

To weaken, or to strengthen international human rights organizations?

That is the question of societal actors, domestic institutions, and international interdependencies

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Submitted as a requirement for the award of the title of

Dr. rer. pol in

Political Science

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Born 30.09.1988 in Most

Submitted on: 2021-03-29

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Acknowledgments

To my wife Caroline and my son Gabriel

I am most grateful to my wife Caroline, who continuously empowers me to fulfill my dreams.

I would also like to thank to my first supervisor, Apl. Prof. Dr. Vera van Hüllen. She provided me with thoughtful guidance at every stage of the research process, as well as throughout my doctoral studies. I especially appreciate her dedication to frequent supervision meetings and her skillful formulation of analytical questions which guided my reflection process. Thanks to her support, it was easy for me to work under the condition of uncertainty.

My thanks belong likewise to my second supervisor, Prof. Dr. Stephanie Hofmann, who made my research stay at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva possible and inspired my field research at the United Nations Human Rights Council.

I would like to acknowledge Prof. Dr. Christian Welzel, the third evaluator of my dissertation, for facilitating an inspiring research environment at the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) as well as at the Doctoral Programme “Democracy under Stress” at Leuphana University of Lüneburg.

Through formal and informal conversations, my research benefitted from the normative feedback that my colleagues from the Doctoral Programme “Democracy under Stress” kindly provided. I also appreciate their help with quantitative methods. I enjoyed the friendly and fair atmosphere of our community.

I would like to thank to the Global Governance Research Unit of Berlin Social Science Center that gave me a chance to grow during my master studies and hosted my PhD research stay.

This research would not have been possible without the generous funding provided by the Georg-Christoph-Lichtenberg-Scholarship financed by the Ministry for Science and Culture of Lower Saxony, the Graduate School of Leuphana University Lüneburg, and the FAZIT-Foundation.

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Abbreviations

AL	Arab League
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
AU-SM	Special Mechanisms of African Union
AME	Average marginal effects
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CoE	Council of Europe
CoE-DGII	Directorate General of Democracy of Council of Europe
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CIS-EMO	Election Monitoring Organization of Commonwealth of Independent States
CSO	Civil society organizations
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EMB	Electoral management body
EU	European Union
Extranet	Extranet of United Nations Human Rights Council
FDI	Foreign direct investment
GDP	Gross domestic product
II	International institution
ILO	International Labor Organization
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICT	International Telecommunication Union
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
net ODA	Net official development assistance
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NHRIs	National human rights institutions
OSCE-ODHIR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OAS	Organization of American States

OAS-SSD	Secretariat for Strengthening Democracy of Organization of American States
OIC	Organization for Islamic Cooperation
p.p.	Percentage points
RoW	Regimes of the World
SADC	Southern African Development Community
UIA	Union of International Associations
UN	United Nations
SP UNHRC	Special Procedures of United Nations Human Rights Council
UNCHR	United Nations Commission on Human Rights
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
UNOHCHR	United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
V-DEM	Varieties of Democracy dataset
WGI	Worldwide Governance Indicators
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

1. Introduction

Human rights and democratizing actors as well as victims of human rights abuse hope for increased compliance with human rights and democracy standards. International human rights organizations (IHROs), such as the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), are expected to make a positive contribution to the liberal human rights regime. IHROs often raise high hopes even though they possess either low levels of legally binding authority or comparatively weak enforcement mechanisms (Dai 2014, p. 570; see Fawn 2013, p. 5; Luck and Doyle 2004).

IHROs are equipped with authority during their foundation. This authority is re-negotiated multiple times throughout their life span during reform processes. An oversimplified expectation would have us assume that democracies want to strengthen IHROs, whereby autocracies strive to weaken them. Yet, the matter is by far more complex. As the UNHRC was reformed in 2006, 2007, 2010, and 2011, some autocracies strived to abolish parts of the UNHRC. Other autocracies aimed to “merely” weaken them. Democracies showcased and even larger variance during this reform process. Indonesia or India predominantly favored weakening the UNHRC, whereby Ghana or Spain supported exclusively strengthening of the organization. To make things even more complex, some attitudes towards the UNHRC changed from one year to the next.

Autocracies diverge not only in their stances towards the UNHRC, but also across their domestic and international dimensions. Nigeria allows different levels of participation by societal actors than Belarus. Cuba does not have the same domestic institutions as Russia. Iran enters international negotiations from a different position than Thailand. Democracies vary on the domestic and international dimensions as well. Put simply, the Czech Republic is not the US, and Costa Rica differs from South Africa.

The question that drives my research is how we can explain this broad variety of state preferences for strengthening or weakening IHROs. Previous research has mostly concentrated on democracies leaving autocracies understudied and treating countries as black boxes (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Hill 2016; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 2008). To account for such shortcomings, I test the relationship of the UNHRC and its authoritarian and democratic members by means of inferential statistics. I examine the explanatory potential of first, participation of domestic societal actors, second, different types of domestic institutions, and third an interplay of international material and moral interdependencies. The vast reform process of the UNHRC offers a rich and relevant body of material. Autocracies and democracies from all over the world negotiated how to re-shape the core body of the liberal human rights regime. In brief, I conduct a systematic study that first, devotes equal attention to autocracies and democracies, and second, opens up the regime types.

1.1. Previous findings and research demand

As a part of liberal theory of international relations, so-called regime type research explains in how far states are ready to strengthen international organizations (IOs) as well as IHROs in particular. In general, regime type research explains international behavior of states by referring to a variety of domestic regime types, such as democracies, autocracies, democratizing or autocratizing states, more or less autocratic and democratic states, or hybrid regimes. In addition to the international protection of human rights and democracy (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Hill 2016; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 2008; Moravcsik 2000), regime type approaches analyze, for instance, liberalization of trade (Kono 2006; Kono 2008; Mansfield et al. 2000; Milner and Kubota 2005) or environmental protection (Bättig and Bernauer 2009; see also Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008).

Regime type research draws on insights from Comparative Politics to fulfill the promise of liberal theory of international relations, namely, to open the black box of states and to link domestic and international levels. Still, regime type approaches do not fully live up to these expectations. Instead of opening the black box, regime type research has created a different set of smaller boxes, such as stable democracies, democratizing states, hybrid regimes, etc.

The boxes—or regime types—inform us in how far states meet the criteria of a democratic ideal, and whether states are stable or undergoing democratization and autocratization processes. The most researched criterion in this regard is quality of elections. The less competitive (or free and fair) elections are, the more repressive the regime. Regime type approaches are driven by the general expectation that the more repressive regimes are, the lower the probability that they will prefer to delegate authority to IHROs as well as other IOs. To delegate authority (or to strengthen IOs) means that countries transfer autonomous decision-making competencies to IOs (Cooper et al. 2008; Zürn et al. 2012; Zürn et al. 2015). Democracies delegate authority to IHROs to increase interdependency in the international system thus leveling up normative pressure on autocracies to refrain from human rights abuse. Furthermore, democratization and autocratization processes are said to “accelerate” authority delegation preferences. Therefore, young democracies might more readily delegate authority than established democracies, while autocratizing countries are generally understood to be less ready to delegate authority than established autocracies. (see Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 2008; Pevehouse 2002, 2005; Pevehouse and Russett 2006, 2006)

Countries vary, however, not only with regard to the institutional dimension or the transition processes. They also differ according to the extent of participation of societal actors. For instance, based on electoral quality, Armenia was classified as an electoral autocracy in 2006, but allowed more

societal actors to participate than electoral democracies such as India in 2006 or Turkey in 2007.¹ Therefore, to meet the expectations and to properly open the black box and establish a link to the international level, I analyze in how far societal actors, domestic institutions, as well as pressures in the international system shape attitudes towards IHROs. Such a general research goal will allow me to make a contribution to regime type research.

So far, quantitative regime type research has provided cumulative findings on the relationship of democratizing countries and IHROs. Democratizing states are more likely to delegate authority to IHROs than any other regime type (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Hill 2016; Moravcsik 2000; but see Tallberg et al. 2016). As political elites of democratizing states are uncertain about the future, they join IHROs to preclude backsliding to an authoritarian mode of governance (ibid). Furthermore, democratizing states enter IHROs in order to send credible signals to established democracies and international investors. These, in turn, are expected to help young democracies to sustain the process of democratization (see Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 2008). These arguments on democratizing states that “lock-in” democracy and “join the club” of democracies by delegating authority apply to IHROs, IOs governing other policy fields, as well as IOs of general purpose (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 2008; Pevehouse and Russett 2006). Apart from the results on democratizing states, regime type research has hardly brought forth further cumulative findings.

Moreover, as regime type approaches predominantly analyze the behavior of democracies in international relations, they have created a bias—especially in the international policy field of human rights and democracy. This bias has resulted in autocracies remaining understudied. Here, established democracies followed by young democracies have been said to be the main drivers of IHROs (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008). This democracy bias has remained in place even though qualitative literature has shown that several autocracies build their own regional organizations (ROs) and undermine liberal IHROs to deflect from human rights and democracy pressure (Acharya 2003, 2004, 2016; Ambrosio 2008, 2009; Munro 2009; Plattner et al. 2016; Soest 2015; van Hüllen 2015). Also, this bias has not been eliminated even though autocracies became more resilient to democratization efforts and several democracies are currently undergoing autocratization processes (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019).

To account for this democracy bias and to keep the promise of opening up regime types, I conduct a systematic study explaining delegation preferences voiced by autocracies and democracies. My study examines the role of societal actors, domestic institutions, as well as pressures on the international

¹ I use a regime type classification called *Regimes of the World*. Participation of societal actors is measured by the *Civil liberties index*. Both measurements are incorporated in the Varieties of Democracy dataset (Coppedge et al. 2018b; Coppedge et al. 2019a). More in *Chapter 5 Operationalization and Methods*.

stage in both regime types. Apart from the demand to broaden and deepen regime type explanations, I aim to generate policy-relevant insights for democratizing actors, such as societal actors, democratic governments, and secretariats of IHROs. The findings of my study will enable these actors to better understand their coalition partners and oppositional forces during IHRO reform processes. Moreover, I am pursuing this research topic to address a normative demand. State delegation preferences (together with norms and power) shape institutional authority of IHROs (see Finnemore and Goldstein 2013), which should in turn improve compliance with human rights and democracy standards (Simmons 2009, pp. 103–108).

1.2. Analytical framework

In order to make a meaningful contribution to regime type research, I suggest several modifications in terms of theory, concepts, and empirical analysis. The overarching theoretical reasoning is provided by New Liberalism as formulated by Andrew Moravcsik (1997, 2003, 2009). New Liberalism envisions a bottom-up process where societal actors formulate their interests for the international agenda in the first phase. In the second phase, domestic institutions (mis-)represent the interests of societal actors. Governmental policies and interests of dominant societal actors form state preferences for international politics. In the third phase, state preferences are adjusted according to international interdependencies, and translate into international state behavior. The difference to regime type research is crucial: I do not assume “what regime types want,” but rather examine how delegation preferences to IHROs are formed both on the domestic and the international level.

Each of the three stages entails specificities according to the either democratic or authoritarian regime types. Autocracies differ from democracies as they apply more repression rather than legitimation to stay in the driving seat (Gerschewski 2013), which has far-reaching implications for all three stages. Regarding the first stage, which analyzes the role of societal actors: Authoritarian regimes either accommodate interests of societal actors loyal to the regime or these actors accept governmental policies in order to secure their privileged position. Oppositional societal actors pressure authoritarian rulers to refrain from repression and to pursue goodwill policies instead. Conversely, democracies rely more on legitimation than repression. To generate sufficient levels of legitimacy, democratic governments strive to incorporate interests of both oppositional and ideologically associated societal actors. At this point, my work differs from the existing regime type literature in two aspects: First, I open up the regime types to inspect roles of societal actors. Second, I do not differentiate between autocracies and democracies based solely on levels of repression or their stability (see Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 2008; Pevehouse 2002, 2005; Pevehouse and Russett 2006, 2006), but account for aspects of legitimation as well. Therefore, I do not underestimate the role of societal actors especially in authoritarian regimes.

In the second stage, domestic institutions select whose societal interests will be reflected together with governmental interests in the formation of state preferences. While institutions in democratic states are supposed to ensure that most societal actors are represented, authoritarian regimes use institutions to privilege societal actors loyal to the regime and to disadvantage opposing ones (Svolik 2012). In order to determine a state's respective regime type, quantitative regime type approaches predominantly scrutinize electoral institutions in combination with further institutional components or minor shares of societal actor participation (see Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 2008; Pevehouse 2002, 2005; Pevehouse and Russett 2006, 2006). My analysis deviates to the extent that I analyze the effects of domestic institutions—namely electoral institutions, rule of law, as well as oversight mechanisms—separately.

In the third stage, state preferences enter international negotiations and are adjusted according to the interplay of moral and material interdependencies. Authoritarian regimes experience asymmetrical moral interdependency since they comply less with prevailing liberal human rights and democracy norms than democracies do (Møller and Skaaning 2013). Autocracies, however, can partially escape this moral asymmetry. I am referring to scenarios where rich authoritarian regimes can “afford” to even question the existence of IHROs because the authoritarian rulers do not depend on international trade with democracies. Here, democracies experience material asymmetry as they depend on trade with autocracies to a certain extent. Unlike most regime type research, I do not further consider the two assumptions that autocracies trade less (Kono 2006; Mansfield et al. 2000, 2002; Milner and Kubota 2005) and thus are on average poorer than democracies, and that wealth conditions democratization (Aidt and Gassebner 2010). Furthermore, I do not underestimate authoritarian regimes in the policy field of liberal human rights and pay an appropriate attention to them. I treat autocracies as full-fledged actors of international relations that deflect liberal human rights and democracy pressures by building their own ROs and deteriorating liberal IHROs.

Apart from the theoretical and conceptual advancements, I employ a different measure of delegation preferences. Conventional quantitative regime type literature operationalizes delegation preferences as time that countries take to join IHROs (e.g. Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Hill 2016; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008). The shorter the time, the more states are ready to delegate authority to IHROs. Such a measure, however, does not account for cases where states enter IHROs in order to weaken them. Moreover, it does not account for the fact that states undergo autocratization and democratization processes and thus their incentives to weaken or strengthen IHROs change over time. Additionally, the authority of IHROs changes over time as well, which might change the incentives of member states. Finally, when accessing IHROs, states only have a limited understanding of the consequences down the road. To account for such problems and shortcomings, I qualitatively access diplomatic statements

made during the reform process of the monitoring bureaucracy² called Special Procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council (SP UNHRC). The reform took place in 2006, 2007, 2010, and 2011. Here, states and especially societal actors already experienced what consequences authoritative reporting carried out by human rights experts implies; the monitoring authority did not undergo vital transformation; and effects of regime change can pronounce into new attitudes towards the IHRO.

To meet the far-reaching research demand and generate results of normative and policy relevance, I pursue the following research question and test the corresponding hypotheses in my study:

“How can we explain authority delegation preferences voiced by autocracies and democracies in reform processes of IHROs?”

H1: The more societal actors can participate on the domestic level, the higher the probability that states will favor authority delegation to IHROs.

H2: The better domestic institutions represent the interests of all societal actors, the higher the probability that states will favor authority delegation to IHROs.

H3: The wealthier authoritarian regimes are, the more easily they can escape asymmetric moral interdependencies, and thus the higher the probability that they will be against authority delegation to IHROs. The wealthier democracies are, the more they can afford to enhance the normative pressure on human rights abusers, and thus the higher the probability that they will favor authority delegation to expensive IHROs.

1.3. Chapter and results preview

Ch. 2 Literature review

The literature review in Chapter 2 sheds a light on shortcomings in regime type literature, unveils the roots of such limitations, and suggests a variety of conceptual updates and possible modifications. First, I review the role of democracies and autocracies in international relations since 1989 in brief. This allows me to identify roots of the democracy bias described above and to show how autocracies have been understudied. In a second step, I fully review quantitative regime type contributions explaining the delegation preferences of predominantly democratic regime types. After that, I integrate insights from qualitative research on autocracies to partially account for the democracy bias. Next, I review quantitative regime type contributions explaining international trade. I identify how such research underestimates economic performance of authoritarian regimes and point to a

² Human rights monitoring bureaucracies stand for permanent or mission-related bodies of IOs that generate, cumulate, and disseminate knowledge on human rights violations. Monitoring bureaucracies do not consist of member states, as intergovernmental bodies do, but include human rights experts who conduct remote or on the ground missions (see Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004).

reductionist theoretical link between economic growth and degrees of autocracy/democracy. In the last step, I provide an up-to-date understanding of autocracies in international relations, which in turn helps me to address the democracy bias.

Ch. 3 Theory

In Chapter 3, I develop a theoretical framework allowing me to introduce progress to regime type research. First, I present the individual stages of the overarching bottom-up process and reflect on its compatibility with regime type literature. Second, I zoom out and contrast the three stages of bottom-up process with theoretical reasonings of realist, constructivist, institutionalist, and domestic politics schools of thought. This contrast will provide analytical clarity and provide the basis for my theoretical assumptions. Third, I refer to the theoretical roots of New Liberalism constituted by ideational, republican, and commercial liberalisms, in order to identify theoretical assumptions that were overseen by regime type literature, but which are useful to explain the delegation of preferences to IHROs. Fourth and finally, I summarize the theoretical framework.

Ch. 4 Research design

Chapter 4 outlines the research design. Primarily, I further justify my research question and corresponding hypotheses. Furthermore, I specify the role of societal actors and domestic institutions in detail integrating insights from legitimacy and repression research originating in Comparative Politics. These complement the theoretical and conceptual premises drawn from regime type research and New Liberalism. In contrast, conceptualizing the interplay of economic and moral interdependencies does not require further details. Instead, I reduce the complexity of theoretical reasoning and propose a testable proposition. I also justify why the last reform of SP UNHRC represents a good opportunity to analyze delegation preferences voiced by authoritarian and democratic regimes, explain the specificities of the reform process, describe the monitoring authority, and highlight an institutionalized linkage with societal actors. Lastly, I integrate all concepts into an analytical framework guiding the empirical analysis.

Ch. 5 Operationalization and methods

In Chapter 5, I operationalize the dependent variable of delegation preferences. Delegation preferences stand for claims made during reform processes of IHROs that aim to either weaken or strengthen the international authority. I introduce a qualitative content analysis generating data for the dependent variable. Moreover, I operationalize explanatory and control variables and select a classification of authoritarian and democratic regime types. Furthermore, I show how the dependent variable data was transformed and introduce corresponding methods of statistical inquiry. Lastly, I

present a modeling strategy that allows me to open the regime types and examine international interdependencies while avoiding issues of multicollinearity.

Ch. 6 Results and discussion

Chapter 6 figures as the most important one in this study. Primarily, it contains a presentation and interpretation of the results provided by inferential statistics. All results are discussed in light of the related research. I begin the chapter by presenting descriptive statistics and proceed with a regime type analysis without opening the regime types and without testing effects of international interdependencies. The boundaries of such a regime type analysis justify—in terms of empirical examination—more detailed tests. Hence, I pursue my main research interest by examining, interpreting, and discussing the impact of societal actors, domestic institutions, and international interdependencies on the delegation preferences to the SP UNHRC.

Ch. 7 Conclusion

A summary of findings constitutes the core of Chapter 7 and provides a brief outlook at this point: In my study, societal actors—along with the interplay of moral and material interdependencies—figure as the most important predictors of delegation preferences voiced by autocracies and democracies during the reform process of the SP UNHRC. Societal actors play a more important role in democracies than in autocracies. Whereby societal actors generate interests in strengthening or weakening IHROs, oversight mechanisms help them to conduct effective lobbying at the domestic level. When comparing the importance of domestic institutions, oversight mechanisms outperform both the rule of law and electoral institutions. Regarding international coalition building, authoritarian regimes turned out to be better organized than democracies.

2. Literature review

Contributing to regime type explanations requires to begin with elaborating what regime type literature is and is not. Regime type literature strives to explain international behavior of states by referring to a variety of domestic regime types like democracies, autocracies, democratizing or autocratizing states, more or less autocratic and democratic states, etc. When embarking on such a mission, regime type approaches explicitly or implicitly take into account whether the international behavior addresses externalities arising from cross-boarder activities regarding security, environmental, and economic policies, or whether the international behavior affects domestic affairs of human rights and democracy policies (Hill 2016, 1; see Moravcsik 2000, p. 217; Pevehouse 2016, p. 1). Hence, domestic affairs are regulated under moral interdependency, cross-boarder externalities under material interdependency (ibid).

Many authors from Comparative Politics or International Relations combine aspects of domestic regime types and material and/or moral interdependencies without necessarily referring to the regime type literature. Furthermore, regime type literature is expected to employ rather quantitative methods as a successor of the almost exclusively quantitative democratic peace research. Nevertheless, numerous qualitative contributions analyze aspects of regime types and interdependency and cover topics that quantitative research has left out. Still, there is plenty of research that I do not consider to be a regime type literature. For instance, domestic politics approaches leave out the conceptualization of interdependency and concentrate merely on internal state affairs when explaining international behavior (Gelpi et al. 2009; Ramsay 2004; Richards et al. 1993; Schultz 2013, p. 3; Tomz 2007). Likewise, I do not count liberal institutionalist contributions as regime type literature since they explain international state behavior by referring to complex interdependencies but leave out aspects of domestic regime types (see Keohane 2012; Keohane and Nye 1989).

In this literature review, I stress the shortcomings of regime type literature that my study aims to overcome. First, I point to the heritage of democratic peace literature that gave rise to the quantitative regime type approaches. Such a heritage entails a democracy bias leaving autocracies understudied. Therefore, I integrate qualitative contributions on autocracies into the review and analyze in how far they can account for the bias in quantitative literature. Since the quantitative literature devoted sufficient attention to the democratic regime types, I refrain from presenting qualitative contributions on democracies.³ Second, I elaborate in how far studies explaining delegation preferences to IHROs provided for inconsistent theoretical assumptions and produced fuzzy empirical results. Third, I review

³ For qualitative contributions, see for example Goodliffe and Hawkins (2006), Keohane et al. (2009), and Munro (2009).

the regime type literature on international trade since its intellectual heritage hinders an appropriate understanding of wealthy autocracies. And fourth, current literature maintains a state-centered perspective and thus overlooks the variation of domestic dimensions within and across regime types.

To cover such a broad research demand, my overarching argument foresees an explanatory bottom-up process where interests of domestic actors are (mis-)represented by domestic institutions and modified by pressures stemming from international interdependencies. Such a bottom-up process further opens the black box of regime types by including domestic actors and institutions into analysis. At the same time, the bottom-up process does not underestimate the impact of international interdependencies. My argument foresees an interplay of moral and material interdependencies.

In Section 2.1. Historical context, I start off the literature review by a brief overview of the roles of democracies and autocracies in international relations since 1989. These roles are only to a limited extent reflected in the regime type explanations. Thus, I search for reasons of the biased focus on democracies to claim an absent update on autocracies in turn. In Section 2.2. Analyzing delegation preferences, I fully engage with quantitative regime type explanations of delegation preferences. The section also integrates insights from qualitative literature on autocracies which were left understudied by the quantitative approaches. I explain the democracy bias and the resultant research gap on autocracies, explicate the state-centered perspective, and make aware of several inconsistent theoretical assumptions and empirical findings. In Section 2.3, I proceed with a representative review of the quantitative regime type contributions explaining international trade. Here, I reveal the knowledge which leads to first, an underestimation of autocracies and their economic performance, and second, a reductionist theoretical link between economic growth and degrees of autocracy/democracy. In the last Section 2.4., I define a theoretical, conceptual, and empirical research demand that I account for. And finally, I conceptualize an up-to-date understanding of authoritarian regimes in international relations which helps me to account for the democracy bias.

2.1. Historical context

The historical context allows us to understand why the current regime type literature devotes more attention to democracies than autocracies. Simultaneously, I size the opportunity here to elaborate why strengthening research on autocracies is necessary to understand state delegation preferences to IHROs. In short, current regime type literature captured the leading role of democracies both before and after 1989 but failed to fully incorporate the active authoritarian resistance to liberal human rights and democracy norms that pronounced especially from 2000s on. Reform processes of IHROs are

negotiated by both autocracies and democracies.⁴ Thus, I suggest employing a systematic comparative study in order to be able to explain autocracies' and democracies' delegation preferences to IHROs during their reforms.


After the end of the Cold War, the outlook for democracy in the Western countries was positive. The breakdown of Soviet Union caused a shift of power in the international system in favor of liberal democracies, as Ikenberry describes (2001, pp. 216–217, modified by author): Russia had to face even more powerful United States, Western Europe and Japan. [The partially democratizing] Russia reacted with an accommodating foreign policy to the West. The United States sought to expand their military and economic power by creating IOs and broadening their membership like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Transnational companies with headquarters in the United States and the European Community (EC) were the leading ones (Braithwaite and Drahos 2001, pp. 215–216).

The collapse of the Soviet Union allowed also Eastern European countries to democratize in the 1990s. Hereby, the third wave of democratization that started in the 1970s in Southern Europe, spread to South America, and incorporated several Asian and African countries, was finalized (Berg-Schlosser 2009; Markoff 2009). The democratic peace research established its agenda along the second (1950s to 1960s) and the third (1970s to 1990s) wave of democratization. The predominant absence of violent conflicts between democracies allowed democratic peace research to maintain its legitimacy even though the peaceful effects of democratic systems were stronger before the Iron Curtain fell down (Gowa 2011).

The regime type literature is an extension to the democratic peace research (Tallberg et al. 2016, p. 60). Authors of regime type approaches interpret absence of violent conflict among democracies as an increased willingness to cooperate in the international system that leads to strengthening IHROs. Alongside with the end of the bipolar system, established liberal democracies initiated creation of further IHROs in order to strengthen peace by integrating young or democratizing states as the regime type literature argues (Pevehouse 2002, 2005; Pevehouse and Russett 2006). Figure 1 shows an increase of IHROs together with the final peak of the third wave of democratization in the 1990s. The process of inclusion of young democracies into IHROs went hand in hand with their integration into military and economic IOs (see Ikenberry 2001, p. 216; Risse-Kappen 1996).

⁴ NGOs (see Binder and Eisentraut 2019) and secretariats of IOs (see Johnson and Urpelainen 2014) participate in the debates during reforms of IHROs as well. The focus here is, however, on delegation preferences of states.

Figure 1: Human rights institutions and democratization, 1945-2000



Source: Hafner-Burton et. al 2015, p. 10

A higher density of IHROs and their strengthening shall not serve only the objectives of established democracies but provide for benefits for the democratizing states, too. A cumulative research demonstrates that democratizing states are most probable to delegate authority to IHROs of all regime types. They do so in order to lock-in the domestic democratization process and to join the international club of democracies (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Hill 2016; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; see also Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008; Moravcsik 2000). I interpret that the regime type literature has left autocracies understudied since it was preoccupied by analyzing the delegation preferences of established and especially young democracies. As such, regime type approaches maintained the democracy bias inherited from the democratic peace research. This is problematic because regime type approaches underestimate an increasingly active role of autocracies in international relations dating from the 2000s (see Ambrosio 2009, 2010).

Apart of the inclusion of young democracies, IHROs shall put autocracies under pressure to comply with liberal human rights and democracy norms (Pevehouse and Russett 2006). Hence, IHROs figure as further democratizing actors together with states and NGOs (see Pevehouse 2002). Compared to immediate support of democratization processes, IHROs were expected to have impact on autocracies in the long-term time horizon. Democracies tried to socialize autocracies to liberal human rights and democracy practice within densely organized IHROs (Fawn 2013; Schimmelfennig 2000; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006). However, such socialization processes alone were not able to overcome the domestic authoritarian rule (but see Fawn 2013; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006, pp. 66–77; Zürn and Checkel 2005).

As a reaction to the growing democratization pressure after the Cold War, autocracies engage in multiple forms of international cooperation among each other and strive to subvert democratization

in their neighborhood. Especially autocracies that experienced a real threat of democratization—for example through the Color Revolutions in the post-soviet space or the Arab Spring in the North Africa and Middle East—promote authoritarianism abroad (Ambrosio 2010, p. 375; Heydemann and Leenders 2011, pp. 649–650). A rather unintentional or not aggressive promotion of authoritarian rule on regional and global scale is conceptualized as authoritarian diffusion (Ambrosio 2010). Authoritarian diffusion is decoupled from mobilization for a certain ideology like fascism or communism (Ambrosio 2010, p. 376). Intentional types of international cooperation among authoritarian regimes are coined as learning, collaboration, and support (Soest 2015, p. 629). Autocracies adopt all these strategies in order to deflect democratization threats at home. Moreover, they strive to avert democratization processes in their near neighborhood which pose a potential threat due to the spill-over effects (Ambrosio 2009, pp. 131–158; Tolstrup 2015). In the end, the international cooperation of authoritarian regimes is self-serving and shall maximize own survival (Soest 2015). Hence, when neighboring democracies do not undergo a contagious democratization process, autocracies cooperate even with democracies (Obydenkova and Libman 2015; see Risse and Babayan 2015).

Furthermore, autocracies promote the norm of state sovereignty in reaction to the universalist claims of liberal human rights and democracy norms (e.g. Acharya 2003; Ambrosio 2008, 2010) carried by IHROs. State sovereignty allows non-democracies to avoid outside pressures for democratization and to suppress more easily domestic human rights movements. Autocracies offer even a popular alternative to the democratic regime type by pushing forward a “sovereign democracy” (Ambrosio 2008, p. 1338). Within a “sovereign democracy”, state induced repression should protect traditional values and anti-terrorism measures legitimize tightening of the regime (Cooley 2016).

Autocracies do not only engage in a rhetorical action when defending the state sovereignty norm. They also establish ROs to protect themselves from the universalist claims. Western ROs like the European Union (EU), shall first and foremost facilitate a regional integration (Acharya 2016). Versus ROs founded by non-western countries like the Gulf Cooperation Council shall provide autonomy from the universalist claims (see *ibid*). ROs constitute a shield from the universalist claims by both localizing the liberal norms (van Hüllen 2015) and promoting the counter norm of civilizational diversity (Cooley 2016, pp. 118–119).

The picture of autocracies as pro-active actors of international relations is not complete yet. So far, I elaborated on authoritarian regimes and their bilateral and regional strategies. They figure as pro-active actors of IOs as well. In IOs with mixed democratic and autocratic membership, authoritarian regimes plea for more procedural democratic standards in order to gain more participatory opportunities (Eisentraut 2013). Autocracies shame their enemies for human rights

violations (Hug 2015; see Lebovic and Voeten 2006) and at the same time they spare each other of severe reputational costs (see Terman and Voeten 2017). Autocracies also cut the budget to IOs if required (Fawn 2013, p. 56). There are several other tactics how autocracies undermine IOs, especially IHROs. One of them is weakening IHROs during reform processes. This strategy is a part of my analysis and thus will receive even more attention throughout the dissertation.

In summary, regime type literature fully incorporates the leading role of established democracies that increasingly sought to bind other states in IHROs in order to strengthen international peace after the Cold War and spread liberal human rights and democracy. It also provides for cumulative research on young democracies that welcomed the opportunity to stabilize their democratization processes and to signal their willingness to join the club of democracies by delegating authority to IHROs. The positive prospects of democracy and the leading role of democracies in international relations after the Cold War skewed the attention of regime type literature towards democracies. Together with the democracy bias inherited from the preceding research on democratic peace, quantitative regime type approaches did not appropriately reflect the response of autocracies to elevated democratization pressure.

Such a response entails action on bilateral, regional, and international level. Autocracies engage in bilateral cooperation to bolster their survival chances. Securing the stability of authoritarian regimes entails also subverting contagious democratization processes of immediate geographical proximity. Furthermore, autocracies organize in ROs to deflect the liberal human rights and democracy norms. Moreover, autocracies promote the norm of state sovereignty in IHROs and strive to undermine them. I argue that regime type literature needs to reflect the overall active and confident role of autocracies in international relations which is also well-pronounced in IHROs. I suggest to equally incorporate democracies and autocracies into the regime type literature. In order to specify the demand, I review the corresponding literature in detail in the following subsections. These are devoted to regime type literature analyzing delegation preferences and international trade.

2.2. Analyzing delegation preferences

“How can we explain delegation preferences voiced by autocracies and democracies during reforms of IHROs?” This is exactly the overarching research question of my analysis. Both quantitative and qualitative regime type literature addressed similar research topics. The quantitative contributions heavily concentrated on democratizing states, weakly democratic countries, and established democracies. Such studies produced limited insights on other regime types like autocratizing regimes, hybrid regimes, or weakly and strongly autocratic regimes. These were, however, merely the remainder regime types used for comparisons against democratizing states and established democracies. Authors applying qualitative methods, in turn, studied autocracies more substantially.

Since I conduct a quantitative analysis, I review the quantitative literature in its full extent. Moreover, to account for the democracy bias in quantitative studies, I integrate qualitative literature on autocracies into the review. There is no special demand to review qualitative contributions on democracies since the quantitative literature devotes extensive attention to them.

There is a rather small community of quantitative researchers providing for cumulative research on young democracies and their delegation preferences to IOs. They repeatedly test the theoretical assumptions put forward by Moravcsik (2000) in his research article on *Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe*. To be precise, they overtake and test the so called “lock-in” argument: Elites of democratizing states are uncertain about the outcome of the transition process. Therefore, young democracies join human rights institutions and organizations that figure as international control instances of the democratization process. Hence, such institutions are expected to help to avoid rolling back to an authoritarian mode of governance. Furthermore, the quantitative regime type literature picked also fragments of assumptions on the so called “signaling/credibility” theses from the prominent article by Moravcsik (2000) and developed it: Democratizing states access to human rights institutions and organizations in order to send credible signals to established democracies and international investors. These shall in turn help young democracies to sustain the process of democratization (see Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 2008).

Nevertheless, before authors of regime type contributions turned to explaining delegation preferences of democratizing states, they were preoccupied with solving the puzzle of IOs and their contribution to peace. Literature documented that IOs weakly, strongly or even negatively influence reduction of violent international conflicts (Pevehouse and Russett 2006, pp. 969–970). Except for methodological questions, it was also the selection of IOs included in the sample that produced varying results (Pevehouse and Russett 2006). Having solved this puzzle, the authors turned to analyzing further legacies of the democratic peace research agenda that expects democracies to cooperate more than autocracies in the international realm.⁵ The delegation of authority figures at this point as an instance of international cooperation. Hence, on the overall, democracies are expected to delegate more than autocracies do.⁶

At this point, the research focusing primary on democratizing states comes into play. Such a series employs the Polity dataset to access regime type that figures as the main explanatory aspect. The delegation of authority is understood as an accession to international treaties and/or IOs. Almost all of the contributions draw on the Intergovernmental Organizations data from the *Correlates of War*

⁵ The agenda on IOs and their peaceful effects did not disappear but rather enjoyed less attention. See for example Simmons and Danner (2010) on positive effects of the International Criminal Court (ICC).

⁶ See Shanks et al. Jacobson et al. 1986; 1996 for an early analysis of the reasons why states enter IOs.

(COW) Project to capture the dependent variable.⁷ The overall trend is to refrain from using indeterminate large samples including both international treaties and IOs towards small samples promising increased precision of inferences made. Table 1 summarizes research designs and results of the reviewed (and rather complex) quantitative studies, see below. I begin reviewing the quantitative contributions that focus primary on democracies and turn to qualitative ones explaining delegation preferences of autocracies later.⁸

Quantitative contributions

To start off, Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) argue that democratizing states and weakly democratic states shall be most motivated to access to international treaties and IOs (here subsumed as international institutions and abbreviated as “IIs”). Leaders in such states find it difficult to credibly commit to the democratization process or the consolidation of democracy. By accessing to international institutions, they hope to solidify their democratic agendas and thus avoid a regression to authoritarian mode of governance. As the authors assert that the protection from authoritarianism will be more pronounced in IIs composed primarily of democracies. Established democracies are expected to join IIs for various reasons: First, to strengthen domestic standards of democracy, second, to reach goals that are impossible to reach without cooperation, third, to obtain external evaluation of goodwill performance suited for legitimation of unpopular domestic policies. The study leaves out theorizing on autocratizing states and anocracies (hybrid regimes) even though they are included in the quantitative model.

The authors find robust evidence in favor of the argument on democratizing states. These states join more IIs than any other regime type. Autocratizing states are less probable to delegate authority to IIs than the rest of states. Further, the more democratic countries are, the more they are ready to access IIs. This holds true for states other than severely autocratic and most democratic ones. Moreover, IIs with predominant democratic membership are more useful to avoid autocratization. The authors control for several further arguments: States that undergo militarized interstate disputes are less likely to join IIs since their diplomatic missions are preoccupied with the conflict; the less is the international

⁷ The study by Hill (2016) is an exception since it draws on other than Polity and COW data.

⁸ The literature review does not incorporate contributions explaining the creation of ICC. The ICC can be understood as an IHRO since it issues judgments on aggravate human rights atrocities like genocide. However, when it comes to explaining delegation preferences to the ICC, prominent quantitative studies like Goodliffe and Hawkins (2009) and Simmons and Danner (2010) demonstrate that regime type explanations are not the dominant ones. Goodliffe and Hawkins (2009) arrive to the results that especially international trade networks can explain the delegation preferences whereby regime types do not deliver significant explanations and point to a counterintuitive negative relationship between quality of democracy and delegation preferences. Simmons and Danner (2010) demonstrate that it takes to analyze the levels of violence exerted in the states than to scrutinize regime types in order to explain delegation preferences to the ICC. See also Chapman and Chaudoin (2013).

system characterized by hegemonic rule, the more states join IIs; there are regional patterns of authority delegation probably influenced by a high number of ROs in the sample; there is no evidence that economic development influences the propensity of accessing IIs; the degree of trade liberalization does not have an impact on the membership in IIs. Last but not least, the study shows that the less democratic states are, the higher the chances are that they will leave an II.⁹ (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006)

In their subsequent study, Mansfield and Pevehouse (2008) differentiate between types of IIs. The reason is that IIs shall have varying utility for the lock-in and signaling purposes of young democracies. The authors divide IIs into three types: standard based, economic and political. The standard based type includes environmental and human rights IIs. Membership of young democracies in human rights IIs is expected to lock-in democratization and send credible signals to other democracies and the domestic audience. Environmental IIs shall help democratizing states to signal to domestic and international actors that the government is serious about the “democracy like” transformation of environmental policies. Ceding sovereignty to economic IIs by young democracies might send credible signals to foreign investors. In political IIs, states discuss broad variety of general topics and are thus expected to be of less utility for democratizing states. In contrast, the authors assert that authoritarian leaders do not face the same uncertainty as leaders do in democratizing states since autocrats reduce uncertainty by repression. Furthermore, authoritarian and autocratizing states strive to avoid both reputational costs imposed by standard based IIs or sanctions by economic IIs.

⁹ Even though the authors formulate assumptions on weakly democratic regimes, they do not incorporate such a regime type into the empirical analysis.

Table 1: Summary of quantitative literature

Contribution	Theoretical assumptions on regime-types	Policy field(s); Dependent variable	Results: Explanatory variables	Results: Control variables
Mansfield, Pevehouse (2006): Democratization and International Organizations	Young dem. and weakly dem. regimes strive to lock-in and consolidate democracy by delegation; delegation helps to gain international credibility	Including all policy fields; DV: IIs*	Young dem. delegate more than other regime-types Autocratizing delegate less than other regime-types	Increasing democratic quality rises delegation except for strongly aut. and strongly dem. states; militarized interstate disputes decrease delegation; decreasing systemic hegemony leads to more delegation; economic development and trade liberalization are insignificant
Mansfield, Pevehouse (2008): Democratization and the Varieties of International Organizations	Young dem. are most attracted to human rights and environmental IIs to gain domestic and international credibility; authoritarian and autocratizing regimes avoid reputational costs imposed by human rights and environment IIs or sanctions by economic IIs	A) Human rights and environment B) Economic C) Political (general policies); DV: IIs	Young dem. more attracted to human rights and environment IIs than to economic and political IIs; young dem. and stable dem. similar pattern for economic and political IIs; young dem., autocratizing and stable democracies have similar pattern for general IIs	Major power, former communist country, and decreasing systemic hegemony show variance of delegation preferences across regime types and types of IIs
Hafner-Burton, Mansfield, Pevehouse (2015): Human Rights Institutions, Sovereignty Costs and Democratization	Young dem. delegate to gain international credibility; established dem. delegate less than young dem; established dem. delegate because of domestic pressure	Human rights; DV: IHROs	Young dem. delegate more than other regime-types; hybrid regimes and stable dem. similar patterns; autocratizing regimes have no explanatory effect	Development (GDP per capita), physical integrity, domestic NGOs, and decreasing systemic hegemony are insignificant; net ODA is significant
Hill (2016): Why Governments Cede Sovereignty	Young dem. delegate to lock-in consolidation, weakly dem. regimes delegate to improve democracy; established dem. and autocracies have least incentives to delegate	Human rights; DV: 2 regional courts with high degree of authority	Young dem. and weakly dem. regimes delegate the most authority; established democracies delegate slightly less than young dem.; autocracies do not delegate	<i>(No control variables interpreted)</i>
Tallberg, Sommerer, Squatrito (2016): Democratic memberships in international organizations	Dem. externalize domestic norms; aut. repress NGOs and are against delegation to avoid democratization induced by IOs	Including all policy fields; DV: change of IO authority over time	Established dem. reform IOs and open them for transnational actors; aut. block or try to reverse strengthening IOs	No evidence found for thesis on democratizing regimes in quantitative but qualitative study; non-material power of established dem. has no impact

* The abbreviation "IIs" stands for international institutions including both international treaties and organizations

Meanwhile the study from 2006 analyzes delegation of authority to IIs from all policy fields, the follow up contribution from 2008 tries to make sense of different policy fields. The later one, hence, slightly converges with my research interests that reside with delegation under moral interdependence. However, the conceptualization of the standard based type of IOs combines policies where IOs shall mitigate negative cross-boarder externalities—environment/material interdependence—and policies regulating the relationship of government and citizens—human rights/moral interdependence. Therefore, it is still complicated to derive relevant insights on delegation under moral interdependence.

Nevertheless, the study from 2008 yields following results. Young democracies delegate more authority to all types of IIs than autocratizing states, stable autocracies, and hybrid regimes do. Yet young democracies do not have significantly different pattern of delegation to standard based and economic IIs from stable democracies. Furthermore, democratizing, autocratizing and stable democracies do not significantly differ when it comes to entering political IIs. Moreover, the control variables like major power, former communist country, or decreasing systemic hegemony, show variance of delegation preferences across regime types and types of IIs as well. What is relevant for my study is to know that state delegation preferences vary not only across regime types but also across policy fields regulated by IIs.¹⁰

There is however, a further variance to be revealed by Hafner-Burton et al. (2015). As these authors demonstrate, it comes to discriminating between accessing to international institutions/treaties and membership to IOs. They analyze accession to both international treaties and IOs in the human rights policy field. Their study shows that none of the following regime types—democratizing, autocratizing, stable democracies, stable autocracies—can explain accession to international treaties. The reason is that international treaties on average do not entail severe sovereignty costs. Put differently, a membership to an international treaty is not an instance of authority delegation if the treaty does not foresee a monitoring mechanism with partially autonomous decision-making competencies. Here, I would like to give an own example. An accession to an international treaty would be an instance of authority delegation if the membership would imply that human rights experts can conduct on-the-ground observation missions in order to critically evaluate to what extent the country complies with the human rights standards set by the treaty. Most of the treaties, however, dispose only of weak

¹⁰ I have excluded the contribution by Poast and Urpelainen (2013) from the chronological review. It tests delegation preferences only of democratizing states. Thus, the reader does not experience about other regime types. According to the authors, democratizing states do not delegate authority to existing IOs but rather create own IOs.

monitoring mechanisms (see Cole 2015; Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006; Hathaway 2008; Powell and Staton 2009; Simmons 2009) so that autocracies do not have to face severe consequences.

The prominent authors Hafner-Burton et al. (ibid) follow a second analytical aim. They strive to explain delegation preferences to IHROs as well. The authors understand accession to IHROs as an act of authority delegation. They try to solve the puzzle of why governments enter IHROs that constrain the relationship of government and their citizens even though there are no material incentives for the government. They formulate expectations on democratizing states and established democracies. By bearing the high sovereignty costs, democratizing states are expected to credibly signal that they are not only “talking cheap” about consolidating democracy. Furthermore, established democracies incentivize young democracies to enter IHROs. Stable democracies are expected to enter IHROs as well. However, they are less motivated to do so than emerging democracies since stable democracies already proved a solid human rights record. Incentives to enter IHROs for established democracies decrease as the sovereignty costs reach its top boundaries. Stable democracies may enter IHROs in response to domestic political pressures in the name of more general foreign policy aims. The authors do not spell reasons of hybrid regimes and autocratizing states to enter IHROs although the regime types are included in the quantitative models.

Two aspects of the conceptualization are especially relevant: First, the literature still treats authoritarian regime types merely as remainder categories without formulating corresponding theoretical expectations. Second, assumptions made in the regime type literature analyzing peaceful effects of IOs (Pevehouse 2002, 2005; Pevehouse and Russett 2006) are incompatible with assumptions made in contributions essentially on democratic regime types (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Hill 2016; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 2008; Tallberg et al. 2016). The later studies expect established democracies to delegate less authority to IHROs than democratizing states do. The former studies, nevertheless, assert that established democracies create strong IHROs in order to stabilize peace. Therefore, I must be careful when formulating expectations on established democracies.

The empirical analysis of Hafner-Burton et al. (ibid) delivers—once again—support for the thesis on democratizing states. Furthermore, hybrid regimes and stable democracies are not statistically distinguishable. Autocratization does not have a significant impact on delegation preferences to IHROs. Regarding the effects of interdependence, the authors does not find significant results: Increasing number of memberships to IHROs does not promote proliferation of authority delegation to other IHROs. The control variable of “military disputes” has a negative and significant impact on the delegation preferences. Furthermore, decreasing hegemony in the international system does not significantly lead to increasing delegation preferences. The effect of wealth, measured as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, is insignificant. In contrast, net official development assistance (net

ODA) shows significant results. Thus, receivers of net ODA are increasingly more probable to join IHROs.

Moreover, despite the intuitive expectations, the extent of murder, torture, forced disappearance, and political imprisonment (physical integrity) does not deliver significant explanations of delegation preferences to IHROs (ibid).¹¹ Similarly, NGOs are insignificant (ibid). In my analysis, I test the explanatory potential of physical integrity and NGOs as well but apply more appropriate measurements. I inspect, however, the explanatory potential of such variables in either autocracies or democracies meanwhile Hafner-Burton et al. (2015) treat them irrespective of regime type. I employ such variables (and many more) in order to find out to what extent single aspects of the regime types can explain the delegation preferences. In conceptual terms, I open up the regime types, and thus refer to domestic aspects instead of international ones as many scholars of International Relations do.

The quantitative regime type literature shall according to Daniel Hill (2016) reduce the sample of IHROs included into analysis. Such a move might help to even better operationalize the sovereignty costs inherent to membership in IHROs. Previous studies included IHROs with varying levels of sovereignty costs. This might have obscured the results. Therefore, Hill includes only two regional courts into the analysis of delegation preferences: the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The author tests the theoretical assumptions where democratizing states strive to externally lock-in the consolidation process and weakly democratic states aim to improve their democracy standard by delegating authority to a regional court. The sovereignty costs that come along with entering a strong regional court outweigh the benefits for established democracies. These already proved to be democratic and do not need an international authority to support the consolidation process. On autocracies, the reader experiences only that they do not prefer to lock-in liberal democracy standards. As a result of theoretical reasoning, Hill expects that established democracies and stable autocracies will have the least incentives to delegate authority. An inverse U-shaped function shall characterize the relationship between the degree of democracy and the authority delegation preferences.

A quantitative analysis of both regional courts yields results in favor of the thesis on democratizing and weakly democratic states. These are more probable to delegate authority than are strongly democratic or strongly autocratic regimes. Hill found out that autocracies refrain from delegating authority to strong regional courts. Inconsistent with the theoretical expectations, delegation preferences of highly

¹¹ The authors Hafner-Burton et al. (2015, p. 21) label such data as “respect for human rights” or “repression”. In my analysis, I prefer to use “physical integrity” since human rights and repression stand for broader phenomena than only murder, torture, forced disappearance, and political imprisonment.

established democracies do not drop completely but the effects of high degrees of democracy rather decrease towards the upper bound. (ibid)

Tallberg et al. (2016) are interested in the effects of regime types as well. By employing a dichotomous measure of autocracies and democracies, they try to explain the design of IOs over time. They are particularly interested in the question what drives opening up of IOs for transnational actors such as multinational corporations, NGOs, philanthropic foundations, or scientific communities. I interpret the opening up of IOs to transnational actors as an instance of authority delegation. The authors draw on theories of ideational liberalism and/or liberal constructivism. They assert that democracies externalize their domestic democratic norms to IOs when pledging for strengthening IOs, thus allowing transnational actors to participate. In contrast, autocracies repress societal actors on the domestic level. Moreover, authoritarian regimes try to eliminate the possibility where transnational societal actors align with IOs in order to induce democratization in autocracies. The authors do not follow the trend of sample reduction and analyze delegation to IOs irrespective of their policy fields and levels of authority.

The quantitative part of the study by Tallberg et al. (ibid) scrutinizes shares of democracies and autocracies in IOs. Thus, it does not come to single countries that change authority of IOs but to their majority or minority membership share. The analysis reveals that established democracies drive reforms of IOs over time and open them up for transnational actors. On the contrary, authoritarian regimes try to block such strengthening IOs. Furthermore, the quantitative study could not find evidence in support of the argument on young democracies that are expected to delegate the most authority of all regime types. In the qualitative part of the study, the authors provide for more fine-grained insights on democratic regime types: Democratizing states support established democracies on their quest of strengthening IOs. The last insight provided tells us that non-material power of established democracies does not have an impact on the design of IOs.

It is not an easy task to navigate through the quantitative literature. One piece of knowledge, however, unequivocally stands out. Democratizing states are more probable to delegate authority to IOs than any other regime type as empirical analyses demonstrate (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Hill 2016; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 2008; Poast and Urpelainen 2013). This holds true especially for the international policy field of human rights (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Hill 2016; see also Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008). Only Tallberg et al. (2016) do not find quantitative evidence for the argument on democratizing countries in an analysis including IOs from all policy fields. Their qualitative study suggests that democratizing states support established democracies when strengthening IOs (ibid).

The theoretical assumptions on democratizing countries vary to some extent across the studies. Hill (2016) expects democratizing states to delegate authority to externally lock-in the consolidation process. Three other studies share this argument. Additionally, their authors theorize that democratizing states also aim to send credible signals to the international community by delegating authority (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; Tallberg et al. 2016). As such, they test the original assumptions formulated by Moravcsik (2000). Mansfield and Pevehouse (2008) partially avoid the lock-in argument and broaden the argument on international credible commitments instead. They assert that authority delegation to IOs sends credible signals to domestic actors as well (ibid). Even though there is some noise in the theoretical reasoning, all contributions assert that democratizing states delegate authority to improve chances of transition, be it through different mechanisms.

Nevertheless, there are some relevant discrepancies to be explicated. Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) and Hill (2016) expect not only democratizing states but also weakly democratic countries to be the most probable ones to delegate authority. Hill (2016) tests both of the regime types (democratizing, weakly democratic) and arrives to significant results. Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) analyze merely the assumption on democratizing states and leave out an empirical analysis of weakly democratic states that do not undergo a transition.

