Average active membership in utilitarian organizations by objective social class (1981-2020)



Figure 5.1.I: Average passive membership in utilitarian organizations by objective social class (1981-2020)

Volunteering in Sociotropic Organizations by Objective Social Class



Note: Graph shows distribution of average active memberships in sociotropic organizations by objective social class. Change shown from the early 1980s to most recently. Empty colunms mean no observations for that particular year.

Figure 5.1.J: Average active membership in sociotropic organizations by objective social class (1981-2020)

Belonging to Sociotropic Organizations by Objective Social Class



Note: Graph shows distribution of average passive memberships in sociotropic organizations by objective social class. Change shown from the early 1980s to most recently. Empty colunms mean no observations for that particular year.

Figure 5.1.K: Average passive membership in sociotropic organizations by objective social class (1981-2020)

Feeling of Control over Life by Objective Social Class



Note: Graph shows mean level of people's feeling of control over their lives by objective social class. Change shown from the early 1980s to most recently. Empty colunms mean no observations for that particular year.

Figure 5.1.L: Feeling of control over own life by objective social class (1981-2020)

Feeling of Satisfaction with Life by Objective Social Class



Note: Graph shows mean level of people's feeling of satisfaction with their lives by objective social class. Change shown from the early 1980s to to most recently. Empty colunms mean no observations for that particular year.

Figure 5.1.M: Life satisfaction by objective social class (1981-2020)



Note: Graph shows mean level of socia movement activity by objective social class. Change shown from the early 1980s to most recently.
Empty colunms mean no observations for that particular year.

Figure 5.1.N: Social movement activity by objective social class (1981-2020)

Preference for Democracy (Table 5.1.D: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** <0.001)										
	Argentina	**Australia**	**Germany**	**Japan**	**Poland**	**South Africa**	**South Korea**	**Spain**	**Sweden**	**United States**
Wave 3										
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.13***	-0.10***	-0.19***	0.06	--	0.08***	0.05	-0.08*	0.01	-0.13***
Security vs. Liberty	0.24***	0.13***	0.24***	0.02	--	0.12***	0.16***	0.24***	0.17***	0.08**
Patriarchalis vs. Emancipation	0.21***	0.19***	0.27***	0.06	--	0.05*	0.10***	0.28***	0.25***	0.16***
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.19***	0.16***	0.27***	-0.03	--	-0.04*	-0.01	0.11***	0.24***	0.09**
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	0.08*	0.06*	0.06**	0.11**	--	0.14***	-0.01	0.03	0.23***	0.01
Economy vs. Ecology	0.15***	0.10***	0.14***	0.14***	--	-0.13***	0.04	0.11***	0.09*	0.08**
Observations	1078	2048	2026	1042	--	2932	1249	1208	1009	1541
Wave 5										
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.01	-0.03	-0.10***	-0.04	-0.16***	0.09***	0.04	0.19***	0.03	-0.18***
Security vs. Liberty	0.25***	0.09**	0.11***	0.05	0.06	-0.02	-0.03	0.19***	0.24***	0.06*
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	0.15***	0.16***	0.19***	0.13***	0.19***	-0.08***	-0.05	0.25***	0.24***	0.17***
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.10**	0.21***	0.25***	0.03	0.15***	-0.10***	-0.04	0.12***	0.25***	0.14***
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	-0.14***	0.07**	0.12***	0.07	0.06	0.05*	0.06*	-0.05	0.16***	0.07*
Economy vs. Ecology	0.06	0.18***	0.16***	0.18***	0.12**	-0.08***	0.04	0.23***	0.13***	0.13***
Observations	1000	1420	2064	1089	993	2988	1200	1195	1003	1232
Wave 7										
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.03	0.06**	0.02	-0.04	--	--	-0.05	--	--	-0.07***
Security vs. Liberty	0.10**	0.18***	0.10***	0.03	--	--	0.01	--	--	0.28***
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	0.24***	0.20***	0.14***	0.04	--	--	0.01	--	--	0.27***
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	-0.04	0.20***	0.18***	0.04	--	--	0.09**	--	--	0.27***
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	-0.15***	0.08**	0.12***	0.11***	--	--	-0.04	--	--	-0.03
Economy vs. Ecology	0.10**	0.16***	0.10***	0.11**	--	--	-0.07**	--	--	0.24***
Observations	1002	1810	1528	1342	--	--	1245	--	--	2590

General Trust (%) (Table 5.1.E: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** <0.001)										
	Argentina	**Australia**	**Germany**	**Japan**	**Poland**	**South Africa**	**South Korea**	**Spain**	**Sweden**	**United States**
					Wave 3					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.03	0.02	-0.14***	-0.06	-0.11***	0.04*	0.02	0	0.02	0
Security vs. Liberty	0.18***	0.13***	0.21***	0.05	0.04	0.06**	0.01	0.07*	0.12***	0.05
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	0.08*	0.14***	0.15***	0	0.05	0.02	-0.03	0.03	0.16***	0.13***
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.18***	0.15***	0.28***	0.11**	0.08*	0.10***	0.01	0.11***	0.20***	0.12***
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	0.08*	0.17***	0.13***	0.02	0.07*	0.05*	0.05	0.12***	0.18***	0.10***
Economy vs. Ecology	0.07*	0.07**	0.17***	0.12**	0.01	0.12***	0	0.11***	0.09**	0.14***
Observations	1079	2048	2026	1052	1151	2934	1249	1210	1008	1542
					Wave 5					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.04	-0.01	-0.10***	-0.05	-0.13***	--	-0.04	0.14***	0.04	-0.10***
Security vs. Liberty	0.05	0.11***	0.09***	0.02	0.03	--	0.03	0.07*	0.17***	0.08**
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	0.06	0.12***	0.15***	0.07*	0.07*	--	0.09**	0.09**	0.21***	0.06*
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.11***	0.21***	0.19***	0.06	0.14***	--	0.16***	0.17***	0.26***	0.12***
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	0.01	0.17***	0.15***	0.08*	0.13***	--	0.10***	0.07*	0.23***	0.15***
Economy vs. Ecology	0.06	0.11***	0.09***	0.10*	0.03	--	0.08*	0.09**	0.03	0.06*
Observations	1002	1421	2063	1095	998	--	1200	1199	1003	1243
					Wave 7					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	0.02	0.02	0.03	-0.01	--	--	0.02	--	--	0.03
Security vs. Liberty	0.16***	0.18***	0.20***	0.03	--	--	-0.05	--	--	0.13***
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	0.05	0.14***	0.10***	0.05	--	--	0.01	--	--	0.14***
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.16***	0.19***	0.24***	0.05	--	--	0.04	--	--	0.16***
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	0.11**	0.21***	0.27***	0.19***	--	--	0.06*	--	--	0.19***
Economy vs. Ecology	0.10**	0.14***	0.16***	0.03	--	--	0.06*	--	--	0.14***
Observations	1003	1810	1528	1352	--	--	1245	--	--	2592

Volunteering in Utilitarian Organizations (%) (Table 5.1.F: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 * <0.001)**

	Argentina	Australia	Germany	Japan	Poland	South Africa	South Korea	Spain	Sweden	United States
					Wave 3					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.04	-0.05*	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.11***	-0.07*	0.02	-0.01	-0.04
Security vs. Liberty	0.09**	0.07**	0.02	0.01	0.05	0.06***	0.01	0.15***	0.08*	0.03
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	-0.02	0.10***	-0.01	-0.06	0.02	-0.02	-0.00	0.12***	0.05	0.06*
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.06	0.04*	0.04	-0.03	0.00	0.00	0.06*	0.06*	0.04	0.03
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	0.13***	0.05*	0.01	0.09*	-0.04	0.05*	0.05	-0.05	0.03	0.08**
Economy vs. Ecology	0.08*	0.06*	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.05**	0.02	0.07*	-0.00	0.02
Observations	1079	2048	2026	1053	1153	2935	1249	1211	1009	1542
					Wave 5					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.05	-0.01	-0.07**	-0.02	-0.06	-0.07***	-0.10***	-0.06*	0.04	-0.06*
Security vs. Liberty	0.02	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.08*	0.04*	-0.02	-0.01	0.11***	0.05
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	0.06	0.13***	0.08***	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.05	-0.00
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.07*	0.05	0.08***	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.04	-0.04	0.05	-0.01
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.02	-0.06*	0.08*	0.06	0.01
Economy vs. Ecology	-0.05	0.02	0.01	-0.08	0.05	0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02
Observations	1002	1421	2064	1094	1000	2988	1200	1200	1003	1241
					Wave 7					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.03	0.01	-0.04	-0.06	--	--	0.00	--	--	-0.01
Security vs. Liberty	0.09**	0.08**	0.09***	-0.01	--	--	-0.00	--	--	0.04
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	0.06	0.07**	0.03	-0.02	--	--	-0.02	--	--	0.06**
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.06	0.03	0.04	0.02	--	--	0.07**	--	--	0.05*
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	0.02	0.03	-0.01	0.11***	--	--	0.04	--	--	0.10***
Economy vs. Ecology	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.06	--	--	0.06*	--	--	0.03
Observations	1003	1810	1528	1353	--	--	1245	--	--	2590

Belonging to Utilitarian Organizations (%) (Table 5.1.G: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 * <0.001)**