None of the other regime types than democratizing states lead to stable results irrespective of the policy field of IOs included into the sample. Therefore, I narrow down the summary to the contributions on delegation under moral interdependency (human rights and democracy policies) that address my research topic directly. Strictly speaking, merely Hafner-Burton et al. (2015) and Hill (2016) analyze delegation preferences to IHROs.¹² Both of these studies are cautious about delegation preferences of established democracies (/strongly democratic countries). Hafner-Burton et al. (2015) assert that established democracies delegate less authority to IHROs since they already reached a fairly good level of human rights protection. Established democracies might experience pressure from domestic interest groups to delegate authority (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015, p. 3). In comparison, Hill (2016) expects established democracies to have very low or even non-existing incentives to delegate authority since they already consolidated democracy. Both of the empirical studies find support for the expectation that established democracies delegate less than democratizing states do and at the

¹² Mansfield and Pevehouse (2008) employ an obscured sample which includes international treaties and organizations governing human rights and environmental policies.

same time established democracies delegate more than autocracies do (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Hill 2016).¹³

A further comparison of the two most relevant studies draws attention to potentially unsystematic empirical results. Regarding “the middle” of regime types, Hafner-Burton et al. (2015) found out that hybrid regimes and established democracies are not statistically distinguishable. Set side by side with Hill (2016), Hill employs a continuous measure of regime type instead of contrasting broad regime type categories as the research design of Hafner-Burton et al. foresees. Taking such conceptual differences into account, the study by Hill still suggests different results. For Hill, it is the weakly democratic countries that are (together with democratizing states) most probable to delegate authority. In the study by Hafner-Burton, hybrid-regimes include weakly democratic states as well. Here, hybrid regimes share the second and third place together with established democracies in terms of the most probable regime types to delegate authority to IHROs.

The remainder of the two studies regarding autocratizing and autocratic regimes can be summarized in detail but not meaningfully compared since their analytical aims along with the operationalization diverge. Hafner-Burton et al. (2015) arrives at the results that autocratization periods do not significantly influence the delegation preferences. For the authors, autocratization stands for a change of the regime type from an established democracy to a hybrid regime or an autocracy (or from a hybrid regime to an autocracy). Hill (2016) does not analyze the dynamic process of autocratization and interprets the results for autocracies instead. In his study, autocracies refrain from delegating authority to strong regional human rights courts. In terms of theory, the two most relevant studies leave out theorizing on either autocratization periods (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015) or authoritarian regimes (Hill 2016). Thus, the democracy bias is most pronounced in the literature explaining delegation preferences to IHROs.

Out of the reviewed quantitative regime type literature, the research analyzing delegation preferences other than to only IHROs offers more theoretical assumptions on autocracies. To be precise, the studies by Mansfield and Pevehouse (2008) and Tallberg et al. (2016) do so. Mansfield and Pevehouse (2008) spell out the assumption that both autocratizing and authoritarian regimes strive to avoid reputational costs imposed by human rights and environmental IIs or sanctions by economic IIs. Hence, autocratizing and authoritarian regimes are expected to delegate less authority than any other democratic or democratizing regime type (ibid). Furthermore, Tallberg et al. (2016) theorize that

¹³ Keohane et al. formulate theoretical assumptions on why IOs might be beneficial even for established democracies: “by restricting the power of special interest factions, protecting individual rights, and improving the quality of democratic deliberation, while also increasing capacities to achieve important public purposes (2009, p. 1).”

autocracies are against strengthening IOs by allowing them to cooperate with transnational actors (NGOs and multinational companies) since autocracies repress such actors on the domestic level. Moreover, the authors assert that autocracies block strengthening IOs or even strive to weaken them because authoritarian regimes fear the democratization potential of IOs. As such, Tallberg et al. (2016) refer at this point to the regime type literature preoccupied with analyzing peaceful effects of IOs (Pevehouse 2002, 2005; Pevehouse and Russett 2006). Nevertheless, even though the studies by Mansfield and Pevehouse (2008) and Tallberg et al. (2016) briefly spell out assumptions on autocracies, they still maintain the bias on democracies as they devote much more attention to established democracies and democratizing regime types.

The sources of such a bias are relatively easy to reconstruct. I mentioned two of them in the previous Section 2.1. where I elaborated on the historical context. The quantitative regime type literature reacts to the post-Cold War era that witnessed a growth in number of IHROs whose creation was driven by established democracies. Hence, autocracies are expected to be of minor importance. Moreover, the third wave of democratization renewed the incentives to analyze international behavior of states undergoing democratic transitions.

Apart of the historical context, I expect that the authors aimed to generate policy relevant insights valuable for politicians from democracies. Somewhat similarly, I argue that the research on autocracies and their delegation preferences needs to be strengthened in order to generate policy relevant knowledge for democratizing actors. In general, by studying the international behavior of autocracies, basic science provides for insights relevant for democratizing actors. Without a knowledge on autocracies, it is complicated to formulate policy recommendations aiming to reduce repression in authoritarian regimes or even induce democratization processes. More specifically, my analysis of delegation preference to IHROs during their reform processes would be incomplete if it devoted less attention to autocracies that participate in the reforms as well or even initiate them.

Except for devoting appropriate attention to autocracies, my analytical perspective diverges in a further aspect from the quantitative regime type literature. The reviewed contributions employ a state-centered perspective. It means that countries are treated as the primary actors of international relations. The regime type literature employs such a perspective even though its ideational roots reside with the democratic peace research which partially opens up the states and scrutinizes especially the effects of electoral dimension on international behavior (Ray 2003; see also Zacher and Matthew 1995, pp. 122–123). I elucidate that the regime type literature refrained from opening up the regimes since the overall theoretical chain foresees even several steps: First, the domestic dimensions of democracies are expected to explain the fact that democracies are less probable to engage into a violent conflict with each other. Second, the lower probability of international conflict is interpreted

as an increased readiness to cooperate internationally. Third, the enhanced probability of cooperation stands in turn for higher readiness to delegate authority to IOs. The regime type literature, hence, departs from the third step of such a theoretical chain as it expects autocracies to delegate less authority to IOs than democracies do.

Instead of making use of the state-centered perspective as well, I open up the regime types to analyze which domestic aspects deliver fruitful explanations of delegation preferences. The general idea backing up such an approach departs from the assumption that international behavior of democratic as well as authoritarian regimes is a result of a bottom-up process. The bottom-up understanding of politics stems from New Liberalism as formulated by Moravcsik. Here, societal actors figure as primary actors of international politics. The demands of domestic societal actors are (mis-)represented by domestic institutions. Domestic institutions together with governmental interests form delegation preferences. International negotiations and coalition building transform delegation preferences into delegation behavior. Hence, by opening up the regime types, I refer to the part of my work where I analyze the explanatory potential of domestic societal actors and domestic institutions. These stand for the initial two phases of the bottom-up process followed by the last international phase. I elaborate and justify the bottom-up approach to its full extent in the Chapter 3 which incorporates the theoretical reasoning.

The last lesson learned from the quantitative contributions instructs me to be precise when deciding which international authority to scrutinize. Mansfield and Pevehouse (2008) reveal a variation among delegation patterns of regime types across international policy fields. Hafner-Burton et al. (2015) and Hill (2016) demonstrate that ratification of international human rights treaties underlies different than regime type patterns. It is because the ratification of international human rights treaties on average does not imply delegation of high extent of international authority. Moreover, Hill (2016) makes it clear that including many IHROs into the sample might obscure the results since the extent of their authority varies. Analyzing specific IHROs where the researcher conceptually controls for the extent of authority to be delegated yields more reliable results (*ibid*).

In summary, the quantitative contributions on delegation preferences to IHROs (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Hill 2016) did not cover all relevant topics and generated demand for further research by employing inconsistent theoretical expectations and producing incomparable empirical results. Autocracies were left undertheorized and insufficiently empirically analyzed. In terms of theory, assumptions on autocracies are missing. Regarding empirical analysis, merely Hill (2016) tests delegation preferences of the authoritarian regime type. His study, nevertheless, does not differentiate between extent of authority to be delegated since it captures either an absent or present accession to strong regional courts. As my empirical study reveals, however, delegation preferences of

autocracies vary from low to high levels of support to SP UNHRC. Thus, delegation preferences of autocracies (and democracies as well) require a more fine-grained scrutiny.

The empirical results on weakly democratic countries are not settled down yet. Hill (2016) proclaimed them to be the most willing regime type to delegate authority together with democratizing states. Somewhat differently, the study by Hafner-Burton et al. (2015) analyzes hybrid regimes instead of weakly democratic states. In their study, delegation preferences of hybrid regimes cannot be significantly differentiated from established democracies. Moreover, my descriptive data documents delegation preferences of electoral democracies (weakly democratic countries) that range from being completely against or fully in favor of strengthening the SP UNHRC. Additionally, my descriptive statistics on liberal (established) democracies suggest that they are ready to strengthen the SP UNHRC the most. This insight is not in line with the previous studies (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Hill 2016) where established democracies were to some extent cautious about delegating authority to IHROs.

On the whole, there are blind spots left in terms of theoretical reasoning and empirical analysis on autocracies and diverging conceptualization and empirical results regarding weakly democratic countries. Such a broad demand for further research calls for a systematic comparative study of delegation preferences of autocracies and democracies to IHROs which I provide for. Since authoritarian regimes are severely understudied in the quantitative research, I need to experience more about them by reviewing qualitative contributions. Such a review will also help me to find out, to what extent can qualitative research fill in the research gap left over by quantitative approaches.

Qualitative contributions

Fortunately, I am by far not the only one that registered the prevailing focus on democracies in the quantitative studies. There is a variety of authors being driven by the idea that democratizing actors need to experience more about the relationship of autocracies and IHROs. Such authors study the delegation preference of autocracies qualitatively. Hence, they partially account for the democracy bias in the quantitative literature. The qualitative studies on delegation preferences of autocracies have several advantages. Such contributions finalize the trend of reducing the number of IHROs in the sample to derive even more precise insights. The “downsizing” trend ends up by analyzing single intergovernmental or supranational bodies. Therefore, the reader experiences more in detail to what extent are autocracies ready to delegate authority to IHROs. Also, samples containing a single IO/body allow to differentiate between delegation preferences to IHROs with mixed membership of autocracies and democracies or with homogenous membership. Furthermore, qualitative studies elaborate on the reasons why autocracies delegate authority to IHROs. Nonetheless, there are disadvantages as well. For instance, the qualitative literature often only dichotomously discriminates between democracies

and autocracies and thus does not account for the broader variation ranging from strongly authoritarian to strongly democratic regimes.

In this subsection, I review qualitative contributions analyzing autocracies' delegation preferences to IHROs only. Hence, I do not draw on qualitative studies on delegation of authority under material interdependence since I primarily cope with delegation under moral interdependence. Some of the arguments inherent to qualitative studies were already included in the quantitative approach by Hafner-Burton et al. (2015) and thus will be synthesized here.¹⁴ The quantitative study treats such arguments as control variables which are not interacted with the regime type or else the study does not foresee significance tests for subsamples made of autocracies or democracies.¹⁵ Thus, the results stand for all states irrespective of the regime type.

The here selected literature represents first and foremost the breadth of arguments put forward in qualitative approaches. When autocracies decide to delegate authority to IOs or ROs operating in the policy fields of human rights and/or democracy, then explanations like fear of political interference by democracies; foreign direct investment and foreign aid linkages; countering liberal democracy and putting forward a concept of "authoritarian democracy"; and in special scenarios also mitigation of negative cross border externalities come into play. Examples of such explanations take us on a tour throughout the African, European, and Asian ROs. Especially ROs with prevailing authoritarian membership serve as "incubators" for explanations of delegation preferences of non-democratic states.¹⁶

The journey begins in the Middle East and North Africa where van Hüllen (2015) analyzes the influence of the external democratizing actor USA. In the aftermath of 9/11 and the US intervention of Iraq in 2003, the Middle East and North African members of the Arab League (AL) perceived a substantial threat of political interference into domestic institutional settings coupled to elevated human rights pressure. As a response, they decided to create an intergovernmental body called the Arab Human Rights Committee in 2004. The committee does not foresee public reporting or other type of sanctioning of human rights abuses. The creation of such a body should satisfy external democratizing actors and assure human rights enforcement "without a bite."

¹⁴ The research by Hill (2016) includes variables controlling for civil conflict and type of legal system. Unfortunately, their interpretation is not disclosed.

¹⁵ An exception would be Tallberg et al. (2016) However, the study includes IOs from all policy fields and thus does not directly address the core of my topic.

¹⁶ Several parts of this subsection were included in the working paper Satra (2018) "Autocracies' Delegation Preferences to International Human Rights Organizations" which I presented at the General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research in Hamburg on the 23rd of August 2018.

The quantitative approach by Hafner-Burton et al. (2015) scrutinizes the influence of USA as well. Somewhat differently, the authors study the role of USA understood as a military hegemon of the international system. They arrive to the conclusion where the decreasing US hegemony in the international system does not significantly lead to increasing delegation preferences. At this point, the insights provided by the quantitative and qualitative literature must be carefully compared. Meanwhile van Hüllen (2015) analyzes the aftermath of usage of hegemonic power characterized by elevated human rights pressure, Hafner-Burton et al. (2015) do not employ “event data” or refer to norm pressure but operationalize hegemony in terms of military capacities instead. Principally, the contributions do not directly oppose each other. A power demonstration by the USA could be understood as an instance of increasing hegemony which does not contradict the insignificant effects of decreasing hegemony.¹⁷

The reasons to delegate authority become financially attributed when democratizing actors condition foreign aid flows and investments to democratic governance organizations. Hulse and van der Vleuten (2016) mention the relation of the *Southern African Development Community* (SADC) and external actors such as the EU together with other OECD countries. The SADC countries created a regional tribunal with even supranational features in 2005. Nevertheless, as the court tried to execute its authority, it was dismantled by its non-democratic members in 2010. Therefore, the shortly lived regional tribunal can be interpreted as an instance of window dressing, where the RO members aimed to signal that they were ripe for foreign aid or investment but, however, were not prepared to expose themselves to judgments of the international authority.¹⁸ The first part of the reasoning on motivation to delegate authority is in line with the quantitative findings. Hafner-Burton et al. (2015) show that net ODA has a significant impact. In their study, receivers of net ODA are increasingly more probable to delegate authority to IHROs.

Alike to the SADC countries, the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) were not willing to accept judgments of an international authority. The election bureau of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) severely criticized elections in the post-soviet countries (Evers 2009, p. 277; Libmann 2011). The CIS states, in turn, created an own monitoring instrument named Election Monitoring Organization (CIS-EMO) in 2003 (Fawn 2013, p. 77). This kind of a monitoring bureau was called into life to counter assessments conducted by the OSCE. The CIS-EMO personnel consists of active and former politicians from illiberal as well as democratic European

¹⁷ See also Hawkins and Shaw (2008) on decreasing hegemony and increasing probability to delegate authority to the Organization of American States (OAS).

¹⁸ *Communauté Économique des Pays des Grand Lacs* (CEPGL) is another case where external donors provided for material incentives for autocracies to delegate to a RO but could not ensure an operative status of the organization over time (see Heyl 2010).

countries whereby the leadership resides with Russia (CIS-EMO 2017). It is supposed to guard domestic governance standards set up by formerly democratizing states whose democracy score and practices rolled back to authoritarian category past 2000, as Russo (2015) analyzes. Hence, the CIS-EMO was founded by autocratizing states.

Regarding quantitative approaches, Hafner-Burton et al. (2015) test the effects of autocratization as well. They operationalize autocratization as a change from an established democracy to an anocracy or an autocracy (or from an anocracy to an autocracy). In their study, the independent variable of autocratization has a negative effect on delegation preferences but does not reach a sufficient level of significance. Comparing the qualitative and quantitative insights can be potentially tricky here not only because of the insignificant results. The qualitative study suggests that autocratizing states are ready to delegate authority whereby the quantitative analysis signals the opposite. The reason for the mismatch potentially resides with the obscured sample of the quantitative study. Namely, it includes IHROs irrespective of their membership. ROs with prevailing authoritarian membership are known to be used as shields from the liberal human rights and democracy norms (Acharya 2016). On the contrary, IHROs including primary democracies are understood as human rights and democratizing actors (Pevehouse 2002, 2005; Pevehouse and Russett 2006). Thus, depending on the membership mixture or the overall mission of an international body, the attitudes of autocratizing states might differ. This is an issue which the study by Hafner-Burton et al. (2015) does not account for.¹⁹

An example of a window dressing situates us according to Munro (2009) and Ginbar (2010) to Asia where the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – being under pressure of human rights norms – created the Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights in 2009. Munro (2009) is suspicious about the altruistic aims of the intergovernmental body since young democracies did not ratify optional protocols of the underlying treaties as they seem to undermine the IO-authority. Meanwhile, these protocols were ratified by authoritarian members.

Regarding ASEAN, a different argument is made by Jetschke (2015). She leaves the window dressing delegation motives aside and concentrates on mitigation of negative cross-border externalities and FDI linkages instead. Her analysis puts forward an argument where authority delegation should protect state sovereignty as van Hüllen (2015) does as well.²⁰ In Southeast Asia, as Jetschke (2015) elaborates, a series of gross human rights abuses occurred when states conducted military operations within their

¹⁹ In contrast, Pevehouse and Russett 2006 control for IOs with prevailing democratic regime type. Tallberg et al. (2016) apply the autocratic/democratic mixture of IO membership as their main explanatory variable.

²⁰ Gingbar (2010) claims as well that the Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights of ASEAN could strengthen the state sovereignty of its members. It is because of the legal status of the commission findings which are clearly subordinated to the domestic policies of the majoritarian autocratic members (ibid). However, Gingbar does not identify any advantages for human rights enforcement as Jetschke (2015) does.

territories to suppress opposition. As a consequence, the region experienced multiple transboundary refugee flows especially throughout 1999 to 2009. Neighboring countries complained about the material and social costs to shelter internationally displaced persons. At the same time, the EU and the USA condemned the state-led violence and refused to appoint the ASEAN members. Such a move questioned the continuity of European and American FDI flows. To decrease the territorial breaches and improve their reputation for economic reasons, autocracies have delegated some degree of authority to the Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights.²¹

Hence, the financial motives to delegate authority can be found in both qualitative and quantitative contributions. It is either the prospective FDI flows as the SADC scenario shows (Hulse and der Vleuten 2016) or the threat of regressive FDI flows in the case of ASEAN (Jetschke 2015) which suggest that established democracies use FDI to motivate autocracies to delegate authority. Less specific insights on the financial dimension provides the quantitative study by Hafner-Burton et al. (2015) where incoming net ODA flows increase the probability to delegate authority to IHROs irrespective of regime type.

My analysis foresees an argument drawing on economic aspects as well. Alike many contributions on delegation preferences, I depart from the assumption that autocracies experience a normative pressure to support the institutionalization of liberal human rights and democracy norms (Acharya 2016; see also Deitelhoff 2009; Ginbar 2010; Hawkins and Shaw 2008; Hulse and der Vleuten 2016; Jetschke 2015; Legro 1996; Munro 2009; Risse-Kappen et al. 1999; Russo 2015; Tallberg et al. 2016; van Hüllen 2015). However, I question the underlying assumption that autocracies are limited in pursuing their interests due to an asymmetric economic dependency on democracies as not only the literature on delegation preferences suggests but also the regime type literature on international trade solidifies.

In contrary fashion, I put forward the argument where autocracies escape the normative pressure thanks to their increased wealth. The logic behind such a reasoning is that wealthy autocracies depend less on FDI flows and net ODA. Therefore, they can resist the normative pressure coupled to financial incentives easier than poor authoritarian regimes. This argument finalizes the bottom-up process and represents the third phase regarding international interdependencies. Moreover, I have to avoid re-implementing the theoretical assumption linking economic growth to democratic development as documented by the regime type literature on international trade that was integrated into the study by Hafner-Burton et al. (2015). Here, the authors control for "Development." They expect that together with growth in wealth, the quality of democracy increases, and thus also the probability to delegate

²¹ See also Robinson (1993) and Li, Resnick (2003) on how foreign direct investment affects diffusion of domestic democratic governance structures.

authority shall rise (but arrive to insignificant results). In order to be able to identify the sources of such a misleading reasoning, I review the regime type literature on international trade in the upcoming Section 2.3. which will also allow me to curve out my argument on wealthy autocracies in more detail.

Table 2 summarizes the qualitative literature and integrates also insights derived from the control variables of Hafner-Burton et al. (2015). All the contributions presented incorporate the meta-assumption that liberal human rights and democracy norms prevail in the international system and thus put autocracies (or states) under moral pressure. Aside of the arguments on economic aspects, I identify two further topic clusters—hegemony and authoritarian norms. On hegemony, we experience that first, the threat of inference into domestic settings by the USA motivated authoritarian regimes of the AL to delegate authority (van Hüllen 2015), and second, the decreasing military hegemony of the USA does not significantly rise delegation preferences of states to IHROs (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015). On authoritarian norms, we learn that first, autocratizing members of the CIS delegated authority in order to legitimize domestic authoritarian form of governance (Russo 2015), and second, authoritarian members of ASEAN decided to delegate authority in order to protect their state sovereignty (see also Ginbar 2010; Jetschke 2015; Munro 2009). Out of the three identified clusters, I address economic aspects in my analysis as I test the interaction of both autocratic and democratic regimes and their wealth.

The qualitative literature shall help in closing the research gap on autocracies which were left understudied by the quantitative approaches. The qualitative contributions elaborate on external economic, power, and norm related reasons for autocracies to delegate authority. Hence, they provide for theoretical reasoning on international aspects coupled to the authoritarian regime type. Moreover, based on the qualitative research, we might infer that the delegation preferences of autocracies vary over intergovernmental and bureaucratic/supranational extent of authority. This holds true for ROs with prevailing authoritarian membership. Hence, there is a research gap on delegation preferences of autocracies to IHROs which mission is to spread liberal human rights and democracy norms. It belongs to my analytical aims to cover such a research gap.

Table 2: Qualitative literature on autocracies

Meta-assumption	Topic cluster	Pro-delegation arguments	Scope	Result
Liberal human rights and democracy norms prevail in the international system	Economy	1. Promise of increased FDI and net ODA flows by OECD countries (Hulse and van der Vleuten 2016) 2. Threat of cuts in FDI flows by EU and USA (Jetschke 2015) 3. Recipients of net ODA (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015) 4. Wealth (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015)	1. SADC autocracies (and democracies) 2. ASEAN autocracies 3. Quantitative: states and IHROs 4. Quantitative: states and IHROs	1. Valid 2. Valid 3. Sig. 4. Insig.
	Hegemony	1. Threat of inference into domestic settings by USA (van Hüllen 2016) 2. Decreasing hegemony of USA (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015)	1. Arab League autocracies 2. Quantitative: states and IHROs	1. Valid 2. Insig.
	Authoritarian norms	1. Deflection of liberal democracy norms (Russo 2011) 2. Protection of state sovereignty (Jetschke 2015, see also Ginbar 2010, Munro 2009)	1. CIS autocratizing states 2. ASEAN autocracies	1. Valid 2. Valid

* Contains also quantitative contribution Hafner-Burton et al. 2015

We further learn that when autocracies decide to delegate authority, then they try to strike the balance between international pressures and domestic interests whereby domestic interests have a priority. As the qualitative literature focused on analyzing the international economic, power and norm aspects, it selectively touched upon the inner workings of authoritarian regimes as well. To the best of my knowledge, the most detailed linkage between the domestic institutions and delegation preferences provides Alessandra Russo (2015) when she analyzes the creation of CIS-EMO. The monitoring bureaucracy shall legitimize repression of domestic actors by employing unfree and unfair elections in many post-soviet countries since 2000s (ibid). Such a goal shall be reached by issuing positive monitoring reports declaring the elections to be compliant with democracy standards (ibid).

Further qualitative contributions, nevertheless, do not systematically open up the regime type to find out more on the linkages between the inner workings and delegation preferences to IHROs. Hence, the qualitative literature covered several topics regarding international aspects but left the domestic dimensions mainly understudied. At this point, my analysis of the bottom-up process which shapes delegation preferences of both autocracies and democracies comes into play. In terms of quantitative analysis, I test the role of domestic societal actors and (mis-)representative domestic institutions. Hence, I largely close the gap on domestic explanatory factors of autocracies and democracies and their delegation preferences to IHROs.

The first reason why qualitative contributions on autocracies did not substantially scrutinize the linkages of single domestic dimensions and delegation preferences was already mentioned. It was simply not of their interest since they prioritized—in an understandable fashion—inspecting effects of international democratization and human rights incentives instead. Moreover, the potential causal

mechanism drags on. It takes to depart from a single domestic dimension like for example the rule of law and trace the effects throughout the whole domestic and international policy making process up to the diplomatic stage in an IHRO where delegation preferences are voiced.

Especially when autocracies shall be analyzed, the long bottom-up process might appear to be demanding to scrutinize. The reason is that autocracies are known to be less transparent than democracies. Obtaining qualitative insights might therefore appear to be overly complicated. In exceptional cases, the restricting factor could be also an oversimplified image of authoritarian regimes where the power resides within a close circle of regime members. Meanwhile it's true that the coalition size or selectorate of authoritarian regimes is smaller than of democratic states (Bueno de Mesquita 2005), it does not directly follow that authoritarian form of governance would be straightforward. Also thanks to the international democratization and human rights pressure, authoritarian regimes must engage in complex and ongoing processes which shall secure the regime survival.

The last insight from the qualitative literature helps me to narrow down the analysis. The review of quantitative regime type literature revealed which research designs are more or less appropriate to conduct reliable and valid research of delegation preferences. The subsequently presented qualitative contributions point to further analytical issues that shall be implemented even in quantitative studies like mine. In order to precisely inquire delegation preferences, it takes to specify additional aspects. First, and rather obviously, it comes to discriminate between an analysis of IHROs whose foundation was driven by democracies in order to spread human rights and democracy norms. In such scenarios, it is difficult to motivate autocracies to strengthen such IHROs. On the contrary, autocracies will be more at ease to delegate at least some extent of authority to IHROs with prevailing authoritarian membership since such international authority serves the authoritarian purposes as for example the studies on ASEAN, CIS, and AL showed. Second, analyzing delegation preferences requires also a specification of the extent of authority to be delegated. Thus, it makes a difference if an autocracy shall delegate authority to an intergovernmental body which has less autonomous decision-making competencies than a monitoring bureaucracy that does not consist of country diplomats but human rights experts.

In summary, the qualitative literature coped with international aspects motivating autocracies to delegate at least some extent of authority to ROs with prevailing authoritarian membership. The quantitative contributions explaining delegation preferences to IHROs left autocracies largely understudied and did not settle down results on weakly democratic countries. Except for such limitations, the regime type literature employs a state-centered perspective. Such a perspective redirected in turn the interests of analysis explaining delegation to IOs governing all types of policy fields. By departing from the assumption that states are the primary actors of international relations,

the literature mainly omitted analysis of domestic dimensions that might be crucial for explaining delegation preferences. To account for such problems, I open up the autocratic and democratic regimes and analyze the explanatory potential of their domestic dimensions and reconstruct the bottom-up process.

The bottom-up process, however, does not end at the state level but stretches to the international level. Both of the qualitative and quantitative literature analyzed international economic aspects and so I do as well. Contrary to the current literature, I do not scrutinize financial incentives of democratizing actors. Instead, I shed light on how autocracies use their wealth to escape the pressure of international human rights and democracy norms. In order to be able to do so, I inspect sources of knowledge that formed current assumptions on the economic standings of democracies and autocracies as well as the linkage between wealth and democratic development in the upcoming Section 2.3.

2.3. International trade and regime types

In this Section, I review regime type contributions explaining international trade of democracies and autocracies. I aim to reveal the sources of insights that lead some studies on delegation preferences to IHROs to incorporate explanatory factors regarding material interdependence. This shall—to some limited extent—help me to formulate my own expectations on the interplay of moral and material interdependence. To be more precise, I rather experience “where not to look and why” as I put forward the argument on autocracies that escape asymmetric moral interdependence through asymmetric material interdependence.

Most of the regime type contributions on international trade document the economic asymmetry in favor of democracies. Out of these studies, I have selected the most prominent ones. They employ a broad variety of research designs as they study either democracies or autocracies, or both regime types at once. Democracies are known to trade more and are in the end expected to be wealthier. This is, as I argue, a piece of knowledge that makes it rather improbable to assert that autocracies can maintain asymmetrical economic relationships with democracies. On top, democracies are known to be the main donors of development aid as I already explicated in the Section 2.2.

To begin with, Mansfield et al. (2000) ask about trade policies of democracies but analyze autocracies as well. Their contribution explains levels of barriers to interstate trade. In recurrence to the electoral democratic systems, the authors arrive at the result that democratic pairs of states maintain lower trade barriers. Meanwhile, democracies set higher barriers when trading with autocracies. Trading barriers in autocratic pairs vary but are only sporadically lower than in democratic pairs. In authoritarian regimes, the chief executive disposes of a greater autonomy than in democracies.

Therefore, the preferences of the leader matter more and cause irregularities beyond the institutional authoritarian setting. In democratic regimes, the head of government is restricted by the legislative. In practice, the legislative approves deals on trade barriers. Therefore, democratic leaders suggest to other democratic leaders lower trade barriers from the beginning on as they are afraid of the veto by the opponents legislative. In the end, the main finding is that democracies trade more. The authors argue similarly that competitive elections “make” democracies to enter zones of preferential trade more than autocracies do (see Mansfield et al. 2002).

The economists Toke Aidt and Martin Gassebner (2010) arrive to a very alike conclusion when comparing autocracies and democracies. According to their study, autocracies are less embedded in the international trade system and also trade less. Compared to Mansfield et al. (2000), they did not scrutinize trading pairs and their policies but accounted for the overall import volumes of single countries. They assume that the quality of institutional setting in democracies is better as the leaders are more accountable. In contrast, autocracies are less institutionalized which gives the government a leeway for self-serving rent extraction. It also makes lobbying by dominant actors that strive to protect domestic markets easier. The authors conclude by a suggestion in the vein of modernization theory: “[...]countries that are not involved in international trade could be autocracies for that reason (Aidt and Gassebner 2010, p. 40).”

Previous studies included both established Western democracies as well as democracies outside of the North America and the Western Europe. Thus, one could have suspected that the results obtained may be driven by strong effects introduced by Western democracies in the sample. A further study, this time by Milner and Kubota (2005), concentrates on explaining trade policies of young democracies in the developing world. Yet they can strengthen the previous conclusions on ever more trading democracies. Young democracies from developing world contribute to globalization by relaxing trade barriers. The reason is, once again, electoral competition. In developing countries, voters are expected to be in favor of trade liberalization. The authors assert several benefits from free trade for workers and the poor: International trade increases employment rates, income, and reduces prices since imported goods levels up the competition. Democracies liberalize trade especially when transitioning from autocratic mode of governance.²²

Daniel Kono (2006) provides for a more nuanced argument on democracies. Due to competitive elections, democracies have contradictory preferences for diverse types of trade policies. The electoral competition generates more information on policies that are relevant for voters and also easier to

²² There are, obviously, severe discrepancies in wealth of Western and non-Western democracies (Sørensen 1993, pp. 100–112; see also Kono 2008). Democracies of Global South experience one-sided economic dependence from Western democracies very often.

communicate to masses. Electoral competition, in turn, produces less information on policies whose effects are more comprehensive. Therefore, democracies are inclined to reduce transparent trade barriers. To maintain an appropriate level of trade protection, democratic leaders level up less transparent trade barriers instead. In practice, democracy results in lower trade tariffs, higher nontariff trade barriers such as quotas and even higher nontariff trade barriers like quality standards for imported goods. As Kono puts it, democracy promotes “optimal obfuscation” that allows for protection of domestic markets while creating an impression of trade liberalization. In the end, I derive that democracies employ more liberal trade policies than autocracies do while maintaining beneficial levels of trade protection. Furthermore, I indicate that the studies are preoccupied by explaining the international trade of democracies leaving autocracies understudied.

In response to the long term democracy bias, Lisa Martin and Daniel Kono (2015) conduct a literature review to identify arguments that might be appropriate to explain trade policies across autocracies. In the first place, they demonstrate a remarkable variation in trade policies of authoritarian regimes. The overall tariff equivalents range from less than 1% (Botswana and Namibia) up to 50% (Sudan and Tanzania). Furthermore, they justify the choice of topic by pointing out that major traders such as China remain to be authoritarian regimes. Neither of the previous contributions explained variation across autocracies. They were treated as a homogenous reference category that was juxtaposed to the—to be explained—varying trade of democracies.

The authors Martin and Kono (2015) derive insights from literature on economic structure, coalition size, time horizons, and the leader’s mode of entry into power: First, the explanatory potential of economic-structural variables probably depends on regime types.²³ Second, the authors favor contributions that parse coalition-size and time-horizons of incumbents. The reason is that autocracies with larger coalitions survive longer and thus may profit from long-term effects of trade liberalization. Third, literature analyzing time-horizons of business cycles in autocracies is missing. Fourth and finally, whether the mode of entry into power was more or less violent, shall not impact trade policies. It is because the effects of power transition diminish quickly. As Martin and Kono focus solely on authoritarian regimes, they do not provide for insights on potential economic asymmetries to the detriment of democracies. Yet, my argument on the interplay of asymmetric moral and material interdependence goes hand in hand with their first insight. In my analysis, I foresee an interaction of regime type and economic indicators.

Building up on the reviewed contributions, we might infer that democracies put forward more liberal trade policies than autocracies do. Furthermore, democracies are also increasingly embedded in the

²³ Kono (2008) and Verdier (1998) couple the regime type explanations with economic factors such as wealth of the trading partners as well. However, the authors devote their attention rather to democracies than autocracies.

international trade system in terms of real volumes of trade than autocracies are. Moreover, this holds true both for Western as well as non-Western democracies. Not only that these studies arrive at similar conclusions, they also provide for similar reasoning in recurrence to either present or absent competitive election in democracies or autocracies. On the part of autocracies, the absence or lower degrees of electoral competition allow authoritarian leaders to maintain high levels of trade tariffs that generate incomes for the regime, not the people. Autocracies are expected to payoff support of dominant societal actors with such money. As a result, the reviewed pieces establish cumulative knowledge where democracies trade *on average* more than autocracies. The highly probable consequence is that democracies are *on average* wealthier than autocracies.

I interpret that it is hard to find quantitative regime type literature going beyond statements that generalize too much and leave out actually well-known dependencies of democracies on autocracies. The most obvious examples are here democracies heavily trading with autocracies rich on natural resources or exploiting cheap labor conditions. The EU still depends on Russian gas. The United States and many other democracies import oil from Saudi Arabia. China provides cheap consumer products to the most parts of the world and employs aggressive FDI strategies in African countries.

One of the insights provided by Martin and Kono (2015) suggests that the research on autocracies shall couple regime type and structural-economic explanations. This seems plausible for me as well. My purpose is, however, to go beyond theorizing only on material interdependence. Instead, I put forward an argument where autocracies with well performing economies can to a certain extent escape asymmetric moral interdependence created by democratizing and human rights actors. I employ such a line of reasoning to account for either missing or misleading assumptions on autocracies and their economic potential in studies on delegation preferences to IHROs.

As a result, I avoid three types of arguments: First, even though democracies are on average wealthier than autocracies, it does not imply that wealthy autocracies would not be able to exploit their dominant position in international trade. Second, I do not follow the reductionist understanding of modernization theory linking merely economic growth to increasing quality of democracy (Aidt and Gassebner 2010, p. 40). Third, I refrain from assuming that increasing wealth could lead to a higher probability of authority delegation irrespective of regime type (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015). In my analysis, I couple economic performance with increasing probability to delegate only for democracies.

2.4. Shortcomings and prospects of regime type literature

The quantitative regime type literature on delegation preferences to IHROs suffers from several shortcomings. Instead of maintaining the state-centered perspective and the democracy bias, I suggest first, to analyze the explanatory potential of both domestic and international dimensions, and second,

to devote an appropriate attention to the authoritarian and democratic regime types in a systematic comparative study. Such a study requires to introduce an up-to-date understanding of autocracies in international relations and provide for theoretical reasoning why domestic dimensions matter for international behavior. In this section, I briefly reconstruct the current understanding of autocracies in the regime type literature and juxtapose it with my conceptualization. In the remainder of this Section, I curve out the theoretical, conceptual, and empirical demand that I account for. I provide for a theoretical reasoning that justifies opening-up of regimes only afterwards in Chapter 3.

The quantitative studies on delegation preferences might evoke the impression that it is not necessary to devote more attention to autocracies. Established democracies figure as the drivers of IOs and democratizing states support their cause by delegating authority to IOs. To a great extent, autocracies did not catch the attention of quantitative research on delegation preferences especially when analyzing IHROs. Meanwhile, literature on international behavior of autocracies promotes an image of autocracies which on bilateral, regional, and international level actively resist the pressure of liberal human rights and democracy norms.

Qualitative studies on delegation preferences of autocracies to ROs, on the one hand, sustain such an image, and on the other hand, erode it. Essentially, we experience that autocracies build ROs in order to even successfully deflect liberal norms and to put authoritarian norms in place instead. We learn as well, however, that autocracies subject themselves to the negative financial pressure or positive financial motivation of democratizing actors. Furthermore, the regime type literature on international trade contributes to the image of autocracies which trade less and are considered to be on average poorer than democracies are. Moreover, it also links economic performance to democratic development. As a result, autocracies are often considered to be economically dependent on democracies.

My understanding of autocracies does not directly question the generalization on democracies being wealthier than autocracies. Instead, I consider the fact that some autocracies are wealthier than other autocracies are or even outperform democracies in terms of wealth. Wealthy authoritarian regimes might be therefore more immune to the normative pressure coupled to the financial incentives than poor autocracies are. Hence, I fully consider the variation in economic performance of autocracies. Moreover, instead of linking economic growth to increasing levels of democracy, I understand wealth of authoritarian regimes as an instrument that allows them to solidify repressive governance.

Aside of the economic dimension, I grasp autocracies as full-fledged actors of international relations that act on behalf of their dominant societal actors and interests of the regime and can actually make a difference for IHROs. Hence, their struggle against liberal human rights and democracy norms takes

place not only through “authoritarian” ROs but happens in IHROs with mixed membership as well. Such a struggle varies from preferences to abolish the SP UNHRC to a discreet reduction of decision-making competencies and autonomy.²⁴ I aim to account for the variation in the opposition to IHROs by opening up the authoritarian regimes. Here, autocracies vary along especially two domestic dimensions that tells us to what extent societal actors can operate freely and their interests are (mis-)represented by domestic institutions.

According to my conceptualization, democracies vary along these two dimensions as well. I theorize that the difference between autocracies and democracies lies in the extent of legitimation and repression. Autocracies repress more than they legitimize and *vice versa* democracies legitimize more than they repress as I elaborate in the following Chapter 3. The very same chapter, however, presents and justifies first and foremost the opening up of regime types and formulates a bottom-up process suitable for explaining delegation preferences. The bottom-up process where societal actors formulate interests that get (mis-)represented by domestic institutions and get adjusted to the international negotiations might help me, on the overall, to tackle down a manifold demand for further research on autocracies’ and democracies’ delegation preferences to IHROs.

To be fair, it is only natural that I indicate further theoretical and empirical demand for quantitative analysis since merely two studies (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Hill 2016) have coped with regime type driven delegation preferences to IHROs and produced relevant results. This, nevertheless, does not mean that I would like to withdraw my criticism. I still consider that quantitative regime type approaches are late to appropriately address the role of autocracies in IHROs and especially their reform processes. Regarding theory, we lack assumptions on autocracies and their delegation preferences to IHROs with mixed membership. In terms of empirical analysis, only Hill (2016) analyzes delegation preferences of autocracies to IHROs with mixed membership. In contrast, we dispose of both theoretical and empirical analysis of democratic regime types. So far, the studies arrived at consensual empirical results regarding established democracies although they departed from diverging theoretical assumptions. The theoretical expectations and empirical results on weakly democratic regimes are not settled down yet.

I cover this wide-ranging research demand by conducting a systematic comparative analysis of autocracies and democracies. Here, I clearly avoid the democracy bias by employing an up-to-date understanding of autocracies. Instead of relying on the reductionist state-centered perspective, I scrutinize the bottom-up process which shapes the delegation preferences to IHROs. Such a fined-grained and complex approach shall account for the broad variation of delegation preferences

²⁴ There is one outlier like Armenia that supports rather strengthening than weakening the SP UNHRC.

across regime types. Whereby the Chapter 2 reviewed, integrated, and evaluated the regime type literature, the Chapter 3 elaborates and justifies the bottom-up perspective in terms of theoretical reasoning.

3. Theory

Being able to provide relevant answers to the research question *“How can we explain authority delegation preferences voiced by autocracies and democracies in reform processes of IHROs?”* means to account for theoretical shortcomings of regime type approaches and develop their explanatory potential. In order to do so, I consult the overarching liberal school of thought. To be precise, I draw mostly on the mid-range theory of New Liberalism. I carve out a theoretical framework positioned between the regime type literature and the encompassing New Liberalism. This will allow me to proceed in the sense of cumulative science. First, I strive to avoid the already described “democratic bias.” Second, I aim to contribute to the systematization of theoretical assumptions and empirical results. Third, I plan to broaden the set of explanatory factors. Fourth, I will specify theoretical assumptions that have been held too general and resulted in undifferentiated arguments.

In Section 3.1, I present the three main assumptions on societal actors, domestic institutions, and interdependency. These ought to contribute to the regime type explanations and stem from New Liberalism (Moravcsik 1997, 2003, 2009). I point out in how far they are compatible with the regime type literature and to what extent they diverge. Furthermore, I juxtapose the three main assumptions with realist, constructivist, institutionalist and domestic politics schools of thought for reasons of analytical clarity and justification. And finally, I reflect upon New Liberalism and compare it with other liberal schools of thought. In Section 3.2, I identify theoretical assumptions that were so far excluded from the regime type literature but I find reasonable to incorporate. As integral parts of New Liberalism, the theoretical traditions of ideational, republican, and commercial liberalisms constitute here the points of departure. In Section 3.3, I provide a bundled summary of the theoretical framework which ought to further develop regime type research.


Out of the liberal school of thought, New Liberalism is the nearest match for regime type explanations. It preserves the core theoretical assumption of the regime type literature: State preferences vary and are endogenous to states. Other versions of liberal theory do not match my analytical purposes. Structural liberalism explains foundation and survival of the liberal world order that is constituted by liberal democracies (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999; Ikenberry 2009a) and thus is not appropriate for analyzing autocracies. For institutional liberals, state delegation preferences are conditioned by the exogenous factor of international institutions (see Keohane 2012). Thus, institutional liberalism violates the core assumption of regime type approaches on endogenous state preferences.

It was an easy task to choose a leading author of New Liberalism. It is Andrew Moravcsik that repeatedly maintains the theoretical core of New Liberalism (Moravcsik 1997, 2003, 2009). He integrates liberal contributions of commercial, republican, and ideational traditions and formulates

assumptions that are expected to hold true both for autocracies and democracies (ibid). Thus, he avoids the bias introduced by regime type literature that formulated theoretical expectations only for democracies (Hill 2016), largely skipped empirical analysis of autocracies (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015), or devoted much more effort to interpret empirical results relevant for analysis of democracies rather than autocracies (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008).

Figure 2 depicts how the liberal school of thought is organized in current literature: Liberal theory consists of ideational, republican, and commercial traditions. Republican liberalism draws mostly on democratic peace research agenda. Regime type literature is a subset of a broader [and older] democratic peace research (Tallberg et al. 2016, p. 60, modified by author).


Figure 2: Organization of liberal theory



In order to further develop regime type explanations, I will broaden their theoretical foundations. Figure 3 provides an overview: The organization of liberal theory remains untouched. It consists of ideational, republican, and commercial traditions. The mid-range theory New Liberalism incorporates main explanatory drivers of liberal, republican, and commercial traditions. Once revisited, regime type explanations will embrace core assumptions of New Liberalism. Hence, regime type explanations will not be any longer a subset of the research peace agenda and republican liberalism. As I am selective which parts of New Liberalism to incorporate into regime type explanations, I am not testing the whole

New Liberalism or even liberal theory as such. For example, I do not test to what extent ideology fuels or hinders coalition building (Moravcsik 1997, p. 527, 2009, p. 8; Owen 1994).

Figure 3: Broadening assumptions of regime type explanations



3.1. New Liberalism

In this section, I reduce the complexity of New Liberalism to illustrate its explanatory potential for general matters of international relations and questions of authority delegation to IHROs. First, I give a compact introduction into New Liberalism. Second, I elaborate the three core assumptions on primacy of societal actors, selectively representative state preferences, and interdependency shaping international behavior. Third, I either discriminate among New Liberalism and realism, constructivism, institutionalism, and domestic politics approaches, or highlight their overlap. Only afterwards in Section 3.2., I introduce more complexity into the review of New Liberalism and substantiate arguments that shall enrich regime type explanations of delegation preferences to IHROs.

I juxtapose New Liberalism with other theories of international relations or approaches for various reasons. Realism is the most long-standing rival to liberal theory of international relations. Constructivism figures as the most relevant alternative when explaining the existence or change of IHROs. Domestic politics approaches partially overlap with New Liberalism. And finally, institutionalism (/liberal institutionalism) was intentionally excluded from the liberal school of thought by Moravcsik.

New Liberalism in one sentence would go like this: Societal actors are selectively represented by states in the international system whereby states' international behavior depends on preferences of other states. The first assumption is that societal actors like individuals or groups are fundamental actors of international relations (Moravcsik 1997, p. 516). The second assumption postulates that states represent merely a subset of societal actors when they formulate state preferences for world politics (Moravcsik 1997, p. 518). The third assumption stresses that states pursue their preferences under constraints of preferences of other states (Moravcsik 1997, p. 520). Taken together, international behavior of a state is a result of pressures by societal actors and other states. Thus, in order to explain delegation preferences to IHROs, liberalism suggests investigating the importance of societal actors whose interests are (mis-)represented by domestic institutions and voiced by states in reform processes of IHROs. States do so under the constraint of their coalition partners and opponents.

Assumption 1: Primacy of societal actors

New Liberalism assumes that politics function as bottom-up process. Moravcsik treats individuals and societal groups as analytically prior to politics. This means that individuals form their material and ideational goals independently of politics (1997, p. 517). Only afterwards, societal actors pursue their interest in the sphere of politics (Moravcsik 2009, p. 3). This, however, does not imply that societal actors would form their interests without being embedded into collective identities like family, [local] community, national [or even regional and global] identities (Coleman 1990, modified by author). For

New Liberalism, societal actors are the most fundamental actors of international politics (Moravcsik 1997, p. 516).

The primacy of societal domestic actors that are transnationally interlinked distinguishes New Liberalism from other theories of international relations. Realists claim the primacy of states acting under the premise of anarchical structure of international relations (Waltz 1979). Institutionalists (coined as functional regime theorists by Moravcsik 1997, p. 536) start their explanations by referring to international institutions and how these create structures of repetitive interaction influencing state preferences (Axelrod and Keohane 1985). Constructivists start their analysis by reference to sets of ideas, identities or norms that appeal to societal and political actors to be more appropriate than other ones and thus shape their behavior (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Finnemore 1993; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Katzenstein 1996).

Authors referring to domestic politics approaches for sure do not exclude domestic societal actors from their analysis. Nevertheless, they make it clear: The choice of foreign policy and single strategies depends heavily on a leader or a small group of government members (Schultz 2013). This shall hold true for democracies and autocracies, too. The repeatedly tested argument on democratizing states put forward by Moravcsik (2000) might evoke the impression that Moravcsik was rather referring to the domestic politics approaches than curving out a regime type argument. Here, young democracies are expected to be most willing to submit to authority of IHROs in order to lock-in human rights and democracy for future generations (ibid). It is the political elites that introduced or at least experienced a regime change from an autocracy to a democracy and are worried about its stability that shall be granted by corrective IHROs (ibid). However, by delegating authority, democratizing states also aim to signal that they are trustworthy partners for other democracies (ibid). Thus, the argument on democratizing states incorporates aspects of interdependency as well and as such shall be treated as a regime type argument and not domestic politics approach.

It is not only the primacy of societal actors in international relations that New Liberalism postulates. Within the realm of New Liberalism, societal actors (domestic as well as transnational) are on average rational and risk averse while being acquisitive. Thus, such individuals and groups strongly defend their current material or ideational assets before assuming costs and risk in pursuit of new assets or ideas (Moravcsik 1997, p. 517). Moreover, they dispose only of limited knowledge, restrained cognitive capacities and time when they engage in “bounded decision-making” (see Klaes and Sent 2005). Societal actors initiate exchange or collective action in order to pursue their interests more effectively than on their own (Moravcsik 1997, pp. 516–517). This happens under the constraint of material scarcity, conflicting values and differentiated influence (ibid).

Other than institutionalists or realists, New Liberalism does not formulate assumptions on whether societies (or states) have conflictual or convergent interests. Realist would predict rather conflictual interests as states are expected to pursue absolute or relative gains in power to survive in the anarchical international system (Legro and Moravcsik 1999, pp. 13–14). Institutionalists highlight the positive prospects of international institutions that are expected to harmonize interests of actors in the international system (see Keohane 2012). Moravcsik leaves such theorizing out and assumes an open ended scenario instead: “Deep, irreconcilable differences in beliefs about the provision of public goods, such as borders, culture, fundamental political institutions, and local social practices, promote conflict, whereas complementary beliefs promote harmony and cooperation (1997, p. 517).” As a result, New Liberalism lacks assumptions on what sets societal actors into motion in the very first place.

Moravcsik accounts for such a lack in his contribution from 2009. Here, he revises the first assumption on primacy of societal actors. They remain the fundamental actors of international relations in fact but are embedded in a systemic structure giving them an incentive to act. It is globalization that is a crucial source of societal interests. Globalization gives societal actors a rational incentive to formulate interests for international politics. Alterations in control of material resources, authoritative values and chances for societal control will inevitably have distributional implications. Therefore, globalization creates so called winners and losers. The main task for liberal analysis is to envision what impact changes in globalization could have for societal actors. (Moravcsik 2009)

In my analysis, I treat IHROs as carriers of globalization (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012b; see Keohane et al. 2009). However, I do not assume IHROs to have the prevailing influence on the formation of state preferences as institutional liberals do. According to New Liberalism, societal actors remain the fundamental actors of international relations. It is their interests that states translate into delegation preferences and voice these during reform processes of IHROs. The delegation preferences together with outcomes of reforms of IHROs have in turn distributional implications both for societal actors in autocracies as well as democracies.

Still, even if New Liberalism accounts for the structural incentives given by globalization, the theoretical micro foundations on societal groups understood as aggregations of individuals are largely missing. At this point, Moravcsik opens New Liberalism for interaction with cosmopolitanism and liberal constructivism (2009, p. 8). Political cosmopolitanism formulates why self-interested individuals actually support IHROs (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012b) whereby liberal constructivists stress the potential for conflict caused by activism of transnational networks. These can be perceived as instances of cultural imperialism (Keck and Sikkink 1998b).

As an author of political cosmopolitanism studies, Ecker-Ehrhardt (2012b) differentiates between functional logic and normative logic that is expected to guide individuals or groups when formulating their interests in changes in “ideational redistribution” by IHROs. Based on the functional logic, individuals are expected to be interested in realization of certain ideas, the more the ideas affect them. Ideas are successfully implemented only when societal actors from the same region or even on a global scale commit to the particular ideas. Whereby the normative logic implies that individuals feel to be responsible for people from other societies. Irrespective of the logic that underlies the formation of interests, societal actors may have conflictual interests carried by transnational (regional or global) actors. For example, the fans of the Russian and pro-Putin Motorcycle Club Night Wolves are well known for their anti-LGBT values (Parfitt 2015; for more see Zabyelina 2019). On the contrary, pro-LGBT movements organize parades that take place in many cities situated mainly in liberal democracies (Peterson et al. 2018). Political cosmopolitanism expects societal actors to support regional or international organizations when local or national governance structures cannot guarantee their ideational interests (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012b, p. 485; Moravcsik 1997, p. 518, Footnote 9).

Moravcsik is very clear as he repeatedly stresses the importance of domestic and transnational societal actors for world politics (1997, pp. 516–517, 2009, p. 1). His understanding of domestic societal actors is particularly broad. It includes almost every type of non-governmental domestic actor. Thus, it could be individuals, NGOs, movements, media, private companies, trade and labor unions, etc., which possess interests in shaping IHROs. Up to now, quantitative regime type literature on IHROs leaves out theorizing on societal actors.²⁵ However, democratic peace research does so. Democracies are expected to represent their peaceful societies (see Maoz and Russett 1993) as they initiate less violent international conflicts than autocracies do. States figure, nevertheless, as the main actors of international relations. Regarding autocracies, quantitative regime type literature does not incorporate theorizing on domestic actors as well.²⁶ Instead, authors formulate assumptions on motives of regimes (understood as governments in autocratic states) to weaken IOs (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008; Tallberg et al. 2016). Assumptions on delegation preferences of autocracies to IHROs are missing as already explicated in the Chapter 2.

On the overall, the first assumption of New Liberalism provides me with guidance on my quest to make a contribution to regime type explanations: I shall prioritize domestic societal actors as the most fundamental actors of international relations. Regarding this issue, I need to overcome the state

²⁵ An exception would be the control variable “NGOs” employed by Hafner-Burton et al. (2015) that, however, shall hold for states irrespective of regime type and turns to be insignificant.

²⁶ The study by Tallberg et al. (2016) figures as an exception. Here, the authors theorize a linkage between authoritarian regimes that repress NGOs on the domestic level and thus does not want to allow IOs to align with transnational NGOs.

centered take on international relations as theorized by current regime type literature. Furthermore, I account for the democracy bias. Hence, I narrow down the theoretical assumptions and empirically analyze the potential influence of domestic actors on delegation preferences of democracies as well as autocracies. Nevertheless, I do not account for the whole complexity of societal actors involved in the making of delegation preferences as suggested by New Liberalism. I concentrate on the domestic societal actors and leave the transnational societal actors from the research design out. I merely assume that domestic actors which are embedded in transnational networks are more probably to exert influence than domestic actors without transnational networks (see Carpenter 2007). In order to fulfill these aims, I derive more detailed theoretical reasoning from ideational liberalism on domestic societal actors and explicate the roots of the state centered perspective on international relations owed to the republican liberalism in the Section 3.2.

Assumption 2: Representation and state preferences

The bottom-up perspective as envisioned in New Liberalism entails a long process before societal interests can be—in a modified form—reflected in reform processes of IHROs. It is mainly the dominant societal actors who get represented by their states in international relations, as incorporated in the second assumption on representation and state preferences. Societal actors may build their own regional or global networks or movements. These, however, do not qualify as governance actors. Thus, according to Moravcsik, societal actors turn to governments/states to represent their interests with increased efficiency. States in turn represent only a subset of a domestic society as they define state preferences and act purposively in world politics (Moravcsik 1997, p. 518) or instrumentally manage globalization (Moravcsik 2009, p. 4).

In terms of New Liberalism, state is a representative actor that is a subject to a constant capture and recapture by coalitions of societal actors. Societal actors are more or less able to prioritize own interests depending on power, informal processes, and especially configuration of domestic institutions. Domestic institutions either favor or constrain societal actors (Moravcsik 1997, p. 518). In a closed authoritarian regime like Saudi Arabia, the state represents interests of a leader and the elite members of regime. In an electoral autocracy like Russia, the state represents a broader coalition of societal actors (including private corporations) supporting the stability and re-election of the current leader. Electoral democracies, like for example Mexico, strive to represent a broad variety of societal actors but cannot guarantee representation of minorities. Liberal democracies like France shall represent large shares of society and refrain from violating interests of minorities.²⁷

²⁷ The examples are based on reading Lührmann et al. (2018).

Of course, I provide here only for formalized idea-typical examples as Moravcsik doesn't specify what kind of institutions shall be more or less important for (mis-)representation of societal actors. It is of my interest to derive what institutions like for example elections, oversight/checks and balances mechanisms or courts own potential to explain delegation preferences. I do so in Section 3.2. where I engage with the republican tradition of liberal theory that stresses the importance of domestic institutions.

So far, we can summarize that it is mainly societal actors (assumption 1) who are selectively represented by domestic institutions (assumption 2) that account for state preferences. The term *state preferences*, however, doesn't equal *state behavior* in the international system. State preferences are different from the daily business of international relations like strategies, bargaining, tactics, policies, etc. (Moravcsik 2009, p. 4). State preferences stand for what states would ideally do on behalf of dominant societal actors independent from strategies of other states (Moravcsik 1997, p. 519). *State preferences* are causally independent of strategies of other states. *State behavior* in turn stands for results of interaction or at least juxtaposition with preferences or strategies of other states.

For liberals, it is common to assume that preferences and the resultant behavior varies from state to state (Moravcsik 1997, p. 520, 2009, pp. 4–5). Here, once again, the primacy of dominant societal actors makes a difference. This time, the regime type literature deviates from New Liberalism. Authors of regime type approaches frequently set off their analysis by imagining what diverse types of autocracies and democracies gain or lose when they decide to strengthen or weaken IHROs (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Hill 2016). In terms of New Liberalism, dominant societal actors (indirectly) inhibit or enable governments to delegate authority to IHROs. Therefore, variation in state preferences and consequent behavior on behalf of societal actors seems to be more plausible than imagining a government voluntarily giving up decision-making and restricting its autonomy by delegating authority to IHROs. As a result, the so called sovereignty puzzle that drives several regime type contributions (e.g. Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Hill 2016; Moravcsik 2000) appear to be obsolete in the vein of New Liberalism.²⁸

The conceptual distinction between state preferences and state behavior has semantic consequences for my analysis. I call the dependent variable "delegation preferences" as a matter of tradition of the regime type literature. I do so even if such a label is not easy to justify. In short, I operationalize delegation preferences as statements voiced during the reform process of the SP UNHRC. The statements were issued during a multitude of official sessions throughout the years 2006, 2007 and

²⁸ I interpret that the sovereignty puzzle is a relict of formerly predominant realist explanations of international relations. Realists assumed that states would be willing to compromise their sovereignty only under a threat of coercive power which makes delegation of authority to IOs improbable.

2010. Such statements are therefore results of short informal coalition building cycles and a juxtaposition *vis-à-vis* strategies of opponent actors that happen between the official negotiation sessions. Thus, a liberal theorist would rather call the dependent variable “delegation behavior” and a delegation preference would be an input statement for unofficial negotiation meetings in-between the official sessions. Nevertheless, it is only the reform outcomes that actually impinge on sovereignty of member states and hence necessarily imply delegation behavior. Here, I turn to pragmatic reasoning. I stick with the label “delegation preferences” since my aim is to further develop regime type explanations and not to conduct a holistic test of liberal theory.

Except for the semantic complexity, the compatibility of New Liberalism with regime type explanations is given, especially when compared to other theories of international relations. To make a contribution to the regime type explanations, I need to maintain its core assumption: preferences are endogenous to states and vary. Realists expect states to have fixed preferences under anarchy which change merely according to exogenous aspects like geopolitical environment (Moravcsik 1997, p. 536). States give up sovereignty only under a threat of coercive force when pursuing survival strategies (Morgenthau et al. 2006, pp. 317–334). Reform processes of IHROs, however, do not witness such threats (see Goodliffe and Hawkins 2009, p. 993) which are reserved for escalated conflicts over natural resources or conflicting claims of territoriality (Morgenthau et al. 2006). Realists, actually, would not expect states to go into lengths and articulate power-based threats as IHROs for realists do not impinge on state sovereignty. Same as realism, institutionalism assumes fixed states preferences under anarchy (Moravcsik 1997, p. 536). Aspects of anarchy can be overcome through repeated action and complex structures of international institutions that are exogenous to states (Keohane 1984). It is, nevertheless, hard to imagine that states would not take into account their domestic constituencies as they form preferences for international policy fields like human rights or democracy. It is because these are in turn of interest for domestic societal actors.

Domestic politics approaches would search for volatile motivation across governments and their members in order to explain variance in state preferences, and they would certainly find some. Nevertheless, domestic politics approaches don’t account for the strategic positioning of state preferences *vis-à-vis* coalition and opponent actors (e.g. Gelpi et al. 2009; Schultz 2013, p. 3) which constitute the diplomatic routine in reform processes of IHROs. Last but not least, constructivists share the assumption with liberals that state preferences vary, yet the sources of state preference differ. Liberals refuse to take a clear stance on the very origins of state preferences. State preferences can be of material and/or ideational origins (see Moravcsik 1997, p. 525). For constructivists, however, state

preferences stem from non-material origins like identities and norms (ibid).²⁹ Therefore, the difference between liberalism and constructivism is rather of ontological nature at this point.

By and large, New Liberalism provides me with a guidance on my quest for development of regime type research once again. The most important aspect of the representation process that transforms societal interests into state preferences are domestic institutions. Hence, I review the republican tradition of liberalism that stresses the role of domestic institutions in Section 3.2 and incorporate insights from Comparative Politics discipline as well. Of my interest is to identify types of domestic institutions that play major role in selecting whose interests state incorporate.³⁰ Nevertheless, before I do so, I need to elaborate on the next step of the bottom-up process. This time, New Liberalism provides for a theoretical assumption on how state preferences become international state behavior.

Assumption 3: Interdependence and the international system

The link between state preferences and state behavior is constituted by interdependence (Moravcsik 2009, pp. 5–6). States pursue own preferences under the constraint of preferences by other states in the international system (Moravcsik 1997, p. 520). Thus, state preferences are stand-alone positions of each state whereas resultant state behavior is a compromise made by considering preferences of other states. These are usually coalition as well as opponent actors.

We can take two hypothetical examples fitted to the reform process of SP UNHRC. Imagine a liberal democracy whose dominant societal actors push for a significant strengthening of the SP UNHRC. A state preference would be here: If SP UNHRC reveal severe human rights breaches, international economic sanctions shall be imposed on the perpetrator state without any further decision-making. Such a state preference is highly improbable to be accepted by autocratic member states of the UNHRC. Thus, instead of voicing the preference, the democratic state transforms it into a state behavior and issues a modified statement: If SP UNHRC conduct an on-the-ground mission and observe aggravated breaches of liberal human rights, then they can issue a monitoring report without consulting it with the perpetrator state. The other way around, a hypothetical preference of a closed autocracy could be to completely dissolve the monitoring bureaucracy SP UNHRC and stick to intergovernmental naming and shaming in the UNHRC instead. Such a state preference would be rather unacceptable for the democratic member states of the UNHRC. Therefore, the closed autocracy converts the state preference into a state behavior and voices an adjusted statement: SP UNHRC must

²⁹ But see Barnett and Duvall (2005) on power in constructivist approaches.

³⁰ A holistic test of the New Liberalism would incorporate informal processes and power of societal actors (see Moravcsik 1997, p. 517).

conduct only remote observation missions that prioritize economic to political rights. The monitoring results are confident and cannot be released to press.

Interdependence does not constitute only the link between state preferences and state behavior. The concept of interdependence is more frequently used to explain how unilateral and international policies affect other states. New Liberalism is supposed to constitute the theoretical core of liberalism and its explanatory scope is therefore very broad. Moravcsik defines interdependence as a “set of costs and benefits created for foreign societies when dominant societal groups in a society seek to realize their preferences, that is, the pattern of transnational externalities resulting from attempts to pursue national distinctive purposes (Moravcsik 1997, p. 520).” As a result, New Liberalism does not differentiate between two types of interdependency: material and moral. The difference is, however, crucial for analysis of delegation preferences to IHROs.

Under material interdependency, IOs regulate policy externalities that arise from societal interactions across borders (Moravcsik 2000, p. 217; Pevehouse 2016, p. 1). Here belong international trade, environmental, or security policies. Whereas under moral interdependency, IOs constrain states’ behavior toward their own citizens (and not toward other states or societies from other states) (Hill 2016, 1). Inevitably, delegation under moral interdependency encroaches more on state sovereignty (ibid). International human rights and democracy policies are regulated under moral interdependency.

Regarding the reform process of the UNHRC, autocracies and democracies actually do not negotiate under a simple moral interdependency but under an asymmetric moral interdependency instead. It is the prevalence of liberal human rights and democracy norms as analyzed by liberal constructivists that creates the asymmetry. These norms appear to be more appropriate than norms put forward by autocracies. The robustness of liberal human rights and democracy norms is assessed as rhetoric action in institutionalization processes (Deitelhoff 2009); implementation on the domestic level varying over number of states, durability and norm specificity (Legro 1997); believes of people (see Hawkins, Shaw 2008, p. 467) and NGO activity (Deitelhoff 2009; Risse-Kappen et al. 1999; see also Tallberg et al. 2016). I would not assume an asymmetric moral interdependency, for example, in reform processes of IOs with homogenous autocratic membership. Here, autocracies institutionalize own norms like “sovereign democracy” (see Ambrosio 2008, p. 1338).³¹

³¹ The New Liberalism foresees a “deadlocked” configuration of interdependent state preferences that might appear to be similar to the presented asymmetrical moral interdependency. Moravcsik postulates that there is a high potential of conflict when dominant societal groups of one state strive to realize their interests through state action that imposes costs on dominant groups in other states (1997, p. 521). I do not refer to the deadlocked state preferences because this concept was primary envisioned to explain international trade or armed conflict. Hence, it does not account for the specificities of human rights and democracy policy fields which are shaped under moral interdependency.

Apart of the missing distinction between moral and material interdependency, New Liberalism has potential to enrich regime type literature. Regime type explanations of delegation preferences to IHROs assume interdependency of policies as well. Interdependency is treated as a source of motivation, for example, for established democracies to bind other states in regional and international organizations in order to introduce peace (see Pevehouse 2002, 2005; Pevehouse and Russett 2006). New Liberalism prioritizes interdependency as one of the three fundamental explanatory patterns for state behavior in international system (Moravcsik 1997, 2003, 2009). Thus, more questions on interdependency shall be asked to avoid stagnation of the regime type explanations. For instance, we know the purpose of increasing interdependency, thus, there must be strategies how to (at least partially) escape the interdependency. In order to derive more precise research interests, I will review commercial liberalism that delivers explanations by predominantly referring to material interdependency.

For reasons of analytical clarity, I compare New Liberalism with competing or overlapping theories of International Relations once again. Realism and institutionalism also incorporate interdependency structures as main analytical drivers as New Liberalism does. Realists claim that the absence of an effective international authority results into anarchy of international system. States are interdependent in the sense that gains in power of one state trigger conflictual reaction of other states. Consequentially, realists assume diverging state preferences caused by the interdependent structure of anarchical system (Waltz 1979). In reaction to realists, institutionalists demonstrated that the anarchy can be overcome. International institutions and organizations create a negotiation environment (coined also as complex interdependence) where the uncertainty of strategies and behavior of other states is reduced and transaction costs decrease (Axelrod and Keohane 1985). As a result, institutionalists assume that state preferences rather converge than diverge.

Furthermore, constructivists refer to structures or patterns of interdependency as well. The power of ideas that socializes states in IOs (Checkel 2005; Johnston 2001) and coherence or disparity of identities (Risse-Kappen 1996; Wendt 1994) determine which preferences will states formulate and try to realize. Hence, the preferences can be either divergent or convergent as New Liberalism assumes, too. Nevertheless, constructivism leaves out a theoretical distinction between state preferences and international behavior which is highly relevant in reform processes of IHROs. Therefore, New Liberalism fits my analytical purposes even better. Domestic approaches do not constitute competition to New Liberalism as far as the question of interdependency is raised. Domestic approaches underestimate the structure of international system. Instead, they shed light on public opinion of domestic constituencies which shall be of more importance than configuration of preferences of other states (e.g. Ramsay 2004; Richards et al. 1993; Tomz 2007).

As aforementioned, regime type literature has not formulated theoretical assumptions on how autocracies can escape the asymmetrical moral interdependency created by norms of liberal human rights and democracy. Hence, I account for this shortcoming in Section 3.2. where I review the commercial tradition of liberalism. Up to now, I have presented New Liberalism which is organized around the three core assumptions on primacy of societal actors, (mis-)representative state preferences, and the pattern of interdependency. The stepwise juxtaposition of New Liberalism to other theories of International Relations introduces increased discriminatory power and serves as a check of external validity. In the remainder of the Section 3.1., I reflect upon criticism of New Liberalism and also compare New Liberalism with other traditions of liberal theory in order to examine the internal validity and to enhance analytical precision. Only afterwards, I will summarize the compatibility and potential of New Liberalism to further develop regime type explanations of delegation preferences to IHROs.

Reflection of New Liberalism and its theoretical guidance for regime type explanations

As Moravcsik formulated New Liberalism, he systematized main theoretical insights from three early traditions of liberal theory and re-casted them in terms of social theory.³² The first assumption on primacy of societal actors corresponds with insights from ideational liberalism. The second assumption on (mis-)representative domestic institutions draws on republican liberalism which includes literature on democratic peace that in turn gave rise to regime type contributions. The third assumptions on interdependency repurposes parts of commercial liberalism. In order to establish a coherent and a clear cut theoretical core, Moravcsik tried to exclude institutionalism from liberal theory. His main source of motivation for an overall re-formulation was, however, a harsh attack by realists on liberal theory (see Moravcsik 1997, 2003; 2009).

After the World War II, realists like Hans Morgenthau (2006) and Michael Howard (1978) criticized ideational liberalism for its “naïve” predictions on successively decreasing prospects of war.³³ The positive predictions on converging state preferences stem from the belief in civil society, modern state, and capitalist economy as elaborated by John Locke, Jeremy Bentham and Immanuel Kant in the 17th century (Zacher and Matthew 1995, pp. 112–114). These beliefs were resurrected after the World War II by the foundation of the United Nations (see Ikenberry 2009a, pp. 74–76). After the Cold War, it was the democratic peace research agenda as a part of republican liberalism that maintained positive predictions of future in the liberal school of thought (see Ray 2003; Zacher and Matthew 1995, p. 123).

³² For social theory, see e.g. Rosenau (1990) or Cerny (2010).

³³ For a detailed critical review of democratic peace research from a realist perspective see Layne (1994).

New Liberalism does not provide for normative reasoning even though it integrates insights from both ideational liberalism on the fundamental role of society and from democratic peace research on the importance of domestic institutions. It is because Moravcsik overtook merely the explanatory mechanisms but excluded the underlying normative assumptions on human nature, modern state, and international cooperation. He chose to do so in order to address the repeated and persuasive objections by realists. This, in turn, shall have allowed him to maintain the core of liberal theory meanwhile making a novel contribution (see Moravcsik 2000). As a result, New Liberalism is more analytically versatile without the normative assumptions. Nevertheless, at the same time, New Liberalism is consequentially not able to formulate policy relevant research that would give guidance on how to fight problems of globalized world.

Instead of the normative assumptions on human nature, Moravcsik treats societal actors as aggregations of individuals acting in terms of bounded rationality. Furthermore, he expects states to act instrumentally or strategically in the international realm. Moreover, due to the absence of fundamental normative assumptions, states are expected to have either converging or diverging state preferences. Thus, New Liberalism can explain both conflict and cooperation in various analytical settings. I consider this aspect to be especially fruitful for analysis of autocracies and democracies in international politics. It is because the realization of one regime type threatens the other and *vice versa* the realization of the same regime type leads to mutual stabilization.³⁴ The absence of normative agenda, nevertheless, implies a disadvantage for my research as well. I have to refer to constructivist contributions in order to explicate whether there are ideational pressures that create asymmetries under moral interdependency or not. Here, New Liberalism practically decreased the competition under post-positivist theories of International Relations as it integrated ideational liberalism without the ideational agenda. Constructivism became consequently the leading non-rational theory.³⁵

The absence of normative agenda caught attention of opponents and proponents of New Liberalism. The most prominent review recognizing the benefits of New Liberalism but taking significantly more effort to elaborate on the problems published Christian Reu-Smit (2001) in his article *The Strange Death of Liberal International Theory*. According to Reu-Smit, already the aim to recast a political theory as a social theory constitutes a problem. To qualify as a political theory it takes to balance assumptions on normative and strategic action of actors. The strategic part is given. The normative part is—as already highlighted—missing and this problem cannot be argued away. Anne-Marie Slaughter and Jose Alvarez based their work on New Liberalism in spite of the recast as a social theory,

³⁴ For contributions on mutually beneficial cooperation of autocracies and democracies see literature on BRICS states. See also Börzel and van Hüllen (2014) on partial stabilization of autocracies by neighboring democracies of the EU.

³⁵ See Jahn (2013, pp. 135–171) for a review of liberal research on international norms.

or actually thanks to this novelty (Slaughter and Alvarez 2000). First, they highlight the analytical versatility given by the omission of normative assumptions. Second and more importantly, they appreciate how Moravcsik links domestic and transnational actors with government/state and its international behavior in a bottom-up process formulated in accordance to social theory. The bottom-up process figures as a distinctive feature for their liberal theory of international law as well as several theories of international relations (see also Jahn 2018).³⁶

Two distinct traditions of liberal theory were developed aside of New Liberalism. New Liberalism does not incorporate assumptions on the role of international institutions. Furthermore, the role of state in international relations is to some extent limited due to the assumption of primacy of societal actors. Other authors than Moravcsik accounted for both of these aspects. John Ikenberry reintroduced state as the major actor of international relations within the tradition of structural liberalism (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999; Ikenberry 2001, 2009a).³⁷ Institutional liberals led by Robert Keohane accounted for the role of international institutions (e.g. Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Keohane 2012). Both traditions, however, do not match my aim to further develop regime type explanations.

The structural liberalism was envisioned to explain the establishment and persistence of liberal world order (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999; Ikenberry 2009a). It reacts to the formation of world order after World War II and after the Cold War. There are five distinctive features of liberal world order: penetrated US hegemony, semi-sovereign great powers, open liberal economy, civic identity, and co-binding security institutions (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999, p. 179). Ikenberry stresses the hegemonic relationship of the US to the European and Asian advanced industrial countries, especially Germany and Japan (Ikenberry 2009a). Already the principal analytical purpose of structural liberalism—explaining liberal world order—implies that it is of no use for regime type literature. It is because regime type literature aims to explain differentiated state preferences instead. Moreover, Ikenberry does not analyze the role of autocracies, and therefore maintains the democracy bias in liberal theory which I strive to avoid.

I already devoted attention to the differentiation between liberal institutionalism and New Liberalism. They deviate regarding the three core assumptions of New Liberalism on primacy of societal actors, varying state preferences, and interdependency. At this point, I would like to stress their distinct roots in the liberal school of thought and their resultant diverging explanatory process. New Liberalism rests on a bottom-up explanatory process. This stems from its reaction to politics after the Cold War where

³⁶ For a detailed critical review of the New Liberalism by an author of liberal theory see Jahn (2009, 2010).

³⁷ Ikenberry did so without underestimating international institutions and their function for world order.

societal actors and/through liberal states shaped the world order as captured by the social theory (see also Cerny 2010; Rosenau 1990, 1998).

In contrast, institutional liberals apply rather a top-down perspective when explaining state preferences. Their points of departure are international institutions created after the World War II and after the Cold War (see Ikenberry 2009b, pp. 206–207). It is the international institutions (together with powerful states and transnational actors) that structure decision-making of states (Keohane 2012). Meanwhile some authors like Ikenberry or Keohane include liberal institutionalists into the liberal school of thought, Moravcsik excludes it from New Liberalism. He even claims that liberal institutionalists share more with realists (1997, p. 516). There shall be merely ideological and historical nexuses that lead to inclusion of institutional liberalism into liberal school of thought (ibid).

Considering the advantages and disadvantages, New Liberalism offers me theoretical guidance on my quest for further developing regime type explanations. Current regime type approaches need to overcome the democracy bias and systematize its empirical insights. I strive to account for such lacks by further analyzing the domestic dimensions of autocracies and democracies. New Liberalism also helps me to select which traditions of liberal theory might offer valuable extensions to its parsimonious explanatory core and which traditions are not compatible.

Moravcsik's New Liberalism postulates that societal actors like individuals, NGOs, movements, private companies, etc., figure as primary actors in international relations. Therefore, I prioritize societal actors over states in the theoretical framework as well as in the empirical analysis. I turn to ideational liberalism to formulate more accurate assumptions on the role of societal actors in Section 3.2. Moreover, in the vein of New Liberalism, I do not restrict potential influence of societal actors to democracies but formulate assumptions on autocracies as well. Bottom-up processes can be identified even in autocracies. The question here is thus not whether autocracies undergo bottom-up processes but rather how such bottom-up processes differ from democracies and what is their impact on international behavior.

As soon as domestic societal actors formulate their interests, the second part of the bottom-up process begins. Here, in line with New Liberalism, I analyze domestic institutions and in how far they (mis-)represent interests of societal actors. Domestic institutions bias interests of societal actors as they transform them into state preferences. It remains to be theorized which types of domestic institutions are appropriate for analysis of delegation preferences to IHROs. For such a purpose, I draw first, on republican liberalism (that consists to a great extent of democratic peace research agenda) and second, I refer to insights from Comparative Politics discipline in the Section 3.2.

The bottom-up process ends at the international level. Here, state preferences are transformed into international behavior. In my analysis, international behavior stands for statements made by states aiming to strengthen or weaken IHROs during their reform processes. The regime type literature delivers sufficient theoretical expectations on democracies. Democracies strive to increase moral interdependency by strengthening IHROs in order to introduce peace in the international system. Repeatedly, my task is to avert the democracy bias and formulate assumptions on autocracies. Of my research interest is to find out how autocracies escape the asymmetrical moral interdependence imposed on them by democracies on behalf of their dominant societal actors. I do so by referring to commercial liberalism in the following section.

New Liberalism offers a parsimonious mid-range *theory* which is a good starting point for developing regime type *explanations*. A mid-range theory gives reasons to keep the theoretical framework straightforward, hence highlighting which parts of the liberal theory are indispensable and which introduce undesirable complexity appropriate to address overarching systemic questions. It comes, however, with tradeoffs. The absence of normative research agenda stimulated by realists' criticism offers on the one hand analytical versatility. On the other, it complicates the ability to formulate policy recommendations to some extent.

Still, New Liberalism provides a more appropriate theoretical foundations for accounting for shortcomings of existing regime type explanation than other versions of liberal theory and further theories of International Relations can deliver. First, New Liberalism avoids the democracy bias and envisions assumptions for states ranging most autocratic to most democratic states. Second, it departs from the expectation that state preferences are endogenous to states and thus vary based on the domestic dimensions. Put differently, state preferences are not exogenous to states. Third, it does not underestimate international pressures and hence is appropriate for analysis of international negotiations where state preferences are transformed into international behavior.

3.2. Ideational, republican, and commercial liberalism as sources of progress

New Liberalism provides for a parsimonious mid-range theory that rests on the three traditions of ideational, republican, and commercial liberalisms. Forming a mid-range theory based on the three liberal traditions required to reduce their complexity. Moravcsik integrated "only" the main analytical aspects. Thus, each of these traditions offers a broader explanatory scope.

Whereby ideational liberalism prioritized the importance of societal actors, it did not leave out theorizing on domestic institutions or international interdependency (Legro 1996). Republican liberalism highlighted the necessity to prioritize domestic institutions but works with societal actors and international interdependencies as well (Doyle 1983). And finally, commercial liberalism gave

precedence to international interdependencies whereby the theory also accounts for societal actors and domestic institutions (Press-Barnathan 2006).

Moravcsik integrated the three liberal traditions in the vein of social theory. I refer to New Liberalism especially for its formulation of a coherent bottom-up process that sets analytical priorities for my quest to further develop regime type explanations. In order to formulate a more nuanced theoretical framework for explaining delegation preferences of autocracies and democracies, I turn to the three underlying liberal traditions. This shall allow me to narrow down the theoretical expectations regarding domestic societal actors, (mis-)representative domestic institutions and interdependency. Even Moravcsik himself stresses the importance of referring to the different traditions of liberalism when theorizing single arguments and approaching particular analytical aims (Moravcsik 1997, p. 524).

Ideational Liberalism: Societal actors in autocracies and democracies

Ideational liberalism gave rise to the assumption on primacy of societal actors in international relations as embedded in New Liberalism. It is societal actors and their interests that fundamentally shape state preferences. In general, domestic societal actors (from here on societal actors) provide support for the government in exchange for political institutions and modes of socioeconomic regulation (Moravcsik 1997, p. 525, 2009, pp. 7–8). By referring to the ideational liberalism, I aim to overcome the state-centered analytical perspective employed in most of the regime type contributions. Furthermore, I avoid the democracy bias as I substantiate expectations on autocracies as well. Here, I briefly draw on insights from Comparative Politics literature that elaborates on how autocracies and democracies include or exclude societal actors from policy making.

Ideational liberalism departs from the assumption that identities stipulate who does or does not belong to the society and what is owed to them (Moravcsik 2009, p. 7). Therefore, identities define who should or should not be represented by the state. For liberals, the fundamental source of identities and norms can depend both on ideational and material factors (Jahn 2013; Moravcsik 1997, p. 525).³⁸ Societal actors support the government in exchange for representation on the domestic and international level (Moravcsik 1997, p. 525). Hence, societal actors legitimize the government. Democracies are stronger on legitimation than autocracies are (Davenport 2007, p. 4) and autocracies apply more repression than democracies do in order to govern (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Poe 2007).

In autocracies, governments get legitimized by members and supporters of the regime that benefit from the authoritarian mode of governance. The opposition is to a certain extent deprived from public

³⁸ For constructivists, social identities stem rather from ideational sources.

goods and rights to participate. The share of disadvantaged societal actors and individuals is larger than the share of beneficiaries from an authoritarian mode of governance. Thus, in autocracies, more societal actors are repressed than represented. It is because the governance backbone of autocracies is repression. In contrast, democracies repress less and legitimize more instead. Therefore, the share of societal actors that participate and benefit from the democratic mode of governance outweighs the share of ostracized and disadvantaged societal actors. As a result, according to my understanding, states can be placed on a continuum ranging from the most autocratic to most democratic states depending on the number of societal actors that are allowed to participate or whose interests are at least being taken into account when formulating delegation preferences to IHROs. To determine when a state is not anymore autocratic and becomes democratic depends on the balance of repression and legitimation applied. If a state applies more legitimation than repression, then I treat it as being democratic. And *vice versa*, if a state rests more on repression than legitimation, I consider it to be autocratic.³⁹

Following this line of reasoning, I expect states that allow less societal actors to participate in the political system to be less probable to delegate authority to IHROs. Here, societal actors still figure as the primary actors of international relations. Thus, I need to incorporate an assumption on societal actors that would guide my further reasoning. In line with New Liberalism, I assume that societal actors are on average rational and risk averse while being acquisitive. Hence, societal actors strongly defend their current material or ideational assets before assuming costs and risk in pursuit of new assets or ideas (Moravcsik 1997, p. 517). This shall hold true for societal actors both in autocracies and democracies.

In autocracies where repression is the prevailing mode of governance, societal actors which constitute or support the authoritarian regime enjoy more rights than the opposition and thus aim to secure their privileged position. Therefore, I expect that they are not in favor of strengthening IHROs which were created on behalf of societal actors from democracies in order to introduce human rights and democracy standards. Strong IHROs could endanger their privileged status and participation rights. Members and supporters of an authoritarian regime type could potentially enjoy even more rights in a democratic system. However, since they are expected to be risk-averse, they do not “gamble” with their current privileged position. Moreover, regarding oppositional societal actors in autocracies, I expect them to be in favor of strengthening IHROs. However, they exert less influence on policy-making than supporters of the regime do.

³⁹ The New Liberalism entails also an understanding of states that represent a very small group of individuals up to states that represent large shares of population (see Moravcsik 1997, p. 518, 2009, p. 5).

I would like to illustrate the risk averse nature of societal actors in authoritarian regimes by using an anecdotal example. When oppositional leaders mobilize a movement—which could be an actual threat to the regime—they are sometimes offered jobs in diplomatic service allocated in favorable destinations. By accepting the job offer, the former oppositional leaders become a part of the regimes in broader sense. Along with such a change, their interests in strong IHROs might alter as well. Resistance to the authoritarian policy would most certainly cost them their privileged status. Principally, even when I refer to the individual level, I have on my mind coalition building strategies in authoritarian regimes.

In democracies where legitimation figures as the prevailing mode of governance, more societal actors can participate in the political system than are repressed. I expect that societal actors strive to secure their participation rights by creating an international authority which controls states and imposes reputational costs if they impinge on human rights and democratic standards of governance. I assert that oppositional societal actors in democracies might exert more influence than in autocracies. The reason is that democratic governments strive to accommodate more societal actors and their interests in order to gain legitimacy. Nevertheless, the support for strong IHROs by the most societal actors is not straightforward. For example, multinational companies—that figure as strong societal actors—could be under certain conditions interested in low levels of protection of human rights which would allow them to prioritize profits over human rights.

By allocating the explanation to the societal level (internal dimension of states), I open up the black box of regime types. The difference to established regime type approaches is apparent. Established regime type approaches assign the theoretical reasoning to the state level. Hence, such contributions depart from assumptions on “what certain regime types want” meanwhile I postulate “what societal actors want” and to what extent their interests can be realized in autocracies and democracies. Consequently, I propose to focus on single dimensions of the regime types without ignoring the twofold form of governance either by repression or legitimation. Regarding the primacy of societal actors, as I clarify in detail in Chapter 4, I suggest examining the explanatory potential of participatory rights of societal actors on state delegation preferences to the SP UNHRC. Having elaborated the theoretical assumptions on societal actors and their interests, it is time to turn to the next phase of the bottom-up process. Here, domestic institutions select whose societal interests and to what extent will be considered when governments form delegation preferences to IHROs.

Republican Liberalism: (Mis-)representative domestic institutions

Moravcsik drew on republican tradition of liberalism as he formulated the second assumption of New Liberalism. The second assumption implies that domestic institutions are most valuable to analyze

whose interests a state will represent in international relations (see 1997, p. 518). Domestic institutions aggregate interests of societal actors and transform them into state preferences. When domestic institutions allow, particularistic groups dominate the decision-making process and systematically privilege own interests over others (see Moravcsik 1997, p. 530). By referring to republican liberalism, I derive which types of domestic institutions might be relevant for explaining delegation preferences to IHROs and I also add an own line of reasoning on domestic oversight/checks and balances mechanisms.

Republican liberalism consists predominantly of cumulative democratic peace research agenda. Democratic peace research analyzes to what extent and why democracies refrain from fighting interstate wars (Ray 2003). Such a research gave in turn rise to current regime type approaches (Tallberg et al. 2016, p. 60). The underlying argument relating democratic peace to regime type approaches tells us that democracies create and join IHROs in order to spread peace (see Pevehouse 2002, 2005; Pevehouse and Russett 2006). Accordingly, regime type approaches overtook the theoretical and empirical focus on democracies and thus introduced bias to regime type literature ostracizing autocracies.

Moreover, as regime type authors derived their assumptions on delegation preferences to IHROs, they incorporated the premise from democratic peace research that—as Ray (2003, p. 213) summarizes—states figure as the primary actors of international relations. As a result, regime type approaches increasingly overlook the interplay of societal actors and domestic institutions which carries implications for the international realm. Especially when formulating assumptions on autocracies, regime type literature treats authoritarian regimes as unitary actors. The role of domestic actors and state in democracies is occasionally mentioned but does not carry implications neither for theoretical reasoning nor for empirical analysis.

Considering the overall heritage of democratic peace research for regime type approaches, I avoid, first, the democracy bias and introduce autocracies into regime type explanations, and second, I revive the link between societal actors and domestic institutions. I do so in general by scrutinizing democratic peace research agenda⁴⁰ and incorporating insights from New Liberalism. The goal is to indicate which domestic institutions might influence delegation preference of both autocracies and democracies.

As stated above, domestic institutions select whose societal interests will states represent in international relations. The more biased (less representative) such a selection is, the more likely states

⁴⁰ The literature reviews by Zacher and Matthew (1995, pp. 122–123) and Ray (2003) offer a compact introduction into the vast democratic peace research agenda. I use these literature reviews to select contributions that are relevant for my analytical purposes. See Brown et al. (1999) for a more detailed historical review of democratic peace literature and its positive as well as negative reception in the research community.

will pursue agendas that disadvantage large shares of population [or violate rights of minorities] (Moravcsik 1997, p. 531, see 2009, p. 10, modified by author). For example, in a closed autocracy like Saudi Arabia, it is rather easy to exclude women's interests out of the state preferences and refrain from supporting IOs which shall account for liberal human rights. What is even more important here, the more biased the selection is, the more likely the international agenda will incorporate interests of government and less of societal actors (see Moravcsik 2009, p. 10). Delegation of authority under moral interdependence implies that the relationship of governments towards citizens is regulated. Therefore, institutions constraining governments to act at their free will are of special importance for my analysis. Yet, I include further domestic institutions into the analysis that influence the selection of societal interests without particularly focusing on the government as well.

Democratic peace research asserts that (rather democratic) states with less "biasing" domestic institutions, are more likely to refrain from aggressive behavior and strive to cooperate instead (Moravcsik 1997, p. 531) (see *ibid*). Support for strong IOs, and especially IHROs, by democracies is interpreted as an instance of cooperative behavior by the regime type literature. Hence, the inverse implication would be that the more "biasing" domestic institutions are, the more non-cooperative (rather autocratic) states are and thus the less probable they are to support strong IOs. Several contributions of the democratic peace research investigate the type of domestic institutions which shall have such far reaching consequences for state preferences. Selected pieces elaborate on the rule of law and most prominently on elections.

Prominent contributions on rule of law highlight its equalizing effect among societal actors. Based on the legacy of Immanuel Kant, Michael Doyle stresses the peaceful/cooperative effects of rule of law whose fundamentals can be found in constitutions: In a political system with established rule of law, societal actors are expected to be better organized. Without the rule of law, rational beings tend to put own interests over others without having to face consequences (see 1983; Doyle 1986, p. 1160). Therefore, I derive that the degrees of establishment of rule of law capture the degrees of (mis-)representation of domestic institutions when transforming interests of societal actors into state preferences.

The contribution by Anne-Marie Burley (Slaughter) on rule of law leads me to the very same deduction. For Burley, democracies constitute "zone of peace" since they form "zone of law". Democracies shall be more cooperative since the conduct of especially private societal actors is regulated by courts. She considers both domestic and transnational private actors whose interests are organized by domestic as well as international courts (see 1992). Similarly as for Doyle, rule of law equalizes interests of societal actors in the research article by Burley. Hence, in (rather autocratic) states where the rule of law is less established and thus has fewer equalizing effects, the domestic institutions allow for

increasingly selective representation of societal interests in state preferences. Furthermore, I would like to highlight one aspect of established rule of law. An established rule of law implies that courts make judgments without inference of the executive (Krygier 2012). Consequently, I do not count states with judicial systems working in the interest of government as having fully established rule of law. An example could be Turkey especially since 2013, where the government utilizes courts to put critical journalists in jail (see Saatçioğlu 2016).

Democratic peace research devoted much more attention to the cooperative potential of democracies due to their electoral dimension than rule of law (Ray 2003; see Zacher and Matthew 1995, pp. 122–123). The electoral dimension is expected to decide whose interests are incorporated in state preferences. An early contribution by Dean Babst departs from the assumption that public is not in favor of war whereby war is interpreted by regime type literature as an instance of non-cooperation. Public can make the choice not to go into war only if the government is elected (1972). Randal Schweller (and others) narrows down the argument: It is improbable that voters would support war prone parties and leaders since the population bears the costs of war (1992). Jack Snyder theorizes on the preferences of people embedded in an electoral system as well. For him, parties strive to appeal to the middle voters who are likely to be risk averse (1990, pp. 18–20). All these contributions assume that only if the domestic institutions—understood as elections—incorporate the majority of population (/do not introduce strong bias), then cooperation is more probable than non-cooperation. For my analysis, it means that support of strong IHROs might be more probable.

Nevertheless, there are differentiated assumptions made based on the electoral dimension stemming from both positivistic and post-positivistic traditions. Schweller offers a distinct rational argument derived from the effects of elections: It is difficult to build a coalition of interest groups in favor of war in a system where groups are fragmented due to the electoral competition (1992). What he means by fragmentation can be interpreted as a pluralistic system reflecting interests of a broad range of societal actors. Thus, elections fulfill once again a (mis-)representative function. Moreover, in contrast to the rational arguments, Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett introduce norms into democratic peace research. Democracies are expected to fight less wars since their foreign policy reflects norms of their peaceful citizens. They allocate the source of peaceful norms and resolution of conflict by non-violent means to the electoral dimension. Free and fair elections are expected to regulate political competition so that compromise is the main means of conflict resolution. Elections also account for peaceful transfer of power from one government to the other. In short, democracies externalize internal peace induced by

elections (1993). *Vice versa* non-democracies externalize internal conflicts caused by electoral competition which is neither free nor fair and hence causes conflicts.⁴¹

Elections attract most of the attention of domestic peace scholars when formulating assumptions on international cooperation and non-cooperation derived from domestic institutional setting. Competitive elections might result in first, representing a majority of society, or second, in a pluralistic mode of representation, or third elections might induce norms of peaceful cooperation. Such a summary has two implications for my research: First, I will include elections as a potential explanatory factor of delegation preferences to IHROs. Second, I will be cautious about its interpretation since the assumptions on why or how elections might affect patterns of cooperation and non-cooperation vary.⁴²

Still, the democratic peace literature does not cover all my research interests regarding domestic institutions. As Moravcsik integrated republican liberalism into New Liberalism, he stressed the importance of inquiry to what extent domestic institutions allow the government to overlook interests of societal actors and realize governmental interests instead (Moravcsik 1997, p. 518). Rule of law should work independently of governmental interest and government arises from competitive elections or their restricted or even absent forms. Both established rule of law and competitive elections does not figure as oversight/checks and balances mechanisms that would question on daily basis in whose name the government works. Rule of law throws a shadow of hierarchy on the government. According to the degree of establishment of the rule of law, the government might fear *ex-post* sanctions if it abuses its power. Society might likewise *ex-post* “punish” the government in an upcoming election by voting for other parties. The possibility to do so depends of course on the availability of competitive elections. For instance, Russian citizens and societal actors that are not part of the authoritarian regime do not dispose of such an opportunity. It is because the Russian parliament Duma includes merely regime-loyal parties (Hutcheson 2018). In sum, the *ex-post* feedback loops provided by the rule of law and elections cannot capture ongoing or prospective (mis-)representation of societal actors in state preferences.

⁴¹ The democratic peace research developed an argument not only on the (mis-)representative function of elections but also on the effects of re-election. Put simply, autocratic and democratic governments strive to stay in power. Democracies do so by the means of a popular vote. Hence, democracies strive to avoid burdening the society by war. Authoritarian regimes repress the opposition. Thus, autocracies are more likely to initiate war since the re-election does not depend on popular vote. (Ray 2003)

⁴² I do not draw on the democratic peace research analyzing aspects of transparency which shall be important for pairs of democracies. Transparency might help to reduce the fear of escalation of international conflicts (Ray 2003) but does not have any bearing on delegation preferences which are made public by all states participating in reforms of IHROs.

This might be of a disadvantage when explaining delegation preferences in reforms of IHROs. Here, I expect that state preferences reflect both the systemic (mis-)representation and also the current policy-making. Thus, I need to analyze as well, to what extent the domestic institutional setting constrains the government to misuse its power in current political agendas, and not only in retrospective. In the vein of republican liberalism as integrated in New Liberalism, I expect that the less oversight/ checks and balances mechanisms are in place, the more selective governments can be about interests of societal actors.

On the overall, domestic institutions like rule of law, elections, and oversight/checks and balances mechanisms capture to what extent are interests of societal actors (mis-)represented when governments form the state preferences. Rule of law equalizes interests of societal actors and might sanction abuse of governmental power in retrospective. Elections determine who forms the government which indicates whose interests will be most probably represented. Moreover, society can *ex-post* “sanction” governments if the state carries out competitive elections and alternative parties consequently form government. Last but not least, oversight mechanisms provide for checks and balances already in the process of formation of state preferences. I avoid building new regime types when incorporating all these arguments on (mis-)representative domestic institutions in my analysis. Instead, I treat them as single aspects of states that can be captured on a continuum. It is namely the extent of bias in representation, not the democratic [or autocratic] institutions *per se* that make the difference (Moravcsik 1997, p. 531; modified by author).

Hitherto, as a legacy of ideational liberalism, I postulated that participatory rights of societal actors might influence delegation preferences to IHROs. Derived from republican liberalism, I add that domestic institutions (mis-)represent interests of societal actors when governments formulate delegation preferences. The extent of participatory rights granted to societal actors often corresponds with the extent of (mis-)representation conducted by domestic institutions. Even if these two aspects of regime types are interrelated, they fulfill functionally differentiated tasks. For example, in an electoral autocracy like Venezuela, NGOs might participate and provide for social goods that are not delivered by the government (Gill 2017, pp. 621–622). However, the interests of NGOs that call for more human rights and democracy standards in Venezuela are not reflected by the government (Gill 2017) since the domestic institutions filter them out. On the other hand, interests of the street guerillas called *colectivos* that support the autocrat Nicolás Maduro are incorporated by the domestic institutions hence *colectivos* are not legally persecuted for their crimes (see Werlau 2014, p. 91). As a result, allowing societal actors to participate does not imply that their interests will be reflected in the delegation preferences to IHROs. Therefore, it is indispensable to analyze both participatory rights as well as (mis-)representative domestic institutions in order to contribute to regime type explanations.

Commercial Liberalism: Autocracies overcome moral interdependency

The bottom-up process as envisioned by New Liberalism foresees a transformation of interests of societal actors at two levels. The societal interests are (mis-)represented through domestic institutions and adjusted according to pressures stemming from international interdependencies.⁴³ The delegation of authority to IHROs takes place for autocracies under an asymmetrical moral interdependency since liberal human rights and democracy norms prevail. Current regime type literature made it clear: Established democracies support strong regional and international organizations in order to first, increase interdependency and thus bind other states to a peaceful conduct of manner (see Haftel 2007; Pevehouse 2002, 2005; Pevehouse and Russett 2006), and second, to spread liberal human rights and democracy norms (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 2008).

Nevertheless, the democracy bias remains in place as the literature does not theorize how autocracies can escape the asymmetrical moral interdependency. Drawing on the tradition of commercial liberalism, I postulate that autocracies might escape the asymmetrical moral interdependency through a different type of asymmetrical relationship, namely through asymmetrical economic interdependency. There is one underlying assumption that allows me to theorize the linkage between asymmetric moral and material interdependencies: States act instrumentally when they pursue societal and governmental interests (Moravcsik 2009, p. 4). Therefore, states are ready to make tradeoffs between on the one hand economic and on the other hand human rights and democracy policies. This holds true both for democracies as well as autocracies.

As aforementioned, New Liberalism ostracized normative agenda (and research on international ideas and norms) from liberal theory. Constructivism and cosmopolitanism overtook the lead instead and provided for research on moral interdependency under which IHROs regulate the relationship of governments and their inhabitants. Meanwhile, many liberal authors researched aspects of international trade and further developed the tradition of commercial liberalism. As Moravcsik puts it, commercial liberalism is preoccupied with research on economic globalization. Globalization alters costs and benefits of international trade, thus creating pressure on governments to facilitate or block such cross-border exchange by means of foreign economic and security policies (1997, p. 528). Hence,

⁴³ At this point, a disclaimer is required: As Moravcsik integrated commercial liberalism into the New Liberalism (1997), he reduced the complexity of commercial liberalism and overtook “merely” the concept of international interdependencies. Furthermore, other than commercial liberalism, Moravcsik understands interdependency as “[t]he configuration of interdependent state preferences (Moravcsik 1997, p. 520, modified by author)” and “[t]he pattern of interdependence among state preferences [that] shapes state behavior (Moravcsik 2009, p. 5)”. Authors who apply commercial liberalism to conduct empirical analysis, however, understand interdependency as the configuration of interdependent preferences of dominant economic societal actors, not states (Press-Barnathan 2006, pp. 263–264). Moravcsik (2003, p. 165) puts the different understandings beside each other only in his contribution “Liberal International Relations Theory: A Scientific Assessment”. Nevertheless, he does not make aware the reader of the discrepancy.

in contrast to moral interdependency, commercial liberalism is preoccupied by analyzing cross-boarder exchange under material interdependency. The concepts of moral and material interdependencies were envisioned to facilitate analysis of differentiated phenomena. Treating moral and material interdependencies separately allows me to theorize their intertwined synergies. Accordingly, wealthy authoritarian regimes can to some extent escape the asymmetric moral interdependence which can be balanced or outweighed by an asymmetric economic interdependence.

Merely an encyclopedia entry helps me to elaborate that symmetrical interdependencies are rather rare: Symmetrical interdependence arises in a situation where all actors that maintain a relationship are equally sensitive to the behavior of the others (Dickens 2001). For instance, states with the same level of compliance to liberal human rights would be equally sensitive to each other's delegation preferences in favor of strengthening IHROs. Already symmetrical interdependence constrains policy choices of states since they are pressured to react to each other. Whereas an asymmetrical interdependence describes imbalanced relationships where the autonomy of some states is more restricted than others. Under an asymmetrical moral interdependency, states that comply less with liberal human rights and democracy standards than other states do are pressured to support IHROs. Such a pressure collides with interests of their governments and dominant societal actors. In general, autocracies maintain lower standards of liberal human rights than democracies do (Møller and Skaaning 2013) and thus experience higher pressure.

Nevertheless, some autocracies might escape the moral pressure to a certain extent. I am referring to wealthy autocracies. Even though democracies are known to be wealthier than autocracies do (see Acemoglu et al. 2019), wealthy autocracies might be the dominant actors *vis-à-vis* democracies under an asymmetric economic interdependency.⁴⁴ In such situations, I expect democracies to refrain from exerting too much of moral pressure upon autocracies in order to avoid renegotiation of international trade relations by autocracies. Autocracies that internationally trade goods of high asset specificity like for instance gas and oil enjoy an especially dominant position in asymmetric economic relationships since such natural resources are monopolized by several countries. Here, finding an alternative trade partner for democracies would be increasingly difficult or it would be progressively easy for autocracies to level up the prices and thus pressure democracies back.

Furthermore, wealthy democracies often couple moral pressure with economic incentives through foreign aid and foreign direct investment (see also Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2012, pp. 173–174;

⁴⁴ Authoritarian regimes might pressure other democratizing actors as well. For example, Russia belongs to the five most important budgetary contributors of the Council of Europe (CoE). The autocracy withdrew its budgetary contributions as its voting rights were suspended in CoE due to the invasion of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. (Hart 2019).

Hulse and der Vleuten 2016; Jetschke 2015; Li and Resnick 2003; Wright 2009). Wealthy authoritarian regimes are partially immune to such economic incentives as they do not depend on foreign direct investment and aid. As Patrick Bernhagen puts it „States that rely heavily on natural resource extraction face fewer demands for democratization (2009, p. 118).” In sum, I expect wealthy autocracies to be more probable to escape asymmetrical moral interdependence imposed on them by democracies, especially when the autocracy possess income from international trade with high asset specificity goods. Poor autocracies are more vulnerable to moral pressure, especially when the pressure is coupled with economic incentives.

I am certainly not the first one to theorize linkages among types of interdependencies. Democratic peace research (Ray 2003) and regime type approaches (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; e.g. Pevehouse 2002, 2005) give reasons why moral and economic interdependencies influence security issues. Moreover, all types of interdependencies and their actors are integrated in the concept of complex interdependence by Keohane and Nye (1989). Complex interdependencies have impact on international relations only in the long-term time horizon counted in several decades. Thus, the more linkages among expanded types of interdependencies are theorized, the longer the time frame of analysis becomes. Reforms of IHROs take “merely” several years to negotiate. Therefore, simple linkages among a small number of interdependencies are more appropriate. Hence, I stick to an interplay of two interdependencies, moral and economic. This allows me to avoid the democracy bias and formulate assumptions on autocracies instead, thus further developing regime type explanations.


3.3. Theoretical progress of regime type explanations

At this point, I would like to provide for a bundled summary of the theoretical foundations of my analysis. Thus, I touch upon the current problems of regime type approaches, how I account for these and what theoretical assumptions I introduce or reject in order to further develop regime type explanations. I also mention what issues cannot be addressed by general theoretical reasoning and thus will be dealt with in Chapter 4 which accommodates a research design.