	Argentina	Australia	Germany	Japan	Poland	South Africa	South Korea	Spain	Sweden	United States
					Wave 3					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.03	-0.01	-0.00	-0.04	-0.03	0.03	-0.02	-0.06	0.05	-0.01
Security vs. Liberty	0.03	0.03	0.07**	-0.05	-0.00	0.07***	0.05	0.06	0.08*	-0.00
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	0.01	0.05*	0.04*	-0.09**	0.05	0.08***	-0.01	0.07*	0.11***	0.08**
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.04	0.06**	0.05*	-0.05	0.03	-0.03	0.03	0.02	0.06	0.03
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.06	-0.01	0.11***	0.02	-0.01	0.06	0.01
Economy vs. Ecology	0.07	0.06**	0.02	0.05	-0.02	0.03	-0.04	0.01	0.07*	0.02
Observations	1079	2048	2026	1053	1153	2935	1249	1211	1009	1542
					Wave 5					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.09**	0.06*	-0.03	-0.04	0.07*	0.07***	-0.05	-0.00	0.02	-0.06*
Security vs. Liberty	0.02	0.08**	0.05*	-0.00	0.01	0.05**	0.07**	0.06	0.08*	-0.02
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	0.03	0.02	0.12***	-0.13***	0.05	0.01	0.05	-0.03	0.06	0.04
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.03	0.09**	0.09***	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	-0.00	0.04	0.05	0.02
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	-0.04	0.00	0.07**	0.00	-0.03	0.03	-0.05	0.02	0.08*	0.06*
Economy vs. Ecology	0.01	0.02	0.06*	0.02	0.04	-0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.03
Observations	1002	1421	2064	1094	1000	2988	1200	1200	1003	1241
					Wave 7					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.00	--	--	-0.07*	--	--	0.02
Security vs. Liberty	0.06	0.07**	0.07*	-0.06*	--	--	0.02	--	--	0.03
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	-0.03	0.02	0.08**	-0.02	--	--	0.07*	--	--	0.08***
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.16***	0.09***	0.01	0.00	--	--	-0.01	--	--	0.01
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	0.12***	0.05*	0.04	0.01	--	--	-0.00	--	--	0.09***
Economy vs. Ecology	-0.08*	0.03	0.07*	-0.03	--	--	0.05	--	--	-0.00
Observations	1003	1810	1528	1353	--	--	1245	--	--	2590

Volunteering in Sociotropic Organizations (%) (Table 5.1.H: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 * <0.001)**

	Argentina	Australia	Germany	Japan	Poland	South Africa	South Korea	Spain	Sweden	United States
					Wave 3					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.03	-0.02	-0.12***	-0.01	--	-0.08***	-0.05	0.02	-0.11***	-0.02
Security vs. Liberty	0.11***	0.01	0.08***	0.04	--	0.02	0.11***	0.05	0.03	0.01
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	-0.03	-0.02	0.00	-0.02	--	-0.07***	-0.06*	-0.02	-0.02	-0.08**
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.06	0.06**	0.12***	0.04	--	0.02	0.01	0.08**	0.06	0.04
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	0.02	0.08**	0.13***	0.04	--	-0.02	0.04	-0.01	0.06	0.08**
Economy vs. Ecology	0.09**	0.07**	0.09***	0.06	--	0.06**	0.05	0.07*	0.07*	0.08**
Observations	1079	2048	2026	1053	--	2935	1249	1211	1009	1542
					Wave 5					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.01	-0.05	-0.11***	-0.02	-0.07*	-0.08***	-0.07**	-0.09**	-0.03	-0.11***
Security vs. Liberty	0.06	0.03	0.07**	0.02	0.07*	-0.01	-0.02	-0.15***	0.01	-0.04
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	-0.06	-0.03	0.05*	-0.08*	-0.01	-0.05**	-0.02	-0.16***	-0.01	-0.21***
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.06	0.09**	0.18***	0.03	0.08*	-0.02	0.06*	-0.02	0.05	0.09**
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	0.01	0.08**	0.11***	0.09**	0.05	-0.02	0.11***	0.08**	0.03	0.11***
Economy vs. Ecology	-0.01	0.01	0.12***	0.07	0.11**	0.04*	0.06	-0.02	0.04	0.03
Observations	1002	1421	2064	1094	1000	2988	1200	1200	1003	1240
					Wave 7					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04	--	--	-0.06*	--	--	-0.00
Security vs. Liberty	0.06	0.08***	0.04	-0.03	--	--	-0.02	--	--	-0.00
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	-0.17***	-0.06*	0.08**	-0.06*	--	--	-0.05	--	--	-0.16***
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.03	0.07**	0.00	0.03	--	--	0.02	--	--	0.05*
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	0.03	0.06*	0.01	0.09**	--	--	0.08**	--	--	0.09***
Economy vs. Ecology	0.01	0.07**	0.02	0.05	--	--	0.10***	--	--	-0.01
Observations	1003	1810	1528	1353	--	--	1245	--	--	2590

Belonging to Sociotropic Organizations (%) (Table 5.1.I: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 * <0.001)**

	Argentina	Australia	Germany	Japan	Poland	South Africa	South Korea	Spain	Sweden	United States
					Wave 3					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.01	-0.01	-0.11***	0.08*	--	0.01	0.04	-0.09**	0.05	0.01
Security vs. Liberty	-0.04	0.05*	0.02	0.02	--	0.04*	0.07*	0.06	0.07*	0.01
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	-0.01	0.04	0.00	-0.03	--	0.14***	0.00	0.04	0.13***	0.06*
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.01	0.03	0.13***	0.03	--	0.02	0.08**	-0.03	0.08*	0.03
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	0.06	0.04	0.10***	0.07*	--	-0.02	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00
Economy vs. Ecology	0.03	0.03	0.07**	0.03	--	0.02	0.05	-0.03	0.04	0.01
Observations	1079	2048	2026	1053	--	2935	1249	1211	1009	1542
					Wave 5					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.04	0.04	-0.10***	-0.02	0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.14***	0.05	-0.02
Security vs. Liberty	0.03	-0.01	0.03	-0.01	0.00	0.04*	0.05	0.00	0.04	0.01
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	0.05	-0.01	0.05*	-0.03	0.02	0.05*	0.05	-0.07*	0.09**	0.05
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.03	0.02	0.07**	-0.03	0.03	0.05**	0.04	0.01	0.06	-0.00
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	-0.03	0.05	0.14***	0.08*	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.04	0.11**	0.05
Economy vs. Ecology	0.03	0.01	0.05	-0.00	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.03
Observations	1002	1421	2064	1094	1000	2988	1200	1200	1003	1240
					Wave 7					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03	0.03	--	--	-0.09**	--	--	0.04*
Security vs. Liberty	0.08*	0.03	0.10***	0.01	--	--	0.02	--	--	0.03
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	-0.02	0.01	0.07**	-0.11***	--	--	0.02	--	--	0.04
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.11***	0.04	0.11***	0.00	--	--	-0.01	--	--	0.01
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	0.10**	0.06*	0.10***	0.03	--	--	0.08**	--	--	0.05*
Economy vs. Ecology	-0.04	0.05*	0.09**	-0.04	--	--	0.08**	--	--	0.04
Observations	1003	1810	1528	1353	--	--	1245	--	--	2590

Life Control (Table 5.1.J: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 * <0.001)**

	Argentina	Australia	Germany	Japan	Poland	South Africa	South Korea	Spain	Sweden	United States
					Wave 3					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.11***	-0.13***	-0.20***	-0.10**	--	-0.12***	--	-0.03	-0.16***	-0.10***
Security vs. Liberty	-0.05	0.00	0.02	0.06	--	0.00	--	0.00	0.03	-0.03
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	0.02	0.05*	0.01	0.14***	--	-0.02	--	0.08*	0.06	-0.01
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	-0.02	0.04	0.07**	0.16***	--	-0.02	--	0.02	0.07*	0.03
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	0.10**	0.11***	0.23***	0.03	--	-0.08***	--	0.03	0.17***	0.08**
Economy vs. Ecology	0.04	-0.04	-0.02	0.12**	--	0.00	--	0.10**	0.01	0.03
Observations	1079	2048	2026	1048	--	2934	--	1208	1009	1542
					Wave 5					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.02	-0.18***	-0.11***	-0.13***	-0.21***	-0.13***	-0.09**	-0.00	-0.15***	-0.21***
Security vs. Liberty	-0.09**	-0.06*	-0.04	-0.01	0.03	-0.06**	0.04	0.11***	-0.02	-0.10***
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	-0.05	0.01	0.04	0.00	0.14***	-0.02	0.04	0.19***	0.11***	-0.04
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.01	0.11***	0.05*	0.05	0.05	-0.00	0.11***	0.13***	0.09**	0.08**
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	0.13***	0.17***	0.12***	0.07*	0.01	0.02	0.00	-0.02	0.17***	0.23***
Economy vs. Ecology	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.09*	0.09*	0.02	0.16***	0.03	-0.08*	-0.01
Observations	1002	1421	2064	1090	996	2988	1200	1198	1003	1237
					Wave 7					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	0.05	-0.02	0.01	-0.06	--	--	0.06*	--	--	0.02
Security vs. Liberty	-0.01	-0.04	-0.01	-0.06	--	--	-0.06*	--	--	-0.11***
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	0.04	0.07**	0.08**	0.10***	--	--	-0.15***	--	--	-0.01
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.03	0.06**	0.10***	0.10***	--	--	-0.04	--	--	0.02
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	0.05	0.23***	0.13***	0.14***	--	--	0.06	--	--	0.20***
Economy vs. Ecology	0.06	-0.01	0.03	-0.05	--	--	0.06*	--	--	-0.00
Observations	1002	1811	1527	1349	--	--	1245	--	--	2592

Life Satisfaction (Table 5.1.K: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 * <0.001)**

	Argentina	Australia	Germany	Japan	Poland	South Africa	South Korea	Spain	Sweden	United States
					Wave 3					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.02	-0.11***	-0.23***	-0.11**	-0.18***	-0.24***	--	-0.07*	-0.13***	-0.10***
Security vs. Liberty	0.00	-0.04	0.08***	-0.02	0.04	-0.04	--	0.04	-0.07*	-0.04
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	-0.02	-0.05*	0.07**	-0.05	0.04	0.03	--	0.09**	-0.02	-0.07**
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.02	0.02	0.14***	0.03	0.07*	0.03	--	0.08**	0.03	0.06*
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	0.08*	0.15***	0.24***	0.13***	0.08*	-0.14***	--	0.05	0.13***	0.12***
Economy vs. Ecology	0.02	-0.02	0.04	0.04	0.07*	0.09***	--	0.01	-0.06	0.08**
Observations	1079	2048	2026	1050	1153	2934	--	1209	1009	1542
					Wave 5					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	0.02	-0.14***	-0.20***	-0.18***	-0.13***	-0.16***	-0.12***	-0.09**	-0.12***	-0.21***
Security vs. Liberty	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	-0.05	-0.04	-0.05**	0.02	0.12***	-0.07*	-0.06*
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	-0.05	-0.08**	0.07**	-0.02	0.06	0.03	0.05	0.12***	0.01	-0.05
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.00	0.09**	0.17***	0.04	0.04	0.04*	0.14***	0.10***	0.08*	0.05
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	0.17***	0.15***	0.20***	0.19***	0.10**	0.03	0.08**	0.06*	0.10**	0.15***
Economy vs. Ecology	0.00	0.01	0.07**	0.10*	0.03	0.09***	0.14***	0.03	-0.05	0.01
Observations	1002	1421	2064	1093	1000	2988	1200	1200	1003	1243
					Wave 7					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.06	--	--	0.00	--	--	0.06**
Security vs. Liberty	-0.09**	-0.06*	-0.04	-0.13***	--	--	0.01	--	--	-0.06**
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	0.01	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	--	--	-0.16***	--	--	-0.05*
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	-0.04	0.01	0.13***	0.02	--	--	0.03	--	--	0.06**
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	0.10**	0.24***	0.22***	0.23***	--	--	0.18***	--	--	0.24***
Economy vs. Ecology	0.05	-0.05*	0.02	-0.03	--	--	0.05	--	--	-0.02
Observations	1003	1811	1528	1352	--	--	1245	--	--	2592

Social Movement Activity (Table 5.1.L: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 * <0.001)**

	Argentina	Australia	Germany	Japan	Poland	South Africa	South Korea	Spain	Sweden	United States
					Wave 3					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	0.07*	0.07**	-0.08***	0.01	-0.27***	-0.04	-0.02	0.03	0.14***	-0.00
Security vs. Liberty	0.28***	0.23***	0.39***	0.15***	0.11***	0.17***	0.28***	0.29***	0.33***	0.20***
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	0.25***	0.36***	0.37***	0.12***	0.17***	0.15***	0.24***	0.37***	0.25***	0.33***
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.21***	0.18***	0.34***	0.05	0.16***	0.01	0.14***	0.16***	0.19***	0.16***
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	-0.02	0.03	-0.10***	0.06	-0.12***	0.07**	-0.19***	-0.07*	0.09**	-0.08**
Economy vs. Ecology	0.20***	0.21***	0.25***	0.14***	0.16***	0.01	0.11***	0.16***	0.18***	0.20***
Observations	1079	2048	2026	1049	1150	2934	1249	1209	1009	1542
					Wave 5					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.00	0.18***	-0.07**	-0.03	-0.16***	0.00	-0.05	0.00	0.23***	-0.05
Security vs. Liberty	0.24***	0.30***	0.23***	0.03	0.15***	0.05*	0.06*	0.09**	0.33***	0.16***
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	0.27***	0.30***	0.26***	0.02	0.19***	0.01	0.10***	0.26***	0.30***	0.11***
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.17***	0.17***	0.20***	-0.03	0.07*	-0.02	0.03	0.20***	0.22***	0.15***
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	-0.12***	-0.10***	-0.05*	0.01	0.05	-0.03	0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03
Economy vs. Ecology	0.15***	0.22***	0.20***	0.11**	0.15***	-0.04	0.04	0.18***	0.20***	0.11***
Observations	1002	1420	2064	1093	997	2988	1200	1200	1003	1232
					Wave 7					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.00	0.08***	0.04	-0.00	--	--	-0.03	--	--	-0.01
Security vs. Liberty	0.14***	0.34***	0.28***	0.15***	--	--	0.01	--	--	0.30***
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation	0.22***	0.30***	0.37***	0.08**	--	--	0.16***	--	--	0.28***
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism	0.22***	0.20***	0.17***	0.01	--	--	-0.03	--	--	0.21***
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment	-0.02	-0.10***	-0.00	0.00	--	--	0.05	--	--	-0.06**
Economy vs. Ecology	0.02	0.28***	0.20***	0.20***	--	--	0.01	--	--	0.27***
Observations	1003	1810	1528	1348	--	--	1245	--	--	2590

The Relationship between People's Trust in Others and their Values



Note: Data are from WVS rounds 1 to 7. Graph shows relationship between people's trust in others and their values by grouping people into social classes and contrasting the groups' average trust in other peope and their mean position on the respecitve issue dimension in ten countries (Argenina, Australia, Germany, Japan, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and the United States) over the period period from the early 1980s to most recently (Pooled N = 86.222).

Figure 5.1.O: The relationship between trust in most people and people's values

The Relationship between Volunteering in Utilitarian Organizations and People's Values



Note: Data are from WVS rounds 1 to 7. Graph shows relationship between people's active memberships in utilitarian organizations and their values by grouping people into social classes and contrasting the group's average number of active membershipsin in utilitarian organizations and their mean position on the respective issue dimension in ten countries (Argenina, Australia, Germany, Japan, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and the United States) over the period from the early 1980s to most recently (Pooled N = 86.222).

Figure 5.1.P: The relationship between volunteering in utilitarian organizations and people's values

The Relationship between Belonging to Utilitarian Organizations and People's Values



Note: Data are from WVS rounds 1 to 7. Graph shows relationship between people's passive memberships in utilitarian organizations and their values by grouping people into social classes and contrasting the group's average number of passive membershipsin in utilitarian organizations and their mean position on the respective issue dimension in ten countries (Argenina, Australia, Germany, Japan, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and the United States) over the period from the early 1980s to most recently (Pooled N = 86.222).

Figure 5.1.Q: The relationship between belonging to utilitarian organizations and people's values

The Relationship between Belonging to Sociotropic Organizations and People's Values



Note: Data are from WVS rounds 1 to 7. Graph shows relationship between people's passive memberships in sociotropic organizations and their values by grouping people into social classes and contrasting the group's average number of passive membershipsin in sociotropic organizations and their mean position on the respective issue dimension in ten countries (Argenina, Australia, Germany, Japan, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and the United States) over the period from the early 1980s to most recently (Pooled N = 86.222).

Figure 5.1.R: The relationship between belonging to sociotropic organizations and people's values



Note: Data are from WVS rounds 1 to 7. Graph shows relationship between people's feeling of control over their own lives and their values by grouping people into social classes and contrasting the groups' average feeling of control and their mean position on the respective issue dimension in ten countries (Argenina, Australia, Germany, Japan, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and the United States) over the period from the early 1980s to most recently (Pooled N = 86.222).

Figure 5.1.S: The relationship between life control and people's values



Note: Data are from WVS rounds 1 to 7. Graph shows relationship between people's for social activism and their values by grouping people into social classes and contrasting the groups' average social activism and their mean position on the respective issue dimension in ten countries (Argenina, Australia, Germany, Japan, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and the United States) over the period from the early 1980s to most recently (Pooled N = 86.222).

Figure 5.1.T: The relationship between social movement activity people's values

	Security vs. Liberty				
	1994-1998	1999-2004	2005-2009	2010-2014	2017-2020
Argentina	0.13	0.18	0.11	0.05	0.06
Australia	0.09	--	0.07	0.07	0.10
Germany	0.17	--	0.07	0.06	0.09
Japan	0.09	0.07	0.11	0.05	0.13
Poland	0.08	--	0.09	0.08	--
South Africa	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.06	--
South Korea	0.11	--	0.05	0.11	0.07
Spain	0.14	0.06	0.03	0.05	--
Sweden	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.11	--
United States	0.05	0.10	0.05	0.06	0.05

Table 5.2.A: Socio-cultural polarization index scores for the period from 1994 to 2020

	Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation				
	1994-1998	1999-2004	2005-2009	2010-2014	2017-2020
Argentina	0.15	--	0.12	0.14	0.12
Australia	--	--	0.12	--	0.19
Germany	--	--	0.17	--	0.15
Japan	--	--	0.04	0.07	0.1
Poland	--	--	0.13	--	0.11
South Africa	--	--	0.09	0.07	0.06
South Korea	--	--	0.09	--	0.07
Spain	--	--	0.12	0.08	0.21
Sweden	--	--	0.16	0.15	0.17
United States	0.11	--	0.10	0.08	0.14

Table 5.2.B: Socio-cultural polarization index scores for the period from 1994 to 2020

	Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				
	1994-1998	**1999-2004**	**2005-2009**	**2010-2014**	**2017-2020**
Argentina	0.14	0.16	0.07	--	0.03
Australia	0.11	--	0.11	--	0.18
Germany	0.27	--	0.14	--	0.17
Japan	0.08	0.02	0.12	--	0.08
Poland	0.16	--	0.07	--	--
South Africa	0.06	0.12	0.10	--	--
South Korea	0.04	--	0.12	--	0.06
Spain	0.04	0.05	0.09	--	--
Sweden	0.11	0.05	0.12	--	--
United States	0.11	0.07	0.07	--	0.09

Table 5.2.C: Socio-cultural polarization index scores for the period from 1994 to 2020

	Anti-Establishment vs. Pro-Establishment				
	1994-1998	**1999-2004**	**2005-2009**	**2010-2014**	**2017-2020**
Argentina	0.07	--	0.09	0.04	0.12
Australia	0.14	--	0.11	0.11	0.16
Germany	0.16	--	0.22	0.13	0.14
Japan	0.15	--	0.19	0.15	0.16
Poland	0.09	--	0.07	0.05	--
South Africa	0.33	--	0.23	0.05	--
South Korea	0.06	--	0.05	0.09	0.12
Spain	0.05	--	0.07	0.06	--
Sweden	0.20	--	0.11	0.25	--
United States	0.06	--	0.15	0.15	0.20

Table 5.2.D: Socio-cultural polarization index scores for the period from 1994 to 2020

	Economy vs. Ecology				
	1994-1998	**1999-2004**	**2005-2009**	**2010-2014**	**2017-2020**
Argentina	0.10	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.02
Australia	0.05	--	0.09	0.08	0.12
Germany	0.13	--	0.12	0.10	0.15
Japan	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.03
Poland	0.12	--	0.09	0.04	--
South Africa	0.16	0.08	0.13	0.05	--
South Korea	0.09	--	0.06	0.06	0.05
Spain	0.13	0.06	0.06	0.04	--
Sweden	0.08	0.07	0.06	0.03	--
United States	0.07	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.02

Table 5.2.E: Socio-cultural polarization index scores for the period from 1994 to 2020



Figure 5.2.A: Socio-cultural polarization (objective social class) on the deregulation vs. intervention issue dimension in the period from 1994-2020



Figure 5.2.B: Socio-cultural polarization (objective social class) on the patriarchalism vs. emancipation issue dimension in the period from 1994-2020



Figure 5.2.C: Socio-cultural polarization (objective social class) on the anti- vs. pro-establishment issue dimension in the period from 1994-2020