But first things first. The current regime type approaches suffer from three substantial analytical problems. First, they maintain the democracy bias. Hence, they underestimate the role of autocracies in international relations and leave authoritarian regimes understudied. I consider it to be crucial to fully introduce autocracies into the analysis of delegation preferences to IHROs especially in times when autocracies gain resilience to democratization efforts (see Gerschewski 2013; Hall and Ambrosio 2017; Plattner et al. 2016; Walker 2016) and many non-established and even established democracies undergo autocratization processes, see Figure 4 (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019, p. 1103). Second, regime type approaches produced inconsistent theoretical expectations and fuzzy empirical results. So far, they were able to present cumulative empirical findings of merely young democracies (Hafner-

Burton et al. 2015; Hill 2016; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008; Moravcsik 1995, 2009). And third, regime type approaches overlooked the domestic dimensions which vary across and within categories like established democracies, weakly democratic, weakly autocratic and strongly autocratic, etc., regimes.

Figure 4: Autocratization



Source: Lührmann and Lindberg 2019, p. 1103

I strive to tackle down all these shortcomings by further opening up the black-box of autocracies and democracies whereby New Liberalism is the main source of progressive theoretical reasoning. Such an approach, however, does not imply a holistic test of New Liberalism. I am being selective on what parts of New Liberalism and its theoretical roots in ideational, republican, and commercial traditions of liberal theory might be fruitful to overcome the specific problems of regime type approaches. By referring to New Liberalism, I prioritize the most important domestic dimensions that will be analyzed. The ideational, republican, and commercial help me to narrow down the theoretical expectations.

The first assumption that I overtake from New Liberalism prioritizes societal actors as the most fundamental actors of international relations. By incorporating such a premise, I must reject the assumption made by current regime types approaches on the primacy of states in the international system. In line with the ideational liberalism, I do not theorize “what autocracies and democracies want”. Instead, I formulate premises on “what societal actors want” and analyze in how far they can successfully pursue their interests regarding their participatory rights in autocracies and democracies. This step allows me to open up the black box of autocracies and democracies whose domestic societal

actors turn to the state to represent their interests in the international realm. New Liberalism actually foresees an analysis of not only domestic but also transnational societal actors. As my overarching aim is to analyze the domestic dimensions, I refrain from including transnational actors into the analysis.⁴⁵

The interests of domestic societal actors are transformed into state preferences depending on power, informal processes and most prominently on the setting of domestic institutions. In line with New Liberalism, I prioritize the domestic institutions that (mis-)represent societal interests. Republican liberalism in turn suggests analyzing the establishment of rule of law and quality of elections. Such institutions might introduce *ex-post* sanctions when governments misuse their powerful position. Furthermore, I analyze the explanatory potential of oversight mechanisms fulfilling the function of checks and balances to account for feedback loops right away during the policy-making. By addressing the role of domestic institutions both in autocracies and democracies, I once again account for the democracy bias.

Apart of the societal actors and domestic institutions, New Liberalism postulates that the interdependent structure of international system transforms state preferences into state behavior. Here, my task according to New Liberalism was to ask more questions about the effect of interdependency since it is one of the three most important factors of the bottom-up process. Regime type literature already covered the agenda on democracies. Democracies create asymmetric moral interdependency to introduce peace or advance human rights and democracy. I theorize that autocracies in response utilize asymmetric economic interdependencies in order to escape the pressure of liberal human rights and democracy norms. Hereby, commercial liberalism pointed me to the importance of economic interdependency. As a result, I expect that the linkage between moral and economic interdependencies contributes to progress of regime type explanations.

Up to now, I have formulated assumptions on delegation preferences of autocracies and democracies to IHROs in general. I will be able to further specify my expectations by focusing on the reform process of the SP UNHRC in the following Chapter 4 Research design. Apart of narrowing down the research topic, I will systematize the theoretical and conceptual framework and will justify the research question and corresponding hypotheses in full length.

⁴⁵ For instance, actors like International Federation of University Women, Amnesty International or the SP UNHRC themselves that lobbied for their interests during the reform process of the UNHRC are excluded from the analysis. I certainly do not aim to underestimate their impact on delegation preferences of states. They are simply not of my major analytical interest this time.

4. Research Design

The literature review in Chapter 2 revealed a substantial demand for further research on delegation preferences that arises especially due to a democracy bias maintained by previous literature. I aim to cover such a demand and make a contribution to regime type explanations by analyzing three stages of the bottom-up process that starts with societal actors, spans over domestic institutions, and ends with an interplay of moral and economic interdependencies as envisioned in Chapter 3 on theory. In this chapter, I advance the analytical framework. It means that I need to first, conceptually cover blind spots left by both the regime type literature and the theoretical approach, and second, I must fully justify the research question and corresponding hypotheses.

Neither the regime type literature nor my theoretical foundations put forward an advanced understanding of IHROs as instances of international authority. I address this issues in Section 4.1. where I reveal what it means to delegate authority and elaborate the ideational roots that allow me to understand how IHROs advance compliance with human rights and democracy standards without being equipped with strong enforcement mechanisms. In turn, I can spell out pathways that illuminate how international authority reaches societal actors and thus triggers their interest in strengthening or weakening IHROs. Moreover, I argue that analyzing delegation preferences during reform processes offers a more precise assessment than scrutinizing them during foundational negotiations or at the end of a life span.

In Section 4.2., I briefly justify and spell out the research question and formulate corresponding hypotheses. Furthermore, I contextualize the role of societal actors and domestic institutions going beyond regime type and theory contributions. Here, I draw on legitimacy and repression literature. When conceptualizing the interplay of economic and moral interdependencies, I do not add further insights but rather break down the theoretical assumptions to spell out a testable proposition. Furthermore, I give reasons why the last reform of SP UNHRC offers a good opportunity to analyze delegation preferences of autocracies and democracies, elaborate on its specificities, present the monitoring authority, and stress an institutionalized linkage with societal actors. In section 4.3., I integrate all concepts put forward into one analytical framework that guides my empirical analysis. I delineate tasks left for *Chapter 5 Data and Methods* as well.

The research design sets an analytical framework that allows me to first, devote an appropriate attention to both autocracies and democracies, second, open the regime types and inspect the role of societal actors and domestic institutions, third, consider international interdependencies, and fourth, further conceptualize the relationship of societal actors and IHROs.

4.1. Understanding international authority

The bottom-up-process implies that societal actors are affected by IHROs as their international authority shall improve human rights and democracy standards on the domestic level (Simmons 2009, pp. 103–108).⁴⁶ Hence, societal actors are interested in weakening or strengthening IHROs. Theories of international relations know a variety of understandings of IOs. However, by far not everyone would treat IOs as instances of international authority. Even though we can recognize a partial congruence between the development of IOs that become more robust and also increasingly penetrate the state sovereignty, the understanding of IOs as full-fledged political actors possessing authority remains to be contested. Several perspectives conceptualize IOs as being relevant only for states. Yet my theoretical reasoning implies that authority of IHROs regulates the relationship of governments to societal actors and also (de-)legitimizes action of domestic societal actors.

Such assumptions leave me with three tasks. First, I need to underpin that IHROs can actually be treated as instances of international authority. Second, I must elucidate how authority of IHROs emerges. Third, I need to elaborate how authority of IHROs becomes relevant for societal actors. The first task takes us on a journey through international relations literature conceptualizing IOs as instances of international authority. To complete the second task, I build on liberal global governance literature and conceptualize what it means to institutionalize international authority. When engaging with the third task, I trace effects of discursive authority of IHROs to show their relevance for societal actors.

From non-actors to international authority

By delegating authority to IHROs, states create an asymmetrical relationship to IHROs and recognize them as appropriate decision-making instances which can harm states' interests (Hooghe et al. 2017; Hooghe et al. 2019). There are several conceptual lenses that can be applied to grasp IOs. They range from perspectives that almost ignore IOs up to perspectives that acknowledge IOs as full-fledged political actors. Studying delegation of competencies to non-actors would not make sense. Therefore, I stick with the conceptualization of IOs as instances of international authority. Such an understanding implies that first, IOs to some extent possess autonomy from states, second, IOs can issue decision that are to some degree binding, and third, IOs need to be able to follow their own logic of action which diverges from states. The conceptualization of IOs accompanies partially their historical development and vary over theories of international relations.

⁴⁶ Nevertheless, the scientific debate whether IHROs significantly improve human rights is still ongoing (e.g. Donnelly 2013; Rittberger et al. 2013b; Schmitz and Sikkink 2013; Risse et al. 2013).

The pre-1989 period witnessed a peak in numbers of IOs. After 1989, the overall number of IOs dropped and IOs grew slowly in terms of numbers and also robustness. Shortly after the Second World War, in 1949, there were 123 IOs and their numbers increased in the following four years by 50%. Their maximum amount of 378 was reached in the mid-1980s.⁴⁷ The number of IOs dropped again after the Cold War as the Soviet Union collapsed and the US was not in a position of a supreme hegemon in the “West” anymore. Subsequently, the US could not enforce maintaining or creating new IOs. (Koch 2008, p. 36; Rittberger et al. 2013a, pp. 80–81)

Regarding the pre-1989 period, the discipline of International Relations treated IOs frequently as instruments of states, arenas of international negotiations, and partially independent actors (Hurd 2011). The understanding of IOs as instruments of states is inherent to realist and neorealist theory. As John Mearsheimer (1994-1995) argues much in accordance with classical realism, IOs serve purposes of the most powerful states that create and shape IOs in order to maintain their share of power or increase it. IOs serve particular interests of states and when their expectations are not fulfilled, they may terminate their membership or simply ignore IOs. The neorealist school reflects upon the absolute cooperation gains that may be obtained *through* IOs as well as relative cooperation losses (see Grieco 1988). According to the (neo-)realists, the only actors of international relations are states. IOs neither possess a will of their own and nor do they influence cooperation. In sum, we encounter an analytical contradiction: Even though IOs help states to push forward their power-based strategies, IOs are not a part of the analysis.

Institutionalists address this contradiction and put forward an understanding of IOs as arenas. In arenas, states negotiate topics that are related to their shared interests. This means that IOs do not serve particular interests of states in the first place, although states remain the most dominant actors (Koch 2008, p. 40). Alike (neo-)realists, the institutional school asserts that international relations take place under the condition of anarchy. This time, effects of anarchy can be partially reduced thanks to arenas that can establish long-term cooperation (Axelrod and Keohane 1985). Arenas make a difference as long as they figure as permanent negotiation forums with specific negotiation procedures and set codes of behavior as well as agendas (Hurd 2011, pp. 10–11; see Rittberger et al. 2013a, p. 20). These “services” for state negotiations together with the IOs’ monitoring and sanctioning functions reduce the complexity of and uncertainty in the international system (Axelrod and Keohane 1985, p. 238; Koch 2008, pp. 41–42). Nevertheless, researchers do not ascribe IOs to have an own logic of action and may not make decisions on their own. As a result, IOs are not treated as actors.

⁴⁷ See Shanks et al. (1996) for perils of counting of IOs that does not allow to use total numbers.

Again, such an understanding seems to be problematic. If IOs overtake tasks like monitoring and sanctioning, they must be equipped with the necessary degrees of autonomy and decision-making competencies which enable them to pursue their mandate (see Koch 2008, p. 83). Notwithstanding, according to institutionalists, states do not delegate authority when creating new IOs. States simply create new instances that are supposed to fulfil orders issued by assemblies incorporating all member states (Mitrany 1943, p. 37 referred by Koch 2008, p. 45). As protagonists of the neoinstitutional Principal-agent-theory and constructivists would also claim, such an understanding was derived by using principles of formal proof which would not stand an empirical examination (see Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Hawkins et al. 2006).

The post-Cold War era witnessed a quantitative decrease in IOs that was followed by their rather steady growth in numbers and expansion in terms of robustness. Especially IHROs and environmental IOs grew in numbers (see Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008, p. 278). In 2010, there were about 240 IOs according to the Union of International Associations (which is still 140 IOs less than in the mid-1980s) (Rittberger et al. 2013, p. 80). Moreover, such a steady growth in numbers was accompanied by an expansion of IOs, one can refer to a growth in robustness. By robustness, I refer to the trend when first, some IOs integrate other IOs (Koch 2008, p. 36), second, when IOs undergo a differentiation into sub-organs, third, when new sub-organs are created (Gehring 2009; see also Gehring et al. 2014; Shanks et al. 1996), and fourth, when their institutional authority increases (Cooper et al. 2008; Lenz et al. 2015; see also Zürn et al. 2012; Zürn and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2013). The growth in robustness of IOs sparked additional research interest and led scholars to re-think the understanding of IOs.

In reaction to the post-Cold War development as well as in reaction to functionalism, the neoinstitutional Principal-agent-theory analyses how IOs overstep their mandate, or in other words, how autonomous IOs are (Da Conceição 2010; Hawkins et al. 2006; Nielson and Tierney 2003; Pollack 1997; Tallberg 2000). Equally important, constructivists examine dysfunctionality of IOs referring to failed missions on the ground (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004).⁴⁸ Both research programs treat IOs, understood as bureaucracies, as full-fledged political actors with their own logic of action which diverges from the logic of action of states. Once researchers ascribed IOs a status of full-fledged political actors, global governance scholars began to investigate how and to what extent states delegate authority to IOs. In turn, they also began to analyze the pervasiveness of IOs that bypass the state sovereignty and are of importance for societal actors as well (Jönsson and Tallberg 2010; Keck and Sikkink 1998a; Tallberg and Uhlin 2012; Zürn et al. 2012).

⁴⁸ See also Piiparinen (2008) for an analysis of crucial dysfunctions of IO' bureaucracies outside of the constructivist realm.

In retrospective, one can ascribe authority to IOs operating even before the Cold War as prominent regime type literature explaining delegation preferences does as well (e.g. Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Hill 2016). For some authors, it is the matter of theoretical assumptions rather than institutional development that allows to grasp IOs as instances of international authority. For the discipline of International Relations, it was crucial to overcome the realist perspective of states being the only actors shaping the international system. A major and an early contribution delivered authors of organizational sociology that conceptualized IOs as actual *organizations* (Ness and Brechin 1988).

Institutional sources of authority

We may indicate two main literature strands analyzing international authority, namely liberal and post-structuralist/constructivist analyses. Even though they operate with different meta-theoretical assumptions, they are not mutually exclusive (Simmerl and Zürn 2016). Authors of both strands would agree that it is easier for IOs to be acknowledged as instances of authority by a broad variety of actors under the condition that states actually *a priori* delegated high degrees of authority to them. On the one hand, I draw on the liberal contributions to capture the meaning of authority delegation to IHROs by states (and later on also to operationalize delegation preferences). On the other hand, I draw on the post-structuralist and constructivist traditions to show how authority of IHROs reaches societal actors.

I would like to start with the liberal take on international authority since as Georg Simmerl and Michael Zürn (2016) point out, some of the post-structural understandings even explicitly integrate liberal accounts, hence creating partially mixed concepts. The liberal account analyses authority that has been delegated by states and is formally institutionalized but not necessarily codified as international law. There is an overlap of definitions or even a consensus on what international authority stands for in general. I can mention a few examples. David Lake understands authority “*as a social contract in which a governor provides a political order of value to a community in exchange for compliance by the governed with the rules necessary to produce that order (2010, p. 587).*” Curtis Bradley and Judith Kelley treat authority delegation „*as a grant of authority by two or more states to an international body to make decisions or take actions (2008, p. 3).*” Furthermore, Michael Zürn, Martin Binder and Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt elaborate that „*international institutions have authority when the addressees of their policies recognize that these institutions can make competent judgments and binding decisions (2012, p. 70).*” All these understandings highlight that IOs, grasped as instances of international authority, shall introduce compliance by the addressees to particular policies. The addressees are actors ranging from states, over private companies, NGOs, movements, rebel groups, individuals or even to other IOs.

Nevertheless, Bradley and Kelley (2008, p. 8) indicate a discrepancy within the liberal global governance literature. The discrepancy emerges along the question in how far must be decisions made by international authority binding to qualify as such. The above presented authors assume that decisions made by IOs are recognized or contested by their addressees. We may, however, encounter also definitions expecting a higher level of penetration attached to decisions made by IOs. For example, Scott Cooper, Darren Hawkins, Wade Jacoby and Daniel Nielson assert that the authority of IOs describes *“in principle or in practice, their ability to make legally binding decisions on matters relating to a state's domestic jurisdiction (2008, p. 505).”* The legally binding qualities of international authority can also be found in selected contributions by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks: *„Our focus is on legal authority which is distinguished from charismatic and traditional authority in being a) institutionalized, i.e., codified in a set of formal rules; b) circumscribed, i.e., specified with respect to who has authority over whom for what; and c) impersonal, i.e., it applies to roles, not persons (2014, p. 307).”* If there is a variation in the degree of bindingness of international authority, then the liberal concepts reunite over the question whether international authority can issue judgements contrary to the interests of states. The common answer is yes, it can, namely in order to promote common interests of the international community (Zürn et al. 2012, p. 87).

Taken together, there are two options how to conceptualize international authority within the liberal realm of global governance studies. The first understanding departs from the assumption that international authority is institutionalized but not necessarily codified in legal terms. Here, international authority can be either recognized or contested by its addressees. The second group of authors sticks with a definition where international authority needs to possess a legal status.

When conceptualizing delegation of authority, I refer to the research on recognized and contested institutional authority, also labelled as political authority. Such an understanding is more appropriate for analysis of state delegation preferences. The reason is that state delegation preferences concern also characteristics of IOs which are of other than legal status and are not paired with strong enforcement mechanisms. Thus, by scrutinizing merely legally relevant or enforcement aspects, I would capture only a small part of delegation preferences voiced during reforms of IOs. This applies especially for IOs operating in the policy field of human rights and democracy. Compared to IOs managing material interdependencies, IHROs dispose of either low levels of legally binding authority or merely weak enforcement mechanisms (Dai 2014, p. 570; see Fawn 2013, p. 5; Luck and Doyle 2004). Due to the lack of legally binding instruments and enforcement mechanisms, IHROs operate through other mechanisms in order to introduce compliance. Therefore, non-legally binding dimensions and other than strong enforcement mechanisms of international authority are for my analysis actually even more relevant than their legally binding counterparts coupled with sanctions.

Whereby the liberal conceptualization of institutionalized authority allows me to grasp what delegation of authority means for states, it comes to its limits when explaining how international authority in the field of human rights and democracy works in practise if almost no enforcement mechanisms are at disposal. At this point, I need to switch the analytical lens to see what international authority means for IHROs. Post-structuralist and constructivist contributions on international authority help me to fulfil such an aim.

International human rights organizations as discursive authorities

The added value of post-structuralist and constructivist literature lies with explaining how IOs use their discursive form of authority in order to induce deterrence by states and other political actors (Avant et al. 2010; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Berling 2011; Buzan et al. 1998). Compared to the liberal take, IOs—understood as discursive authorities—“win” governments and societal actors for their own position. In other words, they can transform interests of governments and societal actors. Such a claim necessitates a perspective where states and IOs figure as diverging identities. Consequently, I treat IOs as international bureaucracies instead of intergovernmental organizations (Bauer et al. 2016; Venzke 2008).

Although labelled as merely discursive authority, the concept of authority pushed forward by post-structuralists and constructivists draws on discursive as well as institutional sources of authority (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 5; Simmerl and Zürn 2016). According to Ecker-Ehrhardt (2009, 2012a), IOs as discursive authorities possess exclusive expertise which allows them, for example, thanks to their agenda-setting function, interpretation of facts and international norms, to make rational-legal based claims. Such claims may be followed by a broad variety of actors since IOs take cautious care of their image (or legitimacy) and present themselves as trustworthy sources of information (ibid).

The institutional sources of discursive authority are at best understood by referring—once again—to the liberal literature. There are three levels of authority delegation but only one foresees a creation of international bureaucracies. First, states refrain from delegating authority when they introduce self-reporting mechanisms (or the whole plenary forum must give its consent with monitoring results). In such a pre-stage of authority delegation, all states keep their decision-making competencies. Second, states delegate authority when they create or reform intergovernmental bodies with limited membership. In such bodies, selected member states decide about monitoring results without a consent of all IO members. Intergovernmental authority is also called pooled authority. Third, states lay down institutional foundations of discursive authorities when they transfer decision-making

competencies and allow for autonomy of international bureaucracies. (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2009, 2012a; Hooghe et al. 2017; Hooghe et al. 2019)

Compared to self-reporting mechanisms and intergovernmental bodies, bureaucracies and their monitoring reports can gain higher degrees of trustworthiness. Regarding self-reporting mechanisms, one can be suspicious whether countries are honest as they evaluate own domestic human rights and democracy standards. In intergovernmental bodies, selected states evaluate compliance of other states and thus avoid the latent allegation of self-interested cheating which is frequently associated with self-reporting mechanisms. Intergovernmental bodies, nevertheless, operate based on the logic of states. Therefore, coalition building belongs to the everyday conduct of business where stronger states or large coalitions are in a privileged position. Thus, independent of their human rights and democracy practice, there is a lower probability that their interests will be hurt when naming and shaming for immoral action is done. International monitoring bureaucracies claim to operate differently. They stress to work in the name of human rights and democracy and irrespective of state interests when they conduct monitoring missions and evaluate and disseminate critical monitoring reports. Here, already the fact that bureaucracies hire experts and hence do not consist of country diplomats grants them a “competitive advantage” compared to self-reporting mechanisms and intergovernmental bodies.

Whereby many contributions on international bureaucracies deliver fined-grained conceptualizations of their discursive authority (e.g. Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Berling 2011; Broome et al. 2017) the work by Ecker-Ehrhardt (2009, 2012a) goes well beyond that. It links theory with systematic empirical analysis. It allows to trace what actors acknowledge and why they acknowledge the discursive authority of monitoring bureaucracies. For my research, it is of an utmost importance as it allows me to illustrate how the discursive authority of the SP UNHRC can make difference for societal actors on the domestic level which possess in turn vested interests in strengthening or weakening IHROs during their reforms.⁴⁹

The acknowledgment of IHROs as discursive authorities implies a creation of hierarchical relationship as delegation of authority to IHROs does as well. Whereby delegation of authority stands for a transfer of autonomous decision-making competencies to IHROs (Hooghe et al. 2017; Hooghe et al. 2019), the acknowledgment of discursive authority of IHROs takes to present monitoring bureaucracies as trustworthy sources of information in public communication (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012a, p. 452). *Vice*

⁴⁹ Since international bureaucracies are known to be more relevant for international politics than domestic politics (Busch 2014; Biermann et al. 2009), the empirical contributions by Ecker-Ehrhardt (2009, 2012a) which demonstrate their outreach to the domestic level gain even more relevance.

versa, it takes to discredit IHROs as sources of biased information in public to contest their status of discursive authorities (see *ibid*).

Ecker-Ehrhardt summarizes insights from theories of communication as he identifies four major sources of discursive authority: Exclusive expertise, impartiality, trust, and offices (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2009, pp. 587–593). An exclusive expertise plays an especially important role for monitoring bureaucracies and their acknowledgment as discursive authorities. The probability that states or societal actors ascribe authority to monitoring bureaucracies grows together with a lack of information in the human rights and democracy policy field. International bureaucracies that monitor domestic elections help me to illustrate such an issue.

For instance, the OSCE and its monitoring bureaucracy called *Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights* (OSCE-ODHIR) conducts remote and on-the-ground monitoring missions of election procedures in both democratic and authoritarian regimes (Evers 2009). Their monitoring reports figured as an exclusive source of information since there were no equivalent organizations conducting large scale pre-/through-/and post-election observations in the Eurasian region (*ibid*).⁵⁰ Since the OSCE-ODHIR regularly disseminated critical evaluation of elections in authoritarian regimes and remained an unrivalled source of information, it triggered not only acknowledgment of their discursive authority but also lead to institution building on the part of autocracies. In order to elevate the exclusivity of OSCE-ODHIR reporting, Eurasian authoritarian and autocratizing regimes created an alternative source of information. Such Eurasian countries institutionalized its own international bureaucracy—CIS-EMO—evaluating unfree and unfair election as being in line with democracy standards (Fawn 2013, p. 77; Russo 2015). As a result, societal actors loyal to the regime (short: regime-loyal) like media and social movements and of course authoritarian regimes themselves dispose of a source of information which helps them to deflect liberal democracy norms.

The empirical analysis provided by Ecker-Ehrhardt (2012a) demonstrates that politicians and media acknowledge the authority of IOs. Politicians of the United Kingdom’s House of Commons and the House of Representatives of the United States refer to the UN Secretariat and further UN Missions and Agencies as to sources of authoritative knowledge on humanitarian crises in Sudan. Furthermore, media outlets like The Guardian and the New York Times carry out a so-called authoritative gatekeeping. When doing so, they disseminate information provided by the UN bureaucracies without contesting their contents. Thus, the journalists do not state any reservations, refute or deny the

⁵⁰ Some international NGOs might provide for insights into election processes abroad, but their capacities are limited and thus the picture they paint incomplete (see Dai 2007). Secret services might also yield some fragmented evidence, but their reports cannot be used to justify policies in public. If states maintain good bilateral relations, then even single states might conduct monitoring missions abroad but it is a rather rare practise (Engel et al. 1996; Santa Cruz 2005).

information provided by the UN bureaucracies or do not critically contextualize the reports issued by the UN bureaucracies. Whereby politicians and media acknowledge IOs as discursive authorities, they actually reproduce their authority and disseminate results of monitoring missions further on. Hence, they extend the attention paid to current violations of human rights and democracy standards.

The discursive authority of IOs implies five consequences for the relationship of domestic societal actors and IHROs. First, as the discursive authority of IHROs reaches parliamentary members (and other politicians as well), liberal IHROs get a fair chance to persuade governments to refrain from repressive policies of societal actors. Thus, IHROs can establish a protection of societal actors. Second, societal actors themselves can draw on monitoring reports of IHROs to provide for an authoritative source of information to pressure governments in order to refrain from repressive policies. Their action gets legitimized by monitoring reports that are presented as if they were well researched by experienced personnel who strive to be impartial, have repeatedly delivered reliable information, and were even officially empowered to do so (summarized as expertise, impartiality, trust, and offices). Third, societal actors can get mobilized in favour of human rights and democracy policies when being confronted with an authoritative source of information on current breaches of human rights and misconduct of democratic standards. Fourth, monitoring bureaucracies and their reports figure as authoritative carriers of human rights and democracy norms, hence they are a source of elevated human rights pressure which tells societal actors to stick to moral standards. Fifth, domestic societal actors can benefit from increased interest of external democratizing actors that got persuaded by discursive authority of monitoring bureaucracies.⁵¹

On the overall, monitoring bureaucracies and their discursive authority improve the chances that governmental as well as non-governmental actors abide from repressive policies. The underlying causal mechanism is twofold, direct and indirect. Governments (and non-governmental actors) get either directly persuaded to abide from repressive policies by IHROs or indirectly when societal actors pressure them to improve human rights and democracy records. Independent of the direct or indirect causal path, the discursive authority of IHROs reaches societal actors. Consequently, I can assert—in the vein of New Liberalism—that societal actors have vested interest in either strengthening or weakening IHROs.

The politicians and media, however, do not acknowledge authority of IOs based only the four sources counting exclusive expertise, impartiality, trust, and offices. If it would be the case, then the conceptual boundaries of IOs understood as epistemic authorities and discursive authorities would be blurred. To

⁵¹ Similar assumptions were formulated for the positive influence of international human rights treaties. The difference is, however, that monitoring bureaucracies and their reports can gain higher levels of credibility compared to very common self-reporting mechanisms associated with international treaty regimes.

be acknowledged as discursive authority, it requires that the senders and the addressees of authority share approximately similar moral values or ideas of legal rightness (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012a, p. 454). Hence, it is not probable that, for example, the President and the Party General Secretary of China Xi Jinping would acknowledge the authority of SP UNHRC in any of his speeches. The official mandate of the SP UNHRC is to monitor individual human rights whereby Xi Jinping's office expects him to restrict rights of individuals. On the contrary, it is more probable that, for instance, the President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko acknowledges the authority of CIS-EMO which was called into life to legitimize misconduct of domestic elections in authoritarian regimes.

Of course, the relationship of domestic societal actors and liberal IHROs is different in democratic and authoritarian regimes. I depart from the definition of democracies where the prevailing mode of governance is legitimation whereby the prevailing mode of governance in autocracies is repression. As justified in Chapter 3, dominant societal actors in authoritarian regimes are rather interested in maintaining authoritarian form of governance since they do not want to lose their privileged status. Hence, they are not expected to benefit from the discursive authority of liberal IHROs but suffer from an elevated normative pressure. The action of oppositional societal actors in autocracies get first and foremost legitimized by authoritative monitoring reports. Thus, the opposition can win new international support or simply more easily justify their demands *vis-à-vis* the authoritarian regime. In democracies, societal actors get legitimized by authoritative monitoring reports and can therefore more easily lobby for better human rights and democracy policies. If the group of societal actors in democracies includes non-democratic movements, extremist groups, or private companies interested in low human rights and democracy standards, such societal actors get delegitimized by authoritative monitoring reports of liberal IHROs.

Nevertheless, I do not aim to evoke the impression that the work of international bureaucracies should not be exposed to a critical evaluation. The research reveals failures of international bureaucracies and points out their democratic deficits or lack of impartiality. For example, as Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (2004) analyze, the UN Secretariat decided to refrain from levelling up the normative pressure on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to leave the peacekeeping mission in time of genocide in Rwanda operative.⁵² Furthermore, Alexandro Grigorescu (2013) criticises that monitoring bureaucracies are not accountable to individuals whose lives they directly impact. Moreover, the impartiality of international bureaucracies is contested. As for instance Hylke Dijkstra (2017) analyses,

⁵² See Touko Piiparinen (2008) for more on pathologies of UN bureaucracy.

individual or group of states informally collude with international bureaucracies at the expense of other states.^{53,54}

On the overall, research that understands IHROs as discursive authorities reveals first, the institutional sources of such an authority, second, shows how discursive authority travels across types of actors and levels of policy-making, third, allows me to highlight the distinctive potential compared to monitoring conducted by intergovernmental bodies or self-reporting mechanisms, fourth and most importantly it allows me to establish the link between societal actors and IHROs. The reader, nevertheless, does not experience much of the policy implications of reputational costs imposed by IHROs. Another pile of literature documents these.

By imposing reputational costs on autocracies and democracies, monitoring bureaucracies can trigger multiple negative consequences on the international as well as domestic level. Regarding the international realm, an image as a trustworthy partner of international relations diminishes due to negative reputational costs (Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Bradley and Kelley 2008, p. 29). For human rights violators, it is very difficult to formulate credible normative arguments on the international stage (Johnston 2001, p. 490). Countries with a clear human rights record may pressure human rights violators to contribute military personnel for international peacekeeping missions (see Daxner and Schrade 2011; Stock, Varwick 2012). A very negative human rights score can also upset foreign investors since it evokes the impression that the rule of law is not well-established and thus investments not secured (see also Barry et al. 2013; Farber 2002; Hafner-Burton et al. 2015, p. 22; Jetschke 2015; Lebovic and Voeten 2009). And finally, good human rights and democracy standards can be a condition to enter IOs like NATO or EU (Lebovic and Voeten 2006, p. 868).

Autocracies are more likely to harvest negative reputational costs than democracies do. Out of the freedoms incorporated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, autocracies repress civil liberties (e.g. right to gather) by far more than individual human rights (e.g. free choice of religion) (Møller and Skaaning 2013). Autocracies impinge on civil liberties to inhibit political competition (ibid).⁵⁵ Human rights movements and stakeholders constitute such a political competition as they aim to induce regime change (Diamond 1999; Higley and Burton 1989; O'Donnell et al. 1986; Przeworski 1991; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006; Welsh 1994). International monitoring bureaucracies—which are believed to provide for trustworthy human rights expertise—initiate and legitimize local and transnational

⁵³ See also Ecker-Ehrhardt (2009, pp. 599–602) for negative consequences of discursive authority of IOs for the quality of democratic press.

⁵⁴ Secretariats of IOs are well aware of their discursive authority and enhance therefore the quality and quantity of public communications (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2017, 2018).

⁵⁵ Furthermore, autocrats resort to repression although it is often not effective in dispersing the opposition. Such behavior is well known as the “Punishment Puzzle” (Davenport 2007).

human rights actors (Dai 2014).⁵⁶ The critical assessments of human rights draws attention of democratizing actors to repressive policies as well as to single grave abuses. At the same time, poor freedom record legitimizes action of human rights stakeholders which are already active. More generally, together with other factors, human rights critics can initiate democratization processes of authoritarian regimes (Pevehouse 2002) or can be misused to legitimize an overthrow by non-democratic means leading to an establishment of a new authoritarian regime. As a result, monitoring bureaucracies pose a threat to the authoritarian incumbent.

Alike in autocracies, reputational costs together with other factors can hinder re-election or fuel governmental failure in democratic regimes. Democracies, however, have more opportunities to transform negative reputational costs into own favor. Democracies' prevailing mode of governance is legitimation. Hence, democratic governments have a greater leeway to learn from critical monitoring reports and refrain from repressive policies in order to boost their legitimacy and thus improve their chances to be re-elected by individuals and societal actors (see Keohane et al. 2009). Autocracies might also decrease levels of repression as a reaction to reputational costs. Nevertheless, they need to maintain sufficient degrees of repression in order to stay in the driving seat. Thus, their credible responses to reputational cost are limited.

Furthermore, ruling elites of authoritarian regimes face *on average* more severe consequences if democratization processes are triggered or coup d'état successfully take place. When democratization actors succeed, the authoritarian elites often face trials and imprisonment for their past repressive policies and human rights breaches. In case of coup d'état, authoritarian elites face death threats, can count with imprisonment or are indeed assassinated if they do not manage to flee abroad. Democratic governments might also face trials for past human rights breaches. It is especially elites of instable democracies that were involved in a civil war or if authoritarian forces misused reputational costs to legitimize a coup d'état. Nevertheless, democratic elites face *on average* less severe consequences than autocratic elites since the transfer of power by means of competitive elections is more peaceful and the legacy of past is less burdensome. Therefore, authoritarian ruling elites possess even personal reasons to control democratizing actors of all types. (see Cheibub et al. 2010)

In summary, the discipline of International Relations has gone long way to understand IHROs as instances of international authority. Liberal contributions to global governance literature allow me to conceptualize the act of delegation where states create an asymmetrical relationship to IHROs. By delegating authority, states recognize IHROs as appropriate decision-making instances that does not necessarily need to respect interests of states. However, legally binding international authority with

⁵⁶ Moreover, IOs in general provide for a communication channel where domestic opposition align international actors to criticize authoritarian policies (Keck and Sikkink 1998a).

an effective enforcement is very rare. As an alternative, monitoring bureaucracies of IHROs maintain an image of impartial and trustworthy source of exclusive expertise to persuade governments and societal actors to abide from human rights violations and stick to democracy standards instead. Hence, they are understood as discursive authorities.

IHROs as discursive authorities reach societal actors directly or indirectly. The indirect channel stands for situations where governments get persuaded by IHROs to abide from human rights breaches and authoritarian rule. By reaching governments, monitoring bureaucracies can contribute to better protection of societal actors on the domestic level. The direct path sets several scenarios. Societal actors can get mobilized by authoritative monitoring results, legitimize their demands *vis-à-vis* repressive governments, profit from elevated human rights and democracy pressure that activates and strengthens interest of external democratizing actors. And of course, the discursive authority might inhibit societal actors when they exert repression. As a result, IHROs impact societal actors that turn to governments which shall represent societal interests on the international stage. Governments carry out societal interest when they give birth, reform or put IHROs to death. As I argue in the following section, state delegation preferences are at best analyzed during reform processes of IHROs.

Reforms of international organizations

The delegation (or withdrawal) of authority accompanies the whole life-span of IOs. In general, states transfer autonomous decision-making competencies to IOs and recognize them as instances that make binding decisions in order to advance common goods and avoid chaos (Zürn et al. 2012, p. 87). Being given authority, IOs may in a short [or even a long] term harm interests of selected member states (Hooghe et al. 2017; Hooghe et al. 2019, modified by author). States need to delegate authority to IOs in order to call them alive. The international authority is adjusted either through informal processes or official reforms throughout the life-span of IOs. Not all IOs, however, survive. Thus, an institutional death principally means that an IO does not maintain an asymmetrical relationship to its members anymore. I choose to scrutinize delegation preferences during reforms of IOs which has several advantages over the birth or death of IOs (or their single bodies). By investigating state delegation preferences during reforms of IOs, I generate relevant insights for the regime type literature on delegation preferences and research on IOs.

When states create new IOs, they almost never depart from a clean slate. Only the very first IO, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) founded in 1865 (Shahin 2013, pp. 235–237)⁵⁷, was created without a previous or comparable experience. According to the Union of International

⁵⁷ But see Pevehouse and Borzyskowski (2016, p. 3) who declare the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine to be the very first IO.

Associations (UIA), there were about 240 IOs in 2010 (Rittberger et al. 2013a, p. 80). States call new IOs into life to overcome contemporary policy problems or to replace old dysfunctional IOs (see Pevehouse and Borzyskowski 2016, pp. 4–8). While negotiating new IOs, states might draw on experience made with already existing IOs (Jetschke 2017). However, they will never be certain how the new international authority will work in detail. Thus, creating new international authority always comes with uncertainty.

The foundation of ICC might be a good example. The ancestors of ICC were single international tribunals devoted to pursuing especially war crimes, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia or for Rwanda (McLaughlin 2013). The decisions made by such instances of international authority provided for insights on how the ICC could work. The ICC itself pursues, however, a broader mandate, and its jurisdiction spans over all member states. Thus, when negotiating the authority of ICC, states could have drawn on the previous experience with international tribunals but were at the same time designing a unique IO that might issue unexpected binding decisions.

Creating international authority does not only mean to lay down foundations of new IOs. Building a new body within an existing IO counts as well. It comes with lower uncertainty than delegating authority to a new IO. I would like to illustrate the reasons on the example of ASEAN. In 2009, the members of ASEAN delegated authority to the Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (Munro 2009, p. 2). Beforehand, the members knew which states form coalitions together and which states overtake a leading role or are rather passive observers. Societal actors could also derive rough estimations of the malicious or goodwill incentives of the ASEAN members based on their previous experience either with the whole IO or its particular bodies. Therefore, based on the previous inner working and output performance of the IO, it was an easier task to imagine for whose benefits the human rights body would work. For instance, the new democracies of ASEAN refrained from ratifying optional protocols that were envisioned by authoritarian regimes to avoid severe reputational costs (Munro 2009). Nevertheless, curving out a unique international body still entailed an uncertainty about its future work.

Compared to the creation of new IOs and new bodies, reforms of IOs or their bodies offer a better opportunity to access delegation preferences. In reform processes, states and societal actors are even less uncertain about the effects of the upcoming authority. States evaluate during reforms the functional or dysfunctional work of a particular body. Hence, they already experienced how the once brand-new international authority was transposed from the wording of a legal text into practice. The practice itself is crucial. IOs or their bodies enjoy autonomy to carry out their mandate. Only by pursuing the mission, states and societal actors find out how international authority precisely works and which benefits or disadvantages it entails.

For example, drawing on the practice of SP UNHRC, the government and societal actors of the US found out what reputational costs “feel like.” The Special Rapporteur on Human rights and extreme poverty, Arjun Sengupta, was straightforward to criticize the economic stratification of US society which makes it easy to fall into a poverty trap but makes it difficult to escape (E/CN.4/2006/43/Add.1). Such a report gave an additional legitimacy to societal actors fighting poverty, shamed the US government for not doing enough, and indirectly put pressure on companies providing for instable and insufficiently paid jobs and discriminatory practices towards ethnic minorities (ibid). Having even repeatedly coped with critical evaluations, the addressees of decisions made by IHROs become even less uncertain how they want to re-shape the international authority.

Following foundations and reforms, international authority either remains operational or comes to an end. As Pevehouse and Inken Borzyskowski (2016, p. 15) summarize, death of IOs is not rare even in times of steady growth. Institutional death is primary conditioned to exogenous shocks like *systemic* conflict and *systemic* change in balance of power (ibid, emphasis added by author). The highest mortality of IOs was registered in the run up to the World War I and World War II and at the end of the Cold War (ibid). Except for exogenous shocks, Julia Gray (2018) couples the vitality or death of IOs to the quality of bureaucratic personnel. None of the mentioned reasons stands for factors endogenous to regime types. Thus, assessing regime type driven delegation preferences at the end of a life span does not seem to be fruitful and none of the authors carried out such an analysis so far. Neither will I.⁵⁸

Regime type driven analyses of delegation preferences accompany especially foundations of IOs, their bodies, and concentrates on their subsequent reforms as well. Most of the literature understands delegation of authority as membership to IOs/bodies (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Hill 2016; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 2008; Munro 2009). Having negotiated the initial international authority, the first years witness an influx of states that sign and ratify the foundation treaty or abstain. Thus, the membership measure generates insights especially relevant for the inaugural life span of IOs/bodies.

Furthermore, the membership fluctuates throughout the life. Some states decide to enter only later on. Here, marginal gains in membership usually do not carry crucial implications for functioning of IOs/bodies.⁵⁹ Similarly, slightly reducing the membership does not hinder the IO/body to pursue its mandate. An exception would be here an accession or membership withdrawal by a major power, essential budgetary contributor, or a country which would bring voting coalitions out of balance. Major

⁵⁸ For more on mortality of IOs, see Cupitt et al. (1996).

⁵⁹ An exception would be for instance the Rome Statute of ICC. Together with 60 ratifications of the Rome Statute in 2002, the ICC gained a jurisdiction over individuals in all countries (Bassiouni 2006, p. 425). Hence, before reaching the threshold of 60 members, every single ratification meant significant progress.

changes in membership are understood as enlargement reforms. One can think of the enlargement reform of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) after the Cold War that integrated many democratizing East European states (see McCalla 1996; Risse-Kappen 1996). In summary, the membership measure captures creation, minor changes, and major reforms of IOs/bodies. Since it does not create insights related to a particular life span, it is difficult to derive relevance of such regime type approaches for research on IOs/bodies. Moreover, as explained in detail below, it does not tell us much about the goodwill or malicious participatory intentions of single countries.

Except for the membership measure, delegation preferences are derived from the resultant design of international authority. Such an assessment allows to discriminate between foundation and reform of IOs/bodies. The measure was applied to analyze delegation preferences of the OIC (Russo 2015) or ASEAN (Jetschke 2015) members as they created new bodies that monitor human rights standards. Furthermore, Tallberg et al. (2016) scrutinize the design of IOs after reforms to derive delegation preferences of autocracies and democracies. The problem with such a measure resides with its character that does not allow to identify delegation preferences of single states. It merely allows to draw conclusions on majority or minority shares of autocracies or democracies. Therefore, it does not fit my analytical aim to explain fined grained delegation preferences that vary within and across regime types.

Furthermore, delegation preferences can be understood as statements voiced when negotiating establishment or reforms of IOs/bodies. For example, Jay Goodlife and Darren Hawkins (2009) scrutinize diplomatic statements that gave birth to the ICC statute. Regarding reforms, for instance, Hawkins and Shaw Carolyn (2008) assess diplomatic speeches (as well as resultant design) to explain multiple (non-)reforms of the Organization of American States (OAS). By assessing diplomatic statements, the differentiation between either a foundation or a reform is straightforward. It simply depends on which negotiation process researchers scrutinize. And what is valuable as well, the diplomatic statements made by country missions to IOs can be unequivocal identified with single countries.

By comparing options of how and when to assess delegation preferences, I arrive to the conclusion that delegation preferences of single states are at best scrutinized during reforms of IOs/bodies where states present their positions. There are three reasons for such a conclusion. First, reforms allow states and societal actors to be precise when forming interests in strengthening or weakening IHROs. It is because they already experienced how the autonomous decision-making procedures of an international authority limits or empowers them. In contrast, creating new IOs or bodies comes with higher levels of uncertainty about the actual practice. Second, the authors (states) of diplomatic statements can be easily identified. Thus, I can go beyond inferences valid only for the whole

membership or large shares of the membership. Third and finally, such an analytical setting allows me to generate relevant insights for a particular life span of IOs/bodies. This is not the case of the most frequently applied membership measure that captures both creation and reforms of IOs/bodies. Taken together, I am about to generate insights relevant for both research on delegation preferences and IOs.

In Chapter 2 and 3, I already spelled out a further research demand for literature on delegation preferences that I cover. It remains to position my research *vis-à-vis* literature on IOs. In order to contribute to regime type research, I test single stages of the bottom-up-process that address the role of domestic societal actors, domestic institutions, and the interplay of international moral and material interdependencies. Regarding research on IOs, I strengthen analysis of IO-reforms. I understand reforms as official re-institutionalization processes that are initiated by several members which are dissatisfied with the IO's work. Moreover, reforms can be a result of a consensual disapproval throughout the membership.

Such a dissatisfaction can be caused by shifts in world politics, internal IO-development, or occurrence of new policy problems. A reform is only one of several options. As a reaction, IOs can be also repurposed, replaced, dissolved (Pevehouse and Borzyskowski 2016, p. 13), new bodies emanate (Gehring 2009; Shanks et al. 1996) or get reabsorbed by parent IOs (Pevehouse and Borzyskowski 2016, p. 13). Regarding both formal and informal reforms, historical institutionalism generated knowledge on the institutional change of IOs over time (Fioretos 2011; Rixen et al. 2016). Prominent IOs caught the attention of researchers. For instance, Tine Hanrieder (2015) analyzed the perils of centralization reforms that trigger further organizational fragmentation of the World Health Organization (WHO) or Velibor Jakovleski, Scott Jerbi and Thomas Biersteker (2019) evaluate the adaptability of the International Labor Organization (ILO) to fast evolving global economy.

Apart of the long-term development covered by historical institutionalism, researchers accentuate reforms of managerial/bureaucratic/supranational apparatus and provide for policy papers on single reforms. Michael Bauer and Christoph Knill (2007) laid down theoretical foundations on speed, acceptance, and scope of management reforms. Gray (2018) explains longevity of IOs that hinges on the quality of bureaucratic personnel. Michal Parizek (2020) shows the demand for more supranational (and parliamentary) bodies of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Aside of the basic science, almost every reform of well-known IOs is accompanied by policy papers that envision potential future design or evaluate results of past re-institutionalization processes. For example, Frank Evers (2009) analyzes a demand to reform the election monitoring bureau of the OSCE that was voiced by autocracies and countered by democracies. Or on the United Nations, Adward Luck (2005) describes the gap between

a large-scale reform requested by the general-secretary Kofi Annan and modest “renovation” goals formulated by the member states.

The regime type literature on delegation preferences already contributed insights relevant for reforms of IOs. To my best knowledge, two studies did, and I strive to join them. Hawkins and Shaw (2008) explained how attitudes of democratizing states, democracies, and autocracies, hindered or fueled reforms of OAS and its democracy governance structures. Tallberg et al. (2016) investigated in how far democratic/autocratic shares of membership can explain design of IOs understood as a result of reforms. Apart of the regime type literature and the studies presented, the list of contributions on reforms could be continued. Nevertheless, Pevehouse and Borzyskowski compare foci of IO research and arrive to the conclusion that “scant attention has been paid to how organizations change after they are formed (2016, p. 14).” Hitherto, the research concentrated rather on foundation of IOs or compliance to IOs.

My analysis generates insights relevant for IO research as I explain state delegation preferences to IHROs voiced during reforms. Once created, IOs undergo even multiple reforms. State delegation preferences shape together with norms and power the resultant authority of IOs (see Finnemore and Goldstein 2013). Whereas Tallberg et al. (2016) analyze outcomes of reforms (design of IOs), I scrutinize the input of reforms as also Hawkins and Shaw (2008) do.⁶⁰ Such a focus allows me to precisely capture delegation preferences of single states which is not possible by analyzing outcomes of reforms that stand for results of collective bargaining and thus most probably override preferences of even several members. On the overall, my analysis covers demand of two research traditions, the regime type literature and IO research. Even more broadly speaking, I draw on the disciplines of Comparative Politics and International Relations to set my analytical framework.

4.2. Research question and hypotheses

In order to cover the research demand at the intersection of regime type and IO research, I ask about delegation preferences of autocracies and democracies during reform processes of IHROs. This allows me to account for several shortcomings and to make a contribution in the sense of cumulative research. First, I account for the democracy bias in studies on regime type driven delegation preferences that has left autocracies understudied. Second, I fill in the research gap on domestic dimensions that shall account for a broad variation of delegation preferences within and across regime types. Third, I analyze an interplay of moral and material interdependencies in the international system. Fourth, I strive to generate policy relevant insights for democratizing actors like societal actors,

⁶⁰ Nevertheless, there are differences to my study. I conduct a systematic analysis of all statements voiced during one reform, whereby Hawkins and Shaw (2008) analyze the outputs of reforms by employing process tracing and illustrating the results by quoting selected diplomatic statements.

democracies, and secretariats of IHROs. The results of my work shall enable them to better understand their coalition partners and oppositional actors during re-institutionalization processes. Fifth, I pursue such a topic to account for a normative demand. Here, state delegation preferences (together with norms and power) shape authority of IHROs which should in turn help to introduce compliance with human rights and democracy standards.

These analytical aims are not pursued separately. An overall theoretical reasoning—that foresees a bottom-up process—integrates them. I expect that interests of societal actors get (mis-)represented by domestic institutions and are adjusted according to an interplay of moral and material interdependencies of the international system. The overall research demand culminates in the following research question:

Q: “How can we explain authority delegation preferences voiced by autocracies and democracies in reform processes of IHROs?”

So far, I have laid down theoretical foundations of the bottom-up process. Before operationalizing them in the following *Chapter 5 Data and Methods*, I need to provide for a more detailed and an even more clear-cut conceptualization, testable hypotheses, and select a reform process that figures as a source of state delegation preferences. In the first place, I devote the most attention to conceptualizing societal actors and their diverging roles in authoritarian and democratic regimes. I will not omit a presentation of how societal actors act either through states or in their own capacity as transnational actors with consultative status to IHROs. In the second place, I proceed with a bundled summary of how domestic institutions contribute to a (mis-)representation of interests of societal actors. In this respect, I elaborate how domestic institutions help authoritarian regimes to strategically include societal actors into the regime or expel them into the opposition. In the third place, I provide for a clear-cut conceptualization of the interplay between moral and economic interdependencies. In the fourth place, and finally, I select and justify why a reform process of the SP UNHRC offers a good chance to analyze the authority delegation preferences voiced by authoritarian and democratic regimes.

Societal actors

Let us begin with societal actors that I treat—in the vein of social theory and New Liberalism—as primary actors of international relations. Societal actors, understood as non-governmental actors like privileged individuals, NGOs, movements, private companies, trade and labor unions, media, etc., turn to instances of political authority that can represent their interests in the international realm with an increased efficiency. Such instances of political authority can be domestic governments and IOs. There are two pathways how societal actors channel their interests in weakening or strengthening IHROs. The first one entails an indirect pathway. Here, societal actors turn to domestic governments.

Governments in turn negotiate and voice authority delegation preferences during reforms of IHROs. The transmission belt between societal actors and governments constitute domestic institutions. The second pathway accounts for the possibility of societal actors to obtain a consultative or an observer status to IOs and make discursive contributions during reform processes directly. Nevertheless, societal actors are not allowed to vote. Such a privilege is reserved to actors with a full membership status, namely to states. Hence, during reform processes, societal actors address especially state members to shape their delegation preferences without having to face domestic institutions. The domestic institutions might, however, decide whether societal actors can operate in certain states freely or are ostracized into the opposition, expelled into foreign dissent, or even prosecuted.

Compared to each other, the first pathway allows societal actors to address “own” governments. The second pathway allows them to appeal to diplomatic missions of foreign states and the “own” one. Both on the domestic and international level, societal actors provide for legitimation of governments. I consider the domestic legitimation to be more important than the international one. This shall hold true for democracies as well as autocracies. When either democratic or autocratic rulers seek for legitimation, they seek active consent, passive obedience, compliance with formal and informal rules, or simple toleration by country inhabitants (Gerschewski 2013, p. 18).⁶¹ In contrast, democratic or autocratic rulers exert repression if they do not strive to gain legitimacy.⁶² Instead of seeking legitimacy, rulers apply high and low intensity coercion to put forward governmental interests (see Levitsky and Way 2002) and interests of dominant or loyal societal actors. Governments exert coercion irrespective of the resistance of the addressees of repression (see *ibid*).