Figure 5.2.D: Socio-cultural polarization (objective social class) on the nativism vs. cosmopolitanism issue dimension in the period from 1994-2020



Figure 5.2.E: Socio-cultural polarization (objective social class) on the security vs. liberty issue dimension in the period from 1994-2020



Figure 5.2.F: Socio-cultural polarization (objective social class) on the economy vs. ecology issue dimension in the period from 1994-2020

Subjective Social Class Polarization	Democracy Preference											
	Model I						**Model II**					
Deregulation vs.	0.04						0.04					
Intervention	(0.081)						(0.084)					
Security vs.		-0.16						-0.16				
Liberty		(0.200)						(0.184)				
Patriarchalism vs.			0.04						0.04			
Emancipation			(0.102)						(0.099)			
Nativism vs.				0.21						0.21		
Cosmopolitanism				(0.130)						(0.133)		
Anti- vs.					0.23**						0.23**	
Pro-Establishment					(0.094)						(0.105)	
Economy vs.						0.29*						0.29*
Ecology						(0.159)						(0.151)
Human	0.18*	0.20*	0.19*	0.21**	0.18	0.19*	0.18*	0.20**	0.19*	0.21**	0.18	0.19*
Development	(0.107)	(0.103)	(0.110)	(0.104)	(0.128)	(0.109)	(0.104)	(0.100)	(0.107)	(0.100)	(0.125)	(0.106)
Democratic	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.09***	0.07**	0.09***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.09***	0.07***	0.09***
Tradition	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.024)
Participatory	0.19***	0.19***	0.20***	0.16**	0.17***	0.19***	0.19***	0.19***	0.20***	0.16***	0.17***	0.19***
Culture	(0.062)	(0.061)	-0.061	(0.071)	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.063)	(0.057)	(0.053)
4. Wave	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01		-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01		-0.00
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)		(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)		(0.017)
5. Wave	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)
6. Wave	-0.04**	-0.05**	-0.04**		-0.04**	-0.05**	-0.04**	-0.05**	-0.04**		-0.04**	-0.05**
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)		(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)		(0.019)	(0.019)
7. Wave	-0.07***	-0.08***	-0.07***	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.07***	-0.08***	-0.07***	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.08***
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Constant	0.41***	0.42***	0.40***	0.38***	0.41***	0.39***	0.41***	0.42***	0.40***	0.38***	0.41***	0.39***
	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.080)	(0.074)	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.076)	(0.069)
Observations	129	129	127	98	114	128	129	129	127	98	114	128
R-squared	0.46	0.47	0.47	0.53	0.48	0.50	0.46	0.47	0.47	0.53	0.48	0.49
Countries							42	42	42	41	42	42

Table 5.3.A: Table shows OLS (left) and PCSE (right) estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Subjective Social Class Polarization	General Trust											
	Model I						Model II					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	0.52***						0.52***					
	(0.147)						(0.131)					
Security vs. Liberty		0.27						0.27				
		(0.326)						(0.312)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			0.40**						0.40**			
			(0.166)						(0.170)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				0.12						0.12		
				(0.205)						(0.195)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					0.66**						0.66***	
					(0.273)						(0.249)	
Economy vs. Ecology						0.01						0.01
						(0.334)						(0.301)
Human Development	0.58***	0.65***	0.59***	0.56**	0.73***	0.66***	0.58***	0.65***	0.59***	0.56***	0.73***	0.66***
	(0.169)	(0.188)	(0.183)	(0.227)	(0.209)	(0.190)	(0.155)	(0.170)	(0.169)	(0.212)	(0.184)	(0.173)
Democratic Tradition	0.25***	0.26***	0.26***	0.25***	0.20***	0.26***	0.25***	0.26***	0.26***	0.25***	0.20***	0.26***
	(0.047)	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.060)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.044)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.050)
Participatory Culture	0.01	0.04	0.05	0.05	-0.01	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.05	0.05	-0.01	0.03
	(0.089)	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.105)	(0.092)	(0.095)	(0.082)	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.100)	(0.086)	(0.090)
4. Wave	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.01		0.01	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.01		0.01
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.045)		(0.043)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.038)		(0.037)
5. Wave	-0.02	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	-0.04	-0.02	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.030)
6. Wave	-0.07**	-0.10***	-0.10***		-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.07**	-0.10***	-0.10***		-0.11***	-0.10***
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)		(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)		(0.028)	(0.029)
7. Wave	-0.07*	-0.16***	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.16***	-0.16***	-0.07*	-0.16***	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.16***	-0.16***
	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.039)
Constant	-0.39***	-0.38***	-0.36***	-0.30**	-0.43***	-0.36***	-0.39***	-0.38***	-0.36***	-0.30**	-0.43***	-0.36***
	(0.099)	(0.114)	(0.111)	(0.134)	(0.123)	(0.114)	(0.093)	(0.106)	(0.100)	(0.124)	(0.108)	(0.104)
Observations	129	129	127	98	114	128	129	129	127	98	114	128
R-squared	0.57	0.54	0.55	0.52	0.62	0.54	0.57	0.54	0.55	0.52	0.62	0.54
Countries							42	42	42	41	42	42

Table 5.3.B: Table shows OLS (left) and PCSE (right) estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Subjective Social Class Polarization	Volunteering in Utilitarian Organizations											
	Model I						Model II					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.15* (0.089)						-0.15* (0.080)					
Security vs. Liberty		-0.36** (0.161)						-0.36** (0.164)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			0.18* (0.095)						0.18* (0.096)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				0.00 (0.132)						0.00 (0.123)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					-0.21 (0.133)						-0.21* (0.113)	
Economy vs. Ecology						-0.12 (0.170)						-0.12 (0.165)
Human Development	-0.24** (0.094)	-0.25*** (0.088)	-0.30*** (0.100)	-0.25** (0.119)	-0.26*** (0.097)	-0.27*** (0.094)	-0.24*** (0.089)	-0.25*** (0.084)	-0.30*** (0.093)	-0.25** (0.110)	-0.26*** (0.093)	-0.27*** (0.089)
Democratic Tradition	0.20*** (0.026)	0.19*** (0.027)	0.21*** (0.027)	0.21*** (0.032)	0.22*** (0.029)	0.20*** (0.027)	0.20*** (0.025)	0.19*** (0.026)	0.21*** (0.026)	0.21*** (0.031)	0.22*** (0.028)	0.20*** (0.026)
Participatory Culture	0.06 (0.065)	-0.25*** (0.088)	0.04 (0.066)	0.02 (0.078)	0.05 (0.064)	0.05 (0.066)	0.06 (0.061)	0.03 (0.061)	0.04 (0.061)	0.02 (0.072)	0.05 (0.060)	0.05 (0.061)
5. Wave	-0.01 (0.018)	-0.01 (0.017)	-0.01 (0.018)	-0.01 (0.019)	-0.01 (0.017)	-0.01 (0.018)	-0.01 (0.016)	-0.01 (0.016)	-0.01 (0.016)	-0.01 (0.017)	-0.01 (0.016)	-0.01 (0.016)
6. Wave	-0.04* (0.020)	-0.03 (0.019)	-0.03 (0.019)		-0.03 (0.018)	-0.03 (0.019)	-0.04** (0.018)	-0.03* (0.016)	-0.03 (0.016)		-0.03 (0.016)	-0.03 (0.017)
7. Wave	-0.02 (0.029)	-0.00 (0.024)	0.00 (0.024)	-0.00 (0.027)	0.00 (0.024)	-0.00 (0.025)	-0.02 (0.026)	-0.00 (0.021)	0.00 (0.022)	-0.00 (0.024)	0.00 (0.021)	-0.00 (0.022)
Constant	0.22*** (0.050)	0.25*** (0.052)	0.23*** (0.055)	0.22*** (0.064)	0.22*** (0.054)	0.23*** (0.054)	0.22*** (0.049)	0.25*** (0.051)	0.23*** (0.053)	0.22*** (0.062)	0.22*** (0.053)	0.23*** (0.051)
Observations	115	114	113	83	115	113	115	114	113	83	115	113
R-squared	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.37	0.39	0.37	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.37	0.39	0.37
Countries							42	42	42	41	42	42

Table 5.3.C: Table shows OLS (left) and PCSE (right) estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Subjective Social Class Polarization	Belonging to Utilitarian Organizations											
	Model I						**Model II**					
Deregulation vs.	0.43***						0.43***					
Intervention	(0.146)						(0.145)					
Security vs.		-0.34						-0.34				
Liberty		(0.272)						(0.276)				
Patriarchalism vs.			0.26						0.26			
Emancipation			(0.162)						(0.158)			
Nativism vs.				-0.09						-0.09		
Cosmopolitanism				(0.184)						(0.182)		
Anti- vs.					0.43**						0.43*	
Pro-Establishment					(0.183)						(0.223)	
Economy vs.						-0.21						-0.21
Ecology						(0.248)						(0.262)
Human	-0.41*	-0.30	-0.38*	-0.28	-0.34	-0.32	-0.41*	-0.30	-0.38*	-0.28	-0.34*	-0.32
Development	(0.238)	(0.209)	(0.222)	(0.265)	(0.208)	(0.214)	(0.224)	(0.201)	(0.211)	(0.264)	(0.199)	(0.206)
Democratic	0.36***	0.34***	0.36***	0.35***	0.30***	0.35***	0.36***	0.34***	0.36***	0.35***	0.30***	0.35***
Tradition	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.057)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Participatory	-0.06	-0.07	-0.04	-0.10	-0.04	-0.05	-0.06	-0.07	-0.04	-0.10	-0.04	-0.05
Culture	(0.093)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.110)	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.103)	(0.097)	(0.123)	(0.099)	(0.102)
5. Wave	-0.00	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03	-0.00	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.028)
6. Wave	-0.04	-0.08***	-0.07**		-0.07**	-0.08**	-0.04	-0.08***	-0.07**		-0.07**	-0.08**
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)		(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)		(0.028)	(0.030)
7. Wave	0.01	-0.06**	-0.05	-0.07**	-0.06*	-0.07**	0.01	-0.06**	-0.05*	-0.07**	-0.06*	-0.07**
	(0.040)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Constant	0.31**	0.36***	0.35***	0.34**	0.32**	0.36***	0.31**	0.36***	0.35***	0.34**	0.32***	0.36***
	(0.136)	(0.126)	(0.129)	(0.161)	(0.123)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.158)	(0.116)	(0.119)
Observations	115	114	113	83	115	113	115	114	113	83	115	113
R-squared	0.45	0.42	0.42	0.40	0.42	0.41	0.45	0.42	0.42	0.40	0.42	0.41
Countries							42	42	42	41	42	42

Table 5.3.D: Table shows OLS (left) and PCSE (right) estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Subjective Social Class Polarization	Volunteering in Sociotropic Organizations											
	Model I						Model II					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.44**						-0.44**					
	(0.209)						(0.189)					
Security vs. Liberty		-0.74*						-0.74				
		(0.442)						(0.452)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			-0.07						-0.07			
			(0.280)						(0.267)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				-0.33						-0.33		
				(0.332)						(0.305)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					-0.22						-0.22	
					(0.367)						(0.304)	
Economy vs. Ecology						-0.25						-0.25
						(0.444)						(0.413)
Human Development	-0.69**	-0.73**	-0.79**	-0.70*	-0.77**	-0.77**	-0.69**	-0.73**	-0.79**	-0.70*	-0.77**	-0.77**
	(0.334)	(0.325)	(0.364)	(0.396)	(0.349)	(0.342)	(0.328)	(0.321)	(0.350)	(0.372)	(0.339)	(0.331)
Democratic Tradition	0.40***	0.38***	0.42***	0.39***	0.43***	0.40***	0.40***	0.38***	0.42***	0.39***	0.43***	0.40***
	(0.068)	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.088)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.067)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.084)	(0.075)	(0.075)
Participatory Culture	0.37**	0.33*	0.32*	0.36*	0.35*	0.36**	0.37**	0.33*	0.32*	0.36*	0.35**	0.36**
	(0.179)	(0.183)	(0.185)	(0.201)	(0.182)	(0.182)	(0.178)	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.196)	(0.177)	(0.177)
5. Wave	-0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.042)
6. Wave	-0.01	0.02	0.01		0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.01		0.02	0.01
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.049)		(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.044)		(0.045)	(0.046)
7. Wave	-0.01	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	-0.01	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05
	(0.066)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.063)	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.054)
Constant	0.57***	0.60***	0.60***	0.54**	0.56***	0.57***	0.57***	0.60***	0.60***	0.54**	0.56***	0.57***
	(0.188)	(0.199)	(0.203)	(0.230)	(0.201)	(0.199)	(0.183)	(0.192)	(0.194)	(0.217)	(0.194)	(0.190)
Observations	114	113	112	82	114	112	114	113	112	82	114	112
R-squared	0.33	0.32	0.31	0.33	0.31	0.30	0.33	0.32	0.31	0.33	0.31	0.30
Countries	-0.44**						42	42	42	41	42	42

Table 5.3.E: Table shows OLS (left) and PCSE (right) estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Subjective Social Class Polarization	Belonging to Sociotropic Organizations											
	Model I						**Model II**					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.02 (0.221)						-0.02 (0.194)					
Security vs. Liberty		-0.54 (0.361)						-0.54 (0.373)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			-0.09 (0.272)						-0.09 (0.258)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				-0.34 (0.326)						-0.34 (0.307)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					0.14 (0.215)						0.14 (0.241)	
Economy vs. Ecology						-0.27 (0.372)						-0.27 (0.375)
Human Development	-0.31 (0.263)	-0.29 (0.240)	-0.35 (0.266)	-0.25 (0.313)	-0.33 (0.249)	-0.31 (0.252)	-0.31 (0.245)	-0.29 (0.228)	-0.35 (0.249)	-0.25 (0.292)	-0.33 (0.234)	-0.31 (0.236)
Democratic Tradition	0.35*** (0.064)	0.34*** (0.064)	0.36*** (0.063)	0.33*** (0.081)	0.34*** (0.064)	0.35*** (0.063)	0.35*** (0.062)	0.34*** (0.063)	0.36*** (0.061)	0.33*** (0.077)	0.34*** (0.061)	0.35*** (0.062)
Participatory Culture	0.18 (0.152)	0.14 (0.153)	0.15 (0.155)	0.19 (0.172)	0.18 (0.153)	0.17 (0.152)	0.18 (0.151)	0.14 (0.153)	0.15 (0.151)	0.19 (0.181)	0.18 (0.151)	0.17 (0.153)
5. Wave	-0.03 (0.043)	-0.04 (0.041)	-0.04 (0.042)	-0.04 (0.044)	-0.03 (0.042)	-0.04 (0.043)	-0.03 (0.037)	-0.04 (0.037)	-0.04 (0.037)	-0.04 (0.039)	-0.03 (0.037)	-0.04 (0.038)
6. Wave	-0.06 (0.045)	-0.07* (0.041)	-0.07* (0.040)		-0.06 (0.041)	-0.07* (0.043)	-0.06 (0.039)	-0.07* (0.037)	-0.07* (0.037)		-0.06 (0.037)	-0.07* (0.039)
7. Wave	-0.02 (0.063)	-0.03 (0.046)	-0.03 (0.048)	-0.03 (0.053)	-0.02 (0.047)	-0.03 (0.050)	-0.02 (0.055)	-0.03 (0.046)	-0.03 (0.047)	-0.03 (0.050)	-0.02 (0.047)	-0.03 (0.047)
Constant	0.35** (0.141)	0.40*** (0.142)	0.40*** (0.140)	0.35** (0.173)	0.35** (0.140)	0.38*** (0.145)	0.35*** (0.131)	0.40*** (0.134)	0.40*** (0.130)	0.35** (0.162)	0.35*** (0.130)	0.38*** (0.132)
Observations	114	113	112	82	114	112	114	113	112	82	114	112
R-squared	0.30	0.32	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.31	0.30	0.32	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.31
Countries							42	42	42	41	42	42

Table 5.3.F: Table shows OLS (left) and PCSE (right) estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Subjective Social Class Polarization	Life Control											
	Model I						Model II					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.27***						-0.27***					
	(0.092)						(0.087)					
Security vs. Liberty		-0.09						-0.09				
		(0.216)						(0.202)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			0.11						0.11			
			(0.165)						(0.154)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				-0.10						-0.10		
				(0.149)						(0.159)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					-0.33***						-0.33***	
					(0.117)						(0.116)	
Economy vs. Ecology						-0.21						-0.21
						(0.207)						(0.192)
Human Development	-0.06	-0.08	-0.12	-0.05	-0.17*	-0.08	-0.06	-0.08	-0.12	-0.05	-0.17*	-0.08
	(0.094)	(0.102)	(0.116)	(0.125)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.094)	(0.100)	(0.114)	(0.121)	(0.098)	(0.096)
Democratic Tradition	0.06*	0.05	0.07**	0.04	0.12***	0.05	0.06*	0.05	0.07**	0.04	0.12***	0.05
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Participatory Culture	0.17**	0.17**	0.12*	0.19**	0.16**	0.18***	0.17**	0.17**	0.12*	0.19**	0.16**	0.18**
	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.078)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.066)	(0.082)	(0.070)	(0.072)
4. Wave	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.03		0.03	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.03		0.03
	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.031)		(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.027)		(0.026)
5. Wave	0.03	0.05**	0.04*	0.04**	0.04**	0.04**	0.03*	0.05**	0.04*	0.04**	0.04**	0.04**
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)
6. Wave	0.04*	0.06***	0.05***		0.06***	0.06***	0.04**	0.06***	0.05***		0.06***	0.06***
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)		(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)		(0.018)	(0.020)
7. Wave	0.03	0.07***	0.06**	0.07**	0.08***	0.07***	0.03	0.07***	0.06***	0.07***	0.08***	0.07***
	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.025)
Constant	0.62***	0.59***	0.63***	0.56***	0.66***	0.60***	0.62***	0.59***	0.63***	0.56***	0.66***	0.60***
	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.068)	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.060)	(0.066)	(0.056)	(0.055)
Observations	128	128	126	97	113	127	128	128	126	97	113	127
R-squared	0.22	0.19	0.15	0.21	0.26	0.19	0.22	0.19	0.15	0.21	0.26	0.19
Countries							42	42	42	41	42	42

Table 5.3.G: Table shows OLS (left) and PCSE (right) estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Subjective Social Class Polarization	Life Satisfaction											
	Model I						**Model II**					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.38***						-0.38***					
	(0.086)						(0.090)					
Security vs. Liberty		-0.07						-0.07				
		(0.278)						(0.257)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			-0.09						-0.09			
			(0.187)						(0.173)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				-0.38**						-0.38**		
				(0.186)						(0.183)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					-0.44***						-0.44***	
					(0.136)						(0.143)	
Economy vs. Ecology						-0.45**						-0.45**
						(0.213)						(0.199)
Human Development	0.08	0.04	0.05	0.10	-0.05	0.04	0.08	0.04	0.05	0.10	-0.05	0.04
	(0.105)	(0.112)	(0.117)	(0.138)	(0.109)	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.109)	(0.116)	(0.131)	(0.110)	(0.101)
Democratic Tradition	0.10***	0.10***	0.11***	0.07	0.19***	0.09**	0.10***	0.10***	0.11***	0.07*	0.19***	0.09***
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.044)	(0.036)	(0.034)
Participatory Culture	0.25***	0.24***	0.21**	0.31***	0.23**	0.26***	0.25***	0.24***	0.21**	0.31***	0.23***	0.26***
	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.096)	(0.101)	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.093)	(0.099)	(0.086)	(0.088)
4. Wave	0.00	0.04	0.03	0.03		0.02	0.00	0.04	0.03	0.03		0.02
	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.034)		(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.029)		(0.028)
5. Wave	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)
6. Wave	0.02	0.05**	0.05*		0.05**	0.05*	0.02	0.05**	0.05**		0.05**	0.05**
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)		(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)		(0.021)	(0.022)
7. Wave	0.02	0.09***	0.07**	0.08**	0.08***	0.08**	0.02	0.09***	0.07**	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***
	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Constant	0.46***	0.41***	0.43***	0.38***	0.49***	0.44***	0.46***	0.41***	0.43***	0.38***	0.49***	0.44***
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.069)	(0.073)	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.072)	(0.064)	(0.060)
Observations	129	129	127	98	114	128	129	129	127	98	114	128
R-squared	0.39	0.35	0.32	0.42	0.41	0.37	0.39	0.35	0.32	0.42	0.41	0.37
Countries							42	42	42	41	42	42