For democracies, acquiring legitimacy on the domestic level is of an utmost importance since it determines the chances of being re-elected. For autocracies, the domestic legitimacy is less important than for democracies. The reason is that the predominant mode of governance is repression, and not legitimation. Nevertheless, autocracies do not exclusively rely on repression (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Gerschewski 2013; Levitsky and Way 2002). They apply a mix of prevailing levels of repression and a smaller extent of legitimation. Such a mix of repression and legitimation extends the longevity of authoritarian regimes (Levitsky and Way 2002). Hence, domestic legitimation is important for autocracies as well. Acquiring legitimacy in the international realm influences the longevity of authoritarian regimes or re-election of democratic governments, too, especially in an international system with prevailing liberal human rights and democracy norms. However, the legitimacy stemming

⁶¹ Johannes Gerschewski translates at this point what “belief in legitimacy” means according to Weber (2013, p. 18). Weber puts forward an empirical approach to gaining legitimacy and thus excludes the normative connotations which are difficult to apply if democracies as well as autocracies are considered (*ibid*).

⁶² An exception can be a scenario where the government oppresses a minority to win legitimacy in the eyes of a majority.

from the international level is less effective than the domestic one as has been conceptually reflected by the literature on international democratization forces as well (see Pevehouse 2002, 2005). On the overall, to generate even more policy-relevant results, I prioritize the first pathway where societal actors indirectly reach their governments meanwhile being mediated by domestic institutions.

Both legitimation and repression determine how many societal actors can participate in a domestic political system. Such an argument can become obvious only if I specify how democracies and autocracies seek for legitimation in cooperation with societal actors and thus favor their participation or apply repression to reduce their participation opportunities and numbers. I refer to the Eastonian (1965) concept of “specific” and “diffuse” support to narrow down domestic legitimation provided by societal actors. To elaborate more on repression, I draw on the work of Steven Levitski and Lucan Way (2002) who discriminate between high and low intensity repression.

Regarding legitimacy, the Eastonian concept of specific support captures performance legitimation. Here, societal actors deliver services or goods instead of the state structures. Autocracies address especially popular demands for socio-economic development and security (Gerschewski 2013, p. 20). One can think of, for instance, the telecommunication company Huawei that is on the paper owned by all of its employees (Zhong 2019) but develops surveillance technologies for the Chinese authoritarian regime to increase security in megacities (Vanderklippe 2018). Hence, Huawei helps the Communist Party of China to gain popular support by decreasing crime. In democracies, societal actors can help state structures to respond to demands voiced by citizens (Fox 2015). For instance, the NGO called People in Need fights social exclusion in the Czech Republic since 1999 (People in Need 2019). The NGO provides for counseling services like debt advice and resocialization programs and helps people to apply for social support provided by the state agencies (ibid). Hence, it accounts for a lack of counseling services on the side of the state. Both in autocracies as well as democracies, societal actors bolster performance legitimacy of governments and thus increase their chances to get re-elected or to extend their survival.

Furthermore, societal actors provide for diffuse (/ideational) support for democratic and autocratic regimes. Such an assistance can be of ideological, religious, nationalistic, traditional, charismatic, [or progressive] nature (Gerschewski 2013, p. 20, modified by author). In democracies, it can be for example private media (or independent public media) that critically evaluate state policies. A critical evaluation implies that both positive and negative development of governmental policies and their implementation are revealed and disseminated. Hence, democratic governments can gain legitimacy by incorporating demands of population whereby the results are critically evaluated by media. In autocracies, societal actors provide for ideational support as well. Among other societal actors in Russia, the Orthodox Church favors Putin as an executive head of the state since his authoritarian

policies go in hand with traditional or regressive values of the patriarchs and bishops at the top of the church hierarchy (Anderson 2007).

On the one hand, the simplistic Eastonian conceptualization of performance and ideational legitimacy can be applied to both autocratic as well as democratic regimes to illustrate the roles of their societal actors. On the other hand, it does not provide for any threshold to differentiate between autocracies and democracies. Here, I stick with the argument where democratic governments legitimize more than authoritarian regimes to stay in the driving seat. Democratic governments strive to incorporate interests of as many societal actors as possible to gain legitimacy and to be re-elected or to avoid new elections. Instead of gaining high degrees of legitimacy, autocracies repress oppositional societal actors more than democracies do, and favor regime-loyal societal actors.

Regarding repression, Levitsky and Way (2002) conceptualize it as high and low intensity coercion: High intensity coercion stands for action where oppositional leaders, well-known groupings, or movements are harassed in public. Mass demonstrations are violently suppressed, prominent oppositional leaders and journalists are imprisoned, they receive death threats, or are indeed assassinated. The targets of low intensity coercion are individuals or groupings of minor importance who are less organized and thus are not perceived as a real threat to the incumbent. Low intensity coercion takes a more subtle shape and is less exposed in public. Concrete measures count surveillance, intimidation, non-lethal physical harassment, impeding carriers, exclusion from educational or health system, non-violent restriction of freedom of speech or assembly, travel bans, unlawful extradition, withdrawal of licenses for media or companies, etc.

Current examples of low intensity coercion in democracies count, for instance, death threats voiced over social media. For example, the citizen of the Czech Republic, Jana Filipová, took the infamous oligarch and Prime Minister Andrej Babiš to court (Kottová 2019). The court decided that the Prime Minister must apologize for defamation of the oppositional demonstrators organized by the movement Million Moments (“Million Chvilek”) (ibid). In response, Jana Filipová received several death threats in public and private social media discussions (ibid). To name an example from an autocratic country, the private media outlet BelaPan faced a non-stop surveillance and power cuts in their Belarussian headquarters in 2006 (Arki 2006, p. 7). I refer to the death tolls during the Iranian mass unrests of 2009 (Rkaina 2018) as to high intensity coercion measures in an authoritarian regime. Even though it is not common for democracies to apply high intensity coercion measures against oppositional actors, the history witnessed politically motivated murder conducted especially by instable electoral democracies. The Senegalese democratic government in 1981 figures here as an example (Davenport 2004, p. 546). Taken together, both autocracies and democracies apply high or low intensity coercion. The difference between the regimes lies in the extent of repression applied.

Authoritarian regimes apply more repression than legitimation whereby democracies rather legitimize than repress. This has crucial implications for the number of societal actors allowed to participate and their interest in strengthening or weakening IHROs as well.

As I already elaborated in *Chapter 3 Theory*, I expect regime-loyal societal actors in autocracies to be interested in maintaining their privileged status, hence I assert that they are not interested in strengthening IHROs that figure as democratizing actors. Authoritarian incumbents shall not be interested in delegating authority to IHROs as well. Still, the extent to what autocracies strive to strengthen or weaken IHROs varies. Hence, it is up to the domestic oppositional societal actors (and international democratizing actors of all types) to pressure autocracies in limiting their attacks of IHROs during their reforms processes.

Oppositional societal actors exert less influence on authoritarian regimes than regime-loyal societal actors. Still, oppositional societal actors enjoy a certain leeway and are not automatically repressed. Hence, they dispose of opportunities to influence authority delegation preferences. Autocracies do not rely only on repression and allow for a limited participation of opposition for several reasons: First, repression is costly and the repression apparatus needs to be professionally equipped and trained (Davenport 2004, pp. 544–545). Second, repression does not always help to silence the opposition and can even trigger a broader resistance if the coercion measures become especially brutal (Davenport 2007). Third, repressing societal actors draws attention of a broad variety of domestic and international democratizing actors including IHROs (Dai 2007). Fourth, allowing the opposition to have some leeway de-escalates the explosive potential which could trigger a democratization process or introduce the next authoritarian regime (Froissart 2014). Fifth, allowing for criticism can be used in performative speech acts to deflect human rights and democracy pressure (see *ibid*). Nonetheless, even if resistance of oppositional societal actors does not directly introduce a democratic transition, it exerts pressure on authoritarian leaders to refrain from plain attacks of IHROs. Therefore, I argue that oppositional societal actors matter in authoritarian regimes. Societal actors are responsible together with domestic institutions and the interplay of economic and moral interdependencies for the broad variance of delegation preferences voiced by both autocracies and democracies.

Conceptualizing the influence of societal actors and their interests in democracies is more straightforward. Since democratic governments rely more on legitimation than repression, they allow more societal actors to participate in the political system than authoritarian regimes do. Furthermore, oppositional societal actors in democracies have higher chances that their interests will be reflected by governments than in autocracies. The reason is that democratic governments need to acquire sufficient levels of legitimacy to avoid new elections or secure re-election. Hence, democratic governments strive to accommodate interests even of societal actors that are not ideologically

associated with the incumbents or for pragmatic or political reasons remain distanced. Of course, societal actors that support the incumbents by increasing their performance and ideational legitimacy exert more influence than oppositional actors can. However, the difference between oppositional and non-oppositional actors is more blurred than in authoritarian regimes. It is the lobby-power of private companies or the lobby-capacities and public popularity of further societal actors like media outlets or NGOs that determine together with domestic institutions the chances to be considered. I assume that oppositional and non-oppositional societal actors in democracies are principally interested in strengthening IHROs. Exceptions can be private companies whose business violates human rights or extremist parties and movements that strive to ostracize parts of society.

IHROs that possess monitoring authority over states work as control instances that shall protect rights of individuals who—if organized in groups—are understood here as societal actors. The SP UNHRC evaluate compliance with liberal human rights as inscribed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948) and as incorporated in the UN Charter (Permanent Mission of Switzerland to UN 2015). The SP UNHRC surveil all human rights: civil, cultural, economic, political, and social (OHCHR 2019). As such, they monitor a broad variety of rights inscribed to a broad variety of societal actors. Having also considered the difference between democracies and autocracies where democratic regimes allow for more societal actors than autocracies, I spell out the first hypothesis on the primary actors of international relations, the societal actors:

H1: The more societal actors can participate on the domestic level, the higher the probability that states will favor authority delegation to IHROs.

Domestic institutions

Having conceptualized the role of societal actors, I turn to domestic institutions in democracies and autocracies. Domestic institutions figure as the link between societal actors and governments. To be precise, domestic institutions select whose societal interests states represent in international relations. The more biased such a selection is, the higher the probability that states will disadvantage large shares of societal actors when acting in international relations. Also, the larger the bias, the more leeway governments possess to pursue their own interests in the international realm.

Domestic institutions like rule of law, elections, and checks and balances mechanisms, fulfill different purposes in respective regimes. In democracies, domestic institutions shall guarantee rights of both oppositional and non-oppositional societal actors. In contrast, domestic institutions in autocracies shall favor regime-loyal societal actors and disadvantage oppositional actors (Svolik 2012). The democratic peace literature devoted most attention to the role of domestic institutions in democracies and their impact on international politics. Where democratic institutions underperform, they are not able to

tame dominant societal actors, they do not effectively protect rights of societal actor vis-à-vis governments, or they refrain from imposing sanctions over mandate holders who abuse their power.

The situation in autocracies is different. Here, when domestic institutions underperform, then authoritarian regimes are not able to disperse benefits for regime-loyal societal actors and the popularity or power of oppositional societal actors is growing. Hence, domestic institutions help authoritarian regimes to introduce an “appropriate” mix of legitimacy and repression. Dispersing benefits for regime-loyal societal actors through domestic institutions can take both formal and informal shape. Limiting suffrage of minorities in the vein of dominant societal actors by issuing new law could be an example of a formal change. An example of informal dispersion of benefits situates us to the electoral autocracy Tajikistan. Tajik ruling elites consciously allow imports of luxury cars that were stolen in Germany (Cadenbach 2014). The Tajik regime deflects the German diplomatic pressure and refuses to stop the illegal practice where Tajik customs authorities play an indispensable role (ibid). Privileged Tajik individuals, mostly associated with dominant societal actors, can in the end afford luxury cars which are sold for discount prices (see ibid).⁶³

Domestic institutions can be captured on a continuum even though they fulfil different purposes in autocracies and democracies. Such a continuum captures to what extent domestic institutions misrepresent or equally represent interests of societal actors. Absent democratic purposes or merely absent protection of rights of societal actors create space for authoritarian purposes, rise of disproportionately dominant societal actors, oppression of opposition, and realization of governmental interests at the expenses of large shares of population. The theoretical assumptions on domestic institutions together with their conceptualization culminate into the second hypothesis:

H2: The better domestic institutions represent the interests of all societal actors, the higher the probability that states will favor authority delegation to IHROs.

Economic and moral interdependency

Both democratic and autocratic governments consider own and societal interests when they form delegation preferences. States translate such interests into delegation preferences and pursue them instrumentally or strategically in the international realm. The delegation preferences are adjusted according to pressures stemming from the international system in the third and last phase of the bottom-up process.⁶⁴ Such pressures arise from an interplay of economic and moral

⁶³ Geschewski would consider such a situation as an example of co-optation (2013, pp. 22–23), not a legitimation strategy.

⁶⁴ I treat societal actors as the primary actors of international relations since their interests matter the most. Nevertheless, the bottom-up process that I analyze foresees that states and not societal actors negotiate and are

interdependencies. I depart from the assumption that liberal human rights and democracy norms prevail in the international system. Autocracies and regime-loyal societal actors suffer from such a pressure whereby democracies, majority of their societal actors, and other democratizing and human rights actors like IHROs create the normative pressure.

Democratic peace literature and regime type research formulated theoretical assumptions on democracies. Democracies are expected to strengthen IHROs to increase the normative pressure for autocracies in order to improve their compliance with human rights and democracy standards. Democratizing actors including democracies often couple the normative pressure with economic incentives like FDI and/or ODA. Especially wealthy democracies can pair economic incentives with normative pressure, dispose of enough diplomatic capacities to employ normative reasoning or can afford to finance expensive IHROs.

Regarding autocracies, especially poor regimes face elevated pressured to refrain from abusing human rights and violating democracy standards, to abstain from attacking IHROs during their reforms or even to support their strengthening. It is because poor autocracies experience both economic and moral asymmetric interdependence when forming delegation preferences for reforms of IHROs. Wealthy authoritarian regimes find themselves in a different situation. Wealthy autocracies act under the moral asymmetry as well but can escape it to some extent. The reason is that they do not depend on financial incentives provided by democratizing actors and possess enough diplomatic capacities to defend their controversial standings.

Moreover, wealthy authoritarian regimes trade with all states including democracies. Hence, wealthy authoritarian regimes can threaten democracies with re-evaluation of economic ties, new trade barriers, or they can decrease trading volumes or even interrupt the international trade. Autocracies that trade with goods of high specificity like natural resources or high-end technology enjoy an especially powerful position. Democracies depend on performance legitimacy and thus need to secure import of indispensable goods or maintain high levels of international trade that generates income required for investments in health and social systems or ensures import of cheap consumer goods (see Przeworski 1991). Hence, democracies that trade with wealthy autocracies can experience asymmetric economic interdependency. Due to such disadvantageous position, democracies might decide to refrain from severe criticism of repression applied by wealthy autocracies or abide from pressuring them to strengthen IHROs. As a result, wealthy autocracies can more easily escape the normative

interdependent from other states. Hence, the analytical actor-unit for the third stage of the bottom-up process are states (regime types).

pressure exerted by democracies and further democratizing and human rights actors than poor authoritarian regimes can.

I would like to break down the theoretical reasoning and conceptualization of the interplay between economic and moral interdependencies to a testable hypothesis. It is a common practice to measure wealth country-wise as is the case for democratic or autocratic regimes-type. Hence, I conceptualize (and operationalize later on) an interaction between wealth and regime type. The respective and third hypothesis reads as follows:

H3: The wealthier authoritarian regimes are, the more easily they can escape asymmetric moral interdependencies, and thus the higher the probability that they will be against authority delegation to IHROs. The wealthier democracies are, the more they can afford to enhance the normative pressure on human rights abusers, and thus the higher the probability that they will favor authority delegation to expensive IHROs.

The hypotheses capture all three stages of the bottom-up process. The first two stages allow me to open-up the regimes-types in order to analyze the explanatory potential of societal actors and domestic institutions. Their roles are intertwined in so far that domestic institutions figure as a transmission belt between societal interests and governments. Depending on regime type, domestic institutions gradually empower or repress societal actors *vis-à-vis* governments. Whereby societal actors and governments possess interests in strengthening or weakening IHROs, my theoretical and conceptual framework does not foresee such actors-characteristics for domestic institutions. Therefore, I expect that societal actors—understood as primary actors of international relations—will deliver stronger explanations of delegation preferences than domestic institutions can. I do not have particular theoretical expectations on the explanatory power of the interplay between economic and moral interdependencies. The source of theoretical progress here—New Liberalism—prioritizes only societal actors and leaves further hierarchical ordering out (Moravcsik 2003). Hence, it is up-to the empirical analysis to reveal more.

Having spelled out the research question and hypotheses, I need to select a reform process that offers a good opportunity to carry out a quantitative empirical analysis which will allow me to contribute to regime type literature explaining authority delegation preferences. The reform process of the SP UNHRC that took place throughout the years 2006, 2007, 2010, and 2011, offers such a good opportunity for several reasons. I justify the selection of this reform, explicate its specificities, and introduce the work of SP UNHRC in the upcoming section.

Special Procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council

The quantitative regime type literature on delegation preferences follows a clear trend: The more specific the sample of IOs, the more reliable inferences studies deliver. The history witnessed studies including all registered IIs (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006) but it turned out that delegation preferences to IIs vary over international policy fields (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008). Furthermore, Hafner-Burton et al. (2015) and Hill (2016) unambiguously demonstrated that ratifying international human rights treaties implies on average a delegation of lower levels of authority than accessing to IHROs. Thus, different explanatory patterns are required. Moreover, Hill (2016) specified that the sample shall include only one IHRO. Such a move prevents sample noise that stems from including many IHROs where the authority levels severely diverge.

By analyzing delegation preferences to the SP UNHRC, I join the trend and provide for an even more precise specification. I argue that one needs to determine to what IO-body states shall delegate authority as well, not only to which IO. The United Nations (UN) human rights system incorporates distinct mechanisms to monitor compliance with human rights. They vary from self-reporting mechanisms over intergovernmental bodies up to monitoring bureaucracies. The SP UNHRC qualify as monitoring bureaucracies since the personnel does not consist of country diplomats but human rights experts (OHCHR 2019). Bureaucracies embody the most authoritative form of human rights monitoring (e.g. Bradley and Kelley 2008; Hooghe et al. 2017; Hooghe et al. 2019; Simmons 2009, pp. 103–108).

Specifically, it is the large degree of autonomous decision making that qualifies monitoring bureaucracies on the top of the authority scale. Monitoring procedures which require unanimous consent by all members or foresee a self-reporting mechanism qualify as a pre-stage of authority delegation. IO bodies that employ majority decision making procedures have medium authority and take the form of intergovernmental bodies. And finally, monitoring bureaucracies which determine monitoring results without a voting approval by member states score the highest authority.⁶⁵ (Hooghe et al. 2017; Hooghe et al. 2019)

Regarding the scope of monitoring, the SP UNHRC differ from the self-reporting mechanisms bound to the UN human rights treaties but share the universalistic scope with the intergovernmental monitoring conducted by UNHRC. The self-reporting mechanisms proceed topic-wise dependent on the treaty in

⁶⁵ Such levels of delegation speak to the monitoring authority of IOs. I certainly would not argue that, for instance, the UN Security Council as an intergovernmental body has less authority than the monitoring bureaucracy of the UN Human Rights Council. Furthermore, international courts possess higher authority than monitoring bureaucracies do as far as the legal character of their work is considered (see Hill 2016). An international court makes one precise judgment per trial. Monitoring bureaucracies “judge” systemic conditions and conduct repeatedly large-scale observations of human rights abuses. Thus, the group of addressees of the monitoring authority is much broader.

consideration. Thus, countries evaluate separately domestic situations of racial discrimination, civil and political rights, or women's rights. Only members to the treaties submit self-evaluations. In the UNHRC, countries can craft reports concerning any other country regarding every human right. The SP UNHRC carry out either country or thematic mandates. Regarding country mandates, the mandate holders decide which mixture of human rights or democracy standards to surveil. The thematic mandates usually concern all countries worldwide (or have a regional focus) but scrutinize only specific topics like sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, or the freedom of peaceful assembly and of association. Whereby the UNHRC devotes short-term attention to current human rights crisis,⁶⁶ the SP UNHRC generate long-term expertise. (Permanent Mission of Switzerland to UN 2015)

The monitoring bureaucracy and the intergovernmental body are institutionally interlinked. State members of the UNHRC decide to create, prolong, or terminate, both country and topic mandates of the SP UNHRC. Even though the name of the intergovernmental body signals that human rights shall be monitored, the SP UNHRC evaluate compliance with both liberal democracy and human rights standards. For instance, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, Adrian Severin, reported that the executive powers of President Lukashenka are not sufficiently separated from the judiciary of the state (E/CN.4/2006/36, para. 22). Such a statement considers democratic standards. The report evaluates human rights standards as well. Citizens of Belarus were substantially restricted in their freedom of speech under the threat of a trial for defamation or insult when critically addressing the president or governmental members in 2005 (ibid, para. 31). Another example can be the Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia, Peter Leuprecht. The Special Representative observed that the Cambodian government was unconstitutionally formed, and that the future of a pluralistic political system was under threat in 2004 (E/CN.4/2005/116, p. 2). Moreover, the police and military were involved in cases of torture (E/CN.4/2005/116, para. 15-17). Taken together, the SP UNHRC monitor both democracy and human rights standards. As a result, I analyze authority delegation preferences under moral interdependency without focusing on particular liberal human rights (e.g. freedom of religion) or single democracy standards (e.g. rule of law).

According to Kofi Annan, the SP UNHRC can be considered as "the jewel in the crown" of the UN human rights regime (as quoted by Nolan et al. 2017, p. XX). Nevertheless, there are several other bureaucracies that monitor *liberal* human rights and democracy standards outside of the UN human rights regime. The OSCE-ODHIR ranks high among the most prominent ones. It is known especially for

⁶⁶ An exception would be the case of human rights violations conducted by Israeli governments in Palestine. This topic is discussed at every session of the UNHRC (Permanent Mission of Switzerland to UN 2015, p. 9).

its authoritative election monitoring, but it issues reports on human rights as well (ODIHR 2019). The Organization of American States disposes of the Secretariat for Strengthening Democracy (OAS-SSD) (OAS 2019). The Council of Europe draws on monitoring reports issued by its Directorate General of Democracy (CoE-DGII) (CoE 2019). The monitoring bureaucracy of the African Union is called Special Mechanisms (AU-SM) but its liberal status is contested (Gawanas 2009).

The SP UNHRC and their last reform process throughout 2006-7 and 2010-2011 offer a good opportunity to analyze state delegation preferences. The UN system has nearly a universal membership of 193 states (UN 2019). Therefore, every regime type and states from all geographical and cultural regions could participate in the reform. Scrutinizing delegation preferences during reforms of OSCE-ODHIR, OAS-SSD, CoE-DGII, or AU-SM, would not allow me to include countries from all continents. At the same time, the combination of country and thematic mandates ensured that almost all countries and their societal actors already experienced what it means to be exposed to more or less severe reputational costs inherent to the monitoring reports. Therefore, the societal actors and states could more precisely shape their interests in strengthening or weakening the SP UNHRC compared to a creation of a brand-new international authority. Moreover, both autocracies and democracies were in favor of a reform (Alston 2006).

Apart of its representativity and political relevance, the reform process of the SP UNHRC comes with three specificities that I consider. First, monitoring bureaucracies figure as the most expensive form of monitoring. Self-reporting mechanisms and intergovernmental naming and shaming are carried out by current personnel of foreign ministries or permanent missions to IHROs. Monitoring bureaucracies consist of human rights experts. Particularly, the mandate-holders of SP UNHRC shall serve in a personal capacity without being paid neither by the UN nor by states (Permanent Mission of Switzerland to UN 2015, p. 15). Nevertheless, their voluntary work implies costs. The stationary work in Geneva and frequent travels across the globe generate considerable expenditures.⁶⁷ The UNHRC provides for the infrastructure required for either remote or on-the-ground observations (ibid). Second, the delegation preferences could be influenced by the financial crisis from 2008 on. Thus, I need to carefully inspect and interpret delegation preferences voiced in 2010. Even though the reform lasted until 2011, there were no statements made that would qualify as delegation preferences (or input) relevant for the outcome. Consequently, I consider both the high expenses of a monitoring bureaucracy as well the potential influence of the financial crisis when formulating hypothetical expectations, conducting the empirical analysis, and interpreting the results.

⁶⁷ Most of the mandate-holders work part-time in their capacity of Special Rapporteurs and it is not an exemption to work outside of Geneva (Permanent Mission of Switzerland to UN 2015, p. 14)

The third specificity relates counterintuitively to the almost universal UN membership that formally allowed nearly all states to participate in the reform process. On the one hand, the nearly universal UN membership enables me to analyze delegation preferences of states from all geographical and cultural regions. On the other hand, the vast number of UN members requires to speed up the negotiation talks. Hence, states voiced delegation preferences on their own or channeled them through statements made by ROs like the EU or the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Such a proceeding is an instance of an overarching process of regionalization of the UN (Panke 2013; Panke et al. 2016). Since my analytical aim is to explain the delegation preferences of autocracies and democracies, leaving out statements made by ROs does not restrict my analysis. It would be troublesome only if I would ask about, for instance, the results of the reform process that were co-shaped by ROs.

The long history of SP UNHRC starts already in 1967 as the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on apartheid in South Africa was created. The creation of the first monitoring mission was superseded by a dedicated fight of several African, Asian, and Caribbean countries against human rights abuses associated with colonialism and racism. The Western colonial powers like Great Britain and France or the United States—which practiced racial segregation—were merely in favor of a promotion but not an active protection of human rights after the World War II. In 1980, there were still only four mandates, but the number increased to 14 in 1990 and rapidly expanded to 34 mandates in 2000. The proliferation continued and there were 50 monitoring missions actively operating by 2014.⁶⁸ (Limon and Power 2014, pp. 4–10)

The history of SP UNHRC witnessed three reforms so far. Together with the quantitative expansion of mandates, the mandate holders further strengthened their monitoring methods and thus gained in authority at the turn of the Millennium. In reaction, states wanted to lay down a common understanding of the monitoring missions and to exercise control over their evolution. Hence, the UNHRC initiated the first official reform of the SP UNHRC throughout 1998 to 2000. Its results brought rather insignificant changes in terms of authority of the SP UNHRC. Only two years after, the SP UNHRC undergone a second official reform that lasted from 2002 until 2004. This time, the reform was not triggered by the development of SP UNHRC but belonged to a UN-wide reform agenda. Its results envisioned even several modifications strengthening the authority of SP UNHRC. These regarded the protection of independence, improved cooperation and responsiveness by governments, increased quality and focus of reports, improved interaction with the UNCHR, improved implementation and

⁶⁸ See a timeline depicting the history of SP UNHRC mandates from 1967 until 2015 in Limon and Power (2014, pp. 8–9).

follow-up recommendations, and increased availability of resources. Such far reaching results were, however, never fully implemented. (Limon and Power 2014, pp. 13–14)

The third reform of SP UNHRC in 2006, 2007, 2010 and 2011, came together with an overall re-institutionalization of the UN Commission on Human rights (UNCHR) that was renamed to UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) (Binder and Eisentraut 2019). The negotiations in 2006 and 2007 laid down preliminary institutional provisions for SP UNHRC that were put into practice until 2010 (ibid). In 2010, they were revisited, and they were approved in 2011 (ibid). The reform of the intergovernmental body together with all its subsidiary bodies including the SP UNHRC was initiated by a far-reaching consensus that the UNHRC and its dependencies are politicized, and thus not effectively working in the name of the Charter of the United Nations and the human rights provisions (Alston 2006, 186-7). The official documents included reform goals captured by the key words like “enhancing”, “strengthening”, and “rationalizing” the SP UNHRC. Behind such noble expressions, states understood contradictory aims of weakening and strengthening the monitoring bureaucracy (ibid). The third reform figures here as a source of observations for the dependent variable of authority delegation preferences. Hence, I provide for more details on the negotiation topics and reform outcomes in the upcoming *Chapter 5 Data and Methods*.

As the reform process ended eight years ago, the question arises in how far the literature already provided for explanations of state delegation preferences to the SP UNHRC. The most represented type of contributions takes a form of policy papers. Here, authors either envision the demand to reform the SP UNHRC or interpret the outcomes (Alston 2006; see also Freedman and Mchangama 2016; Gutter 2007; Limon and Power 2014; Yeboah 2008). Furthermore, contributions of high policy relevance analyze how mandate holders fulfil their mandates in practice and under which conditions the SP UNHRC makes a difference on the ground (e.g. Limon and Piccone 2014; Nolan et al. 2017). Such publications occasionally mention and contextualize negotiation statements made by states or illustrate positions voiced by ROs. As a piece of basic research, Martin Binder and Sophie Eisentraut (2019) devoted a book chapter on delegation preferences of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS). Nevertheless, a systematic analysis of state delegation preferences is still missing.

As a part of my theoretical reasoning, I assume that societal actors figure as the primary actors of international relations. Hence, I would like to describe the institutionalized part of the relationship of SP UNHRC and societal actors. Societal actors and the SP UNHRC have a proven record of interaction from the 1980s on (see Limon and Power 2014, p. 7). During country visits, mandate holders meet NGOs to retrieve information on current human rights violations and disregard of democracy standards (ibid). They are also contacted by the victims (ibid). Thus, the SP UNHRC generate themselves on-the-ground observations and draw on “local” expertise provided by NGOs at the same time. The

meetings with NGOs enable the mandate holders to surpass even authoritarian governments and engage in coalition building with societal actors.⁶⁹ The mandate holders must sometimes, nevertheless, conduct remote observation missions and thus cannot meet societal actors in their countries of origin. The reason is that not every country has issued a standing invitation or declares to have insufficient capacities to receive the requested visit. The acceptance rates vary independently of regime type. For example, Brazil accepted 88%, Sudan 81%, United States 75%, and Russia 25%, of visit requests issued from 1998 to 2013 (Limon and Piccone 2014, p. 25, Figure 6). Treating media as societal actors—I would like to stress once again—that mandate holders are a focal point for media as is the case for NGOs and victims, too (Limon and Piccone 2014, p. 18).

Societal actors can figure as donors to the SP UNHRC as well. On the one hand, the mandate holders shall be independent of any financial resource. On the other hand, they need to make their living and at the same time they report lack of resources necessary for carrying out their office. Societal actors like universities and NGOs can employ mandate holders for other reasons but allow for a part-time work on the monitoring missions or provide for research assistance. Another way how to become a donor is when societal actors contribute to the voluntary funds organized by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR). (Limon and Piccone 2014, p. 21)

Moreover, NGOs with a consultative status in the UN Economic and Social Council (UNECOSOC) can participate in the so-called Interactive Dialog aside by the SP UNHRC or even help to establish new monitoring missions in the UNHRC. During the interactive dialog, the mandate holders discuss monitoring results and follow-up action with states. NGOs can make discussion contributions as well. Furthermore, NGOs can contribute to an establishment of new mandates, support their prolongation, and preclude their merge or termination. It is because NGOs together with like-minded-states exert normative pressure in the UNHRC discussions. (see Limon and Piccone 2014, 16, 31)

Taken together, societal actors share expertise with the SP UNHRC, engage in coalition building with the SP UNHRC to surpass governments, disseminate monitoring results, provide for financial or institutional support, join the SP UNHRC to increase normative pressure put on human rights violators, or even contribute to creation and prolongation of monitoring mandates. Therefore, societal actors can enhance the discursive authority of SP UNHRC under the condition that they pursue similar normative aims. If it is not the case, then societal actors undermine the discursive authority of SP UNHRC by questioning their impartiality, objectivity, or moral and ethical standards, refrain from

⁶⁹ The alignment of local NGOs and IHROs was given into a broader context and researched by Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998a).

financial contributions or institutional support, inhibit their on-the-ground missions or threaten and even attack the personnel (Nolan et al. 2017, p. XX).

On the overall, I decided to analyze the reform process of SP UNHRC for several reasons, but I am also aware of its specificities. By focusing on a reform of one IO-body, I avoid sample noise stemming from inclusion of multiple IOs or manifold IO-bodies whose extent of authority fluctuates. Moreover, analyzing a reform process instead of the foundational years, societal actors and states can be more precise when formulating their interests and delegation preferences since they already experienced reputational costs imposed by the authoritative monitoring results. Furthermore, all states could participate in the reform process since the UN have almost a universal membership. Therefore, the reform provides a good opportunity to scrutinize delegation preferences of both authoritarian and democratic regime types from all geopolitical regions. The reform comes, however, with one specificity that I need to consider when interpreting the results. The reform took place in times of economic crisis and carrying out monitoring missions by human rights experts is an expensive form of monitoring. The monitoring authority of SP UNHRC reaches societal actors in form of discursive authority or societal actors directly cooperate or inhibit the on-the-ground monitoring missions or even stand side by side with the special rapporteurs in the UNHRC. In short, the reform process of SP UNHRC offers a good opportunity to analyze authority delegation preferences to IHROs which I treat as a result of a bottom-up process ranging from societal actors over domestic institutions to international interdependencies.

4.3. Linking concepts together

The research design consists of multiple concepts that either fill in the gaps left by regime type and theoretical contributions or further specify broad theoretical assumptions and break them down to testable hypotheses. Before concluding the *Chapter 4 Research Design*, I would like to link all concepts presented into one analytical framework and envision further steps to be taken.

I refer to global governance studies when conceptualizing IHROs as instances of international authority. Global governance studies foster broad analytical perspectives for the discipline of International Relations. Most crucially, global governance authors avoid an overemphasized focus placed on states and their role in the international system and integrate IOs and societal actors into the analysis as well. Such an analytical perspective allows me to understand that states transfer (or withdraw) decision-making competencies and delineate autonomy when they create, reform, or dissolve IOs. IOs understood as instances of international authority overcome state sovereignty and thus regulate the relationship of states and their societal actors or reach them directly. IHROs seek compliance with moral and ethical standards even without being equipped with strong enforcement

mechanisms. IHROs present themselves as discursive authorities to persuade actors to abide from human rights violation and maintain democracy standards.

Reforms of IOs figure as an especially appropriate opportunity to scrutinize authority delegation preferences. Long before a reform begins, both societal actors and governments experience what consequences authoritative reporting implies. Therefore, they are increasingly precise when formulating interests in strengthening or weakening IHROs. The role of societal actors and domestic institutions vary in democracies and autocracies.

If legitimacy figures as the prevailing mode of governance, then dominant, oppositional, and non-oppositional societal actors possess a fair chance that democratic governments will reflect their interest when forming delegation preferences. By reflecting interests even of oppositional societal actors, democratic governments boost their legitimacy needed for sustaining their mandate and re-election. Domestic institutions play a decisive role in securing rights of societal actors and transmitting their interests to governments.

If governments rely rather on repression than legitimation, then interests of regime-loyal societal actors get overrepresented. In autocracies, domestic institutions protect interests of regime-loyal societal actors and disadvantage oppositional ones. Governmental interests together with interests of regime-loyal societal actors determine delegation preferences to a greater extent than oppositional actors hope for. Nevertheless, interests of oppositional societal actors are not completely ignored by authoritarian regimes since it would require applying even higher levels of repression. Such a move might in turn compromise regime stability and longevity.

Whereby the mixture of legitimacy and repression characterizes the formation of delegation preferences on the domestic level, the international phase is coined by an interplay of economic and moral interdependencies. Of course, moral interdependency is closely related to the mixture of repression and legitimation applied on the domestic level. Asymmetric economic interdependencies, however, modify the strength of human rights and democracy pressure exerted on autocracies. As a result, wealthy autocracies can to some extent escape the moral pressure and attack IHROs during reform processes with less important consequences than poor authoritarian regimes. Democracies, in contrast, use their wealth and economic asymmetries to increase the normative pressure and thus strive to strengthen IHROs.

By linking all the concepts presented, I establish an analytical framework. The analytical framework guides my empirical analysis. To access authority delegation preferences, I scrutinize statements voiced by autocracies and democracies from all geopolitical regions that participated in the last reform of the SP UNHRC. I rely primary on the Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) dataset and World Bank data

to acquire multiple indicators of regime types and especially their components measuring freedom of participation for societal actors and quality of domestic institutions. In the upcoming *Chapter 5 Data and Methods*, I provide for operationalization, present data collection methods and descriptive statistics, curve out a modeling strategy, and select methods of quantitative inquiry.

5. Operationalization and Methods

In Chapter 5, I translate the analytical framework into terms of empirical inquiry. Hence, I operationalize the concepts, present data generation methods as well as disclose employed databases. I also select methods of causal quantitative inquiry and curve out a modeling strategy. Having fulfilled such aims, I will be able to present, interpret, and discuss results of the quantitative study in Chapter 6.

I proceed with an operationalization of the dependent variable of delegation preferences in Section 5.1. Essentially, I understand delegation preferences as claims voiced during reform processes of IHROs that aim to either weaken or strengthen the international authority. I justify which concept of international authority is most appropriate. Furthermore, I present qualitative content analysis that allowed me to generate data for the dependent variable. In Section 5.2, I operationalize explanatory and control variables, as well as choose a classification of authoritarian and democratic regime types. And finally, in Section 5.3, I present how I transform dependent variable data and match it with methods of statistical inquiry. I conclude with a modeling strategy that allows me to open up the regime types and examine international interdependencies while avoiding issues of multicollinearity.

5.1. Dependent variable: Authority delegation preferences

The operationalization of authority delegation preferences that I put forward brings several conceptual advantages which increase the precision of empirical assessment. First, I concentrate on a particular reform of a specific IO body instead of an indifferent assessment of authority delegation preferences throughout the life span of several IOs. Second, I stick with a conceptualization of international authority that captures both decision-making competencies and autonomy of IOs. Thus, I avoid flaws inherent to both autonomy and authority research where empirical research on autonomy seems to be guilty of an analytical overstretch whereby concepts of international authority suffer from an under-specification. Third, I scrutinize delegation preferences in form of statements voiced by diplomatic missions of autocracies and democracies. Hence, I avoid the most common measure that captures “how long did it take for a state to enter an IO.” The membership measure does not account for various motives to enter IOs. States might join IOs to undermine their missions or to support them, etc. Fourth, even though I qualitatively assess the delegation preferences, I provide for a clear-cut dichotomous operationalization that precludes ambiguity of diplomatic speech. The overall re-conceptualization and novel operationalization comes, however, with a cost. The qualitative coding process that I applied to generate enough data for methods of statistical inference was—naturally—labor intensive.

Mediated representative claims voiced during reforms

Scrutinizing delegation preferences during reforms of IHROs entails several advantages as elaborated in Chapter 4. One of them tells us that societal actors and governments already experienced what consequences international monitoring authority causes by imposing reputational costs on violators of liberal human rights and democracy standards. Hence, they form interests in strengthening or weakening IHROs with an increased precision. Such interests are, nevertheless, modified throughout the bottom-up process. Societal interests are (mis-)represented by domestic institutions and together with governmental interests are further modified during international negotiations where moral and economic interdependencies make a difference. Obviously, diplomatic missions to IHROs that voice statements in favor of strengthening or weakening IHROs are not societal actors or governments themselves. They are mediators who make claims in the name of societal actors and governments to reform international authority. Therefore, I understand statements made in favor of strengthening or weakening IHROs as *mediated representative claims*.

By coining such statements as mediated representative claims, I refer to a research tradition that analyzes societal interests imprinted in speech acts. A broad definition of claims tells us that claims are a type of strategic or communicative action in the public sphere that articulate demands, decisions, call for action, make proposals, voice criticism, etc. (Gray and Statham 2005, p. 881). Researchers investigate a broad variety of claims. *Claims* are made by societal actors during protests (Koopmans and Statham 1990). Politicians make *representative claims* when they perform a speech act and declare to represent their constituencies (Wilde 2013). Permanent country missions to IOs put forward such representative claims during reforms of IHROs (see Binder and Eisentraut 2019). In detail, they perform *mediated representative claims* (Michailidou and Trenz 2013; Wilde 2019, 4).

On the one hand, I find the understanding of statements made during reforms as mediated representative claims appropriate since they capture the long way interests of societal actors and of governments undergo before they reach the international audience. Yet on the other, the research on claims implements complex coding schemes indicating several discursive components that exceed my empirical interest. Pieter de Wilde offers a summary of most common indicators of claims: “(1) a location in time and space, accessible to an audience, (2) an actor making the claim, (3) a specific type of action, and (4) a demand concerning a specific policy or political institution (2019, 5).” I focus on the fourth indicator which is an indispensable part of claims as reflected by multiple contributions (e.g. Binder and Eisentraut 2019; Gray and Statham 2005; Wilde 2013). It allows me to interpret whether a country strives to weaken or strengthen the SP UNHRC. Hence, I proceed the same way as Binder and

Eisentraut (2019) did when they scrutinized delegation preferences of the BRICS countries to the SP UNHRC.⁷⁰

International authority: Decision-making competencies and autonomy

The concept of mediated representative claims captures the long way societal interest need to travel before arriving at reform processes of IOs. I need to assess their content to find out whether actors are in favor of strengthening or weakening the SP UNHRC, hence generating data for the dependent variable of authority delegation preferences. Before I present the methods of data generation, I would like to define what international authority stands for in conceptual terms.

Global governance literature got accustomed to referring to IOs as instances of international authority. The operationalization of *institutional* sources of international authority, nevertheless, vary (compare e.g. Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012a; Hooghe et al. 2017; Hooghe et al. 2019; Zürn et al. 2015). I ascribe the variation in operationalization to an underlying analytical problem. Contributions on international authority often underestimate the autonomous dimension of IOs and overemphasize their decision-making competencies. However, the autonomous dimension is indispensable for the treatment of IOs as full-fledged political actors and instances of international authority. Without autonomy, IOs would be merely servants of states and thus would not constitute diverging political entities. Moreover, contributions on autonomy of IOs engage in conceptual overstretch when they analyze how IOs—only thanks to their autonomy—transform interests of states without highlighting the hierarchical relationship inherent to their decision-making competencies.

I need to delimit the conceptual overstretch in analyses of IO autonomy and integrate autonomy into empirical analysis of international authority. This shall allow me to substantiate why the operationalization of international authority must include both the autonomous and decision-making dimensions. In the first step, I establish explanatory cores of both autonomy and authority literature. In the second step, I illustrate the conceptual overstretch of autonomy research and explicate the missing integration of autonomous actor qualities in authority research. In the third step, I justify why I partially follow Zürn et al. (2015) to capture the monitoring authority of SP UNHRC conceptualized as autonomy and decision-making competencies.

To establish a core explanation of autonomy, I analyze prominent research that gave rise to multiple empirical contributions. I review neo-institutional, constructivist, and social-organizational studies. Irrespective of their diverging meta-theoretical background, we may identify a shared core

⁷⁰ I would like to thank the researchers Binder and Eisentraut whose project on the relationship of BRICS countries and the SP UNHRC (2019) sparked my interest for the broader topic of delegation preferences to international monitoring bureaucracies.

explanation. Starting with a neo-institutional principal-agent-theory, it was envisioned to analyze how states restrict autonomy of IOs once they have delegated authority to them (Hawkins et al. 2006, p. 4). The principal-agent-theory understands autonomy as a delegated and self-induced actor quality of IOs. States delegate to IOs degrees of autonomy called *discretion*. Discretion is required so that IOs can fulfil their mandates and is carefully defined in the foundation treaty (ibid, p. 8). Beyond the definition of discretion, the “real” autonomy is the free scope of action that is available to IOs, being limited by oversight mechanisms such as periodical reporting on internal affairs (ibid). Discretion and “real” autonomy are formally institutionalized by states. By contrast, the so-called *agency slack* is a type of autonomy that is not formally institutionalized and is induced by IOs themselves. Agency slack refers to situations where IO bureaucracies act on their own (/not on behalf of states) pursuing agendas whose aim may or may not be to fulfil the mandate (ibid). Thus, agency slack stands for a free scope of action that may be—but does not necessarily have to—be apprehended by states. Both state-delegated and self-induced forms of autonomy explain the free scope of action possessed or created by IOs.

Similar to the principal-agent theory, constructivist contributions by Barnett and Finnemore (1999, 2004) triggered much subsequent analysis. Constructivist understandings of autonomy consider that a certain free scope of action has been delegated to IOs, but they do not pay much attention to such an autonomy. The largest part of their contribution concentrates on explaining how IOs informally gain autonomy from states, so they mainly refer to the self-induced autonomy. First, IOs claim to have aggregated technical and moral expertise and present themselves to states as knowledgeable authorities. Second, IOs chip in their discursive authority in order to be allowed to act on their own. Third, states allow IOs to act on their own. Such a free scope of action is not written down in a contract, but it is institutionalized on an informal basis. States simply tolerate actions taken by IOs.

The next step in autonomy research was introduced by Martin Koch (2008) whose contribution belongs to the realm of social-organizational studies. He explains how IOs gain autonomy through the so-called *autonomization processes* (“Verselbstständigungsprozesse”). Compared to the principal-agent-theory and constructivist works, Koch argues that there is no need for delegated autonomy in order to acquire additional free scope of action. From his perspective, autonomy is forced by IOs and in IOs (Koch 2008, p. 15). To gain autonomy, IOs modify presentation of their internal work. As a result, they decouple the presented image from the actual practice. The result of such a “decoupling” processes is autonomy in form of a free scope of action. Respective autonomy can—but does not necessary have to—be revealed by states (Koch 2008, pp. 184–189).

If we compare the neo-institutional, constructivists, and social-organizational studies, we can clearly identify a core explanation of autonomy literature. The contributions based on understanding of IOs

as full-fledged political actors, here represented by Hawkins et al. (2006), Barnett and Finnemore (2004) and (Koch 2008), stress that autonomy stands for a free scope of action where IOs can apply their own logic of action. The free scope of action is mostly free of interference by states and has been either delegated by states on purpose or has been acquired by IOs themselves.

Having established the core explanation of IO-autonomy, I would like to proceed with IO-authority. Here, I recall insights from *Chapter 4 Research Design* where I reviewed liberal and post-structuralist/constructivist concepts of IO-authority. Authority of IOs explains hierarchical relationships between IOs and other entities like states, societal actors, other IOs and ROs, etc. (see Bradley and Kelley 2008; Cooper et al. 2008; Hooghe et al. 2017; Hooghe et al. 2019; Hooghe and Marks 2014; Lake 2010; Simmerl and Zürn 2016; Zürn et al. 2012). This holds true independent of the meta-theoretical background, delegated or self-induced, legalized, or recognized and contested character (see *ibid*). IOs that possess authority issue decisions that imply consequences for other actors (Bradley and Kelley 2008, p. 8; Cooper et al. 2008, p. 505; Hooghe and Marks 2014, p. 307; Lake 2010, p. 587; Simmerl and Zürn 2016; Zürn et al. 2012, p. 70). As a result, the core explanation of IO-authority lies with analysis of decision-making competencies thanks to which IOs harm or nurture interests of other actors.⁷¹

Nevertheless, by merely analyzing the decision-making dimension, concepts of IO-authority remain to be underspecified. When states delegate decision-making competencies to IOs, they create an actor that does not solely execute their will since, first, the control mechanisms are imperfect (Barnett and Coleman 2005), second, the delegation has to reflect possible future development and thus states give IOs some autonomy (Cooley and Spruyt 2009), and third, states also profit from autonomy delegation since it reduces transaction costs (*ibid*). In the light of these and as well as other contributions, it would be difficult to deny that IOs possess autonomy when disposing of decision-making competencies. Therefore, it is indispensable to conceptualize IO-authority as a two-dimensional concept that accounts for both autonomous and decision-making qualities of IOs.

Whereby concepts of IO-authority often suffer from an under-specification or treat autonomous actor qualities of IOs merely implicitly, concepts of IO-autonomy are afflicted with an analytical overstretch. Such an analytical overstretch makes it even more apparent that autonomy and decision-making competencies shall be integrated into one concept of international authority. As already indicated, the core explanation of autonomy stands for a free scope of action where IOs can apply their own logic of

⁷¹ Apart from the debate on authority of IOs understood as full-fledged political actors, we may also find concepts of authority that would not match the indicated core explanations. For example, Swati Srivastava (2013, p. 72) argues that “[...] IOs are assemblages of diverse actors projecting coherence in order to authorize particular identities, knowledge, and actions.” Thus, IOs can be understood as assemblages of authority which underscore their added value for systemic and social-organizational studies.

action. In short, IO-autonomy refers to an absent relationship. In comparison, the core explanation of authority lies in analyzing of hierarchical relationships between IOs and other political and social actors. Hence, the core explanation of authority underscores that there exists a relationship between IOs and other actors.

Even though autonomy stands in conceptual terms for the absence of a relationship between IOs and other actors, empirical analyses of IO-autonomy frequently claim the opposite. Hereafter, IOs manage to push through their own agenda merely thanks to their autonomy and not their decision-making competencies. As an example, I would like to mention a Principal-Agent study on negotiation behavior of the European Commission (Da Conceição 2010). It situates us into the Doha Development Round. Here, the European Commission bureaucrats were in favor of a liberal trade deal. They received support by a majority of pro-liberal EU members from the beginning on. Nevertheless, all the EU member states had to approve the Doha deal and hence the European Commission had to seek approval of the rest EU members. The author puts forward an argument where the European Commission was able to push through a liberal trade deal thanks to delegated autonomy that allowed the international bureaucrats to negotiate on their own irrespective of conflicting interests among the EU members.

However, I would like to complement that the European Commission successfully acquired an approval of all EU members, since it was increasingly recognized as a symbolic authority, not solely because of the delegated autonomy. In short, the European Commission established a relationship with EU states being skeptical about the liberal trade deal so that they could recognize the international bureaucracy as an appropriate decision-making instance and follow its policy suggestions.⁷²

In summary, concepts and operationalizations of international authority remain underspecified without an explicit integration of autonomous qualities of IOs and concepts and operationalizations of IO-autonomy suffer from an analytical overstretch unless they integrate decision-making competencies of IOs. Therefore, a mutual treatment of both autonomous actor qualities of IOs and their decision-making competencies is indispensable. As a result, I follow the conference contribution by Zürn, Tokhi, and Binder (2015) when operationalizing institutional sources of international authority. The authors set three dimensions of international authority: first, decision-making competencies, second, autonomy, and third, number of policy fields.⁷³ Nevertheless, I do not make use of all three dimensions. The number of policy fields does not vary in my analysis as the SP UNHRC

⁷² Another example of an analytical overstretch inherent to autonomy research can be the study *The Anatomy of Autonomy: An Institutional Account of Variation in Supranational Influence* by Jonas Tallberg (2000).

⁷³ The authors refer to “bindingness” instead of “decision-making competencies.” I find the later expression to be more appropriate for international monitoring authority as monitoring reports does not work with direct enforcement mechanisms.

monitor only human rights. Hence, I capture decision-making competencies and autonomy of the SP UNHRC inscribed in diplomatic speeches voiced during their reform process.

Generating data: Qualitative content analysis

Even though the reform process includes a vast number of speeches, quantitative data collection procedures would not allow me to ensure sufficient validity of data. Therefore, I rely on qualitative data generation methods. Below, I compare qualitative data generating procedures and justify why I rely on qualitative content analysis as envisioned by Philip Mayring (2010a, 2010b, 2015; Mayring and Brunner 2009). Furthermore, I present a coding frame that—on the hand—allows me to interpret statements made in favor of strengthening or weakening the SP UNHRC and—on the other—provides a summary of the whole reform process.⁷⁴

To assess how the institutional authority of the SP UNHRC shall be modified according to societal and political actors, I scrutinize diplomatic statements voiced by states during the reform in 2006, 2007, and 2010. In the statements, diplomats demand to revise decision-making competencies and autonomy of the international monitoring bureaucracy. In 2006, participants made their opening statements or presented even whole policy papers. The negotiations continued in 2007. Until 2010, there was a negotiation break. In 2010, the facilitators of the reform process asked diplomatic missions to submit statements regarding core topics identified in previous years (UNHRC Working Group 2010). The year 2011 witnessed only speeches evaluating the reform outcome document.⁷⁵ I secluded these out of the analysis since I am interested in delegation preferences understood as input for reform processes. Hence, even though the reform process lasted officially until 2011, no data stems from this year.