Table 5.3.H: Table shows OLS (left) and PCSE (right) estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Subjective Social Class Polarization	Social Movement Activity											
	Model I						Model II					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	0.03 (0.089)						0.03 (0.082)					
Security vs. Liberty		-0.12 (0.175)						-0.12 (0.165)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			0.26** (0.101)						0.26** (0.102)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				0.10 (0.156)						0.10 (0.145)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					-0.14 (0.098)						-0.14 (0.102)	
Economy vs. Ecology						-0.04 (0.182)						-0.04 (0.168)
Human Development	0.36*** (0.085)	0.39*** (0.091)	0.35*** (0.089)	0.37*** (0.107)	0.40*** (0.099)	0.38*** (0.089)	0.36*** (0.080)	0.39*** (0.085)	0.35*** (0.082)	0.37*** (0.099)	0.40*** (0.090)	0.38*** (0.083)
Democratic Tradition	0.27*** (0.026)	0.27*** (0.026)	0.28*** (0.026)	0.29*** (0.030)	0.27*** (0.028)	0.27*** (0.026)	0.27*** (0.025)	0.27*** (0.026)	0.28*** (0.025)	0.29*** (0.028)	0.27*** (0.028)	0.27*** (0.025)
Participatory Culture	0.12 (0.073)	0.12 (0.072)	0.13* (0.073)	0.09 (0.084)	0.11 (0.076)	0.12* (0.073)	0.12* (0.070)	0.12* (0.070)	0.13* (0.070)	0.09 (0.081)	0.11 (0.073)	0.12* (0.071)
4. Wave	-0.03 (0.019)	-0.02 (0.021)	-0.01 (0.022)	-0.02 (0.023)		-0.02 (0.023)	-0.03 (0.019)	-0.02 (0.019)	-0.01 (0.019)	-0.02 (0.021)		-0.02 (0.020)
5. Wave	-0.03* (0.019)	-0.04** (0.018)	-0.04** (0.018)	-0.04* (0.019)	-0.04** (0.017)	-0.04** (0.019)	-0.03** (0.017)	-0.04** (0.017)	-0.04** (0.017)	-0.04** (0.018)	-0.04** (0.016)	-0.04** (0.017)
6. Wave	-0.08*** (0.018)	-0.09*** (0.017)	-0.09*** (0.017)		-0.09*** (0.016)	-0.09*** (0.017)	-0.08*** (0.017)	-0.09*** (0.017)	-0.09*** (0.016)		-0.09*** (0.016)	-0.09*** (0.017)
7. Wave	-0.06** (0.026)	-0.07*** (0.022)	-0.06*** (0.022)	-0.07*** (0.023)	-0.07*** (0.022)	-0.07*** (0.022)	-0.06*** (0.024)	-0.07*** (0.021)	-0.06*** (0.021)	-0.07*** (0.022)	-0.07*** (0.021)	-0.07*** (0.021)
Constant	-0.16*** (0.045)	-0.16*** (0.048)	-0.18*** (0.045)	-0.16*** (0.058)	-0.16*** (0.051)	-0.17*** (0.052)	-0.16*** (0.043)	-0.16*** (0.045)	-0.18*** (0.041)	-0.16*** (0.053)	-0.16*** (0.047)	-0.17*** (0.046)
Observations	130	130	128	99	115	129	130	130	128	99	115	129
R-squared	0.74	0.74	0.75	0.73	0.73	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.75	0.73	0.73	0.74
Countries							42	42	42	41	42	42

Table 5.3.I: Table shows OLS (left) and PCSE (right) estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Objective Social Class Polarization	Preference for Democracy											
	Model I						Model II					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.03 (0.083)						-0.03 (0.059)					
Security vs. Liberty		0.02 (0.069)						0.02 (0.056)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			-0.02 (0.060)						-0.02 (0.051)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				0.04 (0.077)						0.04 (0.065)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					0.03 (0.065)						0.03 (0.056)	
Economy vs. Ecology						0.07 (0.065)						0.07 (0.059)
Human Development	0.18* (0.104)	0.17 (0.106)	0.18* (0.106)	0.21* (0.104)	0.16 (0.134)	0.16 (0.109)	0.18* (0.102)	0.17 (0.103)	0.18* (0.103)	0.21** (0.102)	0.16 (0.130)	0.16 (0.105)
Democratic Tradition	0.10*** (0.024)	0.10*** (0.024)	0.09*** (0.024)	0.09*** (0.029)	0.10*** (0.027)	0.09*** (0.024)	0.10*** (0.023)	0.10*** (0.023)	0.09*** (0.023)	0.09*** (0.027)	0.10*** (0.025)	0.09*** (0.023)
Participatory Culture	0.17*** (0.058)	0.18*** (0.060)	0.18*** (0.061)	0.15** (0.068)	0.16** (0.063)	0.19*** (0.058)	0.17*** (0.054)	0.18*** (0.056)	0.18*** (0.055)	0.15** (0.062)	0.16*** (0.059)	0.19*** (0.055)
4. Wave	-0.02 (0.018)	-0.01 (0.018)	-0.01 (0.018)	-0.01 (0.017)		-0.01 (0.017)	-0.02 (0.018)	-0.01 (0.018)	-0.01 (0.018)	-0.01 (0.017)		-0.01 (0.017)
5. Wave	-0.01 (0.017)	-0.01 (0.018)	-0.01 (0.018)	-0.01 (0.018)	-0.01 (0.019)	-0.01 (0.018)	-0.01 (0.017)	-0.01 (0.018)	-0.01 (0.018)	-0.01 (0.018)	-0.01 (0.019)	-0.01 (0.018)
6. Wave	-0.05** (0.019)	-0.04** (0.020)	-0.04** (0.020)		-0.04** (0.021)	-0.05** (0.021)	-0.05** (0.019)	-0.04** (0.020)	-0.04** (0.019)		-0.04** (0.021)	-0.05** (0.020)
7. Wave	-0.08*** (0.023)	-0.08*** (0.023)	-0.08*** (0.023)	-0.08*** (0.023)	-0.08*** (0.024)	-0.08*** (0.023)	-0.08*** (0.022)	-0.08*** (0.022)	-0.08*** (0.022)	-0.08*** (0.022)	-0.08*** (0.023)	-0.08*** (0.022)
Constant	0.43*** (0.068)	0.43*** (0.068)	0.42*** (0.067)	0.41*** (0.067)	0.43*** (0.082)	0.43*** (0.067)	0.43*** (0.065)	0.43*** (0.065)	0.42*** (0.064)	0.41*** (0.063)	0.43*** (0.079)	0.43*** (0.064)
Observations	128	128	127	96	112	128	128	128	127	96	112	128
R-squared	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.53	0.46	0.48	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.53	0.46	0.48
Countries							43	43	43	42	42	43

Table 5.3.J: Table shows OLS (left) and PCSE (right) estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Objective Social Class Polarization	General Trust											
	Model I						Model II					
Deregulation vs.	0.12						0.12					
Intervention	(0.148)						(0.104)					
Security vs.		0.06						0.06				
Liberty		(0.129)						(0.108)				
Patriarchalism vs.			0.10						0.10			
Emancipation			(0.075)						(0.071)			
Nativism vs.				0.05						0.05		
Cosmopolitanism				(0.168)						(0.153)		
Anti- vs.					0.21*						0.21**	
Pro-Establishment					(0.109)						(0.087)	
Economy vs.						0.05						0.05
Ecology						(0.113)						(0.115)
Human	0.58***	0.60***	0.57***	0.53**	0.74***	0.63***	0.58***	0.60***	0.57***	0.53**	0.74***	0.63***
Development	(0.174)	(0.170)	(0.170)	(0.219)	(0.214)	(0.184)	(0.159)	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.206)	(0.172)	(0.168)
Democratic	0.26***	0.27***	0.26***	0.24***	0.24***	0.25***	0.26***	0.27***	0.26***	0.24***	0.24***	0.25***
Tradition	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.057)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.053)	(0.046)	(0.047)
Participatory	0.07	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.04	0.07	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.04
Culture	(0.097)	(0.093)	(0.095)	(0.115)	(0.103)	(0.097)	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.110)	(0.095)	(0.095)
3. Wave	-0.09	-0.07	-0.08		-0.30***		-0.09	-0.07	-0.08		-0.30*	
	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.064)		(0.074)		(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.059)		(0.165)	
4. Wave	-0.08	-0.06	-0.06	0.01		0.00	-0.08	-0.06	-0.06	0.01		0.00
	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.045)		(0.042)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.038)		(0.036)
5. Wave	-0.12*	-0.11*	-0.11*	-0.04	-0.35***	-0.04	-0.12**	-0.11*	-0.11*	-0.04	-0.35**	-0.04
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.033)	(0.078)	(0.031)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.032)	(0.168)	(0.031)
6. Wave	-0.18***	-0.18***	-0.18***		-0.41***	-0.10***	-0.18***	-0.18***	-0.18***		-0.41**	-0.10***
	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.063)		(0.076)	(0.030)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.059)		(0.168)	(0.030)
7. Wave	-0.23***	-0.23***	-0.23***	-0.15***	-0.48***	-0.16***	-0.23***	-0.23***	-0.23***	-0.15***	-0.48***	-0.16***
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.038)	(0.085)	(0.034)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.041)	(0.172)	(0.039)
	-0.24**	-0.25**	-0.23**	-0.26**	-0.13**	-0.33***	-0.24**	-0.25***	-0.23**	-0.26**	-0.13	-0.33***
Constant	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.102)	(0.127)	(0.060)	(0.109)	(0.097)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.116)	(0.164)	(0.097)
Observations	133	133	132	96	113	128	133	133	132	96	113	128
R-squared	0.515	0.530	0.531	0.518	0.601	0.544	0.52	0.53	0.53	0.52	0.60	0.54
Countries							43	43	43	42	42	43

Table 5.3.K: Table shows OLS (left) and PCSE (right) estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Objective Social Class Polarization	Volunteering in Utilitarian Organizations											
	Model I						Model II					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	-0.01						-0.01					
	(0.053)						(0.049)					
Security vs. Liberty		0.08						0.08				
		(0.063)						(0.059)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			0.10**						0.10***			
			(0.041)						(0.037)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				0.13						0.13*		
				(0.079)						(0.075)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					0.07						0.07	
					(0.057)						(0.053)	
Economy vs. Ecology						0.11*						0.11*
						(0.063)						(0.063)
Human Development	0.20***	-0.29***	-0.31***	-0.28**	-0.28***	-0.28***	-0.25***	-0.29***	-0.31***	-0.28**	-0.28***	-0.28***
	(0.028)	(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.120)	(0.101)	(0.097)	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.113)	(0.094)	(0.091)
Democratic Tradition	-0.25**	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***	0.19***	0.19***	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***	0.19***	0.19***
	(0.099)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Participatory Culture	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.02	0.06	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.02	0.06	0.05
	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.085)	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.080)	(0.067)	(0.066)
5. Wave	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)
6. Wave	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02		-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02		-0.03	-0.03
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)		(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)		(0.018)	(0.018)
7. Wave	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Constant	0.22***	0.23***	0.23***	0.23***	0.22***	0.23***	0.22***	0.23***	0.23***	0.23***	0.22***	0.23***
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.065)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.062)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Observations	112	111	111	79	113	111	112	111	111	79	113	111
R-squared	0.35	0.36	0.37	0.37	0.35	0.36	0.35	0.36	0.37	0.37	0.35	0.36
Countries							42	42	42	41	42	42

Table 5.3.L: Table shows OLS (left) and PCSE (right) estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Objective Social Class Polarization	Belonging to Utilitarian Organizations											
	Model I						Model II					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	0.17						0.17*					
	(0.118)						(0.098)					
Security vs. Liberty		0.11						0.11				
		(0.103)						(0.106)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			0.22***						0.22***			
			(0.072)						(0.082)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				0.28**						0.28**		
				(0.108)						(0.113)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					0.35***						0.35***	
					(0.117)						(0.115)	
Economy vs. Ecology						0.18*						0.18
						(0.095)						(0.126)
Human Development	-0.35	-0.37*	-0.44*	-0.42	-0.42*	-0.37*	-0.35*	-0.37*	-0.44**	-0.42	-0.42**	-0.37*
	(0.215)	(0.215)	(0.222)	(0.272)	(0.215)	(0.220)	(0.205)	(0.205)	(0.208)	(0.269)	(0.205)	(0.208)
Democratic Tradition	0.34***	0.35***	0.34***	0.35***	0.32***	0.34***	0.34***	0.35***	0.34***	0.35***	0.32***	0.34***
	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.060)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.057)	(0.044)	(0.047)
Participatory Culture	0.01	-0.05	0.02	-0.08	0.07	-0.02	0.01	-0.05	0.02	-0.08	0.07	-0.02
	(0.104)	(0.100)	(0.102)	(0.117)	(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.105)	(0.101)	(0.125)	(0.105)	(0.103)
5. Wave	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.030)
6. Wave	-0.06*	-0.07**	-0.06**		-0.06*	-0.07**	-0.06*	-0.07**	-0.06**		-0.06**	-0.07**
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.031)		(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.030)		(0.029)	(0.031)
7. Wave	-0.04	-0.07*	-0.06*	-0.07*	-0.07*	-0.07**	-0.04	-0.07**	-0.06*	-0.07**	-0.07**	-0.07**
	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Constant	0.30**	0.36***	0.36***	0.40**	0.33**	0.35***	0.30**	0.36***	0.36***	0.40**	0.33***	0.35***
	(0.128)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.164)	(0.125)	(0.129)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.122)	(0.159)	(0.118)	(0.123)
Observations	112	111	111	79	113	111	112	111	111	79	113	111
R-squared	0.41	0.42	0.43	0.45	0.44	0.41	0.41	0.42	0.43	0.45	0.44	0.41
Countries							42	42	42	41	42	42

Table 5.3.M: Table shows OLS (left) and PCSE (right) estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Objective Social Class Polarization	Volunteering in Sociotropic Organizations											
	Model I						Model II					
Deregulation vs.	-0.02						-0.02					
Intervention	(0.144)						(0.132)					
Security vs.		0.31**						0.31**				
Liberty		(0.117)						(0.128)				
Patriarchalism vs.			0.13						0.13			
Emancipation			(0.087)						(0.096)			
Nativism vs.				0.05						0.05		
Cosmopolitanism				(0.168)						(0.177)		
Anti- vs.					0.10						0.10	
Pro-Establishment					(0.114)						(0.123)	
Economy vs.						0.24*						0.24
Ecology						(0.139)						(0.149)
Human	-0.74**	-0.82**	-0.81**	-0.73*	-0.73*	-0.78**	-0.74**	-0.82**	-0.81**	-0.73*	-0.77**	-0.78**
Development	(0.344)	(0.337)	(0.360)	(0.409)	(0.409)	(0.344)	(0.335)	(0.331)	(0.351)	(0.394)	(0.345)	(0.336)
Democratic	0.38***	0.38***	0.40***	0.38***	0.38***	0.37***	0.38***	0.38***	0.40***	0.38***	0.38***	0.37***
Tradition	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.078)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.090)	(0.074)	(0.075)
Participatory	0.34*	0.41**	0.34*	0.33	0.33	0.39**	0.34*	0.41**	0.34*	0.33	0.36*	0.39**
Culture	(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.190)	(0.227)	(0.227)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.192)	(0.225)	(0.198)	(0.193)
5. Wave	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.044)
6. Wave	0.00	0.03	0.00		0.01	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.00		0.01	0.01
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.051)		(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.046)		(0.047)	(0.047)
7. Wave	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.063)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.064)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Constant	0.57***	0.54**	0.59***	0.55**	0.55**	0.55***	0.57***	0.54***	0.59***	0.55**	0.56***	0.55***
	(0.204)	(0.207)	(0.209)	(0.241)	(0.241)	(0.203)	(0.194)	(0.197)	(0.198)	(0.226)	(0.191)	(0.193)
Observations	111	110	110	78	78	110	111	110	110	78	112	110
R-squared	0.28	0.30	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.29
Countries							42	42	42	41	42	42

Table 5.3.N: Table shows OLS (left) and PCSE (right) estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Objective Social Class Polarization	Belonging to Sociotropic Organizations											
	Model I						Model II					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	0.22* (0.115)						0.22** (0.110)					
Security vs. Liberty		0.41*** (0.117)						0.41*** (0.126)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			0.31*** (0.080)						0.31*** (0.092)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				0.39** (0.166)						0.39** (0.174)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					0.50*** (0.127)						0.50*** (0.129)	
Economy vs. Ecology						0.34*** (0.111)						0.34** (0.137)
Human Development	-0.35 (0.249)	-0.42* (0.238)	-0.47* (0.253)	-0.43 (0.310)	-0.45* (0.241)	-0.37 (0.250)	-0.35 (0.231)	-0.42* (0.227)	-0.47** (0.235)	-0.43 (0.293)	-0.45* (0.229)	-0.37 (0.234)
Democratic Tradition	0.34*** (0.065)	0.34*** (0.064)	0.35*** (0.063)	0.32*** (0.082)	0.32*** (0.061)	0.33*** (0.066)	0.34*** (0.062)	0.34*** (0.062)	0.35*** (0.060)	0.32*** (0.079)	0.32*** (0.059)	0.33*** (0.063)
Participatory Culture	0.21 (0.155)	0.24 (0.152)	0.22 (0.146)	0.22 (0.175)	0.30** (0.149)	0.21 (0.153)	0.21 (0.155)	0.24 (0.158)	0.22 (0.150)	0.22 (0.188)	0.30* (0.159)	0.21 (0.157)
5. Wave	-0.02 (0.048)	-0.02 (0.045)	-0.03 (0.043)	-0.03 (0.046)	-0.03 (0.041)	-0.04 (0.045)	-0.02 (0.041)	-0.02 (0.040)	-0.03 (0.038)	-0.03 (0.041)	-0.03 (0.037)	-0.04 (0.040)
6. Wave	-0.06 (0.046)	-0.05 (0.043)	-0.07 (0.042)		-0.06 (0.041)	-0.08* (0.043)	-0.06 (0.040)	-0.05 (0.039)	-0.07* (0.037)		-0.06 (0.036)	-0.08** (0.039)
7. Wave	-0.01 (0.057)	-0.03 (0.048)	-0.04 (0.048)	-0.03 (0.054)	-0.04 (0.046)	-0.05 (0.048)	-0.01 (0.052)	-0.03 (0.045)	-0.04 (0.044)	-0.03 (0.048)	-0.04 (0.043)	-0.05 (0.046)
Constant	0.33** (0.142)	0.36** (0.145)	0.42*** (0.143)	0.40** (0.177)	0.36*** (0.136)	0.37** (0.143)	0.33** (0.134)	0.36*** (0.135)	0.42*** (0.131)	0.40** (0.166)	0.36*** (0.126)	0.37*** (0.133)
Observations	111	110	110	78	112	110	111	110	110	78	112	110
R-squared	0.32	0.36	0.36	0.34	0.38	0.33	0.32	0.36	0.36	0.34	0.38	0.33
Countries							42	42	42	41	42	42