Whilst the regular sessions of the UNHRC are imprinted in protocols, the reform process did not foresee minutes of the meetings. Instead, diplomatic staff was invited to submit statements in a text form. These texts are stored on the server called Extranet of the Human Rights Council (in short

⁷⁴ To cross-check the role of diplomatic speeches during negotiation routines at the floor of UN, I joined the UNHRC as an observer from November 2017 to January 2018. I was present at several meetings of the Open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights that was negotiating an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises. I also attended sessions of the Universal Periodic Review. I am grateful to my second supervisor, Prof. Dr. Stephanie Hofmann, and the Graduate Institute of International and Development studies, that facilitated my research stay in the UNHRC. The research stay allowed me especially to cross-validate face-to-face interactions with text material and adjust the configuration of statistical methods and modeling strategy to the daily negotiation business.

⁷⁵ The outcome is captured in the UNHRC Resolution 16/21 Review of the work and functioning of the Human Rights Council (2011).

Extranet)⁷⁶ together with statements made by IOs like the OIC, ROs like the AU, UN regional groups like the Latina American and Caribbean group, NGOs, as well as the SP UNHRC staff. I retrieved all statements made by permanent missions of states to the UN since my research question asks about delegation preferences voiced by states, understood as mediated representative claims. The length of statements varies from one paragraph to several pages.

The main text-based methods ranging from most qualitative to most quantitative count objective hermeneutics, qualitative content analysis and quantitative content analysis.⁷⁷ I decided to qualitatively generate data by applying a qualitative content analysis. Essentially, qualitative content analysis allows me to interpret parts of several hundreds diplomatic statements and decide whether the authors speak in favor of strengthening or weakening decision-making competencies or are in favor of enhancing or decreasing of autonomy of the SP UNHRC. The most useful feature of the qualitative content analysis, as envisioned by the leading European author Philipp Mayring, is the ability to interpret, compare, and quantify qualitative data. The qualitative content analysis is used to handle large text corpora meanwhile making rules of interpretation transparent (2010a, 2010b, 2015; Mayring and Brunner 2009).

Objective hermeneutics might be applied to reconstruct latent structures of meaning behind action of single actors (Lamnek and Krell 2010, pp. 186–189). This method foresees a fine-grained inductive procedure that goes beyond the manifested text and can be successful only if the context is considered (Lamnek and Krell 2010, pp. 188–189). Since the diplomatic speech strives to avoid misunderstanding *per se*, there is no need to apply objective hermeneutics. Moreover, the complex interpretative procedures would overburden the researcher if confronted with three years of negotiations counting about 70 actors. Hence, in contrast to the qualitative content analysis, objective hermeneutic offers and demands more than my research interest require.

If objective hermeneutics exceeds my research interests by employing too open interpretative procedures, then quantitative content analysis foresees too standardized data collection procedures. The deductive procedures of quantitative analysis measure, weight, and count frequencies and proportions of comparable text fragments (Krippendorff 2013). At this point, the quantitative content analysis does not fit my text material. The diplomatic language is on the one hand straightforward, yet

⁷⁶ The server is free to access. Acquire log-in credentials for the Extranet at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/pages/hrcregistration.aspx>. All statements for 2006 and 2007 were downloaded from the website Working Group on the review of mandates and mechanisms <https://extranet2.ohchr.org/Extranets/HRCExtranet/portal/page/portal/HRCExtranet/WG-ReviewMechanisms.html>. Statements from 2010 stem from the Compilation of State Proposals, UN Doc. A/HRC/WG.8/1/CRP.1/Rev.1 (UNHRC 2011).

⁷⁷ Another text-based method could be discourse analysis. Discourse analysis, however, is employed rather as a method to establish a relationship between explanatory variable(s) and dependent variable(s). My purpose here is simpler. I need to generate data for the dependent variable.

on the other it is not standardized. Hence, fragments of texts cannot be directly compared without interpretation. Moreover, some of the statements were uploaded to the Extranet in hand-written form or their poor quality does not allow to apply vocabulary based full-text search which is a technical condition for quantitative content analysis.

There are three chief procedures of the qualitative content analysis: summary, explication, and structuring. First, researchers apply the inductive summary procedure to reduce text to its core elements. Second, scientists choose the explication procedure if there are ambiguous parts of text. Here, they consult the context to determine a single meaning. Third, the structuring procedure helps researchers to cross-evaluate text in order to identify content elements of interest. Hereto, scientists create categories in a deductive procedure. The categories represent certain content and are used to systematize large text corpora. Especially the structuring procedure figures as an intermediary between qualitative and quantitative approaches.⁷⁸ (Mayring 2015, pp. 65–114)

I applied the structuring procedure to interpret and systematize parts of diplomatic speeches referring to the authority of SP UNHRC. Even though structuring foresees that I start with theory and define what authority of SP UNHRC stands for, it is indispensable to run a pilot study (Mayring 2010a, p. 603). The pilot study helped me to finalize the category-system (/coding frame) and thus to ensure that all relevant aspects of the authority of SP UNHRC are captured. Into the pilot, I integrated 20 countries (approximately half autocracies and democracies), generated at least five codes per country throughout the years 2006, 2007, and 2010 (if full coverage throughout the time-span was available), and also randomly checked statements made by ten non-state entities like NGOs, IOs, and ROs.

An interplay between the theory-driven categories and the pilot study resulted into a category-system as captured in Table A-1 Qualitative Content Analysis which is placed in the Annex.⁷⁹ The category-system presents coding rules, categories and sub-categories alongside with their definitions, captures corresponding negotiation topics, and gives examples of coded segments. My primary data-generation interest lied with interpretation of whether diplomatic statements were voiced either in favor strengthening or weakening the authority of SP UNHRC. To arrive at such results, I created coding rules that unambiguously systematized parts of diplomatic speeches along the two Main categories *1 Strengthen authority* and *2 Weaken authority*, hence resulting into dichotomous data. It was necessary to build a rather complex category-system even though the purpose was to generate

⁷⁸ There are two other versions of the structuring procedure that do not systematize contents but concentrate on form, type, and scale of text material. For more see Mayring (2015, pp. 97–115).

⁷⁹ The category-system is a qualitative version of what quantitative approaches call data collection instrument.

“merely” dichotomous data. The category-system allowed me to directly contrast parts of text and thus make unequivocal interpretations when deciding about the final 1029 codes.⁸⁰

The category-system can be also seen as a summary of the three year-long negotiations. I would like to briefly present the institutional sources of authority that were negotiated during the reform together with the category-system. Throughout the negotiations, there were two overarching positions. When diplomatic missions were striving to weaken the SP, they were trying to implement intergovernmental institutional features into the transnational design of the monitoring bureaucracy. Put simply, states shall have more say, not human rights experts. Speakers favoring strengthening the monitoring bureaucracy strived to keep its transnational design or even boost it. State interests shall be of lower priority than expert opinion when conducting monitoring missions and disseminating the results.

The category-system is structured around the two Main categories of *1 Strengthen authority* and *2 Weaken authority*. A delegation preference that belongs to the *Main category 1 Strengthen authority* is either in favor of decision-making competencies or is in favor of autonomy of the SP UNHRC. *Vice versa*, a delegation preference that belongs to the *Main category 2 Weaken authority* either strives to weaken decision-making competencies or favors limiting autonomy of the SP UNHRC. The smallest coding unit is a sentence. The largest coding unit is three paragraphs long. To qualify as a code, the text material must be identifiable with one of the Sub-categories integrated into respective Main categories.

The *Sub-category 1.1 Strengthen decision-making competencies* includes codes where the speakers favor institutional features that allow the SP UNHRC to issue judgments on compliance with human rights. The *Topic 1.1.1 Mandate* contains statements where the monitoring mandates shall be easy to establish, cover most human rights crises, and the SP UNHRC shall exercise an early warning function, conduct fact-finding missions for the UNHRC, and monitor implementation of recommendations made earlier. The SP UNHRC shall further on strengthen their capacity building activities provided for states and carry out on-the-ground missions. The *Topic 1.1.2 Cooperation of states with SP UNHRC* captures negotiation statements where cooperation of governments with mandate holders is binding and that the SP UNHRC can pressure governments if they refuse to cooperate. The *Topic 1.1.3 Reporting* contains statements pledging for an enhanced dissemination of monitoring results and disclosure of communication between the SP UNHRC and states. Arguments associated with *Topic 1.1.4 Integration in human rights regime* aim to ensure that the SP UNHRC can cooperate with a broad variety of human rights stakeholders, are better organized and integrated in the UN human rights institutions, and

⁸⁰ I used the MAXQDA software to carry out the qualitative content analysis.

non-governmental actors can contribute to their reform process. Finally, statements categorized under *Topic 1.1.5 Hiring procedure for SP UNHRC personnel* aim to ensure a transnational form of the monitoring bureaucracy where human rights expertise is prioritized over national interests.

When statements do not address decision-making procedures of the monitoring bureaucracy, they might concern the *Sub-category 2.2 Enhance autonomy* to qualify as codes in favor of strengthening the monitoring bureaucracy. Here, speakers favor institutional features that allow the SP UNHRC to apply an own logic of action. Put differently, the SP UNHRC do not need to follow orders issued by states. The negotiations included statements on the *Topic 2.2.1 Accountability*. The SP UNHRC shall not be a subject of new accountability mechanisms envisioned by states but should rather preserve their independence from inter- and governmental actors. Regarding the *Topic 2.2.2 Reporting*, the mandate holders shall be allowed to choose sources of information on their own. And finally, states shall enhance the autonomy of SP UNHRC by securing enough financial, institutional, personal capacities, and to allow for donations, according to statements embraced under the *Topic 2.2.3 Resources*.

On the contrary, parts of text that are either against decision-making competencies or are against autonomy of the SP UNHRC qualify as codes within the *Main category 2 Weaken authority*. The *Sub-category 2.1 Weaken decision-making competencies* systematizes statements in favor of institutional measures that hinder SP UNHRC to issue judgments on compliance with human rights. Opponents of authority delegation to the SP UNHRC reflected same Topics as its supporters did.

The *Topic 2.1.1 Mandate* organizes texts aiming to limit the number of monitored human rights crises, introduce less standardized rules for establishment of mandates, and avoid overlap of mandates and visits in host countries. Furthermore, the SP UNHRC shall refrain from monitoring and carry out only capacity building activities or offer expert advice, prioritize existing mandates over the early warning function, and balance economic, social, cultural, political, and civil rights instead of a prevailing focus on political and civil rights. Regarding the *Topic 2.1.2 Cooperation of states* with SP, states shall not be required to issue a standing invitation for the monitoring missions, the SP UNHRC shall refrain from blaming and shaming of governments in instances of non-cooperation, and there should be more opportunities to meet the mandate holders bilaterally. The *Topic 2.1.3 Reporting* includes statements striving to limit the dissemination of monitoring results, governments shall to some extent co-author the reports, and the reports might make more realistic recommendations. According to the statements in the *Topic 2.1.4 Integration in human rights regime*, the SP UNHRC shall be less interconnected with other human rights institutions and stakeholders, less internally organized, the UNHRC is superior to the SP, and reforms might include only governmental participants. Authors of speeches included in the *Topic 2.1.5 Hiring procedure for SP UNHRC personnel* aim to limit the expertise and experience of

mandate holders, involve governmental actors into the selection process, and value diversity of candidates over their human rights expertise.

And of course, there is a second option how statements get categorized as being in favor of weakening the SP UNHRC: Authors favor institutional features that hinder the SP UNHRC to apply own logic of action, as defined for the *Sub-category 2.2: Decrease autonomy*. The *Topic 2.2.1 Accountability* contains statements that negotiate new accountability mechanisms, strive to decrease ambiguity of mandates, and introduce regular reform of the SP UNHRC to avoid back-door development. The *Topic 2.2.2 Reporting* subsumes appeals to increase transparency of financing, liability of mandate holders, reporting on fulfillment of mandates, and suggests governments as primary sources of information. Finally, the *Topic 2.2.3 Resources* categorizes statements that forbid donations to the SP, foresee equal support for all mandates, or foresee that the UNHRC or states allocate resources case by case.

The difference between strengthening or weakening authority is unambiguous. For example, Belgium issued in 2010 a delegation preference favoring autonomy “Preserve effective and independent functioning of Special procedures system, opposes any proposal to go beyond the existing mechanisms designed to address the professional conduct of mandate holders.” Such a delegation preference opposes the statement made by Philippines in 2006 aiming to decrease autonomy “We’d support calls to establish a comprehensive manual, including a code of conduct, for all special procedures, in order to bring more coherence and predictability to their work and improve relations between mandate holders and governments.”

Meanwhile, the systematization into Sub-categories or their respective Topics is not always straightforward. For instance, the statement made by Bangladesh in 2010 “Channel all funding through the OHCHR and their provisions should be transparent.” could potentially belong to the *Topic 2.2.1 Accountability* or the *Topic 2.2.2 Reporting*. The Topics themselves are not part of the Coding rule. The Topics systematize the rich text material in detail. Thanks to the Topics it was rather effortless for me to navigate through the vast negotiation process and contrast statements to decide on their dichotomous coding in the vein of strengthening or weakening authority. Hence, a potential association with different Topics within one Main category would not impact the coding result.

Nevertheless, there were statements that I was unable to code or that were not of my data generation interest. Most of the diplomatic statements were either in favor of weakening or strengthening the international authority. A few statements, however, had a balanced content and thus would not match neither of the two Main categories. For instance, Thailand issued a balanced statements in 2007 “The initiative to draft a Code of Conduct for the mandate holders could be relevant and useful if it is not too specific but provide general guidelines and avoids duplication with the existing Working Manual,

while respecting the independence of the mandate holders.” Thailand is at this point cautious to limit the autonomy but elaborates on an instrument—the Code of Conduct—that was used by the opposition of the monitoring bureaucracy to tie its hands. I excluded such text material out of the analysis as the motives of speakers were not clearly to categorize. Moreover, the reform process witnessed organizational talk like when does the next voting takes place etc. Of course, these do not belong to the analysis as well as they do not regard the monitoring authority of SP UNHRC.

In summary, I applied a rather “qualitatively orientated” than purely “qualitative” content analysis (Mayring 2010a, p. 604) to generate dichotomous data for the dependent variable of delegation preferences. I decided to generate data by interpreting and systematizing parts of a large text corpora and quantified its contents. Some researchers prefer to apply qualitative content analysis to even establish relationships between independent and dependent variables and hence rely on more qualitative proceedings (e.g. Yanow 2006). I establish the causal inference between independent and dependent variables by applying fractional logistic regression. As already the name of the method suggests, I further transformed the dichotomous data into a format of fractions. This is, however, a topic that I elaborate in full length in Subsection 5.3. Methods of inference and modeling strategy. Before turning to this, I present data employed for explanatory variables.


5.2. Regime type classification, explanatory and control variables

The research question asks about explanation of authority delegation preferences voiced by autocracies and democracies. Hence, there is no other way but to provide for a dichotomous measure of authoritarian and democratic regimes. Furthermore, to deliver a plausible explanation, I open up the regime types and investigate the explanatory potential of first, domestic societal actors, second, domestic institutions, and third, an interplay of moral and economic interdependencies. Therefore, I also operationalize these aspects. I rely mostly on native V-DEM data as well as indices and components based on these as published in releases number 8 (Coppedge et al. 2018b) and release number 9 (Coppedge et al. 2019a). The V-DEM team collects data by conducting expert interviews whereas the experts come from all over the world. The feature that I value the most is the *de-facto* assessment which goes beyond scrutinizing governmental documents. These can be especially in authoritarian regimes mere instances of window dressing. Additionally, I utilize data from other projects being integrated in the V-DEM dataverse. Moreover, I draw also on World Development Indicators (World Bank 2019). Having operationalized the regime types, explanatory, control, and dependent variables, I will be able to present the method of inference and respective modeling strategy in the upcoming Subsection 5.3.

Classification of autocracies and democracies

It is far from trivial to discriminate between autocracies and democracies. Anna Lührmann, Marcus Tannenberg, and Staffan Lindberg (2018, pp. 60–66), point to a growing ambiguity of regime types from 1900 to 2018, see Figure 5. Together with the third wave of democratization, the ambiguity between authoritarian and democratic regimes peaked in 1990s as the black line shows. It remained high until 2018. In 2016, 12% of all countries were difficult to categorize. The challenge mainstream Comparative Politics research faces is the fact that most regimes carry out *de-jure* multiparty elections with universal suffrage. Elections shall ensure that political leaders are at least partially accountable to citizens. Elections that figure as partially free or somewhat competitive merely on the paper are instances of window dressing. Such elections shall ensure longevity of authoritarian incumbents. As a result of pseudo-democratic elections, many quantitative measures overestimate the number of democracies.

Figure 5: Ambiguity of regimes



Source: Lührmann et al. 2018, p. 66

Lührmann, Tannenberg, and Lindberg (2018), use V-DEM data to construct a regime type measure that avoids such an overestimation. It is called Regimes of the World measure (RoW). First, the V-DEM data is collected by expert interviews that capture *de-facto* aspects of domestic institutions and processes. Second, the authors do not rely merely on the assessment of elections to dichotomize regimes into either democracies or autocracies. They account for minimal prerequisites of liberal democracy as well.

These allow citizens to participate in the political system throughout the legislative period, and not only on the ballot day. Hence, they draw on Robert Dahl’s concept of polyarchy.

The authors build a four-point ordinal measure of political regimes. Regimes are accordingly classified as closed autocracies, electoral autocracies, electoral democracies, and liberal democracies. Table 3 provides a summary. Both closed and electoral autocracies do not hold *de-facto* multiparty, or free and fair elections. Also, minimal prerequisites of participation throughout the legislative period are not given. In contrast, electoral democracies and liberal democracies carry out *de-facto* multiparty, free and fair elections. They satisfy minimal institutional features that allow citizens to participate in the political system beyond the ballot day. Controlling for minimal institutional prerequisites gives the RoW a comparative advantage when compared with other classifications or whole datasets relying merely on measurement of electoral institutions. (Lührmann et al. 2018)

Table 3: Regime classification

Closed Autocracy	Electoral Autocracy	Electoral Democracy	Liberal Democracy
No <i>de-facto</i> multiparty, or free and fair elections, or Dahl’s institutional prerequisites not minimally fulfilled		<i>De-facto</i> multiparty, free and fair elections, and Dahl’s institutional prerequisites minimally fulfilled	
No multiparty elections for the chief executive or the legislature	<i>De-jure</i> multiparty elections for the chief executive and the legislature	The rule of law, or liberal principles not satisfied	The rule of law, and liberal principles satisfied

Source: Lührmann et al. 2018, p. 63

As a result of such a classification and measurement exercise, the RoW avoids the perils of an overestimation. The RoW sets higher standards for regimes to qualify as a democracy in order to filter out instances of mere window dressing in favor of authoritarian politics. The authors of RoW state that “[...] a comparison of disagreements with extant datasets (7%–12% of the country-years), demonstrates that the RoW classification is more conservative, classifying regimes with electoral manipulation and infringements of the political freedoms more frequently as electoral autocracies, suggesting that it better captures the opacity of contemporary autocracies (Lührmann et al. 2018, p. 60).”

Since its first release in 2014, the discipline of Comparative Politics embraced the V-DEM data quickly. The discipline of International Relations must fully discover the potential of several hundreds of V-DEM indicators and indices yet. International Relations research in general as well as studies on delegation preferences in particular often incorporate data from Democracy-Dictatorship (e.g. Tallberg et al. 2016), Freedom House (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2014), and especially Polity databases (e.g. Hafner-Burton et al. 2015), to determine the regime type. The Freedom House and Polity datasets do not offer a clear-cut dichotomization for autocracies and democracies *per se*. The native data of Polity foresee

a classification of anocracies, regimes “in the middle” (Marshall et al. 2010). Likewise, the original data of Freedom House classifies hybrid regimes as “partly free” (Freedom House 2017) and thus subverts setting a threshold for a dichotomous regime type measure. In contrast, the Democracy-Dictatorship dataset was made to discriminate between autocracies and democracies.

The authors of RoW claim to outperform all three named datasets when it comes to dichotomous classification of regimes. Researchers used Freedom House and Polity continuous measures to determine—to some extent—arbitrary cut-off points for a dichotomous discrimination (Bogaards 2012; Lührmann et al. 2018, p. 62). Regarding the Freedom House, Matthijs Bogaards counted 14 different ways to set the threshold (2012). He also identified 18 alternatives for Polity data (ibid). The RoW escapes the allegation of being arbitrary as the authors interpret the cut-off point: Regimes are classified as authoritarian when they do not hold *de-facto* multiparty, free and fair, elections. Furthermore, the Democracy-Dictatorship discrimination foresees coding rules that raise questions of concept validity (Lührmann et al. 2018, p. 61). For instance, according to Dahl’s criteria, it takes more than two legal parties to ensure electoral competitiveness, whereby the authors of Democracy-Dictatorship find more than one legal party enough for democratic contestation (ibid).

Taking the significant conceptual and performance advantages, I discriminate between autocracies and democracies in the models using only one classification, the RoW. Somewhat differently, I provide for a manifold operationalization of explanatory variables. Around the hypotheses on societal actors and domestic institutions, I build small clusters of data sources that figure as nearest operationalization possibilities. This allows me, on the one hand, to interpret fine grained differences in explanatory power of single operationalizations. On the other, it enables me to perform a robustness check.

Societal actors

Societal actors turn to domestic governments to represent their interests in the international realm. The first hypothesis seeks to test the explanatory potential of societal actors for authority delegation preferences voiced by autocracies and democracies: The more societal actors can participate, the higher the support of IHROs.⁸¹ Authoritarian mode of governance relies more on repression than legitimation. Therefore, autocracies allow less societal actors than democracies do. Democratic mode of government is based rather on legitimation than repression. Thus, democracies allow more societal actors compared to authoritarian regimes.

The theory-led operationalization tells me to refer to Moravcsik’s work. His understanding of domestic societal actors includes almost every type of non-governmental actors like individuals, NGOs,

⁸¹ H1: *The more societal actors can participate on the domestic level, the higher the probability that states will favor authority delegation to IHROs.*

movements, trade and labor unions, media, private companies, etc. (1997, pp. 516–517, 2009, p. 1). Of my key interest is to operationalize to what extent societal actors can participate on the domestic level. By *extent*, I mean how many types of societal actors can participate and in how far their participatory rights are *de-facto* protected. The multifaceted operationalization of societal actors is summarized in Table 4.

Table 4: Operationalization of societal actors

Index	Civil liberties index	Political civil liberties index	Diagonal accountability index
Sub-index	Political civil liberties index Private civil liberties index Physical integrity index		
Actors	Academia Cultural subjects Civil society organizations Citizens Journalists Media Parties Private companies Religious subjects	Academia Cultural subjects Civil society organizations Citizens Journalists Media Parties	Academia Cultural subjects Civil society organizations Citizens Journalists Media

Here, the nearest match with New Liberalism is the *Civil liberties index*: “Civil liberty is understood as liberal freedom, where freedom is a property of individuals. Civil liberty is constituted by the absence of physical violence committed by government agents and the absence of constraints of private liberties and political liberties by the government (Coppedge et al. 2018a, p. 229).” The true value of this index becomes apparent only when I reveal the measurement of its three sub-indices: First, the *Political civil liberties index* stands for: “Political liberties are understood as freedom of association and freedom of expression. Among the set of civil liberties, these liberal rights are the most relevant for political competition and accountability. The index is based on indicators that reflect government repression and that are not directly referring to elections (ibid).” In detail, it measures participatory rights or their repression of media outlets, journalists, academic and cultural subjects, parties, civil society organizations (movements, NGOs, trade and labor unions), and individuals. Second, the *Private civil liberties index* represents: “Private liberties are understood as freedom of movement, freedom of religion, freedom from forced labor, and property rights. The index is based on indicators that reflect government repression and that are not directly referring to elections (ibid, p. 230).” Hence, the list of included societal actors counts additionally religious subjects and private companies. Third, the

Physical violence index does not add any new societal actors on the list but measures to what extent governments refrain from torture and political killings of oppositional societal actors (ibid, p. 229).⁸²

Except for the overarching *Civil liberties index*, I test the standalone explanatory potential of its sub-index *Political civil liberties index*. This shall allow me to find out whether a closer circle of societal actors deliver better explanations than a broader range including also private companies. This comparison addresses a debate whether societal actors shall be understood as being exclusive or inclusive of private companies.⁸³ Moreover, I add data labeled as the *Diagonal accountability index* into the analysis. “Diagonal accountability covers the range of actions and mechanisms that citizens, civil society organizations, and an independent media can use to hold the government accountable. These mechanisms include using informal tools such as social mobilization and investigative journalism to enhance vertical and horizontal accountability (ibid, p. 224-225).” In detail, the *Diagonal accountability index* investigates the role of media, journalists, civil society organizations, academia and cultural subjects, and citizens (ibid). Compared to the *Civil liberties index*, it does not include parties and private companies.

Domestic institutions

The second hypothesis investigates the role of domestic institutions that select whose societal interests will states incorporate into authority delegation preferences.⁸⁴ The less representative such a selection is, the higher the probability that states will disadvantage large shares of societal actors and the more leeway governments gain to pursue own interests. New Liberalism itself is not specific enough which institutions to analyze. Nevertheless, its theoretical roots in republican liberalism helped me to deduce that I shall investigate the explanatory potential of electoral institutions, oversight mechanisms / checks and balances, and rule of law.

Electoral institutions

Republican liberalism with its democratic peace agenda devoted an extraordinary attention to electoral institutions. Therefore, I create a sub-cluster for electoral institutions. It includes following three measurements: *Electoral democracy index*, *Vertical accountability index*, and *Clean elections index*. First, the authors of *Electoral democracy index* clarify that: “The electoral principle of democracy

⁸² As the *Civil liberties index* includes many liberal freedoms which are inscribed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948), the question arises if it operationalizes liberal human rights. A brief comparison of the index and the Universal Declaration reveals substantial differences. For instance, Articles 6 to 11 speak to establishment of rule of law which is not a part of the index. Furthermore, rights to food, education, leisure, etc., are not included in the index as well.

⁸³ See summary by Jonathan Fox (2015).

⁸⁴ H2: *The better domestic institutions represent the interests of all societal actors, the higher the probability that states will favor authority delegation to IHROs.*

seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate's approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance (Coppedge et al. 2018a, p. 40).” Second, the *Vertical accountability index* (Mechkova et al. 2019) represents: “Vertical accountability captures the extent to which citizens have the power to hold the government accountable. The mechanisms of vertical accountability include formal political participation on part of the citizens — such as being able to freely organize in political parties— and participate in free and fair elections, including for the chief executive (Coppedge et al. 2018a, p. 224).” Third, the *Clean elections index* measures “[...] absence of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election violence (ibid, 2018a, p. 44, modified by author).”

Oversight mechanisms / checks and balances

Another type of domestic institutions that influence the degree of representativeness of societal interest are oversight mechanisms / checks and balances. These remind governments to abide from self-interested politics on daily basis and work in favor of societal actors instead. Here, I integrate three indices into models: *Horizontal accountability index* (Mechkova et al. 2019), *Legislative constraints on the executive index*, and *Legislature investigates in practice*. First, “Horizontal accountability concerns the power of state institutions to oversee the government by demanding information, questioning officials and punishing improper behavior. This form of accountability ensures checks between institutions and prevents the abuse of power. The key agents in horizontal government accountability are: the legislature; the judiciary; and specific oversight agencies such as ombudsmen, prosecutor and comptroller generals (Coppedge et al. 2018a, pp. 225–226).” Second, *Legislative constraints on the executive index* captures “To what extent are the legislature and government agencies e.g., comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive (ibid, p. 46)?” Third, *Legislature investigates in practice* (Pemstein et al. 2020) captures “If the executive were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a legislative body (perhaps a whole chamber, perhaps a committee, whether aligned with government or opposition) would conduct an investigation that would result in a decision or report that is unfavorable to the executive (Coppedge et al. 2018a, pp. 134–135)?”

Rule of law

Moving to an operationalization of rule of law, I would like to recall its systemic functions. First, rule of law shall ensure that interests of societal actors are equalized. Second, in a political system with established rule of law politicians experience a shadow of hierarchy and thus are more likely to abide from a self-interested policies or can be in retrospective punished for breaking the law.

I employ three indices to operationalize rule of law. The V-DEM dataset provides the *Rule of law index (V-DEM)* and *Judicial constraints on the executive index*. The *Rule of law index (V-DEM)* gives answers to the question “To what extent are laws transparently, independently, predictably, impartially, and equally enforced, and to what extent do the actions of government officials comply with the law (Coppedge et al. 2018a, p. 269)?” The *Judicial constraints on the executive index* captures “To what extent does the executive respect the constitution and comply with court rulings, and to what extent is the judiciary able to act in an independent fashion (ibid, p. 46)?”

Furthermore, I rely on World Wide Governance Indicators (WGI) as processed by Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay as well and integrate the their *Rule of law index (WB)* (2016). Compared to V-DEM, expert interviews are not the only source of data. The WGI estimates stem from surveys of households and firms and combine expert assessments produced by societal organizations (all specified as agents) (Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010). As defined by the authors, the rule of law consists of indicators that “[...] measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions and the extent to which property rights are protected (Coppedge et al. 2018a, p. 292, modified by author).”

Interplay of moral and material interdependencies

Regarding the interplay of moral and material interdependencies, I assume that “The wealthier authoritarian regimes are, the more easily they can escape asymmetric moral interdependencies, and thus the higher the probability that they will be against authority delegation to IHROs. The wealthier democracies are, the higher the probability that they will be in favor of authority delegation to IHROs.” To operationalize such assumptions, I interact regime type with wealth. I apply the RoW classification to discriminate between autocracies and democracies. Furthermore, I capture wealth as GDP per capita as made available by the authors of Maddison Project Database 2018 (Bolt et al. 2018) and integrated in log base 10 version in the V-DEM dataverse (Coppedge et al. 2019b, p. 326). The authors are known for enabling researches to go back far in time and making comparisons of contemporary

and Roman empire economic indicators (Bolt et al. 2018). I especially value another feature since my project requires data only for the time span from 2006 to 2010. The authors accounted for regional economic development when modeling the historical as well as contemporary real GDP values to make cross-country comparisons more reliable (ibid, pp. 3-4). Hence, their data fits my analytical purposes as my sample includes countries from every political-geographic region.

Control variable: Politico-geographic regions

Apart of states or NGOs, the reform of UNHRC was negotiated by regional entities like the UN regional groups and ROs. Moreover, scholars demonstrated effects of regional groupings in the UN system (Panke 2013; Panke et al. 2016; see also Panke et al. 2018). To account for regional effects, I include the control variable of politico-geographic regions (see Teorell et al. 2020) into models: “Regions are described as politico-geographic in the sense that they are based on geographical proximity as well as characteristics that contribute to regional understanding as identified by scholars in studies of democratization (e.g. post-Communist) (Coppedge et al. 2018a, p. 323).” I adjusted the data provided by V-DEM so that it matches the negotiation patterns of the reform process.⁸⁵

Furthermore, both qualitative (Hulse and der Vleuten 2016; Jetschke 2015) and quantitative literature (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015) arrive to the results that FDI and/or net ODA can increase willingness to delegate authority to IHROs. Unfortunately, I was not able to include the control variables of FDI and net ODA into my analysis. Their inclusion would either decrease the overall sample or make it fluctuate throughout the analytical process. This would in turn hinder comparison of result across models which requires a constant number of observations.

In summary, the discrimination between autocracies and democracies is based primary on electoral quality combined with a participatory minimum. The operationalization of societal actors, domestic institutions, and interplay of moral and material interdependencies, do not incorporate electoral measures except for the sub-cluster on electoral institutions. In the upcoming Section 5.3. I present a modeling strategy that avoids conceptual overlap of the explanatory variables and the regime type measure as well as accounts for potential multicollinearity issues.

5.3. Methods of inference and modeling strategy

Before turning to the modeling strategy, I would like to present the method of inference. Even though the dependent variable captures the authority delegation preferences on a dichotomous scale, I do

⁸⁵ The original data foresees following responses on country level 1: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 2: Latin America and the Caribbean, 3: The Middle East and North Africa (including Israel and Turkey), 4: Sub-Saharan Africa, 5: Western Europe and North America (including Cyprus, Australia, and New Zealand), 6: Asia and Pacific. I renamed response 5 to “Western alliance” and included the Czech Republic, Israel, Japan, and South Korea. These countries engaged in coalition building with countries from Western Europe and North America.

not exactly employ logistic regression models. I implement fractional logistic regression instead. It fits my research interest better and subverts data-structure scenarios causing autocorrelation as I explain later in detail. In the first step, I describe the transformation of binary dependent variable data into fractions. In the second step, I present the fractional logistic regression and its conditions. In the third step, I describe the modeling strategy that will allow me to compare explanatory potential of societal actors, domestic institutions, and interplay of interdependencies. In the following Chapter 6, I disclose descriptive statistics, present, and interpret results of multiple models and consult related research.

Fractional logistic regression

As a result of the qualitative content analysis, I can determine where single diplomatic statements strive to weaken or strengthen the monitoring authority of the SP UNHRC. When incorporated into a quantitative model, I would explain how come that single parts of diplomatic speeches stand for weakening or strengthening the SP UNHRC. From a conceptual standpoint, such a research goal is not interesting. I suggest explaining a broader picture instead. Such a broader picture depicts a total share of statements in favor of authority delegation per country and year. Put differently, instead of explaining what, for example, Israeli diplomats expressed in one statement in 2006, I explain an “overall attitude” towards the SP UNHRC in 2006. Such an attitude consists of all statements made by a country throughout the whole year.

In technical terms, I transform the dichotomous dependent variable into fractions⁸⁶. A fraction represents the percentual share of all codings in favor of strengthening expressed per country and year divided by the total number of codings made per country and year. For example, Cuba voiced zero statements in favor of strengthening in 2006. Cuban diplomats made altogether 28 statements that qualified as codings in 2006 (/Cuba voiced 28 times the wish to weaken the SP UNHRC):

$$0 / 28 = 0$$

Furthermore, in 2010, Cuba made one statement in favor of strengthening and total of five statements qualified as codings (/Cuba strived four times to weaken the SP UNHRC):

$$1 / 5 = 0,2$$

The following tables compare the original dichotomous dependent variable with a new version of the dependent variable captured in fractions. Together with the transformation into fractions, a new and more appropriate data-structure comes into play. The data-structure had to be modified because of autocorrelation caused by repeated values on the side of explanatory variables as displayed in Table 5. For instance, the data counts seven codings for Colombia in 2010 but the values of the *Electoral*

⁸⁶ Fractions might be called proportions, rates, indices, or probabilities, as well.

democracy index as captured in the last column remain constant throughout 2010 and thus inevitable lead to autocorrelation. The new data-structure—depicted in Table 6—avoids such problems. As a result, I worked with a cross-section time-series data-structure.

Table 5: Dependent variable – dichotomous

	country_name	year	delegation_01	v2x_polyarchy
298	Colombia	2010	1	.5701934
299	Colombia	2010	0	.5701934
300	Colombia	2010	1	.5701934
301	Colombia	2010	0	.5701934
302	Colombia	2007	0	.5310835
303	Colombia	2010	1	.5701934
304	Colombia	2010	0	.5701934
305	Colombia	2007	0	.5310835
306	Colombia	2010	0	.5701934
307	Costa Rica	2010	1	.8917272
308	Cuba	2006	0	.1001388
309	Cuba	2006	0	.1001388
310	Cuba	2010	1	.1599479
311	Cuba	2006	0	.1001388
312	Cuba	2006	0	.1001388

Table 6: Dependent variable - fractions


	country_name	year	dvfrac_year	cnt_infavor_year	cnt_total_year	v2x_polyarchy
21	Canada	2006	.9230769	84	91	.8600331
22	Canada	2007	.8666667	13	15	.8476859
23	Canada	2010	1	4	4	.8457213
24	Chile	2010	1	9	9	.8573461
25	China	2010	0	0	10	.0831593
26	China	2006	.125	3	24	.0864789
27	Colombia	2007	0	0	2	.5310835
28	Colombia	2010	.4285714	3	7	.5701934
29	Costa Rica	2010	1	1	1	.8917272
30	Cuba	2010	.2	1	5	.1599479
31	Cuba	2006	0	0	28	.1001388

The fractions themselves, however, insufficiently represent daily negotiation business at the floor of UN. It makes namely a difference to what extent permanent missions engage in the reform process. For example, Maldives pledged once in favor of strengthening in 2010 and it was the only coding

available for the year (1/1=1,00). Turkey supported delegation of authority five times in 2010 out of total five codings (5/5=1,00). Thus, both Maldives and Turkey get assigned a fraction of 1,00. However, the support of SP UNHRC by Turkey was more intensive than by Maldives. Put simply, Turkey was even more in favor of delegation than Maldives were. To account for such differences, I employ frequency weighting for the dependent variable. Every fraction is weighted by the total number of codings generated for respective country and year.

The transformation of dependent variable does not merely clarify the data-structure. It conditions the choice of inference method as well. Together with a brief analysis of data distribution, I can justify why I employed fractional logistic regression. Figure 6 reports distribution of delegation preferences. By far more than 20 fractions are of 0,00 or 1,00 values. This tells us that many countries were unambiguous about their strengthening or weakening incentives. Even though the fractions are captured on a continuous scale, linear regression does not figure here as an appropriate method. Linear regression is a poor fit for data that approach or hit the upper and lower bounds of scales (Buis 2010, p. 2; Dorta 2016/05/18, p. 5). In contrast, logistic regression serves my purposes.

Figure 6: Histogram of dependent variable



Particularly, fractional logistic regression was tailor made for data that was either observed as fractions or was transformed from a binary into fractional format (StataCorp 2017, p. 808) which is my case. Gini coefficient values qualify as the most common example of fractions (see *ibid*). Further examples count test pass rates for exams on students (Papke and Wooldridge 2008) or probability of a defendant’s guilt and the verdict (Smithson et al. 2007). The authors of fractional logistic regressions are Leslie Papke and Jeffrey Wooldridge who belong to the discipline of econometrics (1996; Wooldridge 2010). Fractional logistic regression can be found in the family of generalized linear models (Buis 2010, p. 3).

I applied fractional logistic regression as incorporated in the statistical package STATA. The method was correctly implemented into STATA only in February 2019 (StataCorp 2019/02/20). STATA offers two commands for fractional responses in logistic models -betareg- and -fracreg-. Betareg was envisioned to evaluate models with fractional responses greater than 0 and less than 1. Thus, betareg is appropriate for dependent variables of the interval (0,1) (Dorta 2016/05/18, p. 4). Fracreg copes with responses that actually reach the values of 0 and 1 (ibid). Hence, fracreg is used for dependent variables in the interval [0,1]. The Histogram 5.1 demonstrates that fracreg fits my data best as the data includes many fractions of 0,00 or 1,00 values.

Fracreg employs a quasi-likelihood estimation procedure. It comes with three link functions: logit, probit, and hetprobit (StataCorp 2017, p. 806). The logit function together with a classic S-shaped curve fits my data best. The quasi-likelihood estimation provides three advantages. First, there is no need to inquire the true distribution in order to retrieve consistent parameter estimates (ibid, p. 807). Second, quasi-likelihood estimation is flexible and prescribes only one condition to be met: The conditional mean of independent variables must differ from the mean of the dependent variable (ibid). My data satisfies this condition.⁸⁷ Third, fracreg uses robust standard errors by default (ibid).

In order to even better capture the reform process by quantitative methods, I account for robust standard errors clustered by country (cluster-robust standard errors). This setting allows me to relax the assumption on independence of observations and still retrieve “correct” robust standard errors. In detail, robust standard errors clustered by country allow for intragroup/intracluster correlation. In my project, observations of delegation preferences voiced by single countries could be correlated. The reason is that delegation preferences may tend to be consistent throughout the reform process. In short, by implementing robust standard errors clustered by country, I address the question of potential endogeneity of delegation preferences.

Taken together, the overall flexibility of fractional logistic regression, the rich data generated from the reform process of SP UNHRC, and the vast number of measurements provided by the V-DEM and World Bank data, allow me to investigate whether societal actors, domestic institutions, and international interdependencies, can explain delegation preferences voiced by autocracies and democracies. I appreciate such convenient conditions especially as the theoretical assumptions of New Liberalism pose several challenges for the modeling strategy.

⁸⁷ I used the -cmogram- command by Christopher Robert (2010) to compute conditional means.

Modeling strategy

An appropriate modeling strategy translates the research interest into a particular configuration of models. My research interest is to find out “How can we explain authority delegation preferences voiced by autocracies and democracies in reform processes of IHROs?” It is further specified by the theoretical assumptions of New Liberalism. Delegation preferences shall be explained by a bottom-up process investigating the role of societal actors, domestic institutions, and international interdependencies. My modeling strategy does not test the gradual three-stage process but rather concentrates on the explanatory potential of single dimensions. The successive process remains a theoretical assumption which is, however, in my opinion rather easy to associate with daily politics.

New Liberalism foresees one clear prioritization. Societal actors figure as primary actors of international relations. Domestic institutions and international interdependencies are indispensable but does not rank the highest. To examine this assumption, I do not only test whether societal actors, domestic institutions, and international interdependencies, deliver significant explanations in authoritarian and democratic countries. I go beyond significance tests to compare size effects of single dimensions across the regime types.

In practice, I provide for average marginal effects of single explanatory factors⁸⁸ and present their point estimates including confidence intervals. For instance, I will be able to compare the explanatory potential of *Civil liberties index* in autocracies and democracies. Furthermore, I organize explanatory variables into clusters (e.g. domestic institutions) and sub-clusters (e.g. oversight mechanisms) as elaborated in Section 5.2. and compare their cumulative explanatory potential based on significance levels and average marginal effects. Here, I will be able to compare whether societal actors, domestic institutions or international interdependencies deliver better explanations. To make results comparable across models, I keep the number of observations constant.

A common—but here impossible—way to go would be to build a one all-including model. Such a model would integrate explanatory variables capturing societal actors, domestic institutions, and international interdependencies, and would include control variables as well. It is not possible for reasons of multicollinearity. Multicollinearity per definition “[...] creates ‘shared’ variance between variables, thus decreasing the ability to predict the dependent measure as well as ascertain the relative roles of each independent variable (Hair et al. 2014, p. 196, modified by author).” As already captured by theory and conceptualization, regime types and their internal dimensions are interrelated. One can

⁸⁸ I estimate margins at the means of covariates.

easily imagine that, for instance, closed authoritarian regimes restrict societal actors in a system without an established rule of law.

The simplest mean to detect potential multicollinearity issues even without running the models is to examine a correlation matrix of covariates (ibid). In general, correlations higher than .90 predict substantial multicollinearity issues (ibid). The regime type, societal actors (example *Civil liberties index*), domestic institutions (example Rule of law), and GDP per capita log base 10 are highly correlated among each other as presented in Table 7. None of the presented pairs of covariates, however, exceeds the threshold of .90 correlation. This holds true for all other constellations throughout the analysis. Still, I need to implement several other measures and even more precise tests to reflect upon potential multicollinearity issues.

Table 7: Pearson pairwise correlation among predictors

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(1) Regime-type	1.000			
(2) Civil liberties	0.814	1.000		
(3) Rule of law	0.558	0.679	1.000	
(4) GDP p.c., base 10	0.372	0.468	0.780	1.000

Multicollinearity can have three types of negative impact as Joseph Hair, William Black, Barry Rabin, and Rolph Anderson elaborate (2014, p. 198). First, multicollinearity can cause a so-called singularity. Singularity occurs when covariates are perfectly correlated. Singularity prevents estimation of any coefficients (ibid). This type of malicious effect does not occur in my analysis. Second, together with increasing multicollinearity, it becomes more and more difficult to arrive at significant results. Here, multicollinearity is marked by elevated standard errors (ibid). I encountered such a negative impact and thus adjusted the modeling strategy accordingly as described below. Third, high degrees of multicollinearity can result in severely incorrectly estimated regression coefficients or even wrong signs in terms of positive or negative relationship (ibid). To my best knowledge, I was not able to indicate such a negative impact in my study. This time, I established a simple theory driven criterion and decided to check descriptive statistics to confirm results of regressions. In short, before estimating models, I laid down the rule to exclude counterintuitive results whose tendencies cannot be validated by tendencies inscribed in descriptive statistics.

I proceeded stepwise to find out how many covariates a model can embrace without facing substantive multicollinearity issues. One model can integrate a total of two variables of interest: A) societal actors and GDP##regime type (interplay of moral and material interdependencies) or B) domestic institutions and GDP##regime type. It is not possible to include both societal actors and domestic institutions into one model. Adding domestic institutions to a model with societal actors meant that the size effects of explanatory variables decreased and were overshadowed by elevated cluster-robust standard errors.

This, however, does not hinder me to pursue my research interest. I simply keep the number of observations constant across models and build models either with societal actors or domestic institutions to ensure comparability of point estimates.

Providing for a correlation matrix of covariates is not the only procedure to predict or check multicollinearity issues. A correlation matrix of covariates can alert authors of potential upcoming multicollinearity issues. It is an *ex-ante* tool. Computing variance inflation factors, in contrast, figures as a common *ex-post* diagnostic toolbox. Variance inflation factors stand for a degree to which single independent variable is explained by a set of other independent variables (Hair et al. 2014, p. 196). I check variance inflation factors to diagnose whether multicollinearity could substantially influence the results.⁸⁹ The suggested threshold is a variance inflation factor of 10.0. Reaching this cut-off point means that multicollinearity issues are almost certain to occur (ibid).

There exists, however, a scenario where even higher values are tolerated or put differently, they cannot be precluded. I refer to work with interactions. To model the interplay of regime type and wealth, my analysis includes the interaction of GDP##regime type. Here, variance inflation factors of the interaction exceed the value of 10.0 since—understandably—the main effects and the interaction are correlated. Table A-10 (see Annex) displays variance inflation factors for selected models devoted to societal actors, rule of law, oversight mechanisms, and electoral institutions. As a preventive measure, I employ mean-standardized data (z-scores) on the side of explanatory variables to reduce potential multicollinearity issues in all models.

As promised in Section 5.2, my modeling strategy avoids an overlap of measurement. The regime type classification draws predominantly on electoral components and all explanatory variables consist of other than electoral components. This holds true for almost all scenarios. The cluster on domestic institutions includes data capturing oversight mechanisms, rule of law, as well as electoral institutions. I depart from the main modeling strategy to test a present or absent relationship of electoral institutions and authority delegation preferences. As the regimes are classified according to electoral quality, I do not interact regime type with further electoral measurements of the cluster domestic institutions. Instead, I split the dataset into autocracies and democracies. Such an alternative strategy comes with its costs, unfortunately. The size effects are not comparable with results from other models anymore. Therefore, I will be able to make judgments “merely” about significant or insignificant relationship.

⁸⁹ I rely on the `-collin-` command “Collinearity Diagnostics” as implemented by Philip Ender (2010) to compute variance inflation factors. The command does not foresee work with interactions. Therefore, I calculate the interaction product and integrate it manually. Furthermore, the command does not account for weighting applied in the fractional logistic regression models.

Such a careful modeling strategy allows me to translate theoretical assumptions into inferential statistics. By opening up the regime types, I shed light on different aspects than previous authors did. For example, I do not investigate impact of autocratization and democratization periods on delegation preferences. Conducting such tests would require longitudinal data whereby I dispose of cross-section time-series data structure.

In summary, the Chapter 5 fosters ways how to further develop quantitative regime type research. Regarding the dependent variable, I justify why is international authority at best captured in two dimensions: decision-making competencies and autonomy. Such conceptualization avoids the analytical overstretch inherent to autonomy research as well as accounts for the under-specification of authority literature. Moreover, the data generation refrains from assuming “what democracies and autocracies prefer” and assesses their delegation preferences directly by means of qualitative content analysis applied to the reform process of SP UNHRC. Furthermore, the operationalization of explanatory variables avoids an overlap of measurement and mostly draws on *de-facto* assessment. Also, the regime type classification refrains from overestimating the number of democracies. And finally, the careful modeling strategy accounts for potential dangers of multicollinearity. In the upcoming Chapter 6, I present descriptive statistics in the first place. In the second place, I proceed with a brief analysis of regime types without opening them. In the third place, I demonstrate that examining the three stages of bottom-up process delivers progressive explanations and deepens studies of regimes in international relations.

6. Results and discussion

Together with a careful theoretical reasoning and an innovative conceptualization, the empirical analysis shall allow me further develop regime type explanations. In Chapter 6, I present and interpret results of inferential statistics and relate them to other contributions explaining delegation preferences. The chapter is structured into four Sections. I start off by presenting the sample and descriptive statistics of explanatory and dependent variables in Section 6.1. Afterwards, I proceed with a regime type analysis without actually opening the regime types and without accounting for international interdependencies in Section 6.2. Here, I show what ordinal and continuous measures of regime type can and cannot explain. I discuss the results *vis-à-vis* regime type literature. Having demonstrated the limitations of classic regime type analysis, I pursue my research interest investigating the explanatory potential of societal actors, domestic institutions, and international interdependencies in Section 6.3 and Section 6.4. I interpret the results in Section 6.5. and discuss them in the light of other studies explaining delegation preferences to IHROs in Section 6.6.

6.1. Descriptive statistics

Before turning to descriptive statistics, I would like to present which autocracies and democracies belong to the sample out of the whole population of UN member states. Afterwards, I offer an overview on claims made either in favor of strengthening or weakening the SP UNHRC throughout the whole reform process. These are followed by shares (fractions) of claims made in favor of strengthening per country. Prior to regime type analysis in Section 6.2, I include summary statistics of dependent, explanatory, and control variables.

Total of 67 countries out of 192 UN members⁹⁰ qualified into the sample. The remaining 125 countries did not actively participate in the reform process or they did not make claims relevant for the authority of SP UNHRC or let UN regional groupings and ROs to advocate their agenda.⁹¹ The sample counts 28 autocracies and 44 democracies. Nepal and Bangladesh figure in both groups as they were re-classified throughout the period of 2006-2010. Table 8 lists all democracies and autocracies in the sample. It marks in which years they submitted authority delegation preferences.

Furthermore, the dataset counts 1039 delegation preferences either in favor of strengthening or weakening the SP UNHRC. Neither supporters nor opposition outnumbered each other. Figure 7 depicts a balanced share of delegation preferences where 47.35% (total 492) strived to weaken the monitoring bureaucracy and whereas 52.65% (total 547) aimed to strengthen the international authority.⁹²

Moving on from the general picture of the reform process, I would like to depict “In how far countries support strengthening the SP UNHRC.” Figure 8 shows delegation preferences of autocracies expressed as fractions per country.⁹³ There were ten authoritarian regimes that exclusively favored weakening the SP UNHRC. Beginning with Cuba that devoted 3% of statements in favor of strengthening, there is a rather gradual rise in delegation preferences, showcasing Morocco with 36% at the upper end. Armenia is a unique instance of an autocracy that submitted more statements in support of strengthening than weakening the monitoring bureaucracy.

The delegation preferences (of the larger sample) of democracies vary more than delegation preferences of autocracies do, as Figure 9 depicts. Delegation preferences advocated by democracies spread almost throughout the whole scale. They vary from Indonesia with 15% up to a group of 15 states being entirely in favor of strengthening. Less countries belong to the span 15-75% than to the

⁹⁰ South Sudan entered the UN in 2011 and thus raised the membership to 193 countries (UN 2019).

⁹¹ Furthermore, due to lack of data on the side of explanatory variables, Liechtenstein was excluded out of the analysis. Another possibility how not to qualify into the sample would be if permanent missions did not submit their statements in text form.

⁹² To export tables from STATA, I use the `-asdoc-` package programmed by Attaullah Shah (2018).

⁹³ The later presented fraction logistic models work with country-year fractions.

range 75-100%. Democracies that expressed full support stem largely from Europe and count a few instances from Latin and South America as well Asia and one African country, Ghana. Taken together, there is a large variance within and across regime types to be explained by societal actors, domestic institutions, and international interdependencies.

Table 8: Democracies and autocracies in sample

Democracies	Year				Autocracies	Year		
	2006	2007	2010			2006	2007	2010
Argentina			1		Algeria	1		1
Australia			1		Armenia	1		
Austria	1		1		Azerbaijan	1	1	1
Bangladesh			1		Bahrain			1
Belgium	1				Bangladesh	1	1	
Bolivia		1			Belarus			1
Brazil	1	1	1		China	1		1
Canada	1	1	1		Cuba	1		1
Chile			1		Iran	1	1	1
Colombia		1	1		Kazakhstan			1
Costa Rica			1		Libya			1
Czech Republic	1		1		Malaysia	1		
Denmark	1				Morocco			1
Ecuador			1		Nepal	1		
France			1		Nigeria	1		
Germany			1		North Korea	1	1	1
Ghana			1		Philippines	1		
Guatemala			1		Qatar			1
Hungary			1		Russia			1
India	1	1			Rwanda			1
Indonesia	1	1	1		Saudi Arabia			1
Ireland	1		1		Singapore	1		
Israel	1	1	1		Sri Lanka	1		1
Japan	1	1	1		Thailand	1		1
Mexico			1		Venezuela			1
Moldova			1		Yemen			1
Nepal			1		Zimbabwe	1		
Netherlands	1							
New Zealand	1							
Norway	1	1						
Paraguay			1					
Peru			1					
South Africa		1	1					
South Korea	1	1						
Spain			1					
Sweden			1					
Switzerland			1					
Turkey		1	1					
Ukraine			1					
United Kingdom	1	1	1					
United States of America	1	1	1					
Uruguay			1					

Figure 7: Delegation preferences




Figure 8: Delegation preferences of autocracies





Figure 9: Delegation preferences of democracies



Most inferential statistics draw on data as summarized in Table 10. Summary statistics of the sub-samples of autocracies and democracies are placed in Annex, see Table A-2 and Table A-3. The majority of models estimate a sample of 1029 observations. The maximum number of observations is here limited by the GDP per capita data.⁹⁴ Only models with explanatory variables *Legislative constraints on the executive index*, and *Legislature investigates in practice* estimate a sample of 1023 observations being lower by 0.6% than rest of the models.⁹⁵ Such a slight fluctuation does not limit the comparability of point estimates across models. The models work with standardized data (z-scores) to decrease potential multicollinearity issues as well as to allow for comparability of point estimates within and across models.

⁹⁴ The GDP per capita data was logarithmically transformed to the base 10. Sudan, Timor-Leste, and Maldives were excluded from the sample due to missing GDP values.

⁹⁵ The *Legislative constraints on the executive index*, and *Legislature investigates in practice* do not include data on Bangladesh.

Table 10: Summary statistics

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Variance	Min	Max
DV: Fraction country/year	1,039	.526	.391	.153	0	1
Regime-types						
RoW 2C	1,039	.611	.488	.238	0	1
RoW 4C	1,039	1.898	1.105	1.221	0	3
Liberal Democracy Index	1,039	.108	1.017	1.035	-1.562	1.397
Accountability Index	1,039	.100	.963	.926	-2.410	1.286
Societal Actors						
Civil Liberties Index	1,039	.089	.954	.911	-2.712	1.012
Civil Political Liberties	1,039	.052	.989	.978	-2.367	.916
Diagonal Accountability	1,039	.103	.956	.914	-2.875	1.278
Domestic Institutions						
<u>Oversight mechanisms</u>						
Horizontal Accountability	1,039	.161	.960	.922	-1.969	1.637
Legislative Constraints	1,023	.128	.946	.895	-1.827	1.053
Legislature Investigates	1,023	.168	.946	.895	-2.100	1.948
<u>Rule of Law</u>						
WB Rule of Law	1,039	.262	1.048	1.098	-1.737	1.636
V-DEM Rule of Law	1,039	.179	.960	.922	-1.822	1.174
Judicial Constraints	1,039	.150	.950	.903	-1.906	1.098
<u>Elections</u>						
Clean Elections	1,039	.078	1.020	.991	-1.906	1.052
Electoral Democracy	1,039	.060	1.004	1.040	-1.951	1.179
Vertical Accountability	1,039	.041	1.002	1.007	-2.938	1.257
Int. Interdependencies						
GDP pc., log base 10	1,029	.226	1.077	1.005	-2.150	2.044

Note: Standardized values of continuous explanatory variables

6.2. Regime type analysis

In order to contribute to regime type research, I need to explore boundaries of existing research strategies. This will allow me to highlight the added value of my approach. To do so, I estimate models with ordinal and continuous regime type predictors. I begin with a simple contrast of delegation preferences of autocracies and democracies as classified by the RoW measure. I proceed with a contrast of delegation preferences of closed autocracies, electoral autocracies, electoral democracies, and liberal democracies, as classified by the RoW measure as well. Afterwards, I introduce two continuous regime type measures—*Liberal democracy index* and *Accountability index*—and examine their explanatory potential. In all models, GDP per capita and political-geographic regions figure as control variables.⁹⁶

The method of inference remains the same as for the main analyses of societal actors, domestic institutions, and international interdependencies, in Section 6.3. Thus, I apply fractional logistic regression. I report levels of significance (* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$) and interpret point estimates expressed in average marginal effects (AME). AME capture increase (or decrease) of

⁹⁶ Effects of political-geographic regions are not presented.

probability given in percentage points (p.p.).⁹⁷ While estimating AME of a variable of interest, I hold effects of other covariates constant at their means. This makes a comparison of AME across variables of interest easier.

Working with standardized data implies that I interpret the change of AME in units of standard deviation. Standard deviations of continuous predictors were adjusted by the standardization procedure to an approximate value of 1. Therefore, I interpret the results in the vein of “An increase of the predictor in one standard deviation leads to an increase (/decrease) of probability to support strengthening the SP UNHRC”. The probabilities are expressed in p.p. Having read Table 10 Summary statistics, I declare one standard deviation to be a “large unit” since the minimal and maximal values announce an approximate span of three to five standard deviations. Furthermore, regarding the ordinal measure RoW, a discrete change in one category (e.g. from autocracy to democracy) leads to an increase (/decrease) of probability to support strengthening the SP UNHRC where the probabilities are expressed in p.p.

Categorical predictors


Regarding the regime type analysis, I would like to present results of models investigating delegation preferences of autocracies and democracies in the first place and move forward with an analysis of closed autocracies, electoral autocracies, electoral democracies, and liberal democracies in the second place. Both the dichotomous and ordinal classifications are based on the RoW measure. In the third place, I present explanatory potential of continuous regime type predictors *Liberal democracy index* and *Accountability index*. In the fourth place, I discuss results in the light of existing research.

Let us begin with a contrast of delegation preferences voiced either by autocracies or democracies. The boxplot Figure 10 provides descriptive insights. Half of delegation preferences voiced by autocracies range approximately from 0 to 10% in favor of strengthening as the median in the first box indicates. Conversely, half of the data tells us that autocracies strived to weaken the SP UNHRC in at least 90% of their claims. Delegation preferences of autocracies are highly condensed in the first median. The third quartile (75 percentile) additionally embraces autocracies' with delegation preferences ranging approximately from 10 to 30% in favor of strengthening. Again, this means that three quarters of autocracies favored weakening in more than 70% of their claims. The maximum of autocracies' delegation preferences stops below 40% in favor of strengthening. There are two outliers

⁹⁷ The unit *percentage point/p.p.* stands for an arithmetic difference of two percentages. For instance, moving up from 50% to 55% is an increase of 5 p.p. At the same time, it expresses a 10% increase in terms of the original measure.

that stem from 2006: Armenia (75%) and Azerbaijan (80%) were the only autocracies that made more claims in favor of strengthening than in favor of weakening.

Figure 10: Delegation preferences by RoW 2




In contrast, democracies have largely dispersed delegation preferences. The median of the second box marks that half of democracies’ delegation preferences vary from about 25% to nearly 90%. The maximum reaches 100%. If we consider also the seven outliers⁹⁸, then delegation preferences of democracies span from solely in favor of weakening to exclusively in favor of strengthening the SP UNHRC. As the two boxes do not overlap, we can expect that the delegation preferences of autocracies and democracies are significantly different. The fractional logistic regression together with AME computations confirm this expectation, as depicted in Figure 11.

In the first place, I would like to explain how I visualize AME at the example of Figure 11.⁹⁹ The figure visualizes point estimates together with 95% confidence intervals. Reference categories of categorical variables are placed at the vertical red line. The AME were computed from four different models. These are depicted in different colors. For example, AME in dark blue color stem from a model that incorporated an ordinal variable discriminating between autocracies/democracies (RoW 2) and a continuous GDP predictor as well as the control variable of political geographic regions. The control variable is not visualized. Corresponding regression tables are in Annex, see Table A-4.

⁹⁸ Brazil 2006, Colombia 2007, Ecuador 2006, India 2006, Indonesia 2007 & 2010, and Nepal 2010.

⁹⁹ I used the `-coefplot-` command as programmed by Ben Jann (2014) to plot AME.

Figure 11: AME of categorical regime-type predictors (point estimates)



AME in dark blue present the following inference: Autocracies and democracies have significantly different delegation preferences. On average, democracies had a higher probability by 40 p.p.*** than autocracies to advocate strengthening the SP UNHRC during the reform process. The result is in line with theoretical expectations and descriptive tendencies.

The regime type literature interprets results for democratizing, weakly democratic, and strongly democratic regimes (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Hill 2016). I proceed with an analysis of delegation preferences of closed autocracies, electoral autocracies, electoral democracies, and liberal democracies (RoW 4). This allows me to indirectly compare results regarding the democratic regimes and to strengthen research on authoritarian regimes. The boxplot Figure 12 depicts delegation preferences voiced by the four regime types. At first glance, the boxplot suggests that closed autocracies and electoral autocracies do not possess significantly different delegation preferences as their boxes fully overlap. The median of closed autocracies is placed slightly above the 10% level whereby the median of electoral autocracies can be found even below the 10% level. It is not straightforward to predict significant differences between electoral autocracies and electoral democracies as their boxes slightly overlap. Electoral democracies strike with claims aiming to solely weaken or exclusively strengthen the SP UNHRC. Out of the four regime types, liberal democracies

possess delegation preferences with lowest variance and are expected to significantly differ from electoral democracies as their boxes do not overlap.¹⁰⁰

Figure 12: Delegation preferences by RoW 4




Figure 11 yields results on differences among the four regime types. As suggested by the boxplot, delegation preferences of closed autocracies and electoral autocracies are not significantly different. There is a minor decreasing tendency: Electoral autocracies are less probable to delegate authority by 2 p.p. than closed autocracies (results in green). Electoral autocracies significantly differ from electoral democracies by 35 p.p.*** (results in red). Delegation preferences of electoral democracies and liberal democracies can be significantly discriminated. Liberal democracies had a higher probability to advocate strengthening the SP UNRHC by 31 p.p.** than electoral democracies (results in light blue).

All models presented in Figure 11 yield same results for the control variable GDP per capita: Insignificant. Nevertheless, having explored the data, I was able to identify an underlying pattern. The following two scatterplots capture the relationship of GDP and delegation preferences by RoW 4 regime types. We can spot a moderate declining tendency in Figure 13: The wealthier autocracies are, the lower the delegation preferences. In contrast, democracies’ delegation preferences steeply increase together with GDP, see Figure 14. Hence, the insignificance of the control variable GDP could be caused by opposite tendencies in subsamples of autocracies and democracies. I pick up these insights in Section 6.3 where I model interactions of regime type and GDP that stand for the interplay of moral and material interdependencies.


¹⁰⁰ The three outliers count United Kingdom 2007, USA 2006, and South Africa 2010.

Overall, the models with categorical predictors RoW 2 and RoW 4 provided following insights. The cut-off between autocracies' and democracies' delegation preferences is significant even if differentiated between the subcategories of electoral autocracies and electoral democracies. Furthermore, delegation preferences advocated by closed and electoral autocracies' cannot be significantly discriminated. Liberal democracies supported delegation of authority to the SP UNHRC significantly more than electoral democracies that in turn were ready to delegate significantly more authority than electoral autocracies. In addition, visualizations suggest opposite effects of wealth: Autocracies' delegation preferences tend to decrease together with higher levels of GDP whereby democracies' delegation preferences grow steeply.

Figure 13: GDP and delegation preferences of closed and electoral autocracies



Figure 14: GDP and delegation preferences of electoral and liberal democracies



Continuous predictors

Moving forward with further regime type analysis, I examine effects of continuous predictors *Liberal democracy index* and *Accountability index*. Both can be classified as high-level indices. Nevertheless, the *Accountability index* draws on more indicators than the *Liberal democracy index*. The *Accountability index* subsumes *Vertical*, *Horizontal*, and *Diagonal accountability indices*. *Vertical accountability index* measures primary electoral institutions. *Horizontal accountability index* captures oversight mechanisms. And finally, *Diagonal accountability index* measures participation of societal actors (private companies are excluded). The *Liberal democracy index* includes indicators represented in the three accountability sub-indices but in lower numbers. Thus, it is a “thinner” regime type measure. Figure 15 allows a quick assessment: Both continuous regime type indices are highly significant predictors of delegation preferences to the SP UNHRC. Corresponding regression tables are placed in Annex, see Table A-5.

Figure 15: AME of continuous regime-type predictors (point estimates)





Figure 16: Liberal democracy index and delegation preferences




I would like to compare the explanatory potential of the *Liberal democracy index* and the *Accountability index* in detail. Starting with the thinner index, Figure 16 plots the *Liberal democracy index* and delegation preferences across regime types. It reveals a cumulation of data in the down left corner comprising closed and electoral autocracies. Data cumulates also in the top right corner where liberal democracies reside. There is a large variance of delegation preferences “in the middle” depicting especially electoral democracies.

Figure 15 reports significance levels and AME. *Liberal democracy index* is a significant continuous predictor of attitudes towards the SP UNHRC. One standard deviation of the z-score increases on average the probability to advocate strengthening the monitoring bureaucracy by 23 p.p.***.

A margins plot offers even more insights, see Figure 17. In the first place, however, I would like to describe what information margins plots provide. The x-axis captures z-score values of the *Liberal democracy index* and the y-axis captures AME. When the curve of AME rises (or decreases), it does not mean that absolute values of the dependent variable of delegation preferences rise (or decrease). The AME curve indicates growth (or shrinking) of AME. Here, together with the lowest values of *Liberal democracy index*, the AME rise. The middle of the graph is characterized by large confidence intervals. Afterwards, the AME decrease together with the confidence intervals indicating a lower variance of AME as we approach the highest values of the index.¹⁰¹


Figure 17: AME of Liberal democracy index



¹⁰¹ On top of the presented results, I conducted even more detailed computations. Here, instead of working with a standard deviation of the *Liberal democracy index*, the computations used 0.1 steps of its z score values. The *Liberal democracy index* is a significant predictor throughout the whole scale.


The *Accountability index* differs in several minor aspects. In Figure 18, we can indicate that the *Accountability index* better discriminates between closed and electoral autocracies since their regions predominantly do not overlap as is the case for *Liberal democracy index* in Figure 16. A closer comparison suggests that electoral democracies vary less over the *Accountability index* than over the thinner *Liberal democracy index*.

Figure 18: *Accountability index and delegation preferences*



In Figure 15, we experience that the *Accountability index* is a significant predictor. One standard deviation of its z-score value increases the probability that a country will favor strengthening the SP UNHRC by 25 p.p.***. Compared to the *Liberal democracy index*, the *Accountability index* has higher AME by 2 p.p. Again, a margins plot yields further information, see Figure 19. The *Accountability index* offers a slightly better prediction than the *Liberal democracy index* with respect to smaller confidence intervals at the lowest index values that are usually occupied by closed and electoral autocracies. Due to narrower confidence intervals around the z-score value 0, it provides for somewhat improved prediction for electoral democracies as well. On the overall, the thicker continuous regime type predictor *Accountability index* delivers marginally better predictions than the *Liberal democracy index*.

Figure 19: AME of Accountability index



Having presented results on both categorical and continuous regime type predictors, I would like to compare them. I restrict the comparison to absent or present significance levels as point estimates and confidence intervals of continuous and categorical predictors cannot be directly compared. The *Accountability index* outperforms the RoW 4 measure regarding explanation of autocracies' delegation preferences. The *Accountability index* delivers significant explanation throughout the whole scale.¹⁰² The attitudes of closed and electoral autocracies could not be significantly discriminated by the RoW measure. This means that the threshold between closed and electoral autocracies is not meaningful for explaining delegation preferences. As the margins plot Figure 19 supports, the *Accountability index* explains delegation preferences of autocracies well. Autocracies occupy z-score values on the *Accountability index* ranging from the minimum of -2.41 to -0.5. In such a range, the AME are highly significant.

Comparisons and interpretations of regime type predictors and their explanatory potential reveal their limitations. Regime type predictors as such measure both dimensions of societal actors and domestic institutions. Furthermore, they vary in their "thickness." The RoW classification draws predominantly on electoral institutions and measures to a lesser extent conditions for participation of societal actors, rule of law and other institutional prerequisites. The *Liberal democracy index* accounts for domestic institutions and societal actors as well, but employs less measures than the thick *Accountability index*.

¹⁰² On top of the presented results, I conducted even more detailed computations. Here, instead of working with a standard deviation of the *Accountability index*, the computations used 0.1 steps of its z-score values. The *Accountability index* is a significant predictor throughout the whole scale.

Whereby I can suggest that the thicker *Accountability index* provides for slightly better explanations of delegation preferences than the thinner *Liberal democracy index*, I cannot explain why. I arrived at this dead-end since regime type predictors do not allow me to disentangle explanatory potential introduced either by the institutional or the actor driven dimension. Therefore, such a dead-end justifies opening-up the regime types and examining their domestic dimensions—as far as possible—separately. Moreover, it is the right time to broaden the analysis and account for the international dimension as well. Here, the interplay of international economic and moral interdependencies could make a difference as the visualizations of contradictory tendencies of wealth for autocracies and democracies indicate.

Discussion of results

Nevertheless, before investigating the three stages of the bottom-up process, I would like to discuss the results of regime type analysis *vis-à-vis* current literature and indicate novel insights provided by my study. Proceeding with categorical predictors in the first place, Tallberg et al. (2016) found out that autocracies and democracies significantly differ in their attitudes towards strengthening IOs (by allowing IOs to cooperate with transnational actors). Autocracies are against strengthening IOs or even strive to weaken them. Strengthening IOs is driven by established democracies.¹⁰³

My study that concentrates exclusively on authority delegation to IHROs (and employs a much broader definition of delegation preferences) supports such results. Autocracies delegate significantly less authority than democracies do. It is straightforward to claim that autocracies aimed to weaken the SP of UNHRC: Half of autocracies' delegation preferences consists at least of 90% claims striving to weaken the SP UNHRC. Furthermore, liberal democracies—which can be approximated with established democracies—issued the highest delegation preferences of all regime types.

Except for supporting the thesis on democratizing states, the analysis by Hafner-Burton et al. (2015) investigated that stable hybrid regimes (stable anocracies) are not statistically distinguishable from stable democracies and autocratizing periods do not statistically affect delegation preferences to IHROs (here accession to IHROs). The results of my study cannot be directly compared since my cross-sectional data did not allow me to systematically investigate stability (or transitional periods) of regime types. Instead, I examined that delegation preferences voiced by electoral autocracies, electoral democracies, and liberal democracies significantly differ. These once again provide evidence

¹⁰³ I interpret the results of my regime type models *vis-à-vis* the study by Tallberg et al. (2016) but do not discuss Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006, 2008). Whereby the study by Tallberg et al. (2016) shares at least the dichotomous operationalization of regime types with my analysis, the analyses by Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006, 2008) diverge too much in conceptualization of both regime type predictors (transitional periods) and the dependent variable (accession to IIs without focus on IHROs).

that there is a significant cut-off between autocracies' and democracies' delegation preferences, even if deconstructed into four regime types, hence setting a higher standard for the significance test "in the middle." Therefore, there is no need to abide from discriminating between autocracies and democracies. It remains, however, to be interpreted why delegation preferences of closed and electoral autocracies cannot be significantly disentangled. I address this issue later in Section 6.5.

Moving from categorical to continuous regime type predictors, the study by Hill (2016) indicated that autocracies do not delegate authority to IHROs and established democracies delegate less than both democratizing states and weakly democratic countries. Both of my continuous predictors, *Liberal democracy index* and *Accountability index*, yielded highly significant results throughout the whole scale. Even though the precision of prediction varies especially for electoral democracies, it holds true that increasing quality of democracy increases the probability of delegation of authority to IHROs. Therefore, compared to the study of Hill (2016), I cannot claim that the most democratic countries voiced on average lower delegation preferences than less democratic states (weakly democratic countries/electoral democracies). However, my study provides support for the claim that most of autocracies strived to weaken the IHRO.

It remains to compare results of the control variable GDP per capita. The GDP measure comes with negative tendencies and remains insignificant across all seven models as indicated in Figure 11 and Figure 15. The study by Hafner-Burton et al. (2015, p. 20) examined effects of wealth as well and arrived to similar results: Regarding delegation to IHROs, the control variable GDP shows negative tendencies and does not achieve statistical significance. Even though the results match, I do not issue a verdict on missing effects of GDP on delegation preferences. Instead, I investigate the effects of wealth more thoroughly. In the forthcoming analysis, I interact wealth with regime type to investigate opposite effects of GDP for autocracies and democracies. In terms of theory, I analyze an interplay of moral and material interdependencies on the international stage.

In summary, my analysis broadens the landscape of regime type studies and most importantly justifies further investigation. First, it delivers support for the intuitive argument on significant differences between the delegation preferences voiced by autocracies and democracies that were so far tested merely by one study. Second, it refines insights on the explanatory potential of continuous regime type predictors that were so far investigated only by one research. Third, it yields promising descriptive insights on the interplay of regime type and wealth. Fourth and of utmost importance for my research goals, it delineates boundaries of both categorical and continuous regime type predictors. These do not allow to discriminate effects introduced by societal actors or domestic institutions. In the forthcoming Subsection 6.3, I examine the explanatory potential of societal actors, domestic institutions, and the interplay of material and moral interdependencies.

6.3. Societal actors and international interdependencies

In terms of theory, societal actors play the most important role in the bottom-up process. Societal actors pressure governments to act in the vein of their interests when IHROs—here the SP UNHRC—are reformed. Domestic institutions select whose interests governments strive to represent on the international stage meanwhile being exposed to material and moral interdependencies. Beginning with societal actors and international interdependencies, I turn to the core of my research. The core of my research also includes a joint analysis of domestic institutions and international interdependencies presented in Section 6.4.

Regarding societal actors, I expect that *H1: The more societal actors can participate on the domestic level, the higher the probability that states will favor authority delegation to IHROs.* With respect to international interdependencies, I assume that *H3: The wealthier authoritarian regimes are, the more easily they can escape asymmetric moral interdependencies, and thus the higher the probability that they will be against authority delegation to IHROs. The wealthier democracies are, the higher the probability that they will be in favor of authority delegation to IHROs.* I employed fractional logistic regression models to test these prepositions. Each of these models includes predictors capturing participation of societal actors, an interaction *GDP#regime type* that stands for the interplay of material and moral interdependencies, and a control variable on political geographic regions.

It is not necessary to plot the relationship of wealth and delegation preferences repeatedly. I only recall that Figure 13 in Section 6.2 suggested a negative relationship for autocracies and Figure 14 indicated a positive relationship for democracies. Let us explore the relationship between societal actors and delegation preferences instead. Figure 20 visualizes the link of *Civil liberties index* and delegation preferences to the SP UNHRC. The colorization according to regime types once again justifies why it is meaningful to inspect single dimensions of political systems and it also makes orientation in the graph easier. Especially closed and electoral autocracies overlap along the *Civil liberties index*. The delegation preferences of electoral democracies remain to be dispersed even along the dimension of societal actors and overlap to some extent with the condensed delegation preferences of liberal democracies. On the overall, there shall be a positive relationship between societal actors and delegation preferences to the SP UNHRC.

Figure 20: Civil liberties index and delegation preferences





Figure 21: AME Societal actors (point estimates)



Except for the Civil liberties measure, I employed the thinner *Civil political liberties* and *Diagonal accountability indices* to provide for a robustness check. Hence, I can present results of three models in Figure 21. The plot depicts results for authoritarian and democratic regimes separately. For instance, following results stem from one model: AME 0.11** of the *Civil liberties index* for autocracies (dark blue color), AME -0.08*** of the interaction *GDP#Autocracy* (light brown color), AME 0.15** of the *Civil liberties index* for democracies (dark blue color), and AME 0.14*** of the interaction *GDP#Democracy* (light brown color). For regression tables, consult Table A-6 in Annex.


At first glance, all computations of AME (while holding other covariates at their means) displayed in Figure 21 are significant. For autocracies, the three predictors capturing societal actors show a positive relationship that ranges from 9 to 11 p.p. on the AME scale. The significance varies from medium to high levels. Regarding democracies, predictors capturing societal actors show a positive relationship that remains highly significant across all models. The AME vary from 12 to 15 p.p.

A comparison of the *Civil liberties*, *Civil political liberties*, and *Diagonal accountability indices* does not allow me to select a predictor that would outperform the other. With respect to the strength of prediction, the *Civil liberties index* offers higher point estimates. However, regarding the precision of prediction captured by confidence intervals and considering the significance levels as well, the *Civil liberties index* does not surpass the thinner predictors *Civil political liberties* and *Diagonal accountability indices*. On the overall, the three indices that capture the extent of participation of societal actors yield significant results for autocracies and democracies. Therefore, societal actors pass a simple robustness check. The three models provide support for the first hypothesis on societal actors.

Out of the three measures of societal actors, the *Civil liberties index* figures here as the nearest match to New Liberalism. It is the only predictor that operationalizes private companies as societal actors. Therefore, I would like to inspect its explanatory potential in detail. A margins plot in Figure 22 unveils more information.¹⁰⁴ The graph shows—on average—smaller confidence intervals for autocracies than democracies (95% CI for autocracies: 0.05 to 0.18, for democracies: 0.06 to 0.23). Therefore, the AME computed for autocracies are more precise than for democracies whereby the point estimates and significance levels remain lower.

¹⁰⁴ The x-lines mark minimal and maximal values of the *Civil liberties index* reached either by autocracies or democracies.

Figure 22: AME of Civil liberties index



The overall progression of AME of the *Civil liberties index* embody an imperfect S-shape and thus can be compared with the progression of *Accountability index*, a continuous regime type predictor depicted in Figure 19. Both predictors yield first, lower AME for autocracies than democracies, second, more precise results for autocracies than democracies, and third, uncover a decreasing tendency of explanatory potential towards the highest values of the predictors. These are usually reached by liberal democracies as the scatterplots in Figure 16 and Figure 18 confirm.

Moreover, the *Civil liberties index* yielded significant results throughout the whole scale.¹⁰⁵ Hence, the *Civil liberties index* is a better predictor of delegation preferences than the categorical predictor RoW 4 which was not able to significantly discriminate between delegation preferences of closed and electoral authoritarian regimes. The participation of societal actors explains also one the authoritarian outliers identified in Figure 10: Armenia was classified as an (electoral) autocracy in 2006 but favored strengthening the SP UNHRC in 75% claims whereby the median of autocracies did not reach 10%. Armenia allowed, however, societal actors to participate more than (electoral) democracies like India


¹⁰⁵ On top of the presented results, I conducted even more detailed computations. Here, instead of working with a standard deviation of the *Civil liberties index*, the computations used 0.1 steps of its z score values. The *Civil liberties index* is a significant predictor throughout the whole scale. Most difficult to predict were delegation preferences of North Korea. Here, the *Civil liberties index* reached low levels of significance. Other countries reached either mid or high levels of significance.

2006, 2007 or Turkey 2007. Armenia does not figure as an outlier in Figure 20 which plots the *Civil liberties index* and delegation preferences, indeed.¹⁰⁶

Furthermore, Figure 21 presents results of the interaction *GDP#regime type*. The results are significant across all models and both regime types. With respect to autocracies, there is a negative relationship between GDP and delegation preferences. The AME range from -6 to -8 p.p. and the significance levels vary from medium to high levels. Regarding democracies, there is positive relationship of GDP and delegation preferences. The AME span from 14 to 15 p.p. and reach a high level of significance without an exception. As a result, the first set of model delivers support both for the first and third hypotheses.

The negative and positive relationships of wealth and delegation preferences voiced by autocracies and democracies can be examined closely as well. The interaction *GDP#regime type* is an imprecise predictor as far as we trace AME for autocracies up to the Quartile 2, see Figure 23. The rest of delegation preferences voiced by richer autocracies enjoy precise predictions paired with smaller AME.

Figure 23: AME of GDP – Autocracies




Additionally, I have inspected the dataset to find out which poor autocracies introduced larger AME. Here, I focused on authoritarian regimes that preferred to exclusively weaken the SP UNHRC: Bangladesh 2006, Cuba 2006, North Korea 2006/2007/2010, Sri Lanka 2006, and Yemen 2010. North Korea, Cuba, and Yemen not only rank among the poorest autocracies but were classified as closed

¹⁰⁶ Spot a datapoint for Armenia characterized by a z-score value about 0,1 and delegation preference of .75

authoritarian regimes and belong to the most restrictive ones as measured by the *Civil liberties index*. Sri Lanka and Bangladesh do not belong to the most restrictive ones but experienced autocratization periods instead. Sri Lanka backslid from an electoral democracy in 2005 to an electoral autocracy in 2006. The authoritarian regime of Bangladesh was tightened from an electoral autocracy in 2006 to a closed autocracy in 2007. Therefore, I interpret that the stronger AME for poor autocracies were not introduced merely by the effects of wealth but are a result of further factors like very low participatory opportunities for societal actors or autocratization periods.

On the overall, the point estimates along with medium and high significance levels, and a closer inspection of the dataset allow me support the assumption: *“The wealthier authoritarian regimes are, the more easily they can escape asymmetric moral interdependencies, and thus the higher the probability that they will be against authority delegation to IHROs.”*

Figure 24: AME of GDP – Democracies



As displayed in Figure 24, the interaction *GDP#regime type* is a good predictor of delegation preferences advocated either by a very small number of the poorest democracies or rich democratic regimes above the Quartile 3. *GDP#democracy* is as an imprecise predictor for the rest of democracies as the margins plot unveils large confidence intervals. Wealth is on average more important for poor democracies than rich democracies as the decreasing tendency of the AME curve indicates. On the overall, the high AME together with the high significance levels across all models allow me to claim that *“The wealthier democracies are, the more they can afford to enhance the normative pressure put*

on human rights abusers, and thus the higher the probability that they favor authority delegation to expensive IHROs.”

The interaction *GDP#regime type* remained a significant predictor across the three models and both regime types as well. Hence, I can claim that societal actors together with the interplay of moral and material interdependencies influenced delegation preferences voiced by autocracies and democracies during the reform process of SP UNHRC. If we consider the strength of prediction together with its precision and significance levels, then neither societal actors nor the interplay of interdependencies comes with a substantially improved explanatory potential. As a result, my study cannot support Moravcsik’s theoretical expectations on the primacy of the societal actors. The first stage of the bottom-up process figures here as equally important as the third stage of the bottom-up process.

6.4. Domestic institutions and international interdependencies

Domestic institutions constitute a link between societal actors and governments. They select whose societal interests states pursue on the international stage, here in the reform process of the SP UNHRC. The less representative such a selection is, the higher the probability that states will discard interests of large shares of societal actors. Also, as the bias grows, governments can increasingly pursue their own interests. Elections, rule of law, and checks and balances mechanisms, serve different purposes in autocracies and democracies. In autocracies, domestic institutions shall favor regime-loyal societal actors and disadvantage oppositional actors. In democracies, domestic institutions shall guarantee rights of both oppositional and non-oppositional societal actors. Despite the different purposes, a continuum captures to what extent domestic institutions (mis-)represent interests of societal actors. In this section, I test the second hypothesis: *“The better domestic institutions represent the interests of all societal actors, the higher the probability that states will favor authority delegation to IHROs.”*

Fractional logistic regression models incorporate here domestic institutions, the interaction *GDP#regime type*, and a control variable political-geographic regions. Each of the sub-clusters on elections, rule of law, and checks and balances, include three different measures to ensure a simple robustness check. Scrutinizing effects of electoral institutions required a different modeling strategy. I had to split the sample into authoritarian and democratic regimes to avoid multicollinearity issues. Consequently, the sample sizes vary across sub-clusters (and regime types). Therefore, results on electoral institutions cannot be compared with results on rule of law or checks and balances to its full extent. It is feasible to interpret present or absent significance, but I need to refrain from interpreting the strength of prediction expressed in point estimates or precision captured by the confidence intervals.

Figure 25: Electoral democracy index and delegation preferences of closed and electoral autocracies





Figure 26: Electoral democracy index and delegation preferences of electoral and liberal democracies




Electoral institutions

Beginning with electoral institutions, I employed *Electoral democracy*, *Clean elections*, and *Vertical accountability indices*, to test whether they can predict delegation preferences. Two scatterplots in Figure 25 and Figure 26 describe the relationship of *Electoral democracy index* and delegation preferences. Regarding the sample of autocracies, it is difficult to read whether the relationship could reach at least low levels of significance. With respect to democracies, the very large dispersion of electoral democracies could preclude significant results.

Figure 27 presents results of six models: Three models devoted to autocracies with a sample of 399 observations and three models on democracies with a sample of 630 observations. Merely the *Electoral democracy index* achieves a low level of significance when estimating the sample of autocracies. No other measure testing the relationship of electoral institutions and delegation preferences voiced either by autocracies or democracies yields significant results. Therefore, electoral institutions clearly do not pass the robustness check. Corresponding regression models can be found in Annex, see Table A-7.

Figure 27: AME Electoral institutions (point estimates)



Compared to the *Clean elections* and *Vertical accountability indices*, the *Electoral democracy index* captures not only quality of elections but incorporates participation of societal actors in between ballot days as well.¹⁰⁷ With respect to the significant results of societal actors predictors from Section 6.3, it does not surprise that a mixture of societal actors and electoral institutions yields significant results whereby predictors exclusively measuring electoral quality remain insignificant. Moreover, it seems plausible for me that the *Electoral democracy index* did not achieve significance when estimating the sample of democracies. Democracies' delegation preferences vary more than those ones voiced by autocracies and hence are more difficult to predict.

Rule of law

Moving forward with rule of law predictors, I employed three measures counting the *Rule of law index* and *Judicial constraints on the executive index* from the V-DEM dataset and incorporated the *Rule of Law index* from WB dataset as well. The WB measure of rule of law figures here as the nearest match with theory. It captures to what extent interests of societal actors are equalized by rule of law institutions whereby the V-DEM indices increasingly reflect constraints put on the executive.

A scatterplot in Figure 28 depicts the relationship of *Rule of law index (WB)* and delegation preferences. As it is not straightforward to recognize a growing tendency, fractional logistic models need to unveil whether a significant relationship is present or absent. The scatterplot demonstrates once again that regime types need to be treated along their single dimensions: Closed autocracies, electoral autocracies, and electoral democracies, score similar values on the Rule of law index (WB). Hence, single dimensions of regime types allow for a more nuanced analysis than the overarching predictors can deliver.

Figure 29 visualizes results of three models testing the explanatory potential of rule of law predictors and the interaction *GDP#regime type*. The three rule of law predictors indicate a positive relationship and point to low levels of significance for autocracies and democracies with one exception. The thinner *Judicial constraints on the executive index* did not achieve significance for autocracies. Autocracies reach 7 to 8 AME p.p. and democracies score 9 to 10 AME p.p. It is not only for the missing significance of *Judicial constraints on the executive index* for autocracies and the overall low levels of significance that cast doubt whether rule of law predicts delegation preferences well. It is also for the confidence intervals that almost reach 0 values and thus point to potentially absent relationship or at least very small size effects. Therefore, the three rule of law indices figure here as poor predictors of delegation preferences voiced by both autocracies and democracies. They provide, however, at least some explanatory potential when compared with electoral institutions which do not stand in significant

¹⁰⁷ The *Electoral democracy index* operationalizes Robert Dahl's concept of democracy called polyarchy.

relationship to delegation preferences. Predictors capturing societal actors clearly outperform rule of law predictors. For regression tables, consult Table A-8 in Annex.

Before turning to the interplay of moral and material interdependencies, a margins plot in Figure 30 allows us to inspect the low explanatory potential of Rule of law index (WB) in detail. The strength and precision of prediction remain relatively constant throughout the whole scale. The dashed and full x-lines remind us of the fact that the minimal and maximal values of Rule of law index (WB) do not diverge along the overarching categories of autocracies and democracies.

Figure 28: Rule of Law WB and delegation




Figure 29: AME Rule of law (point estimates)





Figure 30: AME of Rule of Law WB



The interaction *GDP#regime type* yields significant results across the three models and both regime types as well. For autocracies, the effects are negative as assumed in terms of theory. The significance remains at a high level. The AME span from 8 to 12 p.p. and the confidence intervals are comparably small. Regarding democracies, the effects are positive and thus in line with theoretical expectations. The significance levels range from low to medium levels. With AME from 12 to 13 p.p., the sample of democracies comes with slightly higher AME than the sample of autocracies. Nevertheless, the confidence intervals indicate lower precision of prediction for democracies than for autocracies. On the overall, the models repeatedly deliver support for the third hypothesis where: *“The wealthier authoritarian regimes are, the more easily they can escape asymmetric moral interdependencies, and thus the higher the probability that they will be against authority delegation to IHROs. The wealthier democracies are, the more they can afford to enhance the normative pressure on abusers of human rights, and thus the higher the probability that they will be in favor of authority delegation to expensive IHROs.”*

Oversight mechanisms / Checks and balances

The last sub-cluster on domestic institutions examines explanatory potential of oversight mechanisms. Compared to electoral institutions and rule of law, oversight mechanisms allow to inquire what policies governments pursue on daily basis and thus allow for a more effective lobby of societal actors (or political opponents). Three models scrutinize effects of the predictors *Horizontal accountability index*, *Legislative constraints on the executive index*, and *Legislature investigates in practice*.¹⁰⁸

The *Horizontal accountability index* figures here as the thickest measure. It captures the ability of legislature, judiciary, and special oversight agencies (e.g. ombudsmen, prosecutor, and comptroller generals) to control and punish governmental activities. In Figure 31, you may find a scatterplot depicting the relationship of *Horizontal accountability index* and delegation preferences. One can recognize an almost steadily growing tendency with the usual limitation: Delegation preferences of electoral democracies are widely dispersed.

Figure 32 presents results of three models examining the explanatory potential of oversight mechanism predictors and the interaction *GDP#regime type*. All oversight mechanism predictors point to a positive relationship as expected and stand the robustness check. The significance levels vary from low to medium levels regarding estimations for authoritarian as well as democratic regimes. With respect to autocracies, AME range from 5 to 8 p.p. Democracies arrive at somewhat higher AME

¹⁰⁸ The models estimate a sample that does not include data on Bangladesh. Consequently, the number of observations decreased from 1029 to 1023.

ranging from 7 to 10 p.p. Differences among confidence intervals cannot be meaningfully interpreted across the two regime types. Corresponding regression tables can be found in Annex, see Table A-9.

Yet it is possible to compare precision of prediction of oversight mechanisms and the previously presented rule of law predictors (compare Figure 29 and Figure 32). Regarding the large confidence intervals, the rule of law predictors offer less precise prediction than oversight mechanisms. Moreover, the confidence intervals of the rule of law predictors make us aware of almost absent effects as they very closely approach zero AME values. The oversight mechanisms come with more narrow confidence intervals and all of them stand the robustness check. Therefore, oversight mechanisms possess to some extent better explanatory potential than rule of law measures.

Figure 31: Horizontal accountability index and delegation preferences






Figure 32: AME of Oversight mechanisms (point estimates)



Before presenting results on the interplay of interdependencies, Figure 33 delivers detailed insights on the explanatory potential of *Horizontal accountability index*. The margins plot indicates that the *Horizontal accountability index* delivers precise prediction for autocracies that reach z-score values up to -1. By increasing the z-score values further on, the precision of prediction decreases which is symptomatic for electoral democracies and does not recover even for liberal democracies reaching the highest z-score values. The strength of prediction as expressed in AME and depicted by the full horizontal line remains relatively stable throughout the index.

Figure 33: AME of Horizontal accountability index



Referring back to Figure 32, the interaction *GDP#regime type* repeatedly confirms previous results. As accustomed, the interaction indicates negative effects for autocracies and positive for democracies. Regarding autocracies, the significance levels vary from medium to high levels. Concerning democracies, the significance levels remain exclusively at high level. The interaction yields weaker prediction results for autocracies with AME of 7 to 8 p.p. and substantially stronger for democracies with 14 to 16 p.p. As usually, the interaction offers more precise prediction for authoritarian regimes than democratic ones as indicated by smaller confidence intervals.

Comparison of results

First, I would like to compare the explanatory potential of electoral, rule of law, and oversight institutions. This will allow me interpret results with regard to the second hypotheses. Moreover, a within comparison of types of domestic institutions will help me to interpret the results in conceptual terms in the following Section 6.5.

Starting with the poorest predictors, electoral institutions did not achieve significance except for one scenario: *Electoral democracy index* reached a low level of significance for the sample of autocracies. Hence, I conclude that electoral institutions did not by far stand the robustness check. Proceeding with rule of law predictors, they achieved low levels of significance except for *Judicial constraints on the executive index* when explaining delegation preferences voiced by autocracies. As almost all rule of law predictors achieved at least a low level of significance, they qualify as better predictors than electoral

institutions. However, the confidence intervals of rule of law predictors tell us to be cautious. They almost reach 0 values indicating nearly absent effects for selected data. Moving forward with oversight mechanisms, they offer better explanatory potential than rule of law predictors. Oversight mechanisms predictors reached low and medium levels of significance and their confidence intervals were narrower. As a result, the electoral institutions figure here as the poorest predictors, rule of law institutions qualify as still significant predictors, and oversight mechanism figure as significant predictors.

Such results have implications for the second hypothesis on domestic institutions: *“The better domestic institutions represent interests of all societal actors, the higher the probability that states will favor authority delegation to IHROs.”* Namely, they provide only a limited support. It must be further specified *which type* of domestic institutions and *to what extent* it delivers support for the second hypothesis. Models testing explanatory potential of electoral institutions do not deliver support for the second hypothesis. Models on rule of law institutions provide a least possible support and models on oversight mechanisms deliver support for the second hypothesis.


6.5. Interpretation

There is more to be compared and interpreted than single hypothesis. A comparison of results across and within stages of the bottom-up process will allow me to first, argue that societal actors influenced delegation preferences more in democratic than in authoritarian regimes, second, inspect what drives explanatory potential of regime type predictors, third, argue that delegation preferences depend more on domestic explanatory factors which change within a short-time horizon, fourth, explicate the importance of international dynamics, fifth and finally, reconstruct the bottom-up process according to results of my empirical analysis.

Let us begin with a diverging impact of societal actors on delegation preferences voiced by authoritarian and democratic regimes during the reform of SP UNHRC. My analysis supports the intuitive argument where interests of societal actors are more reflected by democratic and less by authoritarian regimes. At this point, I further deepen insights retrieved from models on societal actors presented in Section 6.3. (related to Figure 21 and Figure 22). Previously, I was able to compare the explanatory potential of societal actors only across the two regime types. A comparison across societal actors and domestic institutions is necessary to exclude that every predictor delivers better explanation for democracies than autocracies based on, for example, improved conceptual and data fit for democratic regimes.

In Figure 34, you may find AME drawn for societal actors (Graph 2: *Civil liberties index*) and domestic institutions predictors (Graph 3: *Rule of law*, Graph 4: *Horizontal accountability*).¹⁰⁹ The curves in Graphs 3 and 4 remain predominantly flat. They indicate that the strength of prediction was not more pronounced for any groups. In comparison, the curve in Graph 2 forms an imperfect S-shape. Here, the *Civil liberties index* indicates weaker effects for autocracies and stronger ones for democracies.

Figure 34: Comparison of explanatory potential



In conceptual terms, this means that democratic governments considered interests of societal actors more than authoritarian regimes did when reforming the SP UNHRC. The underlying reason is that democratic governments rely more on legitimation than repression. Consequently, democracies need to acquire sufficient levels of legitimacy to keep their mandate or be re-elected. Therefore, they increasingly consider interests of ideologically associated societal actors and even oppositional ones (or the most powerful ones). In comparison, authoritarian regimes rely more on repression than

¹⁰⁹ These indices were selected as the best predictors out of the (sub-)clusters on societal actors, rule of law and oversight mechanisms.


legitimation in order to stay in the driving seat. Thus, oppositional actors get increasingly more repressed or their interests are less reflected in governmental policies than in democracies. Moreover, regime-loyal societal actors align with the incumbent to secure their privileged position. It is therefore more difficult to differentiate between regime-loyal societal actors and the regime itself. On the overall, not only that authoritarian regimes permit less societal actors, they also incorporate interests of societal actors less into the international agenda than democratic governments do.

Furthermore, the same Figure 34 allows me to propose what dimension drives the explanatory potential of the continuous regime type measure *Accountability index*. Hence, I want to address an unresolved issue from Section 6.2 Regime type analysis: Is it for societal actors or domestic institutions? The *Accountability index* measures quality of electoral institutions, oversight mechanisms, and participation of societal actors. The AME curves of the regime type as well as societal actors predictors in Graph 1 and 2 form an imperfect S-shape. In addition, the AME curves of domestic institutions predictors in Graph 3 and 4 remain mostly flat. Consequently, I would like to suggest that the explanatory potential of the *Accountability index* is driven by the dimension of societal actors. Such a suggestion shall be a matter of further investigation since single dimensions or components of indices can have either additive or multiplicative effects on the explanatory potential.

The previous arguments and suggestions were based on a comparison of explanatory potential of societal actors, domestic institutions, and regime type predictors. By now, I would like to compare all three stages of the bottom-up process. This will allow me to substantiate that delegation preferences depend more on explanatory factors which change in a short-term horizon. Moreover, I will be able to specify and reconstruct the bottom-up process in the vein of my empirical study. In order to compare findings on societal actors, diverse types of domestic institutions, and international interdependencies, I selected best performing or best fitting predictors from each category and visualized their explanatory potential in Figure 35.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ Regarding domestic institutions, the plot incorporates the *Rule of law index (WB)* since its operationalization fits the theory at best. Furthermore, the figure depicts explanatory potential of oversight mechanisms, here represented by the best performing *Horizontal accountability index*. The plot does not include results on electoral institutions as the findings cannot be directly compared due to diverging estimation proceeding. With respect to societal actors, I selected the *Civil liberties index* as it is the closest match to New Liberalism. Result for the interplay of moral and material interdependencies stem from a model that included the *Civil liberties index*, the interaction GDP#regime type, and a control variable of political geographic regions.

Figure 35: Comparison of explanatory potential (point estimates)



Based on Figure 35 and separate models examining effects of electoral institutions, we can compare the explanatory potential across the whole bottom-up process. I ranked the predictors in an ascending order. Regarding domestic institutions, separate models on electoral institutions indicated their insignificant explanatory potential. As presented in Figure 35, the rule of law predictor almost did not achieve a low level of significance since the confidence intervals indicated nearly absent effects for selected data. Furthermore, oversight mechanisms—here represented by the *Horizontal accountability index*—own better explanatory potential as captured by medium levels of significance. Societal actors—represented by the *Civil liberties index*—and international interdependencies—as captured by the interaction *GDP#regime type*—outperform domestic institutions in terms of predominantly high levels of significance and higher AME. Furthermore, societal actors and international interdependencies come with similar explanatory potential: Societal actors scored higher AME but international interdependencies offered more precise predictions.

If we compare the explanatory potential across all factors, it becomes apparent that short term processes shape delegation preferences more effectively than long-term ones. The interpretation is straightforward: Short-term processes correspond with a short-term formation of delegation


preferences to IHROs. I treat electoral institutions and rule of law as long-term processes. Societal actors and oversight mechanisms fall into the category of short-term processes.

Let us begin with electoral institutions. Fractional logistic models pointed to a predominantly insignificant relationship of electoral institutions and delegation preferences. Competitive elections shall ensure that a majority of societal interests are reflected when governments are formed. Quality of elections, however, does not ensure representation of societal interest throughout the whole legislative period. Lobby conditions for societal actors can fluctuate whereby quality of elections can remain unchanged. It takes less time and effort to improve participatory conditions for societal actors or to impede them. In contrast, reforming electoral institutions figures as a long-term process. The reason is that electoral reforms affect both societal and political actors and therefore require either a broad consensus or a direct exercise of power. Both reaching a consensus in democratic regimes and accumulating sufficient power in authoritarian regimes last long when compared with extra consultations of societal actors or punctual crack downs on oppositional movements.

Development in Turkey from 2006 to 2012 illustrates the disparity of short-term and long-term processes. Figure 36 depicts diverging patterns of quality of elections and participatory conditions for societal actors. Quality of elections remained predominantly stable. The overarching *Clean elections index* as well as its sub-component *Electoral management body autonomy* (EMB autonomy) point to an invariable pattern. Meanwhile, societal actors had to operate under clearly worsening conditions. We can spot a comparably instable and degrading development of conditions for CSOs from 2006. Same scenario applies for media that exerted less criticism towards cabinets led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan from 2007. It is, however, not only for the contrast between electoral institutions and societal actors that underscore the short-time character of the bottom-up process.

Rule of law figures here as another long-term and diffuse process which got outperformed by a short-time process of oversight mechanisms. Established rule of law is expected to equalize societal actors so that dominant ones do not override interests of others. Less established rule of law allows dominant societal actors to enjoy benefits at costs of others. Blatantly acting at costs of others would imply crimes like financial frauds or human rights violations. Here, decision-makers from private sector can be taken to the court. However, rule of law cannot preclude that selected societal actors dispose of disproportional lobby capacities and thus can push through own interests—for example in favor of weakening IHROs—more effectively. Therefore, rule of law alone cannot effectively guarantee fair participatory conditions for societal actors.

Figure 36: Turkey - Disparity of short-term and long-term processes



Furthermore, thanks to established rule of law, politicians perceive a credible threat of punishment if they shall abuse their mandates. Such a shadow of hierarchy is expected to increase the probability that politicians do not introduce human rights violating policies. Nevertheless, such a mechanism is an indirect one. Moreover, rule of law ensures a long-term legal process. Here, the impunity of politicians needs to be ended in the first place to begin a trial. Being on a trial rapidly decreases the chances that politicians will get back to their offices. Hence, an *ex-post* punishment for human rights abuse can happen but an *ex-post* correction of delegation preferences is not realistic. And obviously, politicians cannot go into jail for preferring weak over strong IHROs.

Like rule of law, oversight mechanisms were not envisioned to scrutinize or even punish politicians who perceive IHROs as inappropriate instruments for realizing liberal human rights. Oversight mechanisms inquire what agendas governments pursue to prevent abuse of power. There are two differences to rule of law. First, instead of a rather diffuse shadow of hierarchy, oversight mechanisms pressure executives to abide from illegal or unethical activities on daily basis. As they are present in real time, there is an increased chance to preclude abuse of power. Consequently, oversight mechanisms raise the probability that governments consist of politicians that do not introduce human rights violating policies, and hence are less likely to attack IHROs.