Table 5.3.O: Table shows OLS (left) and PCSE (right) estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Objective Social Class Polarization	Life Control											
	Model I						Model II					
Deregulation vs.	-0.09						-0.09					
Intervention	(0.085)						(0.058)					
Security vs.		0.16***						0.16***				
Liberty		(0.059)						(0.058)				
Patriarchalism vs.			0.00						0.00			
Emancipation			(0.046)						(0.044)			
Nativism vs.				0.01						0.01		
Cosmopolitanism				(0.085)						(0.079)		
Anti- vs.					-0.01						-0.01	
Pro-Establishment					(0.059)						(0.057)	
Economy vs.						0.06						0.06
Ecology						(0.077)						(0.074)
Human	-0.01	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05	-0.18*	-0.10	-0.01	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05	-0.18*	-0.10
Development	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.100)	(0.124)	(0.104)	(0.101)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.096)	(0.124)	(0.098)	(0.101)
Democratic	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.08**	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.05*	0.04	0.08**	0.04
Tradition	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Participatory	0.09	0.17***	0.08	0.19**	0.14*	0.17**	0.09	0.17**	0.08	0.19**	0.14*	0.17**
Culture	(0.069)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.085)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.091)	(0.080)	(0.078)
3. Wave	-0.03	-0.08*	-0.03		0.10**		-0.03	-0.08**	-0.03		0.10	
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.037)		(0.038)		(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.037)		(0.082)	
4. Wave	-0.01	-0.03	-0.00	0.03		0.03	-0.01	-0.03	-0.00	0.03		0.03
	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.029)		(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.025)		(0.025)
5. Wave	0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.05**	0.14***	0.05**	0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.05**	0.14*	0.05***
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.021)	(0.036)	(0.021)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.020)	(0.082)	(0.019)
6. Wave	0.02	-0.01	0.02		0.16***	0.06***	0.02	-0.01	0.02		0.16*	0.06***
	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.036)		(0.037)	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.035)		(0.083)	(0.020)
7. Wave	0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.07**	0.17***	0.07**	0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.07***	0.17**	0.07***
	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.028)	(0.042)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.085)	(0.024)
Constant	0.63***	0.63***	0.65***	0.56***	0.56***	0.60***	0.63***	0.63***	0.65***	0.56***	0.56***	0.60***
	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.069)	(0.030)	(0.059)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.057)	(0.066)	(0.080)	(0.056)
Observations	131	131	130	95	112	127	131	131	130	95	112	127
R-squared	0.14	0.18	0.10	0.18	0.19	0.15	0.14	0.18	0.10	0.18	0.19	0.15
Countries							43	43	43	42	42	43

Table 5.3.P: Table shows OLS (left) and PCSE (right) estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Objective Social Class Polarization	Life Satisfaction											
	Model I						Model II					
Deregulation vs.	-0.21						-0.21***					
Intervention	(0.128)						(0.077)					
Security vs.		0.10*						0.10				
Liberty		(0.056)						(0.058)				
Patriarchalism vs.			-0.10						-0.10*			
Emancipation			(0.074)						(0.061)			
Nativism vs.				-0.16						-0.16**		
Cosmopolitanism				(0.102)						(0.083)		
Anti- vs.					-0.10						-0.10	
Pro-Establishment					(0.096)						(0.075)	
Economy vs.						-0.06						-0.06
Ecology						(0.092)						(0.086)
Human	0.06	0.01	0.05	0.07	-0.05	0.02	0.06	0.01	0.05	0.07	-0.05	0.02
Development	(0.106)	(0.103)	(0.109)	(0.147)	(0.117)	(0.121)	(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.107)	(0.142)	(0.109)	(0.118)
Democratic	0.10***	0.09**	0.11***	0.09**	0.15***	0.10***	0.10***	0.09**	0.11***	0.09**	0.15***	0.10***
Tradition	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Participatory	0.16*	0.26***	0.17*	0.27**	0.18*	0.22**	0.16*	0.26***	0.17*	0.27**	0.18*	0.22**
Culture	(0.090)	(0.083)	(0.090)	(0.113)	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.088)	(0.084)	(0.089)	(0.108)	(0.099)	(0.096)
3. Wave	-0.02	-0.09***	-0.04		0.01		-0.02	-0.09**	-0.04		0.01	
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.034)		(0.040)		(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.041)		(0.095)	
4. Wave	-0.03	-0.05	-0.03	0.02		0.03	-0.03	-0.05	-0.03	0.02		0.03
	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.032)		(0.033)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.028)		(0.028)
5. Wave	-0.01	-0.05	-0.02	0.03	0.04	0.04*	-0.01	-0.05	-0.02	0.03	0.04	0.04*
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.042)	(0.025)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.023)	(0.095)	(0.022)
6. Wave	0.01	-0.03	-0.00		0.06	0.05*	0.01	-0.03	-0.00		0.06	0.05**
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.029)		(0.042)	(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.039)		(0.096)	(0.023)
7. Wave	0.03	-0.00	0.03	0.09**	0.10**	0.09**	0.03	-0.00	0.03	0.09***	0.10	0.09***
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.048)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.031)	(0.099)	(0.030)
Constant	0.51***	0.50***	0.51***	0.39***	0.49***	0.44***	0.51***	0.50***	0.51***	0.39***	0.49***	0.44***
	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.082)	(0.036)	(0.068)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.060)	(0.080)	(0.093)	(0.067)
Observations	133	133	132	96	113	128	133	133	132	96	113	128
R-squared	0.31	0.32	0.28	0.36	0.33	0.30	0.31	0.32	0.28	0.36	0.33	0.30
Countries							43	43	43	42	42	43

Table 5.3.Q: Table shows OLS (left) and PCSE (right) estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Objective Social Class Polarization	Social Movement Activity											
	Model I						Model II					
Deregulation vs. Intervention	0.02 (0.058)						0.02 (0.060)					
Security vs. Liberty		0.14* (0.069)						0.14* (0.071)				
Patriarchalism vs. Emancipation			0.17*** (0.036)						0.17** (0.077)			
Nativism vs. Cosmopolitanism				0.14 (0.087)						0.14 (0.093)		
Anti- vs. Pro-Establishment					0.20*** (0.053)						0.20** (0.095)	
Economy vs. Ecology						0.17** (0.067)						0.17 (0.121)
Human Development	0.38*** (0.078)	0.36*** (0.080)	0.34*** (0.079)	0.36*** (0.108)	0.33*** (0.094)	0.36*** (0.087)	0.38*** (0.073)	0.36*** (0.074)	0.34*** (0.073)	0.36*** (0.098)	0.33*** (0.083)	0.36*** (0.080)
Democratic Tradition	0.26*** (0.026)	0.26*** (0.026)	0.26*** (0.025)	0.27*** (0.032)	0.25*** (0.028)	0.25*** (0.027)	0.26*** (0.025)	0.26*** (0.025)	0.26*** (0.024)	0.27*** (0.030)	0.25*** (0.026)	0.25*** (0.027)
Participatory Culture	0.13** (0.067)	0.16** (0.066)	0.18*** (0.062)	0.10 (0.082)	0.16** (0.076)	0.15** (0.071)	0.13** (0.066)	0.16** (0.065)	0.18*** (0.064)	0.10 (0.079)	0.16** (0.071)	0.15** (0.068)
3. Wave	-0.11*** (0.037)	-0.12*** (0.036)	-0.13*** (0.035)		-0.13*** (0.029)		-0.11*** (0.038)	-0.12*** (0.035)	-0.13*** (0.037)		-0.13** (0.054)	
4. Wave	-0.13*** (0.035)	-0.13*** (0.036)	-0.13*** (0.036)	-0.01 (0.024)		-0.01 (0.024)	-0.13*** (0.036)	-0.13*** (0.035)	-0.13*** (0.036)	-0.01 (0.020)		-0.01 (0.020)
5. Wave	-0.14*** (0.035)	-0.15*** (0.035)	-0.16*** (0.034)	-0.03* (0.019)	-0.16*** (0.031)	-0.04* (0.019)	-0.14*** (0.036)	-0.15*** (0.034)	-0.16*** (0.035)	-0.03* (0.018)	-0.16*** (0.054)	-0.04** (0.017)
6. Wave	-0.19*** (0.035)	-0.21*** (0.035)	-0.21*** (0.034)		-0.21*** (0.032)	-0.09*** (0.018)	-0.19*** (0.037)	-0.21*** (0.034)	-0.21*** (0.036)		-0.21*** (0.055)	-0.09*** (0.018)
7. Wave	-0.18*** (0.037)	-0.19*** (0.037)	-0.20*** (0.036)	-0.08*** (0.024)	-0.21*** (0.038)	-0.08*** (0.022)	-0.18*** (0.038)	-0.19*** (0.036)	-0.20*** (0.037)	-0.08*** (0.022)	-0.21*** (0.058)	-0.08*** (0.021)
Constant	-0.06 (0.044)	-0.06 (0.045)	-0.05 (0.045)	-0.15*** (0.056)	-0.02 (0.025)	-0.17*** (0.046)	-0.06 (0.043)	-0.06 (0.043)	-0.05 (0.044)	-0.15*** (0.051)	-0.02 (0.052)	-0.17*** (0.042)
Observations	134	134	133	97	114	129	134	134	133	97	114	129
R-squared	0.73	0.74	0.75	0.74	0.74	0.75	0.73	0.74	0.75	0.74	0.74	0.75
Countries							43	43	43	42	42	43

Table 5.3.R: Table shows OLS (left) and PCSE (right) estimates with period fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic panels and included in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Marginal Effect of Socio-Cultural Polarization on Trust in Others



Note: Graph shows marginal effect of country-level socio-cultural polarization over different issues on general trust in others at the individual level under the moderating influence of social class.

5.4.A: Marginal effect of socio-cultural polarization on trust in others under the moderating effect of social class

Marginal Effect of Socio-Cultural Polarization on Volunteering in Utilitarian Organizations



Note: Graph shows marginal effect of country-level socio-cultural polarization over different issues on number of active memberships in utilitarian organizations at the individual level under the moderating influence of social class.

5.4.B: Marginal effect of socio-cultural polarization on volunteering in utilitarian organizations under the moderating effect of social class

Marginal Effect of Socio-Cultural Polarization on Belonging to Utilitarian Organizations



Note: Graph shows marginal effect of country-level socio-cultural polarization over different issues on number of active memberships in utilitarian organizations at the individual level under the moderating influence of social class.

5.4.C: Marginal effect of socio-cultural polarization on belonging to utilitarian organizations under the moderating effect of social class

Marginal Effect of Socio-Cultural Polarization on Volunteering in Sociotropic Organizations



Note: Graph shows marginal effect of country-level socio-cultural polarization over different issues on number of active memberships in sociotropic organizations at the individual level under the moderating influence of social class.

5.4.D: Marginal effect of socio-cultural polarization on volunteering in sociotropic organizations under the moderating effect of social class

Marginal Effect of Socio-Cultural Polarization on Satisfaction with Life



Note: Graph shows marginal effect of country-level socio-cultural polarization over different issues on life satisfaction at the individual level under the moderating influence of social class.

5.4.E: Marginal effect of socio-cultural polarization on life satisfaction in others under the moderating effect of social class

Marginal Effect of Socio-Cultural Polarization on Social Movement Activity



Note: Graph shows marginal effect of country-level socio-cultural polarization over different issues on social movement activity at the individual level under the moderating influence of social class.

5.4.F: Marginal effect of socio-cultural polarization on life satisfaction in others under the moderating effect of social class