Second, by inquiring executives on daily basis, oversight mechanisms facilitate lobbying activities of societal actors. For example, the *Horizontal accountability index* measures first, in how far comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman are probable to investigate and report illegal or unethical activities carried out by the government, and second, in how far is legislature likely to investigate and

produce a decision against governmental interests.¹¹¹ Results of such inquiries provide societal actors with information on governmental activity. Societal actors can in turn more easily counter policies which harm their interests. Furthermore, increased transparency means that societal actors can more effectively lobby in favor of own interests. If oversight mechanisms are not in place or are dysfunctional, governments dispose of more leeway to pursue own interests. Also, governments can more easily disrespect interests of oppositional societal actors. Or *vice versa* executives can disproportionately privilege regime-loyal societal actors without a need to justify their action in public political arenas.

In summary, I interpret that oversight mechanisms are a more integral part of the bottom-up process than rule of law for two reasons. First, oversight mechanisms provide a short-time feedback to executives whereby rule of law offers only diffuse and long-term regulation. Second, also due to the short-time horizon, oversight mechanisms facilitate lobby of societal actors.

Whereby short and long-term processes make sense of differences in explanatory potential of domestic factors, the strong prediction delivered by international interdependencies requires a different reasoning. As already argued, societal actors are indispensable for the bottom-up process since they form interests in weakening or strengthening IHROs. Their actions constitute the first stage of the bottom-up process. In terms of explanatory potential, the first stage is as important as the third one. Here, the interplay of moral and material interdependencies shapes delegation preferences as effectively as societal actors on the domestic level.

On the international stage, it means during the reform of SP UNHRC, states negotiated strategically. This involved coalition building and adjusting delegation preferences according to the interplay of moral and material interdependencies. It led to the effect where delegation preferences formed on the domestic level pronounced even more. Put simply, weakening or strengthening tendencies reinforced and thus introduced strong effects into the models.


Furthermore, the strong predictions provided for the international stage are not surprising in the light of another fact: The reform process also witnessed 419 delegation preferences voiced by ROs or UN regional groups. International coalition building has potential to contextualize the large variance of delegation preferences voiced by electoral democracies. For example, Indonesia made 85% claims in favor of weakening the SP UNHRC even though the country guaranteed high levels of participation for societal actors. Indonesia was at the same time a member of the OIC which predominantly consists of authoritarian members. Thus, the strong incentives to weaken the SP UNHRC could be a result of

¹¹¹ The *Horizontal accountability index* captures also in how far governments restrict legitimate authority of judiciary.

coalition building together with autocracies. Similarly, the liberal democracy South Africa excelled on the *Civil liberties index* but made only 43% claims in favor of strengthening the SP UNHRC. South Africa engaged more in coalition building among BRICS countries (Binder and Eisentraut 2019) and within the AU but not with liberal democracies of the EU.

Moreover, the effects of wealth could have been increasingly pronounced in delegation preferences stemming from 2010 since the global economic crises hit both democracies and autocracies from 2008 on. To address such a possibility, I qualitatively examined consistence of delegation preferences before and during the economic crisis of poor democracies like India and poor autocracies like Sri Lanka. These were especially prone to reduced wealth revenues. I could not find descriptive patters that would support such an argument. Nevertheless, GDP is not the only source of income which can be spent on IHROs. For example, the case of India suggests that development assistance can figure as an additional source of income or at least as a positive financial incentive during economic crisis as showed in Figure 37. Net ODA inflows for India rose substantially during the reform process of the UNHRC from 2006 to 2011.

Figure 37: India net ODA



Note: Currency \$
Source: OECD 2020

There is one aspect left to be interpreted: Autocracies voiced more cohesive delegation preferences than democracies. Here, I would like to recall descriptive patterns in Figure 8 and Figure 9 which depicted lower variance of delegation preferences voiced by autocracies and higher variance by democracies. In terms of numbers, delegation preferences voiced by autocracies show .029 variance

whereby democracies score .081. The dispersion of autocracies' delegation preferences is thus almost three times lower than of democracies.

New Liberalism offers a plausible reasoning, once again. In international negotiations, countries—that do not dispose of traded assets—are better organized than their counterparts (Moravcsik 2009, p. 7). The “traded asset” in the reform of SP UNHRC was compliance to liberal human rights. Autocracies abuse human rights more and thus organized their delegation preferences more effectively than democracies. Regarding democracies, liberal democracies were predominantly consensual and had the most cohesive standings towards the SP UNHRC out of all regime types, see Figure 12. Effective coalition building or consensus with electoral democracies is missing as delegation preferences of electoral democracies vary the most out of all regime types. In the end, we encounter several insights highlighting the importance of international stage for delegation preferences. Focusing merely on the domestic dimension would oversimplify of the bottom-up process.

Having interpreted the importance of single explanatory factors, I dispose of sufficient insights to reconstruct the whole bottom-up process. In the first phase, societal actors form interests in weakening or strengthening IHROs and lobby in favor of these (or support governmental policies that do not contradict their interests). Democratic governments consider interests of societal actors more than authoritarian regimes since democratic governments rely rather on legitimation than repression. The more pressure societal actors exert, the less leeway government possess to project own interests into delegation preferences.

In the second phase, oversight mechanisms investigate governmental policies on daily basis and thus facilitate transparency that societal actors need to conduct effective lobby work. Also, oversight mechanisms investigate unethical or illegal action carried out by the executive in real time. Hereby, independent oversight mechanisms increase the probability that governments do not breach human rights or let regime-loyal societal actors to use state resources at cost of others. Thus, such institutions increase the chances that government consist of members who are to some extent interested in human rights. Rule of law institutions are less effective at this point since their working time-horizon is longer and the underlying mechanism more diffuse. Electoral institutions capture in how far societal and oppositional forces are repressed in order to pre-select winners of ballot days. Nevertheless, quality of elections does not imply that levels of repression cannot change throughout the legislative period. Therefore, electoral institutions do not contribute to a better explanation of how the second stage of bottom-up process works.

In the third and last phase, international factors shape delegation preferences as democracies and autocracies negotiate reforms of IHROs. Due to the interplay of moral and material interdependencies,

wealthy authoritarian regimes can afford to support weakening IHROs for two reasons: First, they dispose of sufficient diplomatic capacities to express their incentives. Second, it is viable for them to maintain such attitudes since they do not depend on international trade with democracies that couple normative pressure to support IHROs with financial incentives. Poor authoritarian regimes are in a different situation since they experience both moral and material asymmetries *vis-à-vis* human rights and democratization actors. Moreover, they lack sufficient diplomatic capacities to voice their stances to a greater extent. Regarding democracies, both poor and wealthy democracies strive to strengthen IHROs in order to increase the democratization and human rights pressure on autocracies. Poor democracies submit less claims to strengthen IHROs for two reasons: First, their permanent missions dispose of scarce diplomatic personnel. Second, strengthening international bureaucracies implies higher costs of human rights monitoring.

6.6. Discussion

Current literature concentrates on the explanatory potential offered by categorical and continuous regime type predictors, as was already discussed in Section 6.2. Single dimensions of the regime types are to a limited extent incorporated as control variables. Here, I would like to briefly relate results of such control variables to results of my study. Instead of conceptualizing single bottom-up stages as control variables, I upgraded them in terms of theory, concepts, and empirical analysis, to main explanatory factors. I discuss societal actors in the first place, then proceed with domestic institutions, and finish with international interdependencies. Furthermore, I interpret results of my empirical study in the light of their theoretical roots and highlight necessary theoretical refinements. In the upcoming Chapter 7, I reflect to what extent my study induces progress to regime type explanations of delegation preferences to IHROs.

Beginning with the role of societal actors, my study provided sufficient evidence on the significant relationship between societal actors and delegation preferences to the SP UNHRC. Such results contradict research conducted by Hafner-Burton et al. (2015). Their study controlled for impact of societal actors, but the theoretical assumptions were, however, different. The authors analyzed whether the degree of compliance with human rights makes a difference for delegation preferences. They employed various measures of physical integrity indices representing extent of murder, torture, forced disappearance, and political imprisonment, to test whether repression of non-governmental actors stands in relation with delegation preferences (*ibid*, p. 21 and footnote 71). They concluded with a negative answer.

One of the reasons could be that physical integrity does not capture participation of societal actors well. I miss for example coverage of to what extent is civil society organized or to what extent can media operate freely. Physical integrity covers merely repression of the worst kind whereby today's

authoritarian and democratic regimes employ subtle versions of repression to favor regime-loyal societal actors, disadvantage oppositional forces, or even allow for participation of democratizing actors to avoid escalation of anti-incumbent protests.

Regarding domestic institutions, Hill (2016) tests—to a limited extent—the explanatory potential of judicial aspects. His study includes a dichotomous control variable that scrutinizes effects of present and absent common legal law system on delegation preferences to international human rights courts. The results are not presented, unfortunately. My study pointed to a very low, almost insignificant, explanatory potential of rule of law predictors.

I tested effects of rule of law since rule of law belongs to the democratic peace literature and thus forms theoretical roots of New Liberalism which shall in turn help me further develop regime type explanations. Democratic peace studies indicated that rule of law helps to equalize societal actors and hence “makes them” more peaceful and therefore more cooperative (Burley 1993; Doyle 1983, 1986, p. 1160). Regime type literature derived consequently that democratic regimes which dispose of established rule of law are more probable to delegate authority to IHROs (whereby IHROs figure as instances of international cooperation). As my study specifies, it is, however, not only about societal actors that possess interests in strengthening IHROs. Such societal actors need to be heard by governments. Established rule of law can provide them with merely long-term and diffuse support regarding lobby activities. Rule of law is rather known to stabilize young democracies (Magen and Morlino 2008) or be at least a part of external democratizing strategy (Magen et al. 2009). It is for oversight mechanisms that improve chances of societal actors to effectively push through own interests at times of reforms of IHROs. To my best knowledge, my study makes a novel contribution regarding the role of oversight mechanisms.

With respect to electoral institutions, researchers conceptualized regime type measures predominantly based on quality of elections but did not treat them as stand-alone type of domestic institutions. Some regime type classifications were based on quality of elections, like for example the Democracy-Dictatorship dataset employed by the study of Tallberg et al. (2016). Other regime type indices “only” predominantly drew on electoral quality which was the case of Polity IV dataset incorporated in the study of Hafner-Burton et al. (2015) or a mixture of ten regime type measures¹¹² integrated in the study by Hill (2016). These studies, however, accounted in addition for times of stability and transitional periods when testing the relationship of regime types and delegation preferences. Therefore, results of their regime type measures and my predictors capturing quality of elections cannot be directly compared.

¹¹² See more in Pemstein et al. (2010).

I tested electoral institutions since democratic peace literature devoted most attention to them. Nevertheless, I was cautious about their explanatory potential since already democratic peace literature could not settle down why elections matter: Competitive elections were expected to induce a political system where a majority of society is represented, or to introduce a pluralistic mode of representation, or to induce norms of peaceful cooperation. All these characteristics of democratic regimes were supposed to lower a probability of armed international conflicts. In turn, democracies were supposed to cooperate more and delegation to IOs was treated as an instance of cooperation by regime type literature. My study revealed a predominantly absent relationship of electoral institutions and delegation preferences to IHROs.

From a broader perspective, this means that democratic peace literature did not carry out all encompassing tests of participatory conditions of societal actors and their effects on international behavior. Instead, researchers formulated assumptions on how established rule of law creates pacific attitudes of societal actors in democracies and how interests of societal actors get represented thanks to competitive elections in democracies. Regime type literature built up on such conclusions without analyzing effects of actual participatory conditions for societal actors. Therefore, it was long overdue to test these and to find out that societal actors effectively shape delegation preferences if oversight mechanisms ensure appropriate lobby conditions.

We may not forget about the international dimension. I operationalized the interplay of moral and material interdependencies as an interaction *GDP#regime type*. To my best knowledge, the closest match would be the study by Hafner-Burton et al. (2015, p. 20) which employed a simple GDP measure. The authors analyzed whether growth in wealth confounds democratization and delegation preferences. They arrived at insignificant results. Interacting GDP with a dichotomous regime type in my study paid off: The negative effects of wealth for autocracies and positive effects of wealth for democracies on delegation preferences to IHROs could pronounce. In terms of theory, interacting *GDP#regime type* delivered support for the third stage of the bottom-up process.

Such results carry implications for the integration of international trade literature into explanations of delegation preferences. It is not advised to import the image of authoritarian regimes that are on average poorer than democracies. A more appropriate approach would be to model international behavior of autocracies which range from the poorest to the richest countries in the world. Moreover, the causal chain of economic performance that conditions democratic development which in turn shall result into higher delegation preferences does not hold true for authoritarian regimes. To be precise, higher levels of wealth allow authoritarian regimes to partially withdraw from human rights and democratizing pressure. The upcoming—and very last—Chapter 7 is devoted to a broad reflection of the whole study.

7. Conclusion

In this last chapter, I recapitulate the point of departure as well as my approach. Furthermore, I reflect upon how I sought to avoid the democracy bias and upon the results which this systematized focus on both regime types generated. Also, I elaborate on the research gaps my study covered, I explicate the policy relevance and highlight the normative value of the results, while also considering the limitations of my study. Finally, I highlight in how far my study has contributed to regime type research and envision further research endeavors.

7.1. Covering research demand

Pursuing the research question, “How can we explain authority delegation preferences voiced by autocracies and democracies in reform processes of IHROs?,” allowed me to contribute to regime type research, which in many ways was in need of novel and systematic research. Existing regime type research maintained the democracy bias and therefore underestimated the role of authoritarian regimes in international relations. This bias was especially striking in international human rights and democracy policy fields. Established democracies followed by young democracies were said to be the main drivers of IHROs. The democracy bias remained in place even though autocracies became more resilient to democratization efforts and several democracies have recently been undergoing autocratization processes. Moreover, regime type approaches were merely able to present cumulative empirical findings on democratizing states. Also, regime type research did not pay sufficient attention to the diverging roles of societal actors and domestic institutions, or left out empirical analysis of international dynamics when explaining delegation preferences to IHROs.

To address these shortcomings, I introduced an overarching theoretical scheme provided by New Liberalism, the bottom-up process. The bottom-up process itself, however, needed to be contextualized to the policy field of IHROs and further specified to conduct an empirical analysis. Asking questions about the role of authoritarian regimes—understood as full-fledged actors—embedded in a system marked by the prevailing norm of liberal human rights allowed me to contextualize the theoretical scheme. In order to carry out an empirical analysis, I referred to the theoretical roots of New Liberalism: republican, ideational, and commercial liberalism. Based on these roots, I derived what predictors might be relevant to explain states’ delegation preferences to IHROs, and I also covered several existing blind spots. Taken together, carving out the theoretical assumptions implied two processes. I broadened the theoretical setting and specified it in a second step. During this theoretical exercise, I either avoided building upon conclusions by existing regime type research altogether or I thoroughly examined them before implementation. The reason was simple. Making a meaningful contribution meant refraining from adopting established theoretical chains which were not appropriate to address the manifold research demands or could have even mislead my study.

This theoretical reasoning was accompanied by several conceptual turning points aiming to make a contribution to existing regime type explanations as well. Scrutinizing the three stages of the bottom-up process implied that I had to avoid a predominantly state-centered perspective of regime type explanations. Global governance literature allowed me to integrate societal actors and IOs into the analytical frame: I conceptualized IOs as instances of international authority which surpass state sovereignty and therefore can either regulate the relationship of states and domestic societal actors or address societal actors directly. International authority was conceptualized by two dimensions: decision-making competencies and autonomy. This conceptualization precluded an analytical overstretch inherent to autonomy research and also accounted for under-specification in authority literature.

In my study, reforms of IHROs figured as an especially appropriate opportunity to examine authority delegation preferences. The reason is that societal actors and governments experienced what consequences authoritative human rights reporting imply before voicing detailed delegation preferences to the SP UNHRC. The almost universal monitoring system of SP UNHRC paired with almost universal membership ensured that states had comparable conditions before entering into the negotiations and stemmed from all political-geographic regions. These aspects also guaranteed sufficient representation of autocracies and democracies in the sample.

Moreover, the reform process of SP UNHRC offered a good opportunity to qualitatively assess statements made in favor of weakening or strengthening the monitoring authority. A qualitative content analysis reduced uncertainty about actual incentives of member states. In comparison, quantitative data collection procedures operationalized delegation preferences as membership in IOs. These, however, could not determine whether states enter IOs to weaken or to strengthen them, or whether countries changed their attitude throughout the time. With respect to the operationalization of explanatory variables, the study avoided an overlap of measurement in single models and predominantly drew on *de-facto* assessment. Furthermore, the RoW regime type classification precluded an overestimation of the number of democracies in the sample. A careful modeling strategy decreased risks of multicollinearity. And finally, the interpretation of results considered significance levels, point estimates, as well as confidence intervals, thus offering detailed insights and transparency.

This theoretical reasoning and progressive conceptualization along with the transparent and in-depth inspection of results enabled me to address a variety of shortcomings in existing regime type literature. The main source of several shortcomings is a biased focus which results from an outdated image of autocracies in international relations, leaving autocracies understudied, and not allowing us to generate broader insights for policymaking or having us underestimate the need to inspect

deterioration of IHROs. At this point, I would like to recall what it means to avoid the democracy bias and to devote appropriate attention to both authoritarian and democratic regime types.

7.2. Results

Firstly, I updated the understanding of autocracies in the field of international human rights policy. I treated authoritarian regimes as full-fledged actors that act together with domestic societal actors or on behalf of domestic societal actors. In general terms, authoritarian regimes have deflected liberal human rights and democracy pressures by building their own ROs and deteriorating liberal IHROs. In line with New Liberalism, autocracies were better organized than democracies during the reform of SP UNHRC as their delegation preferences varied less than those expressed by democracies. New Liberalism makes general assumptions on the level of cohesion in international negotiations: states that do not possess traded assets are better organized than their counterparts (Moravcsik 2009, p. 7). Here, the “traded assets” were represented by compliance to liberal human rights, where authoritarian regimes underperform compared to democracies. The higher degrees of cooperation paid off for authoritarian regimes in the sense that the reform did not result in the strengthening of the SP UNHRC, but rather maintained the *status quo* (Limon and Power 2014, p. 16). Democracies and their societal actors received a warning message. One diplomat involved in the negotiation process reported that the abolition of country monitoring missions would likely have been passed if a small number of Western countries had not stepped in last minute (ibid).

Furthermore, with respect to the prevalent focus on democracies, the bottom-up process allowed me to systematically form theoretical assumptions and to implement concepts regarding both autocracies and democracies. There was a demand for further reasoning, especially with respect to the role of societal actors and international interdependencies. In autocracies, governments either incorporate interests of regime-loyal societal actors or societal actors loyal to the regime accept governmental policies in order to secure their privileged position. Oppositional societal actors strive to preclude plain attacks on IHROs. With respect to results of the quantitative study, societal actors in authoritarian regimes shaped delegation preferences to the SP UNHRC less than societal actors in democracies. In democracies, even the interests of oppositional societal actors are frequently incorporated into governmental policies as democratic governments rely more on legitimation than repression to stay in the driving seat.

Regarding the interplay of moral and material interdependencies, it was not necessary to modify assumptions pertaining to democracies. The results supported the thesis that wealthier democracies are increasingly ready to delegate authority to the SP UNHRC. The wealthier democracies were, the more they could afford to increase moral interdependencies by actively negotiating and creating an even stronger and more expensive human rights monitoring system.

To properly explain authoritarian regimes, I needed to avoid two generalizations: First, authoritarian regimes are on average poorer than democracies and thus depend on democracies economically. Second, economic performance translates into democratic development and thus, in turn, increases the chances of IHRO support. My quantitative analysis provided evidence along the following line of reasoning: The wealthier authoritarian regimes were, the more they could afford to defy human rights pressures created by democratizing actors, and thus the more they could afford to favor weakening the SP UNHRC. Taken together, wealth had opposite effects for delegation preferences voiced by either autocracies or democracies.

Furthermore, because of the prevalent focus on democracies, regime type research has – until now – only generated cumulative results on delegation preferences of democratizing states. The main component of regime type indices constituted electoral institutions. The quality of elections as well as further less represented domestic components and regime type stability formed regime type predictors of delegation preferences. Hence, there was a broad demand to generate insights apart from the argument on democratizing states and to fill existing research gaps. I accounted for several of these first by examining further regime types such as closed autocracies, electoral autocracies, electoral democracies, and liberal democracies, second by disentangling the domestic dimensions of regime types into the extent of participation by societal actors and domestic institutions, third by further distinguishing between the types of domestic institutions, and fourth by examining the interplay of moral and material interdependencies.

As a result, we saw that it is not straightforward to explain delegation preferences of closed and electoral authoritarian regimes, as they did not differ significantly. Nevertheless, participation of societal actors delivered significant explanations for the whole group of authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, it was worth to discriminate “in the middle” as both dichotomous regime type measure as well as the difference between delegation preferences of electoral autocracies and electoral democracies were significant. Also, electoral democracies differed significantly from liberal democracies in their claims towards the SP UNHRC.

Having disentangled the regime type measures, models revealed that societal actors were more important for delegation preferences than domestic institutions. Among domestic institutions, electoral institutions were predominantly insignificant, and oversight mechanisms outperformed rule of law predictors. Finally, with respect to the interplay of moral and material interdependencies, wealth had a negative impact on the delegation preferences of autocracies and positive one on delegation preferences of democracies.

In terms of novelty, the regime type predictors find their approximate counterparts in other research, but scrutinizing the three stages of bottom-up process in detail provided new insights. Regarding societal actors, I employed thicker measures than other research and obtained significant results. The separate analysis of electoral institutions, rule of law, and oversight mechanisms contributed new insights as well. Whereby I examined electoral institutions and rule of law based on theoretical assumptions of previous research, testing oversight mechanisms figured here as a unique part of my empirical analysis. Finally, my study was first to examine the interplay of moral and material interdependencies.

7.3. Policy relevance and normative value

The results of my empirical analysis provide a good foundation to formulate policy recommendations. Regarding democracies, it is vital to protect participatory conditions for societal actors in democracies experiencing a deterioration of democratic standards. The participation of societal actors is even more important than the quality of domestic institutions for strengthening of IHROs. Partners of IHROs shall invest more time and capacities into the improvement of oversight mechanisms enhancing the participatory conditions of societal actors rather than focusing on rule of law institutions or even less on the quality of elections. Elections and the rule of law are decisive for the stabilization of democratic regimes, but are less relevant for the bottom-up process that forms delegation preferences to IHROs. Wealth seems to be more important for poor democracies when supporting IHROs. Additionally, regime type research demonstrated that positive financial incentives in form of net ODA can increase the probability that poor democracies act in favor of strengthening IHROs (see Hafner-Burton et al. 2015) during the reform processes. Though increasing chances of wealth accumulation in poor democracies would be more meaningful than net ODA flows. Wealth accumulation in poor democracies would require fairer and more sustainable trade of wealthy liberal democracies with poorer democracies. Learning from autocracies, democracies ought to improve coalition building strategies to enhance the cohesiveness of their delegation preferences when reforming IHROs.

Even though oppositional societal actors in autocracies make less of a difference than in democracies, it is still more beneficial to support societal actors than to focus on institution building in authoritarian regimes – if the policy goal is to enhance support for IHROs. In autocracies, societal actors play a larger role in shaping delegation preferences than domestic institutions. Moreover, as is the case with democracies, electoral institutions and the rule of law in authoritarian regimes are less important than oversight mechanisms in the bottom-up process. Strengthening the independence of oversight mechanisms in authoritarian regimes would improve participatory conditions for oppositional societal actors lobbying for stronger IHROs. The electoral quality determines the type of authoritarian regime and rule of law allows authoritarian rulers to protect and advantage societal actors loyal to the regime

over oppositional ones. Nevertheless, electoral and rule of law institutions are less important for delegation preferences to IHROs than oversight mechanisms and societal actors. With respect to international coalition building, democratizing and human rights actors ought to identify strategies how to disrupt highly coordinated delegation preferences of authoritarian regimes.

Such policy recommendations depart from the traditional belief that IHROs should be strengthened. Delegation preferences along with norms and power shape the institutional authority of the SP UNHRC. Institutional authority, in turn, forms a source of discursive authority helping to increase compliance with liberal human rights. IHROs and the SP UNHRC specifically do not possess disproportional authority so as not to disrupt the domestic democratic policy making process. The SP UNHRC activates and supports local and international human rights and democratizing actors that prevent the exacerbation of human rights abuses introduced by both democratic and authoritarian incumbents. Also, the SP UNHRC pressures governments directly to abstain from liberal human rights abuse. From such a perspective, it was essential for me to find out that domestic societal actors figured (next to international moral and material interdependencies) as main drivers of delegation preferences to the SP UNHRC.

Furthermore, it was important for me to identify patterns of actual delegation preferences that go beyond membership to IHROs. Measuring how long it takes for countries to access IHROs cannot tell us if countries will strive to weaken or strengthen IHROs during reform processes. As far as the reform of the SP UNHRC is concerned, the patterns of delegation preferences contradict the assumption that democracies cooperate more than autocracies (e.g. Mansfield et al. 2000, 2002; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 2008). Democracies were more ready to delegate authority to the SP UNHRC in comparison to autocracies. Authoritarian regimes, however, voiced more cohesive delegation preferences than democracies, which is an alarming message. Therefore, I would like to invite more researchers interested in development of IOs to scrutinize delegation preferences through qualitative proceedings. Eisentraut (2013) and Binder and Eisentraut (2019) might serve as a motivation or inspiration. An alternative would be to refine quantitative proceedings so that they allow even more fine-grained evaluations of written and spoken texts where the coding material is of poor quality.

7.4. Limitations, strengths, and future endeavors

Finally, I would like to reflect upon possible limitations of my study. These limitations predominantly stem from the configuration of the quantitative models, cross-section time-series data-structure, and a lack of qualitative study. I employed two types of robustness checks to see whether the results change with the modifications of models: First, I examined if the results remain stable even though I employ different measures of independent variables. Second, I integrated one control variable of political-geographic regions to examine whether the results remain stable in the light of a further

argument. I integrated only one control variable since I strived to decrease the risk of multicollinearity problems and I wanted to maintain a stable number of observations across models. Such a proceeding allowed me to reach my analytical aims. Nevertheless, theoretically relevant control variables such as FDI and incoming net ODA, whose influence was already revealed by qualitative as well as quantitative studies (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Hulse and der Vleuten 2016; Jetschke 2015), need to be tested as well.

Similarly, regime type literature demonstrated that governments of democratizing countries strive to lock-in the transformation process by quickly accessing to IHROs which shall play the role of control instances (e.g. Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Hill 2016; Moravcsik 2000). Such an analysis requires longitudinal data as effects of democratization or autocratization are expected to manifest themselves within five or more years (see *ibid*). Analyzing one reform process starting in 2006 and ending in 2011 implied that I disposed merely of a cross-section time-series data-structure. In the light of the strong effects of societal actors in my study, the question arises if only governments want to lock-in the democratizing process by delegating authority to IHROs. Even though a higher extent of participation by societal actors does not come automatically during democratization processes (Wong 2005), transitional periods offer a good opportunity for effective lobbying as young democracies cannot ensure enhanced levels of public goods on their own and thus increasingly rely on domestic societal actors (as well as foreign democratizing actors). Consequently, societal actors are in a strong position to formulate interests in the delegation of authority to IHROs.

The question at which level the generation of interests plays a role in the strengthening or weakening of international authority is not new but still requires further reflection as well as research. New Liberalism allocates the primary generation of interests at the level of societal actors. Regime type research such as Hafner-Burton et al. (2015) refer to the state level: Governments generate interests in the delegation of authority according to their own compliance with human rights. Quantitative studies like mine are not able to empirically disentangle to what extent societal actors or governments shape delegation preferences. Such an analytical issue would best be addressed in a qualitative study. Qualitative process tracing combined with semi-structured interviews would allow for the scrutinization of the bottom-up process and would give societal actors, governmental actors, and also permanent country missions to IHROs an opportunity to reflect upon their own decision-making processes.

Overall, introducing progress into regime type explanations took to theorize, conceptualize, and empirically examine several analytical issues. First, my study disentangled two dimensions of regime types. Societal actors shaped delegation preferences to the SP UNHRC more effectively than domestic institutions. Second, my study prioritized between types of domestic institutions. Oversight

mechanisms enhanced participatory conditions for societal actors. Rule of law institutions were less relevant. Electoral institutions determined the regime type, but the relationship to delegation preferences was predominantly missing. Third, my study formulated and examined the interplay of moral and material interdependencies which were in place when the SP UNHRC was reformed. Wealthy autocracies sought to weaken the SP UNHRC thus aiming to reduce normative pressure to comply with liberal human rights. Democracies, on the other hand, used their wealth to strengthen the SP UNHRC hence striving to increase normative pressure directed at human rights abusers.

Such progressive insights delineated the whole bottom-up process: Societal actors formed interests in strengthening or weakening the SP UNHRC and could more easily lobby for these aims if independent oversight mechanisms controlled the executives. Interests of societal actors together with governmental policies formed delegation preferences which were finally adjusted in international negotiations according to the interplay of moral and material interdependencies.

The novel contribution to regime type research was not, however, restricted to deepening and further developing the analysis. It also meant avoiding assumptions made by previous regime type research or refining them. Democracies turned out to be less cooperative, or at least less effectively cooperating as they voiced more dispersed delegation preferences during the reform process. Delegation preferences voiced by authoritarian regimes varied substantially less and hence were more effectively coordinated. Therefore, the assumption that democracies cooperate more than autocracies did not hold. Such an assumption on more cooperative democracies was generated by research documenting rather peaceful behavior among democracies as well as stems from research regarding densely organized trade among democracies. Nevertheless, it does not apply to the international policy field of liberal human rights as the reform of the SP UNHRC suggested.

Specificities of policy fields ought to be prioritized by studies explaining delegation preferences further. The bottom-up process demonstrated fair explanatory potential. Thus, it might be contextualized and reapplied beyond the liberal human rights and democracy policy field. Such a contextualization will require the formulation of assumptions regarding the interests of oppositional and societal actors loyal to the regime in authoritarian and democratic countries. Oversight mechanisms that enable more effective lobbying remain important for other policy fields such as environmental and economic. The interplay of moral and material policy fields and the implications for authoritarian and democratic regimes must be, in turn, adjusted.

Addressing further future endeavors, qualitative research has the potential to disentangle to what extent societal actors and governmental agents project their interests onto delegation preferences before entering into the reform processes of IHROs. Moreover, extensive policy research might further

develop the results of my basic research. There is a need to find precise strategies how do disrupt cohesive delegation preferences voiced by autocracies and how to enhance effective cooperation among democracies during reforms of IHROs.

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Annex

Table A-1: Qualitative content analysis

Coding rule

The smallest coding unit is a sentence. The largest coding unit is up to three paragraphs long. To qualify as a code, the content must be identifiable with one of the Sub-categories. Statements that balance between two Sub-categories integrated in separate Main categories are not coded.

Main category 1 Strengthen authority

Definition: Author either in favor of decision-making competencies or is in favor of enhancing of autonomy of SP UNHRC.

Sub-category 1.1 Strengthen decision-making competencies

Definition: Author is in favor of institutional features that allow SP to issue judgments on compliance with human rights.

Topic 1.1.1 Mandate

Example Argentine 2010: "There should be no limits to the number of special procedure mandates. On the contrary, flexibility should be preserved to decide on the relevance of the creation of those mandates necessary to address new challenges."

Sustain SP

Establish new mandates based on standardized criteria

Establish country mandates in all countries

Preserve country // thematic mandates

// country and thematic mandates // mission to Palestine

Create regional mandates

Partial overlap of mandates allowed

Identify gaps in mandates

Extend duration of mandates

MH decides on prolongation or termination of thematic mandates

No max. number of mandates

Avoid transformation into working groups

Carry out on-the-ground monitoring

Place follow up activities, monitor implementation

SP carry out early warning function

Fact finding missions for HRC

Enhance capacity building activities

Topic 1.1.2 Cooperation of states with SP

Example Czech Republic 2010: "Look for ways to put more pressure on those who already sit in the Council but refuse to cooperate with the mandates."

Create best practice for cooperation

States should cooperate with SP

UNHRC members must cooperate

Issue standing invitation

Pressure non-cooperative governments

SP use all available instruments to make pressure

Topic 1.1.3 Reporting

Example Canada 2006: "The special procedures should be encouraged to make better use of the media as a tool to raise awareness about human rights issues and to promote respect for human rights."

Increase dissemination of monitoring results

Disclose communication of SP and states

Topic 1.1.4 Integration in human rights regime

Example Peru: "Special Procedures should coordinate more with regional human rights bodies."

SP cooperate with NGOs, NHRIs, ROs, victims

Integrate SP into UN human rights system

Effective OR institutionalized cooperation of MHs

MH, NGOs, High Commissioner participate in reform

Topic 1.1.5 Hiring procedure for SP personnel

Example Finland 2006: "In order to guarantee maximum independence and competence, the High Commissioner for Human Rights appoints the mandate holder, based on the objective criteria and suitability for the mandate in question"

Coordination Committee important for selection

No inference by states

Experts, no government officials

Expertise of candidates prioritized

Sub-category 2.2 Enhance autonomy

Definition: Author is in favor of institutional features that allow SP to apply own logic of action.

Topic 2.2.1 Accountability

Example Belgium 2010: “Preserve effective and independent functioning of Special procedures system, opposes any proposal to go beyond the existing mechanisms designed to address the professional conduct of mandate holders.”

Preserve independence

UNHRC cooperates but does not interfere into SP

No new oversight mechanisms

SP develop own best practice guideline

Violations of Code Conduct no reason to inhibit independence

No screening of monitoring plan

Topic 2.2.2 Reporting

Example New Zealand 2006: “On the point ‘sources of information’, in our view, any assessment of the credibility of information by the mandate-holder should not come at the expense limiting in any way the sources of information available to the Special Procedures.

SP decide on credibility of sources

Topic 2.2.3 Resources

Example Iran 2010: “All voluntary contributions to support the activities of the Special Procedures should be provided without conditionality”

Ensure financial, institutional, and personal capacities

Additional finances allowed

Main category 2 Weaken authority

Definition: Author favors weakening of decision-making competencies or favors decreasing of autonomy of SP UNHRC.

Sub-category 2.1 Weaken decision-making competencies

Author favors institutional measures that hinder SP to issue judgments on compliance with human rights.

Topic 2.1.1 Mandate

Example Colombia 2007: "Perhaps, if we discharge the experts' burden of evaluating State policies and complex internal processes, they may continue to positively contribute with their studies and analysis on the matter of human rights, in a manner that is more consistent with their powers and qualifications."

Abolish country mandates

Transform country mandates into working groups

Country mandates as last resort

Thematic mandates without country reporting

Rationalize mandates, avoid overlap

Merge and eliminate mandates OR limit Palestine mandate

Avoid duplication of mandates OR terminate them

Prevent proliferation of mandates

Establish new mandates in step-by-step procedure

New mandates conditioned by available resources

UNHRC establishes new mandates

UNOHCHR not involved in designing of mandates but UNHRC

Avoid parallel visits (country and thematic mandates)

SP only capacity building

No monitoring but expert advice

MH respect legal systems, culture, no inference into internal affairs

Deprioritize early warning over existing mandates

Balance economic, social, cultural, political, and civil rights

Topic 2.1.2 Cooperation of states with SP

Example Timor-Leste 2010: "In relation to country mandate, the establishment of country mandates should be preceded by serious efforts at securing the agreement, at least the consent, of the country concerned."

No standing invitation required

No blaming and shaming

Enhance bilateral talks between state and SP

Topic 2.1.3 Reporting

Example Algeria 2006: "Concerning the relations of special procedures with the media, primacy must be given to the dialogue with the State concerned along with the Human Rights Council, on which it is incumbent to decide on the opportunity to call on the media;"

Limit dissemination of results

Include OR consider comments by host country in reports

Results 1st communicated to host country

More realistic recommendations

Topic 2.1.4 Integration in human rights regime

Example Egypt 2010: "Furthermore only members of the OHCHR Secretariat should accompany mandate-holders during their official country visits."

Seclude SP from other human rights mechanisms

Interaction only with UNHRC and UNGA

No coordination committee for SP

Coordination Committee includes state diplomats

UNHRC superior to SP

Reform of intergovernmental nature

Topic 2.1.5 Hiring procedure for SP personnel

Example Israel 2010: "Avoid appointing individuals who do not meet the threshold of impartiality and objectivity required to properly carry out the relevant mandate: candidates who have published or promoted debated positions or campaigned on the topic of the country specific mandate must not be included on any list for consideration;"

Screening of candidates

No previous involvement

No cumulation of mandates

Limited terms

Intergovernmental elections of MHs

MH approved by host country

Diversity of MHs by regions, culture, religion, legal systems, gender

Sub-category 2.2: Decrease autonomy

Definition: Author favors institutional features that hinder SP to apply own logic of action.

Topic 2.2.1 Accountability

Example Philippines 2006: "We'd support calls to establish a comprehensive manual, including a code of conduct, for all special procedures, in order to bring more coherence and predictability to their work and improve relations between mandate holders and governments."

Establish accountability mechanism

Follow Code of Conduct

Manual or Code of Conduct authored or approved by UNHRC or states

Avoid ambiguity of mandate

UNHRC specifies mandate of SP

SP reformed regularly

Topic 2.2.2 Reporting

Example Qatar 2010: "Invite Special Procedures to verify the credibility of their sources of information;"

Increase transparency of financing

Urgent appeals standardized

Monitoring reports submitted on time

Personal liability of MH

MH report on fulfillment of mandates to UNHRC or UNGA

Governments as primary source of information

Only credible sources

Checks and balances of reports

Topic 2.2.3 Resources

Example Brazil 2010: "Financial allocation should be equal to all mandates."

No extra budget

UNHRC or states allocate resources

Equal support for all mandates

Table A-2: Summary statistics autocracies

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Variance	Min	Max
DV: Fraction country/year	404	.146	.170	.029	0	.800
Regime-types						
Liberal Democracy Index	404	-1.038	.322	.104	-1.562	-0.408
Accountability Index	404	-0.947	.630	.398	-2.410	-0.037
Social Actors						
Civil Liberties Index	404	-0.906	.723	.523	-2.712	.097
Civil Political Liberties	404	-0.986	.813	.661	-2.367	.360
Diagonal Accountability	404	-0.892	.713	.508	-2.875	.419
Domestic Institutions						
<u>Oversight mechanisms</u>						
Horizontal Accountability	404	-0.774	.726	.526	-1.969	.461
Legislative Constraints	388	-0.782	.868	.753	-1.827	.585
Legislature Investigates	388	-0.660	.851	.724	-2.100	.582
<u>Rule of Law</u>						
WB Rule of Law	404	-0.543	.663	.440	-1.737	1.265
V-DEM Rule of Law	404	-0.752	.664	.441	-1.822	1.052
Judicial Constraints	404	-0.784	.762	.580	-1.906	.374
<u>Elections</u>						
Clean Elections	404	-1.015	.672	.452	-1.906	.477
Electoral Democracy	404	-1.122	.437	.191	-1.951	.362
Vertical Accountability	404	-1.021	.796	.634	-2.938	.097
Int. Interdependencies						
GDP pc., log base 10	399	-0.317	.953	.909	-2.150	2.044

Note: Standardized values of continuous explanatory variables

Table A-3: Summary statistics democracies

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Variance	Min	Max
DV: Fraction country/year	635	.769	.285	.081	0	1
Regime-types						
Liberal Democracy Index	635	.837	.508	.258	-0.829	1.397
Accountability Index	635	.766	.348	.121	-0.304	1.286
Social Actors						
Civil Liberties Index	635	.723	.354	.126	-0.623	1.012
Civil Political Liberties	635	.712	.240	.057	-0.281	.916
Diagonal Accountability	635	.736	.376	.141	-0.343	1.278
Domestic Institutions						
<u>Oversight mechanisms</u>						
Horizontal Accountability	635	.756	.514	.264	-0.989	1.637
Legislative Constraints	635	.684	.408	.167	-1.337	1.053
Legislature Investigates	635	.674	.571	.326	-0.902	1.948
<u>Rule of Law</u>						
WB Rule of Law	635	.774	.918	.842	-1.253	1.636
V-DEM Rule of Law	635	.771	.572	.327	-1.261	1.174
Judicial Constraints	635	.744	.448	.201	-1.325	1.098
<u>Elections</u>						
Clean Elections	635	.774	.298	.089	-0.458	1.052
Electoral Democracy	635	.812	.352	.124	-0.283	1.179
Vertical Accountability	635	.717	.262	.069	-0.232	1.257
Int. Interdependencies						
GDP pc., log base 10	630	.570	.873	.761	-1.781	1.581

Note: Standardized values of continuous explanatory variables

Table A-4: Regime-type analysis - categorical predictors of delegation preferences

DV: Delegation preferences	Model 1	AME	Model 2	AME	Model 3	AME	Model 4	AME	Model 5	AME
Autocracy	0 (.)	0 (.)								
Democracy	1.69*** (3.56)	0.40*** (4.01)								
Closed autocracy			0 (.)	0 (.)	0.15 (0.26)	0.023 (0.26)	-1.50** (-2.62)	-0.33** (-3.04)	-3.08*** (-4.10)	-0.64*** (-5.71)
Electoral autocracy			-0.15 (-0.26)	-0.023 (-0.26)	0 (.)	0 (.)	-1.65** (-3.05)	-0.35*** (-3.50)	-3.23*** (-4.55)	-0.67*** (-6.70)
Electoral democracy			1.50** (2.62)	0.33** (3.04)	1.65** (3.05)	0.35*** (3.50)	0 (.)	0 (.)	-1.58** (-2.78)	-0.31** (-2.91)
Liberal democracy			3.08*** (4.10)	0.64*** (5.71)	3.23*** (4.55)	0.67*** (6.70)	1.58** (2.78)	0.31** (2.91)	0 (.)	0 (.)
GDP p.c, log base 10	-0.034 (-0.15)		-0.13 (-0.58)		-0.13 (-0.58)		-0.13 (-0.58)		-0.13 (-0.58)	
<i>N</i>	1029	1029	1029	1029	1029	1029	1029	1029	1029	1029
pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.396		0.404		0.404		0.404		0.404	
<i>AIC</i>	875.6		868.2		868.2		868.2		868.2	
<i>BIC</i>	915.1		917.6		917.6		917.6		917.6	

t statistics in parentheses, control variable politico-geographic regions omitted

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A-5: Regime-type analysis - continuous predictors of delegation preferences

DV: Delegation preferences	Model 1	AME	Model 2	AME
Liberal democracy index	1.37*** (4.68)	0.23*** (14.96)		
Accountability index			1.40*** (5.49)	0.25*** (11.23)
GDP p.c., log base 10	-0.33 (-1.59)		-0.14 (-0.75)	
<i>N</i>	1029	1029	1029	1029
pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.414		0.421	
<i>AIC</i>	850.0		839.9	
<i>BIC</i>	889.5		879.4	

t statistics in parentheses, control variable politico-geographic regions omitted

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A-6: Societal actors as predictors of delegation preferences

DV: Delegation preferences	Model 1	AME AUT	AME DEM	Model 2	AME AUT	AME DEM	Model 3	AME AUT	AME DEM
Civil liberties	1.03*** (3.81)	0.11** (3.26)	0.15*** (3.43)						
Civil political liberties				0.80*** (3.99)	0.087*** (3.34)	0.12*** (3.78)			
Diagonal accountability							0.84*** (3.77)	0.091** (3.23)	0.12*** (3.86)
GDP p.c., log base 10	-0.73*** (-3.55)			-0.54* (-2.39)			-0.57* (-2.31)		
Autocracy	0 (.)			0 (.)			0 (.)		
Democracy	1.73*** (3.49)			1.71*** (3.53)			1.72*** (3.58)		
Autocracy#GDP	0 (.)	-0.079*** (-4.04)		0 (.)	-0.057** (-2.68)		0 (.)	-0.060** (-2.63)	
Democracy#GDP	1.69*** (4.28)		0.14*** (3.61)	1.62*** (4.19)		0.15*** (4.39)	1.55*** (4.03)		0.14*** (3.69)
E. Europe & C. Asia	0 (.)			0 (.)			0 (.)		
L. America & Caribbean	-1.48*** (-3.39)			-1.51*** (-3.50)			-1.51*** (-3.36)		
MENA	-0.67 (-1.76)			-1.07*** (-3.44)			-1.20*** (-3.84)		
Sub-Saharan Africa	-1.81*** (-4.25)			-1.73*** (-3.36)			-1.87*** (-3.58)		
Western alliance	-1.27* (-2.03)			-1.26* (-2.09)			-1.28* (-2.09)		
Asia & Pacific	-1.74*** (-4.14)			-1.94*** (-4.38)			-2.04*** (-4.38)		
constant	-0.17 (-0.56)			-0.027 (-0.08)			0.015 (0.04)		
<i>N</i>	1029	1029	1029	1029	1029	1029	1029	1029	1029
pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.438			0.436			0.436		
<i>AIC</i>	819.8			822.5			822.3		
<i>BIC</i>	869.1			871.9			871.6		

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A-7: Electoral institutions as predictors of delegation preferences

DV: Delegation preferences	Model 1 AUT	AME AUT	Model 1 DEM	AME DEM	Model 2 AUT	AME AUT	Model 2 DEM	AME DEM	Model 3 AUT	AME AUT	Model 3 DEM	AME DEM
Clean elections	0.45 (1.90)	0.048 (1.74)	0.92 (1.01)	0.12 (0.97)								
Electoral democracy					0.82** (2.59)	0.087* (2.36)	0.58 (0.81)	0.074 (0.80)				
Vertical accountability									0.39 (1.79)	0.041 (1.61)	0.46 (0.54)	0.058 (0.53)
GDP p.c., log base 10	-0.72** (-3.00)	-0.080** (-2.83)	0.66 (1.40)	0.084 (1.51)	-0.61** (-2.62)	-0.066** (-2.66)	0.69 (1.45)	0.089 (1.57)	-0.65** (-2.80)	-0.072** (-2.73)	0.76 (1.61)	0.097 (1.78)
E. Europe & C. Asia	0 (.)		0 (.)		0 (.)		0 (.)		0 (.)		0 (.)	
L. America & Caribbean	-3.30*** (-7.24)		-15.7*** (-16.29)		-2.79*** (-6.42)		-14.7*** (-18.77)		-3.03*** (-7.46)		-14.7*** (-17.39)	
MENA	-1.16** (-2.63)		-15.8*** (-14.54)		-0.95* (-2.22)		-14.5*** (-20.57)		-1.09* (-2.46)		-14.7*** (-18.34)	
Sub-Saharan Africa	-1.46* (-2.23)		-16.0*** (-14.73)		-1.35* (-2.46)		-15.1*** (-16.05)		-1.38* (-2.39)		-15.0*** (-16.08)	
Western alliance			-15.1*** (-11.87)				-14.1*** (-14.19)				-14.0*** (-13.69)	
Asia & Pacific	-1.43** (-2.83)		-17.0*** (-13.45)		-1.41** (-2.75)		-15.9*** (-16.36)		-1.29** (-2.65)		-15.9*** (-14.63)	
constant			15.8*** (20.50)		-0.047 (-0.09)		15.0*** (21.39)		-0.58 (-1.40)		15.0*** (21.96)	
<i>N</i>	399	399	630	630	399	399	630	630	399	399	630	630
pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.090		0.275		0.094		0.272		0.091		0.271	
<i>AIC</i>	318.2		508.9		316.8		510.5		318.0		511.4	
<i>BIC</i>	346.1		544.4		344.7		546.1		346.0		547.0	

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A-8: Rule of law predictors of delegation preferences

DV: Delegation preferences	Model 1	AME AUT	AME DEM	Model 2	AME AUT	AME DEM	Model 3	AME AUT	AME DEM
Rule of law, V-DEM	0.70* (2.21)	0.077* (2.14)	0.10* (2.10)						
Rule of law, WB				0.67* (2.24)	0.075* (2.13)	0.097* (2.17)			
Judicial constraints							0.63* (2.23)	0.070 (1.94)	0.093* (2.15)
GDP p.c., log base 10	-0.83*** (-4.07)			-0.92*** (-4.09)			-0.67*** (-3.56)		
Autocracy	0 (.)			0 (.)			0 (.)		
Democracy	2.21*** (3.94)			2.69*** (5.47)			1.99** (3.03)		
Autocracy#GDP	0 (.)	-0.097*** (-4.45)		0 (.)	-0.11*** (-4.19)		0 (.)	-0.076*** (-4.05)	
Democracy#GDP	1.74*** (4.38)		0.13** (2.60)	1.80*** (4.10)		0.12* (2.05)	1.57*** (3.84)		0.13** (2.79)
E. Europe & C. Asia	0 (.)			0 (.)			0 (.)		
L. America & Caribbean	-1.95*** (-3.65)			-1.61** (-3.06)			-1.82*** (-3.67)		
MENA	-1.72*** (-4.45)			-1.34*** (-3.86)			-1.64*** (-4.24)		
Sub-Saharan Africa	-2.41*** (-3.31)			-1.97*** (-3.55)			-2.03*** (-3.76)		
Western alliance	-1.90* (-2.44)			-1.98** (-2.67)			-1.47* (-2.08)		
Asia & Pacific	-2.43*** (-3.90)			-2.15*** (-3.79)			-2.50*** (-4.32)		
constant	0.18 (0.34)			-0.28 (-0.74)			0.16 (0.30)		
<i>N</i>	1029	1029	1029	1029	1029	1029	1029	1029	1029
pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.430			0.430			0.431		
<i>AIC</i>	831.1			831.3			829.9		
<i>BIC</i>	880.4			880.6			879.2		

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A-9: Oversight mechanisms as predictors of delegation preferences

DV: Delegation preferences	Model 1	AME AUT	AME DEM	Model 2	AME AUT	AME DEM	Model 3	AME AUT	AME DEM
Horizontal accountability	0.70** (3.05)	0.076** (2.66)	0.10** (2.83)						
Legislative constraints				0.52* (2.37)	0.056* (2.19)	0.076* (2.32)			
Legislative investigates							0.49** (2.62)	0.053* (2.38)	0.070** (2.75)
GDP p.c., log base 10	-0.62** (-3.15)						-0.69** (-3.20)		
Autocracy	0 (.)						0 (.)		
Democracy	2.11*** (4.29)						2.50*** (6.00)		
Autocracy#GDP	0 (.)	-0.068*** (-3.68)			-0.070** (-3.29)		0 (.)	-0.076*** (-3.61)	
Democracy#GDP	1.65*** (4.36)		0.14*** (3.51)			0.16*** (4.74)	1.83*** (5.29)		0.15*** (4.57)
E. Europe & C. Asia	0 (.)						0 (.)		
L. America & Caribbean	-1.86*** (-3.88)						-1.82*** (-3.62)		
MENA	-1.85*** (-4.11)						-1.68*** (-3.89)		
Sub-Saharan Africa	-2.09*** (-4.05)						-1.98*** (-3.93)		
Western alliance	-1.82* (-2.55)						-1.72* (-2.42)		
Asia & Pacific	-2.28*** (-4.23)						-2.07*** (-3.86)		
constant	0.16 (0.36)						-0.19 (-0.50)		
<i>N</i>	1029	1029	1029	1013	1013	1013	1013	1013	1013
pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.434			0.431			0.431		
<i>AIC</i>	825.8			816.2			816.4		
<i>BIC</i>	875.1			865.4			865.6		

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A-10: Variance inflation factors

Societal actors

Variable	VIF
RoW 2	3.64
Civil political liberties	3.61
GDP p.c., log base 10	14.25
GDP##RoW 2	13.93
Politico-geographic regions	1.16
Mean VIF	7.32

Rule of Law

Variable	VIF
RoW 2	3.75
Rule of law, V-DEM	6.22
GDP p.c., log base 10	14.03
GDP##RoW 2	14.74
Politico-geographic regions	1.45
Mean VIF	8.04

Oversight mechanisms

Variable	VIF
RoW 2	3.30
Horizontal accountability	4.04
GDP p.c., log base 10	14.33
GDP##RoW 2	14.66
Politico-geographic regions	1.25
Mean VIF	7.51

Electoral institutions (sample autocracies)

Variable	VIF
Clean elections	1.41
GDP p.c., log base 10	1.36
Politico-geographic regions	1.05
Mean VIF	1.